MATTER, IMAGINATION AND GEOMETRY

This book considers conditions o f applicability o f mathematics to the study o f natural

phenomena. The possibility o f such an application is one o f the fundamental
assumptions underlying the enormous theoretical and practical success of modem
science. Addressing problems of matter, substance, infinity, number, structure of
cognitive faculties, imagination, and of construction of mathematical objects, Dmitri
Nikulin examines mathematical (geometrical) objects in their relation to geometrical or
intelligible matter and to imagination. The author explores questions in the history of
philosophy and science, particularly in late antiquity and early modernity. The focus
is on key thinkers Plotinus and Descartes (with the occasional appearance o f Plato,
A ristotle, Euclid, Proclus, Newton and others), in whom the fundamental
presuppositions of ripe antiquity and of early modernity find their definite expression.

Matter, Imagination and Geometry presents one o f the first studies to compare the
relation of mathematics to physics in ancient (especially Neoplatonic) and early modem
science and philosophy.
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Matter, Imagination and Geometry
Ontology, natural philosophy and mathematics in
Plotinus, Proclus and Descartes

DMITR^NIKULIN
N ew S ch o o l f o S S o cia l R esearch

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© Dmitri Nikulin 2002

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Nikulin, Dmitri
Matter, imagination and geometry : ontology, natural
philosophy and mathematics in Plotinus, Proclus and
Descartes. - (Ashgate new critical thinking in philosophy)
1. Plotinus 2. Descartes, René, 1596-1650 3. Matter
4. Mathematics - Philosophy 5. Physics - Philosophy
6. Ontology
I. Title
117

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Nikulin, D. V. (Dmitri Vladimirovich)
Matter, imagination and geometry : ontology, natural philosophy and mathematics in
Plotinus, Proclus and Descartes / Dmitri Nikulin.
p. cm. -- (Ashgate new critical thinking in philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7546-1574-X
1. Mathematical physics-Philosophy. 2. Science, Ancient. 3. Plotinus. 4. Proclus, ca.
410-485. 5. Descartes, René, 1596-1650. I. Title. II. Series.

QC20.6 .N54 2001

509--dc21
2001022642

ISBN 0 7546 1574 X

Printed and bound by Athenaeum Press, Ltd.,

Gateshead, Tyne A Wear.
C ¿ .f /z 4 £ £ £

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EÙonoXôyriTOv. IçTy t o u y àp àei ô v t o ç
ri y e co n E T p ia 1! y v c b a iç è c m v

Plato. RP 527b 5-8

 Contents

Introduction ix

PART I: MATTER 1

1.1 The notion of matter 2

1.1.1 On the notion o f matter in Aristotle 2
1.1.2 Plotinus on matter 6
1.1.3 Matter and extension in Descartes 12
1.2 Substance: ontology vs. henology 19
1.2.1 The One and the multitude in Plotinus 20
1.2.2 Distinction between the One and matter 26
1.2.3 Substance and attribute in Descartes 28
1.3 Infinity 34
1.3.1 Infinity in Aristotle and Plotinus 34
1.3.2 Infinity as perfection: Infini and ind€ftni 39
1.3.3 Paradox and infinity 51
1.3.4 Indefinite divisibility of physical and mathematical
entities in Descartes 54
1.4 Substance and essence 58
1.4.1 Otherness in substance 58
1.4.2 Essence and existence: Descartes’ essentialism 63

PART II: INTELLIGIBLE MATTER AND GEOMETRY 69

2.1 Geometry, arithmetic and physics in antiquity 70

2.1.1 Foundations of arithmetic in Plotinus 72
2 .1.2 Constitution and the structure o f number in Plotinus 81
2.1.3 Number and magnitude in ancient mathematics:The point 91
2.1.4 The in(de)finite in mathematical reasoning 95
2.2 Geometry, metaphysics and method in Descartes 103
2.2.1 Geometry in its relation to physicsaccording to Descartes 113
2.2.2 Number and magnitude in Descartes 122
2.3 Intermediary 127
2.3.1 Geometrical objects as intermediary:
Proclus vs. Descartes 128
2.4 The notion of intelligible matter 132
2.4.1 Intelligible matter in Plotinus 135
2.4.2 Intelligible matter in Proclus 141
viii Matter, Imagination and Geometry

PART III: REASON, IMAGINATION AND CONSTRUCTION 145

3.1 Reason and the structure o f cognitive faculties 146

3.1.1 Intellect-noys in Plotinus 146
3.1.2 Discursive thinking-dianoia 150
3.1.3 Life 152
3.1.4 Mind and its ideas: Descartes 157
3.2 Imagination in ancient philosophy 171
3.2.1 Aristotle and Plato on imagination 171
3.2.2 Imagination in Plotinus 175
3.2.3 Main features o f imagination in Neoplatonism: Porphyry,
Syrianus, Proclus 179
3.2.4 Imagination and intelligible matter 183
3.3 Imagination in Descartes 187
3.3.1 Mind, imagination and the infinite 192
3.3.2 Imagination and mathematics according to Descartes 204
3.4 Imagination and kinematic constructionin geometry 210
3.4.1 Construction and the verum factum principle: Cartesian
reconstruction o f the world 210
3.4.2 Construction in geometry: Kinematic constructibility in
Descartes 223
3.4.3 Imagination and geometry: Imagination as constructive 230
3.4.4 Movement in the intellect according to Plotinus 239
3.4.5 Motion and construction in Proclus: Production of
a geometrical figure by movement in imagination 245

Conclusion 255

Bibliography 261

Index 283
 Introduction ix

Introduction

One o f the definite and most important assumptions underlying the enormous
theoretical and practical success o f modem science is, as is commonly recognized,
the mathematization and mechanization o f the physical world, based on the
possibility o f applying mathematics to the study o f physical reality, o f nature.1
Early modem scientists constantly return to this theme: Galilei's famous statement
in the “Assayer” asserts that science is written in the book of nature in the language
o f mathematics, the only language that allows one to read this magnificent book.2
For Kepler, the world—primarily the celestial cosmos, but also the terrestrial
one— in its structure and regularity of movements, follows a divine harmonic
pattern, exemplified and known primarily through mathematical objects, which are
further expressible in proportions and equations o f numbers and in regular
geometrical solids.3 In the French Preface to the “Principles o f Philosophy”,
Descartes presents a simile o f the tree of knowledge where mechanics, as well as
other sciences, appear as branches on the trunk o f physics, itself rooted in
metaphysics; if, therefore, geometry is also to be recognized as a science, the
principles that underlie geometry and mechanics must be taken to be the same.4
Newton begins his “Principia” with the claim that physics, considered as

1Cp. Koyré 1968, 12-14; Maier 1938, passim; Duhem 1954, 107 sqq.; Kuhn 1961, 161-193;
Burtt 1964, 97-107; Funkenstein 1986, 29-30; Gloy 1996,98-117 et al. On various senses of
the notion of applicability see: Steiner 1998, 16 sqq.
2 “Philosophy [i.e. science in general] is written in this grand book, the universe, which
stands continuously open to our gaze. But the book cannot be understood unless one first
learns to comprehend the language and read the letters in which it is composed. It is written
in the language of mathematics, and its characters are triangles, circles, and other
geometrical figures without which it is humanly impossible to understand a single word of
it; without them we would go around as in a dark labyrinth.” - Galilei, Assayer (Galilei
1957,237-238).
3 See: Mysterium Cosmographicum and Harmonice Mundi, -J. Kepler. Gesammelte Werke,
vols. I (1938) and VI (1940). Cp. Koyré 1973, 127 sqq.
4 Descartes. Princ., Pref., AT IXB 14-15; Princ. IV 203, AT VIIIA 326. Cp. Gabbey 1993,
311-323. On the historical background of the attempt of Galileo, Beeckman and Descartes to
use mathematical description for the study of free fall, see: Gaukroger 1978, 192 sqq.;
Schuster 1977, 53 sqq. As Gaukroger argues, unlike Galilei who tries to represent physical
objects as mathematical ones, Descartes “wants both to ‘mathematize’ physics and to
‘physicalize’ mathematics in one and the same operation. He does not simply want to use
mathematics in physics, he wants to unify mathematics and physics in certain critical
respect” - Gaukroger 1980, 97-98.
X Matter, Imagination and Geometry

mechanics, has to be assimilated to mathematics, considered primarily as

geometry.5
This seemingly self-evident possibility of the application of mathematics
to physics is quite often almost taken for granted. However, as it will be argued,
for those ancient scientists and philosophers who follow the Platonic-Pythagorean
programme, such an application is not at all evident and is, in fact, impossible.6
The central question o f this book is thus how and why does it become possible for
early modem science to apply mathematics and its methods to the description of
rerum natura.
In contemporary philosophy (and history) o f science, which often
understands and presents itself as only epistemology and not as natural philosophy,
this problem is not among the most commonly discussed: the applicability of
mathematics to physics appears frequently to be taken as almost obvious. It is
considered grounded either in the structure o f physical reality, or in the mind itself.
Still, there are a number of attempts to address the problem. The “unreasonable
effectiveness o f mathematics in the natural sciences”, to use the well-known title of
Wigner’s Courant Lecture, remains for Wigner an utter mystery with no rational
explanation. Eventually, he comes to the conclusion that “[t]he miracle o f the
appropriateness o f the language of mathematics for the formulation o f the laws o f
physics is a wonderful gift which we neither understand nor deserve”.7 Recently,
Connes similarly argued that the applicability o f mathematics to physics is hardly
explainable.8 Steiner takes physics to use formal analogies.9 However, the question
o f why physical objects allow for such analogies still remains to be clarified.
Separation between mathematics and physics is accepted by Frege, according to
whom mathematicians, “instead o f investigating the properties a thing really
has...don’t care about them one iota, but using so-called definitions, ascribe all
sorts o f properties to a thing that have absolutely no connection with the thing

5 “Cum veteres mechanicam (uti auctor est Pappus) in rerum naturalium investigatione
maximi fecerint; et recentiores, missis formis substantiaiibus et qualitatibus occultis,
phaenomena naturae ad leges mathematicas revocare aggressi sint... Nam et linearum
rectarum et circulorum descriptiones, in quibus geometría fundatur, ad mechanicam
pertinent. Has lineas describere geometría non docet, sed postulat." - Newton. Princ.
Auctoris praefatio ad lectorem (Newton 1972 I, 15).
6Cp. Dummett 1991, 301-305.
7 Wigner 1967,237.
* “The physical world that surrounds us, while not itself the seat of mathematical reality,
coheres with it in a definite way that’s difficult to explain. Einstein ...said that the most
incomprehensible thing about the universe is that it is comprehensible. The thing that’s hard
to grasp about mathematics is that it governs the organization of natural phenomena. Thanks
to mathematics we are able to understand the natural world.” - Changeux and Connes 1995,
55-56.
9 Steiner 1989,452 sqq.
 Introduction xi

itself, and then investigate their properties”.10 But if this is the case, it still remains
to be seen why the mathematically formulated properties may be ascribed to
physical bodies.
Mathematics is taken as the language of physics. Referring to Whewell,
Peirce considers geometry to be physical or mechanical geometry." Mathematical
entities are to be associated with empirical objects and supposedly describe bodily
entities adequately. But why and how is this possible? Why are formal structures
applicable to physical objects? Is the mathematical language for describing
physical objects discovered in the physical, or is it freely produced and then
prescribed to the physical? The “mathematization of physics” 12 in early modem
science takes place because spatial, physical characteristics of body are considered
to already have intrinsic mathematical properties; these properties may be
subsequently observed in both physical bodies and in geometrical entities. Physical
characteristics are constituted primarily as already geometrical, i.e. as primary
qualities, as Galilei and Descartes take them.13 The underlying presupposition,
namely, that the primary physical qualities may be expressed in the language of
mathematics is, however, a very strong one and is not immediately self-evident.
The mathematization o f physics may become possible either, first, if
mathematical concepts somehow arise from physical reality— or, second, if
mathematical structures are imposed onto the physical. The first approach is
supported by a number o f contemporary scholars.14 Thus, as mentioned to Mach,
MUnster considers mathematics as making its concepts fit physical objects and
their properties, i.e. mathematical objects are to be introduced in such a way that
they may conform to the physical world.15 However, an objection to such an
approach might be that in order to be able to portray the relation o f mathematics to
physics in this way, one already has to presuppose that physical entities must have
properties that may be represented in terms o f formal mathematical language,
which entails a petitio principii.
The second way o f looking at the role of mathematics in physics, present
in many modem thinkers (in particular, in Descartes and in Kant), is constituted by
taking physical science as constructed in such a way as to recognize nature in its
project, Entwurf, as already mathematical.16 For instance, Manin argues that

10Frege 1971, 146.

" Peirce 1976, 359-362.
12 Belaval 1950, 489-490.
13 As Garber notes, “Descartes wants to make all of the properties of body geometrical”.-
Garber 1992,69. Cp. Locke. Essay, Bk. II, ch. 7.
14 See: Prosperi 1997,261-267.
15 MUnster 1994, 205-212.
16 Kant. Prolegomena § 10-11, 14 sqq.; cp. Heidegger 1993, 362.
xii Maller, Imagination and Geometry

mathematics associates its mental constructions with physical abstractions.17 This,

however, presupposes that physical abstractions can already be interpreted as
mathematical. But why these abstractions adequately describe physical reality
remains not altogether clear.18 Bohr takes mathematics to study all possible formal
structures and therefore to furnish scientists with such structures and notions as
may be useful in physics. Obvious objections to this position are, first, that
physical reality is already supposed to be in principle mathematizable. And second,
even if Bohr is right, nothing guarantees that appropriate mathematical results are
actually already established, especially since the number o f possible mathematical
structures and theories does not appear to be finite.19 Moreover, it is not
immediately clear why the very structuring o f the physical qua mathematical may
take place, since physical objects do not exemplify mathematical precision and
cannot be taken properly as geometrical entities.
As an attempt to address the problem o f applicability o f the
“Formalwissenschaft” to the “Realwissenschaft” in this book I will provide a
historical reconstruction of two different approaches to the possibility o f presenting
and describing physical objects in terms o f formal mathematical concepts.
However, instead of tracing a hypothetical chain of developmental continuity and
ruptures in the history o f philosophy and science, I have chosen to contrast
antiquity and early modernity as represented by two thinkers. Although antiquity
and modernity (constituted by a great variety of different, sometimes contrary,
theories and opinions) are not uniform historical entities, there still appear to exist
certain metaphysical presuppositions that most o f the thinkers o f a particular epoch
share, even if they are mostly unaware o f them. In some fundamental
presuppositions, which I will try to spell out, antiquity and modernity seem to be
very different in their approaches to studying and constituting the physical in terms
o f the mathematical.20 Two key thinkers that I am discussing are Plotinus and
Descartes (although occasionally Plato, Aristotle, Euclid, Proclus, Newton et al.
also appear on stage), in whom, despite all the peculiarities of their own
philosophical views, the fundamental presuppositions of ripe antiquity and o f early
modernity find their expression. Both thinkers are border figures, as it were,
because, despite considerable originality o f their own views, in both o f them

17 M anin 1981, 6 sqq.

'* As Manin puts it, “a good physicist uses formalism as a poet uses language” (Manin 1981,
5). Mathematical formalism is then to be understood as the language for physics. The poetic
language is, however, not only descriptive but, since the language in poetry often says and
suggests more than is intended, and, in fact, negates and suspends the language by means of
language itself, it may become prescriptive, opening new possibilities for experiencing the
world.
,9 Münster 1994, 209.
20 Cp. Klein 1968, 117-125; Koselleck 1977, 264-299; Nikulin 1993, 203-221.
 Introduction xiii

different philosophical epochs are both separated and connected (ancient and
medieval—and medieval and modem respectively, even if these labels might be
provisional) with different styles and different understandings o f the role
philosophy and science play in the knowledge and constitution o f the world.21 The
choice o f Plotinus might be further justified by the fact that he embraces all three
major school traditions o f antiquity—Platonic. Aristotelian and Stoic. While
necessarily leaving out many important topics, I concentrate on significant
distinctions between two thinkers in an attempt to outline those aspects that appear
to be important for the discussion o f the main problem o f the relation of
mathematics to physics.
The book consists of three parts. The first one begins with a consideration
of the notion of matter, which in Plato and Plotinus is taken as a mere possibility of
being. On this reading, matter is indefinite and utterly unlimited, close to non-
being— in contrast to matter as substance in Descartes, as a definite subject with a
number o f attributes, one of which is taken as essential attribute. Preliminary
consideration o f various “properties” o f matter is necessary for the subsequent
discussion o f the role matter plays in the constitution of both physical and
geometrical entities. The Platonic approach to the understanding o f substance is
further compared to that o f Descartes. In the former (represented mostly in Plotinus
and also traced in Plato’s “Parmenides” and “Republic”), being is introduced not as
a primary phenomenon but as a synthetic unity o f sameness and otherness, o f the
one and the many. These themselves, however, have an originating cause, which
cannot be considered properly as being. The problem o f a possibility o f distinction
between the cause of being, which itself is not being, and matter, which also is not
being, is then addressed. It is also argued that if being in Descartes (for whom the
notions o f being and substance are at the very center o f his thought) is taken in its
existential aspect as substance, it turns out to be an ambiguous notion. Being per se
is rather marked by the attribute o f infinity, which appears in the discussion of
potential and actual infinity in their relation to being and to the cause o f being,
through a number of paradoxes and in the problem of infinite divisibility of
mathematical entities. A number of auxiliary notions (each playing a role in the
subsequent discussion) are also introduced in this part, such as those o f various
kinds of distinctions, o f the one and the many, of the same and the other, of
essence and existence.
The second part is dedicated to the discussion o f various aspects o f the
relation of mathematics to physics. Because number is taken as the pattern for the
consideration o f being and for the constitution o f knowledge, the foundations of
arithmetic in Plotinus are discussed in the context o f the Platonic tradition, partly

21 On the influence of scholasticism on Descartes see: Koyrd 1923; Ariew 1992, 58-90;
Sorell 1994,29-45.
xiv Matter, Imagination and Geometry

known from Aristotle’s polemics against it in books M and N of the

“Metaphysics”. In Plotinus’ subtly elaborated doctrine, number is constituted by
the principles o f sameness and otherness, represented in monad and dyad, which
originate number as a synthetic unity o f a plurality of henads. Arithmetical entities
are then considered in their relation to geometrical objects and later to physical
things. In the Platonic approach arithmetical and geometrical objects are taken as
epistemologically and ontologically different, since number consists o f discrete
units, whereas geometrical magnitude is continuous. The possibility o f applying
geometry to physics in Descartes is grounded in the fact that number (the discrete)
and geometrical magnitude (the continuous) are taken to be mutually reducible.
Furthermore, no crucial distinction between an object of geometry and an object of
physics neither is made (nor can be made) in Descartes, since both belong to the
res extensa. The notion o f the intermediary plays an important role in Platonic
ontology as present in Proclus’ commentary to the first book o f Euclid’s
“Elements”. In this approach, geometrical objects are considered intermediate
between ideal objects (notions) and their physical images, being irreducible to any
of them. In Descartes, with his rigid dichotomic ontological distinction, there is no
room for an intermediary. The equation of geometrical and physical objects in their
ontological status further opens a possibility for the application of geometrical
methods in physics.
A rather neglected notion of intelligible matter is then discussed, as the
specific matter o f mathematical objects, first introduced in Aristotle’s
“Metaphysics”. In Plotinus it is considered a substrate o f the intelligibles-«oe/a, as
an indefinite thinking-noem. Several arguments are provided in discussing the
main features o f intelligible matter (such as its affiliation with the irrational) and its
relation to physical things. Proclus is primarily interested in considering the role of
intelligible matter in constituting geometrical entities: intelligible matter appears
here as a geometrical materiality. Such matter may be interpreted as imagination,
moreover, it might further be construed as extension, where geometricals may be
conceived. It is due to the presence of this geometrical matter in Proclus’ and
Plotinus’ deliberations that geometrical objects are essentially different from
physical ones and can neither substitute, nor adequately represent them.
In Cartesian ontology, on the contrary, there is no room for the intelligible
matter: only one matter for all the extended things is recognized, that which
embraces both physical and geometrical entities. It is due to this non­
discrimination o f different kinds of matter that it becomes possible to consider the
geometrical and the physical in the same terms and to apply the former to the
cognition of the latter and thus to implement the whole project o f mathematical
physics.
The third part of the book discusses the role and the structure of cognitive
faculties as involved in consideration and construction of material and geometrical
 Introduction xv

objects. The Plotinian intellect-noyj with its cosmos o f thinkable objects-woe/a,

distinct from the discursive reason-dianoia, is next contrasted to the Cartesian
mind and its ideas, the mind taken as discursive and as immediately self-
accessible, i.e. as fundamentally reflective. Imagination is introduced as a capacity
to create mental images, which are different from both the noetic objects and from
the images o f senses. Imagination can be taken then as a cognitive faculty that both
separates and unites the thinkable and the sensible. Moreover, imagination is
further related to negativity and to some kind o f materiality, which Proclus has to
identify with geometrical matter. Imagination then has to be that faculty that
primarily represents geometrical objects as divisible, multiple and extended in their
own way. Descartes’ treatment of imagination is quite different, insofar as
imagination is distinguished into mental and corporeal. Contrary to the mind,
imagination cannot render the essence o f a thing, for imagination is not capable of
representing the infinite. Imagination is capable, however, of operating with
images of extended things, which further allows to recognize the geometrical and
the physical within one matter and extension, the former exemplifying the latter.
In the discussion of the role of construction that follows, it is argued that
the imaginary reproduction o f the world in Descartes is undertaken according to a
model that is constructed as geometrical. Since both geometrical and physical
things are considered co-extended, movable and divisible in the same space, the
geometrical may be imposed onto the physical. The former thus becomes the
pattern for the consideration of the latter, which allows therefore to present
mathematical knowledge of the physical material world. In antiquity the imaginary
construction is primarily taken to be applicable to geometrical figures in solving
problems and not in establishing theoretical knowledge through theorems. Crucial
is the connection between intelligible matter and imagination: in Proclus’ and
Syrianus’ interpretation, imagination appears to be geometrical matter, where a
geometrical object can be produced by kinematic construction according to the
object’s noetic form and formative principle, which themselves are already not
constructive. The act of imaginary construction, therefore, does not really
engender a geometrical figure with all its characteristics, but rather reproduces it in
order to facilitate reason in cognition o f the properties of the object, now
represented in an almost visualizable form, with all its properties, already wholly
present in the notion o f the object. A brief conclusion summarizes then the main
arguments and theses o f the book.
In what follows, the references to Descartes’ texts are given according to
the edition: Oeuvres de Descartes. Ed. by Ch. Adam and P. Tannery. Vol. I-XI.
Paris, 1974-1986 (2nd ed.), referred to as AT followed by volume and page
number. All the translations are from The Philosophical Writings o f Descartes.
Vol. I-III. Translated by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch (vols. I-II) and
by J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny (vol. III). Cambridge,
xvi Matter, Imagination and Geometry

1985-1991. References to the Plotinus’ “Enneads” are given according to Plotini

opera. Ed. P. Henry and H. Schwyzer. Vol. I-III. Oxford, 1964-1982; the
translations (except when specified) are those o f A. H. Armstrong, quoted from
Plotinus’ Enneads. Vol. I-VII. Cambridge (Mass.)-London, 1966-1988. The inner
cross-references throughout the text are given to the paragraphs o f the book (e.g.,
2.4.1).
Parts of the book closely follow my articles reproduced from the
following publications by kind permission of the publishers: Henologische
Perspektiven II. Amsterdam-Atlanta: Rodopi, 1997, p. 49-65 (in 1.2.1); Hermes
126 (1998), 326-340 (in 1.2.1); Dionysius 16 (1998), 85-113 (in 2.4.1); Le Timée
de Platon. Contributions à l'histoire de sa réception. Louvain-Paris: Peeters, 2000,
15-38 (in 3.1.3); and Méthexis XI (1998), 85-102 ( in 2.1.1).
A number o f ideas developed in the book were elaborated when working
with Piama Gaidenko. Various aspects of the problems present in the book were
discussed with Werner Beierwaltes, John Cleary, Cristina D ’Ancona, John Dillon,
Alexander Dobrokhotov, Eyôlfur Kjalar Emilsson, Michael Frede, Stephen Gersh,
Charles Kahn, Paul Kalligas, Karen Gloy, Jens Halfwassen, Heinz Happ, Christoph
Horn, Vittorio Hösle, Douglas McGaughey, Christia Mercer, Dominic O’Meara,
Yuri Shichalin, Andrew Smith, Thomas Szlezâk, Alejandro Vigo and Egil Wyller,
to all of whom I am mostly thankful for their thoughtful remarks and suggestions. I
am much obliged to my colleagues and to the graduate students o f the New School
for Social Research, in particular, to Richard Bernstein, Nancy Fraser, Judith
Friedlander, Agnes Heller, and Yerri Yovel, who in various ways encouraged me
in writing this book. Duane Lacey, Claire Martin, Morgan Meis, Edward Skipton
and Sonja Tanner were also helpful in the preparation o f the manuscript. I am
particularly grateful to Sara Walker Bosworth; this book would not have been
possible without her hard work, dedication, and unparalleled commitment as my
assistant. Different parts o f the book were presented and discussed on various
occasions at the New School for Social Research, the University o f Notre Dame,
Ohio State University, Institute for Philosophy o f the Academy o f Sciences in
Moscow, Columbia University, Istituto italiano per gli studi filosofici in Naples,
Novosibirsk University, University o f Oslo and Willamette University. I am
indebted to the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for the assistance which gave
me the opportunity to stay at the University o f Tübingen for a year, where
conversations with Hans Krämer were very fruitful. I would also like to express
my acknowledgment to the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of
Notre Dame for the possibility o f beginning work on the book and especially my
appreciation to Alvin Plantinga, discussions with whom helped me to clarify
several central points of the work. Finally, my family—Elena Nikulina, Alexey
Nikulin and Anastasiya Nikulina—was always the source of support and
inspiration.
 PARTI
MATTER
2 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

L I The notion o f matter

Addressing the problem of how and why it is possible to apply mathematics to the
study and description o f the physical or material world implies a discussion of
what matter is. Descartes’ attitude is that matter is something whose nature is quite
self-evident, hence the more we try to trace subtle distinctions within it, the more
we obscure the nature and essence o f matter. Still, an obvious simplicity o f the
Cartesian treatment o f matter, if thoroughly analyzed, might entail difficulties that
render the putative clear and distinct simplicity o f matter quite questionable. One
o f the possible ways to “suspend" the deceptive self-evidence o f a notion is to
contrast and compare it with another historically “self-evident” treatment o f the
very same notion. Such a comparison may enable us to see better the implicit
presuppositions that made possible the modem concept o f matter. In what follows,
I will be stressing mostly distinctions between the ancient, mainly Platonic,
account o f matter, and the modem Cartesian one, in order to be able to trace the
consequences of the former in the modem scientific account.

1.1.1 On the notion o f matter in Aristotle

In his fundamental investigation of the Aristotelian notion o f matter, H. Happ

distinguishes two main approaches to the understanding of matter in antiquity: (1)
matter as principle, and (2) matter as bulk, mass or bodily stuff.1 The first
interpretation is to be found in Plato (in the Academy and in the later Platonic and
Neoplatonic tradition), as well as in Aristotle. If matter is taken as a principle, then,
as it will be argued in what follows, it should be fundamentally and inevitably
ambiguous in the Platonic interpretation. Indeed, on the one hand, matter may be
taken as an ideal principle o f othemess and alienation. On the other hand, as non-
being, matter is not a principle, but rather mere nothingness, which does not exist
in the proper sense and cannot be known. The second understanding o f matter,
found in the Stoa, prevails in modem philosophy and science, and is influenced by
certain features o f Aristotle’s own account.2

'Cp. Happ 1971,809 sqq.

2 SVF 11, 325 et al. Cp. Irwin 1988, 88-89. According to Happ, one can discern the
following five different reasons that lead to such an understanding of matter: (a) Aristotle
himself, treating matter as a substrate, elevates matter-hyle into substance-oy.ua. His
understanding of matter as substance, however, is limited, whereas for the Stoics matter is
substance in the proper sense; it is describable as ti, the universal Stoic category, which
includes both corporeal entities (the only existing really) and incorporeal (existing only in
thought; cp. Chrysippus, frg. 329-335, SVF II 117; Plotinus. Enn. VI. 1.25.1 sqq.; Rist 1969,
152-172). (b) When matter becomes substance, form becomes an accident inherent in
matter. In Aristotle, form (eidos) expresses essential attributes (ti estin), while quality
(poion) expresses accidental attributes, although both are tightly connected. However, when
Aristotle speaks of the material constitution of the four elements, the form and the
qualitative accidence {pathos) become almost disconnected. This tendency is even clearer in
the Stoics, who turn essential form into a mere poion and place it in matter-hyle (Happ 1971,
809-810). (c) In Aristotle’s biological treatises, matter is almost unequivocally understood
as bodily stuff, (d) Aristotle takes the elementary qualities (warmth, coldness, humidity,
 Part I: Matter 3

Following mainly Happ’s recollection, without going much into the

details o f the argument, I will first briefly establish the main features o f matter as it
is portrayed in Aristotle. The notion of matter in Plotinus will then be considered in
order to be able to discuss further the notion o f intelligible matter, which is crucial
for my exegesis and to clarify the main question posed. Aristotle's approach to
matter is pluralistic (as is often the case in his writings) in the sense that in
discussing certain notions he quite frequently seems to abandon his previous
conclusions and starts anew. Such a peculiarity o f Aristotle’s style might be
explained by his intention to investigate various meanings and usages o f a single
notion, and thereby avoid ambiguity.
Specifically, we find three different “definitions” o f matter in Aristotle.
(1) Matter is the first (and ultimate) substrate.3 (2) Matter is dynamis, potency and
possibility o f being.4 And (3) matter “is” pure indefiniteness, neither this nor that,
nor anything particular; as such it has no form and is not any definite thing, it is not
a tode ti. Substance is characterized for Aristotle by two definite traits: it is
separable (to khdriston)—that is, it exists independently or apart—and it is a
concrete thing (to tode ti).5 Matter is not a substance in any of these two senses.
However, matter may be considered a substrate, hypokeimenon, as that which
underlies all changes in things but itself has no particular form.6 Plato considers
opposites as contrary predicates to be capable o f immediate interaction, even if the
one ousts the other. Unlike Plato, Aristotle, in order to escape a contradiction, takes
opposites to be mediated by and in the substrate or subject, hypokeimenon? Matter
is then the universal substrate or mediator of opposites, although it is not separable
from them.8 Moreover, matter may be taken as a logical subject.9 Yet subject itself
is considered twofold: either as a definite thing (tode ti), or as matter in its relation
to actuality.10 If, then, matter is to be considered a subject, it is only in the second

dryness, in Meteor. 378 b 10 sqq.) as bodily and material, (e) Finally, the doctrine of the
cosmos as limited implies that the total “amount” of matter, quantitas materiale, is
preserved as constant (cp. Zeno, frg. 87, SVF I 24-25; Chrysippus, frg. 597, 599, SVF II
184-185; Sambursky 1962, 37-38)—a doctrine that reappears in early modem physics under
the guise of the law of preservation of the whole amount of matter in the universe.
3 Aristotle. Phys. 192a31 sqq.; cp. Met. 1049a35-36; 1068b 11; Decaelo 293b 14-15.
4 Aristotle. Met. 1042a 27 sqq.; cp. 1032a 20-22; 1050a 15-16; 1060a 21; Phys. 213a 1-10;
Meteor. 378b 34-379a 1.
5 Aristotle. Met. 1029a 20 sqq.; cp. Phys. 207a 26; De an. 412a 7-8; cp. Happ 1971, 296-
297.
6Aristotle. Phys. 190a 31 sqq.; De caelo 306b 16-18.
7Plato. Phaedo 102d-105c; Aristotle. Anal. Post. 72a 11-14. Cp. Dttring 1966, 62; Gaidenko
1980, 258 sqq.
* Aristotle. De caelo 286a 25-26; De gen. et corr. 332a 35-332b 1; cp. 329a 30-31; Meteor.
370b 13-15.
9 Aristotle. Met. 1043a 5-6. See the discussion in: Kung 1978, 140-159; cp. Dancy 1978,
410-412.
10 Aristotle. Met. 1038b 3-6. Substrate is one of at least four main meanings of substance
(oysia); and substrate may be further considered either form or matter or that which consists
of both of them, see: Cat. 2a 12-13; Met. 999b 13; 1028b 34 sqq.; 1042a 34; 1069b 35-
1070a; Phys. 192a 4-7; De an. 412a 6 sqq.
4 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

sense, as an indefinite substrate of all things."

Since contrarieties cannot come together immediately without mediation,
Aristotle has to support a tripartite scheme and introduce the matter-form-privation
(hyle-eidos-steresis) distinction.12 Being (iorm-energeia) and non-being (privation)
are mediated by the not-yet-being or potential being (dynamis) o f matter. Matter is
to be considered then as accidental non-being, while only privation is non-being
par excellence.13 Since matter only accepts opposites, it itself, as mere potentiality,
cannot be opposed to anything. In this particular aspect it is close to substance,
which also has nothing opposing it.14 However, contrary to substance-oys/'a, matter
qua potentiality and possibility o f being (dynamis is both potentia and
possibilitas), does not exist separately from a thing.15 Another obvious difference
is that oysia is always limited, since form is that which defines and embraces,
while matter (as the potentiality of not-yet-being) is close to the infinite and is that
which is defined or embraced.16 As a potentiality, matter is a thing that is not yet
there, and therefore cannot be anything definite— as Aristotle states in the third
definition. It cannot have any particular contents, but is only displayed in pure
relation to form, as the “from which” (ex hoy) to the “into which” (eis ho).11In this
sense, matter is a necessary component o f the hylomorphic structure.
Since matter is not yet actualized, it shows different qualifications. It does
so without violating the principle o f non-contradiction, for even if in Aristotle
matter may represent the unity of the subject, opposites are always predicated of
matter, albeit in different respects. Thus, for instance, the modal meanings that can
be ascribed to matter appear to be opposite for two reasons. First, matter is present
in the modality o f possibility. Matter may always be different exactly because it is
potentiality and, as such, may receive any form. A particular thing, ti, even if it has
a definite essence (and a definition), does not necessarily exist, for a thing may
either be or not be. In this sense ti is accidental, and the cause of this accidentality
is matter.18 Matter is also accidental, since where matter is, there is no purpose.19
Second, matter is also the cause of necessity, but in a sense different from purpose
as the corresponding material condition, without which a particular thing cannot

11Cp. Happ 1971,666.

12Aristotle. Met. 1069b 8 sqq.; 1075a 28-34; 1087a 36-1087b 1.
13Cp. Aristotle. Phys 192a 4-7.
14Aristotle. Cat. 3b 24-25.
15 Aristotle. Phys. 211b 37-212a 2.
16 Aristotle. De caelo 312a 12; Phys. 206b 25 sqq.; 209b 5 sqq.
17 On the “metaphysics of prepositions” see: Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.18.17-19; Proclus. Theol.
Plat. II 60.26-61.9 and Theiler 1930, 31-34; Dttrrie 1969, 217-228. Cp. also Happ 1971, 784
sqq. and Bussanich 1988, 85-88. Early modem science especially stresses the primacy of
relation understood as function to substance, as, for example, in occasionalists and, in
particular, in Malebranche. For him truth is only a relation, a “rapport” between either ideas,
ideas and things, or things themselves, but not ideas or things as such, Malebranche.
Oeuvres complètes I 52-53; II 286-287; Funkenstein 1986, 295-296. Cp. Cassirer 1953,
passim.
Aristotle. Met. 1027a 13-15.
19Aristotle. Meteor. 390a 3-4.
 Part I: Matter 5

be.20 For instance, a saw should be made o f metal and not from cotton or fur,
unless it is produced for some other purpose (e.g., as a work o f art).
An important notion in Aristotle’s consideration o f matter is that o f
materia prima or prime matter. Prime matter is dynamei sdma aistheton, sensually
perceptible body in potentiality, itself not constituted o f anything else and
characterless.21 Since prime matter itself is body only as pure potentially, it is not
body properly speaking, but rather is bodiless and does not exist on its own.22
Since it is present only potentially, is being dynamei, prime matter is preserved and
is not any definite thing.23 Prime matter is not mere nothing, yet it is also not
anything particular. It is indefinite but in this indefiniteness it is the material
substrate, which is inseparable from the opposites it mediates.24 Modem
philosophy, in particular Neoscholasticism, quite often considers materia prima as
the first universal substrate o f every thing potentially, as matter as such. In
Aristotle, however, prime matter is different and distinct from hyle as the principle,
because prime matter is efficient only in the sublunar world but not in the
supralunar ethereal realm. That is to say it is not universal matter, but matter only
o f a particular (although rather large) class o f sublunar physical things. Aristotle
insists on the distinction and opposition in the cosmos o f prime matter, prote hyle,
to that o f hyle topike, or matter o f the ethereal region.25 Why does Aristotle need
this distinction, abandoned in modem science, which decisively cancels the
distinction between the supra and sublunar world? First o f all, because the cosmos
for Aristotle is hierarchically structured, so that the most valuable entities—stars
representing gods— are situated in the place above the world, in an ontologically
and axiologically higher position, which is visibly expressed in their spatial
location. The reason is that the stars, even if they are bodily, do not perish, and in
moving show perfection through the most perfect (circular) movement, which,
unlike the prevalent rectilinear movement o f the sublunar realm, never comes to a
stop.26

20 Aristotle. Phys. 200a 14 sqq.; cp. Met. 1014a 20; 1015a 20 sqq.; Stallmach 1959, 119-
125; Happ 1971,703 sqq.
21 Aristotle. De gen. et c o i t . 329a 29-329b 3; Met. 1049a 27; Phys 193a 29. Cp. Dancy
1978, 372-413 (prime matter is “nothing on its own”, Ibid., 398), as against S. Cohen 1984,
171-194. Philoponus interprets the notion of prime matter in (Platonic) terms of pure
dimensional receptacle: “Prime matter, which is without body, form, or figure before it is
filled out, receives the three dimensions and becomes three-dimensional” (trad. I. Mueller). -
Philoponus. In Cat. 83.14-15.
22 Aristotle. De gen. et corr. 332a 17-18.
23 Aristotle. Met. 1014b 31; 1044a 15 sqq.
24 Aristotle. De gen. et corr. 332a 1.
25 Aristotle. De caelo 269b 14-17; cp. Happ 1971,486-489,693-698; Algra 1995, passim.
26 Cp. Proclus. Inst. Phys. II 1-5. Ethereal entities, unlike the sublunar, may also be
considered not as temporal but as sempiternal. The sempiternal are those entities that exist
always without perishing, but are not eternal in the proper sense (not atemporal), that is,
they are never wholly present in one indivisible moment of stable “now”, nunc stans.
6 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

1.1.2 Plotinus on matter

Plotinus, like many thinkers of late Antiquity, humbly presents himself as only a
commentator who puts his notes on the margins o f the “primary texts” in which the
truth is revealed and around which the whole life o f a tradition is organized, so that
every new written text has the task of being in accordance both with the “primary
text” and with the truth itself. Still, providing a systematic interpretation and
symphonic concordance of the initially unsystematic and sometimes paradoxical
texts, Plotinus at times unwillingly and unintentionally presents an original
interpretation and thus secures the further development o f the tradition.
In his early treatise II. 4 (12) (specially dedicated to the consideration of
matter) and later in III.6 (26), Plotinus gives a comprehensive interpretative
exposition o f Plato’s rather brief account of matter in the “Timaeus” (47e-53c),
describing matter in Platonic terms as receptacle and nurse, as the place and seat of
form.27 Plato equally characterizes matter as all-receptive, as mother and nurse of
everything, and as that which receives imprints.28 Matter is considered as that
which has nothing of itself, nothing of its own: it neither is nor possesses form,
being, formative principle, activity, nor any actuality. Matter is only a pure
possibility—a capacity of being—and is neither a subject with predicates (for it
cannot properly receive predicates), nor is it anything definite (for it is not defined
by itself), nor is a body (for body is matter already defined by form). Matter as
such “is” non-being or nothingness: it is that which is not, never was and never
will be, a “shadow of non-being”, only a receptacle o f form, being, quality, figure,
division and the like.29 On the other hand, materiality as alterability is itself
governed, in Pythagorean and Platonic tradition, by the principle of otherness or
duality (called indefinite dyad, aoristos dyas, or great-and-small, mega-mikron),
which itself is purely thinkable.30
Plotinus' treatment of matter is Platonic throughout, but also incorporates
certain Aristotelian insights (despite the differences in the two notions of matter,
which lead Aristotle to criticize Plato sharply).31 In Plotinus’ account, matter has
the following main features. (1) Matter is considered non-being (me on), as
complete darkness or privation of light. Matter is absolutely different from form
(which represents being): it is imagined as something formless (aneideon ti

27 Plotinus. Enn. III.6.13.12, 19; cp. 111.6.7.1-3; I1I.6.10.8.

2* Matter is called by Plato hypodokhe, titheni, Tim. 49a. meter, pandekhes, Tim. 51a;
hedra, Tim. 52b; khöra, Tim. 52a; ekmageion, Tim. 50c. Cp. Schwyzer 1951, 568;
Ashbaugh 1988, 96-136 (consideration of khöra as spatiality). In Narbonne’s account, the
new features of matter introduced by Plotinus are impassibility and inalterability (Narbonne
1994, 41-42; cp. O’Meara 1975, 71 sqq.). Cp. also: Porphyry, frg. 236 Smith = Simplicius.
InPhys. 230.34-231.24.
29 Plato. Tim. 49a-51a; Simplicius. In Phys. 230.34-231.35; cp. Plutarchus. De Is. et Os. 56,
373; Plotinus. Enn. III.6.7.3 sqq.; cp. Porphyry. Sent. 20. Cp. O’Brien 1995,10-25.
30 Krämer 1959, 254; Krämer 1971, 296 sqq. Cp. Huffman 1993, 37-53; Philolaus, frg. 1
Huffman.
31 Cp. Claghom 1954, 5-19; Szlezäk 1979; Hadot 1990, 125-140.
 Part I: Matter 7

phantazomene).32 Therefore, the “is” which plays the role o f the copula in
predication,33 may be said about matter only improperly (i.e., about the concept of
matter, which is supposed to represent matter). Since matter cannot be properly
predicated and represented, the “is” of matter necessarily misrepresents matter and
always misses matter as such, matter which, strictly speaking, does not have any
notion or concept. The “is” inevitably represents something else, namely, non-
being in the form of being. Matter “as such” may be rather vaguely represented as
“a kind o f unmeasuredness in relation to measure, and unboundedness in relation
to limit, and formlessness in relation to creating form (pros eidopoiétikon), and
perpetual neediness in relation to what is self-sufficient; always undefined,
nowhere stable, subject to every sort o f influence, insatiate, complete poverty”.34
Since there is nothing proper in matter—nothing to be adequately described, matter
as such is indescribable and, as indeterminate, it cannot be really known. In fact,
Platonic matter may be even considered a sheer privation o f any possibility to
change, as otherness removed in its being (which belongs to the otherness qua
principle). Matter is then just an abstraction o f otherness that is brought by
privation to such a degree that it cannot be thought at all. That is why we are only
able to conceive matter by what Plato calls “spurious reasoning”, logismos nothos,
as if dreaming or imagining.35
The “knowledge” of matter is comparable then to seeing darkness in
darkness:36 We see darkness, but not as anything particular or positive, therefore,
we see darkness not by seeing, but by a certain “unusual” kind o f reasoning. We do
not perceive that we see, but rather, we imagine that we see. We are only aware of
the act o f seeing, but the content of seeing does not come from seeing, for there is
nothing out there in the darkness. Darkness is not anything positive, that is why
there cannot be any definite image of it. On the other hand, there is something seen
as an “object” o f such a seeing, so that there is something in such an apprehension
of darkness that is not fully explained merely by the act o f seeing itself. The
“objective contents” of seeing darkness is darkness itself. But since darkness is not
anything positive, it “is” only a privation o f light or non-being of light as privation.
Therefore, the peculiarity o f “seeing darkness” or “thinking matter” is that it is not
seeing or understanding in the proper sense. Rather, it is a kind of unreasonable
reasoning or void imagining. Such thinking is, paradoxically, also not-thinking.
One can “see” darkness both with eyes open or with eyes closed.
To compare, in Aristotle one may distinguish three different ways o f
knowing matter. First, matter is known negatively, as not this and not that, hat ’
aphairesin or apophasei: as potentiality that is not yet definite, matter does not
have any features that might be firmly established.3 As it has been pointed out,

32 Plotinus. Enn. II.5. 5.9 sqq., 4.12 sqq.; cp. Plato. RP 382a; Soph. 254d. Cp. Sambursky
1987,45-46.
33 Kahn 1973, 85 sqq.
34 Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.3.12-16.
35 Plato. Tim. 52b ; cp. Plotinus. Enn. 11.4.10.11; cp. 11.4.12.27-33; III.6.13.46; VI.7.28.11;
Eslick 1963,45-46.
36 Plotinus. Enn. I.8.4.31.
37 Aristotle. Met. 1058a 23.
8 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

although matter has certain traits of substance or subject, it nevertheless is not a

particular, actually existing oysia. Second, matter is known analogically, k a t’
analogian?* Even if we do not or cannot strictly lay out all the members of
proportional relation, we nonetheless can properly describe the relation itself.
Analogical knowledge stresses the relational, not the substantial aspect, so that an
entity (matter, in particular) is known not as such, but only in its relation to
something else. And third, matter is considered by Aristotle as known kata thesin,
positively, through a number o f attributes, although not adequately, for matter is
neither known by itself, nor can it be sensually apprehended.39 Since Plotinus
portrays matter negatively, he has to accept only the two first ways o f “knowing”
matter; that is, the “knowledge” of matter can be either analogical or negative
(aphairesei).40
(2) Matter is that which is left when form is removed, even though the
remainder is not anything particular that can be indicated by “positive speech”. But
what if we also remove or abstract all the “predicates” o f matter, like that of mere
possibility, what is left then? Not a subject, for matter is not anything definite, but
is mere negativity, which, ultimately, cannot be negated. Such a negativity o f the
non-being o f matter is itself necessary and cannot be taken away. In the later
treatise “On what are and whence come evils” (Enn. 1.8), Plotinus finds it even
appropriate to speak about the necessary existence (hypostasis) o f matter.41 The
mere negativity o f matter may be rethought as not only a lack o f all definiteness,
but rather as a negative potency, the radical evil.42 For this reason, when Plotinus
presents matter as privation in terms o f mere negation, he borrows Aristotle’s
terminology, yet radically redefines the concept itself (arsis... he steresis).n As J.-
M. Narbonne argues, privation in Aristotle is always a nihil privativum in relation
to something else (to being), because it is privation of something. However, since
matter represents for Plotinus the negativity “charged” with the possibility to
embody and to represent something definite (even although matter itself is not the
source o f such an embodiment or definiteness), then, in contrast to Aristotle,
Plotinus has to characterize matter as privation in terms o f nihil negativum.*4 This
notion is discussed by Baumgarten, who introduces the notion o f being in his
ontology as derived from the basic concept o f nihil negativum, which is absolute,
simple, not representing anything positively. On his account, any positivity is
inapplicable to it, including die positivity of being a definite subject o f speech and

31 Aristotle. Phys. 191a 7-12.

39 Aristotle. Met. 1036a 8. Cp. Happ 1971,667.
40 Plotinus. Enn. I.8.9.1 sqq.; Vl.6.3.26 sqq. Cp. Aristotle. Met 1029a 11 sqq.; Simplicius. In
Phys. 225,22 sqq.; Proclus. Theol. Plat. II 37.5-39.26.
41 Enn. 1.8.15.1-3; cp. I.8.7.2-4 and Plato. RP 476a.
42 Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.5. Cp., however, the early Enn. IV.8 (6).6, where Plotinus expresses a
much more positive attitude towards matter, not portrayed here as a principle of evil. See
also: Schwyzer 1973, 277; Rist 1961, 154-166; Hager 1962, 85-93; Benz 1990, 104 sqq.;
O’Brien 1996, 171 sqq.
43 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.13.22-23; cp. 11.4.14; cp. 1.8.11.1 sqq.; Aristotle. Phys. 192a 4 sqq.
44 Plotinus. Enn. 11.4.16. Cp. Baumgarten 1963, 3. See also: Courtine 1990, 248-256;
Narbonne 1994,43-49.
 Part I: Matter 9

cognition. The nihil negativum is not a privation o f anything that has already
existed before. The nihil privativum may be arrived at by mere negation or
privation, but the nihil negativum is precedent to the very attempt o f privation, for
the nihil negativum is nothing. The subsequent negation o f nothing, the non-nihil
gives something, aliquid, which is not yet definite and not defined. As a
determined object, it is ens or being; as not determined, it is non-ens, or nihil
privativum, which represents a mere possibility o f being.
As nihil negativum, matter (3) is only a potentiality that never becomes
actuality: it is always only an “announcement”, a “promise” o f being
(epaggellomenon), but not being itself.45 Matter is thus potentiality, which itself is
never actualized but, as Aristotle also argues, is actualized in particular things.46
Such a potentiality of matter, as it will be argued in more detail in what follows, on
the one hand, is displayed not only in bodily matter but also in intelligible matter,
which potentially (dynamei) is all “real things”.47 On the other hand, the negative
potentiality o f matter is not capable of producing anything. Hence, it is not the
same as the potentiality o f the first productive principle (the One).
Matter (4) is unlimited (to apeiron) and indefinite and “not yet stable by
itself, and is carried about here and there into every form, and since it is altogether
adaptable, becomes many by being brought into everything and becoming
everything”.4* That is why matter may be properly characterized only in negative
terms: it is without quality (apoios); it is not body (asdmatos)', it has no size or
magnitude; it is without quantity (aposon)\ and it is shapeless.49 The argument is
preserved by Simplicius quoting Porphyry, who in turn refers to Moderatus: since
matter represents pure negativity, Plato calls it a quantity without form or division
and without any inherent figure.50
Since matter (5) has nothing o f itself, everything is brought to it by being,
which is form-eidos, for matter needs form (endees) in its pure receptivity. 1
Matter also has “no resistance (to antikopton), for it has no activity, but is a
shadow, waits passively to endure whatever that which acts upon it wishes”.52
Having nothing o f itself, matter (6) cannot be affected and therefore is inalterable,
because there is nothing definite in matter that could be subject to change.53 In
matter there is no “self’ and since inalterability does not necessarily imply that
matter is identically the same, in a sense (paradoxically) it is not even true to claim

45 Plotinus. Enn. II.5.4.3; II.5.5.1-9.

46 Aristotle. Met. 1088b 1; 1045a 23.
47 Plotinus. Enn. H.5.5.36.
48 Plotinus. Enn. 11.4.11.40-42; cp. II.4.15.17,33-34; 11.4.16.9-10; 1.8.3.13; VI.6.3.3 sqq.
49 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. II.4.12.34-38; U.4.8.1 sqq.
50Amorphon kai adiaireton kai askhematiston - Simplicius. In Phys. 231.10-11.
51 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.8.23-24, III.5.9.54-56; VI.5.8.15-22. In contrast to matter, the intellect
is unreceptive (adekton, Enn. III.6.6.20). Cp. the discussion in: Lee 1979, 79-97 and Wagner
1986,64 sqq.
52 Plotinus. Enn. III.6.18.29-31; cp. III.6.7.30.
53 Plotinus. Enn. III.6.9.34; III.6.10.22; III.6.11.I8. Nevertheless, as A.H. Armstrong
remarks, in 1.8 and in III.6 Plotinus “goes to considerable trouble to show that matter can
never really receive form or be changed by it from its own evil nature.” - Plotinus. Enneads
VII, note on pp. 164-165.
10 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

that matter is unchangeable, for there is no identity o f subject in matter.

(7) Matter cannot possess any inner structure. Because o f that, first,
bodies lack in their materiality any inner structure and thus are indefinitely
divisible (tmëton gar pan sôma kata pan).54 Secondly, matter cannot be destroyed
(anolethron), for there is simply nothing in it to pass away. Matter, therefore, may
be said to endure but not as anything concrete or definite.5
Finally, (8) besides the enumerated features of the rather paradoxical
description o f matter, which is indescribable in the strict sense (for since matter is
not anything definite or particular, it cannot have clearly distinguishable and
describable traits), a peculiar feature o f matter is that it may be described in
mutually exclusive, contradictory terms without violating the principle of non­
contradiction. Aristotle formulates what he takes to be one of the most fundamental
principles o f thinking and being as: “It is impossible for the same attribute at once
(ihama) to belong and not to belong to the same thing (tôi aytôi) and in the same
relation (kata to ayto)” 56 Thus, the principle o f non-contradiction is violated either
when a statement and its negation are both predicated at once, which may mean at
the same time or/ and about one and the same nature57 or/ and it may be either
about the same thing or subject or/ and in the same relation or respect. Now,
matter is necessarily characterized in opposite terms: it can be said to be both the
same and not the same,58 both one (in its nature) and double (as represented by two
different matters). However, these opposite statements about matter do not violate
the principle o f non-contradiction, because in matter there is no unity of
“togetherness” (hama) in the temporal sense, for matter is not in time. Further,
there is no “togetherness” in the sense of the unity o f nature in matter, for the
“nature” o f matter may be said to accept opposites but is itself indefinite.59 Finally,
there is no unity or sameness o f subject in matter, because, simply, it is not a
subject. And fourth, there can be no unity o f relation in regards to matter, since
there is nothing in matter about which something could be predicated strictly “in
one and the same respect”.
Thus, since opposite statements may be predicated o f matter, it is
therefore deeply paradoxical. For example, in Enn. III.6.10.25, Plotinus notes that
“existing, for matter, is existing precisely as matter”. This “existing as matter” is
paradoxical, for, obviously, “existing as matter” means “being different from
anything else”, which is not matter; in particular, being different and other than
being. But still this “being matter” is nothing else than “truly not being". Since
matter’s “being” consists in non-being, this non-being should be taken, then, as its
being, which is again non-being, and so on. In this way there is a resemblance of
reflectivity in matter, a kind of empty mirroring, by a mirror which itself does not
properly exist. This, however, is not reflectivity in the proper sense, because,

54 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.7.21-22.

55 Plotinus. Enn. 111.6.8.8; cp. III.6.19.14; IV.7.9.11 and Plato. Tim. 52a.
56 Aristotle. Met. 1005b 19-20; cp. 1011b 16 sqq. Cp. Irwin 1988, 181-183.
57 Hama is taken in the sense of the identity not of time but of nature in what is now called
quasi-Aristotelian interpretation”, cp. Vincent-Spade 1982,297-307.
* Cp. Plotinus. Enn. 111.6.14.29» 35.
59 Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.8.18 sqq.
 Port I: Matter 11

unlike the intellect which reflects itself qua being, matter does not turn upon itself,
for, again, there is no identical “self’ in it.60 Because paradox is deeply inherent in
matter, it is not by chance that in Enn. III.6 matter is repeatedly characterized in
paradoxical, mutually exclusive terms: it “possesses without really possessing"; it
“appears to be filled, but contains nothing”; in matter there is “the apparent
presence o f a kind o f image which is not really present”; matter “follows... while
not really following”; and it is “static without being stable”.61 Such descriptions of
matter, however, are not senseless. For even if matter is not properly a subject,
certain statements are false or, at least, make no sense, because matter is inscribed
in the whole that is not determined by it. Therefore, matter presents opposite
appearances on its surface (ta enantia... phantazomenon), but is not affected by
them, for they are not really present in matter.62 Matter may be described then as a
“more or less”, both deficient and superabundant, although not as two different
principles, as Aristotle thinks, but as potentiality capable o f embracing opposites
and even not as a principle o f otherness, but as nihil negativumf*
In his commentary to Enn. III.6.10.19, Fleet maintains that “matter has no
accidental properties”.64 However, when matter is said “ not to have accidental
properties”, this itself is not an accidental property. What, then? Is it an essential
property (like that o f unlimitedness and inalterabilty)? Obviously not, because,
since matter is not a particular subject, it is difficult to argue that it has an essence.
It may be even said that matter’s essence is to have no particular essence or that its

60 In Enn. III.6.17.35-37 we find a rather enigmatic phrase: “What is nothing of itself can
become, by means of something else, the opposite; but when it has become the opposite, it
is not the opposite—for if so it would come to a standstill’1. Taking into account everything
that has been said about matter, we may understand this claim as follows: matter, which is
nothing, always becomes, through something other than itself, other to itself and then
(again) other to that other to itself, and so on, unceasingly, without stop. This means that in
matter there is no real reflectivity, no sameness (even as sameness of otherness), for
reflectivity presupposes a stop, fixing the reflective as returned back to itself. In fact, only
the thinking of the intellect as thinking itself (i.e., its own intelligible objects) is reflective,
and nothing else is.
61 Plotinus. Enn. III.6. 1.36, 7.26, 12.27, 15.31, 7.14. In a sense, matter may be even said to
be both generated and not generated, Enn. II.4.5.24-27. Cp. Harder’s commentary to II.4:
“Die intelligible Materie ist entstanden und zugleich unentstanden. Im vollen Sinne ewig ist
sie deshalb nicht, weil sie von den übergeordneten Prinzipien abhängt.” - Plotins Schriften I,
516. Cp., however, O’Brien’s criticism of the thesis of matter’s being not generated (this
thesis supported in Schwyzer 1973, 266-280), in favor of matter’s atemporal (eternal)
generation by the soul. For O’Brien, this also should clarify the problem of evil, for matter
has to be equally eternally illuminated by the soul, which is always covering matter “with
the appearance of form” or goodness. - O’Brien 1981, 108-123. See also the discussion in
Narbonne 1993 and Corrigan 1986, 167-181. An interesting argument is provided by
Balaudö, who holds that Plotinus advocates an eternal production of matter (and because of
that matter exists eternally), although this production is not a real one. - Balaudl 1999, 70-
75.
62 Enn. III.6.7.14 sqq.; cp. VI.3.12.2-6.
63 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.3.29; Aristotle. Met. 987b 20 sqq.; 1087b 9 sqq.; Phys. 203a 15-16.
Cp. Halfwassen 1992, 366.
64 Fleet 1995, 199.
12 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

essence is elusive. That is why matter cannot be characterized in terms of

accidental and essential properties. In fact, every judgement necessarily “misses”
matter as its object (as matter itself “misses” its object), because matter is not any
particular defined object at all.
If this is the case, then it is proper to speak o f matter in terms of
otherness. The distinctive characteristic, idiotes, o f matter is not form (which is
being), but matter “is not something other than what it is; it is not an addition to it
but rather consists in its relationship to other things, its being other than they.
Other things are not only other but each o f them is something as form, but this
[matter] would appropriately be called nothing but other, or perhaps, so as not to
define it as a unity by the term “other” but to show its indefiniteness by calling it
‘others’”.65 That is why when Plotinus introduces the notion o f separateness (to
khoris), which characterizes not the particular individuality of forms but rather the
fact that they are all distinct from one another (which may be predicated of every
form as its common feature), he says that this separateness consists in otherness
(heteroteti).66 Otherness separates not only physical things, but intelligible forms
as well.
Otherness is deeply inherent in matter, so that physical matter is always
not the same (oy tayton aei).67 Such a statement seems to contradict the previous
claim about matter’s inalterability. However, otherness as a principle is, as said,
different from matter as nihil negativum: the former organizes the latter into a
particular subject. Since matter is not anything particular by itself, it is not other to
anything and thus matter is also always not the same. Further, since the principle of
non-contradiction is not strictly applicable to matter, being always other and
another is quite compatible with the unchangeability o f matter, for it is in being
other than it is that matter persists as unchangeable. Even if it is not a substance,
matter’s “non-essential essence” is to be other to everything else, other to the other,
other even to itself. That is why matter is always only a relation, or, rather, is in
relation to everything else, other than it is.68 Even if radically other to the existent,
matter, never yet definite and defined, is not otherness as such (which is an ideal
principle), but otherness as nihil negativum.

1.1.3 Matter and extension in Descartes

Physical science studies physical things in their properties and movements. But
physical things are material things; therefore, one o f the primary concerns of
physical science is the study o f nature taken as matter—and with all the qualities
attributed to matter.69 Matter is thus crucial for Cartesian scientific investigations.
What is matter for Descartes? In the search for clarity, instead o f the equivocation
o f Aristotle’s notion o f matter (with its three different definitions) and the Platonic
subtlety and paradoxality o f the notion o f matter, Descartes presents matter

65 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.13.24-31.

“ Plotinus. Enn. IV.4.16.10-11.
67 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.3.13.
“ Plotinus. Enn. 11.4.16.2-3; III.6.15.6-8; I1I.6.19.24.
69 Descartes. The World, AT XI 37.
 Part I: Matter 13

unequivocally and straightforwardly as extension. Before 1641, when Descartes

began considering the possibility of appropriating his philosophy for school
teaching and thus tried to present his own terminology consistently and univocally,
his terminological usage is, as Garber shows, rather loose.70 Quite often Descartes
uses terms synonymously and interchangeably. This might seem contrary to his
own intention to present metaphysics and physics in the clearest and most univocal
way, but Descartes is more concerned with clarity o f understanding than with a
thoroughly elaborated system o f notions. The same insight may be put differently,
namely that most discussions and quarrels are about words, not thoughts. Thus,
Descartes identifies extension and space without much worrying about possible
differences between them, since, to him the case appears clear. As Descartes
implies, the more we try to elucidate it by drawing distinctions, the more we render
it obscure: for example, “by ‘extension’ we mean whatever has length, breadth and
depth, leaving aside the question whether it is a real body or merely a space”.71 In
other words, extension is nothing other than three-dimensional geometrical space.
For this reason, it becomes possible for Descartes to construct his physics as
geometrical, because all material nature is already implicitly taken as
geometricized (i.e., as immersed into geometrical extension). The main question
then (also the main question o f this study) is: what makes such a geometrization of
the world possible? We will return to it later, when discussing the notion o f two
matters (see 2.4-2.4.2).
One o f the main statements in Descartes that remains unproved, yet is
taken for granted as axiomatic—as the most fundamental factum about the
world— is that the conception or idea of matter in general is not different from the
idea o f space: for matter the property o f occupying space is not an accident, but
constitutes its essence.72 An important feature of space or extension is that it is
impenetrable, as Descartes points out in his correspondence with H. More. More
argues that space is absolutely penetrable and exercises no resistance whatsoever.
Descartes, however, insists that “impenetrability belongs to the essence of
extension”.73 The essence o f More’s polemics against Descartes is that extension
implies a spatial location o f both material and spiritual substances, with the only
difference being that material objects cannot occupy the same place (having the
property of resistance to any bodily penetration, antitypia), whereas spiritual
objects (souls) may be present in one and the same place at the same tim e.4 This
position is energetically rejected by Descartes solely because it is essential and
proper to matter to be extended and to extension to be material, so that when one
material part moves, it ousts another part and occupies its position. The presence of
two pieces o f matter at the same time in the same part of extension would imply
the annihilation of one o f them. Since space, or extension, is not different from
matter, Descartes cannot conceive o f bodies and, respectively, parts of space as
penetrable without contradicting himself. Likewise, space and corporeal substance

70 See Gaiber 1992,65.

71 Descartes. Reg. 14, AT X 442 sqq.
72 Descartes. The World, AT X I36; cp. To ***, June 1645, AT IV 224.
73 Descartes. To More 15 April 1649, AT V 342; cp. To ***, June 1645, AT IV 224.
74 Nikulin 1993,45-52.
14 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

are not two different substances, because one can take away each of their qualities,
with the exception o f extension.75
One of the peculiar features o f Descartes’ approach is his attempt to
rehabilitate the corporeal in science. In ancient mathematics the corporeal is
regarded mostly as imprecise and fluent, about which there can be no precise
mathematical knowledge. For Plato there is no knowledge o f bodily things at all,
but only o f intelligible eternal entities, for that which is in flux and in becoming
does not have an identity, but ever changes and thus cannot be grasped by reason,
which thinks in definite forms. For Aristotle, physical science is not mathematical
because the two have different subjects, which implies a difference in methods of
physics and mathematics and their rigid distinction in the hierarchy o f sciences.
And even if there are some branches o f mathematics that are close to physics
(optics, harmonics and astronomy), physics is still different from “pure”
mathematics because of the mutual irreducibility of the objects o f physics and
mathematics. On the one hand, numbers, studied by arithmetic, cannot be
considered physical entities, because even if physical objects may be numbered,
they themselves are not numbers. On the other hand, geometrical entities—a line
for instance— may be considered in physical bodies, but not qua geometrical and,
on the contrary, a physical line may be considered in geometry, but not qua
physical. The reason why physical and geometrical straight lines are completely
different is that the former is never exactly straight, but is in becoming and
constantly changes, while the latter is precise and ever unchanging.76
From the very beginning Descartes intends to develop a mathematical
theory of physical things (i.e., of bodies), or to structure nature as purely
mathematical extension. Descartes presents his intention in the form o f a simple
syllogism: body is matter; matter is space; therefore, body is space.77 Since there is
no real distinction between space and extension, body also is extension. A body or
corporeal thing is then merely “that which is extended, or that which contains
extension as part o f its concept”.78 In the fourteenth rule Descartes argues that the
propositions “body possesses extension” and “extension is not body” may both be
true without violating the principle o f non-contradiction.79 This is obviously
possible only if both are understood in different respects. Indeed, the first
proposition refers to an image of imagination, in which it is impossible to
distinguish extension from that which is extended (i.e., from body). The second

75 Cp. Descartes. Princ. II 11, AT VIIIA 46.

76 Plato. Theaet. 151e-154b, RP 522c sqq.; Aristotle. Phys. 194a 7-12; Met. 1026a 6-23;
Anal. Post. 75b 12-17; Proclus. Theol. Plat. II 64.5-6. Cp. H. Wagner 1967, 455; Bumyeat
1987, 225 sqq.; Zekl 1990, 83. E. Hussey’s treatment of the Aristotelian physics as
mathematical is an example of modernization of Aristotle (see Hussey 1991, 213-242).
77 Cp. Descartes. Princ. II 10, AT VIIIA 45; To More, 15 April 1649, AT V 345. However,
as Dicker points out, Descartes’ treatment of the notion of body appears to be ambiguous,
for upon closer examination one might distinguish two different approaches: each body is a
substance and each body is a mode of one single (material) substance (Dicker 1993, 212-
217).
7* Descartes. Seventh Set of Replies, AT VII 519; cp. Princ. II 4-5, AT VIIIA 42-43; To
Gibieuf, 19 January 1642, AT III 478.
79 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 443-445.
 Part I: Matter 15

proposition, on the contrary, refers to the idea o f reason or “pure intellect” and not
to that o f imagination, which is capable o f thinking extension without body. Two
important consequences follow: first, that operations o f thinking and imagining
(which play an important role in the Cartesian physics of the constitution o f bodily
extension as mathematical, see 3.3.1) are quite different in relation to matter or
extension. Second, extension is unintelligible without body and, therefore,
according to the definition o f three kinds o f distinctions Descartes gives in the
“Principles”, there is also no conceptual distinction between body and extension or
matter. It means that there can be only a modal distinction between the two, so that
body is only a mode o f extension, a way o f representing the extended substance.
One may say then that the difference between Descartes' and Plotinus’
understanding o f body is that for the former matter and body are different only
quantitatively, insofar as body is a part o f matter; whereas for the latter, matter and
body are qualitatively different, insofar as body is not matter but is matter
informed by an intelligible form. More specifically, for Descartes body represents
extension qua limited, shaped or formed, or is a part o f extension.*0 Body is
“whatever has a determinable shape and a definable location and can occupy a
space in such a way as to exclude any other body”.81 In other words, body is fiilly
determined by the following four properties: extension (and, since extension is
continuous, also by divisibility82), impenetrability, location (and, subsequently, the
ability to be moved) and form (or shape).83 The first and second are properties that
body has in common with matter or space, but the third and fourth are its specific
properties. It is easy to see that both location and form are due to the fact that body
is a particular part o f matter or extension. And because extension is impenetrable,
as Descartes insists in his polemics with More, the shaped extension has to be
movable (as a fish in water).84 Presented in this way, body obviously satisfies the
requirement of being the subject o f a mathematically structured physics. For this
reason Descartes returns to the notion o f body several times: in the “Regulae”, we
find a different account of bodily features, which are reduced to three, namely,
dimension, unity and shape.85 It is easy to see that both accounts are compatible
with each other: insofar as body is extension or matter, it has dimension. Insofar as
body is a finite part o f extension or matter, it has shape and location (and,

*° Cp. Descartes in a letter to Mislaid: “When we speak of body in general, we mean a

determinate part of matter, a part of the quantity of which the universe is composed” (9
February 1645, AT IV 166).
81 Descartes. Med. II, AT VII 26.
82 As a part of extension, impenetrable, coherent and continuous, body has no void lacunas
and cannot be composed of indivisibles and is thus indefinitely divisible, at least in our
imagination (Descartes. To Mersenne, 28 October 1640, AT III 213-214). Extension is to be
considered as purely geometrical and, therefore, presents a continuum and does not consist
of quanta or atoms.
83 Cp.: “There are certain acts that we call ‘corporeal’, such as size, shape, motion and all
others that cannot be thought of apart from local extension; and we use the term ‘body’ to
refer to the substance in which they inhere ” - Descartes. Third Set of Replies, AT VII 176;
cp. Princ. I 8, AT VIIIA 7; II 2, AT VIIIA 41; To More, 5 Febmary 1649, AT V 270.
** Cp. Descartes. To Elizabeth, 21 May 1643, AT III 665.
15 Descartes. Reg. 14, AT X 447.
16 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

subsequently, is movable). Lastly, insofar as body is continuous and coherent, it

has unity.
Such an understanding of body allows Descartes to consider body
quantitatively, that is, as a purely mathematical or geometrical quantity. Moreover,
he is also able to get rid of “occult” qualities and to understand all primary bodily
qualities (such as weight, hardness, shape, and so on) only in terms o f extension.
Furthermore, he can distinguish between primary qualities of bodies (such as those
mentioned), which are caused by bodies themselves, and secondary qualities,
which are caused only by our sensual apprehension o f bodies.*7 On Descartes’
account, bodily qualities are modally distinct from extension, because the nature o f
body consists not in qualities, but solely in extension; or to put it otherwise, all
qualities are only modes o f extension as substance.88
Body can thus be neither thought nor imagined without extension.
Because extension may itself be conceived as purely geometrical, the physical
body may be understood then as a purely geometrical figure. Consequently, to
know the essence o f a physical thing or body is to know it in its extension, which is
why all bodily features and properties are to be considered as only geometrical.
The whole world is then constituted by purely geometrical extended entities, and
all bodily properties are explainable either in terms of geometrical figures and their
properties or in terms o f our perception o f them. In this way, physics, the science
of bodies and their movements, is already structured as a geometrical science. This
understanding, which Descartes shares with Galilei, Newton and other seventeenth
century scientists, is radically different from any o f the ancient accounts of
physics. Now we can return to our main question, namely, what makes this new
physical science possible as a science mathematically structured.
It is important to note that for Descartes two things or notions are
identical if they cannot be differentiated or distinguished: A is B iff A is not
different from B. Sameness is introduced as non-difference; identity is understood
through non-distinction, as “not different from” and thus through double negation,
for distinction itself is a negation.89 When Descartes proceeds to the systematic

16 Cp. Descartes. To Morin, 13 July 1638, AT II 200; To Mersenne, 20 April 1646, AT IV

401.
87 Careful and attentive observation of the nature of bodies leads Descartes to conclude that
“nothing whatever belongs to the concept of body except the fact that it is something which
has length, breadth and depth and is capable of various shapes and motions; moreover, these
shapes and motions are merely modes which no power whatever can cause to exist apart
from body. But colors, smells, tastes and so on, are, I observed, merely certain sensations
which exist in my thought, and are as different from bodies as pain is different from the
shape and motion of the weapon which produces it. And lastly, I observed that heaviness
and hardness and the power to heat or to attract, or to purge, and all the other qualities which
we experience in bodies, consist solely in the motion of bodies, or its absence, and the
configuration and situation of their parts.” • Descartes. Sixth Set of Replies, AT VII440.
88 Descartes. Princ. II4, AT VIIIA 42; cp. Sixth Set of Replies, AT VII433.
89 We find the very same approach in Descartes’ understanding of number: number is not
different from the thing numbered (The World, AT XI 36), or there is only a conceptual
distinction between quantity or number and the thing that has quantity or number (Princ. II
8, AT VIIIA 44-45).
 Part I: Matter 17

formulation and presentation o f his approach in the “Principles”, he has to specify

the notion o f difference or distinction itself. Every attempt to distinguish and
delineate any two different entities and their properties inevitably leads to a
discussion o f the notion of distinction. In defining matter as not different from
extension, Descartes introduces the distinction as non-distinction, which is
noteworthy since Descartes’ primary intention is to escape negativity’s
uncertainty— which for him is only a privation (nihil privativum)— in favor o f the
clarity of positive being and understanding. It appears to be fundamental for
Descartes and for modem thinkers (who base their considerations in the tradition
o f Enlightenment) to consider philosophy a scientia, that is, a possibly all-
embracing systematic account, accessible to reason, so that the more general and
universal a statement is about the nature of the material world or human
understanding, the simpler and clearer the underlying principles should appear to
the mind.
The two main kinds o f distinctions commonly accepted in scholasticism
are real distinctions, which occur between thing and thing, and mental (or
conceptual) distinctions, which, as Suarez puts it, are not between things as they
exist in themselves but only as they exist in our mind. Mental distinction is itself
twofold: it is either distinctio rationis ratiocinantis, conceptual distinction, which
has no foundation in reality, or distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, which has its
foundation in reality, is “prior to the discriminating operation of the mind” and
requires the intellect only to recognize such a distinction, but not to constitute it.90
However, for certain philosophical and theological purposes, these two kinds o f
distinctions are not enough. The famous third kind is form al distinction, introduced
by Duns Scotus primarily to explain the difference between the divine attributes
while still preserving the unity o f God (Scotus also uses the notion o f formal
distinction in order to distinguish between the universal nature and
quidditas—“thisness”— of a finite created 4hing). Two objects, according to
Scotus, are formally distinct if they correspond to two different (non-identical)
notions that are not merely mental concepts. Formal distinction does not thus
presuppose a real distinction o f subjects (i.e., that they be two different really
existing things).91 Many scholastic writers reject the notion of formal distinction:
Ockham, John of Gent, and Cajetan deny any necessity for a third, intermediary
distinction. Suarez, who also rejects the notion o f formal distinction as excessively
equivocal, argues that there should be an intermediary distinction between real and
mental (or conceptual) distinctions, which in the “Metaphysical disputations” he
calls modal: a distinction “in between” real and mental. Mode is that which affects
quantity and determines “its state and manner of existing, without adding to it a
proper new entity, but merely modifying a pre-existing entity”.92 Modal distinction
is then the distinction between a mode and the thing modified or between modes.93

90 Suarez. Disp. met. VII. 1.1, 1.4.

91 Duns Scotus. In I Sent dist. 2 qu. 7; Opus ox. I. 8. 4; Suarez. Disp. met. VII. 1.13. Cp.
Copleston 1990,222-223.
92 Suarez. Disp. met. VII. 1.17; cp. VI. 1.9.
93 Although, unlike for Descartes, for Suarez there can be only mental distinction between
the modes, Suarez. Disp. met. VII. 1.18-26.
18 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

In his early period, Descartes, in attempting to render things known as

clear and univocal as possible, tries to escape distinctions within the distinctions
themselves. This however, leads to confusion. When Caterus asks Descartes to
explain further the difference between soul and body in terms o f formal distinction,
Descartes erroneously identifies formal distinction with modal distinction.94 The
probable source o f Descartes’ later theory o f distinction is Suarez: trying to
systematize his own philosophy, Descartes volens nolens has to follow the pattern
o f scholastic presentation. In particular, he finds Suarez’ tripartite distinction
appropriate for his own purpose. Descartes distinguishes three kinds of
distinctions: real, modal, and conceptual. The real distinction is between two or
more substances. The modal distinction is either between a mode and its substance
or between two modes of the same substance. The conceptual distinction is
between an attribute and a substance “without which the substance is
unintelligible”, or between two such attributes o f the same substance.95
Thus, when Descartes says “there is no real distinction” (e.g., between
corporeal substance and space) or “there is no conceptual distinction” (e.g.,
between a number and a thing numbered), it means that there is no difference
between two subjects either in reality or in our ideas, which eventually makes them
essentially the same— both as real things or as concepts of the mind. But as is quite
often the case in philosophy, an attempt to put one’s thought in the traditional,
already quite elaborated philosophical language, hides the original thought more
than reveals it. Or at the very least, the standard usage becomes modified. Among
the three kinds, the notion of modal distinction seems especially congenial to
Descartes, because o f his revision of the notion o f “mode” as a loose notion that
somehow represents or shows the essence of a thing.96 In the “Principles”
Descartes states that “by m ode...we understand exactly the same as what is
elsewhere meant by an attribute or quality. But we employ the term mode when we
are thinking of a substance as being affected or modified; when the modification
enables the substance to be designated as a substance of such a kind, we use the
term quality, and finally, when we are simply thinking in a more general way of
what is in a substance, we use the term attribute".91 There is, however, no

94 First Set of Objections and Replies, AT VII 100, 120; Descartes himself recognizes that
he does not draw difference between conceptual and modal distinctions in the
“Meditations”, Princ. I 62, AT V1I1A 30.
95 Descartes. Princ. I 60-62, AT VIIIA 28-30; cp. To ***, 1645 or 1646, AT IV 350.
96 Wells 1965, 1-22.
97 Princ. I 56, AT VIIIA 26. Cp.: “...I make a distinction between modes, strictly so called,
and attributes, without which the things whose attributes they are cannot be; or between the
modes of things themselves and the modes of thinking. ...Thus shape and motion are modes,
in the strict sense, of corporeal substance; because the same body can exist at one time with
one shape and at the other with another, now in motion and now at rest, whereas,
conversely, neither this shape nor this motion can exist without this body. Thus love, hatred,
affirmation, doubt, and so on are true modes in the mind. But existence, duration, size,
number and all universals are not, it seems to me, modes in the strict sense; nor in this sense
are justice, mercy, and so on modes in God. They are referred to by a broader term and
called attributes, or modes of thinking, because we do indeed understand the essence of a
thing in one way when we conceive it in abstraction from whether it exists or not, and in a
 Part 1: Matter 19

univocality in Descartes’ usage, for all three notions (mode, quality and attribute)
may be used almost interchangeably, especially when the three are related to the
case when substance is modified or changed— when the attribute or quality is
modified.98 The notion of “mode” seems further to be congenial to Descartes, since
there is no way for him to know, and thus to compare, substances directly.
Therefore, the mind is able to compare substances only through modes, understood
either as essential or as accidental attributes, which do not exist independently and
separately, but express their “vehicles” (their subjects) in the most adequate way.
Following the distinction Descartes has made, how can the relation between matter
and extension then be characterized? Obviously, their distinction is not real, for
they are not two different substances. Nor are they modally distinct, for neither is
to be considered only a mode, expressing the other as substance. Therefore, they
have to be understood as only conceptually distinct, if each is taken as the essential
attribute o f the other considered as substance (i.e., “extension is material” and
“matter is extended”). The subject (substance) is, however, one and the same in
both cases, univocally understandable and positively expressible, unlike the elusive
negativity o f matter in the Platonic tradition.

1.2 Substance: ontology vs. henology

Comparing the two approaches to the treatment o f geometrical and physical

entities, one might say that Descartes thinks and develops his philosophy and
science within an ontological framework, departing from the initial presupposition
that whatever simply and necessarily is, without detriment and change, is the
primary reality that causes everything that does not exist necessarily. Plotinus, on
the contrary, thinks within the henological (Greek hen, “one”) framework, which
posits the cause and source even for being, the source which is not being itself and
is thereby primary to being. In order to be able to give an account and to appreciate
fully the difference between the ancient and modem approaches to science, let us
first briefly characterize the henological and then the ontological positions by their
fundaments, considering Plotinus and Descartes as their two representatives. Of
course, henology and ontology do not represent two complete and closed systems,
for within each o f the two approaches there exists a significant number of
variations (in fact, every thinker always proposes his or her own variant o f the
whole, which could hardly be ever fiilly thematized), but there definitely are
clearly distinguishable “family resemblances” that make the two fundamentally
non-isomorphic and incompatible with each other. Gilson puts it nicely: “In the

different way when we consider it as existing; but the thing itself cannot be outside our
thought without its existence, or without its duration or size, and so on.” - To ***, 1645 or
1646, AT IV 348-349. Cp. Gaukroger 1995,366-367.
98 As Garber puts it, “the term ‘mode’, modus in Latin, means quite simply ‘way’; it is a
perfect term to choose to express the fact that all accidents are ways of something being
extended or being a thinking thing, ways of expressing the essence of a thing. In
emphasizing the necessity of a link between essence and accident, attribute and mode,
Descartes is saying something his teachers would not have, and thus departures from their
terminology” - Garber 1992,69. Cp. Wolfson 19691, 71-72.
20 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

doctrine o f Being the inferior is only because o f the being o f the superior. On the
contrary, in the doctrine o f the One the general principle is that the inferior is only
because o f that which the superior is not. In fact, the superior ever gives only that
which it itself does not have, because, in order to be able to give it, the superior has
to be above it.”99

1.2.1 The One and the multitude in Plotinus

The starting (or “launching”, as Porphyry puts it) point for Plotinus is the One,
which is not being (ho me on estin). The problem posed by the One draws all of his
attention— his intellectual and physical forces—and, in fact, Plotinus comes to
define the entirety o f his life and philosophy as an attempt to grasp this One and
escape “in solitude to the solitary” in an invincible desire to become one.100
Henology thus precedes and underlies ontology. Plotinus implicitly accepts the
following axiomatic statements about the One.
I. There is the principle (arkhè, aitia, pégè or rhiza) of everything existent. This
principle is the highest possible good, agathon, so that nothing can be better or
greater than it.101
II. Everything which is perfect (teleia), necessarily produces or gives.102
III. That which gives is better than that which is given.103
IV. A unified simple whole is better and more perfect than that which is complex,
compound and composite; it takes precedence over all the parts as distinctions and
differences which can be discerned in it only afterwards.
These four axioms underlie and determine the specific way o f exposition
and specific features o f Plotinus’ system. First o f all, they entail (1) that there is
only one (monori) principle, the principle, the One.104 Evidently, if there were two
o f them, they would have formed a complex system, which (according to axiom
IV) is not as good as a unique single principle. Therefore, as principles they could
not represent the good. The good and the One are thus identical. The one good or
the good One is the One-good, is absolutely one and the same, so that the good as
different from or not identical with the One, in fact, can only be discerned in a
secondary way. This One-good (2) has not come to be (mède gegone),105 since
otherwise there would have to be something better according to axiom IV, (in other
words, the One would not be perfectly “one”). This “not-coming-to-being” o f the

"Gilson 1948,42.
100 Plotinus. Enn. VI. 9. 5. 30; VI.9.11.51.
101 Plotinus. Enn. VI.9.9.1-2; VI.8.8.9. Cp. Steel 1989, 69-84, Bussanich 1988, 207-208 and
Siegmann 1990, 142 sqq.
102 Plotinus. Enn. V.l.6.38.
103 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.17.5.
104 Plotinus. Enn. V. 1.7.20. On various readings of the relation of monism and dualism in
Platonism see: Halfwassen 1997, 1*21. Among the Neoplatonists, lamblichus was later the
first to postulate two Ones, the One allowing no participation and being completely
ineffable, pantelôs arrhêton, and the One simply, precedent to all duality, ho haplôs hen, see
Dillon in: lamblichus 1973, 29-33.
105 Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.7.35.
 Par11: Matter 21

One presupposes that it is beyond all temporal characteristics or duration o f any

kind and gives or produces, first, the monadic “now” of eternity and, then, time
and temporal duration.106
This further implies (3) that the One produces eternally— it is neither in a
certain fixed moment or moments o f time, nor in each moment o f time, because it
is not in time at all. The One is the infinite, the “unspeakably great” potency o f all,
dynamis panton, which never becomes that all. It, in other words, is ever
transcendent to being and to anything that participates in being and is absent from
anything other than itself (only a certain “trace” o f the One is in everything as the
uniqueness o f its individuality).107 The One (4) is absolutely simple, without any
parts whatsoever.108 For if there were several parts in it, then only one o f them,
according to (1) and axiom I (in fact, as it is easy to see, axiom I and (1) are
mutually convertible) and axiom III, would be the best, and hence, according to
axiom II, would be the generator of the other parts. Moreover, it is only the One
that is absolutely simple, indissoluble and without any addition. Therefore (5),
everything other is complex— it is itself and something else.109 Particularly, it
means that for each and every “ayto”, for every substance (be it real or
hypothetical), its essence differs from its existence. The only and unique exception
is the One “itself’, where no such distinction can be made. In this sense, which is
crucial for the henological approach, the One identical to itself as “ayto” is not
being, oyde to on.110 At this point Plotinus turns to Plato’s “Parmenides”, which is
so important for constituting the whole o f his system. The “Parmenides” is the
starting point for Plotinus, around which the whole o f his henology is based.
Plotinus’ henology, as has been discussed, subsumes ontology with its distinction
o f dual intelligible principles o f the same and other—or o f oneness and
duality—which subsequently form the realm o f being and underlie human
subjectivity.
The One o f the first hypothesis o f Plato’s “Parmenides”, considered
beyond any otherness or many, can be grasped neither by sensation, nor
imagination, nor thought. It cannot even be (unlike the One considered together
with the multiple) the one-many of the second hypothesis, which really comes into
being, is being itself and is first to be thought.1 If that which is after the One, the

106 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. III.7.3.36 et al. See also: Pines, Sambursky 1987, passim; Galpirine
1980, 325-341; Hoffmann 1980, 307-323.
107 Plotinus. Enn. III.8.I0.1; IV.8.6.11; V.l.7.10; VI.8.20.38 sqq. See: Nikulin 2000, 15-38.
108 Plotinus. Enn. V.4.1.5.
109 The One “is something which has its place high above everything, this which alone is
free in truth, because it is not enslaved to itself, but is only itself and really itself, while
every other thing is itself and something else” (Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.21.30-33).
1,0 Plotinus. Enn. VI.9.2.47, cp. VI.9.3.37-38. Plotinus constantly refers to the famous
passage in Plato’s “Republic”, although stressing it much more energetically: “the good
itself is not essence but transcends essence (epekeina tes oysias) in dignity and power” (RP
509b; cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.9.28, VI.9.11.42 et al.). There is nothing above the One,
meden esti to hyperkeimenon (Enn. VI.7.22.20-21). Hyperkeimenon, “superstratum”, the
source of being which precedes the being, is an obvious opposition to the Aristotelian
hypokeimenon as underlying substratum of an existing substance.
1 Plato. Paim. 137c-142a; 142b-157b. Cp. Wyller 1960,81 sqq.
22 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

intellect-noys, is the one and unique being, it should somehow contain the very
form of multiplicity. Thus, although the intellect as being is one (the one-being), it
is not altogether simple, but contains a (finite, according to Plotinus) number of
forms o f things. The oneness-Ae/» is not therefore altogether identical with being-
on in intellect, but both form a primary multiplicity as forms of otherness or
duality.
This implies (6) that the One is absolutely different from everything that
is, in particular, from the intellect: it is neither the collection o f forms, nor
thinking.112 Moreover, it itself is not thinkable. Paradoxically, it is not even
thinkable that the One or the good is not thinkable, because the very concept of
“not being thinkable” is itself thinkable. Thinking serves the purpose of
overcoming the state o f partiality, incompleteness and being split; it gathers many
into one. For this reason the One cannot be thought; it is neither incomplete, nor
deficient, nor does it need anything."3 Therefore (7), the One is not knowable in its
essence, which (as not different from its existence) can be represented to us only
negatively, as not-essence (of anything else) or as above essence, which coincides
with non-existence.114 The One is also (8) before all things (pro toyton), since it
precedes being, just as being precedes and is separate from becoming.115
Consequently (9), the One is absolutely different from everything that is, or
somehow participates in being, and is even different from the non-being of matter
(i.e., not only from the intellect and being, but also from becoming; from the
distinction into positive and negative, and so on; and from all that can be thought,
imagined, sensually apprehended, uttered or predicated). But since the One or the
good is the first, the cause of bringing forth all the other things, it is in a sense all
these things, still being absolutely different from them.116 So finally (10), we have
to conclude that, after all, it is extremely difficult to speak about the One and it is
only in this unique case that we have to make use o f a peculiar way of negative
expression, traditionally called the via negativa or apophatic approach.
Where being is presented not as simply existing by itself as an act of
itself, but as caused, one faces an ambiguity of thinking and speaking about that
which is neither speakable nor thinkable.117 The appropriate language is found in
the via negativa.11 Such a language is a peculiar way o f speaking about non-being
and the actually infinite in “the audacity to think the unthinkable”, in the words of
Funkenstein119—a specific way of putting statements in negative form about that
which cannot be formulated in an ordinary way and which escapes adequate
expression in terms of the usual predicative structure (cp. above, (6)). Ordinary

1.2 Plotinus. Enn. III.9.9.1; V.3.14.19; V.4.2.3; V.7.35.43 et al.

1.3 Plotinus. Enn. V.3.10.47.
114 Cp. Gregory Palamas. Triads lll.ii.5; Capita 150, 132-145.
1.5 Plotinus. Enn. VI.9.5.38; VI.9.11.35.
1.6 Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.21.24; VI.9.3.40. Cp. Lloyd 1976, 146-156.
1.7 Cp. Parmenides’ warning against the danger of reasoning about the non-existent (Plato.
Soph. 236e-237b).
1.8 Cp. Armstrong 1940, 29-47; Hadot 1968,1278-283; Beierwaltes 1985,104-107; Guérard
1985, 331-354.
119 Funkenstein 1986,15.
 Part I: Matter 23

language presupposes that the subject-predicate dichotomy refers to finite definite

subjects and is exemplified in logical structures. The via positiva or kataphatic way
consists in enumerating attributes or predicates o f a considered subject that appear
to be either essential or accidental to it. But since the primary principle in henology
is supposed to be beyond being and actually infinite, it is not immediately clear
how it can be grasped or spoken of. The apophatic way is not merely a negation or
abstention from judgement, as it would be in skepticism, but a specific way of
expressing definite statements in negative terms, as not this and not that, as not
such-and-such, o f speaking about that which cannot be ordinarily described. The
One that cannot be grasped per se is revealed through negation, which thus
(re)presents the not representable.
For this reason Plotinus repeatedly claims that every way of “expressing
about the One” (not “expressing the One”) is inadequate.120 Therefore, it is more
appropriate to understand the One negatively: it is neither intellect, nor discursive
reasoning, nor substance, nor relation or logos o f any kind, nor form, nor limit, is
non-dual and not many.121 That is why the One is pre-reflective and, being the
Good, it is primarily the good for the other or, rather, is above goodness.122
Furthermore, since nothing can be properly predicated about the One and there is
not yet an other, in relation to which the cause might be distinguished from the
caused and the foundation from the founded, it is only in some way, “as if ’ (hoion),
relative to our perception and thinking, that the One can be considered the cause of
itself and subsisting by itself; thus equally it may be taken as not self-foundational,
a not sub-stantia, anypotheton.m The One defines everything, while not itself
being defined by the defined.
Mere negation, however, is not an adequate way o f expressing the One,
which transcends all negation, as well as all affirmation. Since the negated in the
via negativa still remains properly inaccessible (as beyond being and infinite),
negation, as Proclus argues, is not privative but primarily productive: negation
does not affect the negated (the One), but also does not establish anything really
opposite to the negated. Thus, to negate the non-being of the One is to affirm
being, although being is not really opposite to the One, which has no opposites and
cannot be thought in terms of opposites. To negate the multiplicity o f the One is
not only to affirm unity (which is not strictly applicable to the One), but also to
make multiplicity (as otherness or duality) exist. Similarly, the negation of the
finite amounts to the acknowledgment of the infinite, but also, simultaneously, to

120 Gerson 1994, 15-16.

121 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. V.3.14.4-8: kaigar legomen ho me estin: ho de estin, oy iegomen.
122 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.13.34; VI.7.17.15,42; Vl.8.13.52; VI.7.41.28-29.
123 Plotinus. Enn VI.8.11.32-33 (eph' haytoy gar kai hyphesteke, prin alio); VI.8.14.35-42;
cp. Plato. RP 510b. On the notion of the causa sui in Plotinus see: Beierwaltes 1999, 191-
225. Narbonne, who argues that both in Plotinus (who is historically the first to introduce
the notion) and in Descartes, causa sui implies insurmountable difficulties in understanding
the One and God, who should rather be considered as subsisting (in Plotinus, beyond being)
a se, understood as sine causa, without cause. - Narbonne 1993a, 177-195.
124 Proclus. Theol. Plat. II 37.5-39.5, 63. 8-17; cp. In Parm. VI 1074.15 sqq. Cp. Steel 1999,
351-368.
24 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

the affirmation o f the finite.

Technically, the notion o f negation is expressed either by the term
apophasis or by aphairesis. The former means “abstraction” or “taking away” and
is used by Albinus to characterize the way a conception is formed by removing
certain attributes.121 The latter means negation in a logical proposition and is used
by Aristotle. Negation, as aphairesis is opposed by Aristotle to privation, steresis:
privation occurs in affirmative propositions and expresses the lack o f a certain
quality that might be present but is not there. Negation, contrarily, stands in
negative propositions and is such that the opposite to negation can never be
affirmed of the subject.126 In Plotinus it is possible to distinguish a tendency of
reserving the aphairesis for the properly apophatic context, while using the term
apophasis for discussing examples put in Aristotelian language.127 However, both
terms may also be used very much interchangeably and, as Wolfson argues, they
are equivalent in the context of via negativa.m Thus, the notion o f aphairesis
rather exemplifies that which can never be characterized by any positive
predicates, the nihil negativum, while steresis primarily refers to the nihil
privativum.
The most congenial way of conceiving “about the One” (again, not
“conceiving the One”) is then negating negation itself, applying the generative
procedure o f negation to negation itself. The negatio negationis plays such an
important role not only in late Platonic thought (in Iamblichus, Proclus and
Damascius, in Dionysius the Areopagite), but also in Philo, Nicholas o f Cusa, in
Newton and in Hegel.129 It is only when negativity reflectively applies or turns to
itself, even if not being anything substantial, that it can give way to that which
cannot be positively defined, although without really grasping the subject to which
the double negation is applied.
Plotinus claims the One to be “other than all the things which come after
it” (pantdn heteron ton m et’ ayto), a non-aliud, non-striving towards anything
other than itself, a non-striving even to itself.130 But it is also correct to say that the
One is not non-being, oyk esti me einai.m Since the One is not in being but
produces it, it may be said to be not-being, yet since it is not a lifeless privation of
being, it is also not non-being. But the negatio negationis cannot pertain to the One
itself (of the first hypothesis o f the “Parmenides”), but the double negation is valid
only in representing reflectively the One in the multiplicity (duality) o f thinking o f

125 Alcinous (Albinus). Oidask. 10.5.

126 Aristotle. Met. 1004a 14-16; 1056a 15-16.
127 Plotinus. Enn. VI. 1.9.33-38; VI.3.27.19; VI.7.36.7; VI.8.11.34.
128 Wolfson 1973 I, 119-121. Cp. Wolfson 1957, 145-156.
129 Cp. Beierwaltes 1965, 395-398.
130 Plotinus. Enn. V.4.1.6; VI.8.10.25-26. Cp. Cusanus. De li non-aliud 6 sqq. In a sense, the
very inability not to speak or not to think about the One is a certain modal reproduction of
the structure of double negation as “not possible not to”. And, of course, it is also not by
chance that this basic structure is to be found in the expression of freedom that is the
rational freedom of the intellect, which “could be said to have freedom and anything in its
power, when it does not have it in its power not to act” (Enn. VI.8.4.6-7; italics added). See:
O’Meara 1992, 343-349.
131 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.I2.I8; cp. VI.5.1.23-24.
 Part I: Matter 25

the one-being of the intellect (of the second hypothesis o f the “Parmenides”).
Besides the via negationis, the other way o f representing the One is
analogy, via analogiae.132 When a considered subject cannot be grasped directly,
one can nevertheless know the relation in which it stands to other things (in case of
the One, the relation o f participation of being in its cause, as the light to the sun).
This way of approaching the One is mathematical, because it is structured as a
proportion.133 In such a proportion one o f the terms, the source o f being, is
expressed analogically in its relation to a known term through the relation of the
other two terms, which are known as well. In this way the term in question may
still not be known per se, but only through the relation o f the other to it.
Thus, although the One is the first and prior to the multitude in any of its
representations, nevertheless it is not the first for us in our considerations, because
o f its simplicity that surpasses all simplicity. In fact, everything simple considered
as such by our mind, is not simple, but has the structure of the “one-being” o f the
second hypothesis o f the “Parmenides”. If we conceive X as simple and say: X is
simple, then S = “being simple” is already thought in an elementary complex
structure, that o f duality, of X— S. If we say “simple (i.e., being simple) is Y”,
then, again, S* = “being simple”, which now is understood as the subject, is
conceived not as simple, but through the other, i.e. through its predicate in S*—Y.
Thus, it may be argued once again that (by analogy) simplicity, which is
discursively thought in any of the above two cases, may be thought only insofar as
it participates in a simplicity that does not allow duality o f the kind “one-being”.
However, everything that cannot be conceived under this pattern is not properly
thought in discursive logical analysis.
We have to begin with something other, namely, with the many that is not
the One itself, but ensues the One, totally different from it and depends on i t 134
This primary otherness cannot be taken just as pure otherness or difference from
everything else, as otherwise nothing could be fixed in being or thought (in
particular, the first otherness itself). Therefore, the first otherness, as it has been
argued, should be different from mere privation, although through the procedure of
double negation it should arrive at the other o f the otherness as something positive,
that is, as the same.135 Thus, the first point o f departure for us is not the absolute
unity o f the One, but the dual unity of sameness-othemess, or one-being. That
otherness (thateron, heterotes) is already in duality, without which nothing can be

132 Cp. Plato. RP 506d-509c; Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.36.7-9; Proclus. Theol. Plat. II 39.6-26; cp.
Damascius. De princ. I 42.11 sqq. The third way, via eminentiae, consists in raising from a
concept exemplified in particular subjects to the concept in itself, e.g. from contemplation of
the beautiful in bodies to the beauty in souls, then in sciences and finally—to the
understanding of the beauty as such, cp. Plato. Symp. 210a-e; Alcinous. Didask. 10.6. This
method is not, however, applicable in henology, for the One does not have a rationally
apprehensible concept. See also commentary by Dillon ap. Alcinous. Didask., p. 109-110.
Cp. Euclid. Elem. VII, def. 20.
134 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.8.18; Halfwassen 1992,75-81.
135 For this reason, the same and the other of Plato’s “Sophist” (2S4d sqq.) are mutually
inseparable in the list of five categories, applicable, according to Plotinus, to the noetic
world (cp. Enn. VI.2.8).
26 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

understood or exist. It is to be considered together with sameness (tayton) as the

two main principles constituting being and intellect.136 These two principles may
be further identified with the one as oneness-/ren (tayton) and the many as duality-
aoristos dyas (thateron, polla) of the Platonic tradition.137 Otherness (the dyad)
together and inseparable from sameness, both constitute in their interaction the
whole sphere o f the intellect, which is being in and through multiplicity, defined by
the initial form of the duality of hen-on. The multiplicity in being, in the intellect,
may then be considered as shaped through the interaction o f the two principles of
oneness (sameness) and the dyad (otherness), interpreted by the Pythagoreans as
the active limiting principle (horizon) and as the passive limited one (horiston kai
horizomenon).m Only the One is beyond otherness, since the One precedes all
possible distinctions, while everything the other participates in, as it occurs through
otherness, involves the many.139 The many is profoundly ambiguous: as otherness,
it appears as both the ideal thinkable principle of multitude, and as a multiplicity of
not being it is represented as matter.

1.2.2 Distinction between the One and matter

One o f the main problems that arises in the henological approach is the relation of
the source of being to the absolute negativity o f matter: is there any difference
between them, and if so, in what sense, since both cannot be properly described.
Matter is the most distant from the One as the absolute lack o f goodness and being,
but, paradoxically, it appears to be the closest to the One. The reason is that, first,
both appear to be unlimited potency-dynamis and, second, neither belongs to the
sphere of being. There are a number o f “predicates” that both the One and matter
seem to have in common (although it is impossible to ascribe any predicates to
them properly). Thus, both the One and matter may be characterized negatively;
both—and only they— may be characterized as nihil negativum. Both are formless,
aneideon, without any image; in(de)finite, apeiron; cannot be spoken of; and are
mere potentiality.140
Remarkably, even when Plotinus enters the shaky ground o f considering
non-being, he cannot completely fail to distinguish the One from matter. If we say

,36 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. III.7.3.8-11.

137 J. Rist argues that the dyad should not be identified with the many as such, because the
former is the generative principle of the latter (Rist 1962, 99-107). The problem here is
whether the dyad and otherness are mutually substitutive or if one of them is logically prior.
I am inclined to think that although dyas and heterotes in most cases are synonymous in the
Enneads, nevertheless heterotes is more fundamental as a principle, because the first
distinction of duality (and, further, of multiplicity) becomes possible only when the first
otherness is brought forward as a distinction from die non-distinction of the One.
138 Cp. Kallikratidos, 103.11 Thesleflf; Iamblichus. Theolog. Arithm. 7,19; 9,6; Pythagoras.
Hier. log. 164.24 Thesleff; Anon. Alexandri 234.18-20 TheslesfY. On the role and dialectic
of hen and aoristos dyas see: Hdsle 1984,459 sqq.
139 So, there can be no thinking in the intellect without otherness, that is, without at least a
virtual doubling of noesis-noeta, cp. Plotinus. Enn. Vl.9.6.42-43; VI.9.8.25.
140 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.33.21; III.6.7.7 sqq.; 11.5.4.12; VI.7.32.15; 11.4.15.10; VI.7.38.11-12;
III.6.15.28.
 Part /. Matter 27

that matter cannot be identical with the One, this judgement is itself paradoxically
untrue in relation to the One itself, for it cannot be put in terms o f the S— P
structure, since the One and matter are not any particular subjects. In fact, it is not
even correct to say “both”, because, prior to any otherness, only the One “is”. If
there is a fundamental difference between the two, it cannot be brought in by
matter, for, as it has been said, the difference of matter is constituted only
negatively (i.e., to everything else), so that it is only the One that ultimately may be
the cause of such a difference. There are at least four points of distinction between
the One and matter.
(1) The difference is already there in terms of difference itself. Matter
differs from everything and in its non-being is radically other to being.141 Since
there is no “se lf’ in matter, it cannot be, in its radical otherness, anything in itself.
Here we encounter an inevitable paradox: matter, as absolute otherness, has to be
different from and other not only to any particular thing or entity, but to itself as
otherness. Matter does not arrive or return back to itself through double negation,
exactly because “pure” otherness in matter is not anything definite— it is not an
ideal principle, rather it is nothing (unlike in the principle o f otherness, aoristos
dyas). Matter, unlike the One, is not “not non-being” as the One, but still remains
non-being. The One, on the contrary, while being absolutely different from
everything else, is introduced by double negation, as “not other than itself’,
remaining “itself by itself’.142
(2) The One is the good per se and is the first and the ultimate in the order
of procession and causation. Since the One is the first and beyond being,
everything that comes after the One is different from the One, and is not the good.
Since being comes second and necessarily consists o f an admixture o f multiplicity,
being is not as good as the One. Matter is after the first and is itself the last in the
existing or in the order of procession. Since being is not the good as such, in a
certain sense being may even be ascribed to matter.143 The notion o f matter is
extremely ambiguous: it is nothing o f the existent and, as said, does not properly
exist— it “is” non-being. On the other hand, since some shadow or image o f being
is brought to everything that is after the One, being may be ascribed also to matter.
However, the presence of the being o f matter is rather metaphorical, or so faint that
matter, the last, may be conceived also as closest to the One. This is an important
conclusion for henology, because it leads first to the recognition o f the above
mentioned purely thinkable principle of otherness, or of materiality, and second to
the recognition o f matter of a special kind, namely, of intelligible matter (see 2.4).
(3) Next, the One is the good, the source o f light, as it were, while matter
is darkness as privation o f light and is even said to be evil.144 The distinction
between matter (as evil) and the One lies in that there is evil neither in that which
is above being, nor in the intellect. And if evil “is”, it “exists” among non-existent

141 Plotinus. Enn. I.8.3.6-9.

142 Oy gar estin alio haytoy to agathon, Plotinus. Enn. V.6.5.11-12; ayto pros hayto menei,
Enn. V.3.10.51.
143 Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.7.17-23; VI.8.8.9; 1.8.7.12. In Enn. V.8.7.22 matter is called eidos ti
eskhaton.
144 Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.8.9; 1.8.7.12; II.4.5.7-9.
28 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

things, in matter as a sort o f form o f non-existence.145 As otherness, matter is not

any particular evil, but rather the “basis” of evil as privation o f goodness. In the
One qua the good there is no evil at all, because there is neither deficiency in it,
nor anything contrary to it. The One is other to being, because it is incomparably
better than being and is, so to say, “before” or “above” being, while matter is
incomparably worse than anything else and is “after” or “beneath” being— it is
absolute deficiency, elleipsis, different from otherness as the principle.146
(4) Lastly, potentiality of matter is not the same as potentiality of the One
As the infinite potency o f everything, the One is ever transcendent to everything
and thus never becomes anything itself. The One is therefore always absent in its
presence. The One is the overwhelming power to produce being, a unique source
o f all, an absolute richness and fullness. Quite to the contrary, matter, as negative
potency that is never actualized, is always present in everything, even in
intelligible objects. Plotinus has to ascribe to matter a certain negative potentiality,
incapable o f any production but as if bothering that which is in being,
inexhaustible because there is simply nothing in matter to be exhausted, an
absolute poverty and emptiness.147 It is only a “promise” and is ever present
through its absence.

1.2.3 Substance and attribute in Descartes

Let us now turn to the ontological description represented in and by Descartes as

opposed to the henological one. Cartesian ontology is based on the notion of
substance. Descartes seems to be less interested in precise definitions o f terms and
subtle distinctions he might use; rather, he is more concerned with a clear and
simple explanation and description of certain phenomena, which he supposes to be
accessible and understandable to every reasonable human being. For this purpose
he uses the inherited scholastic Aristotelian language, rather than inventing his
own, inevitably rethinking much of its contents.148
However, when asked about the notion o f substance, in the objections to
the “Meditations”, Descartes needs to provide explanations. The definition of
substance he gives in the second set o f replies to the “Meditations” stresses that
substance is the subject in which its perceivable attributes reside, which is the
Aristotelian usage o f the term, since for Aristotle substance-oyj/a is primarily the

145 Eidos ti toy me ontos, Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.3.1-6; cp. Corrigan, O’Cleirigh 1987, 576-577.
146 Plotinus. Enn. I.8.5.5; cp. 1.8.6.21; VI.7.23.6-8.
147 Plotinus. Enn. H.5.4.3 sqq.; 1.8.14.35-36; Vi.7.27.11. As Plotinus puts it, the many does
not come from the many, i.e., it does not engender itself and, therefore, matter does not
come from itself, but from the One (Plotinus. Enn. V.3.16.12-13).
148 Cp. Gilson 1979, 275-281. As Descartes argues, it is better to accept a provisional,
already existing building (of the general principles, morals, language etc.) which one already
has at hand, than to construct a new one based solely on rationally verifiable presuppositions
(cp. Disc. Ill, AT VI 22; see also: Peperzak 1995, 133-155). But every language is charged
with historical connotations and has its immanent structure and logic. Language thus resists
our intentions to transform it and usually says either what we do not intend or more than we
want to say.
 Part I: Matter 29

subject that cannot be further predicated o f anything else.149 Descartes also agrees
with Aristotle that all attributes are attributes of substance(s) and cannot exist apart
and independent from them. There is “more reality” in a substance than in an
attribute or mode, because if accidents existed independently, they would have
been substances and not accidents, by their very definition and notion.150 These
attributes are not, however, all equal but express the substance as their subject
differently. Essential attributes are true and adequate expressions of underlying
substance(s), which are thinking, in the case of the mind; extension, in the case of
matter and body; and ultimate perfection (infinity), in the case of God.151
Descartes considers it possible for the attributes to be subordinated to
each other, so that “there is no awkwardness in saying that an accident is the
subject of another accident, just as we say that quantity is the subject of other
accidents”.152 Attributes thus may form a kind o f ladder, so that one attribute may
appear as a subject o f another attribute. Descartes does not, however, go as far as
to say that the difference between substance and attribute is only relative (i.e.,
depends only on the point o f view of their consideration), because that would have
made attributes real, or existing without substance, which Descartes rejects.
The allegedly obvious clarity and simplicity o f Descartes’ account of
extended substance as matter, and thought as mind, is not as simple as it appears.
Even the most fundamental distinction between a finite substance and its essential
attribute is not as univocal as Descartes would like it to be. Indeed, extension and
thought may be considered not only as two created substances, but simultaneously
also as two essential attributes o f these same substances. Descartes has to
recognize that “it seems necessary that the mind should always be actually engaged
in thinking; because thought constitutes its essence, just as extension constitutes
the essence o f a body. Thought is not conceived as an attribute that can be present
or absent like the division o f parts, or motion, in a body”.153 In other words,
thought (as well as the extension) appears to be both substance and the substantial
(essential) attribute.154 Perhaps, this equivocation might be overcome by

149 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 161. Cp. Aristotle. Cat. 2a 12-13; Met. 1028a
10 sqq.; Phys. 190a 36-190b 1. See: Frede 1987, 72-80. An obvious distinction between
Aristotelian and Cartesian accounts of substance and matter is that for Aristotle nothing is
opposite to substance (Cat. 3b 23). Even if in Aristotle matter may be treated as substance, it
nonetheless has no opposite. And more so in Plato and Plotinus: since matter “is” non-being
and is not a real subject, there can be no real opposition to being and to any subject. In
Descartes matter as substance is opposite to mind as the other substance; and maner as finite
substance is opposed to God as the infinite substance.
150 Cp. Descartes. Third Set of Replies, AT VII 185; Sixth Set of Replies, AT VII 434.
151 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 161-162, 165; Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII
385; Princ. I 53, AT VIIIA 25; To Amauld, 29 July 1648, AT V 221.
152 Descartes. To Mersenne for Hobbes, 21 April 1641, AT III 355. Cp. Grene 1985, 88-108;
Marion 1992, 129-131.
153 Descartes. For [Amauld], 4 June 1648, AT V 192; cp. Princ. 1 63-64, AT VIIIA 30-31;
Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, AT VIIIB 348-349.
154 In scholastic terminology that follows Aristotle and Porphyry’s Eisagoge, proprium is an
accident that is not essential, but found only in this particular species—as writing or
laughing are proper only to humans, even if they might not essentially characterize humans.
30 Matter, imagination and Geometry

introducing certain distinctions (like that between thinking and the objects of
thinking, see 3.1.1), but Descartes does not do so, despite providing some hints in
this direction.155 Obviously, Descartes tries to avoid distorting the clarity and
simplicity o f the attentive mind, which intuits reality as consisting simply of two
finite created substances— res extensa and res cogitans—and one infinite creating
thinking substance. Descartes rejects the possibility of a mistake or
misunderstanding, since the natural light of reason, the light that secures the truth
of the clear and distinct cogitation or perception,156 is itself grounded in the truth of
the infinite thinking. The process of questioning stops in the self-exhaustion of
doubt in the act of the “cogito”, the clarity and certainty o f which is itself provided
and supported by the natural light. However, the truth o f the infinite thinking is
exemplified for Descartes by the finite mind, which departs from the starting point
of absolute certitude of self-awareness, initially without any content. But the finite
mind is itself grounded in the infinite one. This is not however, a vicious circle,
because the finite res extensa is secured in its being by the infinite one, or
ontologically, whereas the infinite thinking is secured as known for us by the finite
one, or epistemologically. The objection that the notion o f the infinite substance is
introduced by Descartes simply ad hoc—primarily in order to justify the existence
o f the two created substances, which support thinking and extension— is left
unanswered and so is potentially destructive for the whole Cartesian project of
justifying the existence of God.15
An important question then is why there is only one essential attribute. A
possible answer might be that, as they are introduced by Descartes, essential
attributes separate all that is considered substance into non intersecting classes of
equivalence.158 If R designates a two-place relation, then it is the relation of
equivalence iff it is: (1) reflective: xRx, (2) symmetrical: xRy iff yRx, and (3)
transitive: (xRy & yRz) entails xRz. Obviously, in the case o f Descartes, if T =
“possesses (the attribute of) thinking, equally as” and E = “possesses (the attribute
of) extension, equally as”, then the whole reality is separated (by these two
relations o f equivalence T and E) into two non-intersecting classes o f res cogitans
and res extensa. Moreover, T and E are merely relations, but at the same time, as
said, they may also be considered finite substances themselves, thinking and
extension as such. Perfection, the distinctive “attribute” of God, can also be

Such accidents are called accidentia propria (cp. Aristotle. Topics 102 a 17 sqq.). As Garber
argues, in order to explain all bodily properties as geometrical, Descartes wants to make all
accidents intimately connected with their substance or subject, that is, to be its propria or
accidentia propria (Garber 1992, 68). If essential attributes may be equivocally taken as
substances and attributes of these substances, and if Descartes wants to preserve his already
rather loose ontology, then essential attributes should somehow differ from all other
attributes, qualities or modes, which are then to be considered propria or accidentia propria
of these substances, subordinated to essential attributes and understood solely through them.
155 See: Descartes. For [Amauld], 29 July 1648, AT V 221.
156 Descartes. Princ. 145, AT VIIIA 21-22.
157 Cp. Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 34 sqq.
158 Cp. Spinoza, Ethics I, Prop. 2: “Two substances having different attributes have nothing
in common with one another”.
 Part I: Matter 31

considered in this way with the only difference being that there is only one
member that belongs to the whole class, one single infinite substance that satisfies
all three conditions, which once again shows that God may be considered
substance in a different sense.
Thus, the first aspect of the notion o f substance in Descartes is that it is
subject with attributes that discloses its subject univocally (although the
unequivocal difference between various kinds o f attributes and modes is not itself
established univocally). The mind is required to find an appropriate attribute that
makes one substance different from another. The second aspect o f the notion o f
substance is that o f existence: substance is that which exists by itself, it is “without
aid o f any other substance”.159 If substance exists due only to itself, it does not
depend on anything else other than itself and, therefore, thirdly, is independent.
Thus, there are three aspects of understanding substance in Descartes (also to be
found in scholasticism):60 substance may be taken as subject, substance exists only
due to itself and substance is independent.
Strictly speaking, that substance depends in its existence only on itself,
applies only to the infinite not created and creating substance or God, for only God
does not depend on any other thing.161 “By the word ‘God’”, says Descartes, “I
understand a substance that is infinite, eternal, immutable, independent, supremely
intelligent, supremely powerful, and which created both myself and everything else
(if anything else there be) that exists”.162 This makes the notion o f substance
equivocal, so that Descartes has to specify that the substance is God and the other
two—finite mind and body—are substances only in a limited sense, as dependent
on nothing else but the substance, for they need “only the concurrence of God in
order to exist”.163 Thus, in the proper sense, there is only one substance, the infinite
perfect thinking: as non-created it does not really depend on anything else but
itself—and, further, there are two derivative or created substances, the one spiritual
(mind), the other material (body). In Picot’s French edition of the “Principles” we
find the following explanation: “In the case of other things, some are o f such a
nature that they cannot exist without other things, while some need only the
ordinary concurrence o f God in order to exist. We make the distinction by calling
the latter ‘substances’ and the former ‘qualities’ or ‘attributes’ o f those
substances”.164 This, again, makes the two finite substances (essential) attributes

159 Descartes. Fourth Set of Replies, AT VII 226. Cp. substance is “nothing other than a
thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence”, Princ. I 5,
AT VIIIA 24.
160 A possible source Descartes might have in mind is the manual of Eustachius, which was
known to Descartes. In Eustachius’ presentation, substance “is defined as a being in and of
itself; an accident is being in another. ...the subject of an accident is substance”. Eustachius
a Sancto Paulo. Summa Philosophiae Quadripartita [1609]. Cambridge, 1648. P. 52; cp.
P.41 sqq.
161 Cp. Markie 1994,63-87.
162 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII45.
163 Descartes. Princ. 1 52, AT VIIIA 25. Cp. Spinoza. Principles of the Philosophy of
Descartes, Part I, def. 5-8 and Bourdin’s classification of substances, rejected by Descartes,
Seventh Set of Objections, AT VII 506, 520.
164 Descartes. Princ. I 51, AT VIIIA 24; cp. To Regis, May 1641, AT III 372.
32 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

and renders the whole ontological project o f Descartes doubtful, since the notion of
substance is not univocal and is used in different senses in the case of God and in
the case of finite mind and body. The notion o f substance, however, becomes
instrumentally useful and important for the unequivocal distinction between mind
and body. Or, put otherwise, Descartes is much more interested in the essential
than in the existential dimension of being and cognition (cp. 1.4.2).165
There further arises a difficult question for Descartes: does substance
necessarily exist? Or otherwise, does the notion of substance necessarily include
that o f existence? Obviously, the answer in the case of the created substances is
‘no’, for it is easily conceivable that God did not create anything, for the opposite
would ascribe limits to his power (cp. 1.3.2; 1.3.4). But does it necessarily pertain
to God qua substance to exist? God, as Descartes argues on several occasions,
exists necessarily, which also secures the necessity o f all other truths, even though
it is not necessary that God created them, for this would have diminished his
infinite power. But the notion of existence does not appear to be necessarily
included in the notion o f substance, because o f the equivocality o f the latter. The
second Cartesian definition says simply that i f substance exists, it does not need
anything else to exist. It is worth noting that Spinoza challenges such a conclusion
in Proposition 7 of Part I of “Ethics”, maintaining that “It pertains to the nature o f a
substance to exist”, because since substance cannot be produced by anything else,
it has to be causa sui (i.e., that whose essence necessarily involves existence).
Descartes also has to accept that God is the causa sui, which follows straight from
his second definition of substance. Spinoza’s proposition, however, is only true if
God is considered in such a way that the notion o f causa sui expresses his essence,
that is, represents God essentially. But for Descartes, although God does
necessarily exist and we are able to know that God is, it is impossible for a finite
mind to know what God is, that is, to know him in his essence (see 1.4.3).
Therefore, the finite mind cannot have any clear and distinct vision or
understanding o f how God causes his own (necessary) existence. In this sense the
subsistence o f substance166 is only necessary in the infinite substance, whereas in
the finite one it is only possible.167 For this reason, the attribute o f infinite/ finite,
even if not explicitly recognized essential by Descartes, plays an exceptionally
important role in his ontology.
The crucial distinction between the not-produced infinite substance, or
God, and the created finite substances o f mind and matter in Descartes, is that God
does not need anything else to preserve himself as necessarily existing, whereas
mind and matter—since they are not substances in the proper sense (i.e., since
neither exists only due to itself)—need something else in order to exist. To put it
otherwise, only the infinite substance is pure actuality with no passivity at all: it is
acting only and does not involve being acted upon, because being acted upon

,6S Similarly, Spinoza stresses exactly the essential, and not existential, aspect in the
definition of substance in his “Ethics” Part I, def. 3: “By substance I understand what is in
itself and conceived through itself, that is, that whose concept does not require the concept
of another thing, from which it must be formed”.
166 By definition, “subsistentia est existentia substantiae”, Baumgarten 1963, § 58.
167Cp. Descartes. To ***, 1645 or 1646, AT IV 349.
 Part I: Matter 33

means dependence on something else and thus is improper to substance. Because

o f that, die divine mind has to be taken as pure thinking (which later in the
“Principles” is assumed by Descartes not to be really distinct from the will) with
no sense-perception whatsoever, since sense-perception also implies “being acted
upon”.168 Thus, the only res that exists due to itself is the infinite substance or God.
If limited substances existed due to themselves, they would have been infinite
substances, which is not the case (see 1.3.2). And if they existed due to some other
thing, different from substance in the proper sense, that other thing would need
also to be caused by something else, so that there would inevitably arise either a
circle o f causation or an infinite regress. Therefore, substances in the limited sense
(i.e., mind and body) should be caused in their existence by the unique substance,
which exists only due to itself or, in traditional theological language, should be
created by God. Since finite substances are continually existing (which is not
rationally deduced, but simply stated by Descartes as a fact of consciousness), they
need to be constantly created or preserved in their existence, which is taken as an
axiom: “It is a greater thing to create or to preserve a substance than to create or to
preserve the attributes or properties of that substance. However, it is not a greater
thing to create something than to preserve”.169 Every finite existence is thus a
production o f the infinite mind, who knows a thing insofar as it produces that thing
(see 3.4.1). God, however, is the cause not only o f coming into being, but also o f
the being o f the two substances and of all things, as Descartes tells Gassendi.170
That is, even if Descartes still formally discerns between being and becoming, the
way he presents causation by the infinite substance makes such a distinction
eventually obsolete, because recreation takes place at every moment, in which
coming to be and being cannot be distinguished.
Although the idea of substance can be produced (deduced) by our mind,
substance as such cannot be produced by the finite mind or subject. A peculiar
feature o f the Cartesian approach is that the “I” is considered a substance, “an
immaterial substance with no bodily element”.171 It is no longer the case that the

168 Descartes. Princ. 123, AT VIIIA 13-14.

169 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 166; cp. Disc. V, AT VI 45; Med. Synopsis,
AT VIII 14; To De Beaune, 30 April 1639, AT II 543. As Descartes puts it, “there is no
doubt that if God withdrew his concurrence, everything which he has created would
immediately go to nothing; because all things were nothing until God created them and lent
them his concurrence. This does not mean that they should not be called substances, because
when we call a created substance self-sufficient we do not rule out the divine concurrence
which it needs in order to subsist. We mean only that it is a kind of thing that can exist
without any other created thing; and this is something that cannot be said about the modes of
things, like shape and number” (To Hyperaspistes, AT 111 429). Or: “God continues to
preserve it [matter] in the same way that he created it” (The World VII, AT XI 37, cp. 44).
To be preserved is to be recreated at every moment of time. This removes the two
substances from time, in a sense, since their existence does not causally follow from their
own existence in the immediate past and does not entail the existence in the immediate
future, but wholly depends only on the concurrence of God.
170 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII369.
171 Descartes. To Colvius, 14 November 1640, AT III 247; cp. Med., Synopsis, AT VII 14;
Med. Ill, AT VII45.
34 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

ego is only operational and depends in its activity on the intellect, independent of
myself. Quite to the contrary, the self-evident truth o f the sum testifies that the ego
becomes a substance and not only a sign o f something else that surpasses the ego
and is considered as real objectivity, as that which is capable o f production or, at
least, o f reproduction: the essence o f a thing may be reproduced by the finite
subjectivity, although the existence o f that thing in Descartes still depends on the
infinite substance.
At this point the Aristotelian and scholastic “subject” becomes “object”
and the “subject” turns into the modem ego. How does this become possible?
Descartes’ answer is simple: because I myself am a substance. I am a thinking
substance, which is the source of ideas, for, according to Descartes, nothing
besides my thoughts is fully within my power. This claim is obviously contestable,
since merely wishing to have a thought that might correspond to or express an
unknown property o f a thing (e.g., a geometrical object) may not yet be sufficient
actually to have such a thought. Only an image o f imagination appears to be fully
within my power (see 3.2.1-3.2.3).
Such an understanding o f the ego makes it co-demiurgic, as it were, for
even if the ego is the instance that, due to its finitude, does not really create, at
least it recognizes the creation o f finite substances. For this reason, recognition
becomes extremely important for modernity and, in a sense, is a substitution for
creation, because to create a personal identity is to make others recognize it as
such.
To illustrate how the deduction works, Descartes shows how the idea of
substance (as well as that o f duration and number) is produced from the idea of
myself: “For example, I think that a stone is a substance, or is a thing capable of
existing independently, and I also think that I am a substance. Admittedly I
conceive o f myself as a thing that thinks and is not extended, whereas I conceive o f
the stone as a thing that is extended and does not think, so that the two conceptions
differ enormously; but they seem to agree with respect to the classification
‘substance’.” 172 But, as Descartes argues further, it is impossible for the ego to be
the source o f the idea of God, not because God is the thinking substance, but
because God is considered to be infinite substance. In other words, the only idea
that cannot be generated or produced by subjectivity or the ego is that of actual
infinity,173 because ego is a finite thinking substance. Therefore, it is not substance,
but infinity that appears to be the primary not deducible entity and which thus
becomes a kind of a priori structure, both epistemologically and ontologically.

1.3 Infinity

1.3.1 Infinity in Aristotle and Plotinus

As it has been shown in the previous discussion, the notion o f matter was
considered in the Platonic tradition as radical otherness and as lack o f all form and

172 Descartes. Med. II, AT VII 44-46.

175 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 45-46.Cp. the criticism of Gassendi, Fifth Set of Objections,
AT VII 293.
 Part I: Matter 35

limit, as indefinite (1.1.2).174 The notion o f the infinite, which is o f importance also
for Descartes, was then introduced. Let us now turn to a consideration o f infinity,
again pointing out mostly the differences in its appropriation by les anciens et les
modernes, leaving aside the task of a historical examination o f the notion through
the Middle ages.
The famous “definition” of the infinite in Aristotle is: “it is not that
beyond which there is nothing, but that which always has something beyond.” 175
This is potential infinity. The infinite is thus primarily introduced through the
notion of possibility— of the elusive not-yet-being—and for that reason one can
hardly rely on thinking-noéró in discussing the infinite. On such an account, the
infinite is that which always allows for consideration of a quantity surpassing any
fixed amount. On the contrary, that for which it is not possible to take or consider
anything surpassing, is a whole and complete (holon de kai teleion); it is organized
and structured by the pattern o f telos—purpose and end. The end, however, is also
the limit o f a thing, that is, it delimits it in its existence and definition, so that that
which has neither end nor limit has thereby no definition in the strict sense—it is
incomplete, unknowable and properly not existing.176 Therefore, substance as
complete and, in this sense, as indivisible has to be limited and therefore cannot be
infinite.177
The ancient horror infiniti thus appears to be fully justified within the
ontological representation of substance through limit.178 Further, if the infinite is to
be accepted at all, there can be no telos in it and, because of that, no infinite as
actually and wholly existing. On the contrary, if modernity, and Descartes in
particular, dismisses any teleology in science,17 then, as it will be argued, the only
way in which telos can be preserved is by placing it within substance understood as
a complete whole, the substance that can only be a complete infinite and thus is

174 Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 209b II.

175 Oy Sar hoy meden exo, all' hoy aei ti exo esti, toyto apeiron estin.- Aristotle. Phys. 207a
1-2. See also: Heath 1949, 102-113; Hintikka 1973, 114-134, Kouromenos 1995, 9 sqq
176 Aristotle. Phys. 207a 7 sqq.
177 Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1066b 6.
178 The finite, at least until Plotinus, has ontological, epistemological and axiological
priority (cp. Heimsoeth 1994, 82-85). Aristotle objects to introducing an object that is not
and cannot in principle be fully understood through and by reason, which operates only in
terms of finite determinations and limits. His attitude is that of prudence: once we admit
something we are not able to know, we open the possibility for contradiction and thus for
the destruction of being and thought, and should be prepared for unexpected consequences.
But once actual infinity is accepted, the psychological attitude towards it can only be
ambiguous. On the one hand, infinity as an infinite whole produces feelings corresponding
to the sublime: feelings of awe and dread (cp. Pascal 1950, 94-96 (§199-202); Moore 1990,
76). On the other hand, if the infinite is actual, it is to be existent or it has to be God. That is
why, as Descartes puts it, “the consideration of an object which has no limits to its
perfections fills us with satisfaction and assurance” (Descartes. Princ. I 19, AT VIIIA 12
(addition to the French edition); cp. Spinoza, Ethics Part I, def. 2, 6, 8 and Props. 8, II, 13,
15, 21-26; Bennett 1984). Infinity thus is psychologically perceived with a kind of joy
rooted in fear.
179 Schramm 1985, 25-30.
36 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

inaccessible to finite reasoning. The infinite, as preserved in early modernity,

appears to be a necessary and most characteristic trait o f substance, although, due
to its inaccessibility, the infinite substance must be left outside the consideration of
science and can only pertain to metaphysics.
The infinite, as Aristotle holds, should exist in a way.1*0 But even then the
being (einai) o f the infinite is not itself infinite.1®1 The very existence or form of
being of the infinite is not existence in the proper sense (i.e., the infinite does not
exist as complete and as actual). The infinite in such a case is not a substance, one
o f the main features o f which, as it has been argued, is separate and independent
existence.1*2 The infinite, however, does not exist separately as a complete infinite,
or else each o f its parts would equally be infinite. This is impossible since there
can be no logos, no relation of essence of such an entity to any of its hypothetical
parts. The infinite also cannot exist as an actually infinite quantity, because such a
quantity can neither be gone through nor grasped. It also cannot be a body, for
according to its definition, body is that which is limited by finite planes, which
obviously is not the case in the infinite.183 The infinite then can only be that which
either cannot be transgressed, or has no limit. It is only potential—it is ever
becoming another and yet another, always different from its present state (aei alio
kai alio; aei heteron kai heterori) in which the process o f addition or division never
ends.184 There is an important distinction in the way the infinite is present in
number (plethos), divisible into non-continuous parts, that is, in units and in
magnitude (megethos), itself divisible into continuous, further divisible parts. Such
a distinction represents the infinite in respect to addition and division, kata
prosthesin and kata diairesin (cp. 2.1.3; 2.2.2).185
Since the infinite is present in Aristotle primarily as sheer potentiality, it
appears to be close to matter (cp. 1.1.2), because whatever exists and can be
known, is limited and limiting and thus is that which embraces, whereas matter and
infinity never embrace but are only embraced (oy periekhei alia periekhetai). In
this respect Aristotle is close to Plato, who represents matter as lacking any
immanent limit. Still, there is also an important difference between the two,
namely, that Plato and the Pythagoreans consider the infinite not as an accident but
in itself ()hath' hayto), as an independent entity.187
As it has been mentioned, Plato considers infinity as "great and small” in

180 Aristotle gives us five reasons for the existence of the infinite: the infinity of time; the
infinity of division of a magnitude; the persistence of coming-to-be and of perishing; the
fact that the limited is always bordered by something limited; and the fact that thinking does
not stop. Aristotle. Phys. 203b 15 sqq.
111 Aristotle. Met. 994b 26-27.
1,2 Aristotle. Phys. 207b 27 sqq. et al.
183Aristotle. Met 1066b 11 sqq. (which is a later compilation from Phys. Ill 4-8). Cp. also:
Phys. 204 a 9 sqq.
184 Aristotle. Met. 994al7-18; 1048b 15-18; 1066a 35-38; Phys. 204 a 2-5; Phys. 206a 23-
30.
185 Aristotle. Phys. 206a 15 sqq; esp. 206b 16-18; cp. Met. 1020a 9-11; Phys. 261b 27 sqq.
Cp. Nikulin 1996,51-53.
Aristotle. Phys. 207a 25; 208a 1-2.
187As reported by Aristotle in Phys. 203a 5.
 Part I: Matter 37

its relation primarily to matter. Aristotle reports that Plato recognizes two
infinities, in great and in small (dya ta apeira, to mega kai to mikron).' There are
no direct indications, either in the texts o f the dialogues of Plato, or in the
doxographic tradition, that Plato had an elaborated doctrine of two infinities.
Rather, both apeira should refer to one indefiniteness-aoroto? dyas which, due to
its indefiniteness cannot be presented through an exact definition or logos, but
instead as “more or less” and, therefore, as great and small. However, the reference
to the infinite as great and small may also be taken as both the above mentioned
distinction o f number and magnitude in respect to division, and the distinction of
physical and intelligible matter (see 2.4; 2.4.1).
Aristotle considers infinity, apeiria or aoristia, as potential infinity, which
implies a lack of limit, form and definiteness, and thus an imperfection. The
attitude towards infinity changes, however, in antiquity—particularly in Plotinus,
for whom infinity is primarily actual. Thus, Proclus proves theorems about the
infinite using the reductio ad absurdum, where he tacitly presupposes that the
infinite should be taken as complete and as an independent subject. It is not my
intention here to trace possible reasons for the change in attitude towards infinity;
for the purpose o f the book it is enough to establish the distinction.
For Plato, and especially for the later Platonic thinkers, infinity is a notion
o f major interest.190 Since infinity still represents non-being, however, it cannot be
positively defined— it has no proper logos. Plotinus’ approach to infinity is
characterized by the following: (a) infinity is perfection, and (b) infinity implies
non-being, because being is a defined form and is exemplified through the
communication o f limit and the unlimited, of sameness and otherness. From this
perspective, Plotinus is radically different both from Aristotle, for whom infinity as
potential infinity (i.e., as lack o f determination) is a sign o f imperfection, and from
Descartes and medieval scholastics, for whom being is perfection and the being
(God) is infinite. Infinity as such does not, however, become a special object of his
consideration (and so, in Plotinus there is no special treatise dedicated to the
infinite), although it constantly reappears under various guises. The infinite
permeates the whole o f the cosmos and its intelligible pattern; it is present
everywhere, although differently. In Plotinus infinity appears in three ways: (1) in
the One, (2) in the intellect-/joys and (3) in matter.191 Since each o f the three is
considered in due place (see 1.1.2; 1.2.1; 3.1.1), the infinite in Plotinus will not be
discussed in much detail. For our purpose it is sufficient to note (1) that the infinite
in the One is present through and as absence of form and as non-being, for the One
is not being but its transcendent principle. At the same time the infinity o f the One
is the actually infinite generative or productive power. The One is infinite in its
creative potency or power-dynamis, which precedes and is beyond being, and can
neither be extinguished nor diminished and thus presents, in modem usage, actual
infinity. Unlike potential infinity (which is primarily defined through a relation,

m Aristotle. Phys. 203a 15; cp. Met. 987b 25, 988a 25.
189 Proclus. Inst. phys. II 11-13.
190 Cp. de Vogel 1959,21-39.
191 Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.3.13; III.8.8.46; VI. 1.1.2; VI.9.6.10 et al. Cp. Sleeman, Pollet 1980,
117-120; Sweeney 1992, 167-222.
38 Matter. Imagination and Geometry

and is in a constant flux and becoming and is able either of ever growing or of ever
decreasing), actual infinity, according to Cantor’s definition, is that which does not
change, but at the same time is greater than any finite magnitude. Cantor makes a
further important distinction, not made before him, namely, into transfinite infinity,
which is actual infinity capable of increasing (e.g., transfinite ordinal and cardinal
numbers), and absolute infinity, not capable o f any change.192 In what follows,
when speaking o f actual infinity, we will be referring to absolute actual infinity.
(2) In the intellect-rtcys, which is primarily characterized by measure and
limit within its objects of contemplation,193 the infinite still appears in a number of
ways. First, it is present as infinite intelligible matter, the archetype for physical
matter (see 2.4.1). Second, it is present in the infinity that ideal archetypes bring
into physical and geometrical entities, which all may be said to participate in being,
but may be represented in their relations-/ogo/ to each other in an infinite number
of ways. Third, the infinite is present in the infinite power o f theintellectof
contemplating intelligible objects within noys.194 The infinite power may be
ascribed to the intellectoioys insofar as it produces its objects. Infinity is present in
the intellect even though it is represented as thinking definite and defined forms.195
This defined infinity appears in ideal numbers and forms as one of two principles,
that of indefiniteness, of otherness, aoristos dyas (cp. 1.2.1; 1.2.2; 1.3.1), itself
bound in a synthesis of the one-many of intellect.196 Actual infinity, rejected by
Aristotle, is accepted by Plotinus and becomes a sort of empty object for the
intellect, which takes part in infinity, even if it is unable to think it directly, since
every act of thought is presented in finite terms and notions.
As apeiron or apeiria, infinity is to be found both in the One and in
matter, for neither is, strictly speaking, in being but they are “whence” and “into
what” being as definite is originated. Thus finally, (3) the infinite in matter is
matter “itself’ as lacking all definition and being, as destitute of any power to
produce, as always present through its actual absence, even though it cannot in
principle be withdrawn from the structure of the whole.197 This infinity is a “total
falling away” (apostasis panteles) from the One. It can only be indefinite—great
and small (mega kai smikron)—and in this way it may be regarded both as

192 Cantor 1985, 288-293. At another point. Cantor discerns between transfinite actual
infinity in abstracto seu in natura naturata and in concreto, that is, in the form of transfinite
ordinal numbers, which he equates with Platonic ideal numbers, arithmoi noetoi or arithmoi
eidetikoi (Cantor 1985,264; cp. 2.1.1).
193 Cp. Emilsson 1995,21-41.
194 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.15.17-21; V.4.2.4-7; V.7.3.22; V.8.9.24-28; VI.2.21.7 sqq.; VI 2.22.15
saq.; VI.4.14.5-7. Cp. Plato. Parm. 144b-c; Phil.l6e.
As Plotinus says, the intellect-nojv, infinite in its life, is to be defined when looking at
and striving towards the One, which itself has no limit, horon oyk ekhontos, Enn.
VI.7.17.14-16.
196Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.14.11-12; Simplicius. InPhys. 151.6-11; 453.25-31.
197Thus, even if one makes a distinction, as Heimsoeth does, between the infinite of the One
and the infinite of matter (Heimsoeth 1994, 88), one cannot represent this distinction as a
distinction between actual and potential infinity, but rather between that of immense power
of production of being and of absolute powerlessness.
 Part I: Matter 39

opposites considered at once, and as not opposites.19* Matter represents another

type o f the infinite that is closer to potential infinity, which allows no exact
measure or counting, where nothing can be discerned, a boundless indefiniteness,
apeiron .199This infinity appears to be imperfection and even evil. It is rather an
extreme degeneration of potential infinity. However, here one also has to
distinguish two different cases: (3a) matter as the ultimate and utterly indefinite
receptacle— as the non-being that underlies all being. And (3b) matter o f
intelligibles (see 2.4), which is of the utmost interest for us and which itself does
not lack being altogether, for it appears in and for the intellect. Obviously, the
cases match each other and make pairs o f the infinite in non-being (1) and (3a) and
o f the infinite in being (2) and (3 b). In the first pair infinity appears without any
inner structure whatsoever; while in the One it is the infinity of superabundance, in
matter it is that o f absolute deficiency and lack of all delimitation.200 Besides, the
first element within each pair presupposes a productive aspect, whereas the second
element has a receptive aspect.
One can thus clearly discern different kinds o f infinity in later Greek
philosophy, particularly, in Plotinus. Even if they are not distinct as infinities with
different cardinal and ordinal numbers (cardinal numbers in set theory express the
entire “number” o f elements in a set; ordinal numbers determine the position
(order) o f a set in a certain list of sets), they nonetheless already represent different
types o f infinity. We find a more systematic and elaborated classification of
inifnities in Proclus, who discerns at least three kinds o f infinity: the superabundant
One, the eternity o f the whole of the cosmos (to pan, which has its paradigm within
the intellect), and the infinity of the infinite divisibility—that o f continuous
magnitudes and matter.201

1.3.2 Infinity as perfection: Infini and indéfini

As we have seen, substance for Descartes is characterized by the following

features: independence, self-reliance and being a subject o f predication. The
human mind as a finite substance cannot produce substance: not the substance in
the proper sense (God), nor limited substances; neither itself in its existence, nor
matter. However, the notion o f substance can be produced by the finite human
subjectivity, insofar as it itself is considered (or, rather, considers itself) a
substance. The only exclusion, a notion that cannot be engendered by the ego, is
that o f infinity.202 The substance is distinct from finite substances of mind and body
not in that it exists but in that it is infinite. Why is this the case? Descartes mostly
stresses the essential aspect of substance; the substance, which for him is God,
should be radically different from limited substances. Since, further, finitude of
mind and body is considered a limitation (i.e., a lack o f perfection), the radical

198 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.1.1-2; VI.6.3.28-33.

199Plotinus. Enn. II.4.13.1 sqq.
200Cp. Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.3.13.
201 Proclus. Elem. theol. 92-96; Theol. Plat. II 26.8-28.13; In Eucl. 6.7-7.1. I am grateful to
E. Kutasch for drawing my attention to these quotations.
202 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII45 sqq.
40 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

difference of substance in the proper sense is its lack of perfection. Put otherwise,
the substance should not be deficient, especially in that which marks two
substances o f mind and body, namely, their finitude. Therefore, the substance
should be infinite.
Infinity is thus understood not as a lack o f being, but as positive, that is,
as actual and complete.203 Independence o f the substance thus primarily involves
not being (for finite substances also exist, albeit not necessarily), but infinity.204 As
Descartes writes in one o f his last letters, “By ‘infinite substance’ I mean a
substance which has actually infinite, immense, true and real perfections. This is
not an accident added to the notion of substance, but the very essence o f substance
taken absolutely and bounded by no defects; these defects, in respect of substance,
are accidents; but infinity or infinitude is not. It should be observed that I never use
the word ‘infinite’ to signify the mere lack o f limits (which is something negative,
for which I have used the term ‘indefinite’) but to signify a real thing, which is
incomparably greater than all those which are in some way limited”. Infinity
therefore is not a privation of limit; it is not a nihil privativum, but an actual
perfection— which is not Descartes’ invention by any means, but a commonplace
in scholasticism from at least the middle of the twelfth century.206
Infinity is thus taken by Descartes, who relies on (even if rejecting) the
scholastic tradition, as the sign o f being that exists due only to itself and which is
the highest perfection: infinity is divine.207 The very way we form the idea of utter
perfection is very important for understanding infinity. On the one hand, perfection
may be considered an abstraction from imperfection, by consecutively negating the
limitations that constitute the imperfection as a lack of a certain quality. However,
if one seeks ultimate perfection in this way (i.e., that o f which greater cannot be
conceived), nothing guarantees in advance that such perfection may be finally
achieved in a finite number o f steps o f negating an imperfection. A hypothetical
ultimate perfection (e.g., omniscience— infinite actual knowledge) may be only
indefinitely approximated by the finite mind and thus remains inaccessible and
unknown in its essence to the finite mind. On the other hand, if one begins with the
presupposition o f perfection as infinite, so that imperfection is simply considered a
limitation of this initial actual perfection, then perfection is preserved and also
leaves a possibility of a rational proof o f the necessity o f existence o f the

203 Descartes. Sixth Set of Replies, AT VII 231-232.

204 Cp. Descartes. To Mersenne, 28 October 1640, AT III 191.
205 Descartes. To Clerselier, 23 April 1649, AT V 355-356.
206 Cp. Gregory of Nyssa and John Damascene (“Deus est incircumscriptus, increatus,
infinitus.” - De fide orthod. I, 8 (PG 94, 808C). Later Thomas Aquinas, Bonaventure,
Robert Fishacre, Albert the Great, Henry of Ghent assert that actual infinity as perfection
belongs only to the essence of God qua infinite being and to nothing else. See: Sweeney
1992, 167, 289 sqq.; cp. Gilson 1979, 142-150. As Suarez argues in his “Disputationes
Metaphysicae” quoted by Caterus, “every limitation proceeds from some cause; therefore if
something is limited and finite this is because its cause was either unable or unwilling to
endow it with more greatness or perfection; and hence if something derives its existence
from itself, and not from some cause, it is indeed unlimited and infinite”. - Descartes. First
Set of Objections, AT VII 95.
207 Cp. Locke. Essay, Bk. II, ch. XXIII, 36.
 Part I: Matter 41

substance.20* Descartes univocally maintains the second approach, choosing as his

starting point that an ultimate perfection cannot come from an imperfection,
independence from dependence, existence from privation, and in general,
something from nothing.
The infinite as primary and positive becomes the distinctive mark of true
substance. Clearly, if infinity is taken as perfection, then, since perfection is an
actual entity (that is, it is precedent to the lack o f perfection or to imperfection),
infinity should be anterior both to finite and to potential infinity (i.e., to the not
actualized whole).210 “[I]t is false”, says Descartes, “that the infinite is understood
through the negation o f a boundary or limit; on the contrary, all limitation implies a
negation o f the finite.”211 Or also: “it is quite true that we do not understand the
infinite by the negation o f limitation; and one cannot infer that, because limitation
involves the negation of infinity, the negation o f the limitation involves knowledge
o f the infinite. What makes the infinite different from the finite is something real
and positive; but the limitation which makes the finite different from the infinite is
non-being or the negation o f being. That which is not cannot bring us to the
knowledge o f that which is; on the contrary, the negation o f a thing has to be
perceived on the basis o f knowledge of the thing itself’.212 Infinity thus becomes a
kind of a priori for all considerations, both metaphysical and mathematical (e.g.,
the infinite is a necessary presupposition in the projective geometry o f Desargues,
cp. 2.1.4).
The notion o f the substance, or God, is characterized by Descartes and
introduced primarily through the notion o f perfection: “The substance which we
understand to be supremely perfect, and in which we conceive absolutely nothing
that implies any defect or limitation in that perfection, is called God.”2 Further,
since infinity as a complete whole represents such a perfection (God cannot be
infinite in the sense o f lack o f completeness), and since perfection precedes to an
imperfection as privation, then the very notion o f infinity cannot be invented by the
finite cogitation. No wonder then that the proof o f the existence o f God essentially
involves the notion o f actual infinity. The idea is unique and different from ail
other ideas insofar as it cannot be produced or invented by the finite mind, because
the idea of the infinite substance has more objectivity than the idea o f a finite
substance, since the idea o f a finite substance has more objectivity or objective
reality than that o f a mode or an accident. I have an idea o f substance because I
myself am a thinking substance; yet I am a finite substance and if I have an idea o f
an infinite substance, it is only because it is precedent to me and proceeds from
some other, infinite substance: being finite, I (the finite mind) cannot produce the

208 As Henrich notes, unlike Anselm who considers God to be ens perfectissimum, Descartes
presupposes in his proof rather the notion of ens necessarium (Henrich 1960, 11 sqq.).
Descartes. Discourse IV, AT VI 34-35,38.
2,0 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, AT V 153. Cp. also Third Set of Objections, AT
VII 185.
211 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII365.
212 Descartes. To Hyperaspistes, August 1641, AT III 427.
2,3 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 162. Only God is “actually infinite, so that
nothing can be added to his perfection”.- Med. Ill, AT VII47.
42 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

idea of the infinite. Therefore, the notion of actual infinity should be in some way
inherent in the finite mind.214
The divine essence is such that, first, in it the notions o f the attributes o f
infinity, perfection, being, reality, self-causation, and inexhaustible power may be
all considered as tautological expressions o f this essence.215 Infinity is then the
most adequate expression of all other attributes because the divine perfection is
expressed primarily in terms o f what might be called omm-attributes, which are to
be considered actually infinite: omniscience, omnipotence, omnipresence, and so
on.216 What is the difference between all these attributes? The distinction between
the omn/-attributes cannot be real since all the attributes refer to one single
substance. In such a case, the distinction might be either modal or conceptual
(mental, cp. 1.1.3). A modal distinction can be either between a substance and its
mode, or between two substances. Since we are dealing with attributes (even if
they are of a special— infinite—character), the distinction cannot be modal. The
distinction must be conceptual, since it is only within the finite mind that there is a
difference between the omm-attributes. And furthermore, the divine essence should
necessarily include existence. Therefore, if the notion o f actual infinity cannot be
thought away by the finite mind, the infinite essence is necessary and thus should
exist.
Now, why does Descartes associate the infinite with being and not, like
Plato and Plotinus, with non-being or beyond-being? Obviously, Descartes follows
the Aristotelian tradition (represented, e.g., in Aquinas), which identifies God with
being as actus purus, pure activity and actuality outside all potentiality. Thus the
divine infinite creative power is not the mere possibility o f generation but rather is
the already actualized divine capacity and ability of producing finite things. It is
important to note that the actual divine infinity is not exclusive of the finite— it
entails and presupposes the existence o f the finite (of finite substances, things and
their attributes and modes).217 Unlike in the Platonic tradition, the difference

2.4 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VI 40, 45; First Set of Replies, AT VII 116-117; Second Set of
Replies, AT VII 135-136; Third Set of Replies, AT VII 188; Princ. I 18, AT VIIIA 11-12.
As Levinas explains, “the idea of infinity is exceptional in that its ideatum surpasses its idea,
whereas for the things the total coincidence of their “objective” and “formal” realities is not
precluded: we could conceivably have accounted for all the ideas, other than that of Infinity,
by ourselves. ...The distance that separates ideatum and idea here constitutes the content of
the ideatum itself. Infinity is characteristic of a transcendent being as transcendent; the
infinity is the absolutely other. The transcendent is the sole ideatum of which there can be
only an idea in us; it is infinitely removed from its idea, that is, exterior, because it is
infinite”. - Levinas 1969,48-49. Cp. Peperzak 1993,80 sqq.
2.5 Descartes. Med. IV, AT VII 56-62; First Set of Replies, AT VII 109-110; Fourth Set of
Replies, AT VII 236; Sixth Set of Replies, AT VII 435; To Elizabeth, 6 October 1645, AT
IV 314; 3 November 1645, AT IV 332; To Chanut, 1 February 1647, AT IV 608-609; To
More, 15 April 1649, AT V 343.
216 "[0]ur understanding tells us that there is in God an absolute immensity, simplicity and
unity which embraces all other attributes and has no copy in us.” - Descartes. Second Set of
Replies, AT VII 137. Cp. Med. I, AT VII 21; Princ. I 5, AT VIIIA 6; Princ. I 22, AT VIIIA
13; Princ. II 36, AT VIIIA 61. Cp. also: Proclus. Theol. Plat. I 59.2 sqq.
217 Cp. Descartes. Second Set of Objections, AT VII 125.
 Part I: Matter 43

between being and its principle is not that the latter is transcendent to the former
but that the principle o f being is itself infinite being and because o f that, necessary
being is included in its essence. As Descartes points out in one of his later letters,
the very notion of a principle may be taken in two different senses. On the one
hand, principle may be considered epistemologically— it may mean “a common
notion so clear and so general that it can serve as a principle for proving the
existence o f all the beings, or entities, to be discovered later”. The Aristotelian
principle of non-contradiction (impossibile est idem simul esse et non esse)
exemplifies such a principle. On the other hand, principle may be taken
ontologically—as a “being whose existence is known to us better than that of any
other, so that it can serve as a principle for discovering them”.21®The example of
principle thus understood is the soul because, as Descartes insists, its existence is
best known to us through the conscience o f the cogito.
A difficult problem arises, however, when Descartes speaks about God as
describable by omni-predicates. The problem is that the finite mind can only know
that these omni-attributes are, and not, because of their infinity, what they are. In
the same way, the finite mind knows (finds in itself) the idea or notion o f infinity,
although the finite mind remains ignorant o f what infinity is. Because of the
finitude o f human reason, the difference between these omni-predicates is beyond
the grasp o f finite cogitation. It is not clear—and Descartes does not provide a
univocal answer—how it can happen that the infinite substance is one and yet there
are many o f its omni-attributes, each o f which essentially expresses the substance
and are not really different from it. Perhaps, it might be argued that there should be
an essential unity o f the omni-attributes, insofar as they all are actually infinite.
The problem at hand is not solved this way, however, but just substituted by the
problem of knowledge o f the actually infinite.
Thus, Descartes does not consider the infinite to be a negation o f the finite
or limited or indefinite extension of the finite. On the contrary, the infinite is taken
as primary, so that its negation enables the finite mind, first, to understand finite
things as negations and limitations o f the infinite and, second, to operate somehow
with the notion o f the infinite itself.
The problem is thus that if one accepts, as Descartes does, the actually
infinite as the ultimate perfection and source of all finite truths and things and as
the ontological starting point (although epistemologically the starting point is the
finite self-awareness of the ego), then one chooses a principle that, although it is
being, is incomprehensible insofar as it is actually infinite. This infinite substance
is God for Descartes, “vn estre infini & incomprehensible”.219 The price for
preserving an absolute difference and otherness between the creator and the created

211 Descartes. To Clerselier, June or July 1646, AT IV 444-445.

2,9 Descartes. To Mersenne, 6 May 1630, AT I 150. Cp. Med. IV, AT VII 53 sqq.; First Set
of Replies, AT VII 107 sqq.; Second Set of Replies, AT VII 163; “...we must begin with
knowledge of God, and our knowledge of all other things must then be subordinated to this
single initial piece of knowledge”.- Sixth Set of Replies, AT VII 430. Cp. Beyssade 1993,
85-94.
44 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

is the inability o f finite thinking to know the essence o f infinite thinking.220 “At the
place where I speak o f infinity”, as Descartes writes to Mersenne, “it is a good idea
to insert, as you say, ‘the infinite qua infinite can in no way be comprehended by
us’”.221 Thereby there is something in the ontological picture o f the world that is
not, and in principle cannot be, fully transparent to finite thinking. Since in God
there is no real distinction between will and reason, infinite thinking sets certain
purposes o f and for the world that, as Descartes stresses, cannot be known by the
finite mind.222
Even if the actually infinite cannot be fully known to the finite mind, the
mind is able and, according to Descartes, has to know the infinite in a certain way.
As we have seen, the presence o f the very notion or idea o f the infinite is the
starting point o f the Cartesian proof o f the existence of God in the Third
“Meditation”. That is, since the idea o f the actually infinite cannot be produced by
the finite mind, this idea, which is also the idea o f God as infinite substance, has to
be “imprinted on the human mind in such a way that everyone has within himself
the power to know him”.223 The infinite is thus rationally and indisputably known
to the finite mind in its existence—that the infinite is. Why is the finite mind
capable o f having any firm knowledge about the infinite at all? Because both the
finite mind and the infinite substance are cointensive, as it were, for each is res
cogitans, although they are not coextensive in their greatness. The finite mind
cannot embrace and encompass the infinite all at once.224 Because o f that the
infinite, which actually surpasses any limited magnitude, can never be reached by
gradually expanding the finite in any number o f steps, for in doing this the finite
will always remain finite.225
The infinite surpasses any finite limits. Hence, even if it is known in its
existence that it is, it cannot be known in its essence what it is. In recognizing this,
Descartes follows many medieval theologians who stress the incomprehensibility
o f the divine essence.2 Modern mathematics, which operates with the notion of
actual infinity, has elaborated a procedure that putatively allows for knowledge
about infinity by establishing a one-to-one correspondence between two infinite
sets. If we consider a set to be (actually) infinite, it may be known in its properties
if we find another equally infinite set and establish a univocal relation (a bijection)
between each member of the two sets (e.g., between two sets of integers and all

220 “The Cartesian notion of the idea of the Infinite designates a relation with a being that
maintains its total exteriority with respect to him who thinks it.” - Levinas 1969, 50.
221 Descartes. To Mersenne, 31 December 1640, AT III 273. Cp. To Mersenne, 11 October
1638, AT II 383; To Mersenne, 28 January 1641. AT III 293; To Hyperaspistes, August
1641, AT III 430.
222 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 375; Princ. Ill 2, AT VIIIA 80.
223 Descartes. To Mesland, May 1645, AT IV 187-188; cp. To Regius, 24 May 1640, AT III
64.
224 Descartes. First Set of Replies, AT VII 114. Cp. Med. Ill, AT VII 47; To Mersenne, 6
May 1620, AT I 150; To Mersenne, 21 January 1641, AT III 284; To Hyperaspistes, August
1641, AT III 430; To Clerselier, 23 April 1649, AT V 35—356; Princ. I 18, AT 11-12.
225 Cp. Descartes. Third Set of Replies, AT VII 188.
226As Aquinas argues, God is not known to the human mind in his essence, although it may
be proven that God’s existence is demonstrable. -Summa theol. I, qu. 2, art. 2.
 Part I: Matter 45

integer odd numbers, if both sets are considered actually infinite—as a relation
described by a simple formula, “/j->2«+1”). Such a procedure is central in, for
example, set theory.227 However, what we are really able to know in this case is
only a relation between two elements o f different infinite sets, which is always a
finite relation. We are thus able to handle the infinite without yet knowing what it
is.
If there is anything in principle unknown to the finite mind, it might entail
one of two different epistemological positions. The first is that of sheer skepticism,
which claims that there is ultimately no true and firm knowledge, but only opinion,
which more or less corresponds to the experienced state of affairs. This is
definitely not Descartes’ approach since he stresses the certainty o f self-awareness
and o f scientific, especially mathematical, truths. The other position is that,
although the infinite (God) as such is not known to the (radically finite) human
mind, there is nevertheless true knowledge, presentable in a simple and clear way
and accessible to every finite mind. Such true (scientific) knowledge is possible
however only within the realm o f finite thinking and of finite essences. How does
the infinite, which supposedly originates the finite, have to be thought? There is
something in Descartes’ account that we are able to know and say with certainty
even about the infinite: that it is, for instance, a perfection, that it necessarily exists
and that its essence involves existence. But the infinite (infinite thinking and
infinite being) is not and cannot be thought in its entirety by a simple single act of
understanding o f the human mind— its concept is necessary but inadequate.
In other words, there is a certain negativity necessarily present in every
relation o f finite thinking to the infinite, which cannot be known qua infinite. As
Descartes puts it, “I distinguish between the formal concept of the infinite, or
‘infinity’, and the thing which is infinite. In the case of infinity, even if we
understand it to be positive in the highest degree, nevertheless our way of
understanding it is negative, because it depends on our not noticing any limitation
in the thing. But in the case o f the thing itself which is infinite, although our
understanding is positive, it is not adequate, that is to say, we do not have a
complete grasp of everything in it that is capable of being understood”.228
Thus, it may be the case that if a finite entity has a potentially infinite
number o f properties (like those o f a triangle), they all are either not yet known to
the finite mind, but will be once discovered in the future, or the scientific research
might fail to discover them, so that they remain hidden from humankind as a
collective bearer o f the total knowledge o f properties o f finite things and
mathematical objects. However, even if one rejects the utterly skeptical position,
one has to recognize that in actual infinity there is something that cannot be known
in principle, but is merely a “sheer article of faith and cannot be known by the
natural light”.229 There is an insurmountable distinction in knowledge of the idea o f
the infinite by .the finite mind and by the infinite mind, namely, in the way the
infinite is present to the mind: “[T]he idea o f the infinite, if it is to be a true idea,

227 Cantor 1883, 8-14; Brumbaugh 1982, 104-113.

221 Descartes. First Set of Replies, AT V II113; cp. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 152.
229 Descartes. To Mersenne, 31 December 1640, AT III 274.
46 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

cannot be grasped at all, since the impossibility o f being grasped is contained in the
formal definition o f the infinite. Nonetheless, it is evident that the idea which we
have o f the infinite does not merely represent one part o f it, but represents the
infinite in its entirety. The manner o f representation, however, is the manner
appropriate to a human idea; and undoubtedly God, or some other intelligent nature
more perfect than a human mind, could have a much more perfect, i.e. more
accurate and distinct, idea.”230 Even if certain elements o f the via negativa are
clearly present in Descartes, he is still mostly interested in studying the realm o f
finite properties and propositions, for which he quite often uses the kataphatic
approach.
There is a perplexing question, however, that is not satisfactorily
answered by Descartes. Namely, since in God infinity embraces and permeates all
other attributes, we know that infinity is. But in the case o f the infinite substance,
or God, existence is necessarily included in essence or even may be said to
coincide with it. Therefore, on the one hand, if we know the existence as
necessary, we also know the essence. On the other hand, we cannot know the
divine essence because o f its infinity. One has to state then that either the essence-
existence distinction is insufficient and obsolete in the case of the infinite
substance (for even if we know that such an existence is necessary, we cannot
perceive the infinite essence), or that we are aware o f the infinite essence, but not
fully— we are not able to grasp any quantitative differentiations within it. Hence
the Cartesian distinction between “to know” and “to grasp”.
The Cartesian claim about knowledge o f the infinite has often been a
target of criticism. One o f the immediate and obvious objections raised by
Gassendi is that if one cannot grasp the infinite, then one cannot have any concept
or idea o f it.231 Descartes’ reply is that although we cannot grasp the infinite as
such, we can understand the ‘"true and complete idea of the infinite in its entirety”,
which consists in understanding that the infinite is and that it is—negatively—that
which is not bounded by any limits. The vulnerability o f his claim forces Descartes
to introduce a further distinction, that between understanding and grasping reason.
The finite mind necessarily knows that God is infinite, but cannot grasp, how he is
infinite. In like manner, the mind knows that infinity is—the finite mind
understands it, but cannot grasp, or, moreover, know what it is. The difference
between understanding and grasping the infinite becomes clear in the example of
how do we know the vastness o f a mountain if we stand close to it and cannot see
it all at once. Although physically we cannot embrace the mountain (i.e. grasp it),
we can touch it and in this way understand it: “To grasp something is to embrace it
in one’s thought; to know something, it is sufficient to touch it with one’s
thought.”232 In the case o f the infinite (of infinite perfection), the finite mind

230 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 367-368.

231 Descartes. Fifth Set of Objections, AT VII 294 sqq.
232 Descartes. To Mersenne, 26 May 1630, AT I 152. Cp.: “Since the word ‘grasp’ implies
some limitation, a finite mind cannot grasp God, who is infinite. But that does not prevent
him having a perception of God, just as one can touch a mountain without being able to put
one’s arms round it”. - Appendix to the Fifth Set of Objections and Replies: AT IXA 210.
See also Med. Ill, AT VII 46, 52.
 Part I: Matter 47

cannot grasp the how o f it, because of the immensity o f its object, it can only grasp
that it is. This is because God understands— and thus produces—all things in a
single mental act, in which the divine infinite intellect actually does grasp the
infinite, whereas the finite mind can only approach—and thus understand—it.233
Understanding is expressed in terms of the “clear and distinct” idea o f the infinite
(of God), which simply tells us that there should be the most perfect being (and
infinity is considered to be perfection), which is not just a figment of the
imagination.
It is important to emphasize this distinction within the infinite, between
the “is” and the “what” or the “how”. To know, to understand, the “what” is to
observe an object or a state o f affairs that is independent o f the activity of the
observing mind. To know, to grasp, the “how” it happens is to be able to reproduce
the actual object or state of affairs. The understanding-grasping distinction has to
do then with knowing as (re)production (see 3.4.1): only if the mind is capable of
producing or reproducing an object, is it able to know that object. From Descartes’
point o f view, a mistake to be avoided is that the finite mind thinks that it is
capable o f “completely mastering” the infinite and to comprehend or grasp its
properties: “I have never written about the infinite except to submit myself to it,
and not to determine what it is or is not.”234 That we are not able to fully grasp the
infinite (i.e., that we are radically finite), shows that Descartes still firmly retains
the distinction between the (infinite) creator and the (finite) creature. The finite, the
human mind in Descartes, can already assume the role of infinite subjectivity,
which produces all meanings within itself and the world while retaining its position
of finitude. Why is this the case? The mental operation o f “to know”, which
understands the “is”, is reserved for the finite human mind, which is thus involved
only in an “as-if’-production o f essences. On the contrary, the mental operation of
“to grasp”, which understands the “what” and the “how” of finite things, of
mathematical objects, and also o f the infinite substance, is reserved solely for the
infinite, divine mind, which produces all essences.
The distinction between knowing and grasping corresponds also to the
distinction between objective and formal concepts. If the finite mind has an
objective concept of a thing that it both knows and grasps, then the objective being
o f that concept is contained formally in its cause. But if the finite mind only knows
and does not grasp its object, then the objective being of that thing’s concept is
contained in its cause not formally, but eminently, that is, in a higher form.233
The distinction between “grasping” and “knowing”, however, implies
difficulties not explicitly mentioned by Descartes. First, the understanding-
grasping distinction should imply a differentiation o f mental capacities, namely, of

233 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, AT V 154, 165-166. “Although we do not fully
grasp these [divine] perfections”, says Descartes, “since it is in the nature of an infinite
being not to be fully grasped by us, who are finite, nonetheless we are able to understand
them more clearly and distinctly than any corporeal things. This is because they permeate
our thought to a greater extent, being simpler and unobscured by any limitations”. - Princ. I
19, ATVIIIA 12.
234 Descartes. To Mersenne, 28 January 1641, AT III 293.
235 Cp. To Mersenne, March 1642, AT III 545.
48 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

immediate grasping (e.g., o f the truth o f a proposition) and o f discursive reasoning

(which arrives at the truth of a proposition in a number o f logically justifiable
steps). Descartes, in leveling all mental faculties into one single and simple
awareness o f cogitation, does not, however, make such a distinction (cp. 3.1.1;
3.1.2). Second, if there is something principally unknowable (not graspable) in the
infinite, then what sense does it make to say that the infinite is being and only in
this single case does essence necessarily involve existence? For it might be the
case that the actually infinite, although perhaps being the source and generator of
finite being, itself is not being, or, at least, that the difference between finite and
infinite being is such that it does not make any sense to call the infinite “being”.
For, again, only “being”—the existence of the infinite— is known to the finite mind
as necessary; “being-something”—the essence of the infinite— is not grasped. In
this way, clearly, Descartes paves the way to expelling any objective teleology
from the realm o f finite essences and substances, because being is now identified
not with the notion of limit, as is the case in Plato and Aristotle, but with the lack
o f limit and its suspension, with the actually infinite.
Descartes retains and stresses the distinction between understanding and
grasping throughout his writings, from his early letters up to the “Principles of
Philosophy”.23 The distinction is important not only for Descartes’ theology and
metaphysics, but also for his physics and geometry. Since every finite res is
considered to be produced or created by the infinite substance, it implies that not
only physical, or materially extended bodies are created, but also truths and
objective concepts o f things. The knowing-grasping distinction then becomes both
very convenient and important: it is only the infinite creating substance or God that
our finite mind is unable to grasp, although the mind is able to understand certain
fundamental truths about the infinite. But in cognition of finite substances and
truths, the act of knowing coincides with that o f grasping, except that the act of
cognition is to be understood as reached through a chain o f discursive logical
cogitations. Descartes thus places a possible incomprehensibility not in the sphere
o f the finite (as it is the case with Plato and the Platonic thinkers, for whom the
realm o f finite physical things is that o f the ever-fluent and thus not properly
understandable and not thinkable becoming), but only in the actually infinite.
Finite objects, both physical bodies and geometrical entities, become accessible to
true and adequate cognition.
Since actual infinity expresses for Descartes the essence of the infinite
substance, it is to be found only in God. What can then be said about matter and
spatial extension? Is it possible to conceive that the infinite substance, which is
infinite in its productive power, can equally produce infinite substance(s)?
Plotinus’ answer to the question of whether this infinite power is capable of
producing an equally infinite effect is “yes”, because the intellect-noyi is equally
infinite in its contemplative ability. Descartes’ answer is “no”, for he considers the
infinite intellect to be God. Furthermore, since Descartes accepts only two finite,
created substances, the human mind must be finite, because whatever it thinks, it
should think in terms o f finite determinations—as limited (which is also the

236 Cp. Descartes. To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT I 145-146.

 Part I: Matter 49

Aristotelian argument). What about the second finite substance, the res extenscP.
Aristotle, as we have seen, equally argues that it cannot be infinite, for the infinite
excludes limit, concept, definition or logos, and further, it cannot be known and is
not capable of existing. Descartes does not accept this argument: his attitude
towards the quantity o f the extension of matter is quite ambiguous. For him to say
that matter is finite in extension is to diminish the infinite productive power of the
infinite substance by putting limitations on it. On the one hand, Descartes
reproduces a traditional theological prohibition on putting the first (divine) cause
and its effect on the same axiological and ontological level. Or, to put it in
theological terms, there is an insurmountable difference between the creator and
the created. God is absolutely transcendent both to the world and to the human
mind. On the other hand, if one considered the effect(s) o f the infinite cause to be
only finite, it would impose external limitations on the infinite creative power. To
say, thus, that matter is actually infinite is equally to diminish, or to put limits onto,
the infinite power by supposing that there is no real distinction between that power
and its effect, no real transcendence of the infinite.237 Descartes’ solution is to
consider matter indefinite in extension.238
Descartes’ argument is this: matter is nothing but space or mere
extension. Now, let us suppose that the amount of matter is finite. In this case,
there should be empty space beyond certain limits. But one can only conceive this
empty space qua space (i.e., as three-dimensional and therefore as extended).
However, the extended is matter. Therefore, by reductio ad absurdum, the premise
is false, q.e.d.239 An important implicit premise in the argument is that the
supposed extra-mundane extension is imagined. The imaginary space is, however,
equally extended; it is not only imaginary but real substance—namely, matter or
extension. Imagination thus appears in Descartes to be performatively self-
contradictory, although it essentially is involved in Descartes’ consideration o f
matter and extension. The importance of imagination for knowing matter is
considered in what follows in more detail (see 3.2.4; 3.3).
In other words, the entire amount of matter or extension in the world can
be neither actually infinite, nor can it be finite. The only logical possibility left is to
conceive matter or extension as indefinitely great or as potentially infinite. Such a
position involves abstaining from judgement about the “real” extension o f matter,
which may be known to the infinite mind but is concealed from the finite mind:
“For our part, in the case o f anything in which, from some point of view, we are
unable to discover a limit, we shall avoid asserting that it is infinite, and instead
regard it as indefinite”.240

237 Descartes. To Chanut, 1 February 1647.

238 “[TJhe existence of actually infinite quantity was thought by many to involve paradox,
and the assertion of an infinite world had brought upon many more than one philosopher the
censure of theologians. The Aristotelians avoided the problem by denying reality to infinite
extracosmic space; More by supposing infinite space to be God; Descartes by holding that
the world is indefinite in size.” - Des Chene 1996, 386; cp. McGuire 1983, 69-112.
239 Descartes. To Chanut, 6 June 1647, AT V 52; cp. Princ. II 21, AT VIIIA 52; To
Elizabeth, 15 September 1645, AT IV 292; To More 15 April 1649, AT V 345.
240 Descartes. Princ. I 26, AT VIIIA 15; cp. The World, AT XI 31-32; Disc. IV, AT VI 36;
50 Matter, imagination and Geometry

The difference between the infinite and the indefinite, infini and indéfini,
has a number o f implications, which appear to be the following. (1) One can easily
identify different types o f infinity, implied in the infini/ indéfini distinction: the
infinite represents actual infinity, whereas the indefinite corresponds to potential
infinity. (2) The notion o f the infinite is reserved only for the substance or God, in
whom “not only do we fail to recognize any limits in any respect, but our
understanding positively tells us that there are none”.241 In other words, we know
(about) the infinite, although we do not grasp it. That which we conceive is either
finite or indefinite.242 As for the world or matter as a whole, not only do we not
grasp it, but we do not even know it clearly and “positively”, in the sense of
knowing no limits to it, as is the case with God. Descartes is thus ambiguous in his
usage o f negative description: the infinite for him is negativity, which is taken as
an utmost positivity (the infinite positively, i.e., it actually has no bounds), while
the indefinite is negative only privatively; it is nihil privativum as embodied in the
positivity o f the extended substance— in matter.
(3) The Cartesian argument for accepting the indefinite essentially refers
to imagination (see 3.3.1). At this point we need only mention that the mental
ability to go beyond any given limits without grasping or embracing the whole is
the distinctive trait of imagination, “for no matter where we imagine the
boundaries to be, there are always some indefinitely extended spaces beyond them,
which we not only imagine but also perceive to be imaginable in a true fashion,
that is, real”.243 The immediate corollary is that for Descartes there can be no
plurality or infinity of worlds.244 Why is this the case? Imagination is able to
extend and to go beyond any given limits, to the indefinite, although its object is
finite at any particular moment, so that reason interprets (knows) the imaginable as
material, for matter is nothing but extension. For Descartes, the indefinite is not a
sign o f an imperfection o f the infinite power, but rather of our own finitude, and is
further an indication of the conflict between the finite understanding o f the mind
and the ability o f imagination to go beyond any limits.245
(4) It is also important to note that Descartes, unlike Aristotle, insists that
no intermediary structures, no mediation between opposites (namely, between res
extensa and res cogitans) is necessary (see 2.3.1). The intermediary, although
expelled from ontology by Descartes, appears under another guise o f the indefinite,
which plays the role of mediator between actual infinity and the finite, so that
every limited res participates both in the finite (as a particular limited subject) and

To Chanut, 6 June 1647, AT V 51-52. “The reason why I say that the world is
indeterminate, or indefinite”, writes Descartes, “is that I can discover no limits in it; but I
would not dare to call it infinite, because I perceive that God is greater than the world, not in
extension ... but in perfection.” - To More, 15 April 1649, AT V 273.
241 Descartes. Princ. I 27, AT VIIIA 15. Descartes’ distinction of infini/ indéfini appears to
parallel Cusanus’ distinction of negative and privative infinity, De docta ignor. 91-97, 135-
135 et al. Cp. also: Locke, Essay, Bk. II, ch. XVII, §1.
242 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, 16 April 1648, AT V 154.
243 Descartes. Princ. II 21, AT VIIIA 52.
244 See: Koyré 1957.
245 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 47; cp. Princ. Ill 1, AT VIIIA 80.
 Part /. Matter 51

in the indefinite (as part o f the world).

(5) The situation o f radical finitude, when the finite mind is incapable of
grasping the infinite thinking all at once and has only to increase gradually its
knowledge, is the sign o f imperfection for Descartes. Cognition moves as if within
a circle, which it tries to approximate by a polygon with an ever increasing number
o f sides that, despite all its efforts, can never truly become a circle. That is why one
has to invent and apply a method o f cognition—a special procedure that should
enable the finite mind to gradually increase its knowledge, whereas the infinite
intellect knows and grasps (or at least is supposed to grasp) the variety o f links and
connections within the indefinite all at once. The indefinite thus expresses the
attitude of the finite mind to the actual infinity. (6) Both Descartes and the ancient
philosophers agree that matter is indefinite, although in different respects: for
Descartes it is indefinite in extension; for Aristotle and Plotinus it is indefinite in
its very existence, since matter “is” primarily non-being. Finally (7), the notion o f
the indefinite may be applicable to three entities: first, to the extension o f
imaginary space, which can hardly be distinguished from the real space. Second, to
the set o f integers, for whatever large number n we may choose, there is always a
bigger one, n+1 (cp. 2.1.2; 2.1.4). And third, the indefinite as potentially infinite
applies to the divisibility o f continuous magnitude, which is always divisible in any
o f its parts. In all three cases, the presence of actual infinity is denied, because
Descartes reserves the notion o f infrni for God only, while the finite mind is only
able to recognize a limit within that which is capable of increase or decrease.246 It
is worth noting that the delimitation of these three spheres o f the indefinite fits
exactly the ancient (both Pythagorean-Platonic and Aristotelian) distinction of the
subject-matters o f physics, arithmetic and geometry.247
Important questions that arise in the discussion o f infinity are how the
infinite is present, first, in the functioning o f mental faculties (namely, will and
imagination), and second, in mathematical entities (namely, geometrical figures
and numbers). These questions are considered in due place (see 2.1.3; 3.3.1), after
the notions o f cognitive faculties and mathematical entities are introduced.

1.3.3 Paradox and infinity

As it has been argued, the consideration o f matter in Plotinus is inherently

paradoxical (1.1.2). The not finite One too appears to be paradoxical. On the one
hand, it is impossible to speak about it using the ordinary logical distinction
between subject and predicates, since the One is beyond any definition in finite
terms: the One is not any particular subject and is prior to all predicates, hence
nothing can be predicated of it.24®It is not the case, however, that we cannot speak
about the One at all or express it in any way. The most important constitutive fact
about ourselves, argues Plotinus, is that we are unable not to speak about the One,

246 Descartes. First Set of Replies, AT VII 112-113.

247 Cp. Nikulin 19%, 66-69.
248 Plotinus. Enn. III.8.10.28-35; VI.8.14.30. In other words, the One is really not
expressible, cannot be spoken of or written, oyde rheton, oyde grapton, as Plato puts it in
Ep. VII, 341c. Cp. Plotinus. Enn. V.3.13.1, V.5.6.24, VI.8.8.6.
52 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

just as we are unable not to strive towards the good. It is exactly this aspiration
towards the One as the good that precedes all other aspirations (e.g., to any
particular good or that which appears to be good). This aspiration appears to be a
sui generis transcendental condition for the possibility of all other particular
aspirations—the first fundamental aspiration, which itself is an expression of the
One’s presence preceding all presence.249
In such a case it is important to distinguish between “speaking about the
One” (possible “knowledge about”) and “speaking the One” (“knowledge o f ’,
which is above the capacities of reasoning of the finite mind).250 “Speaking the
One” does not follow logical laws, in particular, the principle of non-contradiction,
since nothing can be predicated about the One. “Speaking the One” is then
inevitably paradoxical. For instance, if we say “the One is not predicable”, this
itself is a self-denying or self-negating, unpredicable predication. In other words,
contradictory propositions are false in “speaking the One”, which itself is self­
contradictory. At the same time, each statement should be true in “speaking about
One”. But o f course being both false and true is not possible from the point of view
o f discursive logical thinking.
An example of such paired statements or propositions can be: (a) the One
is one; (b) the One is not one. On the one hand, (a) holds because the One is the
only and unique principle o f being. On the other hand, the One cannot be
predicated and is altogether beyond oneness, therefore the One is not one, (b). Both
statements (a) and (b) are true in “speaking about the One”, but since they
contradict each other, they cannot both be true. Another example is: (c) the One is
“itself’ (ayto), and (d) the One is not “itself’.251 The first, (c), may be said o f the
One as that which only “is” without any addition, to which no predicate may be
added. The second, (d), appears to be true as well, since the One, the most self-
sufficient (aytarkestaton), is prior to every possible identification, since the act of
identification requires a distinction of that which is identified, and this distinction
should obviously precede all identification (namely, identification to itself)-252
Therefore, the One has to be prior to any distinction, and thus is not an identity— it
is not sameness, paired and opposed to otherness, but is rather the source of
identity beyond all identity and therefore cannot be conceived even as non­
identical before the act o f identification.
Why does a paradox appear in Plotinus? There seems to be two different
reasons. First, consideration of non-being follows the pattern o f consideration of
the existent and thus always opens a possibility for paradox.253 Second, a
paradoxical situation is implied by the notion o f actual infinity (rejected by

249 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.22.18.

250 “We do indeed say something about it (legomen ti peri aytoy), but we certainly do not
speak it (oy men ayto legomen), and we have neither knowledge nor thought of it.”-Plotinus.
Enn. V.3.14.1-3. Cp. Gerson 1994, 15-16.
251 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.9.35 sqq.
252 Plotinus. Enn. V.4.1.13. Another example might be: the One is beyond active actuality of
energy (epekeina energeias, Enn. Vl.7.17.10; cp. VI.8.20.14), but also is primal actuality
(energeia) itself (Enn. VI.8.20.9 sqq.).
253 Cp. Plato. Soph. 237a.
 Part I: Matter 53

Aristotle, which allows him to stress the primary role of the principle o f non­
contradiction in ontology and epistemology). The first reason we do not find in
Descartes, for whom non-being is simply an imperfection. The second, however, is
definitely present in the Cartesian system, since God is taken to be actually infinite.
Thus, acceptance o f the actually infinite appears to involve paradox.
There are a number of paradoxes implicit in the notions of the infinitely big, the
infinitely small, the one and the many. The cost for the introduction and acceptance
o f the infinite in mathematics is paradox.254 Let us confine ourselves here to the
paradox o f infinite power. If the finite mind in Descartes can clearly (and
distinctly) understand a thing (mental or physical), that thing might be created—
that is, it might exist. This statement, however, is loaded with paradox, because,
while everything appears to be possible for the infinite power, a thing that involves
conceptual contradiction, or is unintelligible, is said to be impossible, even for
God.2 How is it possible then to combine the notion of infinite power (which is
governed by the equally infinite will, not really distinct from the infinite thinking)
with the principle o f non-contradiction? If everything is supposed to be possible
for the infinite power, it can or could make the contradictories join without
mediation, as is supposed by Nicholas of Cusa or Hegel. The paradox is concealed
in the following statement: “God cannot have been determined to make it true that
contradictories cannot be true together, and therefore that he could have done the
opposite.”256 It is contradictory that God could not have created such a world
where the principle o f non-contradiction would have been invalid. But then, since
it is possible for the infinite power to suspend, as it were, the principle of non­
contradiction, it is also possible to cancel the contradiction that it could not have
created such a world where the principle o f non-contradiction would have been
invalid. To put it otherwise, infinite power (which is not really distinct from
infinite thinking) is capable of conceptual contradiction. Or, simply, if there is
actual infinity, contradictories and opposites may immediately come together,
without being mediated by a substrate or hypokeimenon; and this is precisely the
moment at which the paradox appears.
An obvious example of a paradox of actual infinity is that God cannot
deprive himself o f his own infinite power, as well as o f his own existence. In other
words, being actually infinite, God cannot choose not to be infinite, omnipotent,
necessarily existent and supremely perfect.257 The contradiction of infinite power

254 Cp. Russell 1970, 56-58. Russell’s paradox produced a shock among mathematicians,
logicians and philosophers of science, enabling a number of them (intuitionists or
constructivists) to drop the idea of actual infinity and to accept only the notion of potential
infinity—that which is in a process of becoming or is being constructed. • See: Weyl 1949,
33-66; Abian 1965, 32 sqq.; Moore 1990, 115; Brouwer 1992, 30. The paradox was first
reported by Russell in a letter to Frege in 1895. Cp. Cavalieri 1966, 651-653 who already
envisages a possibility of building mathematics without using the notion of the actually
infinite.
255 Descartes. To Regius, June 1642, AT III 567. Cp. To Regis, January 1642: AT III 492:
“But what is done cannot be undone”.
256 Descartes. To [Mesland], 2 May 1644, AT IV 118.
257 Descartes. Princ. II 20, AT VIIIA 51-52; cp. Princ. I 60, AT VIIIA 29; To **♦, March
1642, AT V 546; For [Amauld], 29 July 1648, AT V 224; cp. To [Beeckman], 17 October
54 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

is, of course, known well before Descartes, for instance, in the scholastic question
o f whether God could have created a stone that he himself would not have been
able to lift. It is interesting to note that for Origen, who is still an ancient thinker in
his rejection of actual infinity, the divine power cannot be infinite, because then it
could not know itself.258
How does Descartes solve the paradox of the actually infinite power,
which turns out to be self-contradictory? Two observations need to be made here.
First, for the actually infinite, free (i.e., not determined by anything external to it)
will to will (vouloir) something as necessary is different from willing it
necessarily, or to be necessitated to will it.259 Second, as it has been already
mentioned, since there is an unparalleled qualitative difference between the finite
and the actually infinite, the former cannot grasp the latter. Descartes simply
dismisses the paradox of infinity by stressing the finitude o f the human mind,
which in principle is unable to grasp the infinite. The source of the paradox is the
following discrepancy: “[S]ince we are finite, it would be absurd for us to
determine anything concerning the infinite; for this would be to attempt to limit it
and grasp it. So we shall not bother to reply to those who ask if half an infinite line
would itself be infinite, or whether an infinite number is odd or even, and so on. It
seems that nobody has any business to think about such matters unless he regards
his own mind as infinite.”260 In other words, the principle of non-contradiction is
only valid for the finite mind. In the infinite, where there is an ungraspable “single
activity, entirely simple and entirely pure”,261 the actual coexistence o f the
opposites might be understood but not grasped by the finite mind.

1.3.4 Indefinite divisibility o f physical and mathematical entities in Descartes

Paradox appears further in the consideration of materiality and continuity. As it has

been argued, the notion of matter implies a paradox for Plotinus, for matter is no
thing, it has no identity and no order whatsoever. There is only a lack o f all
possible organization or junction, primarily exemplified in the infinite divisibility
o f the continuum. In the continuum one cannot discover or recognize any stable
form or inner structure, but whatever form is associated with it in a geometrical
figure or physical body can always be split further and has partes extra partes.

1630, AT I 165; Conversation with Burman, 16 April 1648, AT V 160. “ ‘God does not
have the faculty of taking away from himself his own existence.’ Now by a ‘faculty’ we
normally mean some perfection; yet it would be an imperfection in God to be able to take
away existence from himself. So to forestall any quibbling, I would prefer to put it as
follows: ‘it is a contradiction that God should take away from himself his own existence; or
be able to lose it in some other way.’” - To ***, March 1642, AT V 546). Another paradox
is that for God it is impossible not to know himself. Cp. 2 Tim. 2:13; Cusanus, Apologia
doctae ignor., 8; Dionysius. De div. Nom. 8,6.
258 Origen. De princ. II, 9.
259 Descartes. To [Mesland], 2 May 1644, AT IV 118.
260 Descartes. Princ. I 26, AT VIIIA 14-15. Cp.: “[W]hat basis have we forjudging whether
one infinity can be greater than another or not? It would no longer be infinity if we could
grasp it.” - To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT I 146-147.
Descartes. To [Mesland], 2 May 1644, AT IV 119.
 Part I: Matter 55

Every extended magnitude, which becomes the subject-matter of science, is

associated with matter. And even if matter is not a continuum per se, it always
appears in continuous magnitudes, both physical and geometrical. In fact, in
appearing thus matter hides, since it is not a particular subject. Nevertheless, it is
possible to discern two different, albeit tightly connected, aspects of matter as
appearing in and through continuous magnitudes, which may be discerned in
Plotinus’ treatment o f matter. First, since matter is not a particular subject and thus
has no inner organization or any inherent structure, opposites may both be
predicated o f it simultaneously. Second, since there is no form or limit in matter at
which the cognition could stop, every continuous entity may be always further
divisible. The insurmountable gap between the discrete and the continuous is
further represented in the distinction between number and magnitude, which is one
of the main reasons for the rigid distinction between arithmetic and geometry in
ancient mathematics from Aristotle to Proclus (cp. 2.1.3).262
That opposites may both be predicated o f matter is not, however, accepted
by Descartes, for whom matter represents finite or indefinite being and therefore is
a particular subject. But even then, while matter is thought o f by Descartes as a
continuous magnitude, one cannot say that it is altogether free of paradox. As
Descartes argues, the actually infinite being or God cannot deprive himself o f his
own infinite power, and even if we imagine that God chose to make a particle of
matter indivisible for us, he could not have deprived himself of infinite power, so
that it would still be within that power to divide the particle further in principle.263
We are able thus to imagine a situation where the infinite power makes a finite part
of matter indivisible, but we are not able to think that the infinite power is unable
to divide that particle ad infinitum.
Although in his early years Descartes seemed to accept, along with
Beeckman, the idea o f atomism, in his later treatises he most definitely rejects the
idea from the methodological point of view. Conceiving of bodies or parts of
matter as not infinitely divisible involves a contradictio in adiecto, for the very
notion o f extension is that o f the continuum or infinitely divisible quantity.264 It
means that there are, and can be, no atoms, because their very notion is self­
contradictory. Every body has to be continuous and infinitely divisible.265 Indeed,
it is always possible to conceive— in fact, to imagine—that a fixed part o f matter
may be further divided, since matter, on Descartes’ account, is pure extension and

262 Consequently, the one and the many are present in different ways in the discrete and in
the continuous: the discrete (number as a set of discrete units) cannot be infinitely divisible,
because the “lower” limit of division is an indivisible unit, monas. The (quantitative)
number, however, can be increased by repetitive addition of the unit. On the other hand,
continuous magnitude, be it geometrical or physical, cannot increase at all, because
otherwise it would turn into another magnitude. That is why the “upper” limit of a
magnitude is magnitude itself as a whole. Still, it can be divided infinitely at any particular
limit, simply because there is no limit in the continuous (cp. Aristotle. Phys. 232a 24-25).
263 Descartes. Princ. II 20, AT VI1IA 51-52; cp. To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 273.
264 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 163; cp. To Mersenne, 28 October 1640, AT
III 191-192.
265 Descartes. To Vorstius, 19 June 1643, AT III 686.
56 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

extension is continuous— it is always divisible into further parts. In this way the
notion of infinite divisibility is connected with that o f contradiction; both are
necessarily implied by the notion of matter.
The question that immediately arises is whether matter is infinitely or
indefinitely divisible. In other words, if we take a body or a particle o f matter, is it
already divided into an actually infinite number of parts or is it merely potentially
divisible? Here again we encounter Descartes’ rigid separation between the actual
infinity o f God, which cannot be grasped by the finite mind, and the potential
infinity or “indefinity”, which is accessible (knowable) to the human mind. Even if
one might conceive o f a finite continuous magnitude (without contradiction)
divided into an actually infinite number of parts, it would be conceivable only for
the equally actually infinite mind. Descartes thus implicitly establishes a
methodological prohibition on the infinitesimals as actually existing, representing
the infinite in small. The finite mind then has to grasp the finite objects, even if it
may in principle never come to a stop in considering ever smaller and smaller parts
of a body—the infinitesimals or particles o f extension which, if considered, should
be taken in the process o f ever becoming less and less, smaller than any given
(however small) finite magnitude e>0. Descartes claims that “the principle that a
series cannot go on for ever (non datur progressus in infinitum) is commonly
accepted. I do not accept that principle; on the contrary, I think that in the division
o f the parts o f matter there really is an endless series (datur revera talis progressus
in divisione partium materiae)".266 But even thus Descartes has to deny an
indefinite regress in thinking, since the very act o f thinking is a limitation and
definition of its object as different from other subjects. That is why there cannot be
an infinite regress in ideas: the finite discursive thinking must, after a number of
steps, finally stop.267 Thus, matter or body must be only indefinitely, rather than
infinitely, divisible.268 Again, as in the case o f knowing the infinite, we only
perceive (know) the truth of the indefinite divisibility of matter, but we do not and
cannot grasp it, because o f the definiteness o f finite thinking.
Discussing Descartes’ stance against atomism, Garber argues that “basic
to atomists, both ancients and seventeenth century, was a distinction between two
different sorts of atomism, mathematical (or conceptual) and physical”.269 The
distinction is that in dividing the physical continuous magnitude one has to stop at
a certain point when the further division is no longer possible for physical reasons
(e.g., because we do not possess enough power to continue the division). But
mathematical division is still considered possible in principle, because logically
there is no reason for not performing another dichotomic step. As Garber goes on
to argue, Aristotle does not distinguish between conceptual and physical
divisibility, whereas Descartes does, at least in the 1640s. This, however, does not
really seem to be the case with Descartes. Attempting to present his natural

266 Descartes. To [Mesland], 2 May 1644; AT IV 133; cp. To Gibieuf, 19 January 1642, AT
III 477.
267 Descartes. To Clerselier, 23 April 1649, AT V 355; cp. Med. Ill, AT VII 42.
268 Descartes. Disc. IV, AT VI 36. Cp. Princ. I 26, AT VIIIA 15; Princ. II 34, AT VIIIA 59-
60; Princ. Ill 46, AT VIIIA 100; Princ. IV 201, AT VIIIA 324-325.
269 Garber 1992, 123. Cp. Gassendi. Opera Omnia I, 263 sqq.; Jones 1981, 286-287.
 Part I: Matter 57

philosophy as simply and unambiguously as possible, he simplifies the problem of

the continuum and criticizes Fromondus’ distinction, which explicitly presupposes
every body or part o f matter (every physical atom) to be continuous and thus
divisible into infinity (i.e., indefinitely).270 Since physical and mathematical
(geometrical) objects are considered in(de)finitely divisible in one and the same
extension, there is no sufficient ground for discerning between the two cases;
moreover, geometrical entities may also be considered moving (cp. 3.4.2).
Therefore, the distinction between physical and mathematical divisibility is not that
between “real” and “mental” divisibility. The distinction, as it follows from
Descartes’ argument, is between the potentially infinite, or indefinite divisibility
for the finite mind (which is both applicable to physical and mathematical entities),
and the infinite as complete and (possibly) accessible only to the infinite mind of
God.
We find another interesting example o f the consideration o f the
divisibility o f continuum in early Newton. In his notebooks from the time of his
studies at Trinity College, Newton sketches a theory of indivisibles or atoms,
equally applicable to both physical and mathematical objects.271 He considers four
different hypotheses o f the possible structure o f prime matter, which is continuous
and underlies all physical things. The hypotheses themselves are originally
suggested by W. Charleton and suggest that prime matter—pure continuous
extension—either (1) consists of mathematical points; (2) consists o f mathematical
points together with extended divisible parts; (3) is a whole indivisible entity; or
(4) consists of indivisible atoms.272 Newton provides arguments to show that the
first three hypotheses cannot be valid and that only the last one holds. He illustrates
his position by a construction showing that the atomic structure o f the continuum
or “prime matter” does not differ in physical and geometrical entities.273 He
introduces entities called “ciphers”, provided with the following features; they are
without magnitude and are such that one “cipher” cannot be identified with another
(i.e., as if it has a repulsive force which prevents two such entities from merging).
If two such “ciphers” are posited, then, by way o f construction, they form an
indivisible entity, a unit or an atom which at the same time may be considered as
the indivisible basis o f number, o f geometrical magnitude and o f physical body.
The structure o f the mathematical and the physical continuum appears to be the
same in both mathematical and physical objects. A strong presupposition in
Newton (as also in Descartes) is that both mathematical and physical objects may
share the same measure or unit and that both may be referred to the same kind of
extension. This is impossible both for Aristotle and for later ancient thinkers—in
particular, for Plotinus and Proclus—but becomes a fundamental presupposition
for the successful development o f the new mathematical science (see 2.1.3; 2.2.2).
A possible objection supporting a difference in the indefinite divisibility
o f physical objects and mathematical objects might be that the former are divisible
in matter, whereas the latter are so only in imagination. Such an objection,

270 Cp. Descartes. To Plempius for Fromondus, 3 October 1637, AT 1422.

271 McGuire, Tamny 1983, 336 sqq.; cp. Cavalieri 1966, 654 sqq.; Nikulin 1993, 113-118.
272 Charleton 1966, 23, 85,95.
273 McGuire, Tamny 1983,420.
58 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

however, is not applicable to Descartes, who explicitly states that all indefinite or
innumerable physical particles of matter are imaginable and, moreover, divisible in
imagination.2 4 Both physical and mathematical entities are then divisible in
imagination and are primarily subjects of and to imagination: this, as discussed
later (see 3.3.1), is a crucial position in Descartes, which becomes revolutionary in
the new scientific programme o f the mathematical investigation of the world.

1.4 Substance and essence

1.4.1 Otherness in substance

An important aspect o f the Cartesian treatment o f the notion o f substance is its

introduction not through the notion o f substance, but primarily through the notion
of the other—by the negatio negationis. As a subject existing by and through itself,
substance is nothing other than that which depends on no other thing in order to
exist. Substance is primarily understood as not other. Descartes thus constantly
struggles with otherness in an attempt to reject it. Such a rejection takes place in
obtaining certitude by means of radical doubt, when Descartes expels everything
he can in order to arrive at a simple truth of “cogito ergo sum”.2 5 Thus, (a) the
absolute or unconditioned other for mind and matter is the not-created substance or
God. The conditioned otherness, (b) for the mind is that which is not the cogito—
that which is not thinking and can be understood only as the “outer”, as that which
is unable to think. The other to the mind, which is both complementary to and
exclusive o f the mind, is matter (body) and vice versa, so that the mind may be
conceived as existing without the body, and the body without the mind.276 Since
the two created substances are conditionally other to each other and thus are
different, they are independent of one another and therefore can exist without and
apart from each other. That is why the real distinction of the two finite substances
is constituted not so much by unconditioned otherness (a), but by the conditioned
one (b), which determines the corresponding essential attribute, opposite to the
attribute o f the other substance: the other to the thinking substance is matter; the
other to matter is thought (we do not find otherness functioning this way in
Plotinus, for whom matter also represents otherness, but never is taken as a
substance, even in a limited sense).
One might say that otherness in its (b)-aspect is epistemologically primary
by way o f cognition (e.g., when the ego starts in cognition with getting rid of
everything that is other to itself), for the infinite, as it has been argued (1.3.2), is
not known in its essence. Moreover, the two finite substances, thinking and
extension, are complementary and thereby ontologically equivalent (for both are
equally supported in their existence by the infinite substance). But
epistemologically, thinking is prior, because extension is justified as not-thinking

274 Descartes. To Mersenne, 28 October 1640, AT III 213-214; Princ. II 34, AT VII1A.
275Descartes. Med. I, AT VII 17 sqq.; Disc. IV, AT VI 32; Princ. I 10, AT VIIIA 8.
276 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 169-170; cp. Fourth Set of Replies, AT VII
219; Seventh Set of Replies, AT VII 484; To [De Launay], 22 July 1641, AT III 421; To
Regis, June 1642, AT III 567.
 Part I: Matter 59

(which Descartes claims to be immediately and clearly perceivable), even though it

is not immediately self-evident whether everything that is not-extension is
thinking, for thinking is already necessarily involved in the very act of distinction.
Thought and extension are thus mutually complementary but also
mutually ontologically and epistemologically exclusive.277 Ontologically, otherness
in its (a)-aspect is prior, for only God qua substance strictly and primarily is.
Descartes is more interested, however, in clear and distinct cognition— in the
epistemological, (b)-aspect o f otherness, and not so much in the fabulous
hypothesizing about being as such. That is, if something is a substance and is not
extended, then it is self-evidently thinking, and vice versa. As Descartes writes to
Pollot, “you agree that thought is an attribute o f a substance which contains no
extension, and conversely that extension is an attribute of a substance that contains
no thought. So you must also agree that a thinking substance is distinct from an
extended substance. For the only criterion enabling us to know that one substance
differs from another is that we understand one apart from the other”.278 With no
active principle in it, matter is merely a moles quiescens. Matter, then, is the pure
“outside”. This becomes one of the main theses underlying not only Cartesian
physics and metaphysics, but also modem science. It is worth noting that being,
understood as spatially located existence, is first found in Aquinas.279 In Descartes,
any physical thing may be known by means o f a strict science, primarily by
mathematics, but only to the extent that this thing does not have any inner activity
itself. A thing may be an object of scientific consideration only insofar as it is fully
spatially (i.e., materially) expressed. Only a purely material thing without any
subjectivity or soul, having no “inner” side, may be scientifically studied and
known. Every “inside” might render a thing unpredictable or as violating the
mathematical laws o f physical interaction. In other words, mind and matter are
distinct as pure “inside” and “outside”. It is in this way that the distinction between
subject and object is understood in modernity, where “object” substitutes that
which for Aristotle was “subject”. Although Spinoza tries to overcome this
distinction by considering “subject” and “object” as mind (thinking) and body
(extension) as just two different attributes o f the same substance,280 the dichotomy
is quite definite and becomes one of the differentia specifica o f modernity.
The question of why there are only two finite substances remains
unsatisfactorily answered by Descartes, except by an appeal to the clarity of
understanding only two substances of mind and body. In an attempt to answer this
question, Spinoza postulates a single infinite substance having an infinite number
of attributes o f which we are able to know and conceive of only two. The problem
remains unsolved, however, for it is still not clear why only two, and not more or
fewer, finite attributes (or, respectively, substances) are known to us. A satisfactory
answer to this question might be given if one took into account the “inner”-“outer”
dichotomy. Descartes gets rid o f any intermediary entities that do not fit either “in”
or “out”, because o f his intention to render the structure of the world-corpus and

277 Cp. Descartes. Princ. I 48, AT VUIA 23; 163, AT V1I1A 30-31.
278 Descartes. To Poilot, 6 October 1642, AT III 567.
279Nijenhuis 1994,1-14.
280 Spinoza. Ethics Part II, Props. 1, 2; cp. Part I, Prop. 11.
60 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

thinking-mere as simple and univocal as possible.281 This appears to be the case

because simplicity is a precondition for clarity, and clarity is a precondition for
truth. Descartes cannot accept only one finite substance, since otherwise he would
have either to acknowledge that the world is cosubstantial with God (which he tries
to avoid as pantheism) or to recognize that there is no (free) rational cognizant
agent in the world, which is unacceptable for him as well.
In the case o f only two substances, Descartes needs to describe only one
single relation between them, whereas in the case of three substance there would
already be three different relationships to explain, for four substances— six
relationships, for five substances—ten relationships, and so on (in general, in the
case o f n substances one has to describe R=n(n-1)/2 different relationships). Even
in the case o f a single relation (that of the mind/ body) the problem is already
complex, so that one might expect enormous difficulties (comparable to the
problem o f many bodies in classical dynamics) as the number n grows, for R grows
not linearly but in the order o f n2. Obviously, the simplest case is when only two
substances are recognized (n=2, /?=1). Still, in order to realize this seemingly
rather arbitrary construction, Descartes has to expel all entities from the mind and
from the world that might mediate between the two substances, thus leaving no
room for a possibility of distinguishing between the specifically physical and the
specifically geometrical, or also between the intelligible and the discursive in
thinking (see 3.1.1 -3.1.2).
As it has been argued (1.1.2), the main approach to understanding matter
in the Platonic tradition (and to some extent in Aristotle), with all its subtle
distinctions and various disagreements, is taking matter as not substance. Matter
therefore does not actually exist and can neither be properly known nor adequately
described.282 This means, first, that matter is not a definite subject; thus, there does
not exist any particular, finite set of predicates that could fully characterize matter.
Second, matter cannot be said properly to exist (maybe only as a pure potentiality);
and so it cannot be characterized by any “positive speech”. Finally, matter is not
independent; hence it cannot by itself produce or engender anything existent.
Descartes explicitly rejects such an understanding o f matter.283 For him,
matter as finite substance is understood univocally, because, unlike mind, matter
cannot be co-substantial with the infinite thinking substance, God. On the other
hand, matter possesses all the features o f substance in a limited sense, namely, it is
a subject with a number of predicates; it is independent; and its subsistence is due
to no other cause but the concurrence o f the infinite substance. Being a substance,
matter may be adequately known in its idea and thus, adequately described}**

281 Following Descartes’ exposition, Spinoza mentions the ambiguity of the term "soul”: “I
speak here of mind (mens) rather than of soul (anima) because the word soul is equivocal
and is often used for a corporeal thing”. Principles of the Philosophy of Descartes, Part I,
def. 6.
282 Cp. “materia non est substantia rei... ipsum esse non est proprius actus materiae, sed
substantiae totius." - Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra gent. II 54.
283 Cp. Descartes. The World, AT XI 33. See also: Gilson 1979, 169-175.
284 Cp. Descartes. To Gibieuf, 19 January 1642, AT III 475; Discourse V, AT VI 42-43.
Since matter is taken as a limited substance by Descartes, and the limited substance does not
 Part I: Matter 61

Since matter is taken as substance, the question o f how matter is known

can be reformulated as the question o f how substance is known. Two closely
related main themes determine the cognition of substance in Descartes. First,
substance is not known immediately in itself but only through its attributes.
Second, substance can only be thought, but neither imagined nor sensually
apprehended.
That substance is not known immediately follows from the mentioned
general principle that attributes do not exist independently, that is, apart from a
substance as their vehicle subject. The subject has to be known in its act through a
number o f modes or accidents, ultimately reducible to one essential attribute.285
The very term “act”— besides its traditional scholastic meaning of actus, which
translates Aristotelian energeia—receives a new meaning in Descartes, that of
representation (which may lead to knowledge) through action (of a noun—through
a verb), because it is in acting that we know, produce or reproduce things (see
3.4.1-3.4.2). Substance, in Descartes’ own words, is revealed only through its
accidents, which play the role of mediators, and thus make cognition possible.286
Revelation has easily recognizable religious connotations in the case o f the infinite
substance or God, whose essence is not grasped and is not known immediately in
itself, besides its acts and attributes, one o f which—thought— is co-intensive with
the human mind, although not coextensive, since the human mind is finite. The

necessarily exist due only to itself, and the world (the nature) is maner, a problem that arises
is that of the objectivity of the (outer) world. To note, this problem is specifically a modem
one: we do not find it in antiquity, because matter is not considered something necessarily
existent, and if it is considered to be such (in the Stoics), it simply is there, and does not
need any further justification or speculation about the fact of its presence—only about its
properties. Descartes, however, has to prove the objective existence of the outer material
world (Med. VI, AT VII 71 sqq.). Peculiar to Descartes’ argument is that for him everything
that may be clearly and distinctly conceived by the mind—such is the power of reason as
thinking substance co-intensive and co-substantial with the divine—may be created by (or is
possible for) God. The argument consists then in demonstrating that in case of matter or
bodies their possible existence is necessary as being supported by God. In particular, bodies
or matter in general exist because the ideas we have of them can neither be produced by
ourselves, nor can such ideas of external extended bodies be present without bodies being
real, just be infused in our mind by God, for God is not a deceiver, and deceiving is an
imperfection, incompatible with the highest possible perfection, which is necessarily
comprised in the essence of God (cp. Princ. I 29, AT VIII A 16; II 1, AT VIIIA 40-41). As
Descartes writes in a letter to Hyperaspistes, “I proved the existence of material things not
from the fact that we have ideas of them but from the fact that these ideas come to us in such
a way as to make us aware that they are not produced by ourselves but come from
elsewhere” (To Hyperaspistes, August 1641, AT III 428-429).
285 “We do not have immediate knowledge of substances, as I have noted elsewhere. We
know them only by perceiving certain forms or attributes which must inhere in something if
they are to exist; and we call the thing in which they inhere a ‘substance’. But if we
subsequently wanted to strip the substance of the attributes through which we know it, we
would be destroying our entire knowledge of it.” - Descartes. Fourth Set of Replies, AT VII
222. Cp. Third Set of Replies, AT VII 175-176; Princ. I 52, AT VIIIA 24-25; Princ. I 65,
AT VIIIA 32.
286 Descartes. Appendix to the Fifth Set of Replies, AT IXA 216.
62 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

unknowability o f substance is further stressed by Locke and Kant, for whom

substance per se is an unknown “x”, which is known only phenomenally, through
its accidents and modes, remaining ever closed and hermetic in itself.287 This thesis
appears to be initially rooted in the notion of absolute an unbridgeable
transcendence of the creator to the created. This makes knowledge of substance
both negative and positive, both ka t' aphairesin and kata thesin. Indeed, substance
is known negatively insofar as its essence remains directly inaccessible. But
substance is known positively insofar as its attributes represent or “reveal” it
adequately to the finite mind. In particular, matter is known for Descartes both
negatively, as not thought, and positively, as extension. In this respect, Descartes
comes close to the above discussed position of Aristotle in the knowledge of
matter, although for Aristotle positive knowledge of matter is not altogether
certain. At the same time, Descartes differs from Plato, for whom knowledge of
matter as not-substance is negative par excellence and cannot be revealed by any
attribute, because, strictly speaking, matter has no attributes.
Suppose, however, we abstract all attributes, accidents and modes from a
substance. Is there then anything left? Is there a substance beyond its attributes?
This question can be hardly univocally answered by Descartes, because in the case
o f infinite substance, attributes reveal it in a rather specific sense, so that the
essence remains not fully accessible even through the essential attribute (see 1.3.3).
And in the case of finite substance, if it is stripped o f its essential attribute(s), there
is nothing left that would allow the identification o f the substance (respectively, as
mind or body). There is literally nothing left, especially since the essential attribute
may also be taken as infinite substance itself.
Still, cognition of two substances is not symmetrical: the res extensa is
known through the res cogitans and not vice versa, because every attribute is
represented in the mind. Further, it is possible to think that there exists no body,
but it is not possible to think that there exists no thought; this would be
performatively self-contradictory since it is thought that performs the operations of
both just “thinking” and of “thinking that something is the case” (in parallel to
“being” and “being something”). We know, says Descartes, “more attributes in the
case o f our mind than we do in the case of anything else. For no matter how many
attributes we recognize in any given thing, we can always list a corresponding
number of attributes in the mind which it has in virtue of knowing the attributes of
the thing; and hence the nature of the mind is the one we know best o f all”.288 And
since every attribute is represented in thought, and we—the finite mind(s)—are
essentially the thinking substance, we know that which is represented in thought
better than that which is in body. In other words, we know body not because we
have body or are in body, but because the attribute of extension is also represented
in thought (from this point o f view, there is no primacy of my own body for me as
different from any other body, that is, the ego rationally—not sensually— knows its
own body as the other’s body). This is the reason why knowledge of substance
through attribute(s) or modes of substance (in particular, knowledge o f matter) is

287 Locke. Essay, Bk. 1, ch.4, § 19; Kant. Critique of Pure Reason B 298 et al.
288 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 360.
 Part I: Matter 63

accessible to the reason or mind only—to the thought, and not to the imagination
or senses, which may distort or misrepresent an attribute or mode (cp. 3.1.4).289

1.4.2 Essence and existence: Descartes *essentialism

A further distinction important for the discussion is that o f essence and existence,
which goes back to Aristotle, for whom to be is not the same as to be something™
Thus, to be a point is not the same as for a point to be. “Being something” implies
the notion o f essence, which indicates what something is, quid sit; and “to be”
implies the notion o f existence, which indicates that something is, an sit. In its
most general sense, essence is and shows “that which” or “what” something is.
Summing up scholastic discussions around the notion of essence, Zubiri presents
essence as “that which responds to the name or to the question ‘what’ something is,
its quid or t f \ 29] The “what” comprises all the properties and attributes (further

289 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 364; Princ. I II, AT VIIIA 8-9. To note, an
immediate consequence for physics of the Cartesian notion of matter is the impossibility of
the vacuum. In rejecting the very notion of the vacuum as self-contradictory, Descartes
appears to follow Aristotle, who denies the void as either only a privation (steresis), or non-
being {me on), or a place where nothing is (Phys. 213a 12 sqq.). The reasons for denying the
possibility of the void are, however, very different for both thinkers. Aristotle mainly proves
the impossibility of void from various absurdities and contradictions for movements of
bodies in a vacuum. But Descartes has a completely different theory of motion based on the
notion of inertia and does not thus require the notions of a mover, moving thing and a
medium for movement. The argument for the non-existence of the void from movement
does not play any important role in Descartes (cp. however To Mersenne, 15 November
1638, AT II 440). Descartes’ main reason is much more evident and simple: “void”
extension is substance, and, therefore, not nothing, that is, “the existence of vacuum
involves a contradiction, because we have the same idea of matter as we have of space'* (To
[the Marquess of Newcastle], October 1645, AT IV 329; cp. Princ. II 16, AT VIIIA 50). The
imperceivable matter is called matiere subtile, which we do not immediately apprehend, but
which still has the same extensional substantiality as perceivable bodily matter. Thus, if one
makes a thought experiment and imagines that the air has been removed from a certain place
(a room or vessel), the result would be that the walls of the room (or of the vessel, for
example) would have immediately joined each other, for there would have been no matter
left—that is, no extension between them (To Plempius for Fromondus, 3 October 1637, AT
I 417; To Mersenne, 9 January 1639, AT II482).
290 Cp. Aristotle. Anal. Post. 92b 4 sqq. See also: MacIntyre 1967, 58-62; Wippel 1982, 385
sqq*
291 Zubiri 1980, 51. See also: Owens 1963, 140-143; Irwin 1988, 211 sqq.; Witt 1989, 101
sqq. Cp. Locke. Essay, Bk. Ill, ch. Ill, § 15. The distinction between essence and existence
is also common in scholasticism, in particular, it is maintained by Aquinas (De ente et
essentia 5), Eckhart (Opus Tripartitum, Prologue), Nicholas of Cusa (De coniecturis I 5),
Suarez (Disp. met. XXXI. 1 sqq. ) and others. Cp. Gilson 1979, 103-106; Copleston 1990,
280, 318. One might also make further distinctions here, for example, of the existential
sense of the ‘is’: (1) as applied to a general notion or universal (“number is”) and (2) as
applied to a particular (“this book is”). In the essential sense, one may further distinguish
(1.1) the definitional usage of the Ms’ in the case of a general notion (“a flower is a plant”);
(1.2.) the tautological usage of the “is” in the case of a general notion (“a tree is a tree”);
(2.1.) the definitional usage in the case of a particular ((a) “this flower is a plant”; (b) “this
64 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

distinguished into essential and accidental). In Aristotle, however, essence is

considered only a moment o f substance. Only natural entities, physei onta, have
essence, only they are considered substances as proper subjects of predication. O f
those predicates some are expressed by logos or definition as disclosing the subject
as it is in itself, kath’ hayto (i.e., essentially), and some show the subject in a
number o f accidental properties, kata symbebekos.292 The essence/ existence
distinction is taken not as physei—not as a real difference within a thing, for a
thing is not a “sum” o f essence and existence—but only in the way of expression
or predication, legomenon, as mental distinction. Historically, only toward the end
o f the fourteenth century and culminating in Descartes does essence become
separate from substance and opposed to existence. This is due to the idea of the
creation of all things, material bodies and thinking souls, so that they have their
existence only because, and insofar as, they are subsumed to divine causation. In
fact, the res, as Descartes uses it, is much closer to the notion of essence than to
that o f substance, because, in the case of finite substance, be it mind or matter, the
notion o f res mainly expresses the “what” it is. If essence is considered as not
really separate from substance, as is the case in Aristotle, then essence is the
correlate o f the definition o f a thing not only as conceived in the mind, but as real,
as to ti en einai.m If, on the other hand, essence is taken in its opposition to
existence, as merely a “notion” that refers to thinking or conceiving, as opposed to
the reality o f a thing, then, as it will be argued, essence is taken as a concept, which
may be further distinguished into formal and objective.
An immediate consequence of the essence-existence distinction is that
every definite particular thing has its essence, while it might not necessarily exist.
Existence, however, is not considered just an accident of essence—essence has
being through the act o f existence. In other words, in the finite (created) substances
and things, essence does not necessarily presuppose existence. But is there a case
where existence is, or might be, considered necessary? Is there any instance where
essence necessarily presupposes existence (i.e., is there anything that is not able
not to exist)? The only instance where essence and existence are identical is the
infinite substance, or substance in the proper sense—God; it is only God who
necessarily exists o f himself and because of himself, who is actus purus ,294 Only
God’s essence consists solely in being. Such a conclusion, fundamental for
medieval Aristotelian theology, does not hold in the Platonic account, because the
first principle is considered not as pure being but as the source of being, which is
not being itself. It should be noted, however, that the essence that consists solely in
being— i.e., that is esse, existence per se— is not a “being-of’ some thing and
therefore cannot be thought, because it has no other definitive specifications,
except for just “to be”, but not “be something”, and hence it is nothing. Thus, pure
being is, but is unthinkable in what it is.

flower is flower” (as genus)) and (2.2) the tautological usage of a particular (“this tree is this
tree”).
292 Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1025a 30-32; Top. 102b 4-7.
293 Aristotle. Met. 1029b 11 sqq.
294 Cp. Thomas Aquinas. Summa theol. I, qu. 3, art. 1-3.
 Part I: Matter 65

In a sense, Descartes does not even really need the aforementioned notion
o f substance: the weight o f the distinction lies rather in the difference between the
not created or infinite substance (which does not need anything besides itself) and
the created or finite one. Following the Thomistic distinction, Descartes might
argue that in the created finite substances essence is different from existence, since
it is possible to conceive an essence o f something (for instance, of a book or of a
horse) without necessarily presupposing that it exists at the same time; the only
instance in which essence is not different from existence is God, for his essence is
to be.295 Yet since the notion o f substance is not univocal; the truth that it belongs
to the essence o f God to exist does not follow for Descartes from the fact that God
is substance. It is not the objectivity of substance but human subjectivity that
secures the truth “God does necessarily exist” or “subsistence of the infinite
substance is necessary”.
The essentia-existentia distinction is wholeheartedly supported by
Descartes, for whom divine essence necessarily contains existence (i.e., God
cannot not exist). 296 For any system o f modal logic, “not possible not to” is
identical to “necessary”, ~0~p =Dp. In other words, there is no real distinction in
God between essence and existence, because he is the only substance that exists
due to itself. No real distinction can then also be traced between essence and
perfection, essence and infinity, essence and power.297 On various occasions
Descartes uses “the regular theological idiom” that “it belongs to God’s essence to
exist” and that “apart from God, there is nothing else of which I am capable of
thinking such that existence belongs to its essence”.29*
For Descartes, not only thought, but also extension or matter represent
being or substance. But why does matter exist not necessarily, or why does
matter’s essence not include existence? An obvious answer would be that since the
infinite substance is pure thinking and thought, and thought is complementary to
extension, the infinite substance is not extended. And since, further, it is only in the
infinite substance that existence belongs to essence, matter does not necessarily
exist. Matter, on this account, is substance in a limited sense, as dependent in its
existence on the substance, which solely necessarily includes existence into
essence. One might consider Spinoza’s inclusion of matter as extension into the
unique substance or God as an attempt to overcome this difficulty. Then, it is not
thinking qua substance that exists necessarily, but only thinking qua infinite, that
thinking whose essence necessarily includes existence. Only the existence of finite
(or created) substances, whose essence does not necessarily presuppose existence,
or whose existence is contingent, depends wholly on the concurrence of the infinite

295 Cp. also Spinoza. Ethics Part I, Props. 7,24.

296 Descartes uses this principle stating that “it is not possible that Goddoes not exist, since
existence is contained in the concept of God—and not just possible or contingent existence,
as in the ideas of all other things, but absolutely necessary and actual existence”.-Comments
on a Certain Broadsheet, AT VIIIB 361.
297 Descartes. To More, 15 April 1649, AT V 343.
291 Descartes. Med. V, AT VII 68-69. The French version of the“Meditations” stresses that
existence necessarily belongs to the divine essence. Cp. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 369;
Hyperaspistes, August 1641, AT III 433.
66 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

substance. For this reason, the notion o f essence cannot univocally belong both to
the infinite substance and to finite substances.299 That is why Descartes has to
specify in the second set of replies to the “Meditations” that “we notice that
necessary existence is contained in our concept of God (however inadequate that
concept may be)”.300 Even if we, qua finite thinking substance, have an adequate
conception o f the infinite substance, we cannot escape the conclusion that the
existence o f this infinite substance is necessary and not merely contingent or
accidental.
One might make two further observations at this point. The first is that the
notions o f essence and existence, even if not directly derived from, are always
exemplified by language use. This is stressed by Ockham, who presents the
difference between essence and existence as that between two vocabula, a noun
(res) and a verb (esse): the one (essence) signifies as a noun (nominaliter), the
other (existence) as a verb (verbaliter).30 The second observation is that
mathematicians, as Amauld mentions, following Aristotle, have to consider
essence only, and not existence.302 The definition of a finite thing clarifies its
essence but not its existence.303 This is also true in cases that involve objects of
scientific knowledge, whose essence still can be defined even if they are not
actually present qua existent.
Comparing Plotinus and Descartes in regards to the essence-existence
distinction, we can say that for Plotinus (and for Plato) it is only in the real being
or intellect that essence is not really distinct from existence: thinking and being are
the same (see 3.1.1). The first principle in henology is, however, beyond being and
is not accessible for intellection o f any kind—it is outside existence and, strictly
speaking, does not have an essence. And matter has neither existence nor essence
and is not a substance at all. For Descartes, who supports the ontological approach,
on the contrary, the principle and cause of finite substance and of every thing is
pure being, in which essence necessarily implies existence. What is beyond the
grasp o f the human finite mind (whose essence does not already include existence),
is not the beyond-being, but the infinite (see 1.3.3). And matter is a finite substance
whose existence is accidental to it (because matter is or exists only insofar as it is
constantly recreated by the necessarily existing substance), and whose essence is to
be extension, in which bodies may be considered as geometrically expressed
entities.

299 As Descartes writes, “existence is contained in the idea or concept of every single thing,
since we cannot conceive of anything except as existing. Possible or contingent existence is
contained in the concept of a limited thing, whereas necessary and perfect existence is
contained in the concept of a supremely perfect being”, Second Set of Replies, AT VII 165-
166; cp. First Set of Replies, AT VII 118; Sixth Set of Replies, AT VII 433.
300 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT V II152; italics added.
301 Ockham. Summa logicae III, 2, ch. 27 (“Utrum esse rei et essentia rei sint duo extra
animam distincta inter se"). Cp. Plato. Soph. 261d-262e. Ockham does not, however,
recognize a real distinction between essence and existence.
302 Fourth Set of Objections, AT VII 212 sqq.
303 Aristotle. Met. 1030b 14 sqq., Anal. Post. 72a 18-24; 76b 7 sqq. “ A definition is a
phrase (saying) indicating the essence of something, esti d' horos men logos ho to ti en einai
simaindn" - Top. 101b 37-102a 17. Cp. Barnes 1993, 100-101; Szab6 1994, 355-356.
 Part I: Matter 67

The existence o f a finite thing is that “counterpart” of it in the essence/

existence distinction that is individual and contingent. Therefore, knowledge and
thinking o f universal (i.e., not contingent) truths must start for Descartes not with
existence (an est), but with essence (quid esf)-304 It does not mean, however, that
existence is o f no concern for Descartes. Existence is the realm o f the divine
providence, o f constant care and of recreative support. Finite existence is produced
by God and is that which makes essence real or “embodied”. But Descartes is more
interested in the study o f the essence of existence. For this reason, his position may
be called essentialism. Essence is essence o f a thing that either does exist or can
exist. Since essence, even if it shows a really existing thing, does not necessarily
entail existence but remains in the realm of concepts or “ideas”, essence, as it is
known to and by the finite mind, is primarily connected with potentiality or
possibility. It is not by chance that contemporary philosophy, which owes much to
Descartes, abandons to a great extent the consideration of necessary existence and
is more interested in possibility, in possible worlds, in modal logic, and so on.
Since a finite thing as a substance may have an essence without really existing, to
know a thing, is to know it as necessary only in its essence (e.g., mathematical
entities), and not in its existence. That is why even if essence is referred to as
potential existence, it is known as necessary in its concept.305 Such knowledge is
firm and sure, and its paradigmatic example is the conception o f mathematical
objects. Even if both necessary essence and contingent existence o f a thing are
supposed to be produced by the infinite essence of God, this essence of a finite
thing “is nothing other than eternal truths” and therefore has to precede
existence.306
What does guarantee then that in the last instance the cognition of
essences is neither futile nor just invented by the finite mind? The warrant can only
be the unique essence in which existence is necessarily included: God, who
conceives all things in their essences from eternity, who supports these things in
existence by (re)creating them and who, by providing the lumen naturale to the
finite mind, makes the cognition certain, excluding any error.307
The connection o f essence and existence is then established by the
principle that the essence which is clearly and distinctly perceived, may be also
brought into existence by God.308 Put otherwise, the link between essence and

304 Descartes. First Set of Replies, AT VII 108.

305 Such a potentiality of existence is not a probability, although the idea that probability
may represent strict knowledge arises for the first time in early modernity, as, for example,
in Pascal’s elaboration of the theory of probability.
306 Descartes. To [Mersenne], 27 May 1630, AT I, 152. Later Descartes contends that “we
do indeed understand the essence of a thing in one way when we consider it in abstraction
from whether it exists or not, and in a different way when we consider it as existing; but the
thing itself cannot be outside our thought without its existence”, To ***, 1645 or 1646, AT
IV 349. He does not explain, however, what constitutes this difference. The distinction
remains obsolete, a part of a confused discussion, as Descartes himself recognizes (Ibid., AT
IV 350).
307 Descartes. Med. IV, AT VII 58.
301 As Descartes says, “It seems very clear to me that possible existence is contained in
everything which we clearly understand, because from the fact that we clearly understand
68 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

existence in the case of finite substances is ontologically secured by the infinite

thinking, but epistemologically—by the finite one. Such a structure, first, allows
Descartes to prove the existence o f God from the mere act of cogito, where the
cogito is itself secured in its thinking (i.e., in its essence and existence) by God.
This kind of circle is not a logical one, for the first in the order of knowing
(essence) is not necessarily the first in the order of being (existence). And second,
the claim that Descartes’ metaphysics is epistemology par excellence is too much a
simplification, for his metaphysics starts with knowing God and soul through the
ego, but the very possibility and essence of the ego is secured by the necessary
existence o f that which is sought to be proven.309
Now, what does Descartes’ essentialism have to do with the notion of
matter? For Descartes, as for most contemporary philosophers, artificial (or
human-made) bodily things have essence exactly in the same way as natural (or
God-made) things. There is no sufficient ground for distinguishing them, since
both artificial and natural things are finite and are thought to have essence as made
or produced (set 3.4.1). Making or producing a thing according to its pattern gives
a thing its existence. The only difference between natural and artificial might be
that for natural things the pattern has to preexist in the infinite mind, whereas for
artificial things— in the finite mind. The distinction between tekhne, which
constructs the artifacts, and episteme, which knows physis or natural facts—that
which cannot be otherwise—thus becomes obsolete.310 For this reason, the whole
o f the extended physical or bodily world might be considered produced, or at least
reproduced in the imagination. There is no need for “real” existence—only an as
//•existence, imaginable and imaginary. If this is the case, then existence, as
contingent, may not be preserved through different mental operations involved in
cognition. Existence could be mentally (imaginary) recreated. Since it is the
necessity o f essence, and not the contingency of existence, that is known and is the
content o f truth, essence is the ontological and epistemological ground of the truth
o f all things and, therefore, it is only the essence of things and finite substances
(both of res extensa and of res cogitans) that are then invariant in all possible
transformations o f things.

something it follows that it can be created by God,” To Mersenne, 31 December 1640, AT

111 273-274; cp. Med. V, AT VII 70; Med. VI, AT VII 78; Fourth Set of Objections, AT VII
219. “For when we come to know God, we are certain that he can bring about anything of
which we have a distinct understanding”, Princ. 160, AT VIIIA 28.
309 “And when I consider the fact that I have doubts, or that I am a thing that is incomplete
and dependent, then there arises in me a clear and distinct idea of a being who is
independent, that is, an idea of God. And from the mere fact that there is such an idea within
me, or that I who possess this idea exist, I clearly infer that God also exists, and that every
single moment of my entire existence depends on him.” - Descartes. Med. IV, AT VII 53.
3,0 Cp. Nikulin 1996,64-67.
 PART II
INTELLIGIBLE MATTER
AND GEOMETRY
70 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

2.1 Geometry, arithmetic and physics in antiquity

Mathematics for the ancient Weltanschauung is an example of science that

exercises an utmost precision of knowledgt-episteme about that which cannot be
otherwise.1 In mathematics, arithmetic is distinguished from geometry. In various
classifications geometry comes second to arithmetic, because, rather than
considering merely the thinkable number, geometry considers the figure, which
(even if unchangeable in its properties) is not only thinkable but also quasi-
corporeal as extended.2 Put otherwise, the subject matter of geometry displays less
precision than that of arithmetic, and the more precise is better known.3 As the
fundamental ontological structure and the pattern of being, number is a matter of
great importance in the Academy, as well as in the later Pythagoreans and
Neoplatonists.4 Number is taken as the pattern by which being is both constituted
and considered; number exists separately from things and can therefore only be
thought—this is why knowledge-ep/s/eme is based on number and structured by
it.5
Indeed, numbers reveal some remarkable properties that, once established,
are forever valid. Thus, for instance, in 1909 David Hilbert proved that for every
integer n there exists an integer m such that every integer is a sum of m n-th
powers, which is a generalization of a 1770 hypothesis of Edward Waring: namely,
that each positive integer is a sum o f 9 cubes («=3, m=9) and of 19 fourth powers
(«=4, m=19).6 This noteworthy result presents a remarkable constancy and
immutability in and of numbers, which makes them the best representatives of
being as that which does not change. Mathematics is, in turn, different from
physics insofar as the subject matter of the former is not found in the world of
becoming. Mathematics has to do with the mathemata—objects of strict

1 Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1026a 6 sqq.; 1064b 1-10; Anatolius. Ap. Heron. Def. 164.9-18.
Mathematics in particular, as arithmetic, differs from the logistic as a practical art of
counting and solving mathematical problems (this difference is especially stressed by Plato
and the Neoplatonists). See: Klein 1968, 10-25; Gaidenko 1980, 18-20; Fowler 1987, 108-
117. According to Plutarch, Archimedes regarded mathematics an incomparably more
dignified science than any of its applications, of which he did not condescend to write about.
- Plutarch. Vita Marcelli 14.4; 17.4.
2 Archytas. Thesleff 1965,6.12-15; Proclus. In Eucl. 35.21 sqq.
3 Cp. Plato. Meno 81a sqq.; Phaedo 73a-77b; Phil. 56c sqq.; Aristotle. Anal. Post. 87a 31-
37; Met. 1078a 28-30; Themistius. In de an.12. 10-12. 27. See also: Fowler 1987, 8-25;
Englisch 1994,91-96.
4 Plato. Phil 16c-19a; Phaedo 101c-I06b; Aristotle. Met. 1080a 14 sqq.; frg. 2, Peri
thagatoy, Ross = Alexander Aphrod. In Met. 55.20 sqq.; Theophrastus. Met. 6a 15-6b 17;
Simplicius. In Phys. 453.25-454.19. Cp. A. Wilson 1995, 367-387.
5 Philolaos B4, B11 DK; Plato. Theaet. 185c-d, 195c-196b.
6 Another example is Vinogradov’s estimation of the number INof the representations of a
positive odd number N as a sum of three primes: N=pi+p2+pj, given by the expression:
IN=RS+0(NJn'<), where A=0{B) denotes that the ratio |A|/B does not exceed a certain
constant, n=ln N; h and c are arbitrary constants bigger than 3; R=N2(l+8)/(2n3) where lim
8=0 when N-*oo; t=Nn‘3h, 0<aSq; 0<q£t; (a,q)=l; p=f(q); and for q=l to oo:
S = f :(q)/p3f e2xi<*'q)N(Vinogradov 1985, 129-132; cp. 101-123).
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 71

knowledge that, once discovered, may be not only systematically structured but
also taught.
But is it at all possible to apply mathematics to the study o f physical
objects? Plato unequivocally denies any possibility of such an application because
of the mentioned rigid distinction between the stable being exemplified in numbers
(and, to a lesser degree, in geometricals, which are already connected with
movement (see 3.4.3-3.4.5)) and becoming, which is represented in physical
things.7 And even if in the “Timaeus” Plato develops a physical theory based on a
consideration of four elements (i.e., physical elementary bodies, which themselves
are taken as regular geometrical bodies), he, first, presents his theory as a just
mythos, as a possible and probable account of the constitution of things (eikos,
48d).8 Second, only the elements themselves (fire, air, water and earth) are
constituted qua geometrical; the geometrical itself is not grounded in any possible
experience but rather is postulated. All other physical objects are constituted by
elements as their primary compounds. But bodies are not already geometrical and
their structure and pattern o f behavior cannot be mathematically or geometrically
described, because combinations o f primary bodies (i.e., of elements) produces an
infinite multitude o f things (poikilia apeira, 57d), the subject matter of mere
opinion or probable account. A possible exception can only be the regular
(circular) movement o f stars; stars, however, represent gods and are bodies of a
special kind. And third, what is never explained by Plato is why and how ideal
geometrical entities—triangles o f two kinds—constitute the properly physical
characteristics in elements, not accountable in terms of pure geometry (e.g.,
weight).
Aristotle develops his physics as a strict but not mathematical science,
structured not numerically but qualitatively. Every physical object on this account
may be taken as the primary substance considered as a subject with a variety of
predicates and a number o f properties. When properties are abstracted from their
subject, they may be arranged and studied analytically, by means of logic. In his
critique o f the Platonic account o f number in the Met. M Aristotle’s aim is to
challenge the Platonic notion o f the independence and precedence of number qua
being from and to physical things. Aristotle’s alternative is to accept the mere
logical precedence o f number. For that reason, he has to concede that the general
propositions o f mathematics may be applicable to physical things not qua physical
but only insofar as they are magnitudes, only insofar as they are movable subjects
with certain predicates that may be subjects o f syllogism, calculation and
representation in a geometrical scheme.9 Physical objects themselves, however,
cannot be properly studied by means o f mathematics—they cannot themselves be
mathemata. In order to become objects of a strict science, physical things should

7 Cp. ho men arithmos hestoton, to de megethos en kinesei, “number is of static things, but
magnitude is in movement”. - Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.13.30. It is interesting to note that even
the contemporary theory of numbers, a very developed and sophisticated theory, finds
almost no applications in physics (see: Manin 1981,98-99).
* Plato. Tim. 47e-61c.
9 See: Aristotle. Met. 1077b 18-23; 1078a 14-17; Phys. 231b 19 sqq. Cp. Dijksterhuis 1961,
68-72.
72 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

therefore cease to be physical things: they should be lost qua physical and be
substituted by objects that represent properties abstracted from the physical
things—by their geometrical representatives. Only thought in (or, rather, into) a
geometrical object, may these properties be studied mathematically.
Aristotle’s operation of abstraction (aphairein or separation, khdrizein)
involved in the substitution of a physical thing by a geometrical entity10 is,
however, not itself completely univocal and for that reason the legitimacy of
abstraction may be called into doubt. First, it appears to refer not to the thinking of
the intellect or physical perception, but to discursive thinking and especially to
imagination (for more details see 3.1.1; 3.1.2; 3.2.1). Second, Frege’s critique of
abstraction is applicable to Aristotle’s consideration. When abstracting, discursive
reason (or imagination) obtains “from each object a something wholly deprived of
content; but the something obtained from one object is different from the
something obtained from another object—though it is not easy to say how”.11 In
his critique o f the Platonic approach, Aristotle does not provide a definitive answer
to the above two difficulties; thus, the ontological status of the relation of
abstracted properties or qualities as mediating between physicals and geometricals
remains unclear. It is clear, however, that the abstracted mental (imaginable)
substitutions o f physical entities are themselves not physical things and that
ontologically they need not have anything in common with physical objects, except
for being extended and having a certain shape. But one cannot ignore the
fundamental fact that a physical surface can never be measured with absolute
precision, whereas a geometrical surface can be measured precisely. Obviously,
there might be different theoretical accounts of this fundamental distinction. In
spite o f his criticism, Aristotle takes a way that turns out to be fundamentally
compatible with the Platonic treatment of mathematical (arithmetical and
geometrical) and physical objects, a way that later is followed and substantially
developed by Proclus—namely, the consideration of geometrical objects as
connected with, and immersed in, a different (not physical) spatiality or
materiality.

2.1.1 Foundations o f arithmetic in Plotinus

Plotinus’ treatise VI.6 [34] “On Numbers” (Peri arithmori) o f the Enneads is
dedicated to considering the place and the ontological status o f number in the
whole structure o f being and ¿linking, number as mediating between the original
unity o f the One and the multiplicity o f the infinite. Plotinus dedicates the Enn.
V.5.4-5 (a part o f the “GroBschrift”, Enn. III.8; V.8; V.5; II.9), which immediately
precedes the Enn. VI.6, to the consideration o f the One in its relation to number,
outlining the main questions on the structure of the number, as if postponing their
solution to a later point.
In the Enn. VI.6 we do not find, however, any discussion specially
dedicated to the problem o f the constitution o f number as such. The question
remains explicitly unresolved: Plotinus does not address it in either the Enn. V.5 or

10 Aristotle. Phys. 193b 31sqq. Cp. Simplicius. In Phys. 290.27-30.

" Frege 1967, 85.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 73

in VI.6, thus leaving the problem without a definitive answer. Here we will attempt
to reconstruct the constitution, derivation and construction o f number in Plotinus in
its various representations, referring to the hints Plotinus provides in his texts. The
“foundations o f arithmetic” are understood in the Fregean sense, as a
comprehensive study o f number in its different aspects and in its specific
constitution qua number.12
Plotinus discerns between what he calls essential or substantial number
(iaysiödes arithmos) and quantitative or monadic number (monadikos, toy posoy).13
In this distinction Plotinus follows Plato, who, in his later years (as reported by
Aristotle and later Greek authors) made a distinction between the so-called “ideal”
and “mathematical” numbers and was even inclined to reduce the forms-eide to
ideal numbers.14 The quantitative number is the image (eidolon) of the essential
number through participation (metokhe, metalepsis)} The quantitative number is
that which provides quantity (i.e., is that by which things are numbered and
counted). The essential number always provides existence (ho to einai aei
parekhön).'6 In the act o f numbering, the quantitative number constitutes quantity
in the numbered as the realization or actualization of the essential number. Krämer
and Szlezäk point out that the distinction between these two types o f number
comes back to Plato and the early Academic discussions, traces of which are
preserved in Aristotle’s criticism of ideal (essential) and mathematical
(quantitative) numbers in Met. M 6-9.17
Essential number in Plotinus is introduced as contemplated primarily in or
“over” (epitheöroymenos) the forms-e/c/e.1* In order to fit the essential number, as
the ordering principle, into the structure of being, Plotinus has to split being (oysia,
to einai) into being proper (on) and beings (onta) (i.e., to discern between being as

12 Frege 1986, 66 sqq. Plotinus himself uses the term arithmetike quite rarely, in Enn.
VI.3.16.20; I.3.6.3 and III. 1.3.26, when referring to the science of numbers within the
Pythagorean distinction of various sciences.
13 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.17 sqq.; VI.6.9.34-35; 16.26; cp. VI.6.10.25 sqq. and commentary of
R. Beutler and W. Theiler ad loc.: Plotinus 1956 (1964), III 450-451. The term oysiödes is
used neither by Plato nor by Aristotle, cp. Plotinus 1980, 199. See also a detailed and
precise exposition of Plotinus’ number theory in: Horn 1995, 149 sqq. and the distinction of
the “epitheoretical” (existing due only to the activity of our thinking) and “accidental”
numbers (Ibid., 201-220). Cp. Trouillard 1983, 227-234.
14 This distinction is, however, rejected by Xenocrates, cp. Aristotle. Met.l080b 11-14;
1083b 1-2; 1090b 32 sqq.; Syrianus. In Met. 186.30-36. Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1083a 17-20;
1090a 3-6; frg. 11, Peri philosophias, Ross = Syrianus. In Met. 159.33-160.5; frg. 4 Peri
ideon, Ross = Alexander Aphrod. In Met. 85.18 sqq. See also: Wedberg 1955, 64-84, 116-
122; Annas 1976, 62-73. Cp. Burkert 1972, 15-28.
15Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.3; V.5.5.11-12.
16Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.18.
17 Cp. Aristotle. Met. 987b 22; 1080a 12 sqq.; Phys. 209b 34; Test. Plat.56-65 Gaiser. See
also: Krämer 1964, 305 sqq.; Th. A. Szlezäk 1979, 90 sqq.; Cleary 1995, 346-365. For
Aristotle, who in his usage follows Plato, Xenocrates and Speusippus, essential number
coincides with the ideal (eidetikos) and quantitative number with the mathematical. Cp.
Syrianus. In Met. 45.33-46.6 and commentary to: Plotinus 1980, 170-171.
18 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.9.35-36.
74 Mailer, Imagination and Geometry

one and as many).19 This distinction is not, however, itself the real one, for being
remains a synthetic conjunction o f the dual unity of hen-on or hen-polla, which
appears as the structure of all-unity within noys (homoy en heni panta).20 Plotinus
faces the choice o f presenting the being of noys either as the duality o f thinking-
noesis, which thinks itself as thought-woefa, or as the triad of being, intellect and
life.21 The difficulty that arises here is how to understand the being-beings
distinction. Thus, in the case o f the noesis-noeta division, the former appears to be
the on, while the latter seems to represent the onta. On the other hand, the being-on
is prior to the intellect-Hoys and the thinking-/ioes« is already a multiplicity bound
into a unity, the hen on of the second hypothesis of the ’’Parmenides”. Now, in the
triad of being, intellect and life qua living being, the last term represents the
cosmos noetos of all the forms in which the intellect fulfills its being—it thinks
itself as the noeta.22 Since, however, every object of thought, noeton, is an instance
of being, life as the living being has to be identified with the onta. But if the
beings-onto represent the aspect o f multiplicity within the noesis, they have to be
identified either with the intellect qua thinking or even with being, because noesis
represents being as the first produced by and after the One.
Comparing the on-onta and the on-noys-zdion partition schemes, one
might argue that the onta are represented as noys in the activity and actuality of
thinking thinking itself23 and thus split into the numerical multiplicity of the zoion.
Plotinus seems to be aware of the difficulty of establishing a direct correspondence
between ontological systems based on double and triple distinctions (into which
the notion of number then has to be inscribed). He does not explicitly resolve the
difficulty, even if he does provide some hints, in particular, by introducing the
distinction o f four terms (on-onta-noys-zoion, which he states in the form o f the
rhetorical question) that might resolve the problem of making a correspondence
between the two- and the three-term ontological systems into a sort of synthesis of
the two and the three in the four.24 Such a task would be important (although it is a
subject of special discussion) both from the systematic and from the exegetic
points of view. The dyad of the opposed principles is mainly used by Plato,
whereas the triad of the principles (where one mediates the other two) is employed
by Aristotle (although Plato is aware o f the possibility o f mediation between the
opposites).25
Plotinus formulates four hypotheses o f possible relations between number
and the forms-e/rfe: the former may be either after, together with, or independent
of, the latter. In the last case number may be also conceived either before or after

19 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.5.22.

20 Enn. VI.6.7.4; cp. Anaxagoras Bl. See also Parm. 143a, 144e. Cp. also Wagner 1985,
280-285; Halfwassen 1992, 56-57.
21 Plotinus. Enn. V.l.4.30-34; V.9.7.6 sqq.; VI.6.8.15-22; 9.27-31; 15.2-3; 18.31-33; III.9.6.
The term “life” comes back to Plato’s Tim. 30c-31b, 39e and Soph. 248e-249a. Cp. Hadot
1960, 105-141.
22 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. V.9.9.1-8 et al. Cp. Plato. Tim. 39e. On the historical background of
the term ‘cosmos noetos’ in Plotinus see: Runia 1999, 165-168.
23 Noesis is considered as the actuality of the noys, Plotinus. Enn. V.4.2.3-4; cp. 3.1.1.
24 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.9.29-31.
25 Cp. Test. Plat. 44a Gaiser.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 75

the forms.26 Plotinus argues (not without a certain ambiguity) in favor of the
independence o f (essential) number as existing before beings and forms: number is
already present in the intellect and in the living being as the principle of being
itself.27 Thus, if we stage a thought experiment in which we create something, we
have to know precisely beforehand how many things are to be produced. In this
way, number has to precede beings.2* As the structuring and already structured
principle, number is inseparable from being, which is split by thinking-noes/s into
the united multiplicity of life according to essential number, the living being,
which itself is a collection of archetypes, forms-eide, or the cosmos o f intelligible
objects-noeta (in the Enn. VI.6.15.16 number is qualified as noy energeiai). In the
Enn. VI.6.8 Plotinus changes the hierarchical being-Iife-intellect order of die Enn.
III.9.1 to being-intellect-life. This is already noticed by Proclus, who resolves the
difficulty by referring life to two different intellects: the higher one and the lower
one.29 This is present in a rather complicated system of hypostases, absent in
Plotinus.30 I would, however, argue that the order of being-intellect-life should be
preserved. Within the one-being, the unity, the image of the One, is the ontological
precondition o f the possibility o f being-on, because being cannot be thought or
considered as not one. Furthermore, being-on is itself the ontological precondition
of the possibility o f think ing-woei/i. In order to think at all, thinking primarily has
to be; thinking is the precondition o f the possibility of life. Life as the cosmos of
beings or intelligible objects-noeta needs to presuppose thinking, which thinks
itself in and as these particular forms. In other words, even before something is
thought as a noetic object-noeton, there should be an act of thinking, noesis. Before
the act o f thinking there should simply be something—the on. Before being there
should be unity; without unity being is impossible.31 The order of being-Iife-
intellect may be then preserved only in the sense that life mediates being and
thinking—thinking as one-being is realized in the plurality of the objects of
thought—in the living being.
The logos or the proportional relation between various representations of
being is therefore established in the following way: unity relates to being as
(essential) number to beings, or, unity relates to (essential) number as being to
beings.32 Essential number is then said to be in (en) being, with (meta) being and
before (pro) the beings which have their foundation, source, root and principle
(basis, pege, rhiza, arkhe) in the essential number, while the principle of being

26 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.4.1 sqq.

27 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.9.38 sqq.; to de on genomenon arithmos, VI.6.15.29 et sqq. Cp.
Sextus Empiricus. Adv. Math. X 258; Krämer 1964, 301-302; Pépin 1979, 199-200. Proclus
misunderstands VI.6.9.23-24 when he concludes "to prötiston on pro tön arithmön", Theol.
Plat 150.15-19.
MCp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.9.14 sqq.
29 Proclus. In Tim. 1427.6-20.
30 Cp. Henry 1938,228.
31 Cp. oyden gar on, ho me hen, Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.13.50-51.
32 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.9.29; 39-40. Cp. Plotinus 1980, 74, 186.
76 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

itself is the One, which is the source of being, and is transcendent to being.33 The
essential number, which exists in and with being, and is before intellect and life,
only becomes fully developed and expressed in all of its powers on the level of
life.34 In Kramer’s concise formulation, the second hypostasis of Plotinus in its
triple unity is nothing else but (essential) number thinking itself.35
Plotinus begins his consideration of number by implicitly accepting the
following fundamental Platonic postulates: first, the absolute superiority o f the
producing unconditioned unity o f the One to the indefinite unlimitedness of non-
being and, second, the one-being as soaring between the One and the absolute
unlimited privation of unity and being. This enables Plotinus to present a row of
oppositions where the first element in every pair is ontologically and axiologically
prior to the second one, the former being “closer” to unity, participating in a higher
degree in the unique principle o f being that itself is beyond being. The latter stands
further from it, in its multiplicity and dissipation, tending to the absolute non-
being, destitute o f any productive capacity. In relation to being (usually considered
as the second hypostasis), opposites are to be considered contraries. But related to
the One and to the absolute privative non-being, opposites are not contraries,
because neither the One nor the me on are subjects of which anything may be
properly predicated. The “Pythagorean” opposites are thus the one-unity itself, the
truly and really one, which is beautiful, possesses itself and does not participate in
the many, as opposed to the many participating in the unique one, the other that
stays away or falls away from the unity, the pure “outside”, base and disorderly,
present as matter and the unlimited.36
The problem o f the constitution o f number arises then as an important and
legitimate question for Plotinus; a question that is tightly connected with the
constitution o f being as thinking. Since number as constitutive for being mediates
between unity and multiplicity,3 number itself should be brought forward by unity
and multiplicity. But how? Plotinus does not give a direct answer to the question
but gives a number of indirect indications and provides a henological and
ontological system within which the problem of the constitution o f number can be
solved.
In the Enn. V.5.4.20 sqq. Plotinus further requires that the following be
postulated.
(a) Before being there “is” the One as the principle of number and being, the “bare
One”, hen psilon.3*

33 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.9.36-39. On the “metaphysics of prepositions” cp. Plotinus. Enn.

Vl.6.18.17-19; Proclus. Theol. Plat. II 60.22-61.9 and the commentary of H. D. Saffrey and
L. G. Westerink ad loc. (p. 117); Simplicius. InPhys. 10.35-11.3.
34 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.15.8 sqq.; VI.6.16.48.
35 “Sichselbstdenkende Zahl” - Krämer 1964, 304.
36 Cp.: hen, alethös hen, to mi metokhei hen, katharös hen, ontös hen, oy kath’ alio hen,
hayto, to endon, ekhei heayto, kalon as opposed to ta alia hen, polla onta metokhei henos
hen, oy to katharös hen, alio, apostasis toy henos, to exö, apollymenon, aiskhrön, akosmon,
hyle, apeira. - Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.1 sqq.; VI.6.1.10 sqq. Cp. also: Aristotle. Met. 986a 21
sqq.
37 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.13.9; Plato. Phil. 16c sqq.
3* Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.11.19.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 77

(b) The essential number is ontologically prior to, and causes the existence of, the
quantitative number by participation.
(c) There are two principles that constitute essential numbers, the monad (monas)
and the dyad (dyas), the former being the principle of sameness, the latter the
principle of otherness.
(d) In number, units may be discerned.
First of all, for the sake of clarity and non-ambiguity of argumentation we
have to lay out a number of terminological distinctions. In what follows, the One
(hen) refers to the One as the unique principle of being, which itself is beyond
being. The monad (monas) refers to the one as the first principle in being; and the
henad (henas) or unit—to the unity within number. The later Pythagoreans tended
to distinguish one-hen as an ideal principle from monas as a numeric unit.39 The
notion o f henad plays an important role in Proclus (who seems to borrow it from
Iamblichus), where a number o f equal henads represents the first plurality of being
after the One.40 Plotinus himself does not make any strict distinction between these
terms, using them rather loosely and interchangeably.41
The fundamental problem that arises from postulate (c) is the ontological
status o f the two principles o f number and the way these principles constituted
themselves. The monad is to be taken as the first and the simplest undifferentiated
unity o f being when being is engendered by the One, ontds hen.42 Such a unity is
not different from pure being-on, which itself is not different from the yet not
determinate thinking-noem. The one being is however already the one being, hen
on, and as such already necessarily presupposes multiplicity, first appearing as a
simple dyad, which, together with the monad, constitute the two principles of
number and being within being.43
But how is the dyad constituted? First of all, the essential dyad cannot be
said to be a collection of two units for the simple reason that before the dyad, there
is no multiplicity or duality. Two different units cannot arise. Therefore, the dyad
should be taken as one whole. The dyad may be defined simply as that which is not
the monad, the other to it. But where does this other come from? How does the hen
on evolve into polla ontcfi The consecutive acts that engender the dyad may be
represented in the following way (the succession here should be understood as
logical and ontological and not temporal). When being is brought forward by the

39 Cp. Anon. Photii 237.17 sqq., Thesleff. Cp. Iamblichus. In Nicom. 11.1-26.
40 Proclus. Elem. theol. 6, 113-165; Theol. Plat. Ill 11.29-17.12. See also: Dillon 1993, 48-
54.
41 See: Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.4.4; 5.6; 5.37-38; 9.33; 10.3-4; 10.19 (to hen kata tin monada)\
11.16-23; 12.1 (to hen kai monas). Cp. Plato. Phil. 15a; Theon. Expos, rer. math. 21.14-16;
monas, kath' hên hekaston ton ontôn hen legetai - Euclid. Elem. VII, def. 1. See also:
Syrianus. In Met. 183.24-25; Proclus. In Parm. IV 880.30-38. Anonymous Photii ascribes to
the Pythagoreans the usage of monas for the intelligible and hen—for numbers (Thesleff
1965, 237.17-19). Here the terms are used in the sense of Iamblichus, for whom hen refers
to the One productive of being, while monas—to the produced (being), monas ek toy henos.
De myst. VIII 2,262.3-5. Cp. Frege 1986,44 sqq.; Dummett 1991, 82-83.
42 Plotinus. Enn. III.8.9.2-5.
43 Cp.: hen on, all’ oyk on, eita hen, Enn. VI.6.13.52-53. See also: Plato. Parm. 142d, 143a,
144e; Pépin 1979,203-204.
78 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

One, there is nothing else in being besides the yet undifferentiated being itself,
which is nothing else but the monad, the ideal principle of number. Plotinus argues
that logically the monad may be said to be before being, because “one” may be
predicated o f being and o f beings in noetic forms.44 At the same time, since in the
hen on conjunction each o f the two terms may in turn be considered as subject and
the other as predicate, it may also be said that “being” is predicated of the one
monad (contrary to Aristotle).45
Every act o f thinking however, is the thinking o f something. Thus, the
being, which at first is nothing else but thinking-noes/i, strives to grasp that which
has produced it (i.e., the One, which, as beyond being, cannot be properly thought).
In order that the noesis could be a complete whole able to think itself as complete
and completed—that is, as self-thinking—one has to presuppose a sort of
movement o f and from the being as one and the same. The final definiteness and
sameness o f the noys could be obtained as self-thinking and not as the initial
indefinite thinking without objects-noeta. As Plotinus puts it, the perfect unity of
the monad and that o f the One is paralyzed by fear of departing from this unity.
Every smallest stirring already brings forward the other and thus the two.46 The
movement away from the unity o f the one in being is not, however, proper to the
monad as such but appears only in the falling away (apostasis) from that unity.47
Such a movement is teleologically directed towards its end, which is the thinking
thinking itself through the forms—the collection of intelligible objects-noeta.
The primary movement and the otherness appear thus as inseparable and
constitutive o f the dyad, whereas rest and sameness characterize the monad.48 This
first movement is then pure olhemess-heterotes, which forever separates
(kekhoristhai) the noys from the One.49 The fundamental principle Plotinus has in
mind here is that “everything seeks not another but itself’.50 The pure otherness or
bare negativity is therefore nothing else but the essential (ideal) dyad, which
enables the thinking to return to itself to its sameness of self-thinking through the
otherness o f the multitude o f intelligible objects. The one simple undifferentiated
thinking-Moes/i sees itself as one in an object of vision and therefore not as one as
thinking and thought (which then turns out to be triple as that which thinks, that
which is thought and the act o f thinking itself or the knower, the known and the
knowledge, ho epistemon, to episteton, he episteme).il

44 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.5.35-38. On predication in Plotinus see: Vigo 1999,119-127.

45 Aristotle. Cat. 2a 11-14.
46Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.8-11.
47 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.1.2.
48 Cp. Aristotle. Met 1004b 29: stasis toy henos, kinesis de toy plëthoys\ see also 988a 14-
15; 992b 7-8; 1066a 7-16; 1084a 35; 1091b 13-1092a 8; Theiler 1964, 106-107; Rist 1971,
77-87. Rist argues that the notion of otherness as movement away from the transcendent
One is incompatible with the union of the soul with the One and that Plotinus should have
defined otherness as finite being, which he did not do. This argument is not valid, however,
in the case of the monad, the dyad and numbers, for while they keep their unity through
participation, they do so without ever uniting with the One.
49 Plotinus. Enn. V. 1.6.53; VI.4.11.9-10.
50 Hekaston gar oyk alio, all ' hayto zëtei. - Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.1.10-11.
51 Plotinus. Enn. V.4.2.4-7; VI.6.15.20.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 79

Thus, the dyad as pure otherness makes being of the initial thinking-
noesis leave its state o f sameness and unreflective identity. When noesis
necessarily misses the only object worth thinking or seeing (cp. the postulate (a)),
the source o f thinking and being (i.e., the One, o f which it yet has an indefinite
image),S2 then thinking can only turn to itself and think itself, since at that point
there is nothing else to be thought. Thinking is itself not other to itself, oyk alio.
The “not other” is nothing else but one— it is the monad in being. But the act of
constituting the one-monad requires the other which is the dyad. The otherness,
represented in the form of the indefinite dyad, aoristos dyas, is the principle of
indefiniteness. The in(de)finite as such is not pure apeiria, which by itself is
absolutely indefinite (in fact, there is neither “se lf nor “itself’ in it), and may be
said to be embracing opposites and contraries at the same time, to be both moving
and at rest, big and small, mega kai smikron (cp. the postulate (c)).S3
Therefore, the constitution o f being necessarily has to presuppose two
principles in being and not only one (the postulate (c)).54 The second principle, that
of the otherness, the dyad, may be said to be posterior to the monad. At the same
time, the dyad may be also considered prior to the monad, because the sameness of
the monad is first realized as the negation of the otherness, as oyk alio.56 The dyad
itself is thus to alio and to heteron, it is first merely as an indefinite other, to alio,
but when the monad comes forth, the dyad is the other to it, to heteron. It is in this
sense that the monad is both prior and posterior to the dyad, although differently.57
Constitution o f the dyad as the othemess-Ae/ero/e? that separates being
from its origin presupposes then not only the duality of same and other, rest and
movement, but involves a more complicated structure of the triplicity through
going out, turning back and, finally, staying in unity.58 In the Enn. V.l [10] “On

52 Cp. Lloyd 1987, 155-186, contra Bussanich 1988, 123-124 and Emilsson 1999, 286-287.
51 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.3.28 sqq. Cp. Aristotle. Met. 987b 26; 1089a 35-36; 1091a 3-5; Test.
Plat. 22B, 23B, 27B, 30, 48B, 50 Gaiser; Sextus Empiricus. Adv. Math. X 261, 274 sqq.
Aoristos dyas may be both considered the other, heteron (Aristotle. Met. 1087b 26; cp.
Plato. Parm. 158c) and multitude, plethos (Aristotle. Met. 1085b 10). Cp. Theiler 1964, 95,
108.
54 Cp.: ek de tes aoristoy dyados kai toy henos ta eide kai hoi arithmoi: toyto gar ho noys,
V.4.2.6; cp. Merlan 1964, 45-47; SzlezAk 1979, 58; Plato. Tim. 35 a; Aristotle. Met. 1081a
14. In Enn. V.l.5.13 sqq. Plotinus argues that number determines the structure of the
intellect and is constituted by the monad and the dyad; the dyad is indefinite (aoristos), a
sort of substrate (hypokeimenon). Numenius deduced the soul from the monad and the dyad;
cp. Xenocrates, frg. 60 Heinze = 165-187 Isnardi Parente; Enn. VI.6.16.45; Aristotle. De an.
404b 27-28.
55 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.24-25; cp.plethos henos hysteron, III.8.9.3-4; Aristotle. Met. 1083b
23-24.
56 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.13.9-11.
57 Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1084b 29-30.
58 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.3.7-9. The order of procession-retuming-staying is different from that
of Proclus’ proodos-mone-epistrophe (In Tim. I 87.28-30; 211.28-212.1; 274.25-30; II 215.
22-24; III 18.1-2; In RP I 88.11-16; I 140.2 et al.). Perhaps, it is not by chance that the
structure of the Plotinian Enn. VI.6. is itself triadic (two chapters in the beginning and two
chapters at the end are dedicated to the consideration of number and infinity (Enn. VI.6.2-3;
17-18), while the middle chapters (Enn. VI.6.4-16) consider the constitution of number and
80 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

the Three Primary Hypostases” Plotinus argues that in returning to the One the
being-intellect sees. This seeing ([horasis) is the intellect itself. The initial act of
seeing or o f contemplation can be compared to the yet unlimited and indefinite
(iaoristos) thinking, as if thinking “unintelligently” (anoetos).59 Such a thinking
does not yet think itself unless it thinks in definite forms-noeta. As if in movement,
thinking comes out o f the One (which in itself has no limit), then returns back to
itself (without having really left itself), and finally stays in fullness in itself as both
the same and the other, thus acquiring limit, boundary and form (horon, peras,
eidos).60 One can also understand in this sense the process (again, logical and not
temporal) of unfolding the unity of being into the unified “colored” multiplicity
within the same being, now unwrapped according to the essential number. Such a
multiplicity is present as on-onta in thinking-noes/s, thinking itself as the forms-
noeta. This process may be then synthetically represented through four terms,
namely, as the initial simple unity of being, as the unfolding of beings, as the
intellect moving in itself, and finally as the living being of the noetic cosmos.61
Since otherness is constitutive of the intellect itself, it is present in the
most fundamental acts of intellection, namely, in distinguishing between two
different things. The very act o f counting may be regarded as the simplest and the
originative for distinguishing primary units, equal in all respects except for being
different numerically (i.e., as discerned within the essential number). These acts of
simple intuition, which are non-discursive and non-logical, are called epiboiai by
Plotinus.62 Such acts that establish the primary form of otherness as dyad, or
movement within the intellect, are an elementary simple pointing to the other,
recognition o f the other, as “this is this and that is that”, tode tode, tode tode.63 The
othemess-dyad establishes the other element in every pair, so that for every pair
only sameness is needed. This states the identity of each element and its opposition
to the other element. In other words, otherness does not itself need otherness but
only sameness, so that the intellect does not need to go into infinity; two primary
principles are enough within the realm of being.

its relation to the being of intellect): the very structure of the treatise appears to imitate the
original infinity of the One, the multiple unity of hen-polla of the being-intellect and the
unlimited dyad.
59Plotinus. Enn. V.l.7.5-6; VI.7.16.14. Cp. D’Ancona 1999, 237 sqq.
60 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.16.14 sqq.; 17.14-21.
61 To men on arithmos hènómenos, ta de onta exelèligmenos arithmos, noys de arithmos en
heaytdi kinoymenos, to de zóion arithmos periekhdn. - Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.9.29-31.
62 It is worth noting that the term epibolè is of the Stoic origin. When Plotinus argues that in
order to think a particular object, for instance, one horse, one already has to be in the
position to recur to the notion of the “one”, he asks whether the monad precedes being and
number precedes beings in cogitation, in intuitive act of the intellect or also in reality, tèi
epinoiai kai tèi epibolèi è kai tèi hypostasei (Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.9.13-14), he uses three
terms, the first of which, “epinoia" is the term of Plato which is not found in Aristotle,
“epibolè" is used by the Stoics and is absent in Plato and Aristotle and “hypostasis” is used
only by Aristotle and is absent in Plato, see: Plotinus 1980, 197,200-201.
63 Plotinus. Enn. VI.3.18.12 sqq.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 81

2.1.2 Constitution and the structure o f number in Plotinus

Let us now turn to the question of how essential or ideal numbers are formed. The
monad and the dyad as such are not yet numbers, but the ideal principles of
numbers. The first essential number appears to be the number two.64
If pure otherness as aoristos dyas is the principle of indefiniteness, then,
after Plato, it may be said to be great and small, mega kai mikron, polla kai oliga
or hyperokhe kai elleipsis (not as two different opposed principles but as one), it
should have an inclination to abandon the stable identity of the monad.65 This
inclination, however, is prevented from going into absolute unlimitedness by the
limiting potency o f the monad. Being as exemplified in thinking becomes thus
other than it is. At this point there is no exact measure yet; becoming—through the
first movement—becomes “bigger” than the being initially is. Two is then
originated: the initial is taken as the monad and the originated as the dyad. The
difference constitutes that henad, which makes two numerically different from the
monad. The increasing (as leaving the state of identity) may then be taken as
doubling and the decreasing (as coming back to the initial state) may be regarded
as dividing into halves.66 Both operations originate the number two and are
mutually convertible, even if addition as increasing by way of construction is
logically prior to division as decreasing.67
Plotinus seems to reject this way of deducing the first number (the two),
denying that the number two is either an addition (coming together or union,
synodos) or division (splitting, skhisis). Otherwise the number would have been
reduced to merely a relation, to pros ti or skhesis. Yet this relation has to be a
relation o f something which is already there, that is, of being split according to the
form of number.6* Simply bringing together two units will not give two, because
the dyad should already be there in order that two units might be thought,
predicated, and exist qua two.69 Moreover, the dyad (he dyas) and the two as the
first essential number (ta dyo) are not in relation as entities of equal ontological
status. The dyad through its presence (paroysiai) determines the two as the first
number; both are connected through participation.
In rejecting the hypothesis that takes number to be posterior to the forms,
Plotinus argues that from the analysis of predication one can establish the logical

64 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.5.4. See also: Alexander. In Met. 56.31-32 Hayduck; Simplicius.
In Phys. 454.28 Diehl.
65 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.3.28.10; VI.4.2.30-31.
66 Cp. Alexander. In Met 56.5-33; Porphyry as quoted by Simplicius (In Phys. 454.9-16).
See also: Plato. Phaedr. 96e-97b (does the number two come from the addition of two units
or from the division of one unit?) and Prot. 356e-357b; Gorg. 451a-454a; Aristotle. Met.
986a 21-26; 1081b 14-15; 1085 b 7; Sextus Empiricus. Hyp. pyrrh. Ill 164-167; Plotinus.
Enn. V.l.5.4 sqq. Cp. Becker 1938, 464 sqq.; Wedberg 1955; Markovic 1965, 308-318;
Szab6 1994, 357-359.
67 Cp. Aristotle’s report that the infinite by addition and by division is the same in Plato:
Phys. 206b 3-16 = Test. Plat. 24.
68 The double and the half, to diplasion kai to hemisy is an example of relation, skhesis,
Plotinus. Enn. VI. 1.6.4. Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1020b 26-27.
69 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.14.15 sqq.
82 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

and ontological priority of being one. If one utters “one man”, the “one” (which is
one in being—the monad) is already predicated of man.70 The same argument
appears in the second hypothesis o f the “Parmenides”: being can only be one-
being, hen on. Although being is one, nevertheless it always already involves the
form of pure duality in the primary compound or synthesis of two components, of
hen-on, for being presupposes that it is one, and one, if thought and predicated, is
in being.71 Since the essential number, according to Plotinus, is in being,72 it
defines the structure o f being and, since being is the synthetic hen on, the very
form o f the number two is thereby established. Still, since being is unity (of
thinking-noéró) in multiplicity (of the thought-noéfó), the one as monad should be
prior to being, which (in regard to the monad) is the “falsely or spuriously one”.
Plotinus puts it as follows: “And if the one is like an element of a compound (hds
stoikheion de synthetoy), there must be beforehand a one which is one in itself, that
it may be compounded with another; then, if it is compounded with another which
has become one through it, it will make that other spuriously (pseydós) one, by
making it two.”73
Therefore, by the way of production being is constituted by the monad
and the dyad, and is structured according to the number two. The very way of
production o f the first essential number involves that the unit that may be discerned
within that number—the henad—should be posterior to the number. In its very
form, the number is prior to its units, which may only be discerned in a secondary
way (the postulate (d)).74 Every henad of the two and the number two itself are
both one (insofar as they participate in the monad) but differently: the unity of the
former is similar to that o f a house which is one in virtue o f its continuity (to
synekhes hen, although the henad is not continuous but discrete; its unity is that of
one subject). The unity o f the latter may be compared to that of an army that is one
substantially or quantitatively.75 In other words, strictly speaking, number does not
consist o f henads nor is it counted by them, although when henads are discerned
within a number, the number may be said to comprise these henads. For this reason
Plotinus has to disagree with Aristotle that the henad may be regarded as matter of
number.76 The matter of the essential number is rather a multiplicity of the dyad,
bounded by the form of the monad.
In the philosophical and arithmetical consideration of number within the
Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, number is defined as a limited magnitude. It is a
magnitude made up o f units, or—as a concrete multitude—a pléthos of discrete
and indivisible monads, a synthetic collection, a unity of units, a systéma, both

70 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.5.29 sqq. Cp. Plato. Phil. 15a.

71 Plato. Parm. 142b sqq.
72 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.15.24.
71 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.5.43-46, trans. Armstrong.
74 As Aristotle recalls, for Plato two is also prior to its units: Met. 1084b 36-37; cp. 1085a 6-
7.
75 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.29-33.
76 Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1084b 5-6.
 Part ¡I: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 83

united in, and limited by, these units. Such a definition, however, is ambiguous
and has to be further clarified; it is not immediately clear, first, whether this
definition applies to essential or to quantitative numbers and, second, whether such
a distinction is implied at all in the definition.
It is important to note that even if the notion o f number plays a key role
both in Platonic ontology and science as the most fundamental characteristic of
being, the notion of number has to be defined, in order to demonstrate its
connection with being and its place in the whole ontological picture. In other
words, number is considered through something else, something more fundamental
and primary. In contemporary mathematics different kinds of number—such as
negative, rational, irrational (algebraic and transcendental), complex and
quaternions— are all defined constructively from the notion of natural numbers,
which are mostly considered elementary and “self-evident” and thus not properly
definable but simply postulated. Thus, for example, Hilbert takes natural numbers
as the result of the process of calculation (Abzahlung) (i.e., of a fundamental
intuition o f succession).78
Plotinus is not unaware of the traditional definition of number but he has
to define it in a more precise and subtle way, in order to be in a position to include
all the fruitful distinctions he has made. Thus, in order to discuss properly the
structure o f the number, one has to be able first to discern the constitutive element
of the number. The difficulty that arises here is that the number itself, as Plotinus
argues, is prior to the thinking that thinks itself in particular forms, or as already
structured according to the number.79 This difficulty may be resolved by accepting
a unity in number, the henad, one by participation in the monad or through the
presence (paroysiai) o f the monad.80 Such a distinction resolves a seeming paradox
and explains how and why the one is both prior and posterior to the dyad and to the
number two: the one is prior to the dyad as the One and as monad; and the one is
posterior to the dyad as henad.81

77 Arithmos pléthos hörismenon or peperasmenon, Aristotle. Met. 1020a 13; monadön

pléthos, Euclid. Elem. VII, def.2; arithmos esti pléthos hörismenon é monadön systéma é
posotétos khyma ek monadön sygkeimenon, Nicomachus. Introd. I 7.1; monadön systéma,
Thales ap. Iamblichus. In Nicom. 10.8-9; pléthos hörismenon, Eudoxus ap. Iamblichus. In
Nicom. 10.16-20; systéma monadön, Theon. Expos, rer. math. 18.3. Cp. later definitions of
number in Proclus, such as: pléthos hörismenon, Theol. Plat. II 16.15; pléthos
diakekrimenon, Theol. Plat. IV 81.6; finita autem multitudo numerus, In Parm. VII, 56.9-10
and in Boethius: numerus est unitatum collectio, vel quantitatis acervus ex unitatibus
profusus, Inst, arithm. I 3. See also: Becker 1957, 44-47; Szabó 1964, 115-121; Klein 1968,
46-60; Burkert 1972, Mohr 1981, 620-627; Cantor 1985, 270-272; Stein 1995, 334-342.
78 Hilbert 1990, 1: “Der Begriff der ganzen Zahl ist der einfachste und wichtigste Begriff in
der Mathematik.”
79 Cp. O’Meara 1975, 79-82.
80 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.5.49; VI.6.14.27-28. On the one as the principle of numbers see:
Cleary 1995, 365-377. As Cleary mentions, Aristotle is somewhat ambiguous (Met. 1052b
14-20; cp. 1088a 6-8: oyk esti to hen arithmos ...all' arkhé [toy arithmoy] kai to metron
hen) on whether the essence of the unity is being indivisible (so Aquinas and Cleary) or
being the first measure of a number (Ross). - Cleary 1995, 369.
81 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.11,24.
84 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

The One and the monad preceding the henad can also be seen from the
fact that there are many henads participating in one monad that is common
(koinon) to them, and which itself participates in the One.82 As absolutely
transcendent to being, the One cannot be equal to other units (to the monad and the
henads), so as to be one of them.83 The multiplicity of the henads (plèthos
henadón) can be proved by a reductio ad absurdum .MIf there is only one monad, it
should be joined or associated with the one being, hen on either (1) in the aspect of
being-on or (2) in the aspect of the one-hen. The (1) is impossible, because (a)
either the units that are distinguished in number have only the same name but
ontologically are not the same (oy syntakhthèsontai) and, therefore, are equivocally
(ihomónymós) said to be henads; thus there are no units in number at all. Or (b)
number will consist o f unlike units (ex anomoión monadón), which Plotinus
implicitly rejects, because every distinction between the henads is superfluous. If
the henads were all different, there would have to be an additional explanation of
how the first principles of the monad and the dyad constitute this difference. But
even if henads are all identical, there is still a non-identity represented in them as a
multitude. There are many henads within each essential number. Such a multitude
differs, however, from the multitude of the one-many of the noys, where all the
intelligible objects (noèta) are different as representing various forms. Henads, on
the contrary, form a set of equals, intrinsically indiscernible, because the
distinction is extrinsic to them, and is brought by the essential number as setting a
definite number of the henads. If the henads of the essential number two are
absolutely the same and equal per se, how can it be said at all that there are two
henads, that is, that they are different as different numerically? The only
explanation is to presuppose the number two as that form which allows the
duplicity o f the henads. Otherwise, it could not be said that there are two henads.
Different henads may be thought then as forming not a consequential but rather a
coexistential order. In other words, henads, unlike the iorxns-eidè, do not have
individual “faces”. Their distinction comes from what defines them as a set (i.e., as
such and such number of henads). The (2) is impossible as well, for in order to be
one, the one which is, the monad needs only the unique One and no other one, in
particular, no henad. The primary duality of the hen on turns out to be enough for
generating all the rich variety o f numbers and the forms within being. However,
one should note that although the henad is not individualized, it is not divisible,
because the henad is defined solely by the essential number as the principle of
individuation o f the henad.85 For if the henad were divisible, it would have defined
another number (e.g., if one henad composed of two henads of the number two
would have been divided into two henads, there would have been three henads—
they would have referred to the number three and not to the number two).

82 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.11.7; 5.31.

83 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.14-15.
84 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.11.10 sqq.
85 Cp.: ameriston kai adiaireton to hen hos hen. - Theon. Expos, rer. math. 18.15. A
privileged position of the henad is shown by the fact that the henad is preserved not only in
the operation of division, but also in that of multiplication: multiplied by itself an indefinite
number of times, it still remains a henad. - Theon. Expos, rer. math. 19.10-11.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 85

Now that the first number, two, and the henad are deduced, we need to see
how the other essential numbers are constituted in Plotinus. Essential numbers
appear to be produced by the monad and the dyad as well.86 Since there inevitably
is otherness in being, in the form of hen on or hen polla and the dyad as othemess
is connected with movement,®7 Plotinus finds an original way o f describing the
deduction o f the essential numbers by means of kinematic production, or by
movement (cp. 3.4.4). If the nature of being “generates in a kind of succession
(ephexes), or rather has generated, or does not stand still at one thing of those
which it has generated, but makes a kind of continuous one, when it draws [a line]
(perigrapsasa) and stops more quickly in its outgoing it generates the lesser
numbers, but when it moves further, not in other things but in its very own
movements, it brings the greater numbers into existence; and so it would fit the
particular multiplicities and each particular being to the particular numbers,
knowing that, if each particular being was not fitted to each particular number, it
could not exist at all or would get away and be something else by becoming
innumerable and irrational”.88
We see the following main points in the description of Plotinus. (1)
Essential number results from a stop (or consecutive stops) of and within
intelligible movement. These stops do not form a temporal succession, for time
appears only with the soul.89 Therefore, the stops can only establish a logical
sequence, so that (2) all the numbers are already there, already having been
moved. Plotinus finds it more appropriate to describe essential numbers, even if
produced by movement, not temporarily— for this movement is not temporal—but
rather in quasi-spatial terms.90 (3) The non-temporal kinematic production o f the
numbers is also presented by Plotinus as the multiplication of being-on into beings-
onta, when being is split (skhizetai) according to the potencies o f the essential
number, which, as the first and true number, is then the principle and the source of
the existence o f beings.91 Things thus may be numbered only because of the
existence of essential numbers, which form the ontological precondition for
numbering and are not simply an abstraction from the things numbered.
Most important is that (4) the kinematic production of geometrical
entities, later used by Proclus,92 is already present in Plotinus (similar to the
kinematic generation of numbers, which are, however, ontologically prior to

86 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.5.2-4. Cp. Iamblichus. De comm. math. sci. 18.3 sqq. Festa: ek de tés
syntheseos toy henos kai tés toy pléthoys aitias hylés hyphistatai men ho arithmos.
17 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. 11.4.5.28 sqq.: othemess as the intelligible matter is the first movement.
11 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.11.24-33; cp. V.5.4.8-10; the closest passage in Plato might be Phil.
24d, although Plato does not speak about the kinematic generation of either arithmetic or
geometrical entities.
Plotinus. Enn. III.7.11.
90 Cp. Plotinus’ explication of the ubiquity of the One: it is everywhere, “for there is
nowhere where it is not” (pds oyn ex henos pléthos; hoti pantakhoy: oy gar estin hopoy oy$
Plotinus. Enn. III.9.4.1-2).
91 Arkhe oyn kai pegé hypostaseos tois oysin ho arithmos ho prdtos kai alethes, Plotinus.
Enn. VI.6.15.29-35.
92 Proclus describes drawing of a line by uniform movement or flowing (tdi rhysin einai) of
a point: Proclus. In Eucl. 185.8-15; cp. 51.21.
86 Matter, imagination and Geometry

geometricals, cp. 3.4.4-3.4.5). This production, used for drawing geometrical

figures, is extended by Plotinus to the sphere of discrete entities. It proves to be
very fruitful, for later Plotinus returns to kinematic production in discussing the
nature o f quantity. The “expansion” (epektasis) of the discrete number serves the
paradigmatic example for prolongation of the continuous into the distance (eis to
porro). “So there is a quantum (posori) when the unit (to hen, i.e. the henad) moves
forward, and also when the point (to sémeion) does.93 But if either of them comes
to a stop quickly in its progress, one is many and the other is large.”94
Finally, (5) one can easily recognize the proodos-epistrophé-moné
sequence in the very description o f the constitution of essential numbers, used in
describing the constitution o f the dyad. Original movement constitutes the moment
of proodos. The stop in movement, as the beginning of turning to itself,
corresponds to the epistrophé as a definite number. The “recognition” of a
particular quantitative determination of a number, in which all of its posteriorly
discernible “parts” or henads are gathered into a unity of being this particular
number, embodies the moné moment o f the kinematic constitution of numbers.95
In the “Metaphysics” M 6, Aristotle considers three hypotheses of
possible relations of the units within number: a unit may be either incompatible
with any other unit (asymblétos) within any number; compatible with any other
unit; or finally, it may be compatible with the unit(s) within this particular number
but incompatible with the units within any other number.96 Following Aristotle,
Plotinus poses similar questions (which he leaves without an explicit answer) in
relation to the constitution o f numbers. How are two units of the dyad different?
How is the dyad one? Are the two units equal within the dyad?97
First o f all, we need to address the question of the relation o f henads to
number. Is the essential number a multitude consisting of indivisible henads that
define it? The answer has to be “no”, just as in the case of the number two. As
Plotinus argues, the essential number does not consist of henads but precedes them
as a unity (as a chorus or an army may be said to precede its parts). This can be
clearly seen from the way numbers are kinematically constituted. Each number is
to be considered not as a set or collection of so many henads. Rather, it is the
successor of the previous essential number, through performing another step within
intelligible movement. It makes no sense to try to determine the “length” o f each
step or even to ask if they are all of equal “length”, for there is no unit of length as
yet, so that every new movement brings forth another number by simply presenting
it as different from the previous one. Since every successor in numbers differs

93 The difference between a henad and a point being that the point is the unit which has
position (cp. he gar stigme monas esti thesin ekhoysa, Aristotle. De an. 409a 6; Met. 1016b
24-26; monas proslaboysa thesin, Proclus. In Eucl. 95.22), i.e. the point exists in the
continuous, where otherness is present not as the aoristos dyas but as matter.
94 Plotinus. Enn. VI.3.12.9-14.
95 Ta panta mere pros hen. - Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.1.19-20.
96 Aristotle. Met. 1080a 15 sqq. Aristotle consecutively rejects all the hypotheses in order to
show the inconsistency of the Academic teaching of number.
97 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.27-29. Cp. Szlezik 1979,91-92.
98 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.5.38 sqq.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 87

from the predecessor by one unit or henad, every step constitutes a difference of
one henad. And since the steps are discrete, the henads are also discrete, or
indivisible. Divisibility in the essential number exists only as its divisibility into a
particular multitude of its units-henads, and not as the divisibility of its
constituents.
Essential number is thus determined as an ordinal, that is, by and from the
order o f its production—recurrently defined by the previous number plus one more
step. A similar procedure was perhaps meant in the ancient Academy, in particular,
by the late Plato, for whom, as Aristotle explains, quantitative numbers are
constituted as counted (1+1=2, 2+1=3, etc.), while the essential numbers are
simply presented (as 1, then 2, then 3 etc.), that is, essential numbers are
constituted as the structured wholes that do not consist of units." The units or the
henads may be discerned, then, in essential numbers—as in the number two—only
in a secondary way. Since the number three is kinematically constituted after the
number two, in which two henads can be discerned, one can consider three henads
in the number three; in the number four, constituted after the number three, one can
discern four henads, and so on. Three objections arise, however. First, the
kinematic production is not itself a temporal process. Second, the logical sequence
that establishes the set of essential numbers exists only within discursive dianoetic
thinking absent in the intellect-noys. Third, the notion of succession presupposes
number as its own precondition. Because of that, it cannot be properly said that
essential numbers are established in succession after each other; rather, they are
established as already existing or generated, as coexisting and as forming one set
o f numbers, which itself determines the multiplicity of beings-on/a and,
subsequently, the structure o f intelligible objects-noe/a.100 As already produced,
the essential numbers (and the henads in them) may be considered not as following
each other, but as simply coexisting.
Now, are henads in essential numbers comparable to each other or are
they all different within one number and within different numbers? Since henads
are separated from each other by a “unit o f movement” (which is discrete and of no
length), by way o f their constitution and distinction they are not different, but are
all equal. But what is the principle o f the individuation o f henads? As in the case of
the essential number two, discussed above, all henads within any essential number
are alike, having no individuality. This principle of individuation can only be, then,
the number as a whole precedent to particular henads. In other words, seven henads
are all exactly alike; they are discernible only because of the essential number
“seven”, which is a precondition for the possibility of considering exactly seven
henads, all of them being different, qua seven henads, and all of them being alike,
qua henads. The essential number can only establish a numerical distinction
between henads, but there is no specific distinction between them. It means that
henads must be comparable to each other within one number. But are they
comparable to the henads o f another number, for example, in five and ten?101 There
is no definitive answer in Plotinus’ text. In fact, henads within different numbers

99 Aristotle. Met. 1080a 30-35, contra Allen 1970, 30-34.

100Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.10.1-4. Cp. also 3.4.4.
101 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.33-35.
88 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

may be said to be both comparable and incomparable, although in different senses.

On the one hand, henads may be said to be comparable, first, insofar as they all are
discernible in the same way from the essential number (as the pure form of a
particular multitude o f henads) and, second, insofar as a henad may be considered
as constituted in and by another step in the kinematic production of numbers.
Therefore, insofar as henads are considered constituted not one by one, but as a
particular multitude within which they coexist as a system of henads (of the
number seven, eight, and so on), they may be considered different in different
numbers, because each number defines a different multitude of henads.102
And finally, is the total number of essential numbers limited?103 Plotinus
often uses ten as an example (in the Enn. V1.6. term dekaldekas is mentioned forty-
five times) but, again, he gives no clear indication of whether the number of
numbers is limited by a particular number (perhaps, escaping the discussion of the
number of numbers)). If we take into consideration the above argument about the
constitution of number in Plotinus, it is possible to claim that such a number has to
be limited. Indeed, the essential number cannot go to infinity, but has to stop, for
number as the multiple unity is both limiting and limited. The infinite number
cannot therefore exist: number is unlimited only in the sense that it is not
measured, but is itself the measure for being. “The infinite struggles with
number”.105 Moreover, since number defines and measures the multitude o f forms
and the number o f the forms-eúfé is limited, the number of essential numbers
cannot be unlimited, because the infinite may define the finite only as the actual
infinity of the power of the One, as dynamis pantón,106 and not as a potentially
infinite— even if numerable, like the potentially infinite row of natural numbers—
which is more dimly established in being than the limit, by which being is first
introduced.
Let us at last turn to the question of how quantitative numbers are
constituted. Since beings-on/a are generated and organized according to the
essential number, and things are further determined by the forms through
participation, things are organized and separated (i.e., can be counted) according to
number.107 The quantitative numbers are also organized under the paradigm of
essential numbers. The quantitative numbers are numbering (arithmoyntes) insofar
as they are applicable to the things that always change (although the numbering

102 Similarly, the late Plato took the units or henads within an ideal (essential) number to be
comparable to each other, whereas the units of different numbers as incomparable. - Gaiser
1963,537-538.
I0> Plato, for instance, limits the number of the ideal numbers to ten only. See Aristotle.
Phys. 206 b 32-33; Met. 1073 a 19-21; 1084 a 12, 24-25. Cp., however, Becker’s suggestion
(not much confirmed in the original texts) to interpret the first ten numbers not as numbers
properly but rather as digits, in which case they may represent (once they are put in a certain
order in diairetic subdivisions) an infinite number of ideas and ideal numbers - Becker 1963,
119-124.
104 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.2.1 sqq.; 17.1 sqq., esp. 18.5-6. Cp. Plato. Parm. 144a sqq.; Aristotle.
Met. 1083b 36-1084a 8; Phys. 203b 23-24.
105 To gar apeiron makhetai tdi arithmói, Plotinus. Enn. V1.6.17.3.
106 Plotinus. Enn. III.8.10.1,V.4.1.36 et al.
107 Kai entaytha meta arithmdn he genesis hekastois. - Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.15.29-36.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 89

number cannot properly grasp the becoming, which always escapes any definitive
limitation). Essential numbers, on the contrary, are numbered (arithmetoi), because
they always already are and are exempt from any change. Essential numbers are
numbered in the sense that they are not the ultimate measure but rather are
themselves measured through the transcendent measure of the One, which alone is
not measured by anything. The One is thus the measure of measure for being—
the One provides the unity for measure, both for the monad, which imitates the
One, and for the henad, which participates in the monad. The One itself, as
absolutely transcendent, is incommensurable with everything else and radically
other even to otherness.
Plotinus uses, although reverses, the terminology of Aristotle, probably
because in Aristotle time is the numbered, and not the numbering number. It is to
be noted that although Aristotle is critical of Plato and the Pythagoreans in their
treatment o f number, he himself discerns at least three different kinds of number, at
the very end o f his discussion o f the notion of time.109 First, there is the number
numbered, that of a group o f things (ten horses). Next, there is the numbering, or
quantitative, number, which allows the discernment of a group as constituted by
ten things. This number itself consists o f a definite number of units (e.g., of ten)
and may be situated in a row of succession (after the number nine); that is, it is a
member o f the set o f natural numbers. And lastly, there is the number by itself,
which does not stand in a relation o f precedence to (or of following) other
numbers, and is a kind of paradigmatic number for the numbering number.110
Aristotle presents a lengthy discussion o f whether units within a number of this
kind are mutually commensurable or not. He discusses the so-called “combinable”
(symblitoí) numbers, reportedly developed by Plato. Units are said to be
“combinable” in a number if they constitute only this particular number and cannot
enter any other number.111 This is the paradigm for numbering numbers, for
example, ten as such, which already is not a member of a succession or sequence,
but is a discrete indivisible principle, indissoluble into simple monadic units and
unrelated to other such principles through the operation of addition or doubling the
unit. Thus, for example, five and seven would not differ by two units, since they
would not be resolved into units as their parts, but would be two different ideal
paradigms for quantitative numbers 5 and 7.
It is not altogether clear, however, whether these ideal numbers form a
finite set (for example, in the case o f ten: the decade is the completion o f the set of
numbers112). It would seem that there should be a finite set o f them, since the
number o f the forms-ideas is finite, according to Plotinus, and the all-in-one
structure of the forms repeats that of the ideal numbers (cp. 3.1.1). In any case,
numbers form a set of discrete entities, which are identical as produced from and
by the unity-one, monas, and dyad, aoristos dyas, but different numerically. This
Platonic teaching dates back at least to Xenocrates and his followers in the

l0* Meiron, oy metroymenon. - Plotinus. Enn. V.5.4.13-14.

109Aristotle. Phys. 224a 2 sqq.; Met. 991a 4.
110Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1092b 20.
1.1 Aristotle. Met. 1080a 11 sqq.
1.2 Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 206b 33; Speusippus, frg. 4 Lang.
90 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

Academy, for whom, as Plutarch reports, “nothing but the generation of number is
signified by the mixture of the indivisible and divisible being, the one being
indivisible and multiplicity divisible and number being the product of these when
the one bounds multiplicity and inserts a limit in infinitude, which they call
indefinite dyad too”." 3 Most importantly, ideal numbers represent the
paradigmatic structure for organizing being and the intelligible forms as the one-
many, where one and dyad are not separate, but are kept as synthesis, structured
under the pattern of ideal numbers as a composite unity which, in turn, becomes a
paradigm for the functioning and understanding of the geometrical and to some
extent, o f the physical world.
It is interesting to note that when Peano elaborates his axiomatization of
arithmetic, he introduces three fundamental, further indefinable notions: zero,
integer number and the successor of an integer (i.e., the operation of addition,
14 Obviously, the notion o f the follower, which substitutes the operation of
adding another unit, corresponds to the operation of the indefinite dyad. For
methodological reasons, Greek mathematics does not have a notion of zero, 0, for,
first, zero would have been a sign (a something) of and for nothing and in this way
would have substantivized non-being or matter. The not-being is represented
differently in arithmetic, for instance, in Plotinus it is the unit, 1, the one in
numbers, the transcendent basis of being of and in numbers and thus is not itself
being (Peano himself mentions that the unit is not considered a number by the
Pythagoreans). However, the unit does not represent the non-being o f matter, but
the beyond-being of the One. And second, zero does not have any place in the
genetic account o f the constitution of both essential and quantitative numbers: zero
is redundant. Zero is thus alien to the system o f natural numbers as understood
within the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, further elaborated in Plotinus. It is not
by chance then that Peano has to introduce zero separately from all other numbers.
Were zero not present in his reconstruction of arithmetic, the system o f axioms
would have been considerably simpler.
For Plotinus, however, the essential number is out of reach of any
temporality, and even if a succession in the generation of essential numbers could
be established, this succession would again be purely logical. As it has been
argued, all essential numbers may be considered coexisting.115 The quantitative
number exists by participation in the essential number. The essential number, as
already numbered, is then the pure actuality of number, fully unwrapped as number
in the living being or the intelligible cosmos. Actuality in being and thinking
precedes potentiality (this general principle of Aristotle116 is valid for Plotinus for
every representation o f being, but not for the One, which, as the infinite dynamis
panton, is never actualized). Therefore, the purely quantitative numbering number

113 Plutarch. De an. procr. in Tim. 1012d-f; cp. Plat, quaest. 1002a: “unity does not produce
number unless it comes into contact with the unlimited dyad”.
114 Peano 1990,27.
115 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.15.37 sqq.; Aristotle. Phys. 219b 5-9. Cp. Amado 1953, 423-425;
Plotinus 1980, 187.
116 Aristotle, Met. 1049b 5 sqq.
 Part 11: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 91

(kathards poson) has to have an admixture of potentiality.117 The quantitative

number, even if it may be considered as (potentially) existing before the act of
counting, has yet to be fully actualized in the very act of numbering.118 Therefore,
the quantitative number may be presented in the form of 1+ 1+ 1, and so on (i.e., as
numbering). For this reason, the quantitative number may already be referred to the
discursive logical process and so grasped by the dianoia as well.
Do the quantitative henads, the units of the quantitative number that may
be considered as participating in the essential henad (which itself participates in the
monad), constitute quantitative number? Or are they discerned in it only in a
secondary way, as in the case of essential numbers? Even if presented as counted,
as produced by the consecutive addition o f the quantitative henads, the quantitative
or mathematical number is not really engendered in the act of counting. It does
already exist potentially as a unity, for instance, as a chorus consisting of nine
people already comprises this number, even if not yet counted. The quantitative
number is only actualized as definite for discursive thinking through a number of
the added quantitative henads.119 In other words, the quantitative number, as
numbering, properly exists in the discursive dianoetic activity of counting. Until
the number of men in this particular chorus is actually numbered, we do not yet
know it as counted, it is not yet “ordered together into one”, although potentially it
is already there.120 For this reason the quantitative number precedes its henads, but
as a potential and not actual entity, unlike the essential number.

2.1.3 Number and magnitude in ancient mathematics: The point

An important distinction that practically vanishes in modem mathematics and

physics (in particular, in Descartes) is that between number and magnitude
(geometrical figure)—the subject matters of two different sciences, arithmetic and
geometry, and the distinction that constitutes a major starting point for ancient
science. 21 Although Euclid describes in his general theory of proportions in book
V of the “Elements” (usually attributed to Eudoxus) certain procedures applicable
both to numbers and magnitudes, he nevertheless makes a careful distinction
between magnitudes and numbers as such. Three arithmetical books, VII-IX, are
dedicated to the consideration o f properties of numbers; numbers may have a ratio,
logos, to each other, just as geometrical magnitudes of equal dimension may have a
ratio. The former, however, belong to a different genus and can never be
substituted by the latter. Number and magnitude are never confounded
terminologically: in Euclid the former is referred to as poson and the latter—as

1,7 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.16.18.

"* Cp.: energeis poson, Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.16.51. To note, Plotinus is the first to use the
verb energed as transitive, Schwyzer 1951, 525.
1,9 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.16.28 sqq.
120Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.16.34; cp. VI.6.13.20.
121 Plato. RP 525a-527c; Theaet. 198a-d. Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.3.13.23-24; Proclus. In Eucl.
60.9-12.
92 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

pel ikon: the former is discrete, the latter is continuous.122

Thus, numbers and magnitudes are distinct insofar as number is a
multitude (pléthos) consisting o f indivisible units, whereas geometrical magnitudes
are continuous and, therefore, infinitely divisible, even if both are derivable from
the same principles of the one and the dyad.123 The geometrical entity is a
continuous magnitude, megethos. As Proclus notes, numbers are also purer and
more immaterial (aylotheroi kai kathardteroi) than magnitudes (cp. 2.1.1; 2.4).124
The only important exclusion is the partless point, which plays the same role in
magnitudes as the monad or henad in numbers. Both the point and the monad
(henad) are representatives of the generative principle in their genus and both
appear as the limit and indivisible basis: the point—of a line, the monad (henad)—
o f a number.123 Among all the geometrical entities, it is the point that represents
limit in the most adequate way, while line, plane and solid participate more in the
unlimited. In general, the more dimensions a geometrical figure has and the more
complicated motions it requires for its construction, the more it takes part in the
unlimited.126 Because o f this privileged position of the point, Plato and Xenocrates
(according to the reports of Aristotle and later commentators) have to “struggle”
with the point in their attempt to introduce the “indivisible line” as the elementary,
atomic constituent o f the continuous magnitude, as a synthesis of the same (hen)
and the other (aoristos dyas) in the realm of the geometrical (cp. 1.1.2; 1.2.1;
2.1.1).127 As Proclus writes, the point has a certain similarity with the One: as the
One, the point has no parts, and as the One itself of the first hypothesis of the
“Parmenides”, it presents a problem for cognition.128 Such an analogy is also
traceable in Plotinus: the point as partless is comparable to the One, whereas the

122 Cp. Nicomachus. Introd. arithm. I 2.5; Iamblichus. In Nicom. 8.3-5; Proclus. In Eucl.
35.21*36.5. It is worth noting, however, that Euclid gives the definition of relation-Zogoí
only in book V, where he considers relations between magnitudes (Elem. V, def. III). But
book VII, where the theory of proportions in numbers is discussed, does not provide a
definition of logos specifically for numbers. This might mean that the relation between
numbers has to be considered in the same way as that between magnitudes. See: Gardies
1984, 111-125. Although, even if there is a parallelism in the consideration of relations in
magnitudes and of numbers, it does not yet make both kinds of entities similar and
interchangeable.
123 Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1085b 20-34.
124Proclus. In Eucl. 95.23-25; cp. Szabó 1978, 304-307.
125 Cp. Aristotle. De an. 427a 9*14; Themistius. In De an. 86.18-86.27; Plotinus. Enn.
IV.7.6.10-15; Proclus. In Eucl. 85.2 sqq.
126 Proclus. In Eucl. 87.21 sqq.
127 Aristotle criticizes Plato for introducing the “indivisible lines” (atomoi grammai) or
“indivisible magnitudes” (atoma megethé) and for rejecting the indivisible, the point, as the
limit of the divisible, because even indivisible lines, qua lines, should have limits, which
have to be not lines but points, themselves indivisible. - Aristotle. Met. 992a 20-23;
[Aristotle]. De lineis insec. 968a 1 sqq.; Xenocrates, frg. 123-124 Isnardi-Parente. Cp. Heath
1956,1 156. Other reasons for accepting “indivisible lines1’ might be attempts, first, to solve
Zeno’s paradoxes and the problem of continuum in general and second, to solve the problem
of incommensurability in the sphere of the geometrical, since the “indivisible line” would be
a common measure of any two lines.
128 Proclus. In Eucl. 104.5-6.
 Part H: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 93

circle (a self-contained and perfect figure) is comparable to the intellect and the
line—to sense-perception.129
In Euclid’s definition, “a point is that which has no part”.130 Another,
earlier definition comes back to the Pythagoreans: the point is the “unit to which
position is added”.131 The point—the simplest, indivisible and partless—is taken as
the limit of the line, just as the unit itself is not a number but the indivisible
principle o f the number.132 In a sense, the point may be taken as infinite, because it
has no limit by itself or is limitless. If, however, infinity is taken as potential
infinity, there is no need for a point to be either infinite or finite, because the
property of being infinite simply is not applicable to the point (as it is not
applicable to the notion of property itself).133
There is no room here for discussing the differences in the above three
definitions. What is important for the present aim is to note that the point (stigmé,
sémeiori) (1) is unique among geometrical entities, insofar as it is the only
geometrical object that is completely indivisible since it has no parts.134 As
indivisible, the point (2) is the limiting principle (arkhe) in geometry, in the same
way as the unit as henad is the principle of number and thus of arithmetic.135 And
the point is (3) the geometrical representative of the noetic entity, o f the monad
(and henad), which may be understood as embodied in intelligible matter and
visualizable in imagination (“the point is a monad to which position is added”).136
Just as arithmetic is considered by ancient mathematicians to be prior to geometry,
because the object of the former is simpler than that of the latter and number is
divisible only in finite discrete units, whereas extended geometrical figure is
infinitely divisible (a number consists o f units or henads, whereas a line does not
consist of points).137 In like manner, the unit-henad is prior to the point, because
although both are partless, unit has no position in extension, while the point does
and is thus connected with (intelligible geometrical) materiality (see 2.4, 3.4.5).
Another important distinction between numbers and geometricals lies in
their relation to infinity. As Aristotle argues, they are different in respect to
increasing and decreasing: (quantitative) number may be potentially infinitely

129Cp. D’Ancona 1999, 252-259.

130Semeion estin, hoy meros oythen. - Euclid. Elem. I, dcf. I.
131 Monas proslaboysa thesin. Proclus. In Eucl. 59.18-20; 95.22; cp. Aristotle. De an. 409a
6; Met. 1016b 24-26.
132 To peras tes grammes stigme, Plotinus. Enn. VI.3.14.14; cp. Euclid. Elem. I, def. 3;
Aristotle. Met. 1090b 5-7; cp. Heath 1956,1 155-157.
133Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 202b 33-34.
134 In Descartes, on the contrary, no geometrical figure or number has any privileged
position and all are equal in their worth and value. It is to be noted that in modem
discussions there is a tendency to modernize Ancient mathematics, in particular, to interpret
Proclus in the sense of Descartes, to find in Proclus’ Euclid commentary a “geometrical
algebra”, cp. Van der Waerden 1983, 78. For the discussion and refutation of this thesis see:
Unguru 1976, 67-114; Schmitz 1997, 126-132.
135 Proclus. In Eucl. 59.19-20; cp. 85.2 sqq.; Aristotle. Met. 1014b 7-8; 1016b 24-26; 1085b
33-34.
136 Proclus. In Eucl. 59.17-19; 205.15.
137Aristotle. Phys. 215b 19-20; Proclus. In Eucl. 59.7 sqq. Cp. M. White 1992, 8 sqq.
94 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

increased through addition, but not divided, since the numerical unit or henad is
indivisible. On the contrary, geometrical magnitude, being continuous, may be
indefinitely divided, but not increased— for the simple reason that it would then
turn into another, different quantity.138 In other words, each of the two has its
peculiar generic limit: in the case o f number it is the limit “from below”, the henad
as the indivisible basis o f the sameness in number, whereas for magnitude the limit
“from ‘above’ is the magnitude itself as a whole”.139 As Iamblichus puts it in his
commentary to Nicomachus’ “Introduction to arithmetic”, “the continuous and
unified should be called magnitude, and the juxtaposed and discrete should be
called multitude”.140
Lastly, number and magnitude differ insofar as any two (mathematical)
numbers are commensurable (symmetra), for their common measure is the unit and
their ratio is expressible (rhétos) through a ratio of two integers.141 Geometrical
magnitudes, on the contrary, may be incommensurable (the side and the diagonal
o f a square, for example),1 2 which is another reason for considering arithmetic to
be prior to geometry. Commensurable magnitudes, as Euclid demonstrates, have
the same ratio to one another as a number has to another number.143 On the
contrary, incommensurable geometrical magnitudes have no such measure, that is,
their relation cannot be expressed (alogos), since there is a certain irrationality,
something inexpressible (arrhéton), in the last instance coming from non-being or
matter.
In order to be able to incorporate incommensurable geometrical
magnitudes into science, Euclid has to redefine the notion of ratio and extend it to
continuous magnitudes, that is, to incorporate the irrationality o f pélikon, rather
than poson, discrete multitude. In order to do that, Euclid introduces ratio or logos
as a “relation in respect of size (hé kata pélikotéta poia skhesis) between two
magnitudes o f the same kind” in book V of the “Elements”.144 Incommensurable
magnitudes are said to have a ratio, when multiplied they may exceed each
other.145 The ratio is to be distinguished from proportion (analogía), which is
established among a number of magnitudes.146 Such a definition o f ratio enables

,3S Aristotle. Phys. 207a 33 sqq. Cp. Anaxagoras B3 DK, ap. Simplicius. In Phys. 164.16-20
(here, however, Anaxagoras seems to argue that a magnitude may be equally potentially
infinitely decreased (divided) and increased). See also: Prantl 1987, 493; Gaidenko 1980,
318-320.
139 It is this insurmountable distinction of number and geometrical magnitude that Aristotle
obviously has in mind when saying that Plato discerns two infinities, which correspond to
the infinity of addition in numbers and to the infinity of division in magnitudes—although
Plato himself does not make such a distinction.
140 “...[T]o men synekhes kai hendmenon kaloit’ an megethos, to de parakeimenon kai
dieiremenonplethos". - Iamblichus. In Nicom. 7.8-10. See also: Euclid. Elem. VII, def. 2;
Aristotle. Met. 1020a 9-13.
141 Euclid. Elem. X.def. 1.
142 Cp. e.g. Proclus. In Eucl. 6.19-21; Heath 1956,1 351 sqq.
143 Euclid. Elem. X, prop. 5.
144 Euclid. Elem. V, def.3; cp. Stein1995,334 sqq.
145 Euclid. Elem. V, def.4.
146 Euclid. Elem. V, def.6; cp. Aristotle.NE1131a 30 sqq. Cp. Patzig 1960-1961, 204-205.
 Part 11: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 95

Euclid, first, to establish a relation between incommensurable entities and, second,

to exclude infinitely big and infinitely small magnitudes (thus, for example, an
angle o f a triangle cannot have a ratio to an angle constituted by two tangent
circles).
Important is the fact that irrationality under the guise of
incommensurability may be observed only within geometrical magnitudes and not
within (quantitative) numbers, each two of which are always in proportion, are
commensurable as m/n and have a common measure in the numerical unit as the
quantitative henad. The incommensurability may be exemplified only in extended
geometrical magnitudes, which thus may be considered immersed in a specific
extension that exemplifies the presence of geometrical matter (cp. 2.4). Qua
geometrical, this matter embodies eternal objects, that is, objects whose properties
do not change, but, qua matter, it brings irrationality, present through
incommensurability and the potentially infinite (indefinite) divisibility of
geometrical extended objects.

2.1.4 The in(de)finite in mathematical reasoning

The Cartesian concept of the indefinite as opposed to the infinite (1.3.2) is

significant for the current discussion, insofar as the concept is applicable not only
within the realm of physical things but in geometrical figures as well. The reason
for this is obvious: one can always extend or enlarge a geometrical figure. The
problem is then whether a particular geometrical figure, when related to the infinite
or to the indefinite (e.g., when indefinitely extended), still preserves all of its
properties and its form. For the infinite is something that cannot be apprehended or
grasped by the finite mind.
As it has been said, the notion o f the indefinite corresponds to the notion
o f potential infinity. If a geometrical figure is indefinitely extended, then at every
step o f its potentially infinite growth it will still remain the same figure with the
same relations between its different elements: a circle will still be a circle, an
ellipse will retain the same relation between its two main components, an isosceles
triangle will keep the ratio o f its sides, and so on. And since in geometrical objects,
unlike in physical things, we are mostly not interested in measuring a “real” length
of a line but rather in proportional relations of various elements, an indefinitely
(i.e., potentially infinitely extended) geometrical figure will by no means be
different in all o f its properties from the initial figure, except for the relative size of
two figures, expressed by a finite number. In other words, the indefinite figure,
which is finite at each step but is capable of being ever further extended, does not
qualitatively differ from a figure taken as the initial one: they both belong to the
same species.
The case appears to be more complicated once not only the indefinite
(potentially infinite), but also the infinite is admitted into modem mathematics,
making it radically different from Greek mathematics and physics, which abstain
from accepting actual infinity.147 When the notion of an actually infinite
mathematical object (a geometrical figure or number) is accepted, the finite mind

147 Archimedes. Opera II, 242-290.

96 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

inevitably encounters a number o f paradoxes (see 1.3.4). For instance, if one

considers an infinitely extended circle, one can say that in infinity the circle
becomes a straight line: “in geometry the concept of the arc o f an indefinitely large
circle is customarily extended to the concept of a straight line; or the concept of a
rectilinear polygon with an indefinite number of sides is extended to that of a
circle.”148 That in the infinite the properties of geometrical figures may radically
change and show a fundamental affinity between various geometrical figures,
hidden in the finite, is one o f the main ideas of the projective geometry of
Desargues.149 In this case the finite mind can only conceive that a polygon is
(becomes) a circle (or that the arc becomes a straight line) in the infinite, but how it
happens still cannot be conceived. Or, another example (one that induced the new
non-Euclidean geometry o f Lobachevsky-Bolyai) is the famous fifth postulate of
Euclid, which, in an alternative reading, states that two parallel lines never
intersect when indefinitely extended, however they do intersect in an actually
infinitely-distanced point.150 The example of parallel lines intersecting “in infinity”
may be explained through lines intersecting in a point at a finite distance, for
example when Desargues explains an obscured species through another species
that is more clear, and not vice versa.151
Ancient geometry, on the contrary, studies its objects insofar as they are
limited, because the infinite cannot be properly known. Thus, for instance, every
surface (epipedon) has to be taken only as limited (peperasmenon).152 Modem
geometry begins, as Descartes shows in his treatment of the infmi, with the infinite
(or possibly indefinite) line, plane or solid and only then considers their limitations
as particular physical or geometrical objects. In this way even a geometrical figure
may be considered as indefinitely increasing or decreasing if this takes place in and
by means of the imagination (cp. 3.4.2). Nevertheless, the actually infinite in
geometrical objects is absolutely transcendent to the indefinite increasing or
decreasing, insofar as the former can—and in fact does—change the properties o f a
figure, while the latter does not.
A problem that arises here is how a finite figure (however large) relates to
its infinite extension. The polygon differs from the circle in its properties and way

,4‘ Descartes. Fourth Set of Replies, AT VII 239.

149 Desargues 1987, 142. Cp. Gray 1994, 897-907; Field 1997, 192-205.
150 The fifth postulate is formulated by Euclid himself as: “That, if a straight line falling on
two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, the
two straight lines, if produced indefinitely, meet on that side on which are the angles less
than the two straight angles”. - Euclid. Elem. I, 202-220. Cp. Proclus. In Eucl. 386.24-373.2.
Proclus, however, considers only three of Euclid’s first postulates (“old", i.e., known
already in the time of Plato, Archytas and Eudoxus) to be real postulates, excluding the
fourth and the fifth. In the later developed Riemann geometry it is possible to draw an
infinite number of straight lines through a given point, parallel to a given line (when the
point does not lie on the line), that is, all the drawn lines do not intersect the given line. Cp.
Gray 1994 877-886. Lobachevsky 1902, 5 sqq.; Riemann 1923, 1-20; Hilbert 1950, 11-12;
Bolyai 1987, 14 sqq.
151 Descartes. To [Desargues], [19 June 1639], AT II 554-556. Cp. Desargues 1864 I, 104
and also Newton on the infinite lines - McGuire 1983,69 sqq.
152 Plotinus, Enn. VI.3.14.28-29.
 Part II: Intelligible Mailer and Geometry 97

of construction; the circle differs from the straight line; the hyperbole indefinitely
approximates its asymptote but never actually reaches it, and so on. The difference
between the infini and the indéfini still remains insurmountable, because the finite
reason can understand what happens when a geometrical object “becomes” infinite.
Or, in terms o f Descartes, reason can understand how a concept o f a polygon is
“extended” to the concept o f circle, but it cannot grasp how the geometrical object
“becomes” infinite; an absolute limit or an abyss between the potentially and the
actually infinite cannot be overcome. Finite reason can efficiently operate with the
notion of the infinite and know it (the “is”), but it cannot apprehend or grasp what
actually happens in the infinite (the “how” of the passage from the potentially
infinite to the actually infinite) (cp. 1.3.2). The infinite can then be explained
analogically through the finite (a physical or geometrical object clearly graspable
by reason and easily imaginable), but the question o f why this is possible at all
remains unanswered. Taking into account, however, what has already been said
about the ontological and axiological precedence of the infinite in Descartes, one
might argue that the procedure o f the “extension” of a figure up to its limit, where
the figure quite often turns into another genus (a polygon into a circle, a circle into
a straight line, and so on), is itself justified only insofar as a kind of a priori
infinite structure or entity has to be presupposed (the infini). Because the infinite is
already there, it itself is not, and cannot be, constructed, although it allows a
particular figure to be understood as a limitation of its infinite limit. Acceptance of
the infinite thus becomes a necessary presupposition for the justification of
contemporary science, in particular, of mathematics.
An obvious difference between geometrical figures and numbers is that
the set o f all integer numbers is well ordered; there is a rule that determines for
every two numbers which o f the two is prior to the other, whereas there is no such
ordering within figures. Nevertheless, the infinite is represented both in
geometrical objects and in numbers. Much of what has been said about geometrical
figures in respect to the infinite is also true in the case of numbers. For instance,
lim l/n=0 when n-»oo (n is a natural number), although zero is never actually
attended. Even if the infinite in mathematical objects is not immediately accessible
or graspable, the finite mind is nevertheless able to draw certain conclusions about

In the Second Set o f Objections to the “Meditations”, compiled by

Mersenne, an objection is raised against the Cartesian proof of the existence of
God, namely, that our mind has neither an idea of God, nor an idea of an infinite
number, and that even if the idea of the infinite were to exist in the mind, it would
not mean that the infinite as such does exist. Therefore, the idea of infinity can
only be a construction o f the finite mind and does not represent anything really
existing. As Mersenne states, “Even if there were just one degree of heat or light, I
could always imagine further degrees and continue the process o f addition up to
infinity. In the same way, I can surely take a given degree of being, which I

151 Cp. Dirichlet 1889, 1 357-380; Bromwich 1926, 26 sqq. Descartes mentions in his letter
an infinite series of numbers, 15/16, 31/32, 63/64, 127/128, 255/256 et sic in infinitum,
which express the “resistance of air” and whose limit is 1 (although never actually attended),
- To Mersenne, 18 December 1629, AT 193.
98 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

perceive within myself, and add on a further degree, and thus construct the idea of
a perfect being from all the degrees which are capable of being added on.” 154 The
question whether the infinite does really exist or whether it is only a construction
of the finite mind thus becomes crucial for the Cartesian proof of the existence of
God. If the infinite is just an extension o f the finite, considered in it highest
possible degree, then nothing guarantees that the infinite does, or has to, really
exist, independently of operations o f the finite mind. But if the infinite is a kind of
a priori structure, a particular limitation of which forms finite notions and
representations (particularly, of a finite number or geometrical figure), without
which they are neither thinkable nor possible as having a number of properties and
attributes, then the infinite has to be accepted as the primary reality.
If God does exist as the infinite thinking substance, if he supports and
constantly recreates the finite substances, then, because he is utterly perfect and
thus actually infinite, infinity must also be present in mathematical—arithmetical
and geometrical—objects. Descartes’ argument is the following: “Now in my
thought or intellect I can somehow come upon a perfection that is above me; thus I
notice that, when I count, I cannot reach the largest number, and hence I recognize
that there is something in the process of counting which exceeds my powers. And I
contend that from this alone it necessarily follows, not that an infinite number
exists, nor indeed that it is a contradictory notion, as you say, but that I have the
power o f conceiving that there is a thinkable number which is larger than any
number that I can ever think of, and hence that this power is something which I
have received not from myself but from some other being which is more perfect
than I am.” 155
The supposedly largest number cannot be reached by the procedure that
the finite mind resorts to—namely, counting. In other words, natural numbers form
a potentially infinite set. That there is at least one potentially infinite ordered set
(of natural numbers) is described in contemporary mathematics by the axiom of
infinity: there exists at least one set Z such that, first, 0 belongs to Z; second, if x
belongs to Z, then the set {x} also belongs to Z. Then {0}, {0, {0}}, (0, {0, {0}}},
etc., all belong to Z. Now, we may simply consider {0}=1, {0, 1}=2, {0, l,...n -l} =
n, and all the natural number described this way will belong to Z and will also be
different from each other. The natural order among them is then also easily
established by the operation “+1”, which signifies the passage from n-1 to n.‘ 6
Every integer may be exceeded by adding another unit to it. It means that there is
no largest number and no actually infinite number accessible to the finite mind.
Now, if we accept the notion of an actually infinite entity (infinitely large

154 Mersennc. Second Set of Objections, AT VII 123-124.

155 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 139. Later Descartes explains it to Burman: “I
know God exists and I have proved it. And at the same time, I notice that when I count I can
never reach a highest number, but there is always a number that can be thought of which is
greater than any number that I can think of. It follows that the power of conceiving of this is
something I do not derive from myself, but must have received from some entity more
perfect than myself. And this entity is God, whose existence I have proved by means of the
arguments already adduced”. - Conversation with Burman, AT V 157.
Cp. Dedekind 1911, passim and the axioms of Peano - Peano 1990, 27-32.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 99

or infinitely small, as in the case o f infinitesimals), two approaches are possible,

both accepted in modem mathematics. First, the actually infinite can be regarded
as inexistent as such, so that we are always thinking in finite terms. Even if infinity
cannot be grasped as such, it nevertheless appears, for instance, in the
approximation o f a particular quantity through a number of iterative steps. For
example, the notion o f infinity is essentially involved in the definition of the limit
of a sequence: if a series a„ has A as its limit, then for any number e>0 there exists
an integer N such that I a„-A| <$ for all n>N. The notions of the largest number or
of infinitesimals thus relate to potential infinity. This is the approach of Cauchy
and o f the classical analysis. The other approach is present in contemporary non­
standard analysis, which takes the infinitely large number and infinitesimals to be
actually existing: the transfinite infinite number “follows” any large natural
number and the infinitesimal is considered to be a fixed quantity, less than any
smallest quantity one might choose (although Cantor himself rejects the possibility
of the existence of actually infinitely small magnitudes).157
In the above passage Descartes may be seen as anticipating Cantor’s
theory. It seems, rather, that Descartes simply tries to extend his approach to
infinity (by stressing the precedence o f the infinite to the finite) to natural numbers,
so that every number might be regarded as a particular limitation of the initial
number, which has to be then a priori presupposed as a condition of the possibility
o f finite numbers. The finite mind can neither think (grasp) nor reach the infinite
number. In this respect, the infinite number does not exist for the finite mind. But
the fact that it is capable o f thinking about (capable o f knowing) the infinite
number and o f continuing the process of counting, has to imply that there is
something that makes the potentially infinite counting possible and which is
perfect in a higher degree. Such a perfection can only be for Descartes actual
infinity. The infinite can be neither merely imaginable nor something that may be
derived from the contents o f the finite mind. Therefore, there should be an infinite
(transfinite) number in God, who is considered to be infinite thinking (it is not by
chance that in his later years Cantor tried to justify his theory by referring to
Plato).158 The infinite number has thus to be accepted on the ground that also
appears in Descartes’ ontological proof. At least, the ability of the human mind to
recur to the infinite in mathematics can be explained only if there is an a priori
entity, which is itself infinite. That infinite entity may exist then only if God, being
actually infinite and perfect, exists. The infinite number may not necessarily be a
number in the usual sense: in fact, Descartes does not accept the infinite qua
number. But in God the infinite represents the highest possible—the actually
infinite—degree o f perfection, which, however, is always considered through the
finite and the limited by the finite mind. In the infinite mind this infinite number

157 Cantor 1985, 294-295; Robinson 1966, 57 sqq., 279-282; cp. Frege 1969, 76-80; Gttdel
1990, II 311. Leibniz is at times hesitant about which of the two approaches to choose, for at
times he takes the infinitesimal to be in the process of becoming and sometimes—as already
a complete entity, see: Nikulin 1993, 167-169.
158 Cantor 1985, 247, 264. Cantor himself considered an infinite set as actually infinite and
in this sense as a whole unity—as the Platonic eidos or idea—and referred to potential
infinity as apeiron. Cp. Dauben 1979, 170.
100 Malter, Imagination and Geometry

may not be represented as number—it need not formally, but only eminently be
number in and for the infinite thinking. Such an infinite number makes possible
then all mathematical procedures that involve the infinite and are thus rejected by
ancient mathematics. Therefore although Descartes recognizes that infinite
knowledge and power are contained formally in the idea of God, infinite number
and length can only be eminently in this idea.159
In the “Parmenides” Plato mentions an “infinite number” (apeiros
arithmos) understood by Parmenides as quantitatively infinite, that is, the set of
natural numbers is considered potentially infinite, so that, once a number is given,
one can always consider a bigger one.160 The notion of the “infinite number”
generated, however, a number o f commentaries in the later Platonic tradition,
which, as we saw in Plotinus, already accepts the notion o f actual infinity. Along
with Plato, Plotinus too considers the “number o f the infinite”.161 The number, as a
form of numbering and also as numbered, has to be definite and thus limited, both
in the intelligible and as referring to particular things, since otherwise nothing
could be thought in its definiteness. In this respect the intelligible line—the notion
o f line, which makes geometrical lines of any length possible—is to be posterior to
the number and may be said to be infinite or, rather, indefinite, in the sense that the
limit is not thought in the definition of a line (en tôi logôi tes aytogrammës oyk eni
prosnooymenon peras). The infinité, apeiria, according to this argument, cannot
limit or define, but may only be limited or defined; it can only appear as a sort of
matter that always escapes limiting and defining (to peras kai horos kai logos).
Plotinus’ conclusion is that if number may be said to be infinite, it is only in the
negative sense, namely, that number is not limited and not defined by anything
else.162
Damascius argues that the infinite has to be necessarily present in
number, although not as actually infinite but as a lack of any limits for further
division. But even if any concrete positive integer is taken by Damascius as finite,
because it is limited by its own form of being this particular number, there should
be an infinite number without qualification (haplôs). As does Descartes,
Damascius claims this number to be inaccessible to finite human understanding,
grasped only by the intellect—by pure being, which in thinking itself must
necessarily employ the notion of the actually infinite, which, in turn, points to the
source of being, to the infinite One.163
The question that arises in Descartes is whether the set of numbers (e.g.,
of natural numbers) exists as a whole, as actually infinite or only as potentially
infinite, where it is always possible to extend a list of numbers or to produce a
bigger number. Descartes sometimes speaks about the infinite immensity
( l ’immensité infinie) of numbers, without specifying how he understands it.

159 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 137.

160Plato. Parm. 144a. Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 203b 24, 206a 11; Proclus. In Eucl. 6.15-17.
161 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.2.1 sqq.
162 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.3.2, 9-12; VI.6.17.4-18; VI.6.18.1-12; Plotinus 1980, 190-194. Cp.
Aristotle. Met. 1028b 24-26.
163 Damascius. De princ., 200.
164 Descartes. To Frenicle, 9 January 1639, AT II 474.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 101

From what has been said, it would appear that for the finite mind the set of
numbers is only potentially infinite: it is always possible to make another step, but
at each particular moment the finite mind thinks a number or an ensemble of
numbers as only finite. For and in the infinite intellect, however, the set o f numbers
might be thought and understood as complete, so that even if there is no actually
infinite number as a formal concept, there is an infinite power and thinking that
knows and grasps the whole immensity o f numbers eminently and all at once.
In other words, numbers, when thought, may be considered as produced
or constructed by the finite mind, although on Descartes’ account it has to be only
a reproduction or an as i f construction, for the whole immensity o f numbers is
already there in and for the infinite mind (cp. 3.4.1-3.4.2). The infinite substance is
then the only instance that may be said to really produce the numbers, although not
in a discursive process o f counting, but in a single act of comprehension and a
simple intuition of the divine mind, inaccessible and not graspable by the finite
mind. The insurmountable difference between the finite and the infinite intellects,
constantly stressed by Descartes, necessitates an acceptance of the scientific
approach or method. Indeed, if one happens to discover or guess a certain property
of numbers (e.g., the Fermat theorem), it does not yet suffice that this property
holds for any finite (however large) number o f numbers, which may be proven
directly (calculated). Nothing guarantees that, beginning at a certain point, the
property in question is invalid. The finitude of our mind plays a crucial role here:
we cannot see or grasp all numbers simply by verifying all the possible cases to be
sure that the discussed property really holds. Such a procedure, as Descartes writes
in a letter to Frenicle, is available only to the infinite mind, which can simply and
immediately see in a single act that the property holds.165 The finite mind, which
cannot immediately enumerate all the possible cases, has to prove a theorem, that
is, to establish, in a finite number o f steps of discursive thinking, that the property
is valid for all the members o f an infinite set or class.
Thus, we encounter once again the fundamental difference between
knowing and grasping: the former is referred to the finite discursive reason, while
the latter—to the infinite non-discursive intellect (cp. 3.1.1; 3.1.2). It is important
to note that the two are rigidly separated in Descartes and in modem philosophy,
because o f the insurmountable distinction between the creator and the created,
between the infinite and the finite. The notions of the infinite and of production are
indeed tightly connected. Thus, Hilbert considers transfinite or infinite objects of
mathematics to be nothing but constructions of the human mind, freely created; the
only requirement is to avoid contradictions. Kronecker, as well as the
constructivists and the intuitionists, rejects the notion of actual infinity (and, on
this ground, also Cantor’s theory, where different infinities are treated as finite
numbers), because, first, the acceptance of actual infinity leads to paradoxes and,
second, from the point o f view o f the constructivists, unlike that of the formalists, a
mathematical object exists not if it is free o f contradiction, but if one can describe
the way this object is (or may be) constructed (see 3.4.1).
The appropriate way for the finite mind to know the actually infinite in
discursive reasoning and proofs is to establish a one-to-one correspondence

165 Descartes. To Frenicle, 9 January 1639, AT II 474.

102 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

between two sets or subsets of a set: if it is possible to find such a correspondence,

two sets have the same cardinal number or “number” of members, even if the
number is infinite. Besides, as Descartes notices, there can be enormously long
numbers, so that the span of an entire human life would be insufficient to write
them down. However, one can conveniently refer to them as a, b, c, etc., and in this
way express them, which further enables the remarkable development of algebraic
methods in Fermat, Descartes and their contemporaries. This operation
corresponds exactly to the contemporary notion of the abstraction of potential
realizability in mathematics and logic, which, in order to represent an infinite
object, presupposes the performance of a finite number of operations or steps.
However, if it is practically impossible to write (to construct) an entity (a long
word or a number written by a substantially large number of signs) to imply the
performance o f a large number of consecutive operations, one may abstract from
the actual realization of the task and simply denote that entity by a sign. Actual
infinity is retained by Descartes only for the infinite intellect, while everything
accessible to the finite mind is displayed by the potentially infinite or by its
abstraction through a finite sign.
An evident analogy for such a conclusion is that the finite mind can know
but cannot grasp such a long number in the entirety o f its digits (even if it is a finite
number, such as an irrational—algebraic or transcendental—number, which cannot
be written either by a finite or by a periodic decimal expansion). The same is true,
as has been argued, in the case of actual divine infinity: one can possibly know it in
its existence, but not in its essence. In the case of number, the finite mind may not
be able to grasp a substantially large number a in its entirety (the number may not
be readable by the finite mind or by a computer within a certain substantially large
period of time), but we are able to know (i.e., prove) what it is in its properties.
The very same procedure is then applicable to the ordinal and cardinal transfinite
numbers, (o and K0,166 so that the finite mind is able to know that this infinite
number is, because there is an idea o f it in the finite mind (namely, it is thinkable
that there is a number “after” all the natural numbers or a number that expresses
the number o f all possible subsets o f the set of natural numbers), but not to know
what it is—and therefore to be unable to grasp the infinite number—because of the
essential finitude of the human mind. In the very same way as it is known that the
infinite is but it is not grasped what it is, one might conclude that there should be
(an) infinite mathematical object(s), by limitation of which one conceives finite
mathematical objects with their properties.
Actual infinity is thus not an extension of the finite or of the potentially
infinite. There is a principal and insurmountable difference between the two. By
adding another element, even a potentially infinite number of times, we will never
achieve the actually infinite, the infinite as a whole. Actual infinity cannot be
presented as potential infinity added or even multiplied a (even infinite) number of
times. As Descartes says, “I readily and freely confess that the idea which we have
of the divine intellect, for example, does not differ from that which we have of our
own intellect, except in so far as the idea of an infinite number differs from the

166Cp. Cantor 1883, 32 sqq.; Abian 1965, 316 sqq.; Jech 1978, 42-52.
 Parí II: Intelligible Matter and Geomeíry 103

idea o f a number raised to the second or fourth power”.167 The impossibility of

arriving at actual infinity by simply indefinitely extending the finite (perfections),
underlies, as it has been said, the Cartesian proof of the existence of God, because
there is no mental operation that might produce the infinite and its very notion out
and from the finite. Or, put otherwise, actual infinity can neither be constructed nor
understood by means o f construction (cp. 3.4.1).

2.2 Geometry, metaphysics and method in Descartes

Mathematics plays a major role in Descartes’ considerations, which seem to fully

support the Platonic claim that mathematics is the clearest and the most certain
science that sets the standard and is itself an example of strict and correct
reasoning, indispensable for searching for the truth. Thus, in geometry, as
Descartes says, “we seek only exactitude (iustesse) of reasoning”.168 Exactitude is
the main requirement for scientific investigations. Exactitude is justice, “iustesse”,
of reasoning, which in particular implies that, first, in our reason there should be a
capacity o f discriminating the just or exact from the unjust or inexact. Being finite,
reason is unable to immediately apprehend or “see” the truth in its entirety; instead,
it should limit itself to pronouncing a correct judgement. The capacity of
judgement becomes, together with taste, one o f the most important faculties of
reason in modernity. Judgement presupposes not only correct reasoning but also a
personal stand: even if a finite subjectivity sincerely, sine ira et studio, tries to
sentence a fact to truth, it nevertheless cannot get rid of itself, of its own presence
and necessary involvement in judgement. As the addition to the French edition of
the “Principles” runs, “(ajbsolute certainty arises when we believe that it is wholly
impossible that something should be otherwise than we judge it to be”.169
Every judgement has thus a flavor of taste and subjectivity. On the other
hand, exactitude as iustesse of reasoning presupposes law, ius, which is to be found
both in geometrical and in natural things. The notion of ius—either ins civile, ius
naturale, ius divinum, or in any other form— is not descriptive but essentially
prescriptive. Ius prescribes the conditions of fulfillment o f truth, both in social
matters and in nature. In a very similar manner, Descartes prescribes truth and
exactitude as law to geometrical and physical things (see 3.4.1; 3.4.2). If truth, not
only in moral, social and political questions but also in science, whose purpose is
to investigate the objective world of physical things and mathematical entities, is
the subject o f taste, then it can hardly be other than prescriptive. Indeed, taste, even
if it is a most intimate capacity o f individual reasoning, is itself the subject of
public opinion, tradition and fashion, which may change throughout history and
prescribe to much extent what should be judged and considered beautiful, elegant,

167 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 137. As an example one might mention the
operation of the Cartesian multiplication of two sets: for two sets X and Y, Xx Y is the set of
all pairs of {x, y} where x belongs X and y belongs to Y. The result of the multiplication of
two finite sets will also be a finite set and of two potentially infinite sets will also be a
potentially, not actually, infinite set.
168 Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 389.
169 Descartes. Princ. IV 206, AT VIIIA 328.
104 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

good and true. The alleged exactitude and precision as justice o f reason are to be
prescribed, produced or constructed and are thus imposed onto extended—both
geometrical and physical—reality.
Descartes’ task, then, is to find an adequate description or method that
would fit this ideal o f exactitude, clarity and distinctness—which becomes a
methodological demand—and would eliminate all possible ambiguity and
equivocation in scientific description (see 3.3.1).170 Because of the certainty of
mathematics and because the most certain and unequivocal results known in the
history o f science belong to mathematical knowledge, the description (or, rather,
the prescription), which may fit the ideal of exactitude as iustesse, has to be
mathematical. If Descartes criticizes ancient mathematicians—Euclid, Pappus,
Apollonius— it is for being unable to elaborate fully the true method or language of
science, since ancient mathematics confines itself to studying mathematical objects
only and does not extend to any other kinds of objects (in particular, to physical
things). Thus, mathematics is to be considered the science that provides the
method for all other sciences or the pattern on which the universal method may be
constructed. If not fully equivalent to mathematics, a pure non-empirical ideal for
the method as mathesis may at least be found in the mathematical practice of
solving problems,171 in the practice o f both arithmetic and geometry, which “alone
are concerned with an object so pure and simple that they make no assumptions
that experience might render uncertain; they consist entirely in deducing
conclusions by means o f rational arguments”.172
At the same time, the ultimate truth Descartes wants to establish and to
ground is not that o f mathematics, but of metaphysics—of the existence o f God
and the soul.173 This truth is then supposed to provide an ultimate foundation for all
other possible truths. Ontologically it has to be the first, although in the order of
consideration (i.e., logically and epistemologically), it is not the first, for
metaphysical truth is originally demonstrated from the subjective certainty of the
self-awareness o f the cogito}14 A certain circularity arises in Descartes’
considerations. On the one hand, a possibility o f establishing the necessity o f being
of the not created thinking substance is rooted in the certainty of the subjective
judgement of the ego. On the other hand, the certainty of the cogito ergo sum is
itself possible only because of the necessity o f being of the infinite not created
thinking substance, which produces the finite thinking substance, the ego itself,
capable of knowing and understanding the very source and cause o f its finite
existence.175 Such a circle, however, is not vicious, because a proposition, in the
Cartesian account, may be considered true if it is grounded both in the divine mind,
which produces and guarantees the necessity of its truth, and in the human mind,

170 Funkenstein 1986, 28 sqq. Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1003a 21 sqq.

171 Lachterman 1989, 141 sqq.
m Descartes. Reg. II, AT X 364-365.
173 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 34 sqq.
174 For interpretation of the cogito as initially non-representative, non-intentional and non-
reflective, see M. Henry 1993, 40-51. For a criticism of such interpretation, see Marion
1993, 52-74.
175 Cp. Descartes. To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT I 145.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 105

which, through the lumen naturale, discursively justifies the statement as

necessary, that is, proves it. A similar circle can also be seen in the relation of
mathematics to metaphysics. If mathematics is the rational science par excellence,
which sets a canon for metaphysical considerations, then mathematics has to be
considered as logically and epistemologically prior. But since metaphysics has to
provide a foundation for mathematics, metaphysics should be ontologically prior.
That is why Descartes has to claim that “the proofs in metaphysics are more certain
than those in mathematics”.176
The finite mind has to start in its subjective evidence with essence and
only then arrive at the recognition o f existence as necessarily presumed in the
unique essence o f the infinite substance (cp. 1.3.2). Because of its finitude, the
human mind cannot start with direct comprehension o f the supposedly infinite
divine mind, the source o f all possible truths. The quest o f the finite mind can only
be realized through a chain o f simple and evident steps in reasoning, by means o f
which one can reach or tie together premises and conclusion.177 These steps are
aimed at the understanding and the demonstration of already not immediately
evident truths (metaphysical, mathematical and physical). But if the finite mind
gradually, first through reflective understanding of itself and then by justifying the
necessary truths, comes to the understanding of the infinite mind, this infinite has
to be presupposed as a necessary transcendental condition for the possibility of
such knowledge.
Where should the finite mind look for the paradigm of its discursive
search for truth? Not among extended things, although not because they are ever
fluent and thus are subject only to opinion-</oxa and not to knowledge, as Plato
takes them to be, but because extended things can be imagined as non-existent in a
reductive act of doubt. Therefore, they do not belong to the realm of primary
evidence and to the truth o f the cogito.m Descartes presupposes the existence of
only two finite substances, hence the paradigm is to be found among objects of
thought. Every finite object bears a trace of its infinite productive cause,
considered the source o f truth, so every finite res has to exemplify a certain order
and regularity, and mathematical (geometrical) objects are most suitable as a
model for it. Since, however, metaphysics is to be considered the ground and
foundation of both mathematics and physics, metaphysical arguments should
display at least the same, or even more, certainty than mathematical proofs. It is

176 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, AT V 177; cp. Med. Synopsis AT VII 15 and:
“The principal aim of my metaphysics is to show which are the things that can be distinctly
conceived...”. - Descartes. To Mersenne, 30 September 1640, AT III 192. Descartes’ claim
is contested by Gassendi (Fifth Set of Objections, AT VII 327-328), to which Descartes
replies that the metaphysical knowledge, primarily, of the existence of God, “is prior in the
order of knowledge and more evident and more certain” (Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 384).
Such a knowledge is not, however, easily established: thus, in his letter to Huygens,
Descartes complains that there are more people who introduce philosophical notions into
mathematics than, on the contrary, those who use certainty and evidence of the
mathematical demonstrations in metaphysics (To Huygens, 1 November 1635, AT I 331-
332).
177 Descartes. Disc. II, AT VI 19.
17* Descartes. Med. I, AT VII 17 sqq.
106 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

even in suo genere an epistemological obligation to employ one’s reason to know

metaphysical truths—about God and ourselves—and only “along that road”, par
cete voye, can foundations o f physics be discovered.179
The program o f catalogical ordering of all knowledge, that method which
should be indiscriminately applicable both to the extended and the thinkable,
structures knowledge as logical, since it has to be established by means of rational
argumentation and in a finite number of deductive steps. It first implies that every
predicate is analytically contained in its subject, so each step of discursive
reasoning provides a mere tautology on both sides of the equation. Second, every
knowledge has to be presented in the form of a proposition that is sentenced to be
either true or false. This program of sheer logicism, seemingly attractive for
providing a foundation o f science, fails, however, with the discovery of the
incompleteness of formal axiomatic systems.
If mathematics is considered the model for the method of scientific
description, then it should be applicable not only to mathematical problems, but
also to every problem that can be put in the mathematical form.180 Mathematics as
the pattern for the method is neither the algebra “of the modems”, nor the
geometry “of the ancients”, for both are just two particular sciences, the former
studying relations o f numbers understood as signs, the latter studying figures and
their properties. One of the purposes of the method is liberation from “greatly
tiring the imagination” o f the ancient geometrical analysis of figures and from the
pure formality of algebra.'*1
Indeed, if any investigation that has to be exact is about things that allow
o f order and measure, then, as Descartes argues in the Rule IV, there should be a
“general science which explains all the points which can be raised concerning
order and measure”, a true mathesis (vera mathesis) that has to be superior to all
sciences in utility and simplicity (vtilitate et simplicitate), for “it covers all they
deal with, and more besides”.1*2 It thus is the pure form o f mathematical
investigation that becomes an attractive model for the construction of the universal
mathesis. Still, the mathesis universalis differs from ordinary mathematics, as
Descartes himself recognizes in the “Regulae”, because the mathesis “should
contain the primary rudiments o f human reason and extend to the discovery of
truths in any field whatever”.183 In a later letter to Hogelande, Descartes defines
mathesis (the project of which appears yet in Proclus and in early modernity in
Van Roomen) as “the ability to resolve all problems, and moreover to discover by
one’s own industry everything that can be discovered by the human mind in this

179 Descartes. To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT I 144. In another letter, Descartes claims that
the arguments for the existence of God “are clearer in themselves than any demonstrations
of geometers”. - To Mersenne, 27 February 1637, AT I 350. Cp. also: Discourse I, AT VI 7;
Med. V, AT VII 65. Cp., however, Clarke 1982, 83-87, who argues that Descartes does not
manage to provide a univocal depiction of the way physics is to be derived from
metaphysics.
180 Descartes. Discourse III, AT V I29.
181 Descartes. Discourse II, AT VI 17-18.
182 Descartes. Reg. IV, AT X 376-378, cp. Reg. XIV, AT X 451; Discourse II, AT VI 17
sqq.; cp. Geometry I, AT VI 368.
Descartes. Reg. IV, AT X 374.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 107

science”.184 As Van de Pitte argues at length, mathesis universalis should not be

understood and translated as “universal mathematics”, although in Descartes’
times, mathesis ordinarily meant “mathematical science”. Namely, if it is supposed
that (a) every discipline that considers objects in terms of order and measure as
related to quantity o f whatever kind may be called mathematica, (b) order and
measure are distinct from the principles o f order and measure and (c) the principles
o f order and measure are logically prior to order and measure, then one can make
the following distinctions in Descartes. (One may generalize (b) and (c) as
requiring in general that the principles of a science belong to a metascience, that
metascience does not constitute a part of a science and that metascience be
logically prior to the corresponding science.) If this is the case, then, first, one has
to distinguish mathesis (prima mathesis) from mathematics, and second,
mathesis—from mathesis universalis: mathesis contains the principles that make
mathematics a science, both principles of validity and of discovery (or learning) in
the mathematica. The latter is to be taken as constituting the principles of all
sciences as mathematicae (i.e., the science of method or universal methodology).
Moreover, mathesis universalis has to present certain procedure(s) by which the
universal methodology has to be applicable in every particular science.185 “By a
‘method’”, writes Descartes in the “Regulae”, “I mean reliable rules which are
easy to apply, and such that if one follows them exactly, one will never take what
is false to be true or fruitlessly expend one’s mental efforts, but will gradually and
constantly increase one’s knowledge (scientiam) till one arrives at a true
understanding o f everything within one’s capacity”.186 These procedures or rules
are not, however, explicitly formulated in the “Regulae”; later in the “Discourse”
Descartes provides a small number of simple rules, but it remains not altogether
clear whether they should be taken as the rules of the mathesis universalis.ls? There
is, however, no obvious reason to identify the method suggested in the “Discourse”
with the mathesis universalis o f the “Regulae”.
The ideal o f the method based on the simple and easy study o f relations or
proportions is present throughout the corpus of Descartes’ texts, from the
“Discourse” published in 1637 to the conversation with Burman in 1648:

184 Descartes. To Hogelande, 8 February 1640, AT XII Suppl. 2.

185 Van de Pitte 1979, 154-174. Cp. Crapulli 1969; Schuster 1980, 41-96; Lachterman 1986,
435-458 and Sepper 1996, 144-152. For the historical background of the “universal
mathematics” and the difficulties involved in the realization of the project see: Schuster
1977, 160 sqq., 459 sqq. Sepper tends to see all mathematics in Descartes as reducible to
knowledge of proportions and presents mathesis universalis as “the science of concretely
imagined proportional relations” (Op. cit., 192). However, if there is a distinction between
the science of order and measure and the science of the principles to which the former
applies, then the two do not appear to be discerned in Sepper’s presentation. Van de Pitte in
his interpretation seems to follow Van Roomen, who distinguishes mathesis into specialis
and universalis and the latter into logistice and prima mathesis, which for Van de Pitte is
“the essential core of basic principles” of mathematics.
186 Descartes. Reg. IV, AT X 371-372.
187The rules are: clearness and distinctness of the premises; dividing problems into simplest
“atomic” parts; following order in procession from simple to complex; and making
enumerations. - Descartes. Discourse II, AT V I20. Cp. Garber 1992, 31 sqq.
108 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

mathematics qua the exemplary method or pure form of reasoning is indispensable

both as a prerequisite for accustoming the mind to searching for and recognizing
the truth—and as the specimen for new discoveries (although later Descartes
gradually abandons his interest in a universal methodology of science).188 That
mathematics is the most exact o f all sciences is no novelty.189 New is Descartes’
attempt to abstract mathematics as the method and the presumably correct form of
reasoning from the content o f mathematics; that is, to liberate mathematics as the
instrument, as the organon o f every—even physical—investigation, from
mathematics as a concrete science, rooted in a particular practice. In doing so, he
tries to “upgrade”, as it were, this new mathematically structured science into a
universal science that would operate with pure forms of description. Since,
however, the content of description is left out (the described object may be of any
kind, both mental and extended; and if extended, both geometrical and physical),
description turns into prescription: in describing a phenomenon (e.g., a physical
one) Descartes implicitly imposes the very structures of description upon the
described. Description thus turns into a construction (see 3.4.1).
The Cartesian consideration o f mathematics as providing a method, or
even the method, applicable to both metaphysics and physics has an interesting
structure. If one recalls Aristotle’s triad of the three exact theoretical sciences—
metaphysics (or first philosophy), mathematics and physics,190 one can easily
recognize all three in Descartes’ project of the method, where mathesis plays the
role o f the science mediating in cognition between the other two, similar to that of
mathematics in Aristotle. The discursiveness of mathesis fits well the subjectivity
of the ego-point, epistemologically prior but ontologically posterior to the
subjectivity of the divine-point, to which metaphysics corresponds. In a sense,
mathesis universalis for Descartes is a (or even the) method of discursive
overcoming o f human finitude, which appears in the unavoidable discursiveness of
thinking. Mathesis mediates between metaphysics, which has to reveal the
necessity of existence of the infinite thinking substance, and physics, which refers
to the finite (or indefinite) extended substance. If this is the case, then if one also
takes into consideration that mathematics is considered detached from its contents,
then mathematics qua discursive method of reasoning may be applicable to every
extended entity without discrimination, be it physical or geometrical (see 2.2.1).
Even if Descartes, as it will be argued (2.3.1), tends to expel intermediary
structures, they nevertheless return and appear unexpectedly under various guises,

188 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, AT V 176-177. Cp. Preface to the French Edition
of the “Principles”, AT 1XB 14; To Beeckman, 26 March 1619, AT X 156-157. In Reg.
XIV, AT X 447 Descartes mentions three characteristics which describe differences in
proportion: dimension, unity and figure (shape).
' ,9 Cp. Plato. RP 517b sqq.
190 Aristotle. Met. 1003a 21 sqq.; 1026a 6-32. Aristotle calls the first philosophy theology
(theologike, 1026a 18-19). However, in books I~ and E of “Metaphysics”, evidently
composed prior to Z, H and 0, there appears a certain discrepancy between considering the
first philosophy, prote philosophia, as, on the one hand, the only discipline that considers
being as such, the discipline that thus has to be regarded as the science. On the other hand,
the first philosophy is taken as just one of the three theoretical disciplines. See the
discussion in: Patzig 1960-1961, 185-205.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 109

in particular, under the guise of mathematics qua the formal method.

Mathesis thus has to determine the order of reasoning for both
metaphysics and physics, while the standard of precision should come from
metaphysics. Therefore, mathesis is epistemologically the first—it is prior in the
order of cognition. Without application of the method, the whole of logical analytic
truths might only be supposed to have been known all at once only in a momentary
grasp in one single point of the putative panopticum, attainable only to the infinite
divine intellect. Such a point represents the limit o f the potentially infinite striving
o f cognition o f the finite mind, which at every particular moment possesses only
finite knowledge—that is, the knowledge expressible in a finite number of
(presumably true) propositions, achievable by the method and capable o f being
increased in their number.
As the universal methodology, mathesis universalis should be then
applicable to every mathematica, which considers as its objects everything falling
under the categories of order and measure, which are to be taken as common
characteristics of all sciences.191 In particular, this very method also has to be
applicable to physical science, which studies physical bodies. Descartes thus
makes a very strong presupposition about the realm o f physical objects, namely,
that it has to be the subject of order and measure: corporeal nature is the subject
matter of pure mathesis (purae Matheseos objectum), as he puts it in the
“Meditations”.192 However, as it has been pointed out, Descartes takes this
presupposition for granted, without really justifying it.
It is also important to note that if the mathesis universalis is to be the
universal science of principles for every science and, further, if for Descartes all
sciences borrow their principles from philosophy (in the “Discourse”), or that
metaphysics as first philosophy contains “the principles of knowledge” (in the
“Principles”), then the mathesis universalis is to replace first philosophy itself.193
Or, put otherwise, first philosophy has to be conceived as methodology—the
approach that we find at the core o f consideration of science in modernity, from
Neokantianism to critical rationalism.
Furthermore, the mathesis universalis appears to be different from the
more geometrico method, insofar as the former is to consider the principles of the
universal application o f order and measure (the method commonly searched for in
early modem philosophy), while the latter, already well elaborated and firmly
established in antiquity, considers deduction of a consistent set of propositions
obtained from a set o f primary principles (definitions, axioms and postulates). A
paradigmatic example o f the method that starts with definitions, postulates and
axioms and then goes on to proving theorems and solving problems, is presented
by Euclid’s “Elements” (mathematics more geometrico) and in theoretical
philosophy by Proclus’ “Elements o f Theology” (metaphysics more geometrico)

191 Cp. MittelstraB 1978, 177-192.

192 Descartes. Med. VI, AT VII 74. Cp. Reg. XII, AT X 412.
191 Descartes. Disc. II, AT VI 21-22; Princ. Preface to the French edition, AT IXB 14. For a
discussion of the problems involved in the Cartesian project of method and an argument that
Descartes might fail to produce the intended method, see: Schuster 1993,195-223.
194Cp. Heath 1953, clxxxii-clxxxiii.
110 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

and in his “Institutio Physica”. Descartes applies the same method o f reasoning to
metaphysics, namely, to the demonstration of the existence of God and of the
difference between soul and body, o f which he gives an example in his second set
of replies to the objections raised to the “Meditations”.195 The “Meditations”
themselves are not, however, written in the “geometrical fashion” (which is a
reproach o f one o f Descartes’ objectors).196 The reason is that the best suitable
genre for a consideration beginning with subjective evidence has to be not
mathesis, but rather confession. Confessio (found already in Augustine) initially
has the double meaning of proclaiming the greatness of being as the primary cause
for existing truths and things—and of recognition of human fault and guilt. In
Descartes’ very personal description of his way to truth (in the “Meditations” and,
in a sense, in the second part o f the Fourth “Rule”),197 the notion of confession is
philosophically redefined as the way of knowing the infinite substance through
knowing the self, the finite thinking substance, as the recognition of Descartes’
own “epistemological sin”, which consists in having taken for granted that which
has been transmitted through the previous (scholastic) tradition. Because o f that,
Descartes rejects the incontestability of tradition as non-critical and unquestioned,
as authoritative and not genuine, as contingent and therefore not true, because the
traditional (school) knowledge is not reconstructed from the immediate evidence of
the self, o f the finite subjectivity.
In modem philosophy the “geometrical method” of argumentation finds
its most notable application in the “Ethics” of Spinoza, who uses the more
geometrico method for the purposes of philosophy which studies not only the
divine but also—to an even greater extent—the finite subjectivity, in his exposition
and discussion o f the affects (Parts II-V). Spinoza achieves a remarkably original
synthesis, for none o f the ancient philosophers has ever attempted to write ethics
under the pattern o f geometry: since ethics has to do with more or less contingent
human actions, none o f the ancient philosophers sees any possibility to understand
and to structure ethics as a strict science. Ethics has to have its own measure of
IQfi
exactitude that stands far away from that of geometry and metaphysics. In a
certain sense, Spinoza’s “Ethics” may also be considered a confession, as an
attempt to understand and to order the effects of finite subjectivity through
knowledge o f the infinite. For these reasons the more geometrico exposition has a
rather decent place in Descartes’ “Meditations” and appears only in marginal
replies to the objections and notes to the main text: on the one hand, as the tribute
to the (scholastic) tradition o f philosophizing and, on the other, as an attempt to
persuade opponents who do not adopt the Cartesian confessional position o f the
first person singular by their own means.
Reproached for refusing to set out in the “Meditations” “the entire
argument in geometrical fashion, starting from a number o f definitions, postulates

195 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 160-170.

196 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT V II128.
197 Descartes. Reg. IVB, AT X 374.16 sqq. Many contemporary philosophical treatises
might be considered a confessio, for example, Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit.
191Cp. Aristotle. NE 1094b 12 sqq.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 111

and axioms”,199 Descartes replies that such a method would amount to using the
synthetic method, preferred by ancient mathematicians and logicians, who start
with the commonly accepted principles and premises and arrive at a proven
conclusion that then is necessary, that is, cannot be otherwise and thus represents
knowledge.200 By opposing synthesis to analysis in the “Meditations”, Descartes
highlights an important difference between his own approach and that o f the
ancient mathematicians. According to him, the ancients used only synthesis, which
“demonstrates the conclusion clearly and employs a long series of definitions,
postulates, axioms, theorems and problems, so that if anyone denies one of the
conclusions it can be shown at once that it is contained in what has gone before,
and hence the reader however argumentative or stubborn he may be, is compelled
to give his assent.” Descartes himself, on the contrary, uses analysis, which
proceeds from the epistemologically prior, more evident and simple, “so that if the
reader is willing to follow it and give sufficient attention to all points, he will make
the thing his own and understand it just as perfectly as if he had discovered it for
himself,” as a truth anew, as freely (re)constructed by the finite mind (cp. 3.4.2).201
Synthesis, as Proclus points out, goes from premises to conclusion, “the method of
proceeding from things better known to things we seek to know”, whereas analysis
(also widely used in ancient mathematics to establish the correctness of the
premises as hypotheses, assuming the conclusion as a given) goes in the opposite
direction, from conclusion to premises.202
Indeed, Descartes needs the analytic method insofar as in his metaphysics
he begins with the end (“first for us but last in the order of being”, to paraphrase
Aristotle), with the cogito, arriving at the first principles (“last for us but first in the
order of being”), that is, God as the infinite substance and being and the soul. In a
sense, presenting in nuce the transcendental method of the later critical philosophy,
Descartes uses analysis to establish the possibility of the antecedent by analyzing
the structure and the very possibility o f the consequent, coming back to the starting
point, demonstrating it as necessary. And in his geometry too he takes advantage of
the analytic method of analyzing a given geometrical entity presented through an
algebraic formula or equation to arrive at the first elementary constituents.203
In antiquity, the method o f synthesis was yet reportedly taught by Plato
Leodamas.204 Referring to Porphyry, Proclus explains that all mathematical proofs
proceed either from initial principles or aim at attaining initial principles, which
themselves may be either self-evident axioms or already established results.
Proofs, which ascend to starting-points, are either destructive or affirmative. The

199 Mersenne. Second Set of Objections, AT VII 128.

200 Cp. Aristotle. Anal. Post. 71b 37 sqq., who argues that those who aim at gaining
knowledge by proof should adhere to the first principles as the most reliable.
201 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 155-156. See also: Curley 1986, 153-176. As
MittelstraC points out, the theoretical purpose of analysis in Descartes is not primarily that
of foundation, but of demonstration. - MittelstraC 1978, 184-187.
202 Proclus. In Eucl. 8.4-8.6; cp. 43.18-21; 69.16-19. Cp. also: Aristotle. Anal. Post. 71b 9-
72b 4.
203 See: Katasonov 1999, 88-100.
204 Proclus. In Eucl. 211.17-23; Diog. Laert. Ill 24. Initially, the analysis was applicable to
geometrical figures, see: Hintikka, Remes 1974, 31 sqq.
112 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

destruction o f the starting point is the reductio ad absurdum, because it denies the
starting point by showing the impossibility o f the conclusions that follow.
Affirmation of the starting point is analysis as a method “which traces the desired
result back to an acknowledged principle.” Synthesis is exactly the reverse,
proceeding from the principles in order to establish a conclusion.205
Analysis— assuming an entity or a conclusion as a given, and arriving at
undissolvable and thus “atomic” (not further analyzable) first principles— is also,
despite Descartes’ claim, widely used in ancient mathematics, for instance, by
Pappus.206
The Cartesian opposition of synthesis to analysis might also stress a
difference between “les anciens et les modemes” in the use of the geometrical
method. In antiquity the more geometrico method is used for the systematic
(synthetic) presentation and rearrangement of discovered properties and theorems,
so that one can univocally demonstrate a necessary connection between them. Such
a rearrangement may reveal a whole cosmos of intelligible entities, which are
independent o f our cognitive actions, but are structured in such a way that every
entity or proposition is connected with every other into a system (cp. 3.1.1). Since
every entity and every statement in such a system—represented in Euclid in a
distilled way—is eventually connected with every other entity and statement (even
if not immediately but through a mediation of other entities), then any entity or
statement may be taken as the starting point, although some are preferred due to
their compelling evidence. But within such a system, the analytic and synthetic
approach have to be convertible (i.e., a statement can be proven, as Euclid often
does, both analytically and synthetically). The distinction between analysis and
synthesis arises only for, and within, finite discursive thinking, which is unable to
grasp the system of entities and propositions in their entirety and thus proceeds
step by step either from principles (synthetically) or ascending to them
(analytically).
Modem science and mathematics in particular, as represented in
Descartes, does not start with an explicit calling into question the very existence of

205 Proclus. In Eucl. 242.14-16; 245.10-15; 255.8-256.8 et al.

206 “Now analysis is the method of taking that which is sought as though it were admitted
and passing from it through its consequences in order to something which is admitted as a
result of synthesis; for in analysis we suppose that which is sought to be already done, and
we inquire what it is from which this comes about, and again what is the antecedent cause of
the latter, and so on until, by retracing our steps, we light upon something already known or
ranking as a first principle; and such a method we call analysis, as being a reverse solution.
But in synthesis, proceeding in the opposite way, we suppose to be already done that which
was last reached in analysis, and arranging in their natural order as consequents what were
formerly antecedents and linking them one with another, we finally arrive at the
construction of what is sought; and this we call synthesis.” Pappus. Collectio VII, Preface I-
3, 634.3-636.30 Hultsch (trans. I. Thomas). See also: Mugler 1958, 57-58, 400-402; Szab6
1994, 341-345; Schmitz 1997, 108-126. Cp. a MSS addition to Euclid. Elem. XIII 1 (Heath
1953, III 442): “Analysis is the assumption of that which is sought as if it were admitted
[and the arrival] by means of its consequences at something admitted to be true. Synthesis is
an assumption of that which is admitted [and the arrival] by means of its consequences at
something admitted to be true.”
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 113

the system o f mathematical entities and truths as independent from the activity of
the finite mind, because such a system can still be supposed to exist as given in the
divine infinite intellect. Nevertheless, the finite mind is capable of considering
necessary truths and mathematical objects themselves as its own analytic
constructions. Still, the necessity of a truth exemplified through the finite mind is
possible for Descartes only because the finite res cogitans is rooted in, and lives
from, the infinite res cogitans. Once the connection between the finite and the
infinite subjectivity becomes loose, the infinite subject (in Descartes, still the
analytic starting point that needs to be arrived at) becomes itself only a
hypothetical construction and a backward projection of the finite subject (in
Descartes, still the result that makes the whole of metaphysical and mathematical
analysis possible), and truth has to be considered a production of the finite mind.
As contemporary intuitivism or constructivism puts it, an object (of mathematics)
may be considered as freely engendered by the finite mind, in statu nascendi,
rendered and defined in a more precise way at every consecutive step (cp. 3.4.2).
The more geometrico method thus loses its importance and survives only in
contemporary mathematics itself, presenting more of a systematization of the
obtained results, rather than presenting the innermost “objective” structure of a
mathematical science.

2.2.1 Geometry in its relation to physics according to Descartes

That geometry and, in general, mathematics, may and even has to be applicable to
physical objects is one of the most important methodological demands of modem
physics. As mentioned, for Galilei the book of nature is written in mathematical
language, where words are lines, circles and triangles. Descartes writes to
Mersenne that “sizes, shapes, positions and motions are my formal object..., and
the physical objects I explain are my material object. The principles or premises
from which I derive these conclusions are only the axioms on which geometers
base their demonstrations”.207 Another formulation of the program of the
mathematization of the physical is as follows: “The only principles which I accept,
or require, in physics are those o f geometry and pure mathematics; these principles
explain all natural phenomena, and enable us to provide quite certain
demonstrations regarding them. ...I recognize no matter in corporeal things apart
from that which the geometers call quantity, and take as the object of their
demonstrations, i.e. that to which every kind of division, shape and motion is
applicable. ...And since all natural phenomena can be explained in this way, as will
become clear in what follows, I do not think that any other principles are either
admissible or desirable in physics”.208
For Kepler too the world can be known by means of mathematics.209 Still,
Kepler considers geometry and numerical proportions as primarily applicable to

207 Descartes. To Mersenne, end of 1637, AT I 476; cp. To Vorstius, 19 June 1643, AT III
686.
208 Descartes. Princ. II64, AT VIIIA 78-79. Cp. Dijksterhuis 1961, 404-409.
209 Even in studying and presenting a new astronomy, Kepler qualifies himself primarily as a
“mathematician”. -Astronomia nova, Kepler 1992, 35 (“Dedicatory letter”).
114 Matter, imagination and Geometry

the study o f astronomy, and thus, to celestial mechanics, more than to the
terrestrial mechanics: “I believe that both sciences [astronomy and physics] are so
closely bound with one another that neither can achieve perfection without the
other”.210 The reason for such a claim might be, on the one hand, the influence of
the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition on Kepler (in particular, of Proclus)211 and, on
the other hand, that the celestial might be taken to represent, in accordance with the
same tradition, the ontologically “higher” or “more valuable” world, whose
harmonious and beautiful geometrical architecture, describable in mathematical
language, is to disclose the utter perfection of its architect. The terrestrial,
however, is not altogether excluded from the realm where mathematically
conceived mechanics might be applicable, and for the following reasons. First,
Kepler does not already support the Peripatetic distinction of the supra- and
sublunar world. Second, he ascribes the regularity in both “ordered shapes of
plants and of numerical constants” to the same cause—supreme divine reason.212
Third, Kepler does explicitly apply mathematics to the study of optics, music and
meteorology. Nevertheless, all these three disciplines may still be considered as
connecting the earthly to the heavenly, since optics studies light, the “subtlest
matter”, as it were, which, from antiquity on is taken as generated in and coming
directly from “above”, from the celestial region.213 Meteorology equally connects

2,0 Cit. ap.: Caspar 1959, 135. Maestlin, Kepler’s teacher in Tübingen, still rejects the very
possibility of application of physics to astronomy: “Existimo autem...á causis physicis
abstinendum esse, et Astronómica astronomicé, per causas et hypotheses astronómicas, non
physicas esse tractanda. Calculus enim fundamenta Astronómica ex Geometría et
Arithmetica, suis videlicet alis, postulat, non coniectures physicas, quae lectorem magis
perturbante quam informant”. (Letter to Kepler of 21 September 1616, ap. Kepler.
Gesammeite Werke, vol. XVII (1955), 187; cp. Koyré 1973, 462). And even in Kepler’s
own “New Astronomy” (“Astronomía nova, Aitiolog€tos, seu physica coelestis” (1609)) we
still find a distinction made between a geometrical and a physical explanation of celestial
phenomena, in particular, of the movement of Mars, whose correct distances from the Sun
are demonstrated geometrically (“in their nature, quality and quantity”), in opposition to a
physical account “from the corrected motive causes” (cp. chs. 56-57). Non-mechanical
teleological explanation of the movement of planets still plays an important role in Kepler:
in the “Epitome Astronomiae Copemicanae”, the rotation of the planets around the Sun is
explained mechanistically, whereas Earth’s rotation around its axis—by referring to an
alleged earth soul (cp. Caspar 1959, 293 sqq.).
211 See: Somnium, Kepler’s note 37, where he praises Porphyry (Kepler 1967, 51). The idea
of five regular (Platonic) solids Kepler took from Proclus' commentary to the first book of
Euclid’s “Elements” (sec Proclus. In Eucl. 70.24 et al.; cp. Euclid. Elem., bk. XIII and Plato.
Tim. 53 c sqq.), to which Kepler explicitly refers a number of times (e.g., Kepler 1965, 10;
37 et al.). Cp. Caspar 1959,44, 380-381.
2,2 Kepler 1966, 32-33.
213 See: Astronomía Pars Optica and Dioptrice-Kepler. Gesammeite Werke, vol. II (1939)
and vol. IV (1941). Dioptrice is written as a “mathematical book”, as Kepler calls it in the
Introduction, and contains definitions, axioms, problems, and propositions, i.e. copies the
more geometrico way of exposition. Descartes, Newton, Hooke and Snel all dedicated much
of their effort to the study of optics, conceived primarily as geometrical optics. Newton,
himself author of the “Opticks”, studied, as a young man, Kepler’s “Dioptrice”. Descartes
famously compares the mind’s power to know truth clearly and distinctly to a “natural light”
 Part il: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 115

“heaven” and “earth”, taking its object of study from the “border” region, as it
were, so that these objects exemplify a great deal of geometrical regularity, which,
for instance, can be seen in the hexagonal form of snow-flakes.214 Finally, music is
to present or reflect the divine celestial harmony, established by the creator of the
cosmos, the harmony thus describable in mathematical proportions and discernible
through regular geometrical solids.213 The genuine synthesis of the celestial and
terrestrial mechanics is eventually achieved only in Newton.216
“Toute ma Physique n’est autre chose que Géométrie”—“my entire
physics is nothing but geometry”— is the often cited credo and a brief formulation
of the Cartesian program.217 Descartes then has to postulate that the corporeal
nature be the subject of pure mathematics.218 In order to be able to explain the
movement and the inner structure o f a material physical object, one has to apply
certain formal instrumentarium o f “sizes, shapes, positions and movements”,
which are considered to be shared both by geometrical figures and by physical
bodies. This last assumption constitutes the main implicit hypothetical premise in
Descartes' considerations, which cannot find immediate support in sensual
experience.
Descartes still retains, however, certain traces of the ancient distinction
and hierarchy of sciences and o f geometrical problems according to the simplicity
of the lines involved in construction.219 Nevertheless, he considers the construction
and study by means of mathematics (geometry and algebra) self-evidently possible
not only for physics, but also for optics and music.22 Sizes, shapes, positions and

within the soul. It is not by chance, then, that the full title of Descartes’ treatise on the world
runs “Le Monde...ou le Traité de la Lumière” (1664) (AT XI 3 sqq.). It is also important to
point out that the first published work of Descartes, the “Discourse on Method” (1637) is
printed as accompanied by three essays: on optics (“La Dioptrique”), meteorology and
geometry (AT VI 81 sqq.).
Sirena seu De Nive Sexangula.-Kep\& 1611. It is interesting to note that Descartes in his
“Meteorologia” (1635), as well as R. Hooke in the “Micrographia” (1665) also turned to the
study of snow-flakes, cp. Kepler 1966, 48-49.
215 See: Harmonice Mundi (1619), esp. bk. III-Kepler. Gesammelte Werke, vol. VI (1940). It
is worth noting that Kepler read Vincenzo Galilei’s “Dialogo della musica antica e
moderna”.
216 Cp. Koyré 1973,364.
217 “...I have decided to give up only abstract geometry, that is to say, the investigation of
problems which function merely as mental exercises. My aim is to have more time to devote
to another sort of geometry where the problems have to do with the explanation of natural
phenomena. If he cares to think about what I wrote about salt, snow, rainbows, etc., he will
see that my entire physics is nothing but geometry'". - Descartes. To Mersenne, 27 July 1638,
AT II 268, italics added.
218 Descartes. Med. VI, AT VII 74.
219 Cp. Descartes. To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT I 139; To Mersenne, 31 March 1638,
AT II 91. In the “Regulae” Descartes formally discerns between arithmetic and geometry,
further considering algebra as a sort of arithmetic, Arithmeticae genus quoddam. - Reg. IV,
ATX 373.
220 Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 424, 430 sqq. Cp. Optics II, AT VI 93 sqq.; To
Mersenne, 18 December 1629, AT I 93. Des Chene notes that in Descartes music and optics
116 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

motions may be studied and described by means of mathematics and are ascribable
to extended entities of any kind. Extended entities are either physical bodies or
geometrical figures; therefore, both may be studied by means of mathematics.
Geometrization o f the physical has to presuppose that, first, the methods
of geometry and physics have no crucial distinction and, second, that geometrical
objects are not crucially different from physical bodies.221 The first presupposition
is consecutively rejected by ancient science, in particular, by Aristotle in his
physics and also by Plato in his understanding o f geometry as a preparation for the
contemplation o f being, as a science which provides exact knowledge-episteme
only about ideal, and not physical, objects.222
Yet in Aristotle we find a claim that physical natural bodies also have
surfaces and volumes that are studied by mathematics—namely, by
geometry—and that theorems o f arithmetic should be applicable to sensible things
(cp. 2 .1).223 Still, the physical line is studied by geometry not as physical but as
geometrical; namely, through the procedure of mental (or, rather, imaginable)
abstraction, line, surface, and volume are separated and studied as purely
geometrical objects (for arithmeticians and geometers consider as separate— i.e., as
substance—that which, according to Aristotle, does not exist separately),224 while
the physical body still keeps its imprecision and is not studied by the means and
methods of mathematics.
What, then, is the object o f geometry for Descartes? In the “Discourse on
the Method” it is “a continuous body, or a space indefinitely extended in length,
breadth and height or depth, and divisible into different parts which may have
various shapes and sizes, and may be moved or transposed in every way: for all
this is assumed by geometers in their object of study”.225 The implicit argument
involved here is: geometry studies space; space is body; body is matter; therefore,
geometry studies matter. Such a conclusion obviously renders impossible and
superfluous the Aristotelian distinction of the geometrical as abstractable from
matter as opposed to the bodily as always immersed in matter. It is thus primarily
extension that becomes the subject-matter of geometry. Since extension is not
different from matter, the object studied by geometry has to be matter, which is a
very important implication that has far-reaching consequences for modem science.
Since, further, according to Descartes, to know extension in its nature is primarily
to think it, the geometrical truths are not to be based in sensory experience, but

are “middle mathematics”, “neither wholly physical nor wholly mathematical” (Des Chene
1996, 116-117).
22IA further distinction between presenting a physical problem geometrically and reducing a
physical problem to a geometrical one (Gaukroger 1978, 184; 192 sqq.) appears to be
unnecessary: in order to present a physical problem geometrically, one already has to
presuppose the possibility of the geometrization of the physical, and thus the possibility of
the reduction of the physical to the geometrical.
222 Plato. RP 526d-527c; Aristotle. Phys. 184b 25 sqq.
223 Aristotle. Phys. 193b23-194a 13; Met. 1090a 14-15.
224 Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1078a 21-23.
225 Descartes. Discourse V, AT VI 36.
 Part 11: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 117

merely in thinking: “We come to know them [geometrical truths] by the power of
our own native intelligence, without any sensory experience.”226
In the distinction between the method and the object, the former has to
appeal to relation or proportion which belongs to the res cogitans; the latter—to
continuous body which is res extensa. The duality of method and object as
applicable to both physical and mathematical (geometrical) refers to the duality of
proportion (relation) and extension as applicable to both physicals and
geometricals.227 The very application of mathematics to physics becomes possible
because the new method of mathesis considers only a relation and not the
substance itself. Relation (pros ti) and proportion (analogia) thus become prior to
substance-oys/a. Descartes has to make, however, a concession in recognizing a
distinction between geometrical and physical principles insofar as the latter “are
not abstracted from all sensible matter, as in geometry, but applied to various
observational data which are known by the senses and indubitable”.229 Such a
concession does not affect the program of the mathematization of the world,
because the physical principles are not applied to the physical reality qua physical
and sensible, but qua already implicitly taken as geometrical.
The object of geometry is characterized by two main features: first, it is
extended and, second, it is (unlike in Aristotle) movable.230 The first feature
presupposes further distinction, insofar as: (1) the geometrical object may be taken
only as continuous body without further specifications, i.e. not as qualitatively
different from the space it occupies; (2) the occupied space may be indefinitely
extended, as in the case o f a straight line or parabola, and (3) such space is
indefinitely divisible. But considered under these three further specifications, an
object of geometry does not principally differ from an object of physical science,
for both share the aforementioned features. In other words, since physical bodies
are primarily understood in terms o f mere extension, i.e. as spatial, one of the main
presuppositions of Descartes is that geometrical and physical bodies are to be
referred to one and the same space or one and the same matter as the corporeal
substance o f three dimensions, because, simply, there is no other space or
matter.231

226 Descartes. To Voetius, May 1643, AT VIIIB 166-167.

227 Cp.: “This identification [of mathematics and physics] is effected by a two-fold
‘reduction’ in which the objects of mathematics are constructed purely as proportions that
can be represented symbolically as figures and line segments and in which the objects of
physics are construed as extensions, all other physical properties being treatable in terms of
extension”. - Gaukroger 1980,98.
228 Proclus argues that proportion cannot be the basis or bond (syndesmos) of mathematics
(In Eucl. 43.22-23). Cp. Plato. RP 534e.
229 Descartes. To Mersenne, End of 1637, AT 1476.
230 For Aristotle, mathematics studies entities that do not exist independently (oy khorista)
and are immovable (akineta), whereas physics studies things existing independently and not
immovable and first philosophy (metaphysics) considers entities existing independently and
immovable. - Aristotle. Met. 1026a 13-16.
231 Descartes. The World, AT XI 17; cp. Princ. III46, AT VIIIA 100-101.
118 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

Geometrical objects do not merely substitute physical objects and

adequately express their properties—geometrical entities are even better and more
preferable objects of study. Indeed, if physical things are to be treated as “the
objects of geometry made real”,232 then physical things have the same essence,
although they differ in their existence, insofar as the existence of geometricals is
only possible, even if necessary, whereas the existence of the physicals is real,
even if contingent (cp. 1.4.3).233 The “real” physical things may be conceived as
produced by the infinite thinking, whereas the “possible” geometrical objects are
products o f finite thinking (see 3.4.1; 3.4.2). That is why, in studying properties of
physical bodies as exemplified in their geometrical substituents, one may fully
ignore the question whether the object of investigation does really exist or not: one
is interested solely in essence and not in existence.234
The Cartesian approach immediately becomes an object of criticism for Gassendi,
who points out that “material things are subject-matter of applied, not pure,
mathematics, and the subject-matter of pure mathematics—including the point, the
line, the surface, and the indivisible figures which are composed of these elements
and yet remain indivisible—cannot exist in reality”.235 Such a criticism, legitimate
within the framework o f Aristotelian physics (even if Gassendi himself is critical
of Aristotle), does not hit its target, however, because in the Cartesian approach
geometrical representatives o f physical reality have the same essential, but not
existential, status—since geometricals exist only virtually, not as “substances but
as boundaries within which a substance [i.e., physical body] is contained”.236 This
is an important point, because in this way qualities of physical bodies may be
considered merely in terms of relations and functions.
Descartes thus considers it possible to study physical and geometrical
entities in the same way, insofar as both are extended. There are, however, not only
close similarities between geometricals and physicals, but also differences that
cannot be ignored. An objection that arises against the assumption that geometry is
applicable to the physical world is that sizes, shapes and positions belong both to
geometrical objects and to physical bodies. Nothing guarantees a priori that these
features belong to both kinds of objects in one and the same respect. And in fact,
sizes, shapes and positions belong, strictly speaking, only to geometrical figures in
which they may be exemplified with exactitude and precision.
For Plato there is a insurmountable distinction between being and that
which only participates in being but is not being itself, and because of that a
physical figure, a physical circle for example, is always imprecise and participates

232 Garber 1992, 63.

233 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, 16 April 1648, AT V 160.
234 Cp. Descartes’ addition to the very end of the Fifth Meditation of the French edition:
“...[A]nd also concerning things which belong to corporeal nature in so far as it can serve as
the object of geometrical demonstrations which have no concern with whether that object
exists” - Med. V, AT VII 71. Cp. Med. VI, AT VII80.
235 Gassendi. Fifth Set of Objections, AT VII 328-329.
236 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 380-381.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 119

in straightness, whereas the geometrical circle itself is perfect.237 Descartes is

aware of this problem and recognizes in his “Geometry” that geometrical figures
are perfect in their shapes, without any flaw, while physical bodies always distort
these shapes: “For although we cannot include in Geometry any lines that are like
cords—that is to say, sometimes straight and sometimes curved [i.e., analogous to
physical imprecise lines]—because the ratios between straight and curved lines are
unknown, and even, I believe, unknowable to men, so that we cannot thereby reach
any exact and assured conclusions: nevertheless, because we use cords in these
constructions only to determine straight lines whose length we know exactly, we
must not entirely reject them.”23* Acknowledging a difference between a
geometrical line which is perfectly straight and a physical line which is irregular
and consists of wavy curves, Descartes encounters a difficulty that he is not able to
resolve. Geometrical figures have to be wholly corporeal and thus lose their unique
role as the link between the intelligible and the physical (see 2.3; 2.3.1),239 but
there is no satisfactory explanation o f why geometricals have to be precise, while
the equally extended physical bodies, which represent geometricals, are imprecise.
The finite mind is then able to conceive a physical line as geometrical
because of the idea of the geometrical line which precedes the physical line and
corresponds to it, so that the former makes possible conceiving of the latter: “I
could not conceive o f an imperfect triangle unless there were in me the idea of a
perfect one, since the former is the negation of the later. Thus, when I see a
triangle, I have a conception o f a perfect triangle, and it is by comparison with this
that I subsequently realize that what I am seeing is imperfect”.240 But even if
geometricals appear thus to be a kind o f a priori form, which enable consideration
of physical things as objects of a strict, mathematically structured science—even
then one cannot argue that geometricals have to be considered as naturally existing,
insofar as they may be constructed by the mind (see 3.4.2-3.4.3).
Descartes’ approach entails, however, a difficulty. Indeed, physical lines
are curvy and imprecise, while geometrical lines are perfect; and physical bodies
are a production of the infinite mind, whereas geometrical entities, since they are
merely possible, can be conceived as produced by the finite mind. This might point
to a flaw o f the infinite divine construction of the world, construction that still
admits imprecision in physical lines. On the contrary, whatever the finite human
may produce (e.g., a geometrical line) might be conceived as perfect and
irreproachable (cp. 3.4.1). Such a conclusion would then contradict Descartes’
position that infinity is incomparably better than the infinite (cp. 1.3.2). In order to
get rid o f this aporia, one has to substitute physical objects by their geometrical
representations and make these latter the only objects of scientific investigation.
This is quite an acceptable conclusion for Descartes, because on the one hand, one
cannot study the imprecise and distorted by means of mathematics. On the other

237 Plato. Ep. VII, 343a-b.

23‘ Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 412. Cp. Malebranche 1997,255.
239 Descartes Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 385.
240 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, 16 April 1648, AT V 161-162. Cp.: “We could
not recognize the geometrical triangle from the diagram on the paper unless our mind
already possessed the idea of it from some other source.” - Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 382.
120 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

hand, in the Cartesian world there is no room for matter as non-being, matter
which might escape cognition or is a principle of otherness and distortion.
In other words, one first has to know the geometrical figure in order to be
able to discern further its presence in the physical body, which, however,
represents the geometrical figure only and always as distorted. The peculiarity of
the Cartesian approach is that one cannot take the geometrical figure as an a priori
of the possibility o f geometrization o f the physical, because the figure itself is not a
given and objectively independent o f the finite mind. For the finite mind the figure
is only possible and therefore may and in fact has first to be constructed or
reproduced by the mind (cp. 3.4.2) and only after that be considered as the
prescriptive pattern for the corresponding physical thing. At the same time,
Descartes describes the physical, as we have seen, in purely geometrical terms of
sizes, shapes and positions, which seems to be in contradiction with his initial
assumption. Sensual data from physical bodies may be then considered indubitable
only if the physical bodies are taken as something other than they are, as
representing “wavy curves”— i.e., as merely geometrical figures. Thus, with
Descartes modem physics does not investigate physical bodies as such, but only
their “ideal” or idealized geometrical representations. The “real” irregular physical
bodies simply are not at all considered as objects of science when, for example, a
moving body is substituted by the “material point”— i.e., by a geometrical point
allotted with bodily properties. In this way, Descartes tacitly expels proper physical
bodies and substitutes them with geometrical entities. Therefore, physical things
can become legitimate objects of physical science only when, and if, they are
expelled and lost qua physical or, rather, equated with the geometricals.
In addition to reducing physics to mere geometry, Descartes supports the
program o f further reducing physics to mechanics.241 This approach eventually
prevails in modem science. Physics has to be developed as mechanics through the
mediation o f mathematics: “[T]he mechanics now current is nothing but a part of
the true physics which, not being welcomed by supporters of the common sort of
philosophy, took refuge with the mathematicians.”2 2
Why is Descartes able to consider mechanics, taken in antiquity as only
an imitation o f nature,243 as a strict science? It seems that the incorporation of
mechanics into physics becomes possible for two reasons. First, both sciences
consider natural laws, which are (or have to be) subject to one single method.244
Second, mechanics and physics both study objects that may be expressed solely in
terms of “sizes, shapes, positions and movements”. But sizes, shapes and positions
may be ascribed, as we have seen, to both geometrical and physical objects qua
extended, and, moreover, qua movable. Since (“real”) physical entities may be
adequately represented by (“possible”) geometrical ones and since geometrical
objects are describable in the same terms as mechanical objects are, nothing
prevents the physical things from being considered exactly in the same way as the
mechanical objects. Therefore, by confining the object of science to merely

241 See: Descartes. To [De Beaune], 30 April 1639, AT II 542. Cp. Gabbey 1993, 311-323.
242 Descartes. To Plempius for Fromondus, 3 October 1637, AT I 421.
243 Cp. Isnardi Parente 1966.
244 Descartes. Discourse V, AT VI 54.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 121

extended thing, the science of the external world (physics) may be rethought as an
essentially mathematical (geometrical) and mechanical enterprise.
Two immediate consequences o f the mechanization of physical science by
means of geometry are, first, that the whole of the universe is considered nothing
but a huge machine (a clock) and its creator an infinite mechanical engineer who
preserves the mechanism in its motion.245 The other consequence is that there is no
ground left for drawing any essential differences between the natural and the
artificial, i.e. every object o f study may be considered as constructed: a natural
thing may be considered as made by the infinite designer, while that thing’s
geometrical representative—as constructed by a finite maker. The whole of
matter—all the extended things in their entirety—is then structured as a
mechanism.246 Body has to be nothing but mechanism—there is no room for any
inner principle o f animation and movement.247
But although there is no essential difference between an artificial human-
made and the divine-made machine, there is still a distinction between them, which
again has to do with the superiority of the infinite over the finite. Namely, the
construction o f the infinite engineer has to be incomparably better than that of the
finite maker. This is why a human-made machine can never be arranged in its parts
in such a way as to, first, be able to use words (i.e., to be capable of speech) and,
second, to be able to react in all possible situations, since they can never be
foreseen in their entirety.248 And even if an artificial machine may be given any
number o f organs, it still will only be an automaton—it will be lacking the
universal non-physical “organ” o f reason,249 such a machine will always be less
perfect than a natural one.
This new attitude towards the mechanization of the physical can be seen
even in the way o f drawing and designing instruments and machines. Ancient
engineers do not know any precise schemes of mechanisms, always presenting
them in the form of rough and approximate sketches with no exact sizes and
proportions, as shown, for instance, in the treatises on poliorcetics, or the art of
besieging towns.230 Quite on the contrary, modem constructors present machines
through and as geometrical figures. If in Leonardo da Vinci machines are drawn as
pictures, this is because he considers art and drawing to become the most precise of
all sciences, so that what the eye sees is not just approximation, but the real,
precise and exact object: the eye no longer sees a deceptive fluent appearance, but
the essence itself, insofar as the eye fixes, draws, depicts and prescribes that
essence through appearance.

245 “God is the primary cause of motion; and he always preserves the same quantity of
motion in the universe.” - Descartes. Princ. II 36, AT VIIIA 61; cp. To More, August 1649,
AT V 404.
246 Cp. Descartes. To ♦♦♦, March 1642, AT III 546.
247 Descartes. Treatise on Man, AT XI 120; Description of the Human Body, AT XI 226
saq.; Passions 16, AT XI 331; I 16, AT XI 341-342.
248 Cp. Sdris 1993, 177-192.
249 Descartes. Disc. V, AT VI 55-56.
250 Cp. Apollodorus, Poliorc. 139 sqq.; Vegetius, Epitoma rei milit., IV; Philo of Byzantium.
Pneum. 1974, 73-79 et passim.
122 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

It is not by chance then that Descartes shows considerable interest in

mechanical inventions, especially in his earlier years when he also devises his
project o f the universal science as method.251 Since mathematics can be practically
applied to the construction of instruments, machines and automata, in Descartes the
descriptions and drawings of machines are not paintings, but geometrically
constructed figures.252

2.2.2 Number and magnitude in Descartes

Every finite truth for Descartes has to be established through the forms of correct
reasoning but not through substantial forms of any kind. Substantial forms are to
be dismissed, hence within the very objects of the scientific investigation, it is
primarily relation to the others which matters. As it has been said, this makes the
application o f one and the same method to both physical and geometrical objects
possible. Moreover, geometrical figures can themselves be represented through
algebraic equations, because, once the substantial forms in figures are ignored,
their properties are expressible solely in terms of proportions and then can be
marked by signs o f any kind (e.g., by letters).253 This is not a novelty, of course,
since Euclid uses a theory o f proportions extensively in the V and VI books of his
“Elements”, in order to describe geometricals and their mutual relations. The
Cartesian approach is different, however, in presenting geometrical entities as
numerical functions, which implicitly presupposes the identification o f number and
magnitude. For Descartes the identification of number and magnitude, of the
discrete and the continuous, is a matter of methodological importance. It is not by
chance that in modem mathematics the continuum is taken as a whole entity, as a
discrete unit and not as an unlimited potentiality where the mind is able to discern
the parts. Even if Cantor posits the cardinal number of the continuum to be greater
than that o f the set of natural numbers, he nevertheless considers the continuum to
be an independent entity characterized by a particular number. If the intuitionist
indivisibility o f the continuum is accepted—according to Brouwer, the continuum
can be split only into the whole and an empty set—the specific difference between
the discrete and the continuous is removed.254 The identification o f number and
magnitude is possible because of the dispelling of the once insurmountable
distinction between the discrete (number) and the continuous (magnitude). Because

251 Cp. Descartes’ description of a machine for polishing lenses in purely geometrical terms,
of a “Chariot-Chaise”, pulley and other mechanical advises - Descartes. To Ferrier, 12
November 1629, AT I 53-74; To Ville-Bressieu, Summer 1631, AT 1 214; To Huygens, 5
October 1637, AT 1435 sqq.
252 Descartes. To Hogelande, 8 February 1640, AT III 724; cp. To Mersenne, 15 May 1634,
AT I 293 et al.
253 “Arithmetization (or algebraization) of geometry” and “geometrization of arithmetic (and
algebra)” both take place in Descartes’ “Geometry”. See: Boyer 1959, 390-393; Belaval
1960; Lachterman 1989, 143. An important shift in early modem mathematics (due to the
works of François Viète) is substitution not only of given magnitudes and entities by a letter
or sign—but also introduction of a variable (Viète 1983, 5), i.e. of a magnitude considered
in a process of becoming (e.g., in the process of a kinematic construction, cp. 3.4.2).
254 Brouwer 1981, 85-87.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 123

of this, it becomes possible to consider the extended geometrical (and,

correspondingly, the physicals) by means of studying mere relations between them,
i.e., by means o f functions.
Descartes seems to be uninterested in number as such: number for him is
not substance, and thus he does not discuss the notion of number in detail. Number
is not a main attribute either, for it is both applicable, as well as other universal,
such as being, substance, duration, truth, perfection, order etc., to everything
conceivable, to both res cogitans and res externa.255 Number is then just a mode of
thinking. It is therefore rethought as stripped of its substantial status that it had in
the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition, because it is not a separate ideal entity, but is
present in the things extended insofar as it is a mode of thought under which the
mind conceives o f things numbered.256 Very much like later mathematicians (for
instance, Hilbert), Descartes considers number as a mental abstraction of the
counted subject, which places number together with the notions of duration and
order.
There is, however, an ambiguity in the Cartesian notion of number, since,
on the one hand, Descartes tends to portray number as applied in counting the
extended things. On the other hand, number appears just a way of ordering things
not only in reason but also in the imagination.257 Since there is only a modal
distinction between number and the thing numbered, there can only be a modal
difference between the number and the numbered (cp. 1.1.3). Number is thus only
a mode of thought— it belongs only to thinking. In order to be able to get rid of the
above ambiguity, Descartes has to postulate only the conceptual (mental), and not
the real, distinction between the number and the thing numbered, as, for example,
the number ten is not really distinct from a continuous quantity of ten feet long.258
In the same way, in the case of other universals there should be no difference
between truth and a true thing, between perfection and a perfect thing etc.259
Descartes’ treatment of the notion of number reveals an interesting and
important structure. First, as we know, Descartes accepts the possibility of
deducing the categories, like the notion of substance, merely from individual
thinking (cp. 1.2.3). In a like manner, the notion of number can also be deduced
from the mind’s activity of counting thoughts, which is tightly connected with the
notion of duration: “With regard to the clear and distinct elements in my ideas of
corporeal things, it appears that I could have borrowed some of these from my idea
o f myself, namely substance, duration, number and anything else of this kind.
...Again, I perceive that I now exist, and remember that I have existed for some
time; moreover, I have various thoughts which I can count; it is in these ways that I
acquire the ideas of duration and number which I can then transfer to other
things”.260 In a very similar way, Brouwer, together with Kant, deduces

255 Descartes. To Elizabeth, 21 May 1643, AT III 665.

256 Descartes. Princ. I 55, AT VIIIA 26; Princ. I 58, AT VIIIA 27; cp. To Hyperaspistes, AT
III 429.
257 Descartes. Reg. XIV AT X 446.
258 Descartes. Princ. II 8, AT VIIIA 44-45; cp. The World, AT XI 36.
259 Descartes. To Clerselier, 23 April 1649, AT V 355.
260 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 44-45.
124 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

mathematics as pure (“intuitive”) mental activity, essentially languageless, from

the perception o f the movement o f time which gives the pure form of otherness or
duality.26
Second, the idea of number is contained formally—neither objectively nor
eminently— in the mind, which means that number neither exists as an objective
ideal structure, nor is present in the things themselves. Number is then not a mental
abstraction of and from extended things but, on the contrary, being formed from
and by counting the thoughts, it is imposed onto things numbered. Put otherwise,
the fact that number may be discerned in things (as ten feet, ten horses) means that
the number numbered in the things can be counted only insofar as there is the
number numbering, which is a mode of thought, itself produced by the activity of
the mind. It means that number in things is a sheer construction o f the mind (see
3.4.1). It is only because the mind first forms the concept of number
introspectively, from self-observation (from the succession of thoughts or
cogitations of all sorts), that it is capable of counting order and measure in the
extended things and of revealing laws in the extended—both in physical and in
geometrical entities.
When Descartes explains his method in the “Regulae”, he presupposes
that all entities of the same genus—which may either be continuous or discrete—
are to be referred to one of the two categories, either of order or of measure (ad
ordinem, vel ad mensuram). Order appears to correspond to the discrete entities,
whereas measure to the continuous objects. However, the problems that involve
measure can be further reduced to the problems involving order, or at least order
and measure are to be mutually reducible.262 The more geometrico method is
equally applicable to both continuous and discrete quantities without
discrimination,263 because both are either extended or considered solely in terms of
relation. In the “Regulae” Descartes describes a calculus, defining four arithmetic
operations—addition, subtraction, multiplication and division—which are to be
applicable to geometrical objects and which allow treatment of these objects in the
same way as numbers would be treated.264 In solving algebraic equations,
Descartes resorts to the use o f geometrical bodies265 and, respectively, geometrical
problems are presented in terms o f algebraic equations in his “Geometry”. In
particular, such an approach enables Descartes to get rid of the ancient
classification of problems and their hierarchy (problems solved by means of only a
rule and compass, by means of conic sections and by means of more complex
lines).266 Once mathematical entities—numbers and extended magnitudes—are
considered as even if not properly identical, but at least mutually convertible, the
ancient distinction between them becomes redundant. The reason that number and
magnitude can be treated on an equal basis is that, in the last instance, the
ontological status of the subject-matter of the strict science does not matter: it

261 Cp. Brouwer 1981,4-5.

262 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 451.
263 Descartes. To Beeckman, 26 March 1619, AT X 156-157.
264 Descartes. Reg. XVII, AT X 461 sqq.
265 Descartes. To Stampioen, [End of 1633], AT I 276-277.
266 Cp. Geminus’ classification of lines, ap. Proclus. In Eucl. 111.1 sqq.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 125

should only be subject to order and measure, so that the content of pure
mathematics is to be limited to the study of relations or proportions only.2 7 In
ancient mathematics such a position is definitely rejected by Proclus, for whom
mathematics cannot have proportion (analogia) as its nexus (syndesmos), because
the entire mathematics is to be ultimately based rather on the notion of form and
substance.268 Ancient mathematics can never ignore the difference between
arithmetic and geometry, because, first, both mathematical disciplines are rooted in
the activity o f different cognitive faculties (namely, in the discursive reason and in
the discursive reason plus imagination, 3.1-3.2) and, second, because their objects
differ ontologically (2.3-2.3.1).
The non-discrimination o f number and magnitude is realized through the
Cartesian system of coordinates, where to every number a geometrical figure (e.g.,
a line) corresponds, and, on the contrary, every geometrical figure is univocally
expressed in terms of number.269 Even if already in antiquity, especially in the
Pythagoreans, we find examples o f the representation of geometricals in terms of
numbers, this does not abolish the fundamental difference between discrete number
and continuous magnitude. Pythagorean representation of integer numbers through
geometrical entities is further extended in modem mathematics to rational and to
real numbers (including also irrational numbers).270 The Cartesian procedure of
equating numbers with geometrical magnitudes “lowers” the status of number,
bringing it down to the physical world, whereas the Platonic-Pythagorean
representation of numbers by figures still recognizes the insurmountable difference
between numbers, discrete ideal entities, and continuous figures, which display an
irreducible otherness, due to their presence in matter. Such a representation is
twofold: first, it merely symbolically represents numbers in terms of geometricals,
which can only be taken as limited, for the unlimited cannot be measured and
cannot be in any relation or proportion to anything else.271 Unit represents point,
dyad— line, triad—plane and tetrad—solid. And second, the identification of
number and magnitude is in principle impossible for ancient mathematics because
of the incommensurability of geometrical lines (e.g., of the diagonal and the side of
a square). The theory of proportion (analogia) goes back at least to the
Pythagoreans who distinguished various—arithmetic, geometric and harmonic—
proportions as means between numbers.272 The theory of proportion is further
elaborated after the discovery of incommensurability by Eudoxus, who establishes

267 Cp. Descartes. Reg. VI, AT X 384-385; Discourse II, AT VII 19 sqq.
268 Proclus. In Eucl. 43.22-44.7.
269 Bronstein, Semendyaev 1980, 685.
270 Thus, Dedekind begins his lectures on differential and integral calculus with the
statement: “Wir können jede ganze Zahl bildlich oder geometrisch darstellen” (Dedekind
1985, 23). The unique role of number is still recognized by some contemporary
mathematicians; for example, Dirichlet claims that every mathematical proposition is
ultimately reducible to a proposition about natural numbers (Dedekind 1911, XI and 7-9),
and Russell and Whitehead try to reduce all mathematics to logic, whose forms have to
represent numbers.
27 See: Plato. Tim. 53c-54b; Aristotle. Met. 985b 24 sqq.; Aristotle. De caelo 268a 7-13; De
an. 404b 18-24. Cp. Nicomachus. Introd. arithm. II 6.4; Plotinus. Enn. VI.3.14.28-29.
272 Cp. Iamblichus. In Nicom. 118.19 sqq.
126 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

his theory o f proportion, systematized by Euclid in Book V of the “Elements”. In

this theory, logos may not only mean a relation of two commensurables (as in
Proposition 5 of Book X o f the “Elements”), but also, as definition 3 of Book V of
“Elements” states, there may be a relation (skhesis) between any two magnitudes
of the same genus in respect of the size. From the very definition of proportion
thus introduced, it follows that since number and magnitude belong to different
genera, there can be no proper logos between them. Besides, ancient mathematics
does not know the irrational number that may represent a relation of
incommensurable entities. Even if ancient thinkers have to accept otherness in
numbers as intelligible matter (see 2.4), numbers themselves are always
commensurable with each other, since the numerical unit is their common ground
and measure (cp. 2.1.1).273
Formally, Descartes retains the ancient distinction between arithmetical
number and geometrical figure. Still, they are treated on an equal basis when
substituted by algebraic signs—a, b, c, etc.—which are considered purely formally,
as subject to the new formal calculus, to mathematical operations, the signs that
may be further arranged in a proper order. Rejecting any generic difference
between number and magnitude, as well as the difference between the discrete and
the continuous, Descartes still has to recognize their specific difference, making a
formal distinction between numbers and geometricals. Solving a geometrical
problem can be then reduced to solving an algebraic equation, or a number of
equations. Descartes’ intention to relate possibly close geometrical objects to
numbers amounts to an introduction of the analogues and substitutes o f the
numerical unit and o f four operations and equations into geometry,275 while Euclid,
on the contrary, presents arithmetic operations in terms of geometry. The attraction
o f the algebraic method proposed by Descartes lies in its simplicity and brevity.276
Moreover, since every value may in principle be ascribed to any sign, the formal
signs can represent and be substituted by variables, they need not have a fixed
value.277 In this way the idea o f function as operating not with a fixed object but
with a variable is introduced into mathematics. Thus, for instance, a line in the
Cartesian geometry can be considered as not fixed but as successively taking an
infinite number o f different values, i.e., is described by a variable. The whole
cosmos, modeled after the pattern of mathematical objects, is then also
desubstantialized and reduced to a great number of relations.
We see thus that, first, the same rules and procedures (the same algebraic
calculus) are applicable to both numbers and geometrical magnitudes. Second,
although numbers are themselves applicable to both res cogitans and res extensa,
the numbers qua modes o f thinking belong to the thinking thing—numbers are not
bodies and are not extended. However, a problem arises: namely, if numbers and

273 See: Proclus. In Eucl. 60.6-9.

274 Descartes. Geometry III, AT VI 444 sqq.
275 Descartes. Geometry I, AT VI 369-373; cp. 385.
276 Descartes. Geometry I, AT VI 376, 383.
277 “[0]ften one has no need so to trace these lines on paper, and it suffices to designate
them by certain letters, one for each.” - Descartes. Geometry I, AT VI 371 sq.
278 Descartes. Geometry I, AT VI 385; cp. 411.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 127

geometricals can be treated in the same (algebraic) terms, do the geometrical

figures belong to thinking or to extended substance? Consideration of the
geometrical figure is necessarily ambiguous, for, obviously, geometrical figures
can be described both in terms o f signs—either as fixed or variable—and in terms
o f shape. The first may be considered a mode of res cogitans, the second is a mode
o f res extensa. The notion or idea of the geometrical is only thought, and thought is
complementary to the extended. Therefore, the notion of a figure as represented
and substituted by a sign cannot be corporeal. Geometrical figure itself qua
extended must be corporeal, present in the same extension as physical things,
which, as we have seen, becomes a most important precondition for applying the
former to studying and describing the latter.27

2.3 Intermediary

One can find a number of interesting and fruitful attempts in contemporary

scholarship to present Aristotle’s views on mathematics in a consistent and
systematic way.2*0 Somewhat simplifying, one might say that in his scientific
orientation Plato is a mathematician, whereas Aristotle is primarily a physicist.
There is no science o f moving and becoming for Plato, and for Aristotle there is
primarily a science o f the things o f nature, which live and move on their own. In
fact, much o f what Aristotle tells us about mathematics is his paraphrasing of Plato
and the Academic doctrines. Much o f what is known about the oral tradition of
Plato and the Academy is also preserved by Aristotle.281 And because the critical
attitude of Aristotle towards his teacher is well known, we have good reasons not
to consider his evidence o f Plato’s teaching uncritical.
As we know, one of the main points of Aristotle’s criticism of Plato is the
critique of the Platonic method of bringing opposites together without any
mediation, an example of which is to be found in the “Parmenides’” one-being
relation. According to Aristotle, the immediate joining of opposites violates the
principle o f non-contradiction (see 1.1.1). Therefore, one has to look for the third,
for the substrate, the mediator or the intermediate, metaxy or meson, which
acquires, receives and mediates the opposites. Such a mediator is to be found in
every kind of object, be it physical or mathematical. Since Aristotle is sensitive to
the problem o f mediation, of the third, an important place in his consideration of
the Platonic doctrines, as transmitted in the “Physics”, belongs to the discussion of
intermediary entities. In Aristotle’s testimony, Plato “states that besides sensible
things (ta aistheta) and forms (eide) there exist, as something intermediary,
mathematical objects (ta mathematika) which are different from the sensible things
insofar as they are eternal and immovable, and they differ from the forms insofar

279 As Descartes notes to Gassendi, “although geometrical figures are wholly corporeal, this
does not entail that the ideas by means of which we understand them should be thought of as
corporeal (unless they fall under the imagination)”. - Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII
385. Cp. Princ. 165, AT VIIIA 32; cp. Princ. I, AT VIIIA 27.
280 See, for instance: Annas 1976, 26-41 and especially Cleary 1995.
2,1 Cp. Krämer 1959; 1971; Gaiser 1962, passim.
282 Plato. Parm. 135d sqq.
128 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

as there are many similar things, whereas every form is unique”.283

Aristotle himself does not, however, accept mathematical intermediate
entities, because he refuses to take the mathematicals as existing separately from
things and independently o f them.284 The main objections that Aristotle raises
against the existence o f Plato’s intermediate mathematical entities are the
following: if one accepts the intermediary as existing separately, one has to
recognize entities like an intermediate heaven prior to the visible one, and the same
would be true of every other physical object. This would lead to the duplication of
all physical objects and to the subsequent duplication of the sciences, which
Aristotle takes to be absurd. If, on the contrary, intermediate entities exist in
bodies, then, first, nothing prevents the consideration of ideal forms as existing in
physical things as well; second, two bodies would occupy the same place; and
third, the intermediates would not be immovable.285 However, even if Aristotle
does not accept mathematical intermediates, he clearly sees the problem of the
relation o f geometrical entities and their exemplification in the physical. Namely, a
geometrical circle is perfectly round and a geometrical line is perfectly straight
and, as Protagoras points out, the one may touch the other in a single point,
whereas in the physical representatives of circle and line the same properties can
never be found (this, as we have seen, is also a problem for Descartes). This is a
serious difficulty which needs to be addressed, if one wishes to explain how
mathematical structures are present in physical things. Aristotle, for whom physics
is not geometrically structured, leaves the question open and the problem unsolved.
Now, what precisely are these intermediate entities?

2.3.1 Geometrical objects as intermediary: Proclus vs. Descartes

One o f our most important sources of knowledge about ancient Greek mathematics
is Proclus’ commentary to the first book of Euclid’s “Elements”, which begins
with the following programmatic statement: “Mathematical being necessarily
belongs neither among the first nor among the last and least and simple of the
kinds o f being, but occupies the middle ground between the partless realities
(ameristdn... hyposthaseon) —simple (haplon), not composite (asynthetdn), and
indivisible (adiairetón)—and divisible things characterized by every variety of
composition and differentiation. The unchangeable (aei kata tayta ekhori), stable
(monimon), and incontrovertible (anelegkton) character of the propositions about it
shows that it is superior to the kinds of things that move about in matter. But
discursiveness o f [mathematical] procedure, its dealing with its subjects as
extended, and its setting up of different prior principles for different objects—these
give to mathematical being a rank below that indivisible nature that is completely
grounded in itself’.287

283 Aristotle. Met. 987b 15-18; cp. 992b 17; 995b 17-18; 1028b 20-28. Cp. Plato. Phil. 17a.
See also: Breton 1969,137 sqq.
284 Cp. Pritchard 1995, 156-157.
285 Aristotle. Met. 997b 2 sqq.
286 Aristotle. Met. 998a 1-5.
287 Proclus. In Eucl. 3.1-14. See also: Hartmann 1909; Bastid 1969.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 129

Similar considerations of mathematical or geometrical entities as

intermediary between the ideal notions and the physical things are also found in
Iamblichus’ “De communi mathematica scientia”.288 The very distinction of
several kinds o f entities that differ in their ontological status is originally grounded
in the notion o f a hierarchical structure of being and of cosmos, which may be
clearly seen in Plato and Aristotle.289 The order of being finds its correspondence
in the order o f knowing. However, unlike Descartes, Plato maintains that being as
such, the ideal being, is not immediately given to the introspective observation of
the finite discursive mind, but is the task and the purpose to be accomplished. At
the same time, the source o f being, which is transcendent to being and thus is not
being itself but generates being, cannot be given in any possible act of
contemplation or mental experience.
The whole Platonic ontology (to which corresponds a specific order of
cognition, see 3.1.1; 3.1.2) is not as simplistic as it is sometimes presented, as the
dichotomy of separately existing ideas opposed to physical bodily things. Further
acceptance o f the intermediate mathematical entities makes the ideal and the
physical not only distinct and separate, but also connected through the
mathematical. The intermediary effectively allows for the explanation of the
generic difference between things and their notions (or, rather, of notions and their
things) and their connection.
The notion of the intermediary also plays an important role in the
structure o f cognitive faculties (see 3.2.2; 3.2.3). Thus, the soul within the Platonic
tradition is considered intermediate between the demiurgical intellect-rtoys and its
product, the cosmos.290 A passage from the first chapter of book A of Aristotle’s
“Metaphysics” (the earliest in the collection), where Aristotle mentions three
different kinds o f substances, drew much attention from Neoplatonic
commentators from Dexippus to Simplicius, who interpreted the text as hinting at a
third order o f entities, mathematical or psychic ones, intermediate between noetic
and physical objects.291 The universal soul-psykhe, on the one hand, participates in
the eternal and unchangeable, in being o f the intellect. On the other hand, since the
produced and the caused is considered secondary, worse and weaker than the
producer and the cause, and the soul itself is considered produced by the intellect,
the soul is present to the physical, to the becoming. Thus, the two realms o f being
and becoming are not only separated, but are also connected through the soul
which itself is neither pure being (because of that its thinking is discursive), nor
mere becoming (because o f that the soul does not perish with the dissolution of its
physical vehicle). The intermediateness of the soul consists in that, first, it shapes
and molds particular things; second, that it governs the movement and running of
the whole cosmos o f particular living bodies;292 and third, that it exemplifies the
discursive faculty of reasoning, dianoia, which already is unable, due to its relative

2M Iamblichus. De comm. math. sci. 9.4 sqq. Both Iamblichus and Proclus might originally
have the same source for their mathematical commentaries. See: Mueller 1987, 334-348.
289 Plato. RP 51 Ib-e; Aristotle. Met. 986b 14 sqq.
290 Plato. Tim. 34b sqq.; Phaedr. 245c sqq.; Plutarch. De an. procr. in Tim. 1014a sqq.
291 Aristotle. Met. 1069a 30 sqq. Cp. Dalsgaard Larsen 1972, 256.
292 Cp. Aristotle. De an. 432a 15-435a 10.
 130 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

weakness in contemplation and remoteness from the first principle(s), to grasp

being in a simultaneous act o f encompassing mental comprehension, which is
characteristic of the noys.
Let us first turn to the ontological aspect of the intermediateness of the
mathematicals qua geometricals. The geometrical figures, as Plato, Proclus and
Iamblichus present them, are to be situated between the ideal entities and the
physical things. The former are characterized as generative, indivisible, partless,
simple, not composite, unitary, undivided and stable. The latter are generated,
divisible, composite, differentiated, have parts, are complex and movable. One
may reduce the whole list o f various attributes to three main ones, which may be
taken then as fundamental characteristics in distinguishing between the realms of
the ideal and the physical. These attributes are: 1. generative/ generated, 2.
divisible/ indivisible and 3. stable/ movable. Intelligibles are generative (as
archetypes o f the existent), indivisible (for every intelligible object is itself a
unique “face” o f being) and stable (for they do not change). Physical things or
bodies, on the contrary, are generated (for a body is said to be existent by
participating in being, i.e. in its archetype), divisible (for they are material
magnitudes, spatially extended) and capable of being moved (the movement,
which may be taken not only as locomotion, but also as alteration, expresses their
inability not to change and not to be always the same).293 If geometrical objects are
intermediary, they also have to relate to the three pairs of opposite attributes.
Proclus describes the peculiarity o f geometricals in the following way: they are
similar to intelligibles and, consequently, are dissimilar to bodies insofar as the
theoretical considerations o f the objects of geometry are unchangeable, stable and
indisputable. On the other hand, geometricals are also similar to material bodies
and dissimilar to intelligibles insofar as consideration of their properties has to be
presented discursively, in a logical form. Moreover, geometricals themselves are
also extended.
The conclusion Proclus reaches is: “Mathematical objects, and in general
all the objects o f the understanding, have an intermediate position. They go beyond
the objects o f intellect in being divisible, but they surpass sensible things in being
devoid of [physical] matter. They are inferior to the former in simplicity yet
superior to the latter in precision, reflecting intelligible reality more clearly than do
perceptible things. Nevertheless they are only images, imitating in their divided
fashion the indivisible and in their multiform fashion the uniform patterns of being.
In short, they stand in the vestibule o f the primary forms, announcing their unitary
and undivided and generative reality, but have not risen above the particularity and
compositeness o f ideas and the reality that belongs to likenesses; nor have they yet
escaped from the soul’s varied and discursive ways of thinking and attained
conformity with the absolute and simple modes of knowing which are free from all
traces o f matter. Let this be our understanding, for the present, of the intermediate
status o f mathematical genera and species, as lying between absolutely indivisible

293 Aristotle. Phys. 200b 13 sqq.; 225a 2 sqq. For Plato the only possible regular—circular—
bodily motion is not that of physical things on Earth, but only of the celestial bodies, which
are not ordinary bodies capable of decay, for they are gods. Cp. Blumenberg 1987,300-302.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 131

realities and the divisible things that come to be in the world of matter.”294
From an epistemological perspective, there are three different cognitive
mental capacities which correspond to intelligibles, geometricals and bodies;
namely, intellect-woys, discursive reasoning (or understanding*<fcmo/a), and mere
opinion-ifojca. A more detailed discussion of the structure of cognitive faculties in
their relation to the objects o f science follows in the next chapter (3.1). Here we
need only to note that the intellect is as if in “touch” with being, i.e., thinks being
without any mediation, because there is no mediation between the intellect as
thinking and its intelligible object.295 Intellect itself always is— i.e., is being—as
Plotinus, together with Parmenides, takes it to be.
Now, how can geometricals be properly characterized in terms o f the
three pairs o f attributes? First of all, neither of the opposite attributes within every
pair is exceptionally applicable to the geometrical entities, because they share
certain properties both with intelligible objects and with bodies. It cannot also be
the case that neither o f the paired attributes is applicable to the geometrical, exactly
for the same reason. The only possibility left is that both of the opposite main
attributes should be applicable to geometrical objects. But in order to avoid
contradiction, the attributes should be applicable in different respects, since the
identity o f subject and of time is present in every geometrical entity (cp. 1.1.2).
Thus, (1) geometricals are generated insofar as they are produced under the pattern
of an intelligible object or eidos, but they also can be taken as generative, as
patterns for construction and distinguishing physical figures—points, lines, planes
etc. (cp. 3.4.2-3.4.3). The geometricals (2) are divisible insofar as in every figure
there may be distinguished various parts (except for a point which is has certain
privileged position among geometricals, since it represents the monad, the
indivisible basis o f number as pure being and the monad itself represents the first
principle o f being (cp. 2.1.3). Geometricals are however indivisible in their form,
once every figure is considered as such in its identity (as a circle, an ellipse, etc.),
i.e. as a species. And lastly, (3) the geometricals, on the one hand, may be
considered stable, since they are conceived in a single act of reasoning (and of
imagination) and never change. But on the other hand, movement may be also
applicable to geometrical entities, because geometrical it may be conceived as
drawn by a movement o f another geometrical figure (a solid—by movement of a
line and a line—by movement o f a point, 3.4.2).
One of the main peculiar features of modernity is expelling of all kinds of
the intermediary in ontological and epistemological structures. Put in mutually
exclusive and complimentary terms o f either/ or—either mind, or body, either the
one or the other—they lack any mediation and thus become absolutely
disconnected. Thus, once the notion of the soul as mediating between the intellect
and the body is abandoned, the mind-body problem becomes an exemplary riddle
for modem philosophy, amounting to the mystery o f the embodiment of the soul.
In fact, it is the disembodied finite ego or subjectivity that becomes the mediator
between being and non-being, between the infinite and the finite. As Descartes
puts it, “I realize that I am, as it were, something intermediate between God and

294 Proclus. In Eucl. 4.18-5.14, trans. G.M. Morrow. Cp. O’Meara 1989, 173-175.
295 Cp. Proclus. In Eucl. 4.2-3.
132 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

nothingness, or between supreme being and non-being.”296 The ego is not however
an intermediary, for, as the complementary to the body, it is—it has to be—
disconnected from the body. Rather, the finite subjectivity puts itself in the center,
driving out the being to the margins of cognitive activity which becomes thus self-
(ego)-centered.
And by reducing o f the object of scientific study to merely extended
object, which is not different from the geometrical object in its fundamental
characteristics (shape, extension, movability), Descartes also paradoxically expels
geometricals as intermediary entities. Intermediary structures simply cannot have
any place in the world where every entity is assigned either to the res cogitans or
to the res externa. The starting point of subjectivity that expels everything which is
not thinking but is external (extended—physical or geometrical), does not leave
any room for mediation. Descartes thus makes the most decisive step in the
geometrization o f the physical: by abandoning the intermediary, i.e., by the very
construction, he abolishes every possibility of making a crucial distinction between
the physical and the geometrical.

2.4 The notion o f intelligible matter

The problem of matter is one of the central and most fundamental problems in
Plotinus, since it is intimately present in all the other constituents of his
philosophy. As it will be argued in what follows, matter is not only present to
physical bodily things, but also to thinkable objects, under the guise of the so-
called intelligible, or noetic, matter. Not only in Plotinus’ earlier reflections but
throughout the whole body o f his work the notion of intelligible matter plays an
important role and thus constitutes one of the intrinsic components in his
philosophy, in particular, in his consideration of mathematical objects. Moreover,
bodily matter and intelligible matter appear to be necessarily connected as different
but at the same time as inseparable; the notion of matter, if thoroughly analyzed,
necessarily entails the notion of the intelligible matter.
In the Ennead II.4.2-5 Plotinus gives a developed account of intelligible
matter, hyle noete?91 Some philosophers maintain, says Plotinus, the existence of
“another, prior, kind [of mater] in the intelligible world (en tois noetois) which
underlies the forms there and the incorporeal substances”. Plato does not have
any univocal and elaborated notion o f intelligible matter. One might see an analog
o f the hyle noete in Plato’s consideration of the four elements in the “Timaeus”:
since they are considered material but at the same time mathematically structured,
each element is represented by a regular polyhedron. A weakness of the “plausible
myth” of the “Timaeus”, as it has already been mentioned, is that Plato does not
provide any clear account o f how such a combination of geometrical entities might

296 Descartes. Med. IV, AT 54.

297 In the edition of the “Enneads” the treatise II. 4 appears under the title “On Matter”; its
other title, “On the Two Kinds of Matter”, we find in Porphyry’s Vita Plotini 4. 45; 24, 46.
Both titles, however, do not belong to Plotinus himself and reflect the school’s usage, cp.
Schwyzer 1951, col. 487.
294 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.1.14-18.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 133

also have, or obtain, physical properties (e.g., weight), nor of how the utterly
unformed matter-khdra differs from the formed and structured matter of the
elements.299 The very notion o f hyle noete appears first in Aristotle, occurring three
times in the “Metaphysics”.300 In the “Metaphysics” Z 11, 1036b 35-1037a 4 and
in H 6, 1045a 34 Aristotle contrasts sensual (bodily) matter to intelligible matter
(esti gar he hyle he men aisthete he de noete). And in Z 10, 1035a 9 sqq., he
stresses the unknowability o f matter as such (agnostos, cp. 1.1.1) and describes
intelligible matter as present “in sensible things not qua sensible, e.g. the objects of
mathematics”.301 Aristotle does not, however, elaborate the notion of intelligible
matter thoroughly, so that this notion does not play any important role in his
philosophy.
Joachim suggests that the already mentioned Aristotelian distinction
between prote hyle and hyle topike (see 1.1.1) parallels that of physical and
geometrical (intelligible) matter.3 2 Still, even if in a certain respect hyle topike is
similar to intelligible matter, insofar as both heavenly bodies and geometrical
objects may be considered synthetic entities constituted by form within matter,
there are, nevertheless, two important distinctions between the two. First,
geometrical entities, unlike celestial bodies, first, do not move themselves (they are
not in constant circular motion) unless imagined as moved. And second,
geometrical objects are not sensually perceivable, but are thought and imagined.
In the contemporary discussion we find an interpretation of the concept of
intelligible matter as an “oddity in Aristotle’s thought”, as an attempt to solve a
problem raised by abstraction—to avoid the substantialization of qualities as the
forms without matter, qualities as abstracted from the matter of physical things.
Therefore, Aristotle is supposed to introduce ad hoc a matter o f special kind, in
order to associate with it the abstracted qualities.303 This is not, however, a
particularly convincing explanation, because even if Aristotle might avoid
substantialization o f qualities by relating them to a special non-physical kind of
matter, nevertheless nothing prevents that these qualities be further, once again,
abstracted from intelligible matter. In such a case one would need to introduce the
third kind o f matter in order to inform in it the qualities abstracted from the second
kind o f matter (i.e., from intelligible matter), and so on ad infinitum. The whole
structure o f the underlying argument would repeat that of the third man
argument,304 which Aristotle himself rejects, because thinking has always to be
performed in finite and definite terms, i.e., can never go into infinity.
That intelligible matter is not just an “oddity”, and that it was a concept
that might be discussed yet in the ancient Academy, is indicated by the fact that

299Plato. Tim. 31b-34a; 53a sqq.

300 Aristotle. Met. 1035a 9 sqq.; 1036b 35-1037a 4; 1045a 34-36. Cp. Pritchard 1995, 157-
158.
301 It is worth recalling that the books Z and H are among the latest and central in
“Metaphysics” according to the chronology of During, where Aristotle expresses his mature
doctrine of substance.
302 Joachim 1982, xxxiv.
303 Annas 1976, 33.
304 Cp. Plato. Parm. 132d- 133a; Aristotle. Met. 990b 18; 1079a 14.
134 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

Speusippus reserves one matter, hyle, for numbers, and the other for geometrical
objects. Xenocrates considers geometrical entities to be constituted by matter
and number: line—by the dyad, plane—by the triad, solid—by the tetrad.306 It is
not immediately clear from Aristotle’s report whether the matter Xenocrates has in
mind is different from the matter of physical things. However, since the distinction
between geometricals and physicals plays a crucial role in Platonism, one might
argue that the matter as formed by number into a geometrical entity has to be
different from that o f physical bodies. Later Calcidius uses the term intelligibilis
silva™
The notion of intelligible matter appears to be neither superfluous nor
accidental, as SzlezAk demonstrates in an informative and detailed discussion of
the notion of hyle noete in Plotinus in its relation to Aristotle’s considerations.308 In
Met. 1045a 36, intelligible matter is depicted as the generic constituent of a
geometrical figure, as, for example, “plane figure” in: “circle is a plane figure.”
Still, the three descriptions in Aristotle are too brief to present the notion of
intelligible matter in full. Alexander of Aphrodisias further interprets the hyle
noete as pure extension (diastasis).309 This is also the understanding of H. Happ.310
Such an extension has to be different from a system of places, because place, as
Aristotle argues, both defines a body as the immovable outer limit and spatially
separates the body from all the other bodies. Mathematical (geometrical) objects
are not in a place, for one cannot argue that they are separated in the same way as
physical bodies are.311 In this sense, intelligible matter as diastasis is closer to the
modem Newtonian (pre-Einsteinian) notion of the uniform extension, unrelated to
bodies that might be put into it. Rist, however, challenges this interpretation and
agrees with Ross that intelligible matter is the generic element, or constituent, in
both species and individuals. Rist concludes that Plotinus appropriates the
Aristotelian notion of intelligible matter found in the relation between genus and
species, and turns it into the relation between “the first effluence from the One
[which is] the base of form and form itself’.312
First o f all, it is important to notice that in all the examples referred to by
Aristotle, it is geometrical figures that instantiate intelligible matter.313 More
precisely, intelligible matter is associated with the following notions: (1)

305 Ap. Iamblichus. Comm. math. sci. 17.13 sqq.; cp. Merlan 1953, 88 sqq.; Theiler 1964,
98.
306 Aristotle. Met. 1090b 22-24. See also: Plutarchus. De E 390e; Krämer 1964, 302-303.
307 Calcidius. ln Tim. 283.10.
308 Szlezäk 1979,72-85.
309 Alexander Aphrodisiensis. In Met. 510.3.
310 Happ interprets hylé noètè as “reine Ausdehnung”, diastasis or diastèma (Op. cit. P. 29,
581 sqq., 639-649). Happ mentions two different meanings of intelligible matter, hyle noete:
1. as pure extension of geometrical figures, 2. as genus in opposition to differentia specifica.
311 Aristotle. Met. 1092a 18-20; Phys. 208a 28 sqq. Cp. Zekl 1990,91-92.
312 Ross 1953, 199; Rist 1962, 106-107.
313 In Mueller’s interpretation, geometrical objects in Aristotle are compounds of properties
abstracted from physical things and of intelligible matter (Mueller 1970, 156-171). Aristotle
does not, however, provide an exact account of the way properties are exemplified in the
hylé noètè.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 135

irrationality (there is something in it that cannot be apprehended), (2) mathematical

objects and (3) certain extension. If, as it will be argued, intelligible matter is also
to be associated with the plenum o f geometrical figures, then—although the Ross-
Rist hypothesis still remains valid—the Alexander-Happ hypothesis cannot be
rejected either. Moreover, both accounts are not incompatible insofar as intelligible
matter may be understood as the generic element o f the geometrical (mathematical)
species as existing in the geometrical extension (of course, in such a case the
“genus” in the Ross-Rist hypothesis should be restricted to geometrical objects
only).

2.4.1 Intelligible matter in Plotinus

Why does Plotinus need the notion o f intelligible matter at all? A plausible answer
is that he tries to incorporate the Aristotelian notion, never found in Plato, in his
own considerations. Plotinus discusses the hyle noete mainly in his early treatise II.
4 [12]. In the treatises o f the middle period II. 5 [25] “On What Exists Potentially
and What Actually” and III. 6 [26] “On the Impassibility of Things Without
Body”, there are occasional references to hyle noete and no mention of it at all in
the late I. 8 [51] “On What Are and Whence Come Evils”. It is only in the
immediately precedent III. 5 [50] “On Love” that intelligible matter reappears in
chapter six to characterize an important distinction and difference between
daimones (spirits) as intermediate between gods and humans. Still, as it seems, the
notion of intelligible matter is not likely to be introduced by Plotinus only for
exegetic purposes—namely, for the reconciliation of the Platonic and Aristotelian
views on matter—but it represents an important intrinsic component in Plotinus’
philosophical considerations.
What role does intelligible matter play in the “Enneads”? In Enn. II.4.2.1-
2 Plotinus sketches a program o f investigation o f intelligible matter: we have to
find out whether intelligible matter (a) exists (ei estin), (b) what it is (tis oysa) and
(c) how it exists (pos estin). All three points should be mutually connected, for the
question o f existence entails the question of essence, and the question of essence
presupposes discussing the question o f the mode of existence, i.e., the way essence
is represented in being. Plotinus presents several arguments in support of his view
that intelligible matter is a necessary constituent of everything that is.
(A) Does intelligible matter exist? It should exist, and (I) the mimetic
argument supports this claim.314 If there is an intelligible order or cosmos “there”,
in the intelligible (kosmos noetos), and if this bodily cosmos is an imitation
(imimema) o f the intelligible cosmos, and if physical cosmos has matter, then there
should be matter “there” too as a paradigm of this bodily matter. Moreover, form
cannot really be form without being imposed on something that differs from it.
This brings us to (2) the argument of substrate or hypokeimenon.ii5
Intelligible matter should also exist, because we assume that the forms-eide

314 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.4.8-11. Cp. Nikulin 1998, 85-113.

315 Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 192a 31.
136 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

exist.316 And if the forms exist, there should be something common to all of them,
but also something individual, by which the forms differ from each other. This
individual difference in form is called shape (morphe); if there is shape, there
should be that which is shaped qua forms. Therefore, there should be matter that
receives this shape—this is intelligible matter. From this point o f view, intelligible
matter is a non-physical substrate, hypokeimenon o f the forms.317 In other words,
shape is a peculiar characteristic in and of the forms, the source of individuation,
while intelligible matter is that which is common to all of them as the
undifferentiated substrate o f the intelligible, representing the aspect of unity o f and
in the forms.318 But although this substrate is in the intelligible, it is not being as
such, for being is a synthetic unity which arises as the result of the (re)tuming of
the not yet differentiated thinking o f the intellect to its source, to the superabundant
unity (which is not even really a unity) of the One.
(3) Next comes the argument from parts.3'9 “There”, in the intelligible,
everything is partless (ameres), but, in a way, the forms may also be said to have
parts. Intelligible matter is then to be understood as that single shapeless plenum
where many shapes (morphai) o f the forms are “cut out”, or embodied: “But if
intelligible reality is at once many and partless, then the many existing in one are
in matter which is that one, and they are its shapes; conceive this unity as varied
and o f many shapes”.320 Intelligible matter is then an indefinite and undefined
source of unity in the forms, a potentiality o f and for the multiple definiteness of
being. Nevertheless, intelligible matter is “one” in a peculiar sense, as the basis for
duality, itself non-dual.
(4) Matter is also present as a “l a d d e r That which is hypostatically and
hierarchically “higher” can be considered a form of the “lower”, which is thus
“matter” to the “higher”; the whole structure thus reminds a ladder. The intelligible
matter is closer to being, for it constitutes a moment in being. It therefore should be
in a “higher” position to the “lower”, or bodily, matter. Such a structure is
commonly present in Plotinus: that which has more potentiality is matter to what
has more actuality.321 The not defined and formless, says Plotinus, should not
necessarily be rejected, for it offers itself to that which is before it and better: such
is the soul to the intellect and to logos, the rational formative principle.322
Likewise, the soul may be considered as matter to the intellect. “[W]e must assume
that soul is matter to the first reality [i.e., to the intellect] which makes it and is
afterwards given shape and perfected.”323 At this point it is important to note that
intelligible matter may be associated not only with the intellect but also with the
soul; this will be crucial in the discussion of the relation between intelligible matter

316 Plotinus. Enn. 11.4.4.2-8; cp. Enn. V.9.3-4.

3,7 Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 192a31; Met. 1024b 8-9.
318 See: Armstrong 1940,67-68.
319 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.4.11-20.
320 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.4.14-16.
321 Plotinus. Enn. III.9.5.3.
322 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.3.1-4.
323 Plotinus. Enn. V. 9. 4. 10-12; cp. V.l.3.12-14, 21-23; 1.2.2.21-23; V.8.3.9; VI.3.16.14-
15.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 137

and imagination (3.2.4).

(B) Consideration of the hylé noété as a shapeless unity embracing many
shapes brings us to the answer to the question of what intelligible matter is (tis
oysa). Intelligible matter may be presented (5) as the indefinite dyad, aoristos dyas
(cp. 1.2.1). The dyad is the primary source and principle o f potentiality, of
multiplicity, o f indefiniteness and o f receiving opposites.324 It plays an important
role in the (logical, not temporal) “process” of constituting the intellect-noys. The
dyad, which represents the not yet definite and not defined thinking of the second
hypostasis o f the “Parmenides”, tends to “offer itself’ back to its source, the One
which is beyond being and any determination.325 Therefore, the dyad (which itself
is not multitude, but the potentiality o f multitude) necessarily “misses” the One and
can only grasp it as not one but as multiplicity and plurality instead. The dyad,
then, in “looking” towards that which cannot be seen (for that reason it is
comparable to “seeing in the darkness”326), and in returning back to the One,
engenders the whole multiplicity o f the forms. When the dyad appears as the first
being, as the first existing—i.e., as indefinite thinking—this indefinite thinking has
no particular defined object yet, in the form o f which it might think itself. The only
object o f indefinite thinking at this stage (of course not in a temporal process) can
only be its source, the One, which is not in being, and for that reason cannot be
thought.327 The not yet definite thinking then necessarily has to “miss” its object
and to represent it in a number o f concrete forms, which thus become the objects of
thought, or the intelligible objects (see 3.1.1). Thinking thus becomes definite, for
now it thinks itself in the forms o f itself which it itself has produced. As the dyad,
thinking receives thus a double definition, as it were, both from the source o f being
and from the multitude of the thinkable forms. Such a structure forms a complete
system, so that nothing can be either added or removed from it.328
The primary (intelligible) indefiniteness of “seeing”-thinking is thus
informed through this arisen multitude of the forms. For this reason, intelligible
matter is not different from indefinite thinking as a mere capacity of seeing (or,
rather, the intention o f seeing) that which as such cannot be seen. That is why the
dyad represents the material aspect of the intellect and thus may be considered
intelligible matter, because before the act o f turning back and “looking” at the One
and subsequent (again: not temporal) determination by the noetic forms, it is
indefinite.3 9 Strictly speaking, the dyad may be considered intelligible matter only

324 Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 203a 15-16, Met. 987b 21-35; Proclus. In Tim. II 153.19-25 =
Numenius. Test. 31 Leemans; Themistius. In De an. 12.13-27; Plotinus. Enn. VI.3.12.2-6;
VI.6.3.29.
325 Plotinus. Enn. III.8.I I. Cp. Iamblichus. Theolog. arithm. 7.19. See also: Armstrong 1967,
241.
326 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.4.31.
327 Cp. Lloyd 1987,177 et passim.
328 Descartes is close to asserting such a structure when he states: “Truth is indivisible, so
the slightest thing which is added or taken away falsifies it” (To Mersenne, March 1642, AT
III 545).
329 Plotinus. Enn. V. 1. 7; V. 3. 11; V. 4. 2. Cp. Plato. Phil. 23c sqq.; Aristotle. Met. 987b 20
flf.; Diog. Laert. VIII 25. Cp.: “Why must there be a principle above the noys, Plotinus asks
138 Malter, Imagination and Geometry

at the second step, after the rise o f the noetic objects (see 3.1.1 3, constitution of
the intellect), o f which it may really be said to be matter. Therefore, the dyad as
intelligible matter should be associated with a certain contemplative capacity,
which is unconscious, for there is no determination of conscious reflective thinking
yet. This contemplative ability to stare at the complete darkness will be later
discussed as an irrational construction of imagination (cp. 3.2.2).
As it has been argued, in its elusive nature—which cannot be fully
grasped in and by reasoning—matter, as pure otherness, appears to be present in
everything to which the multitude in some way is also present (cp. 1.1.2). For
Plotinus, otherness separates everything that may be considered different,
primarily, genetically different. Otherness distinguishes not only different bodily
things, but also intelligible objects. Therefore, otherness has to be understood as
the dyad, as the first produced, as other to the One, as the basis of and for being.
Since thinking always presupposes distinction and distinguishing, the dyad as
prime otherness should necessarily be present in thought, in particular, in thought
about the good: “[W]hen what is other than the good thinks it, it does so by being
‘like the good’ and having a resemblance to the good, and it thinks it as good and
as desired by itself, and as if it had a mental image (phantasia) of the Good”.330
Sameness in matter is present in a very peculiar way, namely, in being
always the source o f difference. Intelligible matter is always the same and always
retains the same form implemented in it; it is always identical but in its identity it,
as the dyad, is the basis o f otherness, of multiplicity, of not coincidence with itself,
since it primarily represents something other (a mathematical object). One might
even say that bodily matter is the otherness that is always the same to itself, while
intelligible matter is the sameness that is always other to itself. Thus, on the one
hand, intelligible matter as the dyad may be recognized as the principle (of
multitude, but not the multitude itself), but on the other hand, matter as pure
nothingness or otherness is different to everything else, for it is incompatible with
any end, peras. Physical matter and intelligible matter are still one and the same
matter as negativity, but in a sense they also oppose each other, since intelligible
matter appears as the principle of multiplicity in the forms, which itself is a unity,
which unites the forms in the structure of all-unity as unity-in-diversity (see 3.1.1).
This duality o f otherness is insurmountable, for its main purpose is always
pointing at and referring to something else. In matter it is present, on the one hand,
as pure otherness, as mere privation of anything definite, as a possibility of
embodiment o f form. On the other hand, it appears to be the principle of
multiplicity, first as duality and then as the one-many of the intellect. That is why
matter is present both at the very beginning (in the primary being) and at the very
end.331
Intelligible matter as the dyad, then, is also a substrate. The dyad is
neither being, which in the first place is represented in and qua intelligible forms,
nor is it non-being (as bodily matter “is” non-being), because it is different from

in Enn. V. 4 2.8-9. Because the activity of noys which is thinking, is aoristos and receives
its determination only from its object (the intelligible).” - Merlan 1964,45.
330 Plotinus. Enn. V.6.5.12-15. Cp. Plato. RP 509a.
331 Cp. Happ 1971, 193-195.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 139

the One, which alone is beyond being. Intelligible matter is then a necessary
“substrate” for the forms (being), which is “prior” to being. The intellect is then a
synthesis of thinking and thought and is constituted as the unity o f thinking, which
engenders, but also is itself defined by, the objects of thought.3
And lastly (6), intelligible matter is to be considered a potentiality of
being because hyle noete is to be defined both by the One and by the forms. As
Rist argues, Plotinus simply associates Aristotelian intelligible matter with the
Platonic indefinite dyad.33 In this very sense, intelligible matter parallels matter in
general as mere potentiality.
(C) Consideration o f intelligible matter as dyad, as the principle of
multiplicity, helps answer the last question of Plotinus: how does intelligible matter
exist. Indeed, the very way the dyad is introduced—as being closer to the One than
anything else and thus as intimately related to the ultimate source of everything
existent—presents intelligible matter as the potentiality o f and for real beings, as
the possibility of their subsistence and embodiment as the forms-eide.
Is intelligible matter produced? Recently, there were a number of
discussions concerning this question, inspired by O'Brien, who supports the thesis
o f the generation o f matter, and by Schwyzer, who rejects the thesis.334 Due to its
inherent ambiguity and paradoxality, in a certain sense matter may be considered
as produced, insofar as it comes next to the One and is also at a later point
reconstituted by the creative potency o f the soul.335 But, on the other hand, matter
may also be said to be not produced, because, first, it comes not in time and,
second, matter as pure indefiniteness, unless and until it is defined, is not a
substance or being in the proper sense and, therefore, cannot be said to be
produced.336 Similarly the noetic objects are engendered when the originally
produced indefinite—and in this sense material—primary thinking turns to
thinking its own origin. Because of that noetic objects may also be considered as
“originated in so far as they have a beginning, but not originated because they have
not a beginning in time; they always proceed from something else, not as always
coming into being, like the universe, but as always existing, like the universe there
[in the intelligible]. For otherness ‘there’ exists always (he heterotes he ekei aei),
which produces [intelligible] matter; for this is the principle of matter, this and the
primary movement (he kinesis heprote). For this reason movement, too, was called
otherness, because movement and otherness sprang forth (exephysan) together. The
movement and the otherness which came from the first are undefined, and need the
first to define them; and they are defined when they turn back to it. But before the
turning, matter, too, was undefined and the other and not yet good, but
unilluminated from the first. For if light comes from the first, then that which
receives the light, before it receives it has everlastingly no light; but it has light as

332 Cp. O’Meara 1995,62-65.

333 Rist 1962,104.
334 See the discussion in: O’Brien 1971, 113-146; 1981, 108-123; Schwyzer 1973, 266-280;
Corrigan, O'Cleirigh 1987, 577-578; Narbonne 1993, 133 sqq.
335 Plotinus. Enn. III.4.1.9-12. Cp. Corrigan 1986,167-181.
336 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. IV. 8.6.18-23.
140 Matter, imagination and Geometry

other that itself, since the light conies to it from something else”.337
This description, first, fits the description of the intelligible matter qua
dyad perfectly well: before turning back to the One matter is indefinite, i.e. is not
yet defined and therefore “is” non existing. Matter receives definition and quasi­
existence only through its epistrophic relation, through turning back to its source,
which is prior and better than matter. Second, when receiving a definition through
the movement towards the origin and the good, the ever-existing (and, therefore,
not produced) radical otherness, (other to everything, even to itself) finds its
realization in and as intelligible matter, which may be said to be produced in its
identity qua intelligible matter.338 That is why matter originally is not defined and
thus does not properly exist.
In the late treatise, “On What Are and Whence Come Evils” (1.8 [51]), we
can hardly find any traces o f intelligible matter, and every attempt of “reading it
out” of the text would be interpretative, even if justified. It seems that for Plotinus
one cannot speak about two different matters. First, matter is not any definite
subject with a number o f distinctive predicates by which it differs from another
subject or entity. Intelligible matter is not a form (for, as dyad, it still has to be
shaped by being, which is different from itself), and bodily matter is not mere
nothing as “zero” potentiality, but is a certain negative capacity, a nihil negativum.
Second, before the whole structure of intelligible objects arise, there is no principle
o f distinction, so that one cannot distinguish anything. Therefore, intelligible
matter cannot be different from bodily matter at this stage. Do they become,
perhaps, distinct at a later stage (although, again, not in time) when the intelligible
noetic being arises? The appearance of the objects of thought does not, however,
change anything in the nature o f matter nor in the relation o f intelligible matter to
bodily matter. Therefore, the two cannot be said to be really different. That is why
Plotinus has to state that matter “must not be composite, but simple and one thing
in its nature”.339 Matter “keeps (phylattei) its own nature”.340 Does this mean that
there is no distinction between the two matters?
The two matters cannot be considered as identically the same. For, first,
unless the ideal forms arise, there is no way to judge about sameness—there is no
principle o f sameness either in the not yet formed matter, nor even in the One,
which is beyond sameness and otherness. We might speak about the nature of
matter, but this nature can only be taken as the source of becoming. In other words,
the “nature” of matter does not express any identity. Quite on the contrary, its
identity consists in being always non-identical. The second point o f distinction of
the two matters is thus explained by Plotinus: “[I]n the intelligible world the

337 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.5.24-37. Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 201b 19-28 = Testimonia Platonica 55A
Gaiser. See also: Narbonne 1993,281.
331 At this point Plotinus brings a new component to his discussion—namely, primary
movement—which obviously is in reference to Plato’s account of five megista gene: being,
motion, rest, sameness and otherness. Plato. Soph. 254d sqq. Plotinus often refers to this
place in “Sophist” throughout the “Enneads” (Enn. III.7.3.9-U; V. 1.4.35-36; V.3.15.40;
VI.2.7.30; VI.7.39.4-6 et al ). Cp. O’Brien 1991,24-25.
339 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.8.13-14.
340 Plotinus. Enn. III.6.18.19; cp. III.6.10.18 and 11.36.
 Part ¡1: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 141

composite being (syntheton) is differently constituted, not like bodies: since

forming principles, too, are composite, and by their actuality make composite the
nature which is active toward the production of form...The matter, too, of the
things that came into being is always receiving different the forms, but the matter
of eternal things is always the same and always has the same form. With matter
here, it is pretty well exactly the other way round; for here it is all things in turn
and only one thing at each particular time; so nothing lasts because one thing
pushes out another; so it is not the same for ever”.34 The composition of the
intelligible may be thus understood as that of peculiarity (shape) and universality
(the intelligible matter). This universality is, however, differently constituted in
bodies, since intelligible matter can be understood as the same (tayton) as receiving
the same form. In other words, the defined form is the source of identity in the hyle
noete, while bodily matter is unable to retain anything firmly and constantly.
The two matters are rather in proportion to each other: the relation of
intelligible matter as an “as if" form of bodily matter is similar to the relation (or
proportion) o f the form (eidos) to bodily matter as khora (cp. 1.1.2). Still,
intelligible matter is not a form in the proper sense, because it is only the
potentiality o f and for the forms. Therefore, one has to somewhat paradoxically
conclude that one cannot treat “matter” as one single subject, but one also cannot
say that it really differs from itself in the distinction between intelligible and bodily
matter. Thus matter should be recognized as fundamentally ambiguous. Ambiguity
may even be found in intelligible matter, insofar as intelligible matter—as it will
be argued in what follows— is represented not only through the indefinite dyad but
also through imagination (3.2.4), which is itself double, insofar as it is positioned
and directed toward both the intelligible and the sensual.

2.4.2 Intelligible matter in Proclus

Let us now turn to Proclus’ reflections on the notion of intelligible matter. Proclus
begins his commentary to the “Elements” of Euclid with a prologue that consists of
two parts. The first part describes geometricals solely in terms of discursive
reasoning; their closeness to intelligibles consists in an immateriality (aylia), which
they share with the forms-e/rfe. However, in the second part of the prologue
Proclus turns to the discussion o f intelligible matter as primarily present in
geometrical objects very much in the same way as Plotinus does.342 At the same
time, Proclus introduces a necessary counterpart of intelligible matter:
imagination-p/ianfctf/a (see 3.2.3). There may be a historical reason for not
mentioning intelligible matter in the first part of the prologue, because it appears
that in the first part Proclus exposes the Pythagorean point o f view, whereas in the
second part he turns to the consideration o f the Platonic position, as influenced by
the Stoics with their interest in imagination.
To what genus o f entities should this intelligible, or geometrical, matter
(geometrike hyle) belong? On the one hand, geometrical figures cannot pertain to
the realm o f sensible things and thus be associated with physical matter, because,

341 Plotinus. Enn. II.4.3.5-13.

342 Proclus. In Eucl. 49.5 sqq.
142 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

first, geometry “emancipates us from sensible things, converts us to the realm of

bodiless existence, habituates us to the sight of intelligibles, and prepares us for
activity in accordance with the intellect”. Second, a point without parts and a
line without width do not exist as physical things or physical figures in matter,
where point has parts and line has width. And third, physical things are always
“more or less” precise, since they are embodied in physical matter, which distorts
everything put in it, while geometricals are always the same, perfectly precise and
uniform in their shape (cp. 3.4.3).344
On the other hand, geometrical entities cannot be completely outside
certain matter, because, first, they would have been completely indivisible. On the
contrary, one can discern various parts in figures, enlarge and diminish them and
one can make figures touch each other. All these properties can be explained only
if one presupposes a certain quasi-material “receptacle” that makes geometrical
entities divisible and extended.345 Second, there is only one intelligible circle, or
the notion of the circle, whereas there are many (a potentially infinite number of)
geometrical circles.346 Therefore, geometrical objects should first and foremost be
associated with intelligible or geometrical matter, and so Proclus’ claim that the
intermediate geometrical entities are immaterial means only that they are not
immersed into physical matter. The doctrine o f intelligible matter is referred by
Proclus directly to the Aristotelian two matters (which are explicitly mentioned),3
and is paralleled in Plotinus and, perhaps, in Porphyry as well, who also wrote a
commentary to Euclid and whom Proclus mentions in his commentary.348 Proclus
might be referring to the not preserved commentary on Euclid’s “Elements” by
Porphyry, who was much interested in incorporating Stoic notions into Platonic
philosophy. Iamblichus might also be referring to Porphyry’s commentary in his
“De communi mathematica scientia”.349
Since intelligible matter is understood by Proclus as geometrical par
excellence, he criticizes Plotinus for bringing matter into the intelligible. However,
as it will argued in more detail in what follows (3.2.4), Proclus’ approach, linking
intelligible matter to imagination, may be reconciled with that of Plotinus. First,
intelligible matter understood as the indefinite dyad may be considered present not
only in geometrical entities, but in arithmeticals as welt— i.e., in numbers. In
numbers hylé noété appears through the multiplicity of numbers and through their
distinction from each other (cp. 2.1.1-2.1.2; 2.4.1), i.e., as the principle of
otherness and individuation in numbers. And second, the intelligible realm for
Proclus is separated from the geometrical, because the intelligible is constituted
primarily by the limit, whereas matter is utterly unlimited.350 Limit for Proclus is

343 Proclus. In Eucl. 49.9-12.

344 Proclus. In Eucl. 49.12-24.
345 Proclus. In Eucl. 49.27-50.2. As Happ argues, hyle noete of geometry is to be taken as
pure extensio - Happ 1971,127.
546Proclus. In Eucl. 54.5-13.
347Proclus. In Eucl. 51.15-17.
348Proclus. In Eucl. 255.12-256.8 et al. Cp. Mueller 1987, 334-348.
349Iamblichus. De comm. math. sci. 12.18 sqq.; cp. Syrianus. In Met. 101.22-103.12.
350 Proclus. Theol. Plat. Ill 40.10-41.15.
 Part II: Intelligible Matter and Geometry 143

related to the unlimited as substance is related to pure potency, dynamis. He further

distinguishes two potencies, the one o f the productive principle, which has to be
associated with the One (cp. 1.2.1), the other of pure receptivity, which has to be
linked to matter.351 Since Proclus does not accept any potentiality in the
intelligible, all matter should be excluded from there. But since the intelligible is
constituted for him by both principles o f the limit and the unlimited, being has to
exemplify a certain potency, which is the infinite potency of unceasing thinking
and production; although, this potency o f being is not potentiality and in this way
is different from the potentiality of coming to be.352
An obvious conclusion from the previous discussion o f physical and
intelligible matter is that no concept of intelligible or geometrical matter would
make any sense for Descartes, who simply leaves no room for any such kind of
matter in his considerations.353 The reasons for this are quite obvious. First, there is
no matter other than extension for Descartes, and extension is the essential attribute
o f bodies. Descartes has to postulate a hypothetical “matiere subtile” instead of a
vacuum in order to explain what is “left” in a closed tube or vessel after the air has
been pumped off (see 1.4.2); this is the only way to save his two-substance
approach. The supposed “matiere subtile” then can only be o f the same kind as
physical matter; there is no geometrical matter. Since body and mind are mutually
exclusive and complementary, there can be no matter related to the mind and to
mental objects of whatever kind. The difficulty of where to put geometrical objects
qua extended—to the res extensa or res cogitans—remains unsolved by Descartes.
Moreover, methodologically it can hardly be solved within the framework o f
Cartesianism. The second reason for not accepting intelligible matter as the
specific matter of the mathematical, or at least of geometrical entities, is that the
infinite for Descartes is actually infinite. Because of that, the idea of the infinite is
by no means a negative or privative idea, as darkness is privation of light or rest is

351 Proclus: In Ale. 122.8-10: ditte gar hi dynamis, he men toy poioyntos, hi de toy
paskhontos. Cp. Theol Plat. Ill, 34.8-11, 40.12-20.
352 Proclus. Elem. theol. 85-86, 90; Theol. Plat. Ill 30.15 sqq.; cp. Plato. Soph. 247d-e.
Originally, the two principles were introduced by the Pythagoreans as the constitutive
principles of the cosmos, later rethought by the Platonists as the intelligible, noetic cosmos.
As Philolaus puts it, “Nature in the world-order was fitted together both out of things which
are unlimited (ex apeiron) and out of things which are limited (peiranonton), both the
world-order as a whole and all the things in it.” - Philolaus, frg. 1 Huffman.
3:3 Although Toletus, following Aquinas, distinguishes sensible matter from intelligible
matter (In Phys. I, ch. 1, qu. 3). He presents sensible matter as substance with elementary
qualities (heat, cold, wetness, dryness), while intelligible matter is taken as a quantity
considered in mathematics, which studies figures and forms as they occur in quantity. The
proportional relation between the two matters is: figure relates to quantity as form relates to
matter. See: Des Chene 1996, 116-117. In modernity, Malebranche assumes the existence of
“intelligible extension” in God, the divine idea of extension, in and through which the finite
human mind apprehends ideas of extended things and figures.
- Malebranche 1997, 626-627.
144 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

privation o f movement.354 And because Descartes understands God in terms of

pure being, as the substance, everything in the infinite divine mind has to be actual.
Evidently, there is no place then for the indefinite potency of intelligible matter
within the infinite mind. Consequently, geometrical objects as intermediary are to
be rejected and expelled by Descartes, and the distinction between the geometrical
and the bodily has to be banished. Physical straight lines are still curvy; therefore
Descartes has to exclude them from scientific considerations and substitute them
with their geometrical representatives. Geometricals thus cease to be intermediates,
because the specifically physical, as changing and becoming always other, is left
out. Geometrical entities replace physical things and thus become the objects of
scientific study and investigation. It is exactly for this reason that it becomes
possible to study bodies as geometrical objects and to apply mathematical rules
and procedures to physics.

354 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 45. Since an idea always represents a “thing”, there can be
no idea of nothing, whether nothing is taken as something positive or merely as privation -
Descartes. Conversation with Burman, AT V 153.
 PART III
REASON, IMAGINATION AND
CONSTRUCTION
146 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

3.1 Reason and the structure o f cognitive faculties

3. /. / lntellect-noys in Plotinus

The notion o f intelligible matter has been discussed in its connection with
intelligible and geometrical objects. Now we have to examine the role intelligible
matter plays in cognition and in the structure of reason. Reason as intellect-noys
plays a major role in Platonic philosophy and in mathematical considerations,
which are taken primarily not as constructive, but rather as discovering certain
properties constituted by the intellect.
The main features of the intellect or reason in the Platonic tradition can be
presented in the following way. Intellect is understood primarily as identical with
being. Only noys really is, is being as ideal paradigmatic activity and actuality;
and, vice versa, that which is exists without any change or detriment—is noys.
Being and thinking, as Parmenides puts it in his famous maxim, are the same.1
How is being constituted? First of all, being is not a primary given, but is
constituted or produced by the interaction of the one and the many, or sameness
and otherness. Hence, being is, on the one hand, definite (only the definite form
enables us to understand a thing in its identity, as both unique and different from
everything else) and, on the other hand, limited. Therefore, to characterize the first
principle as “infinite being”, as Descartes does, would be a contradictio in adiecto,
for the infinite is not being and being is not infinite. Not only is being limited but it
is also always represented as many equally independent beings or intelligibles,
each of which is truly one and unique. Contrary to Descartes, for Plato and
Plotinus only that which is (non-discursively) thought properly is', and that which
is, is and can be thought. Because o f this, neither matter nor anything material can
represent being or substance.
Qua being, intellect can be characterized as the first energeia, the real
activity and perfect actuality without any diminishing—as that which really is and
is the first to be.2 Intellect can be defined as that which always necessarily and
properly is or exists, esti monon. Only the noys is unable to not be. As pure
actuality, being is not affected and, as pure activity, cannot have an end, telos,
outside o f itself and not from itself. That is why the intellect is always already
there, not searching but already having the is and the what of itself in itself, so that
nothing can be added to it. Being is then the end of striving, ephesis, of all other
things that “struggle” for being, as it were, defined in their existence by being and
in their notions by the noys? Similarly, thinking of the noys is the end of all mental
cognitive processes. Because o f the identity of intellect and being, not only the
intellect’s is, but also its what have to be always the same, so that the noys cannot
be properly described in terms of “will be” or “was” but only the “always is”. The

1Parmenides B3 DK. The B3 fragment is the keystone for Plotinus, who explicitly mentions
it at least seven times in the “Enneads” (Enn. 1.4.10.6; III.5.7.51; III.8.8.8; V. 1.8.17-18;
V.4.2.44; V.6.6.22-23; V.9.5.29-30; VI.7.41.18). The same is also true for Iamblichus,
Porphyry, Proclus and Damascius.
2 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.13.1 sqq. Cp. Themistius. In de an. 106.
3 Plotinus. Enn. III.7.4.17 sqq.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 147

intellect thus presupposes eternity as “always”, not as an unlimited duration, but as

a single gatheredness.4
The intellect is not simple but represents multiplicity bound into one, the
rtoys is itself caused, or engendered, by the unity without multiplicity—by the One,
which is not itself being (see 2.1.1).s The cause of being has thus to be
transcendent to being; i.e., itself is not being as such or being of any kind.
However, even if the intellect is not the first and the ultimate principle but is non-
temporarily engendered, it nevertheless has to be taken as the generative principle
of existence of particular thinkable entities, insofar as it contains their archetypes
or notions.6 Understanding being as engendered is opposite to the later medieval
and modem understanding o f being as a pure (divine) act which exists from itself
and due only to itself, i.e., as having no origin (for a more detailed argument see
1.2.1). In other words, for Plotinus, that which is, is only a trace (ikhnos) of the
unique cause o f being, the One. The produced has therefore to be thought as one-
many.7 The central point o f such a consideration is the identification of the one-
many o f the second hypothesis o f the “Parmenides” with the intellect. Although it
is drawn in the conclusion, this one-many is already implicitly presupposed in the
premises as an a priori condition of the validity of the whole argument, because
otherwise, following the first “Parmenides” hypothesis, we could not have argued
about the one per se at all. Being-intellect is thus the first other to the One, but
also, on the contrary, the One is the first and absolute other to the intellect. For that
reason, in order to be able to draw any conclusions about the One at all, we have to
start with otherness as not-sameness or with the principle of the many in the
synthesis o f the one-many. The primary duality of the opposition of being to its
cause, which itself is not being but a unity, establishes the pure form of the many.8

4Cp. Plato. Tim. 37e sqq. As Plotinus puts it, the intellect is “to 'estin' aei, kai oydamoy to
mellón—esti gar kai tote—oyde to parelilythos—oy gar ti ekei parelilythen—all' enestéken
aei," Enn. V. 1.4.22-24. Since the intellect is already fully there, no “will be” can be added to
it, or otherwise the intellect would have “fallen from the seat of being” (to errein ek tés toy
einai hedras, Plotinus. Enn. III.7.4.19-20). Cp. Enn. V.8.3.11.
5 See: Bussanich 1988, 58 et passim; Emilsson 1999, 283-289. On various occasions
Plotinus reiterates that the One is the potency of all, dynamis pantón - Enn. III.8.I0.1,
IV.8.6.11, V. 1.7.10, V.4.1.36, VI.4.1.25, VI.7.32.31, VI.8.20.38, VI.9.6.8 et al.
6 Plato. RP 509b; Tim.29e-31b.
7 Plotinus. Enn. V.3.15.7-12; Vl.7.17.39. The One is identified by Plotinus with the one, or
oneness, hen of the I. Hypothesis of the “Parmenides”; the intellect—with one-many, hen
polla of the second hypothesis and the soul—with one and many, hen kai polla of the third
hypothesis, Plato. Parm. 157b-159b.
8 Plotinus. Enn. V.3.15.40-45. This casts light upon double negation as a way of conceiving
the inconceivable. The ascension to the One, anagoge eis hen (Enn. III. 8. 10. 20, V. 5. 4. I
et al.) goes from dispersion and division to unity. But this “henological reduction”
(Halfwassen 1992, 53 sqq.) through negatio negationis is a movement in reverse to that, say,
in Hegel, from thesis through the negativity of antithesis to synthesis. Quite to the contrary,
in Plotinus we see ascension from the intellect to the One as a dissolution of the composite
synthesis of the one-many and of the whole system of all-unity (which is ultimately
production of the One, not of the intellect itself) to the simplest non-dual thesis or, rather,
un-thesis.
148 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

Pure otherness, however, is also represented through intelligible matter (2.4.1-

2.4.2). Being thus exemplifies not only identity, but also primary radical otherness;
in this respect being appears to be very close to intelligible matter.
Qua being, the intellect cannot be mere potentiality, which is not limited,
and as such has to exemplify unity. This unity is not, however, the unity
disconnected from multiplicity, because pure otherness or unity, as Plato argues in
the first hypothesis o f the “Parmenides,” is not thinkable and not apprehensible in
any way. The intellect then has to be dual in its unity (diploys—while only the One
is simple, haploys), as both the activity of thinking and the actuality of the noetic
cosmos o f thinkable objects. Being-noyi thus inherently embraces multitude and
for that reason thinking and thought can be distinguished in it; that is, the thinking
that thinks itself in the form o f intelligible objects. Since the intellect is not
absolutely simple but is inescapably and fundamentally dual, it is to be understood
as constituted by the one and the many, or by the one and the dyad, as abundance
(hyperbole) and deficiency (elleipsis), or as sameness (taytotès) and otherness
(heterotès). Along with Plato, Plotinus takes being to be primarily represented in
and through the structure o f the one-being, hen-on, of the second hypothesis o f the
“Parmenides”.9 This primordial simplest conjunction already contains the form of
the two or duplicity; not only sameness, but otherness as well, and not only one,
but also many. The form o f duplicity is exemplified by the distinction of one and
being in the conjunction of one-being of the second “Parmenides” hypothesis.
However, this initial, virtual opposition of one to being (in the apprehension of the
“one is”) is possible only because the unity without multiplicity precedes the unity
in multiplicity (the One precedes being-intellect).
This one-being (“the one which is”) is nothing else but intellect-woys,
which thinks itself in its otherness and sameness together, heteron kai tayton.10
Sameness in being means that the intellect always is and, as thinking thinking
itself, is always the same. Otherness in being-intellect is represented as inherent
plurality. This otherness appears in three different ways: first, within the intellect
itself, being and thinking are virtually—not really—the other to each other.
Second, every particular object o f thought is different from, and other to, every
other object of thought. And third, the intellect in its integrity of being as one-
many is the other to its source, which cannot be understood in terms of multitude
and being.
The distinction between the thought (noèsis or nooyn) and the thinkable
(ta noèta or nooymenon, a unique complete system of ideal archetypes or
paradigms of things) can already be found in Plato and Aristotle and is elaborated
in much detail in later ancient philosophy.11 In the intellect we have to distinguish
thinking and thought, which are not actually separated, but represent two different
aspects o f being or intellect. The intellect is thus thinking that thinks itself in the

9 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. V.1.3 sqq.

10Plotinus. Enn. V.3.15.40.
11 Plato. Tim 29d sqq.; Aristotle. De an. 429a 10 sqq.; Cp. Plotinus. Enn. II.4.4.8; I1I.3.5.17;
III.8.11.36; IV.7.10.35; IV.8.3.8; V.l.4.31-34; V.4.2.12; V.8.1.1; V.9.9.7; VI.7.13.1;
Proclus. Theol. Plat. IV.6 sqq.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 149

forms o f its own objects, which are, however, first produced in an attempt to think
the pure unity, properly unthinkable (see 2.1.1). All thinkable objects are without
detriment, so that the intellect thinks everything it has, and there is nothing in the
noys that it does not think. Self-thinking of the intellect seeks nothing, but rather
already has everything in itself in the way that it constantly uses (thinks) what it
has.12 The intellect is then one bounded multiple unity, where thinking thinks itself
in the objects of thought and where every such object is actually communicating
with every other one. This structure o f multiple unity, hen polla, is known from
Plato’s “Parmenides” (144e) and is realized through the communication-&o/«o«/<3
of the intelligible forms, where each iorm-eidos is independent but at the same
time actually—not potentially— reflects and contains all the other forms.13 In the
intelligible realm, ¡cosmos noetos, every constituting element expresses every other,
so that such a constituent is both individual (for it has, or rather is, a particular
eidos) and universal (for all the other constituents actually communicate according
to the principle o f koindnia). Koinonia is the principle of organization of the
intelligible sphere where, as Plotinus puts it, the whole “has not been put together
out o f its parts, but has produced its parts itself, in order that it may truly be a
whole (pan) in this way too”.14 Every thinkable object is single and individual and
at the same time actually contains the totality of all other forms, which are thus
bound in their plurality. Koinonia represents the holistic structure of
communication within the intellect, where every intelligible object keeps its
individual identity (as eidos), and at the same time is present to every other
intelligible object and every other intelligible object is present to it. Such all-unity
is a structure where each is in each, and also each actually contains the whole
without mixing with it. The intellect as a whole may be then compared to a multi­
colored sphere, every part of which is transparent to every other, reflecting and
actually containing every other part in itself.1
The structure of all-unity is not imaginable, but may be present only in
thought. For example, if we understand something (e.g., a theorem), we appear to
be in communication with all other objects of thought (other relevant theorems
referring to the same object or a number of similar objects), so that it is possible to
restore a whole (mathematical) system from a single act of understanding (from
one single theorem). If we conceive a number of conclusions of theorems within a
mathematical theory, we may understand them by first grasping the sequence of
deductions and demonstrations. But if we might also conceive an inner connection
of various theorems not by means o f accepted logical or formal procedures, but by
metamathematical means—by immediately (i.e. not mediated by a discursive

12Cp. Blumenthal 1971,100-111.

13Plato. Soph. 254b-c, 257a; RP 476a.
14Plotinus. Enn. 1II.7.4.8-11.
15 Cp. Plato. Parm. 144b sqq.; Soph. 256b, 257c-d. See also: Dodds 1928, 129-142; Darrell
Jackson 1967, 315-327. Plotinus. Enn. V.8.4.7-12; VI.7.14.12; VI.7.15.25. Cp.: “Truth is
indivisible, so the slightest thing which is added or taken away falsifies it”. (Descartes. To
Mersenne, March 1642, AT III 544).
150 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

rational justification) intuiting their inner connection into one (presumably

consistent) theory—that would represent the mathematical theory as a whole.
Thinking-Moes/s aims at thinking intelligible objects-noéfa, which are not
really different from thinking and which arise, as we have seen (1.2.1), as
inevitable misrepresentations in an attempt o f the noys to grasp its own origin or
source, which is not being and thus is not properly thinkable. The intellect then
inevitably strives towards, without ever really gaining it, that unity which does not
presuppose any dual opposition. Such a striving presents an important moment in
the noys as constituted by constant reflection where the object of thinking is the
noys itself as the other—as not itself, i.e., as one without the other. Therefore, the
intellect necessarily conceives something other than the pure One (of the first
“Parmenides” hypothesis); namely, that unity which is present as one among many
(the one o f the second hypothesis). Rather, the many of the intellect appears to be
in (en), around (peri), after (meta) and towards (pros) the One.16
The intellect is not, however, simply an opposition of two different
counterparts as subject and object but is the first real synthesis o f the inseparable
duality o f oneness and otherness, a complex unity or a simplex. It is a unity in
diversity.17 The image Plotinus uses here is that of an army or of a chorus where
the whole is maintained only through, and in accordance with, each of its
constitutive elements, but is still not reducible to any of them.18 The intellect is
thus both divisible and indivisible. It is a complete system (in this sense it is
indivisible) o f the whole o f ideal archetypes, each of which is distinct from every
other (and in this sense the noys is divisible): the intellect is one ordered unity, hen
syntetagmenos.19
Such a system of communicating ideal (noetic) objects, distinct without
separation, is itself the ideal form and paradigm for the whole physical cosmos.
Physical things, however, are mutually exclusive (and the terms and expressions of
such an exclusiveness are time and space), and the ideal (mathematical) description
cannot adequately fit physical reality, because thinking of the intellect has to do
with those objects which always are and thus cannot be otherwise, unlike physical
things, which constantly change, are “more or less”, divisible, moving, and are
subject to only (possibly right) opinion-dom20

3.1.2 Discursive thinking-dianoia

The inability o f an individual thinking to always preserve its actual states is

present in an unavoidable partiality of discursive thinking, dianoia. Although
Plato tends to use this term generally as “thinking”, in the later Platonic tradition
discursive thinking-rf/ano/a is taken as reasoning that follows a certain order, as
questioning and answering about right and wrong, as if running (discurrere) from

16 Plotinus. Enn. III. 8. 6-7; V.3.10.51; V.3.11.1-15; VI.5.4.17; VI.5.6.1-4. See also: Plato.
Phil. 14c.
17Plotinus. Enn. V.4.2.9; VI.9.2.29 sqq.
18Plotinus. Enn. VI.9.1.5.
w Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.17.14; VI.9.5.16.
20 Plato. Meno 97b sqq. et al.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 151

one object or its property to another, as Plato himself argues in the “Theaetetus”.21
Unlike thinking o f the nays, dianoia is always incomplete and only partial. It
cannot embrace the whole o f thinking in the structure of all-unity, but has to
represent itself as judgement in a strictly ordered number of statements, deducing
one from another. In doing so, discursive thinking always presupposes a
fundamental duality o f indemonstrable first principles (e.g., axioms) and formal
rules o f deduction, which have to be preserved and followed at all times and in all
steps o f an argument. For instance, thinking as exemplified in scientific procedures
is only discursive and thus is unable to represent the whole ordered unity of
thought in its entirety where every thinkable object is actually present to, and in,
every other object, so that logical or mathematical thinking has to gradually move
from one proposition to another, thus developing appropriate demonstrations (i.e.,
rational justifications), and thus constructing a system (as Euclid does in his
“Elements”). Dianoia then primarily operates, on the one hand, in logical and
mathematical kind of justification o f a true conclusion. On the other hand,
discursive thinking always has to be mediated by signs and cannot immediately
proceed from one object of thinking to another. Presence of otherness is thus even
stronger in the discursive dianoia, where unity of the intellect is split, so that it
becomes virtually impossible for thinking to retain the whole of the noetic cosmos
of thought in its pluralistic unity.22
Still, unlike mere opinion-tfoxa, dianoia can provide a strict and
invariable knowledgc-episteme. Discursive reasonmg-dianoia is situated as if
between doxa and noys. Dianoia is similar to doxa insofar as it presents its
considerations in an ordered manner, as Descartes also describes it in the “Rules
for the Direction of the Mind”. But for Platonic thinkers discursiveness is a sign of
detriment, for it expresses the inability to immediately grasp a single object in its
notion, as well as the whole o f the object’s infinite set o f properties and relations to
other objects. As Proclus puts it, dianoia “traverses and unfolds the measureless
content o f noys by making articulate its concentrated intellectual insight, and then
gathers together again the things it has distinguished and refers them back to
noys”.2* Syrianus considers dianoia in his commentary to Aristotle’s
“Metaphysics” in a similar way. Referring to Plato, Syrianus distinguishes three
layers of being—the strata o f the intelligible, the discursive and the
sensual— which at the same time correspond to the structure of cognitive faculties
(in particular, this implies that there is no real difference between the order of
being and the order of cognition).24
Discursive reasoning starts with particular objects (e.g., with geometrical
figures or any o f their constituents), analyzes their properties in their mutual
connection, and presents them through a synthetic conclusion formulated as a
theorem or a number of justified or proven statements. Because of that, dianoia

21 Plato. Theaet. 189d-190a; RP 533e-534c; cp. Soph 260e, 263d-e and Aristotle. Met. 1025b
3 sqq.; De an. 431a 1 sqq.
22 Cp. Plotinus. Enn IV.3.19.25 sqq.
23 Proclus. In Eucl. 4.11-14.
24Noeten, dianoeten, aistheten taxin ton onton, Syrianus. In Met. 4.5-6; 82.1 sqq. et al.
152 Matter. Imagination and Geometry

(together with the imagination, which assists dianoia in visualizing, i.e., in a

clearer representation o f its object, see 3.2.4), is fundamental for scientific
reasoning. Science, as Proclus suggests, “as a whole has two parts: in one it
occupies itself with immediate premises, while in the other it treats systematically
the things that can be demonstrated or constructed from these first principles, or in
general are consequences of them”.25

3.1.3 Life

Late ancient thinkers appear to be perceptive to the problem of mediation (cp.

1.1.1), aspiring to disclose mediating structure^) in noys and being, which might
also help to get rid of the rigid dichotomy of thinking and thought. Since intellect
and being are the same, and thus are one, there is no real distinction between them;
only a mental distinction might be made. However, such a distinction is produced
by the intellect in order to understand itself; this very distinction may only arise
through a reflective procedure o f noys thinking itself as an object o f thought. In
order to overcome duality in thinking, one might recognize a more complex
structure within thinking, which involves not only duality but also triplicity. In
every act of identification, A=B (or even A=A), three terms are involved: two
terms o f the equation and then the act o f identification itself. This structure is
present even in an attempt o f thinking the unthinkable. The One, the source and
principle o f every identification, aytos p a r' haytoy aytos, “itself is itself from
itself’, as Plotinus puts it, without being properly any particular subject.26 In other
words, there should be a third that mediates the other two without being really
distinct from both of them, because, as said, there is no real distinction between
being and intellect.
An appropriate way o f presenting mediating structures in the intelligible
and in being may be found in Plato’s “Sophist”, where Plato argues that there are
five main ontological categories, or genera (gene): being-oyi/'a, rest, movement,
sameness and otherness.27 As it has already been mentioned (3.1.1), categories of
being, sameness and otherness are associated with the intellect-rtoys. Categories of
rest and movement are also applicable to it, although not in the same way as to
physical bodies: namely, the intellect may be rather metaphorically described as
unmoving movement, so that all the intelligible objects remain in constant actual
connection with each other without being changed, according to the principle of
koinonia, or all-unity.2*
Stable movement may thus be taken as mediating, as if constantly
bringing thinking to being in the forms o f thinkable objects, and uniting these
forms through sameness without depriving them of their multiplicity and
difference. The unity in the plurality o f the intellect is realized through the
interaction o f sameness and otherness, and is a kind of movement that forever
remains at rest. The intellect, then, does not cease to be one while preserving its

25 Proclus. In Eucl. 200.23-201.3.

“ Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.20.19.
27 Plato. Soph. 254d-257b; cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.7-8.
28 Gersh 1973; Plotinus. Enn. VI.9.5.14-15.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 153

plurality o f forms while representing otherness. The mediating “third”, which

preserves the identity o f being and intellect, is life—primarily exemplified through
the good of, and for, the intellect, which is to be one (both to be one and to be one;
to hen to en tdi onti). And the good for being is “its activity towards the Good; but
this is life; but this is movement”.29 Thus, there is not only the inseparable duality
of being-intellect, but also the triplicity o f being-1 ife-intellect—a distinction much
elaborated in late ancient philosophy (in particular, in Proclus).30 It is life,
connected with the movement within thinking, that appears to be the inherent
principle o f the communication between intellect and being, thinking and thought,
unity and plurality.31 It is life that, according to Aristotle, is the perfect activity and
actuality o f the intellect.32
This “ first life” (prdté zde) can be only modally distinct from being and
thinking. The life o f the intellect can be considered as mediating between thinking-
noèsis and its objects-noéto. It is primarily due to life that communication takes
place within the intellect—the communication that makes thinking seem as if
moving from one object to another without having really moved, always already
being present to every object o f thought, thinking all of them at once: the life o f the
intellect is then at rest, en s ta s e li It is such communication that subtly balances
sameness and otherness (which '■'■wakes the intellect to life”) within the noys .34And
it is due to the presence of otherness through the mediation of movement that the
intellect incorporates its multitude into a perfect identity constituted by sameness
and rest.35 Because o f the indissoluble unity o f the one-many within the intellect,
life, as mediating in stable movement, is proper to the intellect only. This unity is
already disrupted in the thinking-dianoia that forever attempts to recollect
wholeness out o f single parts by the consequent gluing together o f the whole of the
noèta.
Thus, without movement or “journeying” there is no life and,
consequently, no communication-fo/rtoma, no thinking, and no system of noetic
“living beings” in the all-unity o f the intellect.36 As kinèsis, life is constituted by
both principles of sameness (insofar as it is in the unchanging being) and of
otherness (insofar as it goes to different objects, always remaining where it is):
“there in the intelligible, through which [the movement goes], the life is the same,
but because it is always other, not the same”.37 This connection of life with some
kind o f movement can be seen even in physical things, among which only those
capable o f self-movement are alive and, in the Aristotelian sense, belong to nature,
as the source o f motion.3*

29 Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.17.25-30.

30 Cp. Proclus. Theol. Plat. IV 6.16 sqq. ct al.
31 Cp. Plato. RP 521a; Plutarch. De an. procr. in Tim. 1012d-f.
32 Noy energeia zde, Aristotle. Met. 1072b 7.
33 Plotinus. Enn. III.7.11.45-46.
34 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.13.11.
35 Cp.: oyden estin aytoy, ho ti me alio, Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.13.55.
36Pasa de dia zoes heporeia kai dia zoion pasa, Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.13.44-45.
37 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.13.46-47; cp. Plato. Soph. 255a-b.
38 Cp. Plato. Phaedr. 245c-246a; Tim. 37d; Aristotle. De an. 434a 23 sqq.; Phys. 200b 13.
154 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

If we recall the distinction between being and being-something, as

existentia and essentia, we may say that in the intellect, “to be intellect” already
tautologically includes “to be” ( this is unlike a physical thing—for instance, “to be
a stone” does not necessarily imply “to be”). In other words, the intellect always is,
and this is not temporal but eternal. The intellect is unable not to be: it is
insofar as it thinks, and it thinks insofar as it is. That noys constantly thinks itself in
the forms of itself, and that it is as if movement at rest, means that the intellect is
alive. One can say then that the intellect is life, because life cannot be separated
from it, as the essence o f the intellect cannot be separated from its existence. The
life of the intellect expresses this inability o f separating being from being-intellect
and their constant connection without ignoring their distinction through the
movement at rest. This movement seems to “split” the intellect, always reflexively
returning the intellect to itself without delay, in the “already” (èdè) of eternity. The
source or the giver (khorègos) of life for the intellect is the One, which itself does
not have life, however, as it does not have being or thinking.39
Understanding life as a kind of kinesis is only possible under two main
implicit presuppositions. First, life as the intellectual movement makes sense only
within the system of the ever communicating noèsis and noèta; only within the
intellect, which is the “hearth” o f being and incessant active actuality, existing all
together, with “abiding life and a thought whose activity is not directed towards
what is coming but what is here already, or rather ‘here already and always here
already’, and the always present, and it is a thought thinking in itself and not
outside. In its thinking, then, there is activity and motion, and in its thinking itself,
substance and being”.40 And second, within the five Platonic genera, life as
movement is not opposed to rest, but rather represents a condition o f the possibility
of the unchanging (and thus eternal) being of the intellect in reflective
communication with itself.41 Life, as a specific movement, is not a movement from
something not yet present in being toward its actualization. On the contrary,
everything is already there in being as thinking, actualizing each other and itself
through the other. A good illustration here would be Schelling’s example o f a child
who lives in the not yet developed fullness of life and, although being yet unable to
give an account (logos) o f what she herself and her world are, already possesses
the fulfillment of the as yet unevolved life that is already present in her.
We may say thus that life is an incessant intellectual activity, free of all
potentiality, a restful movement “from”, “around” and “to” being, a movement of
thinking that thinks itself in the intelligible forms, communicating according to the
principle o f all-unity, the condition for communication of noèta brought into
oneness by noèsis. But although life essentially is mediation between the unity o f
being and noys, it allows further distinctions. First of all, (1) life is in (en) the one
o f being, o f the intellectual and intelligible nature; it is from (ex) it and with (syn)

39 Plotinus. Enn. 1.6.7.11; I.8.2.6; II1.8.9.38-39; V.5.10.12; VI.7.23.19-20; VI.9.9.1-2, 50;

cp. Plato. RP 509b.
Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.8.7-13.
41 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. III.7.3.7 sqq.
42 See: Gadamer 1970, 349.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 155

it.43 Next (2), as it has been already mentioned, life is a movement o f a specific
kind, namely, it is an intellectual movement, kinesis noera, which, unlike the
subsequent movement of the soul, which represents time, is without parts; it is
present all together and remains as if at rest.44 This life is (3) always the “selfsame”
or self-identical (hosaytos) and (4) remains the same in the same (taytotes,
menontos, en toi aytoi). As such, life (5) is present, as Plotinus puts it, in
“compressing the otherness in the intelligible objects, and seeing the unceasingness
and self-identity of their activity, and that it is never other and is not a thinking of
life that goes from one thing to another”.45 In the case of life that evolves in and
through a succession, we may make a distinction between the time o f something
(i.e. a life span) and the time fo r something, o f which there is always a greater
shortage the less time o f it (human life, for example) is left. On the contrary, in
eternity such a distinction as eternity o f and eternity fo r makes no sense, because
both refer to the intellect in which, due to the reflective teleological structure of
thinking, “o f ’ and “for” fully coincide. This life of the intellect (6) can only be
without expansion, extension or interval (adiastatos), because there is no sequence
in it. Again, in this respect, life as movement differs from rest: the distinction
consists in that although the notion o f rest is presupposed in the notion of
substance, the notion o f rest (unlike the notion of movement) does not entail the
notion of the dynamic unity of being and intellect.46
From (1) and (6) it follows, as it is easy to see, (7) that there are no
separate parts within life, but rather it is present altogether and cannot be
extinguished.47 Life represents (8) the partless completion (telos ameres) of the
intellect, due to which the intellect forever finds its end, which is not different from
itself; it gathers itself into a unity o f thinking that thinks itself. Such a perfect
completion (according to (6), it is comparable to extension) is similar to a point
that is always the same and has not yet begun moving, thus producing a line.48
Since life remains the same, it (9) only is, esti monon, being full without
any dissipation whatsoever; it does not change and is deficient in nothing.49 This
eternal /s (10) is not a substrate or substance (which corresponds to rest), but rather
is a perfect activity that makes being manifest not by way of demonstration, but by
simply showing or displaying itself as that which is. And that which is, shows itself
as true. The truthfulness of being is thus not a paradigm-image correspondence, but

43 Plotinus. Enn. III.7.4.2; cp. III.7.11.61-62; VI.9.9.15-16.

44 Plotinus. Enn. III.7.11.50. Plotinus clearly makes a distinction between noetos and
noeros—intelligible belonging to the sphere of the objects of thought and intellectual
belonging to thinking itself. The life of the intellect is thus intellectual and not intelligible.
That is why Armstrong’s translation “intelligible motion” is somewhat misleading in the
present case.
45 Plotinus. Enn. III.7.3.12-15.
46 Plotinus. Enn. 111.7.2.32-34; cp. III.7.3.15; III.7.13.63.
47 Life is primarily a holistic structure, in which “not now this, and then again that, but all
things [are] at once (hama ta panta), and not now some things and then again others.” -
Plotinus. Enn. III.7.3.16-19, 37; III.7.11.55; V.3.15.21-22. Cp. Anaxagoras DK Bl.
48Plotinus. Enn. III.7.3.19-20.
49Oyk endees, Plotinus. Enn. 1II.7.3.23, 34-35; III.7.4.15; 1II.7.6.37.
156 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

the presence of being through a noetic object. Every noetic object, however, is in
its communication with the others; and in its “simply-being” or “being-there”,
every intelligible object is what it is and as it is—and is thus true, since in the
intellect there is no real distinction between being and being-something (or
thinking and its object).50 Such a representation of being through the activity o f its
life means that ontologically, being is never non-being; epistemologically, being
cannot be known as non-being (because non-being is not anything that might be
positively known or expressed, and therefore cannot be known in principle); and
modally, being cannot not be, or be otherwise than it is.
Since life always is and is not changed, it (11) always already (ede) exists
in its completion; it is already eternal (ede aidion).il This “already”, which is often
taken to be the central characteristic of the intellect in Neoplatonism, expresses the
pure actuality o f the intellect, in which there is nothing that might change into
something else, because everything is already present there as it is. It also means
that when we think or understand something discursively, we neither construct nor
engender the object o f thought by the act of thinking, but rather discover that
which is already there in the intelligible sphere of the noysP
From (7), (9) and (11) it follows that (12) life can have neither future nor
past, neither “before”, nor “after”, for it cannot acquire anything that it would not
already have.53 So it can neither become, nor be, otherwise than it is now. The “is”
of being may mean that being always is and that it always is, or is gathered and has
neither extension nor duration, which could make any intrinsic distinction. For that
reason being is indifferent, or without difference (adiaphords). Life, in order to
represent being, has then to “follow” it in these two aspects of one and the same
“always is”: life also always is and always is—it is fully in the present, or, again,
life is without any extension, detriment and change. In other words, the life o f the
intellect is eternity.54 In its present, life (13) which governs the communication

50Plotinus. Enn. III.7.3.24-25; II1.7.4.11-14; cp. III.7.6.12-14.

51 Plotinus. Enn. 111.7.5.4; cp. also 1.5.2.12-13; III.7.3.26-28; Vl.2.8.9-10; VI.7.1.49 sqq.
52 Plotinus. Enn. 11.5.3.1-7; VI.6.18.4.
53 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. IV.3.25.14-17.
54 En toi paronti aei, Plotinus. Enn. III.7.5.21-23, 29-33; I1I.7.6.7-8, 14; cp. 1.5.7.15-16.
Plato. Tim. 37d. It is to be noted that Plotinus does not say that the eternal life is “now” or is
in “now”, as nunc stans. The text of the treatise “On Eternity and Time” can be interpreted
in this sense, but for Plotinus himself the “now” is rather a negative characteristic of the
eternal (e.g., it will become “nothing that it would not be now”, Enn. III.7.3.28-29). Plotinus
often uses “now” negatively as “not now”, oy nyn, me nyn (Enn. III.7.3.17, 30). Criticizing
Aristotle’s concept of time, he uses the notion of “now” in the way Aristotle docs, i.e., as the
limit within time at which “before” stops and “after” begins. The “now” thus primarily
characterizes time for Plotinus, not eternity (Enn. III.7.9.65; cp. IV.3.13.21; VI.1.5.16;
VI.3.19.22-23). The life as a stable movement is rather in the “present” than in the “now”.
The “now’* is even once opposed to the eternity of aei (Enn. IV.3.8.33-34). Quite often
“now” does not have any special technical meaning in the “Enneads” (cp. Lexicon
Plotinianum, col. 715-716). The nunc stans of Augustine, of Themistius (In de an. 110.20
sqq.), and of the later scholastic tradition, the “all at once” (simul) of Boethius (Dc consol.
5. 6), originate in Plotinus, but it would be misleading to present Plotinus himself as an
advocate of the view of eternity as “standing now”.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 157

within the intelligible cosmos, displays the same structure o f the one-many; i.e.,
although life is without parts, it is constituted through multiplicity bound into
unity. And finally, (14) because o f the infinite potency o f the noys, life is infinite
and represents the infinite, to apeiron, o f intelligible objects, not as a lack of limit,
but as infinite in dynamis, in its power o f unification and production.56

3.1.4 Mind and its ideas: Descartes

One o f the immediately noticeable differences in Descartes’ consideration of the

mind as compared with the Platonic approach is the considerable simplification of
the structure o f the mental. Throughout all of his writings Descartes rigidly
opposes the mental to the material, the mind to the body. Yet, as it will be argued
in what follows, he leaves no room for the proper distinction between the
discursive and the non-discursive in the mind and for the intermediary in thinking.
Reason is taken by Descartes as mind or soul, mens sive anima, without stressing
an important distinction between the two.57 The mind is simply a finite thinking
substance and thus has to be characterized by its main attribute—thinking (see
1.2.3). However, the human mind is radically finite (cp. 1.3.2), so if there is any
image or likeness of the divine infinite mind in the human, it is not so much in the
finite mind but in the will, which is not limited, and, as freedom o f choice,
resembles the divine not qua substance but qua in(de)finite.58 In every act of
thinking, the mind keeps its substantial sameness; moreover, it is the same mind
that is present in all mental operations— in perception, remembering, discursive
thinking and intellection.
In the “Regulae” Descartes presents the mind as ingenium, which acquires
knowledge about the mental and the extended (in particular, about geometricals)
through two elementary operations of intuitus and deductio. The former proceeds
only from the light o f reason and is the “conception (conceptum) of a clear and
attentive mind, which is so easy and distinct that there can be no room for doubt
about what we are understanding”. The latter implies “the inference o f something
as following necessarily from some other propositions which we know with
certainty”.59The intuitus shows clear and self-evident truths (and decides what is to
be taken as the starting points, as the simple natures, be they common, intellectual
or material— such as corporeal nature, extension, shape, etc.).60 The deductio
resembles a “movement or sequence” (motus sive successio) and allows one to
apprehend with certainty an operation of discursive thinking in a chain of
deductions, to know necessary true conclusions from the known by the intuitus.
Still, despite the intuitus-deductio distinction, the finite mind for Descartes is to be

55 Ekpollon, Plotinus. Enn. I1I.7.5.22.

56 Plotinus. Enn. III.7.5.23-24; I1I.7.11.54. Cp. Plato. Tim. 37d, 38b-c.
57 Descartes uses the terms mens, animus, intellectus and ratio as synonyms (Med. II, AT
VII 27). Cp. Cottingham 1992, 236 sqq. Equation of soul with mind can, however, be
already found in John Damascene (De fide orthod. Bk. II, cap. 27).
58 Descartes. Med. IV, AT VII 57.
59 Descartes. Reg. Ill, AT X 368 sqq.
60 Descartes. Reg. XII, AT X 418 sqq. Cp. Marion 1992, 115-139.
158 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

considered uniform and essentially discursive (in the “Regulae” Descartes also
uses the terms enumeratio and inductio to designate operations of discursive
thinking). Non-discursivity can be presupposed only as a privileged feature o f the
infinite mind in “a single identical and perfectly simple act by means of which he
[God] simultaneously understands, wills and accomplishes everything”.61 Some
traces o f non-discursivity in the finite mind may be seen in the concept o f the
intuitus, which is an act rather then a process.62 But even if it is the immediate
apprehension o f the mind, the intuitus is different from the noetic non-discursive
conceiving of a noeton by the noys, insofar as the intuitus is involved in
apprehension not of noetic objects, but rather of the simplest propositions: for
example, that the thinking mind intuits that it exists, that it thinks (vnusquisque
animo potest intueri, se existere, se cogitare)\ that the triangle is limited by only
three lines; that the sphere is limited by one plane, and so on.63 Another atavistic
Hoys-like feature of the mind is that the mind, like the noys, is fundamentally
reflective; every act of thinking is always accompanied by immediate awareness of
that very act. But, unlike the noys, the mind does not grasp its object fully in all its
different aspects. The difference between the two is that in the mind immediate
awareness is contentless; it consists in a simple apprehension of the act o f thinking,
cogito, as actually being there or taking place: “We cannot fail constantly to
experience within ourselves that we are thinking.”64 On the contrary, the noys
thinks itself only insofar as it thinks the noeta, which are not really different from
the noesis (see 3.1.1). It means that Descartes expels the intellect-noys as precedent
to, and distinct from, the dianoia, reducing the mind to only discursive reasoning
(in a similar way, Hobbes takes thinking to be only ratiocination, i.e., discursive
logical computation).63
Since, further, for Descartes, as for the majority of later philosophers, the
substance is God and is infinite (i.e., is supremely perfect), there is no, and there
can be no, principle or arkhe of the mind other than the mind itself. Because of that
there is a spark of the divine within the finite mind.66 The human mind and the
divine mind differ only extensively (as the finite from the infinite) and not
intensively. The divine mind produces the human mind; the human mind conceives
the divine mind in its existence, although still missing its (infinite) essence.
From the early “Regulae” till the late “Principles” Descartes still retains a
distinction between different faculties within the mind: intellect (reason),

61 Descartes. Princ. 123, AT VIIIA 14.

62 A sui generis non-discursive intuitive understanding (an “illumination of the mind”) is
reserved by Descartes (who obviously follows Aquinas in this point) to the “beatific vision”,
which can only be an act of divine grace and is not accessible in our present state, where we
can only cognize by means of discursive reasoning - Descartes. To [Silhon], March or April
1648, AT V 136-137. Traces of the Platonic distinction between the non-discursive intellect
(divine ratio, the cause of mathematical regularity within the cosmos) and the discursive
reasoning (human ratiocinatio) are to be found also in Kepler’s “The Six-cornered
Snowflake”-Kep!er 1966, 32-33.
63 Descartes. Reg. Ill, AT X 368.
64 Descartes. Sixth Set of Replies, AT VII 427.
65Th. Hobbes. De corpore I 1 2.
“ Descartes. Reg. IV, AT X 373.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 159

imagination, memory, sense-perception, and will (the role of the will as an active
faculty o f mind is especially stressed in the later treatises). But if the mind is taken
simply and only as thought, then everything referable to thinking is mind in some
way: “Thinking is to be identified...not merely with understanding, willing and
imagining, but also with sensory awareness.”67 The distinction of the faculties of
the mind is more a tribute to the tradition and is ‘horizontal’ rather than ‘vertical’:
different faculties are not so much hierarchically structured or ordered, but
represent different cognitive functions of the same mind. The modem tendency
towards homogenization of the mind is manifest in Descartes, in that various
mental faculties are easily reducible to “kinds of thought”, functions or modes of
the same finite created thinking substance.68 Mind is hence a progression of
thinking, and it is one and the same mind-substance that can be presented as
different mental faculties in different cognitive roles. We can thus say that in
Descartes the mind is discursive: there are no single acts of thought not inscribed
into a continuous succession o f thinking-cog/iaf/o. 9
The mind has to be able to apply itself not only to itself but also to the
external world, effectively judging other things, having “the power o f judging well
and o f distinguishing the true from the false... it is not enough to have a good
mind; the main thing is to apply it well”.70 This constitutes the modem “turn”
towards understanding the mind as judgement par excellence, judgement that both
unifies and separates spheres o f being and of nature—the turn towards accepting
the phenomenon o f taste as expressing the subjective autonomy of individual
judgement.
Striving to secure the clarity and distinctness of cognition, Descartes
establishes two complementary substances, which should be as simple in their
inner structure as possible. This simplicity is rendered by the acceptance of only
one single attribute o f thinking or o f extension, which makes both substances
innerly homogeneous (and for that reason all sorts of “substantial forms” or “occult
qualities” are expelled) and mutually incompatible. In this case, however, the mind
loses the radically other to itself within itself, so subtly presented and preserved in
the Platonic theory of the noys. The only other to the mind is matter. In Descartes’
simple dichotomic distinction there is no room left for any otherness within the

67 Descartes. Princ. 19, AT VHIA 7. Cp. Reg. VIII, AT X 395-396; XII, AT X 410-411.
61 Descartes. Description of the Human Body, AT XI 224; cp. Princ. 165, AT VIIIA 32.
69 In Med. II, AT VII 29 Descartes equates cogitare with sentire. In its most general sense,
cogitatio in Descartes may be taken as a somehow organized thought. Sepper draws an
interesting parallel between Descartes’ terms cogitatio, meditatio and contemplatio and
those used in the St. Victor school • Sepper 1996, 128, 257 sqq. In Descartes, cogitation is
explained as “the directed action of what, when undirected, is an aimless agitation of
thought”, and meditation as a prolonged, intense and recursive act of thought, whereas
contemplation is explained as a final understanding and knowledge of truth (Ibid., 262,
272).
70 Descartes. Disc. I, AT VI 2. Cp. Aristotle who argues that using (khresis) is preferable to
just having (hexis) and that the latter is for the sake of the former which is thus the actuality
and the purpose of the hexis, MM 1184b 15-17. Descartes, however (as Kenny points out),
is unable to distinguish between a mere not yet realized capacity of acquiring something
(knowledge) and the non-exercise of the already acquired hexis (Kenny 1987, 103).
160 Maller, Imagination and Geometry

mind— in particular, there is no room for the notion of intelligible matter, which
plays such an important role in ancient mathematical considerations (2A-2.4.2).
The other to the mind is thus fully externalized and ousted from the mind. This
other is matter, not God, which explains why Descartes does not accept any
principle or arkhe beyond being or thinking. Mind literally becomes anarchic.
What is most important for the consideration of geometrical and mathematical
entities is that the loss o f any inner, “id e a r otherness within the mind leads to the
impossibility o f finding any appropriate place for matter in the intelligible, which
might be other to the mind but still be within the mind.
Let us now turn to a brief discussion of the Cartesian understanding of the
notion o f idea in contrast to the Platonic “idea”. In the Platonic tradition, idea—
idea or eidos— is an intelligible archetype not only of physical things (of a stone,
o f a horse), but also of intermediate geometrical figures (of a circle, of a line).71 In
this respect the Platonic idea is independent of both physical and geometrical
entities. Such an archetype is a member o f the communicative system o f the noeta,
which are actually present to each other in the structure of koindnia. Idea is
primarily the subject of understanding of the noys but may also be accessible to
discursive reasoning-dianoia through a number of demonstrable propositions or
arguments. Idea is responsible for both the being o f a thing and, as the limit-peras
of that thing which fully defines it, allows for knowledge of the thing.
The Cartesian use of the term “idea”, as Kenny, Ariew and Grene argue,
is both new and not altogether unequivocal. It is new for at least two reasons. First,
for Descartes, unlike for the scholastic thinkers, an idea is not an archetype of
things in the divine mind.72 Second, unlike in the seventeenth century literary
usage, an idea is not an image derived from senses or imagination. It is equivocal
because Descartes does not have a thoroughly and systematically elaborated
consistent theory o f ideas; he confines himself to occasional descriptions (e.g., in
the “Meditations” and in the replies to the objections raised to them) and
metaphors, which may appear incompatible, incoherent or too loose at best. It is
rather difficult to draw a clear and unambiguous picture of the mind’s relation to
ideas in Descartes, of ideas in relation to thoughts, and of the distinction between
idea as an act of thought, as an exercise o f a concept and as an occurrence o f an
experience.73
As Descartes states in his later letter to Mersenne, “idea” is “in general
everything which is in our mind when we conceive something, no matter how we
conceive it”.74 In other words, idea is everything that is in the mind properly, every
mental content o f any kind o f cogitation and cogitation of any kind. Such an
understanding o f idea represents the Cartesian tendency toward the
homogenization o f substance and the abolition of distinct mental cognitive
structures. An idea may originally be caused by senses or imagination, but once it
is processed in the mind-reason, it is different from an image in the senses or in

71Plato. Tim. 28a, 35a; Phil. 16d; RP 486d-e, 505a; Parm. 129a et al.
72 Cp. Descartes. Third Set of Replies, AT VII 181.
73 Kenny 1987 96-116; Ariew, Grene 1995, 87-106.
74 Descartes. To Mersenne, July 1641, AT III 392-393; cp. Third Set of Replies, AT VII
185; Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 366. Cp. Yolton 1981, 208-224.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 161

imagination, since the mind is to be understood as autonomous and possibly free

from imagination and the senses. And although Descartes does not reject ideas in
the infinite mind, an idea is to be considered in the first place in the finite, in “our”
mind: an idea always, and only, is in the mind and is in the mind, nunquam est
extra intellectum.15
Still, already in this “definition” there arises an ambiguity: is an idea, as
“everything which is in our mind when we conceive something”, an object of
thought or is it an act or mental state?76 This question will be addressed in the
subsequent discussion o f formal and objective. Here we only need to note that on
different occasions Descartes appears to support different approaches: at times
ideas are presented as the acts, operations or modes of thought, and at times ideas
are taken as objects o f thought or o f operations of thinking. (Thus, for example, in
a note to the Latin edition o f the “Discourse”, “idea” denotes any thinkable thing,
insofar as it is represented by an object in die mind.)77
Although there is a certain ambiguity in Descartes’ treatment o f the notion
o f an idea, it is still possible to discern several distinctive traits in his
considerations. First, every idea represents something: “[T]here can be no ideas
which are not as it were o f things.” * An idea thus is a mental representation and,
insofar as a particular object is represented in the mind, be it mental or physical, it
has to have an idea. The Platonic idea is being and is paradigm either o f a thing
that exists, or of a thing that is thought. The thing is also an image of that idea. A
thing is thus not being, but rather an image or representation of being. On the
contrary, the Cartesian idea, as it is portrayed in the “Meditations”, represents a
thing. Therefore, such idea is itself being, insofar as it belongs to the thinking
substance, but it also represents being. Because of that, ideas for Descartes
primarily express the essence, and not existence, of a thing (see 1.4.3).
Such a notion o f idea allows Descartes to ascribe an idea to every
thing—to every mental and physical object—as its representation, which allows for
the possibility of the strict knowledge of physical things, because physics, the
science o f them, has to study their ideas as mental representations. It is therefore
possible to restructure physics as a mathematical science only if it is possible to
treat these images of physical things by means of mathematics. The latter becomes
possible once mathematics comes to interpret any representations—in particular,
ideas o f physical things—by means of proportional relations with no distinction of

75 Descartes. First Set of Replies, AT VII 102.

76 Kenny 1987, 99-101. Cp. a distinction made by V. Chappel and supported by N. Jolley,
that between idea as an act (idea™) and idea as an object (content) of thought (idea,,). •
Chappel 1986, 177-198; Jolley 1990, 12 sqq.
77 “Nota hoc in loco et ubique in sequentibus nomen ideae generaliter sumi pro omni re
cogitata, quatenus habet tantum esse quoddam objectivum in intellectu." - Descartes. Disc.
IV, AT VI 34. Cp. Med. Preface, AT VII 8; Med. Ill, AT VII40; Second Set of Replies, AT
V II160. Cp. also: Spinoza, Ethics II, def. 3.
7>"...Nullae ideae nisi tanquam rerum essepossunt” - Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 44. Cp.:
since “our ideas cannot receive their forms or their being except from external objects or
from ourselves, they cannot represent any reality or perfection which is not either in those
objects or in ourselves” .- Descartes. To [Vatier], 22 February 1638, AT I 561.
162 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

number and magnitude, put in the form o f meaningful propositions, which may
then form a scientific theory.
But, second, an idea is not to be taken as an image, despite Descartes’
own rather perplexing remark in the Third “Meditation”, which seems to equate an
idea as thought with an image o f a thing. When Hobbes criticizes this ambiguity,
however, Descartes restates that “idea” refers to “whatever is immediately
perceived by the mind”, explaining that an idea has to be distinguished from an
image— if by image one means a corporeal image in imagination.79 This thesis is
further explicitly presented in a letter to Mersenne: “[W]hatever we conceive
without an image is an idea of the pure mind, and whatever we conceive with an
image is an idea o f the imagination.”80 Thus, for example, ideas o f common
notions are also not immediate images of things.81 And even if, as it will be argued,
an idea may be accompanied by a mental or corporeal image o f imagination, an
idea cannot be equated with them, for the mind-reason has to be kept different
from the imagination and from the corporeal (see 3.3).
And third, in the definitions in the Second Set of Replies to the
“Meditations”, Descartes makes a distinction between thought and idea. Thought is
any mental state, act or content that the mind is immediately aware of, but this
immediate awareness is possible only because there is an idea that is the form of
that thought. It is through the immediate perception of this idea that the mind is
aware o f that thought. Thus, the idea as form organizes thinking in its mental
content and in its acts o f cogitation in such a way that the mind is immediately
aware o f itself, i.e., o f its content and its cogitation. In other words, mind is
reflective through the idea. Such an understanding of the notion of idea is implied
in Descartes’ consideration o f the mind, in which every act o f cogitation (i.e., of
thinking, imagining, sense-perception and even o f will as determined and guided
by an idea o f reason) has to be accompanied by an immediate awareness o f that
very act.83
Descartes makes a famous distinction between three kinds of ideas: innate
(“my understanding o f what a thing is, what truth is, and what thought is”),
adventitious (which come from outside objects, o f sensations) and those invented
by me (fictitious ideas of imaginable entities, such as sirens and hippogriffs).84 O f

79 “Some of my thoughts are as it were the images of things, and it is only in these cases that
the term ‘idea* is strictly appropriate—for example, when I think of a man, or a chimera, or
the sky, or an angel, or God”. Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 37. Cp. Treatise on Man, AT XI
176-177. See also Second Set of Replies, AT VII 160-161 and Passions 135, AT X I355.
10 Descartes. To Mersenne, July 1641, AT III 395.
81 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, AT V 153.
12 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 160. Cp. “I am taking the word ‘idea’ to refer
immediately to whatever is immediately perceived by the mind”. - Third Set of Replies, AT
VII 181.
13 Cp. Descartes. Med. II, AT VII33 and To Mersenne, 28 January 1641, AT III 295.
84 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 37-38. Gassendi, however, raises a legitimate objection to
such a division, arguing that adventitious and fictitious ideas should not be different,
because both come from the combination of sensual images, “for the idea of a chimera is
simply the idea of the head of a lion, the body of a goat and the tail of a serpent, out of
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 163

particular importance is the notion of the innate idea, which, first, allows one to
understand what a thing or a thought is, and second, is derived from man’s own
nature— it does not come from an outer stimulus.85 Examples o f innate ideas for
Descartes are ideas of God, o f a triangle, or o f geometrical truths.86 The innateness
of an idea does not signify its self-evidence, however. An innate idea is self-
evident only once “attended” by the mind, only when actually thought—for it can
happen that a person, even having an idea o f God or of a geometrical truth, will
never actually think it. Thus the innate idea is close to hexis, which is not simply a
possibility o f doing or understanding something, but is a capacity to realize a
notion as self-evident in the presence o f clear and attentive thinking. It is in this
sense that one has to take Descartes’ claim in the “Comments on a Certain
Broadsheet” that innate ideas are not distinct from the mind’s own faculty of
thinking.87 Because o f that, the mind does require innate ideas to be distinct from
its own thinking. As ideas in general, they are not to be understood as divine
archetypes. Innate ideas thus have no other source than myself, the finite mind.
That is why for Descartes “when we say that an idea is innate in us, we do not
mean that it is always there before us. This would mean that no idea was innate.
We simply mean that we have within ourselves the faculty o f summoning up
(facultas eliciendi) the idea”.88 But the ability of the finite mind to produce innate
ideas is still not unrestricted. The mind is not really producing innate ideas but
rather is activating them as actual and clear in thinking, because the finite mind is
itself produced by God or the infinite mind.89Therefore, the infinite mind produces
the finite mind capable of awakening the ideas, which in this sense are innate. The
innate ideas then show the essence of that which is. It is for this reason that innate
ideas, as Descartes tells Mersenne, involve neither affirmation nor negation.90 They
presuppose no judgement but simply show what is there and what it is essentially
(thought, thing, truth), without a reference to that which is external to the mind (in
particular, to the non-mental).
In his late “Comments on a Certain Broadsheet” Descartes goes even
further, arguing that even an adventitious idea is in some sense innate, because any
idea o f an external object is not in any way similar in the mind to the thing thought
(it is the image of imagination that may resemble the thing imagined and thought,
cp. 3.3), and thus the idea in the mind is different from the image o f the
corresponding sense-perception. If thinking is informed through external stimuli
(“corporeal motions”), then these ideas are adventitious; if it is informed by
internal mental stimuli (when the object comes only from the thinking itself), then

which the mind puts together one idea, although the individual elements are adventitious”. -
P. Gassendi. Fifth Set of Objections, AT Vll 279-280.
85 Descartes. Med. HI, AT VII 38. Cp. Cottingham 1986, 144-149.
86Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 381-382; Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, AT
VIIIB 360; To Hyperaspistes, August 1641, AT III 424.
87 Descartes. Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, AT VIIIB 357.
88 Descartes. Third Set of Replies, AT VII 189.
89 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT V II133.
90 Descartes. To Mersenne, 22 July 1641, AT III 417-418.
164 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

the ideas are properly innate.91 Such an understanding of innateness opens a

possibility o f understanding the mind as constructing and producing its own ideas
(cp. 3.4.1), which in Descartes is still limited to the infinite mind, which, as said,
creates the finite mind. The finite mind is then capable of “summoning up” innate
ideas.92
The innateness o f ideas has three different meanings. First, that the idea
refers to the realm o f intelligible objects, which are independent from finite
thinking, and which define a particular thing in its notion and existence.93 Second,
innateness may mean the physiological existence o f certain mental structures,
accompanying every human at least from the moment of her physical appearance
into the world. Even if the mind does not recognize these structures at first,
gradually they become clear and explicit to the mind through the mind’s awareness
o f its own mental experience. And third, innateness may mean that the mind knows
certain notions as innate (e.g., o f finite substance) insofar as the mind itself brings
and imposes its own structures unto the known (in particular, unto physical things),
and knows them insofar as it constructs them. Plato and Plotinus accept innateness
in the first sense, and Descartes (as later Kant) only in the third sense.
One might say, perhaps, that from the Platonic perspective, innate ideas
may be considered ideas of the intellect; ideas invented by me—as images of
imagination; and, lastly, adventitious ideas— as sensual perceptions. Still, there are
important points of difference between the Cartesian and the Platonic
understanding of innate ideas. First, in Plato, Plotinus and Proclus, every idea is
innate, for adventitious and fictitious ideas are not ideas in the proper sense; they
are not eide. Even if Descartes might take adventitious ideas to be innate, he does
so in a very different way, as explained above. Thus, not every idea is properly
innate for him. Second, unlike in Plotinus, in Descartes there is no consistent and
elaborated description of the process of the constitution of innate ideas by and
within thinking. And finally, in Plato and Plotinus innate idea is a noeton, an object
of thought, different from, and originally constituted by, the noesis (see 3.1.1). In
Descartes innate idea is rather a hexis and therefore is not really distinct from the
mind as the faculty o f thinking, so that the “objectivity” of innate ideas is produced
by the “subjectivity”.94 “Summoned up” by finite subjectivity, innate ideas are not
themselves being strictu sensu, but are an “objective” representation of being,
merely signs o f being.
An important distinction that still plays its role in seventeenth century
philosophy, particularly in Descartes, is the scholastic distinction between formal
and objective concepts or ideas. We find a clear and concise definition of the two
in Goclenius’ widely read “Lexicon philosophicum”: “The formal concept is that
which we form concerning something apprehended by the intellect. The objective
concept is the thing which is conceived insofar as it is the object of our formal

91 Descartes. Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, AT VIIIB 358-359. Cp. Kenny 1987, 103-
105.
92 Cp. Descartes. Princ. I 58-59, AT VIIIA 27-28.
93 Cp. Plato. Meno 81b-86b et al.
94 Cp. Descartes. Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, AT VIIIB 366.
 Part 111: Reason, Imagination and Construction 165

concept.”95 Originally, the objective-formal distinction arises from the distinction

between the conceived, res cogitata (objective) and the conception, res cogitans
(formal). Descartes takes a concept or an idea to be “objective” when it represents
a thing through its attribute to the mind as “the being of the thing which is
represented by an idea, insofar as it exists in the idea. ...For whatever we perceive
as being in the objects o f our ideas exists objectively in the ideas themselves”.96
“Objective” is thus the content of thinking, whereas “formal” is the act of thinking
or conception.97
O f course, an idea or concept98 may have an objective reality insofar as it
has a formal reality in the finite mind, e.g. a fictitious idea (or factitious, a me ipso
facta). However, in some cases the objective reality of an idea cannot be produced
by the formal act o f the finite mind. This claim is of central importance for
Descartes, for such are sensual ideas and especially innate ideas— in particular,
ideas of God and infinity. In other words, in the finite mind, the formal reality of
an idea cannot in many cases be the cause of the objective reality of that idea. For
this reason Descartes insists that “the objective reality of our ideas needs a cause
which contains this reality not merely objectively but formally or eminently”.99
This cause is the infinite mind, in which— and only in which—formal and
objective do fully coincide in all cases, because the infinite mind knows things
insofar as it always produces those things. But how can Descartes justify his claim,

95 Goclenius 1613, 428 (trans. Ariew and Grene). For parallels in scholasticism see: Gilson
1979, 86-90.
96 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 161.
97 In Gassendi's formulation, formal reality “applies to the idea itself not as it represents
something but as an entity in its own right”.- Fifth Set of Objections, AT VII 285. Spinoza,
after Descartes, provides the following definition: “Things are said to be in the objects of
ideas formally, when they are the same in the objects as they are in our perceptions”
(Principles of the Philosophy of Descartes, Part I, def. 4).
98 As Kenny argues, the terms “idea” and “concept” are to be distinguished in Descartes. -
Kenny 1987, 108-109. However, Kenny seems to modernize Descartes in this point, taking
the notion of concept in a contemporary sense, as a notion that discloses what a thing is,
whereas both scholastic and seventeenth century usage of the conceptus is rather loose,
meaning both an act of conceiving and a thing conceived, i.e., used both formally and
objectively. Cp. Goclenius 1613, 427; Ariew, Grene 1995, 99-100. See also: Leibniz, New
Essays, 119.
99 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 165. Cp.: “All the reality or perfection which is
present in an idea merely objectively must be present in its cause either formally or
eminently” (Second Set of Replies, AT VII 135). In Descartes’ definition (where he follows
the traditional scholastic via eminentiae, which comes back to Plato and is put by Alcinous
in his “Handbook of Platonism”, Didask. 10.5-6.), “something is said to exist eminently in
an object when, although it does not exactly correspond to our perceptions of it, its greatness
is such that it can fill the role of that which does so correspond” (Second Set of Replies, AT
VII 161). Or, in Spinoza’s paraphrase, things arc said to be in the objects eminently, “when
they are not actually such as we perceive them, but are of such force that they can be
substituted for things as we actually perceive them. Notice that when I say a cause contains
the perfections of its effect eminently, I mean that the cause contains the perfections of its
effect more excellently than the effect itself’ (Principles of the Philosophy of Descartes, Part
I, def 4). Cp. Rovane 1994, 89 sqq.
166 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

then, that it is possible to originate the very notion of substance simply from within
the finite mind (1.4.1)? When Descartes says that the finite mind is able to produce
the idea of substance, this only means that the essence of substance as an objective
idea has to be posited as different (and, in finite things, separated) from existence.
The example o f an entity that cannot be produced in this way is the idea or concept
of ultimate perfection, which refers to that unique instance where existence is
included or coincides with the essence (which itself is a perfection), or in which the
formal and objective coincide. Descartes thus still restricts the ability of the finite
mind to produce ideas as the content of its own cogitation (cp. 3.4.1). For him the
finite mind is a finite thinking substance not emancipated from the infinite
substance, which therefore cannot be considered merely hypothetical.100
Now, we need to make several observations. (1) Matter has an objective
concept for Descartes revealing matter’s essence— i.e., being extended. And this
concept cannot be produced by the finite mind because the objective concept of
matter is perceived, as Descartes insists, clearly and distinctly (and independently
of the mind’s possible intentions), and such a perception cannot be false.
(2) The objective concept consists o f (a system of) all the independent and
non-contradictory properties or attributes (whose consistency cannot be proven
within that system of the finite discursive mind).101 Objective concepts as such do
not produce, or necessarily imply, either a formal concept or existence and as such
are merely possible, unless they are formally conceived.
(3) The distinction between formal and objective concepts resembles the
Platonic distinction between thinking and objects of thought—noèsis and noèta.
Descartes, however, understands the objective concept as only “ideal,” i.e., as
being in mente and not in re, as having only mental reality; depending on the mind
as opposed to the “external” reality of either the res corporea or the infinite
thinking. Even if in the noèsis-noèta distinction thinking is logically anterior to the
objects o f thought, both are not really different and both may be said to really exist
(cp. 3.1.4). The same is true for Descartes only in the infinite intellect, where
formal concepts (such as ‘‘thinking”) coincide with the objective.
(4) Because o f the distinction between the objective (conceived) and the
formal (conception) in the idea, another definition of the notion of idea becomes
possible as “the thing which is thought of in so far as it has objective being in the
intellect”.102 But Descartes also further introduces the notion o f the “materiality” of
the idea as the operation, operatio, of the mind.103 The notion of the materiality of
ideas does not imply, however, any concept of intelligible matter, since Descartes
insists that ideas cannot correlate to materiality in the proper sense: the former
represent the res cogitans, the latter represent the res extensa. In his reply to
Amauld, Descartes supports the scholastic distinction that “ideas are forms of a
kind, and are not composed o f any matter, when we think of them as representing
something we are taking them not materially (materialiter) but formally
(formaliter). If, however, we were considering them not as representing this or that

100 Unlike Laplace’s “je n’avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse” to Napoleon.
101 Zubiri 1980, 88 sqq. Cp. GOdel 1986,1 147 sqq.; Moore 1990, 172 sqq.
102 Descartes. First Set of Replies, AT VII 102.
103 Descartes. Med. Preface, AT VII 8.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 167

but simply as operations o f the intellect, then it could be said that we were taking
them materially”.104 There is no further clear explanation by Descartes o f the
relation between formality and materiality in ideas. The difference between the two
appears to be the following: formality consists in thinking-something, whereas
materiality is just an unspecified thinking. Still, both the material and the formal in
thinking are opposed to die objective or the conceived.
There is thus no room in Descartes for any distinction between intelligible
and bodily matter, the former exemplified in the ideas as objects of and for
thinking, the latter represented in physical things. But if we recall that for Plotinus
materiality in thinking is its indefiniteness (2.4.1), while for Descartes materiality
consists in the operation o f the mind-reason, taken only as an unspecified activity
of thinking, we might discover an interesting and surprising parallel between the
Platonic (Plotinian) and Cartesian accounts o f materiality in thinking, of which
Descartes is not aware and which is not elaborated any further and does not play a
major role in his philosophy.
(5) Lastly, essence is considered an objective concept, for it shows what a
thing is as represented to the mind. The categorization o f essence as objective
affects the understanding o f reflectivity. Thus, for Plotinus and Proclus only the
intellect-noys is being. It simply is and insofar as it is, it is thinking; and it is
thinking that thinks itself through the noèta, since there is nothing else that really
is. Being and thinking are (is) thus the same and represent pure actuality, as
Parmenides puts it.103 As it has been noted, for Descartes being and thinking,
objective and formal, can coincide only in the infinite mind. In the case o f the
finite mind there is a discrepancy between being and thinking; because, although
mind in Descartes as substance is being, it is only a being, for it is opposed to the
being of another finite (extended) substance, and possibly to another minds and to
the being o f the infinite thinking substance. In the finite mind, on the contrary,
being does not coincide with thinking, insofar as in innate and in adventitious ideas
the objective is not included in the formal. Because of this non-coincidence of
being and thinking in the finite mind, Descartes has to negate the immediacy of
being; the expression of such negation is radical doubt. Since, however, being has
to be mediated in its representation by an objective concept, being should be
expressed in thinking and speaking. The very immediacy of the act of cogito is
then in fact not immediate, but is arrived at only through the mediation of thinking
itself: the sum is not produced by the cogito, but the former is the presupposition of
the possibility o f the latter.
Furthermore, for Plato, Plotinus and Proclus the principle of being and of
intellect is itself beyond being and thus is not being (cp. 1.2.1). For Descartes the
principle o f all things is pure being and infinite intellect, which already and always
is. Descartes thus needs no initial indefinite thinking, which in its desperate

104 Descartes. Fourth Set of Replies, AT VII232-233. Cp.: “I regard the difference between
the soul and its ideas as the same as that between a piece of wax and the various shapes it
can take.” - Descartes. To [Mislaid], 2 May 1644, AT IV 113. Cp. Aristotle. De an. 429b 24
saq. See also: Chappell 1986,177-184.
Parmenides B3 DK; Parmenides, frg. II Tar&i; Clement. Strom. II 440.12; Plotinus. Enn.
1.4.10.6; III.8.8.8; V. 1.8.17; V.9.5.29.
168 Malter, Imagination and Geometry

attempt to think the unthinkable source o f being and thinking, constitutes the
kosmos noetos. Descartes therefore does not leave any room for an initial indefinite
dyad or intelligible matter, especially as specifically associated with geometrical
entities as an extension in which geometricals might be considered irreducibly
different from corporeal things (see 2.4). For Descartes both material and
geometrical objects appear to be placed and considered in one and the same
(material) extension, which is the most important precondition for the possibilityx)f
the application o f mathematics to physics.
The necessity to speak about or to express being as mediated by thinking
has a number o f important implications in Descartes. First o f all, the mind as
thinking has to pass a judgement about its object. Judgement thus becomes one of
the central concerns for modem philosophy, understood by Kant as the only
mediator between the theoretical and the practical, between necessity and freedom.
As Hannah Arendt argues, in the form of taste, judgement becomes the distinctive
feature o f modernity. 06 As such, judgement is already ambiguous, being both an
operation o f the mind and a (new) mind’s faculty. Every finite mind has to express
its own judgement. On the one hand, this makes such a judgement almost
autonomous and universally valuable (for the finite mind is recognized, among the
other minds, as equal in its right and ability to produce and express its judgement).
On the other hand, as taste, judgement is only individual and subjective and cannot
pretend to be universal. Another implication is that, unlike sense-perception, which
just tells us what it perceives, judgement is supposed to be either true or false.
Ideas per se are not false (clear ideas are true, cp. 1.2.3), falsity appears only in
judgement. For Descartes a clear idea—as opposed to the confused idea or to an
idea that represents a non-thing as thing— is an idea which, due to the natural light
o f reason, corresponds to its object, which implies the adequation concept of
truth.107 Thus, in the Third “Meditation” Descartes argues that in itself and by itself
an idea cannot be false—only judgement can be strictu sensu false in combining
ideas in a way that corresponds or does not correspond to a thing.108 Falsity thus
does not exist in ideas, but in judgement only, which has to pronounce its verdict,
i.e. has to put ideas in a right order, reconstructing this order in correspondence or
adequation to the order o f the things. Moreover, the mind may also will to judge,
and error occurs when the will surpasses the limits of reason.109 The truth o f things
is thus no longer in the things themselves, but only in their mental representation,
which may either be correct (adequate) or not: the truth then has to be “tasted” in
judgement, and it has to be properly presented, i.e., in a refined judgement.
Further, a thing has to be thought in its objective concept, and so has to be
judged by the mind. Until then a thing simply is, but is not yet thought. When it is
thought, it is thought as something—as having an essence. But once it is actually

106Arendt 1978, 111 sqq.

107 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 43; cp. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 147-148; Fourth Set
of Replies, AT VII 233.
101 Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 37; Princ. I 13, AT VIIIA 9. Cp. the criticism of Amauld
and Descartes’ reply: Fourth Set of Objections, AT VII 206; Fourth Set of Replies, AT VII
233.
109 Cp. Williams 1978, 163-183.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 169

thought, it has to be expressed or a judgement has to be uttered. The pragmatic

dimension thus receives particular attention.110 Lastly, there is a remarkable
parallel between thinking and reflectivity on one hand, and the duality of existence
and essence on the other (cp. 1.4.2). To be (existentially) is not the same as to be
something (essentially). Similarly, to think differs from to think something. The
distinction between thinking and thinking-something parallels the distinction
between thinking as the activity o f the mind, and thinking as reflectivity and
judgement. Within the finite mind such a distinction is exemplified in that the
thinking thing (the mind) can have as its object, as the thing thought, not only the
“external” material thing, but also the “internal” thinking thing, i.e. itself.
Obviously, “to be” matches “to think”, and “to be something” corresponds to “to
think something”. “To be something” is realized by the mind as the essence o f a
thing through the objective concept o f that thing. And the objective concept is that
which makes the mind think that thing as something (i.e. as definite), which means
that the “being” o f the mind is to think, and the “essence” of the mind is to think
something.
An important implicit presupposition behind the Cartesian understanding
of idea is the reflectivity o f the mind. The mind for Descartes has to be
reflective— aware o f itself and o f its contents. Indeed, for the finite mind
perceiving or thinking is always accompanied by perception o f perceiving or by
thought o f thinking. In the distinction between thought and idea, the thought,
cogitatio, is everything “we are immediately (immediate) aware o f ’.1" Or also:
“By the term ‘thought’ I understand everything which we are aware o f as
happening within us, in so far as we have awareness of it.” 112 Descartes thus
presupposes that there is a thing o f which there is a thought as an act of
thinking—distinguished as the objective and the formal. (The Cartesian mind
differs from the noys, which is also reflective, in that reflectivity o f the mind does
not presuppose communication-foi'/iom'a of, and within, noetic objects, cp. 3.1.1.)
If the thing that is thought is itself material, the idea or representation o f such a
thing still belongs to the mind. If the thing that is thought is itself mental (e.g., a
universal), its representation in thinking is mental as well.
To the formal-objective distinction one might still add a third moment,
that o f immediate mental perception, whereby the mind is aware of its formal act in
which it thinks its “objective” content. In fact, such a distinction would well fit the
distinction between thought and idea, where thought designates any mental state,
act or content o f which the mind is immediately aware, and the idea is the form of
thought, through which the mind is aware o f that thought. Still, such immediate
mental perception (perceptio as cogitatio), as well as any reflectivity, is not
immediately implied in the formal-objective distinction, because if in an act of
thinking the mind thinks something, nothing yet guarantees that the mind should
thereby think itself. Immediate mental perception can hardly be characterized in
terms o f either formal or objective concepts, because it represents both an act (of

110 In the Wittgensteinian question: “How can I think this or that as expressed in my
perception, feeling or thinking by means of language?” - Cp. Wittgenstein 1967, passim.
111 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 160. Cp. Med. II, AT VII 33.
112 Descartes. Princ. 19, AT VIIIA 7.
170 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

awareness o f itself) and a content (of awareness o f itself).

These three constituents—formal, objective and immediate mental
perception— might be taken as constituting three stages in the reflectivity o f the
mind, namely, the “I think”, the “I think something” and the “I think that I think”.
Each consecutive stage may be understood as implied by the precedent one, but is
not fully describable by it. The act o f cogito may then be analyzed and put in terms
o f these three subsequent stages, which constitute three successive logical (not
temporary) steps in the reflective procedure of the mind. These stages cannot be
reduced to one another, but rather are exemplified in their synthetic unity through
the apparent simplicity o f the mind’s self-awareness.
To note, one might attempt to distinguish a fourth moment in the
reflective procedure, namely, that o f the “I think that I think something”. But in
fact, as it is easy to see, this last moment in reflective thinking arises simply as an
application o f the pure intentional form of thinking (“I think something”) to the
immediate perception taken in its general form (“I think that X”; when X is the
idea o f the self—i.e., “I think”—then we have a particular case of the mentioned
reflective mental immediate perception, i.e., “I think that I think”). Obviously, the
result of such an application will be the “I think that I think something”, which
thus is not an independent moment in thinking, but is derivable from the three
mentioned moments.
On this account, the very act of the self-awareness of the cogito has to be
tripartite, rather than one elementary, undissolvable act of
consciousness— although the composite nature of self-consciousness may remain
unnoticed— because the three constituents o f self-perception are exemplified not in
a temporal, but only in a logical, sequence. Once again we encounter one of the
fundamental presuppositions o f modem philosophy; namely, that the mind’s
understanding and knowledge of something (of an external thing and also of itself)
presupposes at the same time that the mind—through the described reflective
procedure— also understands and knows its own state and content. Until the
contemporary radical criticism o f self-transparency of consciousness (with its
precursors in Leibniz, Schelling and E. Hartmann), the “I” is regarded as only
discursive, self-transparent thought, which in thinking thinks itself and also knows
itself. The very fact of thinking, the conclusion “cogito ergo sum”, is possible only
because of the reflectivity of thinking, which always turns to itself and through this
constant turning justifies itself and the metaphysical truth(s). Without such
structure o f reflectivity the cogito could not even have been thought, expressed or
uttered, because the “I” would have been simply unaware of the fact that it actually
thinks. But such self-evidence o f cogito—which, under the guise of clearness, also
becomes the distinctive mark o f truth—is in fact a complex reflective self-
awareness o f thought.
Reflectivity may also be considered essential for distinguishing between
the two created substances (cp. 1.1.3; 1.2.3; 1.4.1). Descartes does not provide an
argument to explain why extension and thought (and nothing else) have to be the

113 Cp. Leibniz’s theory of small unnoticeable perceptions (Monadology, 3 19-24 et al.) and
E. Hartmann 1869.
 Part 111: Reason, Imagination and Construction 171

main attributes, and why there are only two attributes and not more, except for
referring to an alleged self-evidence o f such a distinction. It might be considered to
be the case simply because God wills to create such a world where only thought
and extension are the main attributes of the created substances. Such an answer,
however, is insufficient for Descartes, because of his explicit rejection of the blind
will: the creative will then has to follow the divine mind or reason.114 Instead of
positing two different essential features of two substances, one might confine
oneself to one single feature, that o f reflectivity. The relative complexity and
heterogeneity o f thought and extension as attributes might then be substituted by
the attributes of the reflectivity of the mind and the non-reflectivity of the body:
that which is reflective is thought or mind, and that which is not reflective is body
or matter.
Such a distinction might still be ambiguous, since reflectivity may either
be considered in the not created (in the infinite mind), or in the created (in the
finite mind). Moreover, when the finite mind reflectively turns to itself, nothing
prevents it from considering itself as the creator of all its mental content and
objective ideas instead o f receiving it from the other to the mind—from the infinite
mind or from the extended world. In other words, mind always envisages a
possibility o f solipsism, or of viewing itself as the creator o f itself (i.e., as thinking
which constitutes itself in thinking and by thinking itself). Reflectivity thus may be
reconsidered as the mark o f creativity and the ability to produce not only things but
also truth in the form o f true propositions.

3.2 Imagination in ancient philosophy

3.2.1 Aristotle and Plato on imagination

An important question we now need to address is a possible connection or affinity

of geometrical entities with the hylenoete and with imagination. We will begin
with a discussion of Plato and Aristotle, and then turn to a more elaborated account
of imagination in Plotinus and Procius. In recent years the notion of imagination in
ancient philosophy received much attention—which parallels contemporary
interest in imagination in general—in the discussion in the works of H. J.
Blumenthal, I. Chitchaline, J. Dillon, E. Emilsson, M. Nussbaum, M. Schofield, G.
Watson, M. Wedin and others.
Plato is the first in Greek literature to use the term phantasia (in
“Republic” 382e), although in the dialogues he uses it only occasionally and does
not present any consistent theory o f it.115 Still, it appears that in the “Philebus” he
speaks about the imagination without mentioning it by name.116 Here Plato
presents the soul as a “painter” in its capacity (1) to create mental images (eikonas)
o f whatever kind after the “inscriptions” within the soul’s memory. Since,

114 Cp. Descartes. Discourse III, AT VI 28. Facing this very problem, Spinoza posits an
infinite number of attributes belonging to one single substance, God, only two of which can
be and are known to us (Spinoza, Ethics II, Prop. 1 sq ).
115 Watson 1994, 4766,4771; cp. Plato. Theaet. 152c, 161e.
1,6 Plato. Phil. 38a-40e. Cp. Schofield 1978,99.
172 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

however, image is always weaker and worse than its paradigm, the capacity of
creating images (2) brings distortion into its products and (3) separates and thus
distinguishes them from images o f sense-perception (those o f vision or of any
other sense). These mental (imaginary) images (4) refer not only to the past and
present but may also be projected into the anticipated future. Lastly, (5)
imagination, as the capacity o f producing and as if contemplating mental
representations, is connected with both sense-perception and with reason in its
capacity to form opinion, further expressible by speech.117
In the “Sophist” Plato takes phantasia to be a mixture of sensation and
opinion (symmeixis aistheseds kai doxes), where opinion is the end, termination
and completion o f the discursive reasoning of the soul, of its inner discussion with
1Iff
itself. Imagination is thus connected to, and at the same time separated from,
sensation and thinking and is neither of them—as if occupying a middle position
between the two. Imagination is thus connected with opinion, which is also an
intermediate faculty (he metaxy dynamis) aimed at grasping that which is between
being and utter non-being.119 Important is that even though opinion may be false in
its content, when it is falsely related to a thing (i.e., in a way in which this thing
does not exist), the very act o f having opinion can never be false, because if a
person has an opinion o f having an opinion, she really has an opinion that she is
unable not to have.120 The same may be said about imagining as appropriation of
an image: an image may refer to a non-existent, or not properly existent, thing
(e.g., a physical thing), but the act o f image-making itself cannot be called into
doubt. If we now recall the Cartesian cogito, we will discover a striking similarity
between its self-evidence and that o f the opinion-making of dianoia and of image-
making.
Aristotle mentions the notion of phantasia more frequently than does
Plato, and dedicates several pages to it in the “De anima” III.3. Scholars differ
considerably, however, in interpreting what Aristotle does indeed say. Thus,
Schofield takes imagination in Aristotle to stand for all kinds o f abnormal,
pathological or “non-paradigmatic sensory experiences”.122 Wedin, on the
contrary, argues that phantasia in Aristotle is not a faculty at all, but “subserves
full faculties in the sense that images [of the imagination] are the devices by which
such faculties (re)present the objects toward which they are directed”.123 Both
approaches seem to be extreme in the interpretation of the notion of imagination.
One might rather follow C. de Vogel, who suggests that phantasia is a necessary
and normal constituent in cognition.124

117 Cp. Plato. Soph. 236c. See: Emilsson 1988,107-111.

m Plato. Soph. 263d-264b.
119 Plato. RP 476d-480a, csp. 479c-d.
120Plato. Phil. 40c.
121 Aristotle. De an. 427b 14 sqq. See also: Bemadete 1975, 611-622; Todd 1981, 49-59;
Watson 1988, 14-34; A. White 1990, 7-13.
122 Schofield 1978, 101-106.
123 Wedin 1988,24.
124Cit. ap. Schofield 1978, 105.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 173

For our present purpose we will only briefly recollect the conclusions of
Aristotle’s argument.125 First o f all (1), phantasia is an ability to produce images or
“representations” different both from images of senses and from objects of
thought.126 The term itself comes from phainesthai, “to appear”, so that the faculty
has to do only with phenomena and not with essences. That is why (2) imagination
may be false (and is mostly so)127 and (3) it is capable of negativity, and has to do
with the unreal, with a certain irrationality or “as if-ness”—as in the case when we
look at a picture portraying something awful. We might be frightened, but our
emotional state is “suspended”, as it were, because we understand that the
frightening exists only “as i f ’, in the imagination.128 Still, phantasia does not seem
to be a faculty (dynamis) specifically defined by its own object and by a proper
activity, but is rather a state (hexis), or even a movement, that arises and follows
the activity o f sense-perception.129
As such, phantasia (4) differs from all other faculties that provide images
to the soul. It is different from sensation (aisthesis) and from discursive thinking
(idianoia), as well as from mere opinion (doxa) and from strict knowledge
(episteme). Imagination (5) does not arise without sense-perception, but the
supposition or discursive combination of judgements (hypolepsis) and discursive
thinking itself are both impossible without imagination, which provides the
“material” for interpretation by thinking.130 In other words, imagination relates
both to sense-perception and to discursive thinking. Also, Aristotle seems to
suggest that imagination cannot happen without a body, which might explain why
imagination (6) is present in most animals.131
A further important distinction is that between productive and
reproductive imagination.132 The latter only reproduces or “paints” an image,
phantasma, o f a thing after the thing has gone. Clearly, this after-picturing can be
very lively, producing bright and vivid images. It inevitably distorts its image,
however, because it reproduces the image o f a thing always only more or less
precisely, never exactly portraying the thing. Reproductive imagination is always
an after-representation, for it becomes effective only after its object has been
removed.133 Aristotle obviously acknowledges this kind of imagination—which
operates mostly when the sensible object is gone—as an ability o f keeping images
of sense-perception, especially of seeing (in this sense, imagination is as i f mental
visualization). Reproductive imagination is also able to act in the presence o f a
thing, however. It either reconstructs the properties of a thing in bringing that thing

125 Aristotle. De an. 427b 14-429a 8.

126 Aristotle. De an. 428a 1-2.
127Cp. Aristotle. Met. 1024b 24-1025a 6; 1062b 43.
12i Aristotle. De an. 427b 22-24.
129Aristotle. De an. 429a 1-2; cp. Met. 1022b 4-5.
130Cp. Aristotle. De an. 403a 8 sqq.; 431a 15-17; De mem. 449b 31 sqq.
131 Aristotle. De an. 403a 8-10; cp. 428a 9-11; Met. 980b 25-27; De motu anim. 700a 6 sqq.
132 Cp. I. Kant. Critique of Pure Reason A 115 sqq., B 151-152; Anthropology, § 28, where
facultas imaginandi is divided into exhibitio originaria and exhibitio derivativa.
133 As Wittgenstein remarks, “while I am looking at an object, I cannot imagine it”. -
Wittgenstein 1967,109 (§ 621).
 174 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

to completion (e.g., when we see only the front of a book, we add in the
imagination the hind part o f it, bringing the book to a three-dimensional
imaginable unity), or the reproductive imagination projects and extrapolates a thing
with its properties into a future situation. Aristotle in fact presupposes the
reproductive imagination when mentioning a mnemonic technique based on the
creation o f images.134 Still, the notion of productive imagination does not yet have
its full recognition and consideration in Aristotle.135 In any case, (7) Aristotle’s
account leaves room for a distinction between productive and reproductive
imagination. The notion o f productive imagination appears first in Philostratus, as
a capacity to produce images o f true reality, o f being, as opposed to mere imitation,
mimesis, o f bodily things.
Productivity o f imagination presupposes a capacity of making changes in
the visualized or represented object. This further implies a certain plasticity and
mobility o f imagination. Indeed, imagination (8) is said to be a movement that
results from the activity o f sense-perception.137 But imagination is also (9) the only
faculty that can act completely at will, whereas the senses transmit what they have
and discursive thinking has to follow necessity in combining its objects in the right
succession.
In what follows, “phantasia” will be rendered as “imagination”, although,
o f course, there are important differences between ancient and modem notions of
imagination. Thus, for instance, imagination in Plato and Aristotle is never taken in
the transcendental sense,138 as it appears in Kant, because ancient thinkers never
raise the question about a priori formal structures in their epistemological
investigations, which might render experience possible and valid without
simultaneously asking about the ontological status of these structures. Historically,
as Watson argues, phantasia turns into creative or productive imagination due to
the Stoic influence on later Neoplatonism. According to Sextus Empiricus, humans
differ from animals not because the former have imagination—for animals have
imagination too— but because humans have imagination that allows for transition
and composition.139
Although Plato and Aristotle may vary on a number of points in their
accounts o f imagination, there nevertheless appears a remarkable similarity in both
approaches. We have to agree with Dillon, who takes the Aristotelian treatment of

134Aristotle. De an. 427b 18-20.

135 An important question that is left open here is to what extent does the imagination affect
our actions and activity: thus, image-making is for Aristotle active in dreaming, but we
cannot act when asleep, cp. Aristotle. De insomn. 460b 15-461 b 5; NE 1098b 31-1099a 3.
Nevertheless, quite often in acting we (and even animals) follow imagination - Aristotle. De
an. 429a 4-6.
136 Philostratus. Vita Apoi. VI 19; cp. Watson 1994, 4766-4769.
137 Aristotle. Dc an. 428b 30-429a 1; cp, Aquinas 1951,396.
138 Against Dillon 1986,57-58.
139 Ti metabatikéi kai synthetikii - Sextus Emp. Adv. Math. VIII 276. Phantasia becomes
imaginatio for the first time in Augustine and in Boethius and is later developed by Aquinas
and by Dante into an intermediate active faculty securing the way to the divine - Watson
1994,4790 sqq.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 175

imagination to be an elaboration o f Plato’s account.140 Plato’s position is developed

in more detail by the later tradition, in particular, by the Neoplatonists.141
Summarizing the previous discussion, it is important to stress the following traits
of imagination, which will be important in the subsequent considerations: (A) the
unique creative ability or spontaneity o f imagination; (B) the intermediate position
of imagination “between” sense-perception and discursive thinking; (C) an affinity
with negativity—the presence in the imagination o f an admixture of the irrational;
(D) its relation to a certain (quasi)extension through the capacity o f representing
physical and ideal objects; and (E) its connection with some kind of movement
((E) will be considered, in 3.4.3 and 3.4.5).

3.2.2 Imagination in Plotinus

Various aspects o f the notion o f imagination in Plotinus are discussed in the works
of Blumenthal, Emilsson, Warren and Watson. One can discern the following
major points in Plotinus’ interpretation o f imagination. First of all, (A) imagination
can be broadly understood in the Aristotelian vein as an ability to produce psychic
images-phantasmata.142 The notion of phantasia is used in the “Enneads” rather
broadly as an ability—again, not as a distinct faculty—to represent objects of
whatever kind as mental or psychic images. But, as a capacity o f representation,
imagination is not just a passive reflecting or mirroring, for imagination forms its
images (phantasiai) quite unlike impressions on the wax that receives them.
Criticizing the Gnostics, Plotinus argues that the soul can create “through
imagination (dia phantasias) and, still more, through rational activity” .
Imagination is thus considered not only as productive, but also as reproductive,
insofar as it is taken as possessing (or, rather, itself being) an active potency,
independent o f the images it produces, because of the general principle that image
does not affect its origin.144
(B) Most importantly, imagination for Plotinus, as for Plato, has an
intermediate position between the sensible and the thinkable. Imagination, to
which otherness is present as irrationality, is to be strictly separated from the
intelligible. Imagination may be taken then as a mirroring, a projection of the
intellectual act (noema, cp. 3.1.1), rather than as an act of the intellection itself.145
In other words, imagination in its “upper” end meets the intelligible not
immediately, but at best through the discursive reasoning. Because o f such
intermediateness, Plotinus has to distinguish two imaginations (phantastika) or
rather, two different aspects o f the same psychic ability. In Enn. IV.3.31.2 sqq.,
Plotinus explicitly discerns two imaginations corresponding to the higher and the

140Dillon 1986,55.
141 Plato never uses the term “phantasia” in his early dialogues, so it very well might be that
the notion of imagination receives much attention in the Academy toward the end of Plato’s
life and Aristotle himself benefits from this discussion.
142 Cp. Plotinus 1995, 73.
143 Toy logizesthai, Plotinus. Enn. II.9.11.22; cp. 11.6.3.29.
144 Cp. Fleet 1995, 248, 266; Moutsopoulos 1976, 11-22.
145 Dillon 1986, 56-57; Plotinus. Enn. IV.3.30.5-6.
176 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

lower levels in the soul which, when undisturbed, allows the two imaginations to
be in accord. The higher imagination then subsumes the lower one and both
produce one mental image.146 Two imaginations correspond to two souls: the
higher disembodied one, and the lower soul connected to the body. This latter soul
keeps remembrances acquired in the imagination.147 The two souls are not really
different, however, but rather express a modal distinction within the soul in its dual
relation to the sensible and the thinkable. The higher, “primary” imagination (prote
phantasia) represents the opinion-doxa and, as Dillon argues, may be taken as a
capacity to synthesize and reproduce the data of sense-perception. The other, lower
imagination is “uncriticized, indeterminate or indistinct (anepikritos)”.148
The two imaginations are usually indiscernible, for when the highest soul
governs, then “the image becomes one, as if a shadow followed by the other and as
if a little light slipped in under the great one; but when there is a war and
disharmony between them, the other image becomes manifest by itself, but we do
not notice in general the duality o f the souls”.149 This duality is overwhelmed by
the image o f the lower imagination, which resembles a double reflection. The
image o f the lower imagination makes the image of the higher imagination dim and
almost invisible (which is why the difference between the two imaginations usually
is not noticed). The lower imagination is then almost completely unaware that the
image of the higher imagination itself reflects and visualizes a noetic object. It
does not mean, however, that the two imaginations are completely separate, the
one belonging merely to the intelligible, the other to the sensual. Plotinus argues
that this cannot be the case, “for in this way there will be two living things with
nothing at all in common with each other”.150 There thus would have been two
different and separate souls, or two different cognitive faculties, that would have
nothing to do with each other. The difference between the two imaginations may
also be considered modal, brought in not by the difference of their objects but by
the hierarchical difference in the whole ontological structure (which in the last
instance comes back to the henological difference between the superabundant One
and the indefinite dyad). The “intermediateness” of imagination, then, consists not
in that the imagination is in “between” the intelligible and the sensual, but that it
reaches both “here” and “there”. This reflects an insurmountable ambiguity in the
imagination, in regard to both its object (intelligible and sensual) and the
ontological reality with which it is associated (the higher and the lower soul).151

146 Blumenthal 1976, 51-55; 1971, 92-93; Warren 1966,284.

147 Plotinus. Enn. IV.3.31.1 sqq. Cp. the also a note of A. H. Armstrong in: Plotinus.
Enneads VII, 234-235.
148Plotinus. Enn. III.6.4.19-21.
149Plotinus. Enn. IV.3.31.9-13. Cp. Watson 1994, 4795.
150Plotinus. Enn. IV.3.31.6-9.
151 Cp. Warren 1966, 277-285. Warren argues that the faculty of imagination is double:
“When the sensitive and rational functions are combined into one soul, a new conceptual
imagination performs a function analogous to that of sensible imagination” - Warren 1966,
278. Regarding the two kinds of imagination, which correspond to two different levels of
the soul, Blumenthal suggests that one kind is between sense-perception and reason and the
other is subsensitive (Blumenthal 1971, 89-95; 1976, 51-55). See, however, the convincing
criticism of Emilsson 1988, 108.
 Part ill: Reason, Imagination and Construction 177

What position does imagination occupy in respect to sense-perception and

reasoning? In his analysis o f sense-perception, Emilsson stresses the connection of
sensual perception and imagination in Plotinus.152 The argument is that
imagination is the terminating point of perceptions or phantasmata, as
representations o f things that arise in the soul as the result of sense-perception; in
this respect Plotinus appears to be close to Aristotle.153 Imagination and perception
thus are connected, although they appear to have different objects. If imagination
were to be considered only as the function of sense-perception, however, it would
be rather difficult to account for the unity o f a “synthesized” image of sense-
perception, recollected from a multiplicity of disrupted and disconnected sense-
data. For even if sense-perception and imagination meet in an act o f perception,
they are different in that imagination, unlike sense-perception, does not have to
directly refer to physical objects. In producing its objects-phantasmata,
imagination begins with non-physical data transmitted by senses and not with the
physical objects themselves. Imagination, even when considered as the lower
imagination, should thus be different from, and “higher” to, sense-perception—that
is, closer to the dianoetic interpretative discursive reasoning of the soul. Emilsson
suggests another hypothesis of imagination as conscious awareness, for instance,
the act o f reading when reading.154 Still, as it has been argued, reflectivity in the
awareness o f thinking while actually thinking is proper primarily to the thinking of
the intellect (3.1.1).
Thus, to be intermediate, imagination has to be a “bridge” that both
separates and unites sense-perception and reasoning, as the soul mediates between
the domains of the sensible and the intelligible, being also a “bridge” between the
two.155 Imagination is then as if on the border-line (methorion) between the
sensible and the intelligible.156 On its “upper side” imagination meets discursive
reasoning to which it transmits the phantasmata, and on its “lower side” it meets
and absorbs the data o f sense-perception.157 Therefore, Plotinus’ claim that “the
imaging part [of the soul] has a sort of intelligence” 158 can be fully justified.
Another argument in favor o f situating imagination as intermediate may
be recovered from Enn. VI.8.2.17, where imagination, linked here with
experiences of the body, is said to be compelling.159 On the one hand, a compelling
force is primarily associated with the necessity o f matter. On the other hand, since
freedom is determined by a closeness of thinking to the One and thus emerges
through ascension to the good, the intellect is mostly free. But the intellect is free
“when it does not have it in its power not to act”. However compelling it may

152 Emilsson 1988, 107-112.

153 Plotinus. Enn. IV.3.29; IV.3.30; IV.8.8; IV.4.20.17-18.
154 Emilsson 1988, 112. Sec Plotinus. Enn. 1.4.10.19-22; II.9.1.34-36.
155 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. 1V.6.3.5-7; Watson 1994, 4796.
156 Plotinus. Enn. IV.4.3.11; cp. V.3.9.28-36.
157 Although, it is sense-perception that already begins the interpretive work: perceptions for
Plotinus are judgements (kriseis). Cp. Emilsson 1988, 121-125.
15‘ Phantastikon hoion noeron, Plotinus. Enn. IV.3.23.33.
159Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.3.7-16.
160 Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.4.4 sqq.; VI.8.4.6-7.
178 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

seem, freedom consists in the voluntary act of choosing to pursue the good and
therefore in freely accepting the necessity not to act in a contrary way. This “not
able not to” is, however, radically different from the simple necessity of the “not
able” o f matter.
Imagination thus may be compared to a two-sided mirror that reflects in
its images-phantasmata both sensual things and intelligible objects.161 What
phantasmata share in common with physical things is that objects o f the
imagination are visualized by the imagination, first, as extended and, second, as
divisible. Phantasmata are also similar to intelligible objects insofar as both are
stable and exemplify unchanging properties (at least, unless imagination
voluntarily brings change into its image).
Although the teaching o f two imaginations is not thoroughly elaborated in
Plotinus, the very reason for introducing it seems to be dual: on the one hand, to
stress even more the intermediateness o f the imagination as capable of reflecting
both intellectual acts (in their processed form of discursive cogitations, logoi) and
acts o f sensual perception, while still preserving a rigid distinction between the
sensual and the thinkable. On the other hand, the doctrine of two imaginations
(which may be interpreted as two “sides” of one and the same mirror) helps to
explain why imagination may conceive both perfect geometrical figures and
arbitrary images, to which no intelligible form corresponds, no discursive account
(logos) and no sensual object. The former can be taken as contained within the
higher imagination, and the latter as processed by the lower imagination, being
closer to the sensible. This is another reason for taking geometrical objects to be
separate from numbers, because geometrical entities are imaginable, whereas
numbers are only thinkable (cp. 2.1.1).
(C) The mirroring o f imagination is still of a very peculiar kind, fo
phantasia represents physical objects in a non-physical form and intelligible
objects as visualizable through an image, which the noeta do not have. Products of
imagination are thus ambiguous and ontologically different from both sensual and
intelligible objects. This distinguishes phantasia from every other faculty. The
imagination is unable to adequately reproduce both kinds of objects, but always
needs to reconstruct them as not what they are (imaginary representation o f a circle
is neither a physical circle, nor the circle’s ideal notion). The imagination thus
inevitably misrepresents its object, either grasping it in an integral image, or
representing it in a succession, i.e., as being constructed part by part (3.4.3). Such
immanent misrepresentation or inalienable negativity is due to the imagination’s
connection with the irrational, alogon, which comes “from a stroke of something
irrational from outside”.162 Images of imagination are themselves vague and
unclear; they are amydrai phantasiai, described exactly in the same terms as Plato
characterizes matter, khalepon kai amydron eid o sm Once again we encounter the
fundamental ambiguity in imagination. On the one hand, it may reproduce and

161 Plotinus. Enn. IV.3.30; cp. 1.4.10.7 sqq. Blumenthal 1971, 88; Watson 1988. The image
of mirror may come back to Plato’s Tim. 71b-d.
162 Phantasia de plelgei alogoy exothen, Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.15.18-19. Another reading
adopted by Henry and Schwyzer is that imagination is itself a stroke (plege).
163 Plato. Tim. 49a; Plotinus. Enn. 1.8.14.5.
 Part 111: Reason, Imagination and Construction 179

construct its images in an unrestrained way, at will, and subsequently can put its
images in arbitrary associations by connecting, disconnecting and distorting them.
On the other hand, there is a certain irrationality or “darkness” within phantasia,
which cannot be controlled. This is why when describing inner detachment, the
exhortation o f the higher part of the soul to the state of pure being and thinking,
Plotinus argues that it should not only be detached from everything bodily, but
from the imagination as well.164 Imagination is then compelling and compelled in
that it receives the shape o f and for its images from something else: either from
physical bodies (e.g., the head of a man, the tail of a horse, in the image o f a
centaur) or from intelligibles (e.g., the form o f a circle). Imagination thus has
certain features both o f the intelligible and o f the material, but at the same time
phantasia belongs to neither of them exclusively, because imagination has features
that are altogether alien to both intellection and matter.
(D) Imagination represents its objects as quasi-extended images,
connected with a kind o f plenum where psychic images are present as embodied
and as quasi-extended. Intelligible matter was introduced as the indefinite dyad of
the not yet formed intellection-woesis which, in a desperate attempt to grasp its
originating principle and cause, (mis)represents it as a multitude of forms (cp.
2.4.1). In a sense, the originating principle, which is beyond being, can only be
imagined, but not really thought. That is why when Plotinus speaks about the One
in Enn. VI. 8, he proposes an imaginary experiment: in thinking about the One,
“we first assume a space and place (khoran kai topon), a kind of vast emptiness
(khaos), and then, when the space is already there, we bring this nature into that
place which has come to be or is in our imagination, and bringing it into this kind
o f place we inquire in this way as if into whence and how it came here, and as if it
was a stranger we have asked about its presence and, in a way, its substance, really
just as if we thought that it had been thrown up from some depth or down from
some height”.165 In its very notion, imagination cannot be separated from some
kind o f materiality and extension. And in fact, as it will be argued in what follows,
intelligible matter in Plotinus appears to be necessarily connected with imagination
(see 3.2.4). Thus, the distinctive features o f imagination that may be discovered in
Plotinus are its creativity, intermediateness, negativity and affinity to extension.

3.2.3 Main features o f imagination in Neoplatonism: Porphyry, Syrianus, Proclus

Neoplatonists further develop an original theory of imagination. As Watson puts it,

“the Neoplatonist treatment of phantasia is governed by two contrasting attitudes
to it: 1) a suspicion that it is dangerous and to be avoided because of the deceits of
the body, and 2) an acceptance of it in the (Aristotelian) understanding of it as a
middle between sense and intellect, and even a welcoming of it as a possible help
to a glimpse o f a higher world”.166
The features o f imagination that we have seen in Plotinus may also be

164 Plotinus. Enn. V.5.6.17-19.

165 Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.11.15-22.
166 Watson 1994, 4792. In Neoplatonic considerations of imagination the Stoic influence is
traceable.
180 Malter, Imagination and Geometry

discovered as elaborated more explicitly in later Neoplatonic thinkers. Thus, (A)

imagination is taken as an ability to produce images; according to Proclus it is a
thinking capable of producing images, in and through which it tends to know
intelligible objects.16 Important to note is that imagination is also considered a
necessary constituent in the production o f speech (the so-called phantasia lektike
or semantike), which we will have to leave here without further discussion.168 Ideal
objects-noeta are represented as partless in thinking-«oes/s, whereas imagination
takes them in the form o f an image in which one can already discern parts.169
Imagination is capable o f both reproducing and producing images according to
data that may come either from sense-perception or from purely thinkable objects.
In the former case, imagination recollects the form o f various multiple sensual data
and presents them to the further judgement of reasoning-dianoia. In the latter case,
representation moves in the opposite direction, as it were, from intelligible objects-
noeta to their discursive representation in the dianoia, and then to the activity of
imagination. It is on the basis o f images formed in the imagination that we may
further apply and recognize them in physical things, as in the case of the
construction of a mechanism or building a house.
Imagination (B) is to be understood as intermediary, as “between” sense-
perception and discursive logical reasoning.170 Images or products of imagination,
phantasmata, have, on the one hand, certain features common with both physical
things (they have parts, are visualizable and divisible) and with intelligible objects
(both display identical non-changing properties).171 On the other hand,
phantasmata are themselves neither purely physical, nor purely intelligible. As the
content o f imagination, they cannot be reduced to the content o f discursive
thinking. In phantasmata there is always some kind o f materiality or quasi-
spatiality, which is lacking in the objects o f discursive thinking. Phantasmata do
not come to be, unless caused voluntarily by, and in, the imagination. Phantasmata
are quasi-extended: they appear to be extended, but not in the same way as
physical things are, i.e., images of imagination are not spatial. They are also
multiple, so that one and the same object (intelligible or physical) can be
represented by an unlimited number of different images of imagination.
The intermediateness o f imagination is explicitly stressed by Proclus
when he argues in the commentary to Plato’s “Alcibiades” that the intellect-nojv is
precedent to discursive reasoning-dianoia, and that discursive reasoning is itself
precedent to the imagination-phantasia and opinion-cfoxa.172 The notion of
imagination as double (which is already found in Plotinus’ doctrine of two

167 Phantasia noêsis oysa morphôtikë noétôn ethelei gnôsis einai tinôn, Proclus. In RP I
235.18-19.
,6®Proclus. In Crat. 19.8 sqq.; Syrianus. In Met. 9.22; 163.21; Simplicius. In de an. 142.24;
Watson 1988, 133.
169 Syrianus. In Met. 98.26 sqq.
170 Porphyry. Sent. 43; Proclus. In Tim. Ill 286.29 sqq. Sometimes Proclus hesitates whether
it is imagmation-p/iantaî/a or opinion-cfoxa that is to be considered immediately adjacent to
sense-perception. See: Blumenthal 1975 144-146; Blumenthal 1999, 324.
171 Cp. Proclus. In Eucl. 51.17-20.
172 Proclus. In Ale. 140.18-20.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 181

imaginations) is very much in accord with Aristotle—for him imagination is

always connected with both reasoning and sensation.173 As also (Pseudo-)
Philoponus reports, Plutarch of Athens “considers the imagination to be double,
and that its upper boundary, which is to say its originative principle is the [lower]
boundary o f the discursive intellect (dianoètikoy), while its other boundary is the
upper limit of the senses”.174
Here we need to note, however, that imagination is not the only faculty to
be considered intermediate. Discursive reasoning-<fta/?o/a, as Plato argues, is
intermediate (metaxy) between intellect-«oyj and opinion-rfoxa, and is necessarily
involved in the understanding and consideration of geometrical entities.175 Thus, in
Plato we may see a distinction that is not ternary but rather quaternary, that of four
hierarchically ordered mental faculties: intellect-/joys, discursive reasoning-
dianoia, imagination-phantasia and sense-perception-aisthèsis (cp. 3.1.2). This
requires the consideration o f phantasia as a proper mental faculty and not just as
an ability o f being moved by another object (namely, that of sense-perception), as
in Aristotle. Objects of these four faculties are respectively noèta, dianoèta {logoi),
phantasmata and aisthèta.m Obviously, two of these four mental faculties,
discursive reasoning and imagination, can be taken as intermediate, although, first,
reasoning has to be understood as a faculty “higher” than that of the
imagination— i.e., as presenting being in a more adequate way. Dianoia binds the
notions-/ogo/ (for example, of geometrical entities) logically and discursively,
whereas phantasia represents them as if visualizing in a quasi-extended shape. As
intermediate, both discursive reasoning and imagination are involved in
understanding and knowing geometrical entities (and not physical things). Namely,
phantasia seems to visually represent and construct the geometrical figure in a
certain plenum, according to the notion-/ogoi o f discursive thinking. The logos
itself, however, is a representation of the ideal form-noèton of that figure within
the intellect-Hcys. And second, both discursive reasoning and imagination can
obviously be taken as terminal faculties in two triadic sequences o f mental
structures, namely, in noys-dianoia-phantasia and in dianoia-phantasia-aisthèsis.
The first triad represents rather the material aspect of the imagination, in which it
submits entities -phantasmata (in particular, of geometrical figures) for
interpretations and proofs o f discursive reasoning, which borrows the form-eidos
of the objects in question from the intellect-noys. The second triad may be said to
represent the formal and formative aspect of imagination, in which it is taken as
capable o f constructing and reconstructing its objects, in particular, presenting
geometrical figures as produced by movement (see 3.4.5).
Imagination is thus ambiguous in a certain sense, because it reflects in
itself both physical and intelligible objects, both uniting and separating them.

173 Cp. Aristotle. De an. 433b 29; 434a 5-7.

174 Philoponus. In de an. 515,12-15.
175 Plato. RP 511 b-e. Eikasia (“conjecture” or imitation) might be considered similar to
imagination. Still, eikasia, a notion not elaborated at length in Plato, seems to refer rather to
the sphere of sensual images and imitations and, being followed by the opinion-dora, is not
an intermediate faculty connected to discursive thinking.
176Cp. Syrianus. In Met. 24.4; 38.9-10; 82.1.
182 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

Imagination unites sensation and thinking, insofar as it transmits the form o f sense-
data to discursive reasoning. Yet it also separates both, insofar as the form
processed by discursive reasoning is purely intelligible and not imaginable—hence
the already mentioned metaphor o f the imagination as a (double-sided) mirror that
reflects and thus both unites and separates the physical and the intelligible.177
The mirroring of the imagination inevitably implies negativity and
misrepresentation (for although the imaginary circle is perfect, it is generically
different from its paradigm-e;</a?, which is neither visualizable nor circular). This
is because of the admixture of otherness, which does not allow phantasmata to be
simple and communicating as intelligible objects-noeta. In other words, (C) there
is negativity or irrationality (ta aloga) in the imagination.178 Imagination, as
Plutarch says, is that which prevents the human mind from being active, from
always thinking; imagination brings passivity into thinking and splits or “extends”
it into a visualized image-phantasma}19 Thinking should thus stay away from
imagination.180 Thinking o f a merely intelligible form (to noerori) lacks a
visualizable image.181 As Iamblichus puts it, the power of imagination (he
phantastike dynamis) is sleeping when intelligible life is perfectly active.182
Imagination thus appears to veil the intelligible.183 It depicts an invisible,
and only thinkable, iom -eidos in an imaginable shape. Since imagination reveals
eidos as visualizable, however, phantasia simultaneously conceals the ideal form
of what it currently represents.184 In this sense, the imagination inevitably
misrepresents that which it has to convey, and appears to be able to produce the not
(yet) existent. As Synesius, influenced by the Neoplatonic philosophy, states:
imagination takes being (ta onta) away from existence (einai) and brings in non-
being.185 Images o f imagination, phantasmata or simulacra, in E. des Places’
translation, always tend to represent intelligible objects but always inevitably miss
them. Imagination visually represents these objects with all of their properties (for
instance, an imaginable circle contains and displays all the properties included in
the ideal notion or the form o f the circle), but at the same time also necessarily
presents them inadequately, admixing otherness and thus inevitably representing
noetic objects in the way they are not (as extended, divisible, and so on).
If imagination represents a partless ideal object (idea or eidos or noeton)
(D) as quasi-extended or quasi-spatial, then phantasia has to be connected with
some kind of extension in which such an object can be considered—that is,
visualized as having parts and a recognizable shape or image. Since phantasmata,

177 Cp. Proclus. In Eucl. 121.5-6; Iamblichus. De myst. 94.4; De comm. math. sci. 28.7.
178 Cp. Philoponus. In de an. 515.9-11; Proclus. In Tim. I 247.10 sqq.; 269.7-9; Watson
1988, 119.
179 Plutarch ap. Philoponus. In de an. 541.20 sqq.
1,0 Proclus. In Parm. 1020.8 sqq.
181 Iamblichus. De myst. 107.11-12. Cp., however, hai noeseis oyk aney phantasias.
Porphyry. Sent. 16.
182 Iamblichus. De myst. 287.1-3; cp. 250.14.
183 Porphyry. Sent. 47; Iamblichus. De myst. 246.13-14.
184 Iamblichus. De myst. 167.16; cp. 173.5.
185 Synesius. De insomniis, 1316c. See also: Chitchaline 1993.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 183

as constructed and reconstructed by imagination, do not exist as physical things,

such “extension” may be understood as connected with intelligible, and not
physical, matter. In his commentary to the “Alcibiades” Proclus argues that “what
sense-perception ascertains in a manner immersed in matter, exists in a more
immaterial manner in the imagination” 1*6 (cp. 3.2.4).
In the Neoplatonic tradition after Plotinus—in Porphyry, Iamblichus,
Syrianus, Proclus and Simplicius—we find the teaching o f a quasi-material
pneumatic “vehicle” (okhema) o f the soul.187 The notion of this non-physical body
is referred back to Plato and especially to Aristotle. As Dodds points out, for
Aristotle pneyma is “the seat of the nutritive and sensitive soul and the
physiological condition of phantasia”, and, as Aristotle himself explains, it is
analogous to the “quintessentia”—the “fifth element”, which constitutes the stars
(the divine bodies).188 In Porphyry and Proclus there are a number of hints o f a
possible connection o f phantasia to pneyma, or soul’s pneumatic “vehicle”. Even
though Porphyry avoids a direct identification o f imagination with pneyma, he still
asserts that impressions o f imagination, themselves received from the (sensual)
affection, are further brought on to pneyma.1*9 In his commentary to “Timaeus”,
Proclus conceives phantasia to even be some kind of perception-a/si/iews whose
external activity is sense-perception and whose internal activity is imagination,
which looks at the images in pneyma.190 Proclus thus takes the intermediateness of
imagination to be that phantasia unites rather than separates sense-perception and
mental processing o f sensual images. On another occasion, Proclus assigns to
imagination the function o f sensus communis (cp. 3.3).191 However, even if the
imagination is to be conceived as connected to some kind of material or quasi­
material substrate, the purported relation of phantasia to pneyma and okhema is
left without a detailed discussion and is not elaborated into a consistent theory.

3.2.4 Imagination and intelligible matter

Imagination thus has an affinity with some kind of extension; objects of

imagination therefore appear to be similar to physical things, insofar as the former
are divisible and imaginable as extended. Still, phantasmata are fundamentally
different from physical things, insofar as the latter are in constant change—they
incessantly appear and perish. Objects o f imagination can also be considered
engendered, but only in the sense o f being constructed, part by part, by means of
another imaginable object in and by the imagination (see 3.4.3). Phantasmata,
especially geometrical figures as imagined, differ from physical bodily things
insofar as geometricals do not really perish unless they are either no longer

1,6 Proclus. In Ale. 199.5 sqq.

187 See: Dodds ap. Proclus 1963, 313-321; Finamore 1985. There is an even further
distinction into two different vehicles of a higher and lower soul, Blumenthal 1999, 326.
’** Cp. Plato. Phaedo 113d, Phaedr. 247b, Tim. 41e et al. and Aristotle. De gen. Anim. 736b
27 sqq. Dodds ap. Proclus 1963, 315-316.
189 Porphyry. Sent. 29. See also: Smith 1974,152 sqq.
190Proclus. In Tim. Ill 286.20-28.
191See: Blumenthal 1999,324-328.
184 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

retained by the imagination (not actually imagined) or they are transformed by the
imagination into different imaginable object(s). Moreover, geometrical, imaginable
objects, unlike their bodily images (e.g., a circle drawn on paper), exemplify non­
changing properties o f the corresponding intelligible object (the idea or notion of
the circle) of a purely thinkable form, noéton or eidos.m
As it has been argued, intelligible matter has to be understood as both
otherness and multiplicity within the intelligible, and also as geometrical matter,
where geometrical entities exist (see 2.4.1; 2.4.2). Geometricals are not to be found
in the physical world, so that their divisibility, multiplicity (even in those
belonging to the same species) and quasi-extension differ from the divisibility and
multiplicity in and of physical bodies. Therefore, the divisibility of geometrical
objects cannot be sensually perceived. Nor can they be understood by the intellect,
which considers geometricals as indivisible intelligible objects, i.e. as noetic forms.
As visualizable and quasi-extended, geometricals are also not apprehensible by
discursive reasoning, because dianoia considers geometrical objects without
paying attention to their divisibility and quasi-extension. The reason for this is that
the main purpose of discursive reasoning is, on the one hand, to construct
arguments or proofs (e.g., of theorems), or to provide logically valid and justifiable
passages from one established statement to another, putting them in a systematic
order. Thus, it can only be imagination that can present geometrical objects as
divisible and extended (with the only exception being the point, see 2.1.3)— as
considered in intelligible or geometrical matter. Discursive thinking tends to
overcome, however, the multiplicity of the visualizable extension of imaginable
geometricals, bringing them back to the unity o f their rational notions-/ogoz,
unimaginable and unextended in any way (as Syrianus argues, the
mathematical— geometrical—object primarily exists in the dianoetic reason and is
structured under the pattern o f the logos).193 The originality of Proclus’ approach
consists not only in his equation of phantasia with the matter of geometrical
objects, hylé gedmetriké, but also (since imagination can be affected and, as a
special kind o f matter, can embody form and formative principle) in taking
imagination to be the “passive intellect” (noys pathétikos), introduced by Aristotle
as the material component o f thinking, informed by the active and productive
intellect, noyspoiétikos (see 3.4.5).194
In what follows, it will be shown that intelligible matter, as it appears in
Plotinus, is also necessarily connected with the imagination. This would mean that
geometry, as a science and as a practice (in particular, as the kinematic imaginary

,92 See Plato. RP 51 Od sqq.

193 Syrianus. In Met. 85.4-5; Proclus. In Eucl. 55.6 sqq.; cp. Plato. RP. 511a-b. Morrow
notes that Nikolai Hartmann “sees Proclus in this passage anticipating Descartes’ analytic
geometry” (Morrow 1992, 45; see Hartmann 1909, 35). But even if Descartes tries to reduce
geometry to arithmetic (more precisely, to algebra, where signs may be substituted by
numbers), he nevertheless does not get rid of the imagination but, on the contrary,
introduces it even into the sphere of arithmetic, which in ancient mathematics is out of reach
of the imagination.
194 Aristotle. De an. 430a 10-25; Proclus. In Eucl. 52.3; 56.17-18; In RP II 107.14-29; In
Tim. I 244.20-21; III 158.8-10 et al.; cp. Porphyry. Sent. 16; 43.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 185

production o f a geometrical figure, see 3.4.3), is grounded not only in discursive

reason, but in the imagination as well.
Imaginable matter appears in the intellect’s attempts to think that which
cannot be properly thought, namely, the source of being and of thinking (cp. 2.4.1;
3.1.1). When (A) we attempt to think the One, as Plotinus has argued, we cannot
think it otherwise than imagining it put into a certain place. This place cannot be
real (for it is not yet defined, because the One is not yet definite for thinking, and
place defines that of which, and for which, it is the place)195 but it also cannot be
altogether unreal (for, as intelligible extension or indefinite dyad, it represents
pure, and yet undefined, thinking-woes«, which constitutes being). It can therefore
be only an imaginary place, an “as-if’ place (“as-ifness” is also an important
feature o f intelligible matter). Since thinking about the primary source of being
involves non-being, imagination is appropriate here, because it can embody
(visualize or imagine) both being (thinking thinking its own source) and non-being
(the beyond-being). All things other than the One or the good—primarily
intelligible objects-Moe/a—“are satisfied with themselves by their participation in
or imagination o f the Good”.196 Participation-metoysia in the good or the One may
be considered then as providing iorm-noeton, while intelligible matter comes in as
phantasia, as a kind o f imaginary place.
Next, (B) this imaginable place can be characterized in the same terms as
Plato’s khora—as the sheer possibility of the embodiment of a physical thing.197
This imaginary “place”, however, primarily belongs not to the physical but to the
noetic realm, and so is not merely a privative non-being, but also somehow
represents being. Furthermore, (C) the imaginary “place” o f the beyond-being (of
the One) is not a place in a proper sense, but only an “as-if’ place. But since place
is distinct from that o f which it is the place, conceiving the One as if in a place
already presupposes duality. Imaginary place can first be considered as the place
for extended non-physical, or geometrical, entities. This place can be then taken as
quasi-spatial, as a plenum in which continuous, divisible and extended objects can
be embodied. This imaginary place is close in its characteristics (which are vague
and improperly defined) to Plato’s khora and thus also to matter, which has no
proper notion (1.1.2). This imaginary place, however, is only a possibility or pure
potentiality o f extension; it is the material component of a geometrical object, as it
were. As Plotinus argues, matter as such “is not contained in the definition of the
three-dimensionality, nor three-dimensionality in the definition of matter”. 198
Empty space is not extension (neither should it necessarily be extended), but the
extended may be put into space as an empty and non-qualified receptacle. A
scientific theory of place, which becomes space in modem science, becomes
possible only when the imaginary “as-if’ status of the receptacle is abandoned, so
that the space is considered already intrinsically measured, the real space of and for
being.199 The other, complementary formal component that constitutes the

195 Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 209b I sqq.

196 Plotinus. Enn. VI.8.13.46.
197 Plato. Tim. 52a.
'9* Plotinus. Enn. VI. 1.26.24-25; cp. VI.27.36.51.
199 Sec: Nikulin 1993.
186 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

particular identity o f a geometrical object, measurable and extended (i.e., one-,

two- or three-dimensional), is the ideal form, the noeton.
Imaginary place is then the locus where forms or intelligible objects may
be considered embodied and apprehended as extended without really being
extended. Such place is not anything that might have an essence or might be a
substance; it is only a capacity to acquire form which, however different, is both
present in bodily spatiality and in imaginary quasi-spatiality. The imaginary
extension is not in any way organized: it is, as Armstrong notes, close to chaos,
which Plotinus takes, “as Aristotle does, as the empty space or place which things
occupy”.200 Alexander’s interpretation of intelligible matter as diastasis (2.4) also
suggests a striking similarity between imagination and hyle noete.
(D) The ambiguity of imagination, which makes Plotinus acknowledge
two phantasias (see 3.2.2), parallels the distinction between intelligible and bodily
matter. Finally, the ability to retain images within the imagination and to visualize
them as quasi-extended is connected with the faculty of memory, which represents
that very perception in the form o f a remembrance or a retained image. In the
case of a geometrical figure, it is, however, both memory and discursive reasoning
that are involved in the apprehension of an image provided by perception, since the
faculty o f imagination is itself involved in the operation of discursive reasoning.202
As we have seen, even the intellect is not free from a certain—
intelligible— materiality, exemplified through the initial indefiniteness, aoristos
dyas, o f the not yet defined thinking-noes«, which intends to think its own origin.
An analysis of the features o f imagination— its creativity, its intermediate position
between the sensual and the thinkable, its connection with inalienable irrationality
and its quasi-spatial character—may now unveil the relation of intelligible matter
to imagination. Indeed, all of the above-mentioned features of the imagination are
equally applicable to intelligible matter as well.
First o f all, one might ascribe a certain creativity to intelligible matter,
insofar as indefinite thinking qua aoristos dyas, in its striving towards the source
of being, brings forth the (finite, according to Plotinus) multitude of forms. The
One is beyond any possible representation, however, and the dyad, as mere
potentiality o f being, is undefined. The creativity of intelligible matter is then only
illusory or imaginary. Imagination creates its objects within itself, but only as if,
because it makes visualizable—as phantasmata—that which already is as an object
of thinking. Second, irrationality is also found in intelligible matter, because, as
primary indefinite potency, hyle noete is alogical before it is determined in
concrete noetic forms. Third, intelligible matter is also intermediary— it is “in
between” pure being (noetic forms) and mere non-being (bodily matter). And last,
intelligible matter is “plenum” and khdra as an empty, not a definite “place” for the
embodiment o f intelligible objects-noeto and geometrical figures.
In other words, imagination and intelligible matter have much in
common. Such a conclusion is supported by a passage from the treatise “On the

200 Plotinus. Enneads VII, 1988,262-263. Cp. Hesiod. Theog. 116; Aristotle. Phys. 208b 31-
33.
201 Plotinus. Enn. IV.3.25 sqq; esp. IV.3.29.26-28.
202 Cp. Aristotle. De an. 431a 17; Themistius. In de an., ad. loc.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 187

Impassibility o f Things Without Body” (Enn. III.6), where Plotinus speaks about
imagination as matter to the soul: “in the soul the mental picture (eidolon) is
imagination, while the nature of the soul is not phatasmal [i.e. not of the nature of
the image, oyk eiddloy]-, and although the imagination in many ways seems to lead
the soul and take it wherever it wants to, the soul none the less uses it as if it [the
imagination] was matter or something like it (analogon).”203 Imagination is thus
located between the intelligible and the bodily. Similar to intelligible matter,
imagination acquires and embodies images. At the same time, this similarity does
not yet make both identical, because hyle noete represents the fundamental
otherness within thinking-woey/i— it represents noesis as indefinite—while the
imagination is secondary to noys, only reflecting noys and imitating the noesis in
its thinking of the noeta in a visualizable, or inadequate, form.

3.3 Imagination in Descartes

It is not easy to establish a univocal sense in which Descartes uses the notion of
imagination. He does not elaborate any single consistent theory of imagination.
Moreover, his treatment of imagination appears to be different in different
writings, which is why Descartes’ considerations of imagination need
interpretation. In the “Discourse”, Descartes defines imagination by its activity and
by its object, as a specific “way o f thinking specially suited to material things” .204
In the ’’Meditations”, he presents imagination as an ability to visualize inwardly, to
contemplate, to adequately grasp “the shape or image of a corporeal thing” and “an
application of the cognitive faculty to a body that is intimately present to it”.205 The
activity o f imagination consists in the apprehension, perception, copying and
formation of images of corporeal figures; these figures can be both physical things
and geometrical figures, since they are not different in the way they are present to
the imagination. In a more narrow sense, imagination is involved in the process of
transmitting and submitting sensory perceptions to the mind. The scheme of this
process is appropriated by Descartes from Aristotle: sense-data are transmitted to,
and coordinated in, the “common sense” and are further interpreted by
imagination.206 Imagination is thus a faculty or a mode of thinking involved in

203 Plotinus. Enn. III.6.15.16-22.

204 Descartes. Disc. IV, AT VI 37. See also: Roy 1944. Klein argues that Descartes’ concept
of imagination is Stoic in origin. - Klein 1968, 198*199.
205 “...Nihil aliudest imaginari quàm rei corporeaefìguram, seu imaginem, contemplari.” -
Descartes. Med. II, AT VII 28; Med. VI, AT VII 71-72; To Mersenne, 25 December 1639,
AT II 622. Cp. Williams 1973, 26-45.
206 Cp. Aristotle. De an. 425a 13-b 11; 427b 11 sqq. See Gilson 1979, 137-140. In Aristotle
the notion of “common sense” (aisthèsis koinè, sensus communis) is mentioned only a few
times (De an. 425a 27; De mem. 450a 10; Part anim. 686a 31; cp. De somno 454b 25-27;
De an. 426b 12 sqq. and Themistius. In de an. 84.35 sqq.) and designates the common
nature, which is inherent in all particular senses but exemplified differently in them. Due to
the sensus communis, one is able to perceive the so-called “common sensibles” (size,
number, unity, duration, rest and movement); to perceive “incidental sensibles” (De an.
418a 21, e.g.: “the white thing’s being the son of Diares”); to perceive that one perceives; to
18S Matter, Imagination and Geometry

processing images o f extended things.207

What is the relation of imagination to corporeal substance? On the one
hand, imagination appears to belong properly to the mind as one o f its modes,
which allows for conception o f the corporeal (although imagination does not have
a special organ). Imagination appears then to be a part of thinking-cogitation,
which in a restricted sense may be taken as sensory perception (in this sense,
sentire is nothing else but cogitare).20®As Descartes writes to Gibieuf of 1642, “I
do not see any difficulty in understanding on the one hand that the faculties of
imagination and sensation belong to the soul, because they are species of thoughts,
and on the other hand that they belong to the soul only in so far as it is joined to the
body, because they are kinds o f thoughts without which one can conceive the soul
in all its purity.” Imagination is thus present to the finite mind because it is
connected to die body: imagination is “proper” to humans yet it belongs to the
mind not as thinking, but rather as embodied. In a sense, it is a sui generis purpose
o f imagination to represent the corporeal and the extended to the not extended.
Because o f that, although imagination, on the account of the “Meditations”,
belongs to the mind and cannot be understood without it, the mind as a thinking
thing has to be understood without and besides the imagination. The power of
imagining (vis imaginandi) differs from the power of understanding (vis
intelligendi) and does not constitute human essence (as the finite thinking
substance).210 The (subjective) finite mind, the “I”, is thus not imagination. Since,
however, it is the imagination (now taken as a mental capacity) that helps the finite
mind to get rid o f the body and then of the imagination itself, such a reduction
itself becomes possible only because of the imagination. I am therefore defined by
imagination; in a sense, negatively I am imagination. “What else am I?” asks
Descartes, “I will use my imagination”.211 In other words, in order to show that
imagination does not belong to my essence, I have to use that very imagination.
Therefore, it is primarily imagination that has the power of self-negation. Such a
conclusion is in agreement with Descartes' essentialism, for it is easier to say what
I am (or, negatively, what I am not) than to establish an existential or ontological
status o f the I am.
On the other hand, imagination appears to be connected not only to the
mental but also immersed in the corporeal, because imagination conceives
corporeal images— images of extended things—and further brings them to the

discern between the objects of two senses; and to give an account of why senses are all
inactive at the same time during sleep (cp. Ross 1949, 139-142).
207 Cp. Tye 1991, 33-60.
20SDescartes. Med. VI AT VII 29.
209 Descartes. To Gibieuf, 19 January 1642, AT III 479. Since an idea is taken by Descartes
to be a mental image of whatever kind, he has to stress specifically in his objection to
Gassendi: “you restrict the term ‘idea’ to images in the imagination, whereas I extend it to
cover any object of thought” .- Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VI 366. Cp. Roy 1944, 9-
55; Williams 1978, 231; Cottingham 1986, 126; Sepper 1996, 253-254.
210 Descartes. Med. VI AT VII 73, 78.
211 In the French edition of the “Meditations” it is also added to this place: “to see if I am
something more” .- Med. II, AT VII 27.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 189

consideration o f the discursive faculty of the mind-reason. This is why Descartes

distinguishes between imaginario (facultas imaginandi) as mental imagination, and
phantasia as corporeal imagination (although he still finds it difficult to explain in
general the connection and the interaction between the extended and the non­
extended). Corporeal imagination is “a genuine part of the body” and represents
corporeal images (corporeal ideas, which are physiological events), which, being
extended and thus material, are not ideas properly. The mental imagination is a
faculty o f the mind that acts on images of the corporeal imagination and produces
non-extended images submitted to the discursive mind-reason, already capable of
thinking ideas without images.212
Among the early notes of Descartes preserved by Leibniz, we find a brief
one, stating that “just as imagination employs figures to conceive of bodies, so, in
order to frame ideas of spiritual things, the intellect makes use of certain bodies
which are perceived through the senses...”.213 This statement should not be
overemphasized; Descartes does not develop it in other texts.214 Still, it clearly
suggests that, on the one hand, the imagination as corporeal connects bodies to
figures, by which one can reliably understand geometrical figures. On the other
hand, intellect as ingenium is taken to include the mental imagination, connecting
bodies, or rather their images, to the spiritualia-ideas. What arises here is the
question (discussed in 3.3.1) of how we should understand the ontological status of
geometrical objects and their relation to bodies, mental entities and the mental
imagination.
If imagination primarily aims at representing the corporeal, as well as the
possible affections connected to it, and there is a further distinction between mental
and corporeal imagination, then how does the mind-reason conceive of the
corporeal (extended or material) through imagination? First of all, in the “Regulae”
corporeal imagination-p/iiJ«fana is portrayed, “along with the ideas existing in it,
as being nothing but a real body with a real extension and shape”.215 On the
account o f the “Treatise on Man”, imagination as corporeal is located, together

2,2 Cp. Descartes. Reg. XII, AT X 414; Med. IV, AT VII 57; Second Set of Replies, AT VII
160-161; Third Set of Replies, AT VII 181. The distinction between imaginatio and
phantasia is supported by Fóti and Sepper against Marion (see: Fóti 1986, 635; Sepper
1989, 387-389; Sepper 1996, 272, 402). Marion argues that imagination in Descartes may
be understood “de manière purement mécanique”, because images-phantasmata are
spatially transmitted.- Marion 1981, 124-126. On the notion of corporeal ideas, which
Descartes uses in his earlier works to denote corporeal sense-impressions, see: E. Michael;
F. S. Michael 1989,33 sqq.
213 “Kf imaginatio vtitur figuris ad corpora concipienda, ita intellectus vtitur quibusdam
corporibus sensibilibus ad spiritualia figurando...” - Descartes. Cogitationes Privatae, AT
X 217. Cp. Fóti 1986,632-633; Sepper 1989, 381; Sepper 19%, 46 sqq.
214 From this note Sepper deduces a hierarchy of geometrical figures-bodies-spiritual entities
(Sepper 1996, 117-118). Nothing in Descartes’ other writings, however, suggests that
physical bodies might be conceived in any way intermediate between physical and mental
objects.
215 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 441, italics added; cp. Comments on a Certain Broadsheet,
AT VIIIB 364. As Joachim puts it, “the phantasia is a genuine part of the body and
phantasmata are bodily changes in it.” - Joachim 1957,23.
190 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

with common sense, in the brain, in the pineal gland. Unlike the intellectual or
mental imagination (which forms non-corporeal, and thus not extended, images of
extended things that further allow the mind-reason to recognize or to form the
corresponding ideas), the corporeal imagination operates within corporeal images
or phantasms, which serve as the material for further recognition and interpretation
by the mental imagination.216
Corporeal images, also called corporeal forms or figures, are
indispensable to the discursive mind in understanding the extended. Corporeal
forms for Descartes are “not only things which somehow represent the position of
the edges and surfaces o f objects, but also anything which...can give soul occasion
to perceive movement, size, distance, colors, sounds, smells and other such
qualities”.217 As Descartes also explains to Gassendi, “the powers of understanding
and imagining do not differ merely in degree but are two quite different kinds of
mental operation. For in understanding the mind employs only itself, while in
imagination it contemplates a corporeal form”.218
But is the mind-reason able to apprehend ideas without images? The
earlier Descartes is not always unambiguous in his use of the term “idea”, as we
see, for example, in his reference to “the simple ideas in the human imagination
out o f which all human thoughts are compounded”.219 In the “Regulae”, however,
he uses the notion o f “idea” in a more restricted sense, referring to the content of
the corporeal imagination, an image or a “ look” of a corporeal thing.220 Later, in
the “Meditations”, Descartes suggests that even if the mind-reason thinks of
spiritual things—such as the ideas o f substance and of God—without images, the
ideas o f extended material things are accompanied by images, although not
corporeal but mental (cp. 3.1.4).22 Thus, in the “Meditations” we find a succession
of, first, the extended corporeal images or forms of the corporeal imagination,
which are figures and represent an extended object, projected from the external
sense organs and from inner parts of the brain onto the surface of the pineal gland,
that part o f the body where corporeal is transmitted, affects and is affected by the
mental (this affection is mutual).222 Second come the images of mental
imagination, which are formed according to corporeal images (in fact, Descartes
does not exclude a possibility o f forming the corporeal images under the pattern of

2,6 See: Beck 1952, 219; Scpper 1996, 272.

217 Descartes. Treatise on Man, AT XI 176; cp. Ibid., 202.
218 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 385.
219 Descartes. To Mersenne, 18 December 1629, AT I 81.
220 Sepper even argues that in Descartes there is no thinking without phantasms. This might
be true only in Descartes’ earlier writings, e.g. in the “Regulae” where, as Sepper himself
recognizes, the mind-reason (intellect) and imagination operate yet in concord, whereas in
the “Meditations” there is a sharp divide between the two. - Sepper 1996, 7, 97, 242, 245,
266. Cp. Kenny 1987, 106-107.
221 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 139; cp. Ibid., AT VII 160-161; Med. Ill, AT
VII 37; “...by ‘idea’ I do not just mean the images depicted in the [corporeal] imagination
(fantaisie); indeed, in so far as these images are in the corporeal imagination, 1 do not use
that term for them at all”. - To Mersenne, July 1641, AT III 392. Cp. also: Princ. 1 73, AT
VIIIA 37.
222 Descartes. Reg. XII, AT X 415.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 191

mental images). And, third, there are the ideas of the mind-reason, in terms of
which the mind interprets and understands figures (both physical and geometrical)
and which correspond not to corporeal but to mental images, because ideas have no
affinity to extended corporeal images. The images of mental imagination act as if
they are playing the role o f intermediary between images of the corporeal
imagination and ideas o f the mind— but only as if, since images of mental
imagination are in no way ontologically commensurable with those of the
corporeal imagination.223 The corporeal and the mental are still separated from
each other and the mechanism o f their interaction—in particular, of the corporeal
and the mental imagination—is neither clearly explained, nor firmly established,
because the communication between mind and body amounts in Descartes to the
unresolved problem of embodiment and interaction of the spiritual and the
corporeal.
Historical development and changes in the Cartesian understanding o f the
notion o f imagination are traced in a detailed and comprehensive study by Sepper.
According to him, Descartes does not use the notion of imaginatio in any special
technical sense in his early writings (between 1618 and 1621, mostly scattered
through a number o f brief notes, for example in “Cogitationes privatae” and
“Musicae Compendium”), even if it is of central importance. Instead, he uses the
notion o f imagination to refer to various processes of visualizing and constructing
(including auditory synthesizing): for example, the division of a continuous
magnitude, the bringing o f parts o f a song into a unity, the visualization of
geometrical constructions, and so on.224 Mental imagination is taken here as
belonging to the cognitive power and is primarily discursive, involved in the
discovery of propositions and in the consideration o f order and proportions, or in
visualizing processes of geometric construction. Later in the “Regulae”—where
imagination is portrayed as belonging to the mind-ingenium— Descartes, partly
under the influence o f Beeckman, presents imagination as figurative, applicable to
recognition and to the conception o f images of memory, of geometrical figures
(taken, at the end o f the “Regulae”, to be o f the dimension not higher than two),
and o f corporeal images involved in geometrical algebra. The consecutive
diminution o f the cognitive role of imagination in Descartes’ later works
(particularly in the “Meditations”) characterizes a shift in the Cartesian
understanding o f imagination. As Sepper argues, imagination is initially split into
bodily (image-making) and mental or intellectual (poetic-cognitive), of which the
latter is further considered two-fold: as producing and conceiving mathematical
images o f corporeal things (assigned partly to the body and partly to the intellect),
and as cognizing in the intellectual synthesis o f thinking. Beginning with 1637, any
uniform and unique theory o f imagination can hardly be traced. There is a sharper
distinction and dissociation between an image of a figure present in a sense-organ
and in the corporeal imagination and the idea of that figure in the mind. An

223 Due to the non-distinction of corporeal and mental imagination, Gaukroger’s attempt to
portray imagination in Descartes as intermediate between the intellect (reason) and the
corporeal world (imagination is to represent then abstract algebraic entities as geometrical
magnitudes) is unconvincing. - Gaukroger 1992, 109-111.
224 Descartes. Compendium Musicae, AT X 89 sqq.
 192 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

inability to explain neither infinity nor the physiology o f perception (both appear to
be beyond the representative capacity of imagination) illustrates some problems
now encountered by Descartes' earlier account of the imagination. Moreover, the
mental imagination of the “Passions” seems to be driven more by the will than by
the mind-intellect. Imaginings appear here among the perceptions of the soul
dependent mostly on the activity o f volition. Thus, the development of the notion
of imagination in Descartes appears to be from the imaginatio o f the
“Regulae”— as a hypostasis o f the vis cognosce™ involved in discursive
apprehension o f proportional relations—to the facultas opposed to, and separate
from, the intellect (in the “Meditations”), active and spontaneous under the guise
o f volition.225
In what follows, we will concentrate on a discussion of the Cartesian
treatment o f imagination without focusing on the changes in Descartes’
understanding o f imagination throughout his writings. Our primary interests are the
ontological status o f imagination; the possibility of it being intermediate; its
relation to infinity; and its connection to geometrical objects. Concerning the last
case, we will also discuss the difference between corporeal and geometrical
representation in corporeal and mental imagination, and the way in which the
imagination relates the geometrical to the physical.

3.3.1 Mind, imagination and the infinite

Imagination is thus twofold for Descartes, appearing as mental and corporeal.226 In

order to explain different mental faculties in a uni vocal manner, in the
“Regulae”— where mind is taken as ingenium— Descartes further introduces a
notion of cognitive power, vis cognoscens. This “power is sometimes passive,

225 Sepper 1989, 382-383, 397-401; Sepper 1996, 6, 28-46, 102-113, 208, 244, 254, 276 et
al.; see also: F6ti 1986, 635, 641-642. Sepper is reluctant, however, to draw conclusions
about any possible immanent logic of development of the Cartesian notion of imagination,
mostly providing factual descriptions and their possible interpretations, while F6ti stresses
the partiality and incompleteness of such development. Cp. A. White 1990, 20-24;
Gaukroger 1995, 124. Descartes. Passions I 19-20, AT XI 343-344.
226 Similarly, memory also appears to be distinguished into mental and corporeal: on the one
hand, memory (placed by Descartes in the pineal gland or conarium) is a corporeal capacity
of keeping and preserving corporeal images of past events, although not all of them, for
many are lost (To Mersenne, 1 April 1640, AT III 47). These images are of the same nature
as the images of imagination and are stored in the "folds” of the brain, which “are not unlike
the folds which remain in this paper after it has once been folded” (To Meyssonnier, 29
January 1640, AT III 20; cp. To Mersenne, 11 June 1640, AT III 84; 6 August 1640, AT III
143-144). Memory preserves images of external objects, as well as ideas of internal
passions, which come from the “common sense” (Treatise on Man, AT XI 177-178;
Discourse V, AT VI 55). But on the other hand, as in the case with imagination, Descartes
has to recognize memory also as a mental capacity: “As for memory, I think that the
memory of material things depends on the traces which remain in the brain after an image
has been imprinted on it; and that memory of intellectual things depends on some other
traces which remain in the mind itself’. - Descartes. To [Mesland], 2 May 1644, AT IV 114;
cp. To [Amauld], 4 June 1649, AT V 192-193.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 193

sometimes active; sometimes resembling the seal, sometimes the wax...It is one
and the same power: when applying itself along with imagination to the ‘common’
sense, it is said to see, touch etc.; when addressing itself to the imagination alone,
in so far as the latter is invested with various figures (ftguris), it is said to
remember; when applying itself to the imagination in order to form new figures, it
is said to imagine or conceive (imaginari vel concipere); and lastly, when it acts on
its own, it is said to understand. ...According to its different functions, then, the
same power is called either pure intellect, or imagination, or memory, or sense-
perception”.227 An act of the mental imagination, which forms mental images, thus
has to be understood as an application of one universal spiritual power to the
corporeal imagination, where extended figures are located.
Cognitive power is not really different from thought—Descartes stresses
its incorporeality (neque enim in rebus corporeis aliquid omnino huic simile
invenitur). Cognitive power thinks or understands only when acting by itself. But
then it is hard to draw a real distinction between cognitive power and the mind-
ingenium. Cognitive power has to be taken rather as a unique determinant in, and
of, cognition, different from the other faculties—such as sense-perception, memory
and imagination, which are thus the determined. Consequently, reason as cognitive
power should be, on the one hand, different from the other three faculties, because
it assumes different “functions” in these faculties. Yet on the other hand, reason
also cannot differ from them, because it is in these “functions” that this same mind,
as cognitive power, is variously represented as referring to the body (in particular,
as corporeal imagination), displaying itself either as reason properly, or as
imagination, memory, or the senses. Obviously, Descartes’ intention is to explain,
or rather deduce, various faculties involved in cognition from one single simple
(and not yet differentiated) thinking as applied to the sensus communis, to the
corporeal imagination and to itself, operating “on its own”. Only in the latter case
the mind-ingenium is the mind simpliciter, whereas in the operation of all the other
faculties— sensation, memory and imagination—the corporeal imagination is
essentially involved as the material aspect of these faculties or mental capacities.
Descartes does not abandon this position even later, portraying imagination as one
of the different modes o f thinking, façons de penser, together with understanding,
willing and sensation (vouloir, entendre, imaginer, sentir), and arguing in the
“Principles” that together with sensation and will, imagination is intelligible only
in the mind.228
What is the relation between the mind as reason, and mental imagination?
First o f all, they have to be firmly separated: even if the imagination may be
considered a façon de penser, it is to be strictly distinguished from the mind as
reason in the proper sense, intellectio ab imaginatione secernitur}29 Why? Because
even if reason and imagination may affect each other, the mind-reason thinks,
whereas the imagination depicts.230 Mental imagination, a faculty of the mind, is

227 Descartes. Reg. XII, AT X 415-416.

228 Descartes. To Mersenne, end of May 1637, AT I 366; Princ. I 53, AT VIIIA 25.
229 Descartes. Med. Synopsis, AT VII 15.
230 ‘Worn cum intellectus moveri possit ab imaginatione, vel contra agere in illam".
Descartes. Reg. XII, AT X 416.
194 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

responsible for transforming corporeal images o f the corporeal imagination into

mental images, representing the former for being further processed in the ideas by
reason. It is only by reason that the mind can know that extension exists and that it
is an extended substance, but extension in its representation can be pictured only
in, and by, the imagination. Reason can think (in particular, can think itself) by
referring to images, but it can also think and understand without them (which is
especially stressed in the “Meditations”). Reason is therefore to be considered
superior to the imagination. Because imagination primarily refers to the corporeal,
it may assist reason when representing the extended—the corporeal and the
mathematical—but impedes reason when it is thinking about the not extended.231
A major difference between reason and mental imagination is that
imagination can represent images that do not exist in reality.232 Imagination hides
and clothes thought with visual and visualizable shapes, as if veiling the
understanding in, and by, innumerable bodily images.233 And even if the objects of
imagination may be considered not real, the imagination itself still cannot be
considered not real. Imagination represents negativity in picturing the not real and
thus may embody the “falsehood and uncertainty” and become an obstacle for
truth, and therefore has to be eliminated or suspended even as mental.234 In the
“Meditations”, where Descartes seems to be preoccupied with the necessity to
delimit imagination and describe it more closely, he argues that through
introspection (“I find in m yself’, invenio in me) one has to recognize the faculty of
imagination, together with sense-perception (facultates imaginandi et sentiendi), as
“special modes o f cogitation” (modis cogitandi). As Descartes explains to Burman,
imagination is thus considered parallel to sensation but is different from sensation
in that in sense-perception images are imprinted by external objects, whereas in the
imagination they are imprinted by the mind itself without the presence of external

231 Cp. Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 440-441.

232 Descartes. To Elizabeth, May or June 1645, AT IV 218-219.
233 Descartes. [To Silhon], March or April 1648, AT V 137. In his early notes Descartes
claims that truth is more accessible to poets through imagination: “It may seem surprising to
find weighty judgements in the writings of the poets rather than the philosophers. The
reason is that the poets were driven to write by enthusiasm and the force of imagination. We
have within us the sparks of knowledge, as in a flint: philosophers extract them through
reason (ratio), but poets force them out through the sharp blows of the imagination, so that
they shine more brightly”. - Descartes. Cogitationes Privatae, AT X 217. The difference
between reason and imagination is, however, already recognized and established.
234 Although it is not imagination, but reason qua judgement that is primarily responsible for
error. In the “Meditations” and the “Principles” it is will that is the primary source and cause
of error through non-coincidence of the scope of will implied in the judgement with the
scope of reason. This happens because the will can easily extend onto that which is not
clearly perceived—it is will that is primarily infinite or, rather, indefinite—and thus can
cause error. - Descartes. To Mersenne, 27 February 1637, AT I 350; The Search for Truth,
AT X 508; Reg. XIV 442-444; Med. IV, AT VII 56-58; Princ. I 34-35, AT VIIIA 18. Cp.:
imagination which is “the part of the mind that most helps mathematics, is more of a
hindrance than a help in metaphysical speculation”. - Descartes. To Mersenne, 25 December
1639, AT II 622.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 195

objects.235 Does this mean that imagination is only reproductive, or may it also be
considered productive? Later in the “Principles”, the will begins to play a much
more important role as an active principle in cognition, whereas understanding,
imagination and sense-perception are presented as passive perceptions o f the
intellect. Here Descartes appears to introduce just another dichotomy within the
imagination: not only mental/ corporeal, but also mental/ volitional imagination. In
the latter distinction, imagination as a mode of perception in a broader sense
appears to be receptive and reproductive, whereas imagination linked to the acts of
will is active— spontaneous and productive.236
As it has been stated, imagination cannot be understood outside o f the
cognitive activity o f the mind-reason, but reason can be understood without
imagination. Reason, as pure intellection, is opposed to imagination and sense-
perception, insofar as intellection is independent of the body. Moreover, reason
is able to think that which imagination cannot represent. The preservation of a
clear image in the imagination requires a peculiar effort (contentio), which may be
above the capacity of the imagination—an effort not required for discursive
understanding.238 This constitutes another major difference between mind as
intellectio pura and mental imaginatio. Imagination is thus limited cognitively but
not productively, since it may always imagine a magnitude bigger and larger than
the one given.
A further important distinction between mind-reason and mental
imagination is exemplified in sleeping: when “we are asleep and are aware that we
are dreaming, we need imagination in order to dream, but to be aware that we are
dreaming we need only the intellect”.239 Reason is thus always aware of something.
In particular, reason is aware o f itself and o f its present state, which means that
reason is fundamentally reflective, whereas the imagination is not: every act of
thinking and o f thinking something is, and always has to be, accompanied by the
awareness o f thinking. On the contrary, in an act of imagining, the imagination
should not necessarily be aware of imagining; moreover, it is reason that can
assure such an awareness. And even when in the later works of Descartes the will
assumes the role o f the leading active mental faculty, it is reason that is aware of
willing. Every act o f will is always necessarily accompanied by rational
perception— by the understanding o f the fact of willing—and thus it is still the
mind-reason that is primarily reflective.240
Escaping ambiguity, according to Funkenstein, appears to be one o f the
major intentions of early modem science and philosophy, which aspire to present
most complex problems in an understandable fashion, to assist others in using the

235 Descartes. Med. VI, AT VII 78; Conversation with Burman, AT V 162-163; cp. Princ. I
32, ATVI1IA 17.
236 Descartes. Princ. 132-33, AT VIIIA 17-18; cp. Med. IV, AT VII 56-57.
237 Cp. Rozemond 1993,97-114.
238 Cp. Descartes. Med. VI, AT VII 72 and the discussion of the impossibility of imagining
the chiliagon in what follows.
239 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 358-359.
240 “For it is certain that we cannot will anything without thereby perceiving that we are
willing it.” - Descartes. Passions I 19, AT XI 343.
196 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

faculty o f reason (cp. 2.2), and to avoid ambiguous perceptions and thoughts.241 In
Plotinus imagination is marked by profound ambiguity (3.2.2). But Descartes too
cannot altogether escape ambiguity in his treatment o f imagination, which appears
as both corporeal and as mental, as the image-making power.242
The Cartesian mind is fundamentally discursive. It moves from one single
clear idea to another, and in this way arrives at a propositional truth that may not
be immediately self-evident. The discursive mind grasps the truth o f such
axiomatic statements as ‘th e whole is greater than its part” or “if equal magnitudes
are added to the equals, the result is equal”. The mental activity that appears to be
reflective may be, however, either discursive or non-discursive. Discursive
reflectivity is that of the discursive mind, and non-discursive reflectivity is that
involved in one single act o f thinking. In Descartes such an act may fiirther be
either the act o f cogito or the immediate clear understanding of an idea—the idea
that can also be visualized in and by the corporeal imagination and then conceived
by the mental imagination. In the act of cogito, the mind is immediately aware of
itself without any image. The mind thus can think itself in the pure awareness of
cogito. But imagination is not immediately reflective, for it cannot imagine itself.
On the contrary, the imagination can imagine itself only in and through an object
o f imagination— i.e., itself imagining an image, but not itself as a capacity of
imagining. In other words, imagination is not reflective for Descartes, which
constitutes another important distinction between understanding and imagination.
Here, however, Descartes agrees with Aristotle and the Neoplatonists, for whom
imagination is not reflective either: reflectivity is the privilege of the intellect-ftojv
only. The crucial point of difference is that for Plotinus and the Neoplatonic
philosophers, imagination is a border faculty; it is “between” senses and thinking,
reflecting both but itself lacking the gift o f reflectivity due to the irrationality and
negativity involved in imagination (3.2.2; 3.2.3). In a sense, for Descartes
imagination may be also considered a medium o f representation for the intellect
and a power standing between sense-perception and understanding.243 But even
then imagination is not really a border faculty because, first, Descartes reserves the
possibility of thinking without images of imagination and, second, imagination in
Descartes is split into corporeal and mental without a clear elucidation of the

241 Funkenstein 1986,28 sqq. Cp. Owens 1963, 111 sqq.

242 There also is a certain ambiguity in the fact that—unlike in Aristotle, for whom
imagination is proper to most animals (De an. 428a 9-11)—for Descartes imagination is not
present in animals (To Gibieuf, 19 January 1642, AT III 479); animals are not supposed to
have souls. However, on another occasion Descartes does ascribe imagination to them, as in
the experiment with a hen: drawing lines right in front of its eyes prevents the activity of
hen’s imagination to such an extent that it becomes immobile (To Mersenne, 2 November
1646, AT IV 555).
243 Cp. F6ti 1986, 636; Sepper 1996, 2, 119-120. An interesting problem raised by Sepper is
whether the activity of imagination may take place without the objects of imagination. Since
imagination is not reflective, it cannot have an immediate awareness of itself without
images, whereas reason knows itself primarily in an act of reflective thinking. Therefore,
reason does not appear to be able to notice the activity of the mental imagination in the
absence of the objects of imagination.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 197

mechanism o f their interaction.

The essence o f a thing is accessible to reason alone and not to the mental
imagination, as Descartes argues in the Second “Meditation”: in a piece of wax die
imagination may only vaguely grasp an “immeasurable number” of different
figures and shapes possibly implemented in that piece, or even produced by the
imagination itself.244 Why is this the case? Descartes argues that the potentially
infinite number o f possible figures contained in a piece of wax cannot possibly be
clearly discernible all at once; they cannot be visualizable by the imagination,
which can represent only a finite number o f features within an object or a finite
number o f objects. Since any piece o f extension can assume an indefinitely great
number o f forms and the imagination is unable to grasp the infinite, in/ini, then
extension in general can be imagined only vaguely (or only in the simplest cases,
when an extended piece has small number o f visualizable features). The nature or
essence o f extension, as it has already been pointed out, can only be thought:
“bodies are not strictly perceived by the senses or the faculty of imagination but by
intellect alone, and...this perception derives not from their being touched or seen
but from their being understood”.245 Extension can be easily perceived by the
imagination, but the imagination is unable to represent extension as such.
Imagination can only display a particular species o f magnitude, not “in isolation
from subjects” (from shaped figures), but only extension or magnitude in
concrete—as limited, and thus as specifically determined.246 In examining a body,
reason can only be supported by the evidence of imagination.247 Since imagination
does not reveal (it rather conceals) the essence of the extended, the imaginable
visualization o f an extended—physical or geometrical—body does not yet prove
anything about it, for the strict proof is reserved for reason alone, although
imagination may provide useful support and evidence for reason (for example, in a
geometrical proof). This means that extended entities, both physical and
geometrical, are represented equally and in the same imagination, and are to be
further reduced to their non-imaginable form in the mind as reason. Descartes
insists that knowledge arises only when the mind is separated and freed from the
imagination, that understanding and imagination are not to be confused, and that
“the powers o f understanding and imagining do not differ merely in degree but are
two quite different kinds o f mental operation. For in understanding, the mind
employs only itself, while in imagination it contemplates a corporeal form”.248
Thus, since die essence o f matter is extension, and extension can be represented in
an infinite number o f ways (and yet is the same extension), neither the infinite nor
the extension can be known in their essence to the imagination, but to the mind
alone.
Imagination thus does not “see” the true essence of a thing not only

244 Descartes. Med. II, AT VII 30-31. Cp. Hobbes’ and Gassendi’s objections:Third Set of
Objections, AT VII 178-179; Fifth Set of Objections, AT VII272.
245 Descartes. Med. II, AT VII 34; cp. Med. V, AT VII 63; Fifth Set of Objections,AT VII
267 and Optics VI, AT VI 132.
246 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 441-443.
247 Descartes. Reg. XII, AT X 416-417.
248 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 365; cp. Med. Ill, AT VII 52-53.
198 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

because that essence is purely intelligible, but because imagination (both sensual
and mental) cannot run through all the possible modifications (or modes) of it.
Imagination fails to represent not only the infinite, but even the indefinite.
Imagination differs from sense-perception insofar as the former is limited “from
above” in its ability to clearly depict a large number of bodily features (for
example, a thousand sides o f a polygon or a great number of particles), whereas the
latter is limited “from below”, insofar as the senses fail to grasp the smallest
particles o f matter, which, as Descartes argues against Henry More, are
imperceptible.249
Another distinction between the mind and the imagination is that only the
mind has access to the infinite (although only to its existence, not its essence: in
thinking that the actually infinite is, not what it is) and to the essence of two finite
substances. Imagination, on the contrary, has no access to adequate understanding
o f either thought or matter, because it is unable to embrace the infinite (or even the
indefinite) variety of possible modifications, and thus it is unable to grasp the
essence o f a substance. This cognitive opposition of reason to imagination is
further illustrated by Descartes in the separation o f an image of a material thing in
imagination, an image that depicts a phenomenon as distinct from an idea in the
mind-reason—the idea that depicts the essence o f a thing.250
O f what kind is the distinction between the mind and the imagination— is
it real, conceptual or modal? First, obviously there is a real distinction between (a)
reason (as res cogitans) and corporeal imagination (as res extensa), which is a
trivial case o f the distinction between mind and body (brain). There is, however, no
real distinction between (b) reason and mental imagination (which is a mode of the
cognitive power), since both belong to the ingenium and thus to the res cogitans.
Second, modal distinction is obviously applicable only in the case of (b), so that
there is a modal distinction between the mind as reason properly and the mind as
cognitive power operating as mental imagination (between two modes of cognitive
power). Descartes compares imagination to seeing an image (of a geometrical
figure or a body), while reason understands an image without any “seeing” of its
shape. In particular, the modal distinction between reason and imagination (as a
mode of cognitive power) consists in that the former is discursive, whereas the
latter is not or may not be, for imagination is not only capable of the quasi-visual
production o f its object in a process, but also o f visualizing its object as a whole in
one single act. And finally, a conceptual distinction is not applicable in this case,
since only reason, as thinking, is die substantial attribute, whereas imagination
cannot be taken as an attribute.
As it has been pointed out, substance as such can be known for Descartes
by reason only (1.4.2) and cannot be known by imagination. Since, further, God is
the substance, he cannot be known by imagination, or, is unimaginable. Descartes
by all means wants to escape the conclusion that the idea of God might be just
imaginary, i.e., voluntarily invented by any productive faculty of the mind.251 Since

249 Descartes. To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 268.

250 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 139.
251 Descartes. Fourth Set of Objections [of P. Petit], AT VII 206 sqq.; cp. To Mersenne, 27
May 1638, AT II 144.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 199

God and the soul are purely intelligible, they cannot be objects that might
correspond to images o f the corporeal imagination.232 When polemicizing with
Descartes, Henry More introduces the doctrine o f spiritual extension (an extension
proper to God, angels and souls), trying to overcome the Cartesian dichotomy of
the extended and the not extended, and substituting it with the dichotomy o f the
divisible (body) and the not divisible (thought).2” Such a new distinction would
make thinking imaginable, however, which is the reason why Descartes (for whom
imagination qua corporeal is a hindrance to knowledge of truth) rejects More’s
hypothesis without hesitation: “God is not imaginable or distinguishable into parts
that are measurable and have shape.”254 In regard to the divine, only feeling or
“passion” can be imagined, which is ultimately a corporeal affection—that of love
caused by attraction to the sublime.235 Even the finite mind cannot understand what
the infinite is in its perfections, because the mind cannot grasp and reproduce them
as actually infinite. The actually infinite substance remains inaccessible to the
imagination, which can only represent the indefinite expansion of an ever greater
and greater perfection of the mind and of extension as indéfini (see 1.3.3).
Since, further, God is the thinking substance, everything corporeal and
material should be alien to it: “We recognize”, insists Descartes, “that God does
not possess any corporeal imagination.” 56 Corporeal imagination-p/ia«fas/a thus
can have no place in the infinite substance. But the supposed all-embracing divine
intellect can also have no lack in perfection exercised in thinking and thus all
faculties that may be discovered in thinking should be present in the infinite
thinking as actually infinite, without being really distinct. Upon examining our
finite mind we find, first, the faculty o f imagination in ourselves; second, that this
faculty is finite; and third, that the finite is the limitation of the infinite and not vice
versa (cp. 1.3.2). Therefore, as Descartes concludes in the Fourth Meditation, there
should exist an infinite mental imagination (and memory) in God, in the infinite
mind, which cannot be just a hypothetical projection of the finite mental
imagination onto the infinite—but the infinite mental imagination should be a
(ontological and epistemological) precondition for the possibility of the existence
o f the finite imagination.
An obvious problem that arises at this point is that the finite imagination
implies a connection of the finite mind to the finite body. There is no body or
extension present in the infinite mind, as Descartes argues against H. More, and
therefore infinite imagination can only express the fact that there is an indefinite

252 Descartes. Third Set of Replies, AT VII 183.

253 See Nikulin 1993,45-58.
254 Descartes. To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 270-272. Cp.: “il n’y a rien en Dieu qui soit
imaginable.” - Descartes. To Chanut, 1 February 1647, AT rv 607.
255 For Descartes, God arouses love and “although we cannot imagine anything in God, who
is the object of our love, we can imagine our love itself, which consists in our wanting to
unite ourselves with some object. That is, we can considerourselvesin relation to God as a
minute part of all the immensity of the created universe”. -Descartes. ToChanut, 1
February 1647, AT IV 609-610.
256 Descartes. Third Set of Replies, AT VII 181.
257 Descartes. Med. IV, AT VII 57.
200 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

extension that may be conceived in, and by, the infinite mind. In the finite mind the
mental imagination may either interpret images of the corporeal imagination or
produce images itself (for example, o f geometrical figures) that are not corporeal
and thus not extended. Obviously, in the infinite mind the first possibility is
missing, since there is no corporeal imagination associated with it. This means that
for Descartes the infinite mind can only know images of the corporeal (of the
physical and geometrical) not as corporeal and extended (for, because o f mutual
complementarity and exclusion of the material and the mental, there is no way to
represent corporeal images qua extended to the mind), but radier as produced, as
thought without a corporeal image—not as described, but as prescribed for
extended entities, thus constructed into the world o f the res extensa.
The notion o f infinity appears to be not only tightly interwoven into the
ontological structures in Descartes (see 1.3.2; 1.3.3), but also involved in the
differentiation o f various faculties o f the mind. Thus, in the “Principles” Descartes
accepts two different modes of thinking: perception of the intellect and operation
o f the will. An important difference between intellect and will in the finite mind is
that the former is limited, whereas the latter is not, for we can easily “extend our
will beyond what we clearly perceive”.258 In the divine mind there are no real
distinctions, hence one cannot suppose a real or even a modal difference between
various faculties and mental operations within the infinite intellect; for example,
between reasoning (where also knowing and grasping are not different) and willing
in God—just as one cannot suppose such a difference between the divine infinite
om«/-attributes (cp. 1.3.2).259
If everything in the world is caused by the infinite substance, which is
pure thinking, then also nothing can happen without the infinite will, because it is
not really distinct from the infinite mind. Only the divine will can be considered
really infinite (infini) for Descartes, whereas the human will is only potentially
infinite (indéfini), always able, unlike the finite reason, to surpass any given limits
or borders. It is in its ability to go beyond any limits that the will appears to be
similar to imagination: imagination is the only mental ability or faculty that may
operate at will. Not only physical things but also necessary truths are to be
considered caused by the infinite mind-will, not because o f their inner consistency
or adequation to certain facts, but because God wills them as necessary (which is
not the same as God necessarily willing them, for this would impose limitations on
him: God is understood as actually infinite and destitute o f any inner immanent
limitations, cp. 1.3.4).261 A problem then is whether necessary truths may be, or
could have been, different from what they are, as known by the finite mind qua
necessary. It appears that for Descartes the rule of modal logic, Op = p (cp. 1.4.3),
is valid only for the finite thinking that operates within the sphere of the lumen
naturale intelligibile, where knowing is (or may be) different from grasping (cp.
1.3.3). However, in the case o f the infinite intellect, where there is no real

251 Descartes. Princ. I 35, AT VIIIA 18.

259 Descartes. Princ. I 23, AT VIIIA 14.
240 Cp. Descartes. To Elizabeth, 6 October 1645, AT IV 314; To [Mesland], 2 May 1644,
AT IV 118-119.
261 Descartes. To [Mesland], 2 May 1644, AT IV 118-119.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 201

distinction between will and intellection, nothing prevents that physical, logical
and mathematical truths be established (willed or thought) otherwise. As Descartes
puts it, eternal truths “are possible only because God knows them as true or
possible. They are not known as true by God in any way that would imply that they
are true independently o f him. ...In God willing and knowing are a single thing in
such a way that by the very fact o f willing something he knows it and it is only for
this reason that such a thing is true”.262
Still, due to its actual infinity, the divine intellect cannot be grasped (it
can only be known that it is, not what it is) either by the finite mind or by the finite
imagination.263 One can therefore only affirm that if the finite mind understands
something clearly, this very thing is possible for the infinite mind, because, as
Descartes argues, everything that is clearly perceivable for the finite mind is
possible for God, that is, it may be created by him (see 1.4.3). The possibility of
being true is expressed then as “it cannot be thought otherwise” (e.g., that 2+2=4),
or through a logical necessity linked to the sphere of finite essence, that is, the
essence that does not necessarily presuppose or include existence. The situation
changes once no real distinction between essence and existence can be made, such
as in the actually infinite. Here, first, mere logical consistency (as presented to the
finite mind) implies real being or existence (as included in the infinite essence).
Second, if the finite mind does not understand a thing (especially, if it does not
grasp that thing), this does not yet mean that this thing is impossible for the infinite
thinking— but only that this thing is not within the grasp o f the finite mind.264
In modernity the notion o f actual infinity is accepted into science and
philosophy, and not only the new physical universe but also die whole social world
is constructed from the point of view of the hypothetical, all-embracing and
calculating divine intellect.265 Since the finite mind cannot discursively embrace

262 “Ex hoc ipso quod aliquid velit, ideò cognoscit, & ideò tantum talis res est vera” -
Descartes. To Mersenne, 6 May 1630, AT I 149. In his letters to Mersenne, Descartes also
mentions several times the notion of “eternal truths”, vérités éternelles, which does not
appear in the “Regulae” and seems to be originally introduced in the exchange by Mersenne
(To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT I 145). Mathematical truths are examples of eternal
truths; eternal truths are established (establies) by God and are known by him as true and
possible, but are not independent of him. - To Mersenne, 6 May 1630, AT I 149-150, To
Mersenne, 27 May 1630, AT I 151-153; To Mersenne, 27 May 1630, AT II 138. See also
the discussion in: Hatfield 1993, 259-287. But are eternal truths innate? There is no clear
answer in Descartes to this question; however, eternal truths appear to be distinct from
innate ideas in at least three respects. Unlike innate ideas, eternal truths are, first, established
by the infinite mind, not the finite mind. Second, an eternal truth is considered an actual
object of thinking rather than a hexis. And third, eternal truths are supposed to be caused by
God in the same way as things are, that is, through efficient causation, whereas (as it has
been mentioned) innate ideas are not directly caused by the infinite mind.
263 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, 16 April 1648, AT V 154; cp. Med. Ill, AT VII
46.
264 Descartes. To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT I 146. For Descartes God could render
invalid even the most evident mathematical truths. See the discussion in: Funkenstein 1975,
186-199.
265 Cp. Moore 1990, 75 sqq.
202 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

actual infinity, the mind as non-discursive intellect becomes itself either obsolete
or merely hypothetical, which is why reasoning is understood only as discursive, in
terms o f a logically elaborated and structured argument.
Among all the faculties o f the mind, it is the will that represents the
infinite par excellence (see 3.1.4). The mind as discursive reason cannot grasp the
infinite as such but is able to know that the infinite is or exists: the conception of
the mind is an operation that can only discursively run from one idea to another
and thus can be stretched over the indefinite, without ever really grasping the
actually infinite—for example, the whole o f “the extension of the imaginary space,
or the set o f numbers, or the divisibility of the parts of quantity'’.266 But even if the
mind is always able to move discursively further, it necessarily has to stop at a
certain point, in order to grasp its object as definite and to arrive at a demonstration
of an argument in a finite number o f steps, for otherwise the argument cannot
prove anything. For Descartes, imagination can visually represent or grasp only a
finite and limited number o f elements, whereas reason is able to think any number,
however large, and even actual infinity, without grasping it (see 1.3.3).267 The
Cartesian insistence on the extension o f matter as indefinite is justified by the fact
that imagination can always reach any fixed limits and transgress them. Important
is that (mental) imagination may represent its objects at will. Being connected to
the will, imagination is thus also capable of expressing the indefinite or the
potentially infinite in its own way. An imaginary overstepping of any fixed limits
(involved also in the Cartesian cog/fo-procedure) can be considered double: on the
one hand, as surpassing any limits in an increasing (imaginary) growth, for
example, in imagining the world o f an ever larger and larger size. On the other
hand, such overstepping can be taken as dividing, as in the case of an extended
physical or geometrical entity that may always be split further into as many parts
as one may will to imagine, so that the very process of division may, in principle,
never stop but always be carried further. In other words, both imaginable addition
and imaginable division are potentially infinite.268
If the argument o f the indefiniteness of the extension o f matter is
grounded in the (volitional) ability o f imagination to go beyond any fixed limits, it
does not yet imply that the imagination creates matter, but only that the activity of
imagination is such that it makes sure that there are no limits to matter. The
implicit presupposition behind this argument is that only the infinite, in/ini, can,
and in fact necessarily does, create. Imagination, however, is indefinite; that is, it is
always limited, although it is capable of voluntary overcoming its current definite
contents. The imagination is thus unable to grasp the infinite in its entirety. As
Descartes writes in a letter to Mersenne, “You ask whether there would be real
space, as there is now, if God had created nothing. At first this question seems to
be beyond the capacity of the human mind, like infinity, so that it would be
unreasonable to discuss it; but in fact I think that it is merely beyond the capacity
o f our imagination, like the questions of the existence o f God and of the human

266 Descartes. First Set of Replies, AT VII 113.

267 Descartes. Med. II, AT VII 30-31; First Set of Replies, AT VII 113; cp. Reg. XIV, AT X
449; The World, AT XI 31-32.
2Í* Cp. Descartes. To Mersenne, 5 October 1637, AT I 453.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 203

soul.”269 Imagination thus does not, and cannot really, create a real extended thing,
but it can produce it only as imaginable; imagination can only as i f create. And
vice versa, if the infinite does not really and necessarily create, it is only
imaginary.270
Extending into the indefinite, imagination is nevertheless always kept
within finite boundaries, for the following reasons. First, every image of
imagination, even if vague, is limited. And second, in order to know the truth, the
mind should primarily keep the imagination severely restrained: “our imagination
is tightly and narrowly limited, while our mind has hardly any limits, there are very
few things, even corporeal things, which we can imagine, even though we are
capable of conceiving them.”271 This is not simply a methodological rule that needs
no further explanations. Descartes has to impose rigid limits on the imagination
because it can properly imagine only a finite number o f factors, and the finite is
considered inferior to the actually infinite. This can be clearly demonstrated in an
imaginable experiment described in the Sixth “Meditation”, which displays the
difference between understanding and imagination. We are capable of
understanding equally well both a triangle and a chiliagon, since we are able to
understand clearly the rule o f their construction and the number of their sides.
However, the triangle is easily imaginable, and the chiliagon is not, or at least only
vaguely: “When 1 imagine a triangle, for example, I do not merely understand that
it is a figure bounded by three lines, but at the same time I also see lines with my
mind’s eye as if they were present before me; and this is what I call imagining. But
if I want to think o f a chiliagon, although I understand that it is a figure consisting
o f a thousand sides just as well as I understand the triangle to be a three-sided
figure, I do not in the same way imagine the thousand sides or see them as if they
were present before me. It is true that since I am in the habit of imagining
something whenever I think o f a corporeal thing, I may construct in my mind a
confused representation of some figure; but it is clear that this is not a chiliagon.
...I notice quite clearly that imagination requires a peculiar effort of mind which is
not required for understanding; this additional effort of mind clearly shows the
difference between imagination and pure understanding.”272
When the mind introspectively investigates itself, it arrives at an apodictic
certainty, finding its own limitations and the limitations of the faculties associated
with itself (in particular, o f imagination). The inability to represent clearly and to
retain the image o f the chiliagon with all its thousand sides in the imagination,
demonstrates that imagination as a representational mental faculty is limited not in
its power o f overstepping limits but in its ability to visualize a large number of
features in one single act, requiring a peculiar “effort” o f mental gathering or
attention.273 Imagination is denied the knowledge of truth and reality, not because

269 Descartes. To Mersenne, 27 May 1638, AT II 138, italics added.

270 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 141-142, which is the second of three
arguments proving that the infinite does not exclude the existence of finite things.
271 Descartes. To Mersenne, July 1641, AT III 395.
272 Descartes. Med. VI, AT VII72-73. Cp. Locke. Essay, Bk. II, ch. 29, § 13.
273 In the same way as in the “Meditations” imagination, unlike reason, is considered
incapable of grasping all possible forms that may be implemented in a piece of wax, in the
204 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

it is a constructive faculty, but because it is incapable of grasping the infinite in

any o f its forms, as neither actual nor potential. The ideal of philosophy as a strict
(perhaps the strictest) science implies that philosophy is to be considered a rational
enterprise independent of sense-perception and imagination. Indeed, imagination,
first, is able to deliberately and voluntarily represent the non-existent as existent.
And second, it can conceive the extended— not in its essence (which can only be
thought), but by representing the extended through an image. The extended is not
different from the corporeal, but the corporeal only obscures and as if veils for
Descartes the clear and distinct primary notions and the (self-)evidence o f truth.
Therefore, those who strive to know the truth of metaphysics should “withdraw
their minds from corporeal things, so far as is possible”.2
One might further conjecture that since for the infinite divine mind there
can be no real distinction between reason and imagination, and a mind only has to
think and not imagine, the infinite mind would need no “mental effort” for
representing any object, even an object with an actually infinite number o f parts,
such as the world as a whole. Imagination can represent the extension of the world
as indefmi, not in its multiple different features, but only as capable of ever further
increasing. Imagination is thus capable o f overcoming any fixed limits but is
limited in its ability to represent and to retain a considerably large number of
distinct features in an image, whereas the mind is virtually unlimited in its ability
to discursively connect ideas together.275

3.3.2 Imagination and mathematics according to Descartes

One of the major presuppositions o f early modem science is that every corporeal
object can be considered within a mathematically formulated empirical theory (cp.
2.2.1). How and why is this possible in Descartes? For him, the geometrical figure

“Geometry” the imagination appears to be incapable of grasping all possible curves, ordered
from simplest to most complex. - Hyppolite 1952, 170. Descartes further explains the
chiliagon example to Burman: “Since my mind can easily form and depict three lines in the
brain, it can easily go on to contemplate them, and thus imagine a triangle, pentagon, etc. It
cannot, however, trace out and form a thousand lines in the brain [i.e., in the corporeal
imagination] except in a confused manner, and this is why it does not imagine a chiliagon
distinctly, but only in a confused manner”. - Descartes. Conversation with Burman, AT V
162-163.
274 Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 157.
275 Cp. Descartes’ explication of the chiliagon example to Gassendi: “[W]e have a clear
understanding of the whole figure, even though we cannot imagine it in its entirety all at
once”. - Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 384; cp. Fifth Set of Objections, AT VII
329-330. Descartes insists on abandoning the realm of the incertitude of the sensual and the
imaginary and on considering only the order, measure and mutual relations of objects of
whatever nature by means of mathesis (see 2.2). Such a method (even though this projcct is
abandoned in the later writings, but it is never rejected) comprises long chains of elementary
“atomic” reasonings secured through intuitus and deductio and applies a small number of
algorithmic rules for joining simple thinkable entities. The mathesis is then to be structured
according to discursive reasoning only and not according to the imagination, which might
cause an aberration and misrepresentation of its object, as is the case with the chiliagon.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 205

is extended (except for the point) and has properties that do not change over time
and can be expressed mathematically, that is, by means of numbers (for example,
through a function). Numbers can themselves be represented and are imaginable as
either sets of units or as magnitudes.276 As has been argued (2.2; 2.2.1), Descartes
cannot univocally decide to which of the two substances the geometrical figure
should belong. Indeed, as extended, the geometrical figure should belong to the res
extensa\ but as thinkable, it should belong to the res cogitans. Since geometrical
figures may be present to the corporeal imagination, which is a physical thing, they
can thus preserve and exemplify all their unchangeable properties in the physical
world. Every corporeal image of imagination corresponds to its mental image and
to its idea. But, unlike the mental image, the corporeal image is extended and, as
extended, is material. The imagination, which yet in the. “Regulae” plays a crucial
role in figuring mathematical objects, is capable of visualizing numbers and ratios
and comparing them immediately through their imaginable representations (for
example, 1/2 and 1/3); that is, without any further calculation, almost assuming the
immediate non-discursive capacity of the intuition of the noys. In doing so, mental
imagination “displays more distinctly” its objects than any other faculty. Every
mathematical problem can then be put in terms of proportions, subsequently
expressed in terms o f equations, finally presented through extended geometrical
figures.277 In the “Regulae”, geometrical constructions correspond to algebraic
operations, and algebraic signs (letters) and geometrical figures univocally
represent each other. Hence, numerical discrete entities and extended geometrical
figures are rendered fully mutually convertible. Algebra and arithmetic thus may
be reduced to geometry; in this reduction imagination plays a decisive role. As
Sepper argues, in the “Regulae” and even in the “Cogitationes privatae”, Descartes
substitutes mathematics by mathetics, that is, by the universal mathesis: an analysis
of proportional relations between objects of any kind based on an analogy between
different levels o f being. In particular, a physical object can be represented through
a geometrical one in the imagination, and then that can be represented through an
algebraically studied proportion. Thus, for example, various colors might be (and
some have to be) represented through various geometrical figures and then those
would be further analyzed in terms of pure proportions.27*
Such a reduction methodologically plays an auxiliary role, namely,
making the solution o f mathematical problems easier. The mind-reason can, and
should, be aided in its conclusions by the imagination, but not fully substituted by
it, because imagination is only able to visualize concrete, finite and limited objects
(particularly,in the number o f features displayed) and therefore cannot ascend to
universal conclusions and formulations of theorems, which are the end o f scientific
investigation. There are a number o f difficulties implied in such a project. First, the
imagination may easily be able to figure or represent a difference in proportion
between, for example, 1/2 and 1/10, yet it is not at all evident whether it is capable
o f doing the same in the case o f 1/999 and 1/1000, since the imagination is

276 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 445-446.

277 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 440-443.
271 Sepper 1989, 396-397; Sepper 1996, 100 sqq. et passim. Cp. Descartes. Reg. XII, AT X
412 sqq.
206 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

incapable o f representing and retaining a substantially large number of features in

one single act. Also, if there is an “analogical structure o f reality” in Descartes, as
Sepper assumes, there should further be rather strong implicit presuppositions that
will make the “how” and “why” o f such an analogy possible. In particular, there
should be, second, an implicit identification of the discrete (number and algebraic
signs) with the continuous (geometrical figures) in their fundamental properties
(see 2.2.2). And third, geometrical figures are precise, whereas physical things
(which geometricals presumably represent) are not, which is recognized by
Descartes himself. If this is the case, the “how” and the “why” of the
representation o f the physical by the geometrical remains to be further elucidated.
Then, it would seem, unless the implicit presuppositions o f the analogical
proportional mathetical approach are clarified, the whole Cartesian project remains
questionable.
Geometrical objects are imaginable and extended, i.e. are represented as
extended corporeal images in the corporeal imagination (which reproduce the form
of geometrical figures) and also as non-extended mental images in the mental
imagination. That geometrical figure, be it a line, square or cube, is primarily
represented to the imagination, is one o f the starting points for Descartes,
established already in the “Regulae”: “If we are to imagine something and are to
make use, not o f the pure intellect, but of the intellect aided by images depicted in
the imagination, then nothing can be ascribed to magnitudes in general which
cannot also be ascribed to any species o f magnitude”.279 Geometrical figure as
extended (not in its notion or rule of construction) is a particular species of
magnitude and is a subject o f the corporeal imagination, any geometrical figure is
“wholly corporeal (omnino corporeae)2K> and thus material, belonging to the
same substance as any physical object. It is because of that the activity of
imagination consists, as it has been pointed out, in contemplation of an image of a
corporeal thing (in the “Regulae”), a particular way of figuring material things (in
the “Discourse”, see 3.3).
How should one consider the relation between geometry and imagination?
One might say with Descartes that imagination conceives bodies by means of, and
through, geometrical figures. Eveiything extended is corporeal and everything
corporeal is imaginable, that is, is representable to the corporeal imagination and
then to the mental imagination. Still, not all objects of mathematics have to be
conceived as corporeal, for example, a purely discursive order or sequence of true
statements does not (see 2.2). However, this order or sequence, which is

279 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 440-441, 456; cp. Reg. XII, AT X 413 sqq. Cp. Boutroux
1900. To Elizabeth, Descartes writes: “Metaphysical thoughts, which exercise the pure
intellect, help to familiarize us with the notion of the soul; and the study of mathematics,
which exercises mainly the imagination in the consideration of shapes and motions,
accustoms us to form very distinct notions of body.” - To Elizabeth, 28 June 1643, AT III
692.
240 Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 385.
2,1 Cp.: “...[T]he only order which I could follow was that normally employed by geometers,
namely to set out all the premisses on which a desired proposition depends, before drawing
any conclusions about it.” - Descartes. Med. Synopsis, AT VII 13.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 207

comprehended primarily by the mind as discursive reasoning, itself may also be

imagined, because this sequence can be represented either by a sequence of
discrete units (for example, points) or by a continuous magnitude (for example, a
line with a clear order o f its parts). But since every object of mathematics can be
imagined, and everything imaginable can be related to the corporeal, then, in a
sense, everything that is an object of mathematics can be also considered
corporeal.
What is, further, the relation between the geometrical figure as thought
and the figure as extended? As we have seen, for Plato arithmetic is based in the
activity o f the intellect-Hcys, whereas geometry—in that of the intermediate
discursive reasoning-dianoia, supported by imagination (see 2 .1).282 The
distinction between number and magnitude plays an important role in ancient
mathematics: numbers are entities o f a higher ontological status than geometricals,
because numbers are only thought; they are unimaginable and lack specific
corporeality, associated with geometrical entities.283 Extension, according to
Descartes, is primarily thought in its essence. Likewise, the geometrical figure has
“a determinate essence or nature or form which is immutable and eternal and not
invented by me or dependent on my mind”. Therefore, a figure has a number of
demonstrable properties that in the first place are thought, but, as Descartes wants
to establish in the “Regulae”, can also be geometrically and imaginably
represented. That a geometrical figure is imaginable, fits Descartes’ essentialism
well, since a figure should not necessarily exist but may only be imagined: it may
only as i f exist. The geometrical figure is not, however, essentially extended, since
its intrinsic properties in principle can be conceived as clear and distinct and
presented by non-extended entities, for example, numbers or proportions. Thus, the
essentially geometrical figure is only thought and thus belongs to the res
cogitans. This means that the essence o f mathematical entities (both arithmetic
and geometrical) is determinate and unchangeable, and is only thinkable and not
imaginable. In the last instance, it is determined by the infinite thinking substance.
But existentially a mathematical entity is only possible. In other words, essence
cannot be attributed to a mathematical entity by the finite mind, but existence can
be ascribed to a mathematical object by a spontaneous voluntary act of
imagination, which may represent an entity (a geometrical figure or a number

282 Plato. RP 51 Id; cp. 522c-527c.

283 Proclus. In Eucl. 48.9-13.
284 Descartes. Med. V, AT VII64.
285 As Descartes explains to Burman, “an entity is said to be ‘fictitious’ ...when it is merely
our supposition that it exists. Thus, all the demonstrations of mathematicians deal with true
entities and objects, and the complete and entire object of mathematics and everything it
deals with is a true and real entity. This object has a true and real nature, just as much as the
object of physics itself. The only difference is that physics considers its object not just as a
true and real entity, but also as something actually and specifically existing. Mathematics,
on the other hand, considers its object merely as possible, i.e. as something which does not
actually exist in space but is capable of doing so. It must be stressed at this point that we are
talking of clear perception, not of imagination. ...As to whether our perceptions are clear or
not, this is something we know perfectly well from our own inner awareness”. - Descartes.
Conversation with Burman, 16 April 1648, AT V 160.
208 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

through a geometrical figure) as merely as i f existing, or as existing as imaginary.

Imagination for Descartes has corporeal things as its objects (which may
have a semblance to a physical extended body): “nothing falls within the scope of
the imagination without being in some way extended.”2“ The geometrical object as
extended, and thus as corporeal, is present in four ways: in the physical world, in
the corporeal imagination, in the mental imagination and in reason. The first and
second are corporeal and extended; the third and fourth are mental and not
extended. But which one is the genuine geometrical figure? Descartes does not
provide a clear answer to this question. However, if the geometrical figure is to be
understood not simply as a collection of properties present in the mental
imagination and thought by reason, but also as having an inalienable spatial
component that, as representing a substance (namely, matter as extension), cannot
be reduced to any general thinkable term or number of synthetic properties, then
the geometrical figure has to be present either in physical matter or in the corporeal
imagination.
Further, both the physical image and the image in the corporeal
imagination belong, on die one hand, to the realm of the extended and therefore are
of equal ontological status. On the other hand, geometrical lines and figures are
perfect and cannot be adequately represented or depicted in the physical world, as
Descartes himself recognizes (see 2.2.1). As extended, geometricals cannot be
adequately presented in the physical realm, but only recognized as “semblances” of
physical things. The same geometricals, however, are also formed as corporeal in
the corporeal imagination, and as such can be imposed unto the extended physical
things or constructed into the world of bodies, as it were. In this case, geometrical
entities can be understood as imagined in the physical, and because of that they can
be recognized as unchanging imaginary patterns of changing physical things.
Geometricals in the corporeal imagination can be understood themselves as
produced by, and in, the imagination under the pattern of a thinkable figure.
Imagination can further recognize these forms in corporeal things, in fact
substituting the “more or less” o f the physical by precise mental images or ideas
brought into the physical. Imagination as corporeal appears thus to be the
instantiating center that transmits the non-corporeal form into the corporeal image,
and then constructs it into the physical world. Imagination is not intermediate in
Descartes, as is the case in Plato, Plotinus and Proclus, because geometrical images
of the corporeal imagination are corporeal as well, coinciding with the images of
geometrical objects as imposed onto physical bodies. In order to remain in
compliance with his own rigid ontological dichotomy, Descartes must expel, or
rather, not recognize, any intermediary structures, both in ontology (intelligible
matter and geometrical objects) and in epistemology (imagination and discursive
reason as intermediate faculties, cp. 2.3.1). It is this simplification that enables
Descartes to put geometricals (qua extended) and physical bodies into one and the
same extension, and thus to be able to apply all the rules and theorems of the
geometrical to the physical.

2*6 Descartes. To More, 5 February 1649, AT V 270. Cp. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 387.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 209

And although Descartes makes a distinction a between perfect

geometrical figure (perceived by the corporeal imagination) and its physical
representation, which is an approximation of that figure (perceived by the senses),
nevertheless, both are extended; therefore, they are to be present in one and the
same space or extension. Because o f this, the former may represent the latter,
allowing for the possibility o f constructing a mathematical empirical science.
Besides, one has to distinguish between imagined, extended, perfect geometrical
figures (accessible to the corporeal imagination) and geometrical figures as a
collection of purely thinkable properties and relations, expressible, describable and
formalizable mathematically, also known to the mind or cognitive power as reason.
There are thus two important presuppositions that make the precise
scientific study o f imprecise physical bodies possible. The first has just been
mentioned: physical things and geometrical objects are co-extended, as it were,
since there is only one uniform extension, res externa.287 Geometrical figures, on
the one hand, are distinctly discernible as extended and as represented in the
corporeal imagination.2** On the other hand, they can be adequately represented
through, and by, various figures and, more specifically, through proportions that
are primarily thought.289 Second, by presenting the physical through the
geometrical, Descartes further reduces geometrical problems to algebraic equations
(the roots o f which are either real or imaginary, that is, expressed by complex
numbers),290 thus introducing pure algebraic form into mathematics, which itself
becomes possible because of die non-discrimination of numbers and magnitudes
(cp. 2.1.3; 2.2.2).
The application o f algebraic methods to the study o f geometrical figures
further implies that a geometrical figure can be considered either an extended
figure in the corporeal imagination, or an ideal figure conceived by the mind
(mental imagination and reason). The corporeal imagination receives its images
from the senses, and only then are these images transmitted for the interpretation
and analysis o f the mental imagination and then of reason. One might perhaps say
that the “ideal” figure is simply abstracted from the “extended” figure, which itself
is abstracted from a corporeal physical imitation (or a drawing) of that figure. In
geometry objects are considered extended, the extended is material, and the
material is corporeal. Therefore, geometry has to conceive various shapes and
forms o f the corporeal (although not the corporeality or extension as such, which is
the subject matter of reason). But geometrical figures have properties that are to be
understood as precise and numerically expressible, and for that reason geometrical
figures have rather to be considered produced under the pattern of reason and in
reason, and only then imposed onto (and not abstracted from) the physical. The

2,7 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 438 sqq.; cp. Gäbe 1983, 654-660.
248 “Even though the mind is united to the whole body, it does not follow that it is extended
throughout the body, since it is not its nature to be extended, but only to think. Nor does it
understand extension by means of an extended semblance which is present within it
(although it does imagine extension by turning to a corporeal semblance which is extended,
as I have explained).” - Descartes. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 389.
289 Descartes. Discourse II, AT VI 20.
290 Descartes. Geometry III, AT VI 453-454.
210 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

physical then, as co-extended with the geometrical, has to be subdued to the

geometrical and thus structured as mathematical (see 3.4.1).

3.4 Imagination and kinematic construction in geometry

3.4.1 Construction and the verum factum principle: Cartesian reconstruction o f

the world

Let us once again turn to our main question, namely, why and how physical
changing things can be known and described in the new science by means of
mathematics, which is a thayma o f the new science. A previously obtained answer
is that mathematical physics of early modem science becomes possible for
Descartes because o f the expulsion of intermediate structures, which would both
separate and connect the physical and the mathematical (the geometrical), making
them still mutually irreducible. In particular, there is no room left for intelligible
matter either in ontology or in epistemology (see 2.3.1; 2.4.2). Because of that,
both physical and mathematical objects (the latter being adequately represented as,
and in, geometricals) are put into one and the same extension or space. Therefore,
both are considered co-substantial—so, first, geometrical entities can adequately
represent physical objects and, second, both are studied exactly in the same way,
by the same procedures o f reason supported by imagination. Since the world is res
extensa, it can be conceived as substituted, and adequately represented, in its
entirety and in each o f its extended parts by geometrical figures.
It is now possible to reconsider the main problem from a slightly
different perspective. Both ordinary experience and the tradition of ancient physics
reject the possibility of description of the physical in terms of the mathematical.
The former teaches us that it is simply impossible to measure exactly (that is, to
express in a number) the real parameters o f a physical magnitude, such as its size,
position, or impulse; for every measurement is performed with some degree of
precision. This material “more or less” o f physical measurement can never
coincide with the formal exactitude of mathematical identification, first, because of
the imprecision of measurement itself (measuring instruments are physical things
themselves). And second, a physical thing never coincides with its geometrical
substitute. For example, one cannot exactly measure breadth of a table, for it is
never precise: the limits o f a table are never perfectly straight lines, round circles,
and so on. They are never properly geometrical, but rather as if “shifting” around
some quantity and never coinciding with it. And ancient physics is either not
considered science, as strict episteme, at all (as is the case in Plato, for whom
everything physical is essentially unknowable becoming) or is considered science
in a very different way, as not mathematical but qualitative, as in Aristotle or the
Stoics (see 2 .1).291 It might be objected, however, that in the “Timaeus” Plato
describes the constitution of physical things with four elements (fire, air, water and
earth). Every element is itself constituted as a regular geometrical polyhedron by a
number o f primary triangles (of which there are two different kinds; the number of

291 See: Sambursky 1959.

 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 211

triangles is different for each element).292 In this way, geometrical triangles make
up geometrical bodies, which further compose elements (ordered “by form and
number”)293 that, in turn, constitute physical things. To this it may be replied that
geometricals, which represent being, are strictly separated in Plato from physical
things, which are not in being but in a constant flow and change. A difficulty in
Plato’s interpretation and representation o f physical things in the “Timaeus” results
from the fact that although Plato recognizes an essential difference between
mathematical objects (numbers and geometricals) and physical things (the former
can represent the latter only symbolically at best), in the “Timaeus” he does not
give any consistent account o f geometricals as intermediary (cp. 2.3; 2.3.1). The
four elements might be further interpreted as intermediate between being
(represented through geometricals) and becoming (represented through physical
bodies). However, Plato unequivocally says that the elements are themselves
bodies. The elements thus appear as equivocal centauric entities that, qua
elementary constituents presenting the ground structures of the cosmos, somehow
bring together the immutability o f the mathematical with the changeability and the
properties of the physical (for example, they have weight), being “maximally”
mathematical and “minimally” material, as it were. Thus, the elements might be
considered as combining both mathematical and physical properties. However,
how such a combination takes place remains unclear and can hardly be elucidated
in Plato’s own terms. The Pythagorean project of mathematizing the cosmos thus
remains not fully realized in Plato, who has to recognize that there is a radical
otherness, present through matter, that prevents number from really becoming
everything, and prevents the complete mathematization of the world.294
The “project o f modernity” finds its expression in the works of
Descartes not only because o f the establishing of the existence of the infinite
subjectivity (which subsequently produces the finite subjectivity, finally coming to
the recognition of the infinite subjectivity and of itself), but rather because o f
certain implicitly accepted principles that underlie modernity. Beyond the claim
made above, another reason for the possibility of applying exact mathematical
reasoning to overtly inexact and fluent physical things is the constructiveness of
subjectivity, discussed by a number o f contemporary writers (LOwith, Blumenberg,
Funkenstein, Lachterman, Gaidenko, HOsle et al.).295 According to the verum
factum principle, subjectivity knows its object to the extent that, and only insofar
as, it produces this very object and the means for knowing it. According to this
principle, the verum and the factum are mutually convertible (verum et factum
convertuntur), and the paradigmatic example o f it is found in the construction of
geometrical problems.

292 Plato. Tim. 53c-57d.

2,3 Plato. Tim. 53b.
194 Cp.: Gaidenko 1980, 163 sqq.; Funkenstein 1986, 31-35.
295 See: Blumenberg 1966, 175; LOwith 1971, 157-188; Funkenstein 1986, 12, 290 sqq. et
passim; Gaidenko 1987, 319-328; Lachterman 1989, 8-24; HOsle 1990, 45; Nikulin 1996,
38-47, 94-102.
296 Vico 1982, 50 sqq.
212 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

The verum factum principle can be traced back at least to Nicholas of

Cusa and is also present in Descartes. Moreover, the constructivist approach can be
seen in many early modem thinkers whose philosophical positions are quite
distinct from those of Descartes. Thus, from a very different perspective of the
rejection o f any “innate ideas” or principles, the verum factum principle is
supported by Locke, who presents most of the variegated and multiple contents of
the mind as “complex ideas”, produced or constructed (out of the elementary
“bricks” o f “simple ideas”) through, and by, the activity of the mind itself.297 In
Hobbes the human mind (understood as the pure ability to calculate) has
demonstrative knowledge only insofar as it itself produces this knowledge.298
Knowing is thus realized as doing, praxis, so that “truth” and “construction” are
synonyms for Hobbes. In a word (that of Leibniz), mens facit phenomena,299
For Kepler, the world is already ordered in such a way that
mathematical laws are applicable to it, describing its structure and movements. The
universe is conceived as produced qua geometrical by its creator, whose goodness
is therefore expressible in terms o f the regularity of mathematical proportions and
figures. Kepler accepts the ancient Platonic-Pythagorean idea of God the creator
being a geometer, so that the divine ratio embraces geometrical archetypes, due to
which the ideas o f mathematical objects (e.g., of regular solids) are not invented by
the finite mind, but are rather discovered: “Geometry, being part o f the divine mind
from the time immemorial, from before the origin of things, being God Himself
(for what is not God that was not God Himself), has supplied God with the models
for the creation of the world and has been transferred to man together with the
image of God. Geometry was not received inside through the eyes.” It is because
Kepler takes the world and the soul (the mind) to be created in God’s image—the
former being corporeal, the latter incorporeal, mundus est imago Dei corporea,
animus est imago Dei incorporea—that the two exemplify features of remarkable
(mathematical) regularity, which is primarily the regularity of geometry:
“Geometry is one o f the reasons to call man an image of God.”301 What is modern
in Kepler’s approach, however, is that the ego, which looks for a mathematical
explanation o f the phenomena o f the world, takes part not only in a re-creation, but
rather in a mathematical co-creation of the world: “There is nothing I want to find
out and long to know with greater urgency than this: I can find God, whom I can
almost grasp with my own hands in looking at the universe, also in myself.”302 It is
therefore the mind (the divine mind, but also the human mind, insofar as it is able
to discover the divine mathematical design) that becomes the source of order in the

297 Locke. Essay, Bk. II, chs. II, XXIII et passim.

298 Hobbes. English Works VII, 183 sqq.
299 Cit. ap. Lachterman 1989, XIII.
300 Kepler. Harmonice mundi, Bk. IV, ch. I - Kepler. Gesammelte Werke, Vol. VI, 223 (cit.
ap. Caspar 1959, 271).
Cit. ap. Caspar 1959, 93. Cp.: “To God there are, in the whole material world, material
laws, figures and relations of special excellency and of the most appropriate order”.
- Kepler. Letter to Herwart, 9 or 10 April 1599, cit. ap. Baumgardt 1952, 50.
302 Kepler, letter to Peter Heinrich von Strahlendorf, 23 October, 1613. Cit. ap. Baumgardt
1952, 114-115.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 213

world, which turns out to be mathematized: “The mind is the source of orderliness.
Nothing arranged by the mind is out o f order and confused unless the mind, using
its own judgement, has given free rein to instrumental causes different from
itself.”303 The remarkable mathematical regularity of the physical arises thus as a
mind’s construction into the world.
In contemporary science, and particularly in mathematics, the properties
of an object are quite often introduced through the construction o f that object, as is
the case with irrational numbers in Dedekind; with the foundation o f mathematics
in Lorenzens; or in Brouwer and intuitionists— for whom existence is identified
with constructibility and truth—with actual construction. (In this sense intuitionists
are genuine Cartesians, since they reduce theorems to solving—that is,
constructing— problems.)304
In “The Ethics of Geometry”, Lachterman, with good reasons, stresses
the continuity between Descartes and Kant; both implement the principle of
construction, which plays an exceptional role for them. (The leading role of
construction explains also the interest o f modernity in potentiality as possibility: it
is implicitly presupposed that everything can be put in quantitative terms only.)
Most clearly and consistently the constructionist approach is represented in Kant,
whose solution to the problem o f the applicability o f mathematics to physics is that
mathematical structures are a priori structures o f subjectivity, or of the finite mind
(in particular, o f its sense-perception), which puts or constructs them into the
physical phenomenal world in which the mind subsequently cognizes and
recognizes these very structures. In other words, what the mind describes as
(scientifically) known in the world is that which the mind itself prescribes to the
known, both in terms o f its contents and its structure, that is, in terms of the notions
the mind applies to the known.305
In ancient Weltanschauung the verum factum principle has a rather
limited application— it is mostly accepted in geometry (see 3.4.3). In the
“Republic” Plato also subordinates opinion {pistis) based on the production or
construction o f a thing (for example, o f a flute) to the knowledge (episteme) based
on the use o f that thing. Only he who uses the thing (ho khrdmenos) is able to
disclose the thing’s structure and purpose, which (even if realized by the maker)
represent the eidos and telos o f the thing not produced by the finite mind.306
Descartes accepts the verum factum principle in his “Geometry”: in order to really
understand a proof o f a theorem or a solution o f a problem one has to produce, or

303 Kepler’s note XIX to the Somnium - Kepler 1967, 157.

304 Dedekind 1912, 12-17; Weyl 1949, 50-54 et al. See also: Becker 1954, 393-398;
Dummett 1977. Descartes in his “Geometry” solves problems and does not prove theorems;
cp. Viète 1968,320 sqq.
3 5 Cp. Kant. Prolegomena A 34; Critique of Pure Reason B 41; A 128-130; B 168-169 et al.
As Gaukroger argues, the project of mathematical physics is rendered possible through a
shift in the explanatory structures in physical science, which in early modernity (in
particular, in Galileo) are conceived as determined by mathematics, that is, by its proof
structure, which is reciprocally defined by its system of concepts (Gaukroger 1978, 182-
229). The explanation in physics is thus already to be constructed as mathematical.
306Plato. RP 601 d-602a.
214 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

at least reproduce, the proof or the solution: “I have not demonstrated here most of
what I have said, because the demonstrations seem to me so simple that, provided
you take the pains to see methodologically whether I have been mistaken, they will
present themselves to you; and it will be o f much more value to you to learn them
this way than by reading them.”307 As Descartes later explains to Hogelande, “I
generally distinguish two aspects of mathematics, the historical and the scientific.
By 'history' I understand everything which has been discovered already and is
contained in books. By ‘science’ 1 mean the skill to solve every problem, and thus
to discover by one’s own efforts everything capable of being discovered in that
science by means o f our native human intelligence”.308 Thus, one might say that
knowledge is scientific (that is, demonstrable as strict) only if it is scientific (that
is, demonstrable as reproducible).
One needs to make a distinction, however, between understanding as
production and understanding as reproduction. If we speak about artificial things,
then understanding o f such artifacts can be obtained by both production and
reproduction. A master produces a thing that he constructs under certain
preconceived pattem(s) and rules. Nevertheless, he realizes and understands his
own intended project only as he advances in implementing it. The product that
arises in the end bears a similarity to the original project and design, insofar as it is
made according to the original plan. Yet the final product is also quite dissimilar
from the intended, insofar as the produced discloses features that originally were
wrapped up and hidden from the finite demiurgic mind. Now, when looking at the
work, we might understand certain inner principles involved in it by reproducing or
copying it, either physically or in the imagination. However, in the case o f entities
supposed to exist by themselves, one might say that our task as mathematicians is
not to produce, but only to reproduce their hidden properties in order to understand
them— only to disclose, and not to invent—the properties that are thus only
reconstructed by us.
The constructor o f physical things—those existing physei—can be only
the divine infinite intellect for Descartes. It is this intellect that produces the soul,
the whole world and all their properties, and prescribes their laws. As the infinite
mind (and thus omniscient), God has all concepts of things formally. That is, on
the one hand, he has these concepts from eternity, on the other hand, he knows
things insofar as he creates them. In other words, first, for the creator it is the same
to know and to produce. Second, things in their concepts should be known by the
divine mind not discursively, as the finite mind knows them, but in an intuitive
momentary grasp, because to know is to create and the creation is momentary.
Third, the infinite mind has to know every idea quite differently, not only
essentially, as the finite mind does, but in the highest degree— that is, eminently.309
The finite mind that constructs its object always has to “look” at the eternal
paradigm o f a thing or o f a geometrical object, the paradigm which itself is not
produced by the finite subjectivity.310 However, since finite subjectivity itself has

307 Descartes. Geometry III, AT VI 464.

30* Descartes. To Hogelande, 8 February 1640, AT III 722-723.
309 Descartes. Med. IV, AT VII 79; Second Set of Replies, AT VII 135, 161-169 et al.
310 Cp. Plato RP 507 b-c; Tim. 28c-29a.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 215

constructive capacity, it can eventually substitute the infinite mind by the

sovereign constructive finite ego. One of the reasons for such a substitution, which
cannot be discussed here, appears to be that in the Western Aristotelian theological
tradition, God is equated with being and with the infinite intellect and is no longer
considered, as in the Platonic tradition, the superabundant cause of being which is
not being itself.3" And if the source of being is considered to belong to being
itself, and, further, being can be thought in an act of self-reflection of finite
subjectivity, then a distinction between the objective source o f thought and the
reflecting thought itself becomes not immediately self-evident. The finite
subjectivity finds itself in a position to produce contents o f its own thinking and in
this way to determine itself, being autonomous.
As it has already been stressed, only the opposition of finite and infinite
still separates the two thinking substances for Descartes, which still allows him to
recognize the “ innateness” of some ideas of which the ego cannot be the cause.312
Since, however, finite human subjectivity is considered essentially capable of
construction, capable of overcoming any “naturally” prescribed limits and borders,
it eventually comes to understand and establish itself in overriding the veto of
actual infinity. For the finite subjectivity, which understands itself as the being, as
the (re)productive thinking substance, infinite subjectivity simply become obsolete,
as well as the distinction between the non-created and the created subjectivity. The
paradox that thinking creates itself in reflectively turning upon itself—in thinking
itself when the ego reflectively constitutes itself—can be solved only by assigning
the status of the substance to thinking, the substance that indeed needs nothing
except itself in order to exist. Subjectivity becomes substantial as the source of
everything and o f itself. Objectivity becomes superfluous.
Descartes, however, still wants to retain the objectivity of the divine
subjectivity (that is, its full independence o f the finite subjectivity or the mind). On
the contrary, it is the finite subjectivity that is independent from the infinite one for
Descartes. Such subordination can be seen in the preservation of at least one
category of ideas (innate, see 3.1.4) independent from the productive activity,
desires and intentions o f the finite mind. The independent existence of substances,
assured and supported by the introspection o f the ego in the cogito, is not yet
cancelled by complete autonomy o f the finite subjectivity. In Descartes, the
production of the world is still ascribed to its incessant recreation by the divine
intellect. But since the human mind is co-substantial with the divine—for both
belong to the res cogitans—the only division left is that between the infinite and
the finite, which may be understood as creative and recreative, constructive and
reconstructive respectively. The distinction between the infinite and the finite is
still insurmountable in Descartes, but is eventually overcome due to the potentially
unlimited constructive capacity of the human mind, which is capable of bracketing
the actually infinite— either by putting it outside the set of objects of reasonable
consideration, or by constructing the infinite (as in modem mathematical
constructivism, as an abstraction o f finitude) and thereby overcoming the absolute

311 Cp. Proclus. Theol. Plat. II 30.22-26.

312 Cp. Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 38 sqq.
216 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

transcendence o f the infinite to being and thinking (cp. 1.3.2). Since in the mind,
both infinite and finite, there is a productive capacity represented by the mental
imagination, not only the form but also the content of reasoning may be considered
subjectively prescribed and regulated, and therefore constructed by the mind itself.
Descartes’ famous claim is: “Nothing lies within our power except our
thoughts.”313 Even though originally this claim means that it is easier to master
oneself rather than to change the (independent of finite subjectivity) rules and laws
o f the world, nevertheless, when the mind eventually becomes independent of the
divine, subjective reason is then considered autarchic and demiurgic. Finite human
reason becomes thus emancipated from the infinite intellect. Descartes does in fact
violate a principle he himself has declared: it is not the finite that is understood as a
limitation o f the infinite (cp. 1.3.2), but on the contrary, the infinite is implicitly
considered a projection and an extension o f the finite.
The finite being (which in fact is not being any more than being without
existence is, only a pure essence reducible to the reflective self-consciousness)
brings forward a number o f options for how the world and the self will appear. If
these options are all produced, in the last instance, willingly or unwillingly,
consciously or unconsciously, by the finite subjectivity, there is no sufficient
ground to prefer one option to the other. The situation seems rather paradoxical: all
mutually exclusive options are initially produced by the finite subjectivity, which
then itself has to decide which one to choose. Since there appears to be no
sufficient ground for such a choice (except a voluntary or random one), the choice
becomes completely “free”—that is, contingent. The number of options is either
finite or potentially infinite, if a new one can always be introduced. The “I” has to
consider then that it is entirely up to itself to decide which choice is the right one,
in which o f the empty boxes to put a check-mark, which particular identity to
choose.
Because of this, any objective teleology becomes redundant, being
deliberately wiped out by Descartes and by most modem thinkers. Since the world
is merely a res extensa, it has no purposes by and for itself.314 Every purpose or
telos may be given to it only by its creator or constructor, by the infinite res
cogitans. Eventually, this function of assigning sense or purpose to the world
becomes the prerogative o f the finite subjectivity. Why? Because the ultimate
justification of subjectivity comes not from the subjectivity of the other (in
particular, not from the infinite subjectivity) and not even from one’s own
subjectivity as reflected in and by the other, not mediated by that very
justification— but such a justification becomes the immediate clear and distinct
perception o f myself. If subjectivity is immediately verified by and through the
self-awareness, then the other’s subjectivity, both infinite and finite, has to be
established from my own, finite one, so that the distinction between the infinite and
the finite easily evaporates and appears to be just imaginary.
As the finite subjectivity gradually emancipates itself from the infinite
one and understands itself as autonomous and sufficient, starting from the cogito, it

313 Descartes. Disc. Ill, AT VI 25.

314 Schramm 1985, 70-77 et passim.
 Part HI: Reason, Imagination and Construction 217

becomes difficult to retain a necessary distinction between reason and will. Since
the finite subjectivity is opposed as its other to extended material things or
geometrical objects, the infinite subjectivity appears then not as the radical other to
the “ego” but becomes the intimate same. The subjectivity of the self-awareness of
the “I” thus becomes divine and the other finite ego can only be assumed to be
intersubjective, but is never directly accessible to the “I”. One o f the most
important methodological requirements o f modernity becomes that the “I” should
be capable o f knowing something other than itself definitively and as true only if
this other is completely destitute o f any inner subjectivity—of any capacity of
producing and ascribing purposes of its own to the world. Indeed, that which is
able to set purposes has to be free, that is, not limited in its choice by anything else;
such is (or at least historically becomes) only the finite subjectivity, which liberates
itself even from its infinite source, the infinite divine subjectivity. Inevitably there
arises a sui generis circle. The finite subjectivity rather contingently assigns
purposes to the world, but then in making decisions, subjectivity has to take those
purposes into consideration; it becomes enslaved, as it were, to itself by itself
through unconditional purpose-making.
Among the constructed and reconstructed objects of knowledge are
mathematical entities, represented in Descartes by abstract algebraic objects, easily
reducible to geometrical figures, to which physical things are eventually reduced
(see 2.2.1). But since even the physical object is considered geometrically
structured, the very activity of construction cannot be that of physical production,
because if the mathematical (the geometrical) is constructed under the pattern of
the physical, nothing can guarantee mathematical precision, for the physical is not
precise per se.
Every powerful weapon and instrument may turn self-destructive if not
properly used. O f course, the notion o f “proper use” is a teleological one: only if
there is a certain objective purpose can there be a proper use. When the objective
teleology is intentionally destroyed and subsequently abandoned in favor of the
subjective one, the constructive capacity of the imagination has to inevitably turn
against itself; that is, everything has to be considered as a free, or arbitrary (not
teleologically oriented) construction. Descartes, however, still retains the res
extensa as produced by the infinite mind and thus as capable only of being
reproduced by the finite subjectivity.
Descartes faces the task o f reconstructing the whole world, although he
himself modestly takes it to be only a possible reconstruction that, most
importantly, takes place in imaginary spaces.315 In the newly created world, the
finite (mental) imagination extends as far as it can— indefinitely, it is as »/infinite,
just as the sea is only seemingly infinite. Human subjectivity is thus separated from
the divine by the barrier o f infinity and not o f substantiality: essentially both are
the same, which is why the human mind is assigned an astonishing capacity to
create and recreate things and their rules and thus to know them. Illusion or
seemingness plays an important role in the constitution of the new world, which is

315 Descartes. The World, AT X I31-32.

218 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

both physical and imaginary, for it should represent the “real” world not
existentially but only essentially.316
An important question then is whether this imaginable and imaginary
recreation o f the world is an act or a process. The divine or “real” creation,
considered an act (or, at least, a number o f consecutive acts317), is understood by
Descartes in terms of the scholastic doctrine of the constant recreation o f the
world. This doctrine is further supported by Descartes’ observation that the
contents o f the mind at each particular moment o f time are completely independent
o f the previous momentary mental contents, which finds its expression in the
mutual independence of the moments o f time. But what can be said about
recreation in the imagination? Such a recreation can be considered both momentary
and continuous. It is momentary insofar as the primary constituent, the whole of
the extension or matter of the new world, can be conceived all at once, in a single
and indivisible act of imagination. On the other hand, since this new world has to
undergo a certain development in order to present the whole variety o f visible
bodily things in their heterogeneity, the recreation has to be continuous. The
difference between the “real” and the “as i f ’ creation (or between creation and
recreation) lies again in the distinction of the infini and the indéfini: the
imagination cannot grasp and clearly represent the infinite or even a substantially
large magnitude (a chiliagon). The difference between the finite reason and the
finite imagination consists then in that both are limited in a different way. Reason
is limited only in its ability to know actual infinity, I'infini, while the imagination
is limited in its cognition also of the indefinitely large.318 In other words, reason
fails to know actual infinity (in its essence, although not in its existence), the
infinite o f the divine reason. But imagination fails to represent even potential
infinity (for example, the number of particles in the newly (re)construced world),
although the process that constitutes potential infinity, that o f making another step,
is itself perfectly imaginable. One might say that the difference between actual
infinity and potential infinity is that the former presupposes an act, while the latter,
a process. This distinction is applicable to the construction of a figure that might be
considered contemplated when it, first, is constructed by and in the imagination
(that is, produced in a process) and, second, is retained in the mind and imagination
as wholly and completely present as a single entity (in an act).
The act o f imaginary construction thus really belongs to the infinite
divine reason, whereas the process of the consecutive engendering of a thing in
imagination is accomplished by the finite human mind. In Descartes’ example of
the chiliagon, the finite mind cannot clearly imagine the figure all at once (in an
act) although it can easily imagine the process of the production of the chiliagon,
side by side, according to the rules that describe such a production. The finite mind
is able to co-imagine, as it were, only the simplest geometrical entities (circles,
spheres, triangles, squares, cubes, and so on) with the divine mind; in doing so the

316 On the connection of illusion, deformation and projective geometry see: Gaidenko 1997,
54-68.
317 Cp. Gen. 1:1 sqq.
318 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, AT V 163. Cp. First Set of Objections, AT VII
96; First Set of Replies, AT VII 113-114.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 219

finite mind shares functions o f the demiurg to some extent. These simplest—
clearly and distinctly imaginable—geometrical figures can be then considered
elementary “bricks” of the “grand mathematical book” of the universe. Once again,
imagination appears to be fundamentally ambiguous. It is capable both of
representing an extended entity (be it a geometrical figure or physical body) as
given all at once in a single moment o f “now”, and of conceiving it as constructed
continuously step by step, as becoming in time.
In “The Passions of the Soul” Descartes subdivides all thoughts into
actions and passions.319 Actions are volitions— those thoughts that are completely
in our disposition; passions are perceptions of two kinds, caused by the soul itself
and caused by the body. Now, where does the imagination belong together with its
products, imaginings? Since, as we have seen, imagination is ambiguous in its
nature, Descartes cannot place imaginings only in the mental or only in the bodily.
But because he does not recognize any intermediate entities, he has to split the
imagination into mental and corporeal, which now seem to reappear under the
guise o f active voluntary imaginings and passive bodily imaginings. The latter do
not immediately depend on the nerve structures of our brain, because “they arise
simply from the fact that the spirits, being agitated in various different ways and
coming upon the traces o f various impressions which have preceded them in the
brain, make their way by chance through certain pores rather than others”.320 These
imaginings just happen to us, without any ostensible inclination of the will; we are
not capable o f voluntarily constructing them. Active imaginings are, however,
purely mental, the imaginings of intellect and the imaginings of will: the latter can
be guided by volition when the soul imagines something non-existent, for example,
a chimera or a centaur.321 The constructive active capacity is thus primarily
connected with the imagination, because it can imagine whatever it wants and wills
without any restrictions whatsoever. Restrictions, of course, appear when the
mental (active) imagination imagines geometrical figures and the new world as
well,322 because the final products have to coincide with the “real” ones. Here
imagination is bounded by the non-imaginary, by only thinkable (divine produced)
properties o f figures and physical bodies: for instance, the finite mind cannot
imagine a triangle with two right angles, and even if it can, the figure simply is not
a triangle in Euclidean geometry.
Thus both the imagination and the mind appear to be constructive. But
then how do they, supposedly different, share their constructive capacities? This is
a question Descartes does not directly address. One might suggest that the
constructive ability of imagination extends only to the construction (or, possibly,
the voluntary distortion) of geometrical figures and that it is the mind as cognitive
power that determines all the different modes o f cognition, including imagination.
But then, since imagination is itself determined by reason, it can be said that it is
the reason that in the last instance constructs figures through and in the
imagination. There is still a difference, however, between the two: reason is the

319 Descartes. The Passions of the Soul 1 17-26, AT XI 342 sqq.

320 Descartes. The Passions of the Soul 121, ATXII344-345.
321 Descartes. The Passions of the Soul 120, ATXII344.
322 Cp. Descartes. Discourse V, AT V I42-43.
220 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

constitutive principle of the intelligible— of that which is only thought. For

Descartes, the constructive principle in the proper sense can only be God as the
infinite mind; the finite mind has to arrange its contents and cogitations in due
discursive sequence o f the right and orderly cognition. Imagination, when it
operates with the imaginings o f intellect, is essentially reconstructive, for it follows
a pattern (for example, a notion or an idea of a geometrical object) given to it by
reason (in the last instance, by the infinite reason). On the contrary, when
imagination deals with the imaginings of the will, it may spontaneously produce
such objects of which no “innate idea” or essence as pre-established can be
conceived.
Since, however, Descartes still recognizes innate ideas, which restrict
the (in many respects autonomous) activity of the will, not everything can be
imagined: Descartes has to acknowledge entities that are “purely intelligible and
not imaginable”.323 Whatever is constructible is also imaginable. Everything
imaginable can be understood, but not everything that can be understood is
imaginable, as the chiliagon example shows. Therefore, if not everything is
imaginable, then not everything can be constructed. This is the crucial point in the
Cartesian proof of the existence of God from the idea of supreme infinite
perfection, for this idea cannot be simply a construction of the finite mind.324
Furthermore, while reason represents the truth of being (essentially, not
existentially), imagination is the only faculty capable of imagining non-being.
Non-being for Descartes is, o f course, quite different from the absolute privative
non-being of Plato and Plotinus. The Cartesian non-being is, as it were, also not
existential but essential: it “is” that which does not exist but could have existed
(the most obvious reason for its non-existence is that God does not will it to exist
in the actual world). The mental imagination then connects non-being as “as i f ’
being with thoughts as passions: “[w]hen we read of strange adventures in a book,
or see them acted on the stage, this sometimes arouses sadness in us, sometimes
joy, or love, or hatred, and generally any of the passions, depending on the
diversity o f the objects which are presented to our imagination.”325 Imagination
presents the whole drama o f a worldly event on the stage of the new world where
physical things and geometrical figures are put into the same extension. Yet the
mental imagination has to be a capacity o f visualization of an imaginable object in
contemplating its image or shape as if it were immediately present to the
perception. Contemplation as visualization has to be taken then primarily as an act
of imagination, not o f reason. The contemplation of the Platonic noys has to reveal
being that is and that is thinkable—that is not constructed and that is not changed
by an act o f contemplation. The contemplation of the Cartesian imagination, on the
contrary, can be considered as inventing being by the very act of visualizing it in
mental imagining, which can be directed by the will and in which the imagined
extended thing is produced together with all o f its properties. In order to preserve
the constructed in its existence, however, imagination is necessary but insufficient:

323 Descartes. The Passions of the Soul I, AT XI 344.

324 Cp. Descartes. Med. Ill, AT VII 40 sqq.; Second Set of Objections, AT VII 123.
325 Descartes. The Passions of the Soul, AT X I441.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 221

the effort o f “the surprising mental concentration” is needed, which is attention.326

Thus, even though the most divine in us for Descartes is the mind as
reason or thinking (which, due to its limitations, is discursive)—for it is purely
spiritual and incorporeal and thus co-substantial with infinite thinking—
nevertheless the faculty that represents the divine creative power in its spontaneity
and versatility is imagination rather than reason. It is (mental) imagination that
allows the finite mind to some extent reproduce the productive action of the divine
creative power. Modem subjectivity, which is often taken to conceive of itself as
the creator o f its world and thus to replace the divine infinite subjectivity, becomes
demiurgic only because o f the potential creativity of imagination. Once the world
is considered given, the finite reason may suffice to fully investigate and
understand the world. One of the main Cartesian methodological presuppositions,
however, is not to take anything for granted until the mind is able to understand it
as necessary, that is, as clear and distinct. And if the world is not given, one has to
(re)create it—to imagine it. Imagination can operate spontaneously (that is,
directed only by the will) and is capable of voluntary and arbitrary interpretations,
for example, in visualizing sensual things and in actively constructing their
images.32 In the “Meditations” Descartes seems to restrict the spontaneity o f the
imagination (which allows it to invent fictions, the imaginatione effingo) to the
sphere o f corporeal images only. But at least within corporeal images the
imagination appears to be not only reproductive but productive as well, to be
unrestrained and thus capable o f acting according to the will: I may will to imagine
and thus actually imagine that which does not exist or at least which I have never
seen.328 Thus imagination appears to be the constructive faculty par excellence (cp.
3.4.1).
A number of implicit presuppositions underlie the Cartesian
consideration of construction and reconstruction. First, even though Descartes
wants to avoid using a hylomorphic scheme,329 he still considers the mind (or the
soul) as molding extended objects, although now the mind shapes its material
through the mental imagination, which may operate spontaneously, at will,
depicting the world anew—the world as it could have been, given the requirement
that the phenomenal should not be different from the “real”. Descartes thus
recreates not only the content o f the world (the material, the extended), but also the
very notions the mind employs in the reconstruction; in a sense, the mind itself
through the imagination, the formal.
Second, one of the main presuppositions of early modem science is that
the movement o f the universe is organized and orchestrated by God, although
opinions may vary on whether he constantly puts the same amount of movement
into the world and thus preserves the motion of bodies and matter or whether he
does it only once or periodically.330 Descartes supports this presupposition

326 Descartes. Conversation with Burman, AT V 163.

327 Descartes. Optics IV, AT VII 113-114; To Elizabeth, 6 October 1645, AT IV 311; cp.
Passions of the Soul, AT XI 387; To Chanut, 1 February 1647, AT IV 601.
328 Descartes. Med. II, AT VII 28-29; Passions 143, AAT XI 361.
329 Cp. Aristotle. De an. 412a 27-412b 6.
330 See Nikulin 1993,213.
222 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

throughout his writings: “I think the only general cause o f all the movements in the
world is God.”331 Nevertheless, since God always, at every moment, reinfuses
motion into the matter he himself creates, when the soul imagines the production
of the new world, it follows this pattern, as i f creating or infusing motion into the
world. Since there is no distinction between geometrical and physical extension in
Descartes, it also becomes possible for the soul to consider a geometrical entity
(for example, a point or a line) moving in the imagination and thus to (re)create a
figure (respectively, a line or a plane) by drawing or tracing it in the plenum of the
imagination as i/in a certain matter (see 3.4.5).
Third, as it has been mentioned (3.1.4), the mind as reason is considered a
merely discursive thinking (not only by Descartes but by most modem and
contemporary thinkers).332 Thus, a proposition present to the mind may be
considered true only if it is demonstrated, that is, discursively reconstructed in a
number o f consecutive steps, possibly using other justified propositions. One might
object that the cogito itself is not discursive; still, in order to arrive at its clear and
distinct understanding, the mind gradually has to suspend and remove everything
superfluous. In such a case the discursive mind loses, however, its status of
intermediary that it has in Platonism, since the notion of noys is completely
abandoned, for the noys can by no means be clearly and distinctly perceived either
in an act o f imaginary reduction o f the external, or by an introspection of the
cogito. Thinking o f the noys rather requires abandoning of the self-awareness and
oblivion o f the ego.
Fourth, the notions or the “ideas” o f geometrical objects (as well as innate
ideas and truths) are not subject to the imaginings of the will. They can be
imagined at will but are not produced by the will (only the infinite divine intellect
thinks what it wills and wills what it thinks). Because of this, geometrical truths are
known “by the power o f our own native intelligence, without any sensory
experience”.333 Since all geometrical objects that embody these truths can be
constructed accordingly, all their properties may be then discerned in these objects
after the construction has already taken place. And fifth, the new world appears to
be a possible world, the possibility o f which is actualized by imagination.
In the reconstruction o f the world, the opposition between “the old” and
“the new” is between that which “really” exists and that which is created by the
infinite and the non-created substance. However, epistemologically the old world
is not a surely existing world. The new world can be known in its inner structure
and underlying principles only because it is recreated by the mind and within the
imagination. This statement is in agreement with the verum factum principle: in
order to know something, the finite mind qua mental imagination has to create, or
at least recreate, that thing in its properties (not in its real existence, which still is
produced and supplied by the infinite mind). In recreating the world, the
imagination is able to bring differentiation into the originally uniform extension

331 Descartes. To [the Marquess of Newcastle], October 1645, AT IV 328.

332 Spinoza accepts the cognition of reason (ratio) as discursive, but also recognizes intuitive
knowledge (scientia intuitiva), which is rather an exception, see: Ethics, Bk. II, Schol. 2 ad
Prop. 40. Cp. also: Locke. Essay, Bk. IV, ch. II, § 1.
333 Descartes. To Voetius, May 1643, AT VIIIB 166-167.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 223

and split homogeneous matter into different entities constituted by tiny particles of
a thin-grained “subtle matter”, matiere subtile.334 The newly “created” imaginary
and imagined matter is, first, completely formless—that is, homogeneous and
uniform. Second, it is also not the Aristotelian “prime matter” that lacks all forms
and qualities and thus cannot be clearly and distinctly understood (cp. 1.1.1 ).335
The matter needed for the imaginary recreation of the whole world is substance for
the simple reason that it is extended. Being an extended plenum where various
figures can be discerned, matter is continuous, so that, third, it can be “divided into
as many parts having as many shapes as we can imagine”,336 Moreover,
imagination is able to (re)produce even the laws of motion: “each part is capable of
taking on as many motions as we can conceive”.337 And with the production of
matter and the laws o f its motion the world is complete.338

3.4.2 Construction in geometry: Kinematic constructibility in Descartes

An important feature o f Cartesian geometry is the reduction of various problems to

the solution o f problems o f a single type. Ancient geometry recognizes a
classification o f different types o f problems corresponding to different types of
geometrical figures, by which these problems may be solved. These problems and
lines are ordered axiologically according to their simplicity: a straight line and
circle, conic sections, more complex lines resulting from complex constructions.
Another way of ordering geometrical objects is to consider first plain figures and
then three-dimensional objects, as in Euclid’s “Elements” where consideration of
solids follows at the very end, in books XI-XIII. Descartes retains some traces of
the ancient geometrical hierarchy o f problems and figures in his “Geometry”. He
still divides problems into the following categories of solvability: by ruler and
compass alone, by means o f conic sections and by means of more complex lines.
He mentions three kinds of problems distinguished in ancient geometry, namely,
plane, solid and linear.339 Ancient geometers also further distinguish so-called
mechanical lines constructed by a rather complex mechanical advice (for example,
conchoid and cissoid). Descartes, however, rejects the notion o f mechanical lines
for the reason that it is not clearly understandable, and that some of the ancient
“mechanical” lines (for example, quadratrix) can be described by “two separate

334Cp. Descartes: To Mersenne, 15 November 1638, AT II 440; December 1638, AT II 465;

9 January 1639, AT II483 sqq.; To Mersenne, 16 October 1639, AT II 593-594; The World,
AT XI 16 sqq. Cp. Morin’s discussion of the subtle matter (as it appears in the Cartesian
“Meteorology”) in his letter to Descartes, 22 February 1638, AT I 544 sqq.
335 Descartes. The World, AT XI 33.
336 Descartes. The World, AT XI 34.
337 Descartes. Ibid. Cp. Schuster 1977,685-739.
331 In a rather similar way, in his early work “De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum”
Newton proposes a recreation or reproduction of the world by imagining that God has made
some of the parts of the extension impermeable, as if “closing” them. If the property of
movability is added to these parts, the resulting world will by no means be different from
the phenomenal one. - Newton 1962, 105-109; see also: Nikulin 1993,129-130.
339 Descartes. Geometry I, AT VI 380-381; Geometry II, AT VI 388. Cp. To Beeckman, 26
March 1619, ATX 157.
224 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

movements which have no precisely measurable relation to each other”.340 The

main reason for the ancient geometrical classification of lines is that every line can
be considered produced by a construction that follows a certain algorithm that can
represent regular movements, the difference between which thus constitutes the
hierarchy of lines and problems. Descartes’ intention is to reduce all curves
involved in the solutions o f geometrical problems to two or more simple lines and
to present a simple way of their generation or construction. At this point, Descartes
follows ancient geometers in accepting movement as the way of engendering new
curves (and also surfaces and solids) once simpler lines as primary constituents
“can be moved through one another, and that their intersections determine other
curves”.341 Yet then the whole ancient geometrical hierarchy becomes obsolete,
because any line is supposed to be constructive and constructed indiscriminately
by the movement o f some geometrical object. “[I]t seems to me”, says Descartes,
“that it is very clear that if (as we do) we understand by ‘geometry’ that which is
precise and exact, and by ‘mechanics’ that which is not; and if we consider
geometry as a science that teaches a general knowledge of the measures of all
bodies, we must no more exclude complex lines from it than simple ones, provided
that we can conceive them as being described by a continuous movement, or by
several continuous movements of which latter are completely determined by those
which precede: for by this means, we can always have an exact knowledge of their
measure.”342
The construction o f geometrical objects plays a central role in ancient
geometry as well.343 As Mueller argues, constructibility of geometricals is essential
for Euclid: “In general, Euclid produces, or imagines produced, the objects he
needs for a proof... It seems fair to say then that in the geometry o f the Elements
there is no underlying system o f points, straight lines, etc. which Euclid attempts to
characterize. Rather, geometric objects are treated as isolated entities about which
one reasons by bringing other entities into existence and into relation with the
original objects and one another... In the geometry of the Elements the existence of
one object is always inferred from the existence of another by means of a
construction.”344 This claim is largely justifiable in Euclid’s “Elements”, where at
the beginning o f the first book postulates are precedent to axioms. A postulate
(aitema) is a requirement for the possibility o f the existence of an object, where
such existence is secured by the procedure of construction. An axiom (axioma, in
Euclid, koine ennoia), on the contrary, is a general statement that needs not be
proved but has to be accepted by every reasonable human being. Such an
understanding o f the axiom (which goes back to Aristotle) primarily refers to a
process of learning (for mathemata constitute strict knowledge, science that can be
taught) and not to an abstract system of propositions deduced from a number of

340 Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 390.

341 Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 389; cp. Geometry III, AT VI 476.
342 Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 389-390.
343 Cp. Szabó 1978,185 sqq.; Lachterman 1989, 67 sqq.
344 Mueller 1981,14-15. Cp. Viète 1983,371 sqq.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 225

self-evident statements.345 The distinction between postulates and axioms parallels

that between problems (where a construction is required) and theorems (where one
has to determine a certain property o f a given object).346 (Although, both are
related to each other: according to Proclus, who comments on Euclid, every
proposition or theorem contains, as two of its six integral parts, construction
(ikataskeye) and then proof (apodeixis).)347 A postulate requires the constructibility
o f an object: unless the object is actually constructed, it cannot be said to exist
(even though originally postulates (aitemata) came from dialectic, where they
denoted assumptions not accepted without reservation by one of the participants of
the dialogue).348 And yet in the Late Academy we find many discussions about
whether theorems can be reduced to problems (as Menechmos and Carpus thought)
or whether theorems, which presuppose the existence of non-constructible, non­
changing entities, are prior to problems (as Speusippus and Geminus argued). Put
otherwise, the former maintained that the quod erat demonstrandum is always
reducible to the quod erat factum.349 The latter denied such reducibility, stressing
that knowledge, as Plato takes it, reveals those entities that always exist without
changing their properties. Those properties are to be discovered through
demonstration and not through construction, for construction presupposes
movement and change. Theorems therefore refer to being in the first place, the
only realm o f knowledge for Plato, whereas problems always involve becoming
and, as such, can at best provide additional supportive evidence for science.
Thus, for instance, the definition of parallel lines is given by Euclid as a
possible construction: when indefinitely extended, such lines do not intersect.350

345 “An immediate deductive principle I call a posit (thesis) if it cannot be proved but need
not be grasped by anyone who is going to learn anything. If it must be grasped by anyone
who is going to learn anything whatever, I call it an axiom.” - Aristotle. Anal. Post. 72a 14-
17. Cp. Met. 1005a 19-23; 1005b 11-17; Top. 101b 38-102a 1 and the definition of an
axiom in Theophrastus as quoted by Themistius. In anal. Post. 7.3-4. See also: Mugler 1958,
45, 68; Szabd 1965, 355 sqq.; Heath 1970, 50 sqq.; Schmitz 1997, 316-336. According to
Barnes, “P is an axiom for S iff anyone knows any proposition in S, then he knows that P”
or, in a more general form, “P is an axiom iff anyone who knows anything, knows P”-
Bames 1993, 99.
346 Cp. Plato, RP 530b; Aristotle, Phys. 213b 2; Proclus. In Eucl. 178.1. sqq.; Archimedes.
Opera I 6.14-10.28. See also: Dijksterhuis 1956,143-149.
34 Every proposition or theorem is constituted by six steps: enunciation (protasis,
propositio), exposition (ekthesis, expositio), specification (diorismos, determinate),
construction (kataskeye, constructio), proof (apodeixis, demonstratio) and conclusion
(symperasma, conclusio). - Proclus. In Eucl. 206.12 sqq.
348 Cp. Aristotle. Anal. Post. 77a2-3. Szabd argues that in Greek mathematics axioma and
aitema were interchangeable expressions in dialectic (Szab6 1978, 268 sqq., esp. 287). See
also: Breton 1969, 43 sqq.; Van der Waerden 1977-1978, 343-357; Leszl 1981, 293 sqq.
According to Stenius, who supports the constructivist interpretation of Greek geometry, the
solution of problems provides proofs of the existence of geometrical objects (Stenius 1978,
255-289). Still, even if the existence is not described by axioms, which primarily display the
essence of an object, its existence, at least for Plato and the Platonic thinkers, is not secured
by construction, but is provided by the eidos of the object.
3* Proclus. In Eucl. 241.18-244.9.
350 Euclid. Elem. I, def. 23.
226 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

Before Euclid, the constructive approach is supported by Oenopides and also by

Hippocrates.351 Aristotle takes the properties (diagrammata) inherent in
geometrical figures to be discovered or shown through activity (energeiai):
namely, by drawing lines, that is, by constructing these figures.352 These properties
are not, however, invented by construction; they simply are rendered
distinguishable and as if visible, already inherent in their subject, that is, in a
geometrical figure. In this respect, the construction of a figure may be regarded as
a non-temporal process, in which all the parts and stages are already present.353 In
the Pythagorean-Platonic interpretation of mathematics—based on the acceptance
of number as the ideal paradigm and o f the geometrical figure as intermediate
entity (see 2.1 sqq.)— construction is only an auxiliary method of displaying the
properties o f an entity that does not itself come into being with the act of
construction, but may be said to exist ideally, independently o f the productive
activity o f any o f the mental faculties.354
The above mentioned interpretation by Mueller of Euclidian geometry
stresses construction as connected with the absence of unconditioned assertions of
the existence o f geometrical objects, as is often the case in modem mathematics
(for example, in Hilbert). Such an interpretation, however, seems to some extent to
be a modernization, since ancient mathematics appears to have different initial
premises. First o f all, axioms are considered statements to which, as to the first
principles, all analytic propositions are ultimately reducible. Axioms are thus not
produced by our cognitive activity, but simply articulate the given notions and
geometrical entities. In early modem science, on the contrary, axioms are often
taken to be constructions of the cognizing mind, for instance, in Leibniz.355 Also,
as it was argued, beginning with Descartes modem mathematics, unlike ancient
mathematics, does not accept the notion of the geometrical entity as intermediate
and as existing in intelligible matter (cp. 2.3.1; 2.4.2), which is missing in
Mueller’s presentation. For Euclid and Proclus, the geometrical object exists to the
extent o f its participation in its own ideal (noetic) paradigm, which can only be
rendered visualizable through construction but not produced as such. A
geometrical object exists thus only insofar as it represents its ideal notion. Unlike
Descartes, Euclid is not an essentialist. Euclid demands the constructibility and the
actual construction o f geometrical objects because of their intermediateness:
geometricals do not exist either necessarily (as intelligibles) or contingently (as
physical things). Nevertheless, as said, this very construction only exemplifies the
geometrical objects’ paradigms, themselves not constructed. And lastly, modem
mathematics is based on discursive thinking, whereas ancient geometry not only
takes into consideration the discursiveness o f the dianoia supported by the
imagination-pAawfoy/a capable o f constructing figures—but also the intellect-rays
embracing all the paradigms o f geometrical objects (see: 3.1.2; 3.2.2).
Being strict and demonstrable, knowledge of geometrical entities for

351 Sec: Van der Waerdcn 1977-1978,353-355; Szab6 1978, 273-276.

352 Aristotle. Met. 1051a 21-32.
353 Cp. Aristotle. De caelo 279b 32-280a 10.
354 Cp. Pritchard 1995, 172-173. Cp. Plato. Timaeus 53c sqq.
355 Cp. Gaidenko 1987, 313-319.
 Pari III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 227

Descartes is, on the one hand, certain—almost as certain as the proof o f the
existence o f God.336 On the other hand, it is knowledge of those objects that can be
constructed, that is, whose existence before the construction is not yet assured,
which corresponds to Descartes’ intention to put the weight of scientific research
onto questioning the essence rather than the existence of mathematical and
physical entities. On his account, even geometry and arithmetic do not require
(unlike physics, astronomy and medicine) the actual existence o f their objects;
therefore, only the object’s essence is to be studied.357 Therefore, the question of
the existential status o f geometrical objects is not of primary importance to
geometry itself, which has to study essential properties of its objects. But then
these objects can be taken as only imaginary. Consequently, one might omit the
question o f their ontological status and consider geometricals only as i f existent,
which is sufficient for the purpose o f the scientific “investigation”. The Cartesian
geometrical method is that o f the reduction o f a whole class of problems to one
single problem, although one can make such a reduction to “an infinity of other
problems...thus solving each o f them in an infinity of ways”.35* All geometrical
problems, according to Descartes, can be then reduced to the (easily constructive)
simplest terms, which are lines.359
How does the construction of a geometrical entity have to be
understood? Is it an act or a process? As we have already seen, the imaginable
(re)construction o f the world anew can be considered an act, in its “elementary”
initial constituents (imagining the whole undifferentiated primary extension-
matter), and a process of consecutive differentiation (“grinding” the matter through
movement o f its parts). The same can be said about geometrical figures, at least,
about simple ones: they can be considered both visualizable in a single act of
imagination, and produced in the process of a consecutive delineation of their form
and shape by movement in the imagination. Yet Aristotle takes imagination to be
capable o f causing movement.3 Descartes understands such causation as
mechanical: when ideas of internal passions or o f external objects arrive in the
common sense, they can be further interpreted by the corporeal imagination, which
can “change them in various ways, form them into new ideas, and, by distributing
the animal spirits to the muscles, make the parts of this body move” in many
different ways.361 At the same time, as it has been argued (3.3.1), rather complex
geometrical entities, like the chiliagon, cannot be clearly and distinctly represented
in an act of imagination, although the process of their engendering in a finite
number o f elementary steps (for example, of drawing an interval), which follows a
simple algorithm, can be easily imagined. Every geometrical object and—since an
extended physical body can be represented for Descartes by its geometrical

356 Descartes. To Mersenne, 25 November 1630, AT 1 182.

357 Descartes. Med. I, AT VII 20.
358 Descartes. Geometry III, AT V I485.
359 Descartes. Geometry, AT VI 369 sqq; esp. 373 sqq.; 422; 440. According to M.
Hyppolite, the whole of the Cartesian “Geometry” began from one single problem of
Pappus, solved by Descartes in 1631 (Hyppolite 1952, 169). Cp. Lenoir 1979, 355-379.
360 Cp. Aristotle. De an. 432a 15 sqq., esp. 433a 9-10; Themistius. In de an. 117.33 sqq.
361 Descartes. Discourse V, AT VI 55; cp. Description of the Human Body, AT XI 227.
228 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

substitute— every extended object can also be considered kinematically produced,

that is, generated by the movement of another figure or figures (kinematic
construction is widely used in the new science, for example, by Barrow and
Desargues; cp. 3.4.5).362 For this reason, not only polygons but “all curved lines
which can be described by some regular motion ought to be included in geometry”,
although for the construction o f a problem the simplest curve should be chosen. By
the “simplest”, “we must understand not only those that are the easiest to describe,
nor those that most facilitate the construction or demonstration o f the proposed
problem, but principally those that are o f the simplest class which can be used to
determine the required quantity”,363 those that are themselves easily constructible
and also visualizable in an act o f imagination. As it has been said (2.2.1), the
geometrical object is characterized by its extension and movability. Extension is
further specified by three characteristics, namely, by dimension, unity and shape.364
All of these can in addition be considered as resulting from both the act and the
process of construction. Obviously, it is not extension, but rather movability that
makes the application o f the kinematic construction in geometry possible. For
example, a line may be constructed by first determining several of its points and
subsequently by tracing a trajectory through those points (for example, a spiral)
“by a regular and continuous movement”. Otherwise, a geometrical line, surface
or body can be traced kinematically by a “flowing motion” of another geometrical
entity according to some rationally established rule, realized in a construction.366
Thus, geometrical constructibility is primarily kinematic constructibility.
The only object that cannot be produced in this way is the point, which therefore
has a privileged position among geometrical objects (cp. 2.1.3). The point is the
simplest geometrical entity not only because it can be taken as the initial, most
simple element for construction, but because (unlike all other geometrical entities)
it is not to be kinematically constructed. The essential properties o f every
geometrical entity are thus exemplified and shown in and through movement,
where the elementary moving unit is the point. All the more complex kinematically
producing objects are reducible to a line, which itself is engendered by the moving
point. In particular, the surface tracing a solid can itself be considered
kinematically constructed by a line, and the line—by the point; the point can thus

362 Descartes. Geometry III, AT 479, in which Descartes is followed by I. Barrow, see
Nikulin 1993, 61-63. Cp. Descartes’ description of the kinematic production of geometrical
figures that fall under the scope of imagination, To Beeckman, 26 March 1619, AT X 157.
Desargues in his “Rough Draft on Conics” takes the infinity of a straight line to be proved
by its extension in and by the imagination: “The understanding feels itself wandering in
space, not knowing whether that space continues for ever, or if at some place it ceases to
continue. To decide the matter, the understanding may for example reason as follows; Either
space continues for ever, or at some place it ceases to continue; if at some place it ceases to
continue, wherever that place may be, the imagination can find it in time. Now imagination
can never find any place in space at which this space ceases to continue; Therefore space
and consequently the straight line continue for ever”. • Desargues 1987, 141-142. Cp. 3.4.5.
363 Descartes. Geometry III, AT V I442-443.
364 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 447.
365 Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 441-412.
366 Cp. Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 446.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 229

be regarded as the primary constituent in the kinematic construction. The object

itself then, the what of the geometrical construction, is the kinematically
producible and constructive geometrical entity.
But what is the where o f productive geometrical movement? Here we
encounter the same difficulty that Descartes encounters when addressing the
question o f whether the geometrical figure belongs to the res extensa or to the res
cogitans (cp. 2.2.1; 2.4.2). Indeed, the where of the movement-production o f a
geometrical entity cannot be thinking, for the produced and the producing
geometrical object are extended, except for the point. But the production o f a
geometrical object can hardly take place in the extension of physical bodies either,
for physical objects do not have the same measurable mathematical properties as
geometrical figures, always representing them with a certain approximation. In
fact, the question remains unanswered by Descartes, due to the difficulty of solving
the problem o f the interaction o f two finite substances. It might be conjectured that,
since the construction is not real, it might be considered imaginary, thus taking
place in the imagination. Imagination itself is split, however, into mental and
bodily in Descartes (cp. 3.3.1), and therefore it still remains to be seen whether the
construction o f geometrical objects has to be considered a mental or a physical
imaginary process.
Since all extended objects, both physical and geometrical, are implicitly
put by Descartes into the same space, matter or extension (there is no room for
intelligible matter), it is body qua extended that is considered being in motion and
constructed by the movement of a point. It is for this reason that mathematics
(specifically, geometry) can be practically applied to the construction of bodies, in
particular, o f instruments and m achines.67 This is just another formulation o f the
verum factum principle, since every physical property can be satisfactorily
explained only insofar as it is constructed or produced in extension by the mind.3 8
It means that all mathematical properties and laws embodied in constructive
geometrical figures are to be found in physical entities as well. And, on the
contrary, the property o f movability, originally associated with physical things, has
to be extended and ascribed to geometrical objects, bracketing the question of
whether motion takes place in physical matter or in the imagination. It is in this
way that it becomes possible to describe physical things, their properties and
movement, in terms of geometrical entities.
Thus, the method of reduction of a whole class of geometrical entities (in
Descartes, o f lines) to a single, simpler geometrical object which, except for the
point, is kinematically constructive, becomes a powerful instrument in the new
science. On the one hand, as it has been argued (2.2.1; 2.2.2), numbers and
algebraic signs can be represented through and as functional relations.369 The latter
are further representable as geometrical entities, constructive by the movement of
other geometrical entities (in this way, the ancient distinction between number and
geometrical magnitude is abandoned). On the other hand, physical and mechanical

367 Cp. Descartes. To Hogelande, 8 February 1640, AT III 724.

368 Cp. Descartes. To Mersenne, 13 July 1638, AT II 238, where the weight of body is
explained by a geometrical construction.
369 Descartes. Reg. XVI, AT X 456.
230 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

things are also reducible to geometrical objects, because both are considered as
already existing in the same extension and sharing many of the same properties
describable as geometrical properties (thus, Descartes considers a string, la chorde,
either stable or moving, as represented by an interval, that is, by a geometrical
figure moving as well).370 For that reason it becomes possible to understand
constructibility as mechanical: there may exist an infinite number of physical
objects represented by geometrical lines that can be constructed mechanically—by
an instrument “composed of several rulers”.371 Similarly, there can be an infinite
number o f descriptions (not different from the construction) of a figure, for
instance, of an oval.372 In other words, physical and geometrical magnitudes are
constructed in the same way. Ancient ontological and epistemological hierarchies
o f objects and cognitive faculties become thus superfluous and obsolete, for both
numbers and physical things can be represented in and through geometrical objects
(in fact, reduced to them). This allows for the more geometrico description of
physical moving and changing things, by means of (and in the terms of)
mathematics, which is now considered capable of embracing and comprising
movement and change.373

3.4.3 Imagination and geometry: Imagination as constructive

As we have seen, the major operation of mental imagination for Descartes is

forming new figures (3.3.1).374 One might even say that constructing new figures is
a sui generis purpose o f the imagination. This is, of course, only a faint remnant of
the traditional teleology in the consideration of cognitive faculties, when every
faculty is supposed to be designed to know certain entities, already existing and
independent o f that faculty. Since early modernity intends to expel and ban
teleology, one has to understand imagination not through its purpose— it hardly has
any, at least, from the finite human perspective—but through its virtually unlimited
capacity to form new objects, even those that it has never seen.375 There is a further
important distinction within the objects of mental imagination; these objects can be
considered to be o f two kinds. The first is constituted by the imaginings of those
things that we have seen or experienced. These come initially from senses through
the corporeal imagination. Here belong the imaginings of physical bodies and
geometrical figures, whose imitations can be found in the physical world. These
imaginings might be called imaginings of intellect, for although constructed or
gathered from “real” parts, they are considered to have prototypes not completely
dependent on our volition. Such imaginings embrace both geometrical figures and
physical bodies, which are put in the same extension without discrimination. They
are constructed by the finite imagination, which only follows the divine infinite

370 Descartes. To Mersenne, 15 April 1630, AT I 143.

371 Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 391 sqq.; cp. mechanical construction of an ellipse by
movement of a point, ibid., AT V I428.
372 Cp. Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 427-428; III, AT V I464 sqq.
373 Cp. Descartes. Geometry II, AT VI 414 sqq.
374 Cp. Descartes. Reg. XII, AT X 415-416.
375 Cp. Descartes. The Passions of the Soul, AT XI 361.
 Part HI: Reason, Imagination and Construction 231

construction and produces an imaginary or an “as if ’ construction. To the second

kind belong imaginings of things never seen or not “naturally” existing before they
are first produced (e.g., chimeras or sky-scrapers), when the finite subjectivity or
mind is not bound by any objective restrictions and is completely free to construct
whatever it wishes according to its volition. These might be called imaginings of
will. Imaginings o f intellect have a higher status for Descartes than those of will,
because the former follow the objectively established divine order and the latter are
to much extent arbitrary. The distinction between intellection and willing is valid
only for the finite mind, whereas in the infinite mind there can be no real
distinction between the will and thinking: “In God, willing, understanding and
creating are all the same thing without one being prior to the other even
conceptually (<ne quidem ratione)”.376 However, since the finite intellect has to
pronounce its judgement about actually existing infinity, which is essentially
beyond the grasp, one can only state that there should be no such distinction. That
is, such a non-distinction should be there, but in what this non-distinction consists,
one cannot really say. All truths then are ultimately grounded in God and are true
or possible because God knows and wills them as true or possible (i.e., not
necessarily but as necessary). It is thus the infinite mind that constructs both
extended and thinkable objects through the acts of will.
The divine infinite intellect produces every truth, “innate idea”,
geometrical figure, and physical body by a single act of volition, which is not
really different from an act o f thinking—which, in turn, is not really different from
the act of imagination in which the infinite mind is able to momentarily grasp any
of its objects (not only a chiliagon but even a figure with an actually infinite
number o f sides). Therefore, from the Cartesian point of view, there can only be a
modal difference between thinking and imagination in God, and the infinite
imagination is to be presupposed in the divine mind. In fact, the very act of the
divine creation o f both res cogitans (the finite mind) or res externa (the world) can
be considered a voluntary imagining o f them according to the immanent laws of
the divine mind itself.
As it has been argued, the cognitive faculty that enables the finite mind to
be constructive is primarily the imagination (yet Aristotle claims it to be within our
power).377 Imagination may voluntarily combine and mix different images into
new ones that do not necessarily correspond to any reality (i.e., they are imaginings
o f the will, cp. 3.3). Since the outer reality is only inanimate res extensa,
everything that is thought or imagined may be imposed onto matter, which thus
can be shaped, constructed and reconstructed. But Descartes puts corporeal things
into the same extension and matter as geometrical figures, for the simple reason
that there is no other extension. Geometrical figure can be constructed by the mind

376 Descartes. To Mersenne, 27 May 1630, AT I 153. The origins of modem voluntarism
may be found in Augustine, and later in Walter of Brugge, Peter Olivi, Duns Scotus and
Ockham, who stress the unlimited autonomy and primacy of the will. Cp. Augustine. De
civ. Dei XXI.5; Gaidenko 1997, 33-48. From such point of view, the good is good and true
is true because God wills them to be good and true, and not because they are necessarily
good and true for God, belonging to his nature (cp. 1.3.4).
577 Aristotle. De an. 427b 17-18.
232 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

according to an image or “idea” the mind has or produces (since Descartes still
tries to save the divine infinite intellect, innate ideas themselves can be considered
as constructed by the infinite divine mind). Corporeal things may also be
considered constructed according to their ideas. The production o f such images or
ideas is not, o f course, thought as completely voluntary (it may be reproduced in
the imaginings o f reason), since it is not in the power of reason not to think
something as true when this something is true for the infinite intellect, and is
established by means o f a (method-oriented) proof. But since for Descartes reason
has to prescribe the best for the will (but not necessarily does, for the will can still
act on its own— reason and will, two different “modes of thinking” in the
“Principles”, can coincide only in the infinite mind), the involuntariness o f the true
cannot in fact be the criterion o f being true.
The content of the mind (even the innate ideas) is easily visualizable in
and by the imagination, and the demonstration by (imaginary) construction “is
obvious to the eye”, that is, the inner eye becomes, as it is in Renaissance painting,
a precise instrument for producing construction and making decisions about the
constructed.37* Thus, two important features of imagination in Descartes are (a) its
intimate connection with matter qua extended and (b) its creativity and
constructive capacity. The first feature, (a), has already been discussed: extension
is easily imaginable and imagination has corporeal things as its object (3.3.1).379
Still, the notion o f extension-matter differs from extension as such. The notion is
thought by reason alone and should not necessarily require any representation of
and in the imagination, whereas spatiality, the three-dimensionality of extension is
represented in and by the imagination. Second (b), imagination plays an important
role in the creation o f figures. It might be that we cannot know how God first
created this world and that we are unable to understand how he maintains two
created substances by the constant recreation of them.380 According to Descartes,
one has the reason to understand the necessity o f the world’s creation, but in order
to understand how it is created, one has to recreate the world, repeating the steps of
the world’s production. Since this production takes place in the imagination, it is
imagination that becomes the demiurgic mental faculty par excellence.
Because o f the unique constructive capacity of imagination, the autonomy
o f reason in Descartes turns out to be to much extent the autonomy o f imagination,
taken as the constructive faculty. A thin border between as »/existence and real
existence becomes permeable: imagination, which Descartes still understands to be
subordinated to reason, may be thus understood as autonomous and creative. Even
though Descartes claims that only our thoughts are within our power, in fact,
spontaneity is the distinctive mark o f imagination, because imaginings are within
our power to evoke, to produce and to reproduce them. Moreover, imagination can
be taken as both the productive capacity and (since it is able to visualize the
extended) as that very plenum where production takes place. In other words,

371 Descartes. Geometry III, AT VI 443.

379 Descartes. Reg. XIV, AT X 442. Cp. Fifth Set of Replies, AT VII 387; To More, 5
February 1649, AT V 270: “Commonly when people talk of an extended being, they mean
something imaginable”.
3*° Descartes. Second Set of Replies, AT VII 166.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 233

creative imagination assumes the role o f both intellection-noesw and intelligible

matter, where intelligible objects-noeto are produced.
Imagination as constructive appears to be unbounded and free in its
4A|

operations, especially in “fashioning this matter as we fancy”. As Descartes

farther explains, “the idea o f this matter is included to such an extent in all the
ideas that our imagination can form that you must necessarily conceive it or else
you can never imagine anything at all... [S]ince everything I propose here can be
distinctly imagined, it is certain that even if there were nothing o f this sort in the
old world, God can nevertheless create it in a new one. For it is certain that he can
create everything we can imagine”.382 Imagination thus becomes a most important
constructive, as it were, demiurgic faculty, even considered prescriptive to the
divine reason. Descartes goes as far as to argue that it is not only the case that we
are able to imagine everything God can create (except that he can know ideas and
produced things eminently), but also that God can create everything we can
imagine.
For this reason Descartes needs to state that such a creation is not only
possible, but actual: in “The World” he has to undertake an ambitious attempt to
recreate the world anew. In this recreation, however hypothetical the initial
presuppositions and the very process o f such a recreation may be, the final result
(the phenomenal world) cannot be different from the real world, that is, from the
world created by the infinite mind. O f course, such a recreation is purely imaginary
because, first, we do not really know how the real creation takes place. Second,
imaginary creation occurs in imaginary space(s).383 And third, the true appearance
is obtained from the presumably false, or only provisional, principles, which
Descartes is reluctant to presuppose in the creation by the infinite intellect.384 The
new world still is not really “real”, and the purpose of Descartes is not to explain
real things, but to produce a world that, although a fake, phenomenally is not
different from the “real” one. Moreover, there could be a different number of
various hypothetical descriptions and recreations of the same world. The
requirement of real being or existence is weakened and reduced to the requirement
of essential coincidence with the observed God-given world, which thus can be
substituted by the phenomenal illusionary appearance in a clear and distinct
panoptical vision, observing every thing and every event from one single point of
the finite ego. Descartes does not require that life be real; a theater that imitates life
will suffice. In fact, there is no way—unless we know the algorithm, the procedure
o f construction—to tell which world is the “real” one and which one is merely a
phantasm. Both share exactly the same attributes, except that being is produced by
God in one case, and by the human imagination in the other. This is very much in
accord with Cartesian essentialism: Descartes is not so much interested in the

381 Descartes. The World, AT XI 33.

3.2 Descartes. The World, AT XI 35-36.
3.3 Descartes. Discourse V, AT VI 42-43.
384 That a true conclusion can be obtained from a false premise (permissible for the
operation of the material implication) is accepted byDescartes:“truths may beoften
illustrated by a false example”. - To Hyperaspistes,August 1641,AT III429; cp. Princ. Ill
45, AT VIIIA 99-100.
234 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

ontological status o f the new world, but much more in what we can “construct
into” such a world, so that phenomenally it might coincide with the “real” one.
As it has been argued (3.2.2), imagination, as portrayed by Plotinus, is
characterized by the following main features. It has an ability to produce images-
phantasmata; it is intermediate and ambiguous; it is associated with negativity; and
it is tightly connected with quasi-extension. Another important feature that is
crucial for our present discussion, however, has been left out: namely, the
connection o f imagination with the geometrical, which is not so clearly established
by Plotinus but is later brought in by Syrianus and further elaborated by Proclus.
In his commentary to “Metaphysics”, Syrianus’ interpretation is that Plato
makes imagination the place for geometrical figures.385 The intellect immediately
knows intelligible objects, which are not extended and indivisible forms. Sensible
objects, on the contrary, appear to be extended and divisible and are known
through mediation o f the sense organs. Imagination, which, as Proclus explains,
occupies “the central position in the scale of knowing, is woken up by itself to put
forth what it knows, but because it is not outside the body, when it brings what it
knows from its undivided life into the divided, extended and having figure. For this
reason everything that it thinks is a picture or a shape of the thought (noimatos). It
thinks the circle as extended, and although this circle is free of external matter,
imagination has intelligible matter in itself. This is why there is more than one
circle in the imagination, as there is more than one circle in the sense world, for
with extension there appear also the more and the less and a multitude of circles
and triangles. ...[T]he formative principle (logos) of the circle—or of the triangle
or of geometrical figure— is o f two kinds, the one in intelligible matter, the other in
sensual matter”.386
We have already seen that imagination is essentially effective and
operative in the intermediate sphere. There are, however, two intermediate
cognitive faculties that both have to do with geometrical objects; namely, the
discursive reason ing-dianoia and the imaginmon-phantasia, introduced
respectively in the first and second parts of the prologue of Proclus’ commentary in
Euclid. What is the relation between the two cognitive faculties? On the one hand,
as Proclus explains, geometrical figures are present in discursive reasoning-dianoia
and in the naagmzxion-phantasia in a considerably different manner: “the circle in
the reasoning (en dianoiai) is one and simple and unextended, and magnitude itself
is without magnitude there (to megethos amegethes ekei), for they are all formative
principles devoid of matter, and figure is without shape. But the circle in the
imagination is divisible, formed, extended—not one only, but one and many, and
not a form (eidos) only, but a form in instances (katatetagmenon eidos), whereas
the circle in sensible things is inferior in precision, infected with straightness, and
falls short o f the purity of immaterial objects”.387 On the other hand, there is also
an important difference between grasping the circle in discursive reasoning and in
the intellect. The latter conceives the circle in one single act, all at once with all its
properties, whereas the former consecutively establishes the properties of the circle

385 Syrianus. In Met. 186.16-22.

386 Proclus. In Eucl. 52.20-53.22, trans. with changes.
387 Proclus. In Eucl. 54.5-13; trans. with changes.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 235

one by one through an argument: “For the discursive reasoning contains the
formative principles but being weak (asthenoysa) to consider them when they are
wrapped up, unfolds and exposes them and presents them to the imagination sitting
in the vestibule; and in imagination, or with its aid, it explicates its knowledge of
them, happy in their separation from sensible things and finding in the matter of
imagination a receptacle (hypodokhe) apt for receiving its forms.”38*
Thus, on the one hand, reasoning and imagination are both intermediate
between the intellect and the senses, the former closer to the intelligible, the latter
closer to the sensual. Imagination plays the role of a receptacle for the formative
principles-/ogo/ effective in reasoning-rf/ano/a, formed under the pattern of
intelligible objects-noeta. On the other hand, both dianoia and phantasia appear to
be ultimate terms in the cognitive triads of intellect-reasoning-imagination and
reasoning-imagination-sensual imagination (sensation). Paradoxically, there
appears also a sui generis inversion between reasoning and imagination. Reasoning
is discursive, whereas imagination is capable of presenting its object both (at least,
a simple one) as an immediate whole (as the intellect thinks each of its objects in
its entirety and all of them in the unity of koinonid), and also as appearing, arising
part by part in the medium o f intelligible matter. One might consider the relation
between reasoning and imagination as that of form and matter, where the activity
o f discursive reasoning develops and unfolds in the imagination. However, it is not
the form-eidos but the formative principle-/ogos that appears in reasoning and,
consequently, is ascended to in geometrical considerations and constructions; and
it is not physical but intelligible matter that appears as matter of and for
imagination. Multiplicity, brought to a unity by science (e.g., in formulation o f a
theorem for an infinite number o f objects satisfying certain requirements), is also
present differently in discursive reasoning and in the imagination. In the former,
multiplicity appears in and through discursiveness, in only partial understanding at
each step. In the latter it appears in and through the multitude of circles that can be
imagined, as well as in their potentially infinite divisibility.
One has to conclude therefore that in such an unfolding of the previously
concealed, it is discursive reasoning that projects its logos (which is itself a
projection o f the eidos o f the noys) into the geometrical matter of the imagination.
As intermediate, both dianoia and phantasia have their share in the constitution of
geometrical entities. First, the eidos (or, the notion of a figure) is processed as
logos in discursive reasoning-rfano/a, which investigates and represents the
properties o f a figure in terms o f consistent propositions and proofs. The logos of
partless and immaterial figures (ayla skhemata), itself partless and immaterial, is
then projected as if upon the “screen” of imagination, which is able to visualize
geometrical entities by reconstructing them under their pattem-/ogos now already
as extended (diastatos), and to represent them further in and through a physical
image (for example, a triangle or square).3*9 That is why, strictly speaking, every
geometrical object exists as four-fold: in the eidos of noys as its paradigm; in the
logos o f dianoia; in the phantasma o f phantasia; and, finally, in the representation

3MProclus. In Eucl. 54.27-55.6, trans. with changes.

3,9 Syrianus. In Met. 85.4-5; 98.26 sqq.
236 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

of the sensual image perceived by the senses.390 The geometrical figure thus
primarily exists not as abstracted from its sensual imitation, not as an imaginable
simulacrum, and not even as an object o f discursive thinking (which already
includes in itself, as in a subject, all its properties), but as the ideal partless
paradigm or form.
Thus, when the imagination conceives a geometrical figure, for example,
a circle, it takes the circle’s image, phantasma, not as abstracted from a number of
physical circles (all o f which are imperfect), but rather forms a circle as if drawing
it according to its ideal form or pattern, which is transmitted from noys to dianoia
and further to phantasia. A circle in imagination can be either imperfect (i.e.,
distorted) or perfect; the imagination can present and produce both. But does
imagination itself discern between the perfect and the imperfect? The task of
imagination is not to judge whether this particular circle is perfect or not; it has to
produce a circle, and if it produces the circle under the pattern o f discursive
thinking, the circle is exact and perfectly round. If, however, the imagination
deviates from the logos, and either borrows its construction pattern from sense data
or voluntarily changes the perfect figure, the produced circle is inevitably distorted.
It is thus up to the judgement o f the dianoia to decide which circle is perfect.
Not only in Plotinus, but also in Proclus imagination is intermediate
between sense-perception and discursive reasoning and plays a central role in the
constitution o f geometrical entities, which themselves occupy an intermediate
position between physical bodies and discursive formative principles. As Proclus
explains, when the soul (i.e., the discursive reasoning) is acting cognitively (kata to
gndstikon energoysa), it projects the formative principles of figures (toys ton
skhématón logoys) upon the mirror of imagination.91 Imagination then presents the
undistorted image o f a figure (a perfectly round circle or square with truly equal
angles) and thus provides discursive thinking with an opportunity for easier
consideration o f the figure, immediately and not deductively grasping the
properties o f a geometrical object.392 This enables ancient mathematicians to
represent (but not to equate) mathematical objects, such as numbers and their
proportional relations, as geometrical figures: lines, parallelepipeds, and so on (cp.
2 .2 .2 ).
Imagination visualizes the dianoetic formative principle-/ogos (the
discursive notion), which itself is a discursive representation, splitting an
indivisible noetic iorm-eidos (the intelligible notion). Geometrical figures are thus
connected with intelligible objects through the mediation o f logoiJ 3 Indeed, the
mentioned properties o f imagination are all equally discernible in geometrical
figures, which may be considered produced in the imagination by discursive
reasoning.394 Furthermore, geometrical objects are intermediate insofar as, on the
one hand, they share similar features with both physical things (as extended and
divisible) and with intelligible objects and formative principles (as unchangeable

390 Syrianus. In Met. 50.7.

391 Proclus. In Eucl. 141.4-9.
392 Cp. Iamblichus. De comm. math. sci. 34.4-12.
393 Cp.: geometría de noetdn oysa taktea ekei, Plotinus. Enn. V.9.11.24-25.
394 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. III.8.4.7-10; VI.3.16.14-15.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 237

and mutually connected), participating not only in the intelligible forms through
rational principles but also displaying the irrational as represented by multiplicity
and otherness in divisibility and extension (cp. 2.3.1).395 An important distinction
that needs to be mentioned here is that discursiveness in the analysis of
geometrical objects (which are considered then in an act, as already given) differs
from discursiveness in the construction of figures (which are considered then in a
process of their kinematic formation by a uniform and undeviating movement).
Proclus has this last procedure in mind when he comments on the first three
Euclidean postulates o f Book 1 o f the “Elements”: “The drawing o f a line from any
point to any point follows from the conception of the line as the flowing of a point
and o f the straight line as its uniform and undeviating flowing (homalen kai
aparegkiiton rhysin)."m The act o f imagination is discrete, as it were, proceeding
in a number of steps from one premise or object to another. The process of
construction in the imagination, however, is continuous, following a continuous
process of as if drawing a line. Such a distinction can be assigned to the
fundamental ambiguity o f the geometrical as intermediate between the pure
intelligible and the bodily. And lastly, the geometrical figure is characterized
primarily not by its size or magnitude, but by its shape (morphe) of a certain
quality (circular, triangular, and so on).397 This shape is unique but can be present
in many geometrical figures of the same form (as in the case of concentric circles,
for example), which is only possible when a geometrical figure is represented in
the extension of intelligible matter.
Imagination cannot represent either only divisibility or only indivisibility.
If the former were the case, it would not be able to display and preserve the form
of its object (of a geometrical figure) as extended. And in the latter case,
imagination would not be able to construct its objects, because the indivisible
cannot be engendered in and by a process. Therefore, the activity o f imagination
“should start from what is partless within it, proceed therefrom to project each
knowable object that has come to it in concentrated form, and end by giving each
object form, shape, and extension”.398 There should be an entity that represents
indivisibility more than anything else, an elementary unit by means of which all
other geometrical entities may be produced. Such an entity is the geometrical point
(see 2.1.3).
The principle-a/Mé o f a mathematical entity has to be generically
different from (“transcendent to”) that o f which it is the principle. (The principle of
a number—monad— is not itself a number; the principle of a geometrical figure—
point— is not a figure strictly speaking; similarly, in ontology die principle o f being
is not itself being; cp. 1.2.1; 2.1.1; 2.1.2.) This is because the principle is not a

395 Cp.: “[T]he knower in knowing [one part] brings in all the others by a kind of sequence
(akoloythia)-, and the geometer in his analysis makes clear that the one proposition contains
all the prior propositions by means of which the analysis is made and the subsequent
propositions which are generated from it.” • Plotinus. Enn. IV.9.5.23-26. See also: Plotinus.
Enn. VI.3.16.20-23; Plato. Phil. 16c-17a, 56a-57d; RP 525a-530d.
396 Proclus. In Eucl. 185.8-12.
397 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. VI.3.14.20-24.
398 Proclus. In Eucl. 95.10-14.
238 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

genus for that o f which it is the principle.399 Therefore, the principle may be
defined negatively: “negative definitions are appropriate to the first principles.”400
In the ontological order principles are the first, but in the order of cognition they
are not the first and are arrived at by negation of the given. Since the point is the
elementary constitutive unity for any other geometrical entity, it is only the point
that is properly negatively defined by Euclid, whereas line and surface are already
defined positively. 01 Quite to the contrary, modem mathematicians tend to begin
with the axiomatized first principles in the order of cognition, immanentizing these
principles by putting them in similar terms with the principiated (cp. 2.1.2; 2.1.4;
2 .2 .2).
The geometrical point can be further considered representing the
arithmetical unit or monad in intelligible matter. What would represent then the
indefinite dyad, the principle o f otherness in numbers? Monad and point differ
insofar as the monad can be conceived both as the formative, generative principle,
and as the material principle in and of numbers. A point, on the contrary, can be
considered only as the formative principle of a line and not the material one,
because a point added to another point does not ever produce a piece of extension.
However, a point is also to be considered as the limit of a line and as its productive
unit, by which the line is engendered (is drawn). Since such generation involves
becoming radically other to itself (the continuous is produced from the discrete),
the point, as Proclus puts it, “secretly” contains the potentiality of the unlimited, of
otherness (i.e., of matter). Because of this “minimal” materiality (or inherent
otherness), the point, while still being indivisible, is to be considered capable of
both generating a continuous entity (a line) and of limiting it. The point is then to
be considered located in intelligible matter and in imagination, and is capable of
being imaginably moved.402
The limit and the unlimited are two primary principles for Proclus, which
immediately follow the primary cause of being (see 2.4.2).403 The limit and the
unlimited are present as sameness and otherness in every entity.404 In particular,
they are to be found in geometrical entities: every geometrical figure (except for
the point) is limited as having a boundary405 and can be conceived existing as a
whole, in an act o f imagination and reasoning. Even if the existence of a
geometrical object is not presupposed but is to be established by constructing a
problem, the object itself cannot suddenly change into another one. The unlimited,
on the other hand, is exemplified in extended geometricals through (and as)

399 Cp. Plato. RP 509b; Plotinus. Enn. VI.9.2.47; Aristotle. Met. 1076b 18-19. Aristotle
reports that Plato refused to consider the point a genus (Met. 992a 20-21). Plato seems to
stress that the point, as the representative of the unit, is not a geometrical entity.
400 Proclus. In Eucl. 94.10-11; cp. Theol. Plat. II 38.13-39.5. Cp. also: Aristotle. De an. 430b
20-21.
401 Cp. Euclid. Elem. I, def. 1-5.
402 Cp. Proclus. In Eucl. 88.2-5.
403 Proclus. Theol. Plat. II 30.22-26 et al. Cp. Breton 1969, 97-110.
404 Proclus. In Eucl. 5.25-6.7; cp. In. Tim. I 444.16-19; cp. Plato Phil. 16c sqq.; Iamblichus.
De comm. math. sci. 12.18-14.17.
405 Cp. Euclid. Elem. I, def. 13-14.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 239

divisibility and insofar as they can be considered in the process of becoming,

kinematically engendered in the medium of intelligible matter.
Proclus considers circular and rectilinear motions as two primary motions,
because they correspond to the figures of the circle and the straight line, which
have the simplest, and thus most “perfect”, definitions and corresponding
constructions. O f these two, the former more represents limit, the latter the
unlimited, because the circle and circular motion are always held within the limit
of their shape, while the line and rectilinear motion can always potentially go
lurther or change direction.406 Because actually infinite geometrical figures have
no finite boundary, and therefore no corresponding logos, they cannot be
considered by ancient mathematics.407 For this reason, the circle and circular
motion have privileged positions and are simpler and more perfect than the straight
line and rectilinear motion, and the latter are simpler and more perfect than any
mixed complicated figures and motions.408 Limit and the unlimited are present then
in all geometrical objects in various degrees. Limit (which represents indivisibility,
uniformity, stability and form) takes precedence over the unlimited (which
represents divisibility, imprecision, irregularity, change, movement and matter),
but both are necessarily present in everything that can be considered existent.409 It
is because o f the presence o f limit and the unlimited, of sameness and otherness,
that geometrical objects “can hold fast to their own origins and yet go out to all
things, preserving continuity with their principles and not being separated from
them, but ever driven by the all-powerful cause in them to move forth”.410
Even though Plato may have intended to introduce quanta of continuous
length (see 2.1.3), and Damascius—quanta of continuous time,411 the dualism of
point and line is not overcome by ancient mathematics. This is because the
indivisible cannot be reduced to the divisible, as form cannot be reduced to matter;
unity to duality; and sameness to otherness. Still, ancient geometers find a way to
establish a connection between the two: a line can be considered both as existing in
an act and as kinematically produced, that is, engendered by movement.

3.4.4 Movement in the intellect according to Plotinus

Let us first consider motion in the intelligible in more detail. In the “Sophist” Plato
introduces, together with the categories of sameness and otherness (which also
play an important role in other dialogues),412 two further categories within the
intelligible (i.e., pertaining to being): those of rest and movement, discussed by
Plotinus in his treatise “On the Kinds of Being” (cp. 3.1.1; 3.1.3).413 For Plotinus,

406 Proclus. In Eucl. 104.11-16, 187.19-27; cp. Aristotle. Met. 1072a 21-22.
407 Cp. Aristotle. De caelo 272b 17-24.
408 Plato. Tim. 34a; Aristotle. Phys. 261b 28-265b 15; De caelo 270b32 sqq.; Plotinus. Enn.
V.l.7.7-9 et al.; Proclus. Inst. Phys. II 1.
409 Proclus. In Eucl. 86.5 sqq.
4,0 Proclus. In Eucl. 187.11-15.
411 See: Pines, Sambursky 1987,64-92.
412 Cp. Brisson 1974.
413 See esp.: Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.7.
240 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

motion is not devoid o f ambiguity, insofar as it embraces opposites and originates

intelligible matter (once indefinite thinking turns to its source, see 1.2.1; 2.4.1;
2.4.2), which itself is inevitably ambiguous and does not “stand still” (me
menei),4U presenting an identical non-identity. As Corrigan argues, since
intelligible matter is associated with the aoristos dyas, ambiguity is also
fundamental for Plotinus’ account of matter—particularly, of intelligible matter.415
Why does Plotinus need the notion o f movement at all? In the “Sophist” Plato
argues that rest and motion are irreducible to sameness and otherness, because
sameness and otherness are necessarily present both in rest and in motion, since
otherwise motion would have come to a stop and rest would have moved.416 Here
the categories o f rest and motion are not specifically reserved for either
paradigmatic or eiconic realms (i.e., they are both applicable to the intelligible and
the physical). But Plotinus seeks to delineate further two spheres, in order to justify
Plato’s division between the eternal and its imitation in the moving image of the
“Timaeus”.417 Therefore, on the one hand, Plotinus faces an exegetic task of
making a concordance between the five categories -genera of the “Sophist” and that
o f the etemity-time distinction of the “Timaeus”. On the other hand, he needs to
present his own systematic explanation of the relation of the intellect to eternity.
For this purpose, the notions o f rest and movement appear to be indispensable for
Plotinus.
Since the intellect is being, it is always the same, and everything in it is at
rest (hestota, i.e., all intelligible objects are stable).418 However—this reasoning
parallels Plato’s argument in the “Sophist”—the intellect cannot be only at rest.4
Why? Because one single act of thinking a particular object involves not only rest
in being identically present in this act, but such an act primarily involves activity
and therefore cannot stop at one particular object of thought-noeton. In other
words, thinking is always present to each and every object of thought. Or,
otherwise, there can be no thinking without some kind of movement. The
transcendent principle of thinking, the One, is then potentiality of movement and
itself is neither in movement nor at rest, because it itself is not thought.420 Thus, the
activity of thinking is represented through the notion of movement (kinesis), as
thinking the other and going from one object of thought to the other without really
leaving any o f them, whereas the sameness and being o f the intellect (of both
thinking and especially of thought) are represented by rest-ito/s.421 Both are
connected: in the intelligible, movement is always stable and rest is a stillness that
is ever in movement and therefore does not bring change. As Plotinus himself puts
it, in the intellect “there could not be thinking without otherness, and also
sameness. These then are primary, the intellect, being, otherness, sameness; but

414 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.3.23.

415 Corrigan 1986,167-181.
416 Plato. Soph. 254e sqq.
4.7 Plato. 37d-e.
4.8 Plotinus Enn. V. 1.4.21-22.
419 Cp. Plotinus. Enn. V.9.10.7-9.
420 Plotinus. Enn. III.8.7.1-3.
421 Cp. Gersh 1973, 103-107.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 241

one must also include motion and rest. One must include movement if there is
thought, and rest that it may think the same; and otherness, that there may be
thinker and thought; or else, if you take away otherness, it will become one and
keep silent; and the objects o f thought, also, must have otherness in relation to each
other. But one must include sameness, because it is one with itself, and all have
some common unity; and the distinctive quality (diaphora) of each is otherness”.422
The multiple complex unity o f the intellect can be considered in different
ways. As subject or substrate, the intellect is said to be substance; as life—
movement; as preserving its identity, unchanging—rest; and as altogether one—
both the same and the other (cp. 3.1.1) 423 We may say that the categories of
sameness and otherness represent the dynamic structure that constitutes the
intellect as the intelligible—as thought. Whereas the categories of rest and
movement represent the noys in its intellectual aspect—as the eternal activity of
thinking. Intellectual movement as pure activity and actuality of thinking has to be
different from physical movement, which expresses the measure of a physical
thing in approaching its telos in passing from the state of potentiality to that of
actuality.4 At this point, Plotinus has to reject implicitly the Aristotelian theory of
motion (applicable only to physical things) in favor of the Platonic notion of
movement in the “Sophist”. However, for Aristotle non-physical matter is also
connected with motion, although in celestial bodies: “All things that change have
matter, but different things have different kinds; and of eternal things such as are
not generable but are movable by locomotion have matter, matter, however, which
admits not of generation, but o f motion from one place to another” (cp. 1.1.1).425
Such motion can be considered geometrically, because, unlike the motion of
physical perishable things, it is circular eternal motion which is identical and ever
the same in its alteration. Still, properly speaking, this motion is not the motion of
geometrical or intelligible objects, but of celestial material things. Later Greek
mathematics and philosophy reappropriate the non-physical motion of the
“Sophist”. The movement Plotinus is primarily interested in is not a spatial motion
from one place to another, but rather is the sameness considered through
otherness—a staying in motion, a paradoxical status movendi. The other (the
object), which the intellect thinks, is not different from the intellect itself, because
it lies within the same noys, so that the intellectual movement appears to be a
circular, non-spatial motion that fits an always identical form and goes out without
ever having really left itself.
Movement and rest have to be present in the intellect because of the
intellect's duality or distinction into thinking-noesu and being-noeta: the being of
the intellect “is that in which thought comes to a stop, though thought is a rest
which has no beginning, and from which it starts, though thought is a rest which
never started: for movement does not begin from or end in movement. And again

422 Plotinus. Enn. V. 1.4.33-41; cp. Enn. VI.2.8.25 sqq.

423 Plotinus. Enn. I1I.7.3.7-11.
424 Cp. Aristotle. Phys. 201a 10-202b 29; 224a 20 sqq.
425 Aristotle. Met. 1069b 25-27.
242 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

the form at rest is the defining limit of the intellect, and the intellect is the
movement o f the form”.426
Movement is movement towards an end, telos, which in the case o f the
intellect is a noetic object, the limit o f thinking at rest, en stasei peras. Thus, rest or
stasis characterizes the whole o f the intelligible cosmos, ideai or noèta, the realm
of being (on) and substance (oysia), whereas movement, kinesis, represents noys as
the intellectual activity of thinking-noém. However, movement and rest in the
intellect are not, and cannot be, rigidly separated, because the activity of thinking
is always directed to, and comes from, the being of thought (eis ho; aph ’ hoy).42
Movement thus is neither “under” (hypo) nor “over” (epi) being, but is with (meta)
being.428 Since, further, the intellect is also one in its multiplicity, is “double one”
(diployn hen), all binary distinctions and oppositions within it are not real
distinctions and belong only to the conception (epinoia) (i.e., are only mental
distinctions (cp. 1.1.3)).
Intellectual movement cannot be taken, however, as a predicate of the
subject-rest. The notion of rest rather conveys the intellect’s perseverance in being,
which serves the end (telos) for movement—that intellectual movement which
does not change being but brings it to perfection of communication and
reflectivity.430 Indeed, the intellect thinks itself in the form(s) of intelligible objects
which are not really different from the intellect, so that its intellectual activity is
always directed to itself and always returns to itself (see 3.1.1). This self-thinking
is thus immediate self-knowledge—always present in the intellect through the
activity o f the self-movement o f noys (aytokinèsis), which is incessantly
“wandering” in itself, as it were (en haytdi planethentos).43i The intellect in the
fullness o f its being is completed by returning to itself without ever really having
left itself. If the intellect were to be understood only in terms of identity and rest, it
would have been inactive (argei), it would not have thought at all and would not
have known itself. In fact, it would not even have existed.432 Therefore, there is
nothing in the intellect that at the same time is not the other. In its thinking, the
intellect is ever present to all its objects as if moving towards all of them and at the
same time already having moved, as if filling them all.433
But why are the two categories o f movement and rest insufficient for
characterizing the life o f the intellect? Because there are also other kinds o f
movement: discursive movement in reasoning; geometrical movement, associated

426 Eti de he men idea en stasei peras oysa noy, ho de noys aytes he kinesis, Plotinus. Enn.
VI.2.8.20-24.
427 Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.8.14-15.
428 Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.7.16-17.
429 Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.7.24; V1.2.17.23-24.
430 Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.7.24 sqq.
431 Plotinus. Enn. VI.2.18.8-9; 1.1.13.4-5; VI.7.13.30-31.
432 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.13.39 sqq.
433 Plotinus. Enn. VI.7.13.4-16. The intellect “in its movement moves always in the same
way and on a single, identical course, but still is not the same one partial thing, but all
things” (noys te kinoymenos kineitai men hosaytos kai kata tayta kai homoia aei, oy mentoi
tayton kai hen ti en merei, allapanta, Enn. VI.7.13.4-6).
 Part 1H: Reason, Imagination and Construction 243

with the imagination; and physical movement. It is in order to distinguish between

these kinds o f movement that one has to resort to the other pair of categories, those
of sameness and otherness. It is only in the intellect-woyi that there is a subtle
balance between the same and the other in the not dissolvable one-many, so that
the life “there” is always equal to itself, remains in perfect quietude, hesykhia,
possesses itself and is present to itself without any diminution.434 Discursive
thinking-rf/a/jom (the soul) is already unable to hold the equilibrium o f the same
and the other (which is now dissolved into the separate one and many), so that the
life o f the soul is no longer complete but is weakened, as if there were a “spreading
out” (diastasis) or a succession (alien m et’ alien; ephexes) of mental states and
objects.435 In this state, thinking becomes necessarily discursive, unable to embrace
and to know itself in a single act, and therefore always strives in vain to grasp the
fullness o f the intellect’s life (cp. 3.1.3).436
If movement were simply identical with change, it would also change
otherness into sameness (i.e., into other than otherness itself), since otherness
necessarily presupposes sameness: there is no otherness without sameness and vice
versa. Similarly, there is no movement without rest and no rest without movement
in the intellect, since they mutually presuppose each other.437 When the initial dyad
is brought forth, both otherness and sameness are already there, inseparable from
each other, however, not yet defined as sameness and otherness unless there is the
first “movement” o f the intellect back to its principle which is in “rest” (cp. 1.2.1).
Therefore, on the one hand, otherness and movement are not identical, for they
express different moments of the relation o f the dyad to the One. Otherness is
constituted in advancing, proodos, whereas primary movement is constituted in
returning, epistrophe (although, as said, movement is always present in otherness
and otherness is present in movement). On the other hand, there is no real
distinction between otherness and primary movement, because both represent pure
change. For this reason Plotinus brings both otherness and primary movement to
characterize indefinite thinking, in which “if you approach any o f it [the not yet
defined object of the indefinite thinking] as one, it will appear many; and if you
say that it is many, you will be wrong again: for each [part] of it is not one, all of
them cannot be many. And this nature o f it according to one and the other of your

434 Plotinus. Enn. III.7.11.14.

435 Plotinus. Enn. I1I.7.11.36-37,41.
436 Cp. Themistius. In de an 109.18 sqq. Metaphorically, this unbalanced state of the soul
can be described as dominated by an “unquiet power” (dynamis oykh hesykhos) that tends to
perform that which it should not and cannot do, by a “restlessly active nature (physeos
polypragmonos) which wanted to control itself and be on its own, and chose to seek for
more than its present state” (Plotinus. Enn. III.7.11.15-21; cp. VI.3.23.1-5). Instead of
eternity, there arises time (Enn. IV.4.15.2-4; cp. III.7.11.1 sqq.). At this point of the
dissolution of the one and the many into two independent entities, there appears evil, which
consists both in desire and in the inability to retain the whole of the life, thinking and being
of the intellect. Observations on the connection of this necessarily deficient state of the soul
to the “audacity” (tolma), “independence” (aytexoysion) and “striving” (orexis) see in: Jonas
1962, 315-317; Manchester 1978, 101-136; Strange 1994, 48. Cp. Aristotle. De an. 433a 9-
11.
437 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.3.26-43.
244 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

imaginations is movement, and, according as imagination has arrived at it, rest.

And the impossibility o f seeing it by itself is movement from intellect and slipping
away; but that it cannot run away but is held fast from outside and all around and is
not able to go on, this would be its rest; so that one may not say that it is only in
motion”.438
Since, as it has been argued, indefinite primary noesis is exemplified in
intelligible matter, which, in turn, is connected with the imagination (see 2.4.2;
3.2.4), primary movement also has to be connected with the imagination.439 In Enn.
III.6 Plotinus argues that imagination is capable of originating movement.440 Now
between intellectual and physical movement we have two other (as if intermediate)
movements: that of discursive thinking (of logos) and of imagination. How are
these two related? Plotinus depicts this relation in the following way: “Now the
soul [i.e. the discursive thinking] which holds the forms of real beings, and is itself,
too, a form (eidos), holds them all gathered together (homoy pant a), and each
individual form is gathered together in itself; and when it sees the forms o f things
perceived by the senses as it were turning back towards it and approaching it, it
does not endure to receive them with their multiplicity, but sees them stripped o f
their mass; for it cannot become anything else than what it is... So therefore both
that which proceeds from the rational principle in the higher world has already a
trace (ikhnos) o f what is going to come into being, for when the rational principle
is moved in a sort o f picture-making imagination (en phantasiai eikonikei
kinoymenos ho logos), either the movement which comes from it is a division
(merismos), or if it did remain the same, it would not be moved, but stay as it was;
and matter, too, is not able to harbor all things gathered together, as soul is; if it
could, it would belong to the higher world; it must certainly receive all things, but
not receive them undivided (me amerds)."4*'
Movement in matter represents the appearance of an object “part by
part”, as it were (i.e., in some sequential order). But this “part by part” embodiment
of a thing can take place not only in bodily matter but also in intelligible matter,
hyle noete, and it is not a physical body, but the rational formative principle-/ogos
that is moving. Since, as it has been pointed out (3.1.2), in discursive reasoning,
and even more in the imagination, the simultaneous whole of the communication-
koindnia of noetic objects is split, discursive reason also has all forms together, but
in separation, which it has to overcome by gathering the theoremata in establishing
their properties as visualized and traced in geometrical objects through the
embodiment o f logos in the plenum of intelligible matter by means of imagination.
When the discursive formative principle (logos) is moved (kinoymenos) in the
imagination, in its very movement the logos brings division and distinction in the
previously undivided and undistinguished intelligible matter, as if delineating it
into distinct (geometrical) objects. Why is such a construction by movement
necessary? Because it is only in the intellect that the form, the noetic object, is
always what it is. In the discursive reason, and even more in the imagination, any

438 Plotinus. Enn. VI.6.3.33-43.

439 Cp. Aristotle. De an 428b 11 sqq.; esp. 429a 1-2.
440 Plotinus. Enn. III.6.4.43-46. Cp. Fleet 1995, 132.
441 Plotinus. Enn. III.6.18.24-37; italics added.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 245

object is not already homoy panta with all other objects of possible consideration
and thus it has to be reestablished in its unity (particularly, through construction of
a problem or proving a theorem).442 Here Plotinus disagrees with Aristotle, who
stresses the sameness and non-materiality of the image of imagination.443 To
represent an imaginable object as one single whole, one has to visualize it,
producing it through construction by movement in the imagination. In other words,
the formative principle, logos, can be considered as moving and thus as if “cutting
out” its object in intelligible matter by means o f the imagination.

3.4.5 Motion and construction in Proclus: Production o f a geometrical figure by

movement in imagination

An object is constructive if it has parts. Since an extended object has parts, it can
be constructed according to its notion in discursive reasoning or in the intellect.
However, an extended physical thing is not constructive in ancient science (unlike
in Descartes’ reconstruction o f the physical world), because it is considered either
not constructed at all, or constructed by the demiurg, the noys. Only an imaginable
extended thing—in particular, a geometrical object—can be constructed or
reconstructed by and within the finite mind. That which is partless cannot be
constructed— it is rather created, for it may either be or not be. Thus, for Proclus
the intelligible form-eidos is not constructive, because it is simple: it is not
movable (akinéton), not bom (agenéton), indivisible (adiairéton) and has no
substrate (pantos hypokeimenoy kathareyon).444 The substrate that makes an object
o f consideration divisible, and thus potentially constructive, is intelligible
matter—not qua the principle o f otherness and multiplicity, but qua that plenum
where an object may be considered as a sui generis extended. Such an object in the
mind is primarily a geometrical figure, as if visually represented in the
imagination.
But why does the mind need to construct its object at all? As we have
seen, in the Platonic ontology four different constituents of an object of cognition
can be discerned (see 3.2.3). In particular, in every geometrical figure there can be
distinguished, first, the intelligible notion of the intellect-«oys, or its iorm-eidos
(thought as the intelligible object-noetori)\ second, the formative principle-/ogoi
(or dianoetic notion) o f discursive ihwiáng-dianoia, according to which the figure
can be constructed (see 3.4.3); third, the image of imagination-phantasia\ and
fourth, the sensually apprehensible image o f the figure. O f these four, the first and
the second are partless and not extended in any way. The third and the fourth are
extended in a way and thus have parts. However, the geometrical figure as
represented in the imagination is perfect, whereas its sensual physical imitation is
not. For this reason, Proclus has to ascribe a special kind of matter and materiality
to geometrical objects, in which a geometrical figure is conceivable as extended

442 Plotinus. Enn. I.8.3.6-9.

443 “[W]hen we contemplate, we must contemplate the image (phantasma) as one (hama),
for images are like objects of perception except that they lack matter.” - Aristotle. De an.
432a 8-10.
444 Proclus. In Eucl. 56.11-13.
246 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

and having parts and as constructible. This matter he calls geometrical matter, hylê
geômetrikê (cp.2.4.2; 3.2.2).445
As it has been argued, geometrical matter is intelligible matter
represented specifically in imagination and in geometrical figures. Intelligible
matter is a broader concept: as indefinite dyad, aoristos dyas, it is the principle o f
otherness and multiplicity, present also to nays (cp. 2.1.1; 2.1.2; 2.4.1).
Geometrical objects are intermediate between dianoetic formative principles and
sensual bodies (cp. 2.3.1). As the former, geometricals have no modifiable
properties but are precise and unchanging over time, studied by science. As the
latter, geometricals exemplify otherness through specific— intelligible or
geometrical—materiality. Conceived as necessarily related to intelligible
geometrical matter, a geometrical object (again, except for the point) can be
conceived as quasi-material or extended (i.e., existing in some kind o f
(geometrical) extension, diastatos), as having parts (meristos), as divisible
(diêirëmenos) and as having shape (eskhêmatismenos, i.e., visually representing its
formative principle).446
Most important is that a geometrical object has only one unique notion
and one formative principle, which can be represented in a potentially infinite
number o f instances. In other words, there can be multiple objects o f the same
shape. Why are there many representations of one figure in intelligible or
geometrical matter? First of all, because of the partiality of discursive
reasoning—because o f its inability to hold the whole of intelligible objects in their
timeless communication and to conceive and grasp them all at once in one single,
simple act o f comprehension and knowledge. The dianoia is capable o f
understanding a formative principle (e.g., in the construction of a chiliagon), but it
cannot immediately know all the properties inherent in its object. The notion-en/os
is simple, and it is not easy for discursive thinking to discern its inherent
properties, which are analytically contained in it as a subject. In order to simplify
the consideration, as if to return to itself and to the simplicity of the noys,
discursive reasoning needs the assistance of imagination, which visualizes the
object as extended, in order to subsequently analyze it and to reveal its properties
through a number o f propositions and constructions.447 To know the properties of a
(geometrical) entity, discursive reason has to externalize that entity, representing it
first in the imagination. In order to understand that which the reason already has, it
has to alienate its objects (dianoëta), as if unfolding them by constructing them as
divisible, geometrically shaped or formed. Discursive thinking considers then “the
outer” (the extended figures) in order to be aware of “the inner” (the formative
principle), and to further ascend to the form or notion of the figure, under the
pattern o f which the extended geometrical figure is formed qua extended. There is
a single object o f discursive thinking, dianoëton, representing one single formative
principle, logos, which further corresponds to a unique form, eidos, or intelligible
notion of that object. However, there can be a potentially infinite number o f

445 Proclus. In Eucl. 56.23.

446 Proclus. In Eucl. 50.22-51.2; 54.8-9.
447 Cp. Syrianus. In Met. 91.25-92.7. Cp. O’Meara 1989, 133-134.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 247

representations o f this same geometrical object (e.g., o f a circle) in the imagination

and in the physical world, because it can be constructed always anew (e.g., a
number o f concentric circles).
“The true geometer”, explains Proclus, “should cultivate such efforts
and make it his goal to arouse himself to move from imagination to pure and
unalloyed discursive reasoning (dianoia), thus rescuing himself from extension and
the ‘passive intellect’ (pathetikoy m y , i.e., from imagination) for the discursive,
dianoetic activity that will enable him to see all things without parts or intervals—
the circle, the diameter, the polygons in the circle, all in all and everything is
separately and by itself (panta en pas in kai hekaston khdris). For this reason even
in our imagination we show circles as inscribed in polygons and polygons as
inscribed in circles, in imitation o f the proof that the partless formative principles
exist in and through one another. And for the sake of this, we describe structure
and construction o f figures, their divisions, positions and juxtapositions, and we
use imagination and the extended images that it brings, because the form (eidos) is
itself motionless and is not in becoming and is altogether free from being formed.
But everything that is concealed in the form is brought into the imagination as
extended and divisible and that which projects (such images) is the discursive
reasoning {dianoia), the source o f projection is the form in the discursive reasoning
(to dianoeton eidos, i.e., the form o f the intellect as appropriated and processed by
the discursive reasoning), and that which it is projected into is die so-called
‘passive intellect’ which unfolds itself around (pert) the partlessness o f the true
intellect (toy alethois noy), sets a distance between itself and that unextended pure
thinking (noeseos) and shapes itself after the unshaped forms and becomes
everything that constitutes the discursive reasoning and the indivisible formative
principle (logos) in us”.44*
As it has been argued (see 3.2.4), multiple geometrical objects are
rendered visualizable in intelligible (geometrical) matter which is not different
from the imagination. Intelligible matter and imagination share a number of
common properties (see 2.2.4; 3.2.3). In imagination, as well as in geometrical
matter, geometrical objects can be considered quasi-extended with the above
mentioned properties. But matter, even intelligible matter, always represents
otherness as possibility (of division, o f multiple appearance of the same object, and
so on). Everything that exists in the imagination, exists also in intelligible matter449
and, on the contrary, everything connected with intelligible matter (i.e., every
object o f thought, both of the intellect and of discursive reasoning) is imaginable or
representable in the imagination. Proclus not only equates phantasia with hyle
gedmetrike, but also further identifies imagination with the Aristotelian “passive
intellect” (noys pathetikos), because of its ability to be affected and its intermediate
position between the intellect and the senses.43 We find a similar interpretation of

Proclus. In Eucl. 55.23-56.22, trans. with changes.

449 Proclus. In Eucl. 51.13-20.
450 Aristotle. De an. 430a 10-25; Proclus. In Eucl. 52.3; 56.17-18; In RP II 107.14-29; In
Tim. I 244.20-21; III 158.8-10 et al.; cp. Porphyry. Sent. 16; 43. See also: Chitchaline 1993,
22-31.
248 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

imagination in Syrianus, who Proclus might follow in his commentaries.451 Such

an identification appears to be particularly appropriate, because Aristotle portrays
(very briefly) the “passive intellect” as a kind of matter for the active intellect
(which is the intellect-noyi in the proper sense): the former becomes everything—
it embodies every object that the latter produces in thinking. As intelligible or
geometrical matter, noys pathétikos receives forms placed in it by the activity o f
the (productive) intellect. In the active intellect, forms or notions are fully
expressed in their actuality, but in the passive noys they are still only potential (as
forms in matter) and thus need to be actualized. Such an actualization is conceived
by Proclus as production o f a (primarily geometrical) object in intelligible matter
or imagination. Potential knowledge is to be actualized, that is, presented in
discursive thinking in a number of (true) propositions and arguments. Once
produced, an object represents all its properties that can be strictly, or
scientifically, known, gathered by the dianoia from partiality and dispersion.
Scientific cognition thus presupposes a construction of its object as a
procedure that simplifies the considerations. The most adequate, or precise, object
that is both quasi-extended and almost visually represents the properties of the
formative principle and the corresponding ideal form, is the geometrical figure.
The geometrical figure is then to be considered constructive. But where and how
does such a construction take place? The drawing of a straight line cannot take
place in physical space, because of the presence of physical matter, which
inevitably distorts and corrupts every image and representation. The “where” for
Proclus has to be intelligible matter qua imagination or noys pathétikos. The
geometrical figure is thus constructed in the imagination. Imagination, as passive
intellect, is that “screen” onto which or into which (en hoi) the constructed object,
the geometrical figure, is projected or thrown upon {to probailomenori). The
determining form o f the geometrical figure, that which is projected, is its formative
principle, or logos, from which, and according to which, the geometrical object is
originated (aph ’ hoy proballetai) and itself is the discursive representation of the
intelligible form (to dianoéton eidos). And that which “throws” (to proballon) the
formative principle is the discursive thinking-J/ano/a. The unextended, non-
imaginable and not visualizable intelligible notions are present in this way in the
imagination, as in an extension or matter that separates itself (diistas) and its
objects, alienating them for clearer consideration. S2 Discursive thinking is not
immediately reflective. Because o f this, in order to understand the formative
principle, the dianoia has first to estrange the logos, to subsequently recognize and
investigate the logos in the image o f a geometrical figure, which is an unfolding o f
the properties that are already contained (“secretly”, kryphios) in the thinkable
form (cp. 3.4.3), thus representing the unextended and shapeless as extended and
having shape. The purpose o f the imaginable projection is to “release” or “liberate”
the logos, and, further, the corresponding eidos, from materiality (although
intelligible matter is still present to both) and to gather the broken and dispersed
knowledge into unity.

451 Kalei gar taytén en heteroispathétikon noyn, Syrianus. In Met. 110.32-33.

452 Proclus. In Eucl. 56.14-22. Cp. Trouillard 1983, 233-234.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 249

The construction o f a geometrical figure is then an unwrapping of the

logos, when the simplicity o f the noetic form is represented through an analyzable
and structured object. But what constructs geometrical objects in the matter of
imagination (phantaste hyle)? The underlying construction scheme in Proclus is
obviously hylomorphic. Therefore, that which constructs has to be actual and
limiting. Proclus takes the activity o f discursive thinking (dianoetike energeia) to
be depicted in the imagination.453 The logos thus as if lends itself to the
imagination taken as imaginable matter. But even if it is discursive thinking that
represents actuality in the construction, it is not the fully expressed and gathered
actuality o f the intellect, but it is weakened (asthenoysa) by multiplicity.
Imagination is potentiality, both the capacity and the place o f construction. The
constructive activity is transmitted down to the productive power of the
imagination, as it were, which is then able to “unfold” itself (exelitton heayton)
against the partlessness of the intellect.454 Imagination can be thus taken as
motivated by itself, as if (such “as i f ’-ness is a distinctive feature of the
imagination) woken by itself.455 Imagination, however, is recreative rather than
creative, because imaginable construction is reproduction of its object, which has
to represent a formative principle and the corresponding notion-e/Vfoi, Both
formative principle and intelligible notion, the patterns for imaginable
reconstruction, are themselves not constructible, being neither arbitrary nor
contingent, but simply existing and being what they are. The same might be said
not only about imaginary reconstruction of geometrical objects and naturally
existing physical things, but also about arbitrary images assembled from parts (e.g.,
chimeras), to each o f which a formative principle can be ascribed.
Proclus’ interpretation o f the postulate in Euclid explains the way
motion can be conceived in geometrical figures. Not only can geometrical figures
be kinematically constructed, but they themselves can be considered movable, as in
the case of two figures that should mutually overlap in order to be conceived
congruent. Because geometricals are intermediate between the thinkable and the
sensual, they are to be produced neither by intellectual nor physical movement, but
by an intermediate one that takes place in the imagination. As Proclus argues,
“[L]et us think o f this motion not as bodily, but as imaginary (me...somatiken alia
phantastiken), and admit not that things without parts move with bodily motions,
but rather that they are subject to the ways of the imagination. For intellect, though
partless, is moved, but not spatially; and imagination has its own kind of motion
corresponding to its own partlessness.”456 Since there are objects of different
ontological statuses, one has to distinguish different kinds of motions and places
where these motions occur, for “the motion of bodies is one thing, the motion of
objects conceived in imagination is something else; and the place of extended
objects is other than the space o f partless beings. We must keep them separate and
not confuse them”.457 One might thus distinguish four different kinds of motion: in

453 Proclus. In Eucl. 56.1.

454 Proclus. In Eucl. 56.18.
455 Proclus. In Eucl. 52.22.
456 Proclus. In Eucl. 186.9-14; cp. 51.17-20.
457 Proclus. In Eucl. 186.25-187.3.
250 Matter, imagination and Geometry

noys, in dianoia, in phantasia and physical motion, where the first three appear
within intelligible matter, and the last one within physical matter. It is only the last
two kinds o f movement that are subject to construction; only in them can
construction be rendered kinematically visualizable. At the same time, such a
construction can be precise only in the imaginable, since geometrical figures can
be produced only in the imagination and then further studied by discursive
reasoning. Geometry as a strict knowledge is thus only about geometricals, not
bodies. For Proclus there can be no mathematical science o f physical things.
As it has been said, the geometrical figure can be considered either in an
act or in a process of construction. In the second part of the prologue to his Euclid
commentary, Proclus describes imagination as a faculty that “both by virtue of its
formative movement (dia te ten morphotiken kinésin) and because it has existence
(hypostasin) with and in the body, always produces pictures (typon) that are
divisible, have parts and shape, and everything it knows has this kind of existence
(hyparxin)”.45* Such a movement takes place in the medium o f intelligible matter
by means o f the imagination, governed by the formative principle (or logos),
which, in turn, represents the corresponding eidos (or intelligible object-noéton, cp.
3 . 1. 1; 3 . 1.2 ). The activity o f imagination is then expressed primarily as the
“formative movement”, by which its objects are produced. In the commentary to
the “Republic” Proclus also portrays imagination as the “shape-producing thinking
which wants to know the intelligibles (phantasia noésis oysa morphdtiké noétdn
ethelei gnosis einaij".**9 The imagery movement that produces, as if drawing, a
figure is then an image o f the pure activity of production.
There are many examples o f the geometrical kinematic construction in
ancient geometry: thus, Archytas solves the problem of doubling the volume of a
cube by means o f an imaginary movement o f a two-dimensional figure around a
fixed axis.460 Apollonius describes the generation of the conic surface by the
movement o f an indefinitely extendible straight line, fixed in a point and moving
along a circumference.461 And Archimedes, as Heath points out, uses a great
variety o f words for “drawing a line”.462
However, not every geometrical entity can be constructed: the point
cannot be constructed. Indeed, constructible is that which has parts, but a point,
according to Euclid, “has no parts” (see 2.1.3). Therefore, the point has a
privileged position among geometrical entities. If a geometrical figure is
constructed, as if drawn or kinematically produced in the imagination, what is that
which is moving or moved by the morphdtiké kinésisl Is it intelligible form or
formative principle? Neither, since both are indivisible, unextended and without an
underlying substrate, they are not movable, and only extended entities are
considered capable of locomotion, because locomotion implies movement from
one place to another. It is by movement of the point that a line is produced, as if
drawn in the imagination (and the line further produces a plane, and the plane—a

451 Proclus. In Eucl. 51.20-52.3; trans, with changes.

459 Proclus. In RPI 235.
460 Archimedes. Opera III 84-101. Cp. Becker 1957, 76-80.
461 Apollonius. Con. I, dei 1.
462 Heath 1953, clxxiv-clxxv.
 Part III: Reason. Imagination and Construction 251

solid, so that each time the dimension increases).463 The geometrical figure should
therefore be constructed by a movement in the imagination of a figure of a
dimension less by one. The minimal entity, a geometrical unit, is the simplest in all
respects, because it has no parts (which is the definition of the point); the maximal
is a three-dimensional solid. (Ancient mathematics does not recognize any
dimensions higher than three, because more dimensions cannot be visually
represented in the imagination and because, as the Pythagoreans argue, the number
three is a complete one, representing the whole and thus the cosmos (to pan) in its
beginning, middle and end.)464
The order of construction may not coincide, however, with the order of
analysis: the last in the order of analysis may be (and in mathematics, it usually is,
as Aristotle points out) the first in the order of production (en genesei, cp. 2.2).
Thus, in the order o f the kinematic construction of geometrical objects, the point is
prior to the plane, as the plane is prior to the solid; but by way of analysis, on the
contrary, the solid is prior to the plane and the plane is prior to the point.465 The
reason for this is that construction has to do primarily with postulates that start
with the construction of a straight line by the movement o f a point (it is in the
commentary to the first three postulates that Proclus introduces the notion of the
kinematic production of the geometrical figure). When a point is traced as moving
uniformly in the simplest way without any deviations (displaying not only
sameness, insofar as it stays on the same course and preserves the same form, but
also otherness, insofar as it always is not in the same geometrical place as it has
just been), then the generative point moves, producing one of the two simplest
lines: either a straight line (the first and especially second postulates of Book I of
Euclid’s “Elements”) or a circle (the third postulate of Book I).466 In fact, it is only
in the imagination that the straight line can be drawn by a point “moving uniformly
over the shortest path”,467 because in physical matter a straight line cannot be
produced. In other words, in order to bring a geometrical entity to existence one
must as if visually ascertain in the imagination that the entity thought through its
formative principle and its form be actually reproduced in construction, as if by an
imaginable drawing (e.g., a line). In this way, postulates are then established and
the problems solved. In order to understand the first postulate, namely, to draw a
straight line from any point to any point, one must actually draw it, reproduce it in
(the) imagination: “If we take a straight line as limited by a point and conceive the
point as moving uniformly over the shortest route, the first postulate will have been
established by us in a simple thinking procedure.”46* Such uniform movement o f a
point is an image of pure activity o f the discursive reason and of stable movement
of the intellect represented in and by the imagination.

463 Cp. Aristotle. De an. 409a 4-6.

464 As reported by Aristotle. Phys. 268a 6 sqq.
465 Proclus. In Eucl. 85.8-13; 89.4 sqq.
446 The first three Euclid postulates of Book 1 are: “Let the following be postulated: 1. To
draw a straight line from any point to any point. 2. To produce a finite straight line
continuously in a straight line. 3. To describe a circle with any center and distance.”
467 Proclus. In Eucl. 185.17.
461 Proclus. In Eucl. 185.12-15.
252 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

There are, however, two difficulties that arise once a line is conceived as
traced by the point in the imagination. First, if imagination conceives divisible and
quasi-extended objects, how can it have any representation of the point? To this
Proclus replies that since imagination essentially is not different from intelligible
(imaginable, or geometrical) matter, it both exemplifies the same and the other, the
limit and the unlimited, the undivided and the divided, as if moving “from the
undivided to the divided, from the unformed to what is formed”.469
The second difficulty is: how is it possible that the point, being partless
and therefore indivisible, can move or be moved? Aristotle excludes the possibility
o f the movement o f a point or anything indivisible, because when moving, an
object moves to some distance proportional to a finite part of its length. Since the
point is indivisible, it can move only to the whole of itself (which has no length).
Therefore, a line produced in this way will be the sum total of the points added up,
which is impossible, because the continuous does not consist of the discrete and
indivisible (cp. 2.1.3).470 In order to resolve this aporia, Proclus has to admit that
the point moves not spatially but only as if, which means that it moves by an
imaginary movement. Such a movement is described negatively, as distinct from
the spatial: it is the other o f bodily locomotion and thus does not happen in real
space, but in an imaginary one, namely, in geometrical matter. However, the
imaginary movement of the point can hardly be positively characterized. Unlike in
modem science, there can be no mathematical account of the movement of a point:
its trajectory cannot be counted by number, since this trajectory is elusive to
thought. The geometrical figure is studied and analyzed by discursive thinking
once the figure has already been produced and is considered stable and not moving
(as, for instance, in Archytas).471
How is it then possible to conceive of imaginary movement? On the one
hand, as said, there can be no proper consideration of such movement, because that
which is in becoming can hardly be thought (it is for this reason that Proclus
refuses to characterize properly imaginary movement). On the other hand, the
imaginary construction o f a geometrical figure is both necessary and possible in
Greek science. It is necessary because discursive reasoning cannot embrace and
grasp at once all predicates inherent in the subject of consideration. It therefore
must as if alienate them from their notions and formative principles by visualizing
them, constructing the object o f study as quasi-extended in the imagination. It is
also possible because of the inalienable otherness present in both what a figure is
constructed in and that which constructs it. That in which a figure is produced is
intelligible (or geometrical) matter or imagination, where, as it has been argued,
otherness is essentially present. That which produces a figure is primarily the point
(in “drawing” a line in the imagination by means of some rule-/ogoj, according to
which a figure— a straight line, a circle, a conic, a cissoid, a helix, and so on— is
produced). And the point “secretly” contains the same and the other, the limit and
the unlimited. Even the arithmetic monad (whose geometrical imaginary

469 Proclus. In Eucl. 94.26-95.2.

470 Aristotle. Phys. 241a 7-14; cp. De gen. Et corr. 337a 25-27. See also: Proclus. Inst. Phys.,
def. I-XIV ad II.
471 Thesleff 1965,6.
 Part III: Reason, Imagination and Construction 253

representative is the point), since it belongs to and represents being, is not

altogether free from the grasp o f otherness (cp. 2.1.1; 3.4.3). As representing the
limited, the point may be thought as identical (i.e., as a geometrical object with no
parts). As representing the unlimited, it cannot be imagined (for it has no place that
would embrace it; also, that which has no parts can hardly be imagined). It is the
presence of otherness that enables discursive reason to consider the point as “not-
point”. In other words, the other to the discrete (point) is the continuous (line). The
point then only as i f moves (i.e., not really but by an imaginary movement). It is in
fact not the point that moves or is moved, but the continuous entity, which in its
“flow"-rhysis progresses in the imagination (see 3.4.3).472 Why does it progress?
Because the point, on the one hand, is the limit of the line. On the other hand, this
limit itself is always other to itself and thus always reserves the possibility of going
over the limit o f the continuous. As Plotinus puts it, thought (ennoia) prolongs the
continuous (to synekhes) further, into the extended (eis to porróí).m TTie monad is
the principle of number. It itself is not a number, yet in order to form a number the
monad has to be associated with the dyad. Similarly, the point is the principle of
the continuous, which is itself not continuous but needs to be associated with the
dyad as imaginary matter to produce a line. As the monad, the point is indivisible;
and as the monad, it also presupposes the other of it, the dyad, now exemplified in
the “flowing” continuous geometrical magnitude.474
Such a duality explains for Proclus why the indivisible point and the
divisible line are two visualizable representatives of the indivisible and the
divisible in imagination: “For if the imagination were divisible only, it would be
unable to preserve in itself the various impressions of the objects that come to it,
since the latter ones would obscure those that preceded them—just as no body can
at the same time and in the same place have a series of shapes, for the earlier ones
are erased by the later. And if it were indivisible, the imagination would not be
inferior to the understanding or to the soul, which views everything as undivided;
nor could it exercise form-giving functions (energeias). It is necessary therefore
that its activity should start from what is partless within it, proceed therefrom to
project each knowable object that has come to it in concentrated form, and end by
giving each object form, shape, and extension. If, then, it has a nature of this kind,
the character o f indivisibility is in a certain sense within it, and it is primarily by
virtue o f this character that we must say it contains the being of the point; and by
virtue o f the same character the form o f line also exists wrapped up within it.
Possessing this double character of indivisibility and divisibility, the imagination
contains the point in undivided and intervals in divided fashion.”475
The procedure of construction within the imagination is applicable to the
restricted sphere o f geometrical problems and figures only, since the formative
principle o f the geometrical figure is not constructed and is not constructible in the
described way because the logos represents form-eidos, which is not constructible
either, but simply is or exists. Such a construction remains thus in the realm of the

472 Cp. Aristotle. De an. 409a 4.

47J Plotinus. Enn. VI.3.12.10-12. Cp. Aristotle. Top. 108b 26.
474 Cp. Proclus. Theol. Plat. II 14.18-23.12.
475 Proclus. In Eucl. 95.2-20.
254 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

intermediate, which binds the duality of the indivisible and the divisible within the
specific imaginable geometrical materiality. The sphere of noetic forms is thus
kept out o f reach o f kinematic construction—that sphere which stays unalloyed and
is still separate from both the geometrical and the physical, the sphere of the ever
unchanging and already present being.
 Conclusion 255

Conclusion

Much o f the difference in considerations of the relation of geometrical entities to

physical things (when the possibility of the application of the former to the
cognition and constitution o f the latter is either implied or denied) appears to be
grounded in a difference in understanding of matter and being. As the first part of
the book attempted to show, in his approach to matter Plotinus mostly follows
Plato’s interpretation o f matter as pure receptacle and the seat o f forms, yet he also
embraces Aristotle’s conception o f matter as the ultimate substrate, utter
potentiality and indefiniteness. In construing the notion of matter (if it has a
notion), Plotinus presents matter as non-being, as radical otherness to being,
stressing its unlimitedness and paradoxality. Descartes, however—and such an
approach might be considered exemplary for modem philosophy and science—
takes matter as substance; that is, as primarily and adequately represented in being
and thought through its clearly conceivable main attribute, extension. A body is
then a shaped or formed part of that extension, defined solely in terms of
geometrical characteristics. A physical body is therefore presented in such a way as
to be already subject to mathematical considerations.
The Cartesian ontological approach, which places being as a primary
phenomenon in the center o f consideration, is further contrasted to Plotinus’
position, which takes being as a synthesis of sameness and otherness, or o f oneness
and multitude (dyad), themselves engendered by the first principle, the One. If
being is not itself primary, then the One has to be postulated as the definitive cause
of being, prior to being (i.e., as properly not being). If, however, matter is equally
represented as non-being, the question arises o f whether it is possible, and how it is
at all possible, to make a distinction between the One (the ultimate source of being)
and matter (the complete lack o f being). As it was argued, Plotinus has resources to
establish such a distinction and thus to characterize matter in definite terms,
although such a characterization eventually involves a paradoxical description,
since it appeals to that which never is and never will be, that which is inescapably
missed by any rational discourse.
Substance is thus introduced by Descartes as that which is, that which
exists due only to itself and is conceived univocally in its essence, characterized by
a (necessary) essential attribute. Still, his attempt to portray matter as an
independent substance involves ambiguity, for on the one hand, matter—as
characterized by its essential attribute, extension—has to be considered substance,
but on the other hand, matter does not exist due solely to itself and therefore is not
properly a substance.
In Plotinus’ approach, being has to do not only with a synthetic unity, but
with a limit as well, which is also thoroughly stressed by Plato and Aristotle. In the
Cartesian ontological approach, being, which is God, is conceived as perfection,
tautologically expressed as reality, self-causation, inexhaustible power and,
moreover, as infinity: it is infinity and not limit that has to constitute perfection.
However, Descartes is reluctant to bring actual infinity into the material world and
into the realm of mathematical entities, because, as he argues throughout his
writings, in regard to the infinite, we are only able to know that it is, and not what
256 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

it is (hence the distinction between cognitive procedures of “knowing” and

“grasping”). This further leads him to recognize that the physical and the
mathematical has to be indefinite as a whole, rather than infinite, and only as such
can both be known. Still, admitting actual infinity inevitably involves paradox,
which for Plotinus has to be either avoided or logically resolved, whereas for
Descartes paradox rather serves an indicator o f a potential growth in philosophical
and scientific knowledge, and as such can be fruitful.
The very possibility o f the application of mathematics to the study of
physical phenomena, as discussed in the second part o f the book, is the cornerstone
o f modem science and is consequently denied in ancient science. Thus, for Plato
and for the later Neoplatonic thinkers (in particular, for Plotinus and Proclus),
mathematics can give knowledge about those things that cannot be otherwise and
therefore has nothing to do with the ever-fluent physical things, about which there
can only be a (possibly right) opinion. Aristotle develops a different approach to
physics, which he considers scientia, but this science is not mathematical
(Aristotle’s physics remains the only science about the world until its radical
mathematics-oriented revision in the late middle ages and early modernity).
Furthermore, ancient Neoplatonic thinkers carefully distinguish between
arithmetic and geometry within mathematics itself. A reconstruction o f Plotinus’
theory o f number, which embraces the late Plato’s division of numbers into
substantial (ideal) and quantitative (monadic, or properly mathematical), shows
that numbers are structured and conceived in opposition to geometrical entities. In
particular, numbers are constituted as a synthetic unity of indivisible, discrete
units, whereas geometrical objects are continuous (except for the point) and do not
consist o f indivisible parts. This mutual irreducibility of number and geometrical
magnitude is overcome in modem science, being canceled in Descartes, who, as it
has been argued, considers number not primarily in relation to the finite (a limit),
but rather to the infinite. Moreover, a decisive step undertaken by Descartes is the
non-discrimination of number and (extended and thus continuous) magnitude: even
if they are still formally .distinguished, both can be used interchangeably in
scientific considerations and are taken to represent each other univocally. Besides,
the Cartesian project of the universal scientific method, the very way it is
constructed and introduced, presupposes that the method should be equally suitable
for both mathematical (geometrical) and physical entities. Geometrical objects are
applicable to physical bodies, insofar as both are supposed to be structured
according to order and measure. This order and measure is then to be discernible in
both geometrical entities (themselves expressible through numbers) and physical
things, allowing for the possibility o f the application of the former to the latter.
The notion o f the intermediary further plays an important role in the
development o f the argument. In the Neoplatonic reading of Plato, as found in
Iamblichus and Proclus, mathematical objects are considered intermediate entities
between physical things (bodies) and noetic, merely thinkable, entities (notions).
As the previous analysis o f Plotinus’ teaching on number intended to show,
arithmeticals (numbers) should be placed in the same ontological category with
ideal forms, or noetic objects. Being distinct from numbers, geometrical figures are
to be considered intermediate, insofar as they are in a certain respect similar to
 Conclusion 257

both thinkable and physical things and, in another sense, are different from both.
As Proclus shows, geometricals on the one hand are divisible and in a certain sense
extended, as bodies. On the other hand, like noetic objects, geometricals are
precise and do not change their properties over time, Therefore, mathematical
entities— numbers, as well as geometricals—are to be conceived differently from
physical bodies. Descartes, on the contrary, tends to abolish all the intermediate
structures in ontology, epistemology and cosmology, and thus simplifies the
picture o f being and o f the world, to ensure the possibility of the consideration of
geometrical figures and physical bodies in similar terms—that is, as merely
extended, as subjects to order and measure and by the same cognitive procedures.
The notion o f intelligible matter becomes of central importance at this
point: introduced by Aristotle as a matter o f mathematical objects, it is thoroughly
elaborated by Plotinus and Proclus. In Plotinus, intelligible matter is conceived as a
universal substrate of multiple thinkable forms. It is further associated with an
ineradicable otherness within being (a potentiality for being), and is thus present to
all ideal entities and to mathematical objects, including numbers and geometrical
figures. Intelligible matter is further interpreted as indefinite thinking, (not yet
informed by the objects o f thinking) when thinking tends to think its own cause,
which is not being and thus cannot be properly conceived or thought, since it is not
a particular object o f thinking. The indefinite thinking, as dyad, thus inevitably
“misses” its origin and is informed, as intelligible matter, only when it comes to
think itself in definite terms as, and through, noetic objects. As it was argued,
Proclus, in his elaboration o f the notion of intelligible matter, takes it to be a
specific geometrical matter (i.e., primarily a matter of geometrical objects). Such
matter can then be consistently interpreted as imagination, as a sui generis
extension where geometrical objects can be conceived as divisible, as having parts,
as extended and as constructive by the movement of another geometrical object
(e.g., the point). It is then intelligible matter that separates the mathematical from
the physical and makes the two ontologically and epistemologically
incommensurable.
In Cartesian ontology, on the contrary, there is no way to distinguish
between different kinds o f matter, since there is only one matter (which is
extension and substance) that is present as the common matter of all extended
objects, in particular, of both geometrical and physical things. This inability to
distinguish between specifically geometrical and specifically physical matters
allows for the possibility o f putting both geometrical entities and physical bodies in
one and the same extension, and o f applying the same set of rules and procedures
to the consideration o f both. Because of this, Descartes is capable of expressing
bodily properties in the precise language of mathematics. Moreover, since he
intends to present arithmetical number and geometrical magnitude as mutually
expressible through one another, he can build physics as a mathematical enterprise,
which further leads to the substitution o f the properly physical by the geometrical.
In a sense, the whole physical world is then omitted (or, rather, bracketed) and the
laws o f geometrical, imaginary construction are imposed onto the physical and
eventually expel it as concrete and imprecise from scientific considerations.
258 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

The third part of the book portrays the relation of matter (specifically, of
intelligible matter) and o f geometrical objects to cognitive faculties and to the
imagination in particular. In the Platonic tradition, as represented in Plotinus, the
intellect, seen through the category of life, is capable of conceiving the first
principles. Construed as being and pure actuality, the intellect is further presented
through a distinction (which cannot be taken as a real one) between thought as
thinking and thought as thinkable, as the objects of thought that exist in an
uninterrupted communication. On the contrary, discursive thinking, essentially
involved in mathematical and logical argumentation, is incomplete and only
partial. Discursive reason carries out its activity in a number of consecutively
performed steps, because, unlike the intellect, it is not capable of representing an
object o f thought in its entirety and unique complexity and thus has to comprehend
the object part by part, in a certain (correct) order.
The Cartesian cogitating mind is quite different from the intellect in its
structure: the mind is a thinking substance, discursive par excellence. Mind is also
self-transparent and essentially reflective. Reflectivity is considered proper to the
mind alone, whereas its ontologically complementary counterpart, matter, is not
reflective. In comparison with the Platonic intellect, the Cartesian mind, which
conceives of ideas as any content o f thinking, appears to be rather simplistic and
deliberately simplified. Such simplification o f the mind in its structure, constitution
and functioning, undertaken for the sake o f clarity of understanding, appears to
involve difficulties and ambiguities. In a sense, the simplification of ontological
and cosmological structures (e.g., the non-distinction of a specific difference
between the geometrical and the physical) can be taken to represent a distinctive
feature o f modem philosophy and science, which allows modem thinking to
become particularly efficient in reconstructing and reconsidering the physical
cosmos as knowable in a strict and precise way.
Imagination appears further to play a crucial role in the constitution and
understanding o f the sphere o f the geometrical. Plotinus, Plutarch of Athens,
Syrianus, Proclus and Porphyry, who have their predecessors in Plato and
Aristotle, present imagination in its capacity to produce mental images different
both from thinkable objects and from sense-data. Imagination is portrayed as
distinct from the intellect and discursive thinking, on the one hand, and from sense-
perception, on the other. Put otherwise, imagination is intermediate; it is as if “in
between” sense-perception and discursive thinking, both separating and uniting
them. Plotinus compares imagination to a double-sided mirror, reflecting both the
sensual and the intelligible, sharing certain features with both, but being neither of
them. Furthermore, imagination is intimately connected with some kind of
extension and movement, insofar as geometrical objects exist and can be
constructed in imagination as geometrical in the proper sense (i.e., as extended,
divisible and visualizable), thus exemplifying irrationality and otherness (which
brings forth a multiplicity o f geometrical figures of the same kind). Moreover,
since imagination and intelligible matter appear to share exactly the same features,
in Syrianus and Proclus the two are identified with one another. Intelligible matter
thus can be taken as geometrical matter—that matter in which geometricals not
 Conclusion 259

only exist, but also can be retrieved by kinematic construction (i.e., construction by
movement) according to their ideal notion and formative principle.
In Descartes we do not find a consistent “theory” of imagination; his
treatment of imagination involves a number of difficulties and ambiguities,
particularly due to his hesitation about its ontological status. Imagination, split
further into the mental and the corporeal, marks a connection o f the finite mind to
the body. Unlike the mind-reason, imagination is unable to represent and access
the reality or essence o f a thing, because reason can think that which imagination
cannot represent, namely, the infinite. Imagination (which is not an intermediate
faculty for Descartes) submits sense data to the interpretation of the mind, which
interprets the objects o f imagination as extended things, that is, as physical
material things and geometrical objects, insofar as both are extended. Through
imagination, geometrically extended figures are brought and constructed into
physical things, so that the former appear to become not only semblances, but
much more substitutes for the former. Geometrical objects are therefore to be
recognized as unchanging patterns (themselves constructed after thinkable
essences) o f physical things, so that both are to be considered (or even imagined
into) the one and same matter and extension.
Modem philosophy and science, as it was argued, accept the verum
factum principle, according to which an object can be known and does not exist to
the extent that, and insofar as, it is and can be produced or constructed. This
principle is traced then in Descartes, for whom the physical world in its substantial
materiality is still a divine construction. Because o f that, Descartes has to confine
his efforts to presenting a consistent account of the (imaginary) reconstructed
world as an object o f scientific consideration. However, in this imaginary
recreation o f the world, the finite mind easily assumes the role of the demiurg, who
knows the world insofar as he himself has created that very world. Only that which
is put into the object o f cognition by the cognizing subject can be admitted then as
knowable in the proper sense, which eventually cancels and destroys all objective
teleology.
The discussion o f the construction principle was mostly focused on
construction in geometry, which is already prominent in antiquity (e.g., in
Archimedes and Apollonius), although construction is used mostly in problems and
not in theorems (in Euclid), and does not appear to play a central role in theoretical
considerations within the Platonic approach to mathematics—where, in general,
the (already) existing has a higher ontological status than the produced. The
method of the kinematic generation o f a geometrical figure by uniform movement
becomes especially important in early modem science as the model for
consideration o f the physical. As Descartes intends to show, the geometrical and
the physical are both movable and reproducible in the same way, insofar as
everything extended can be considered constructible under a geometrical pattern,
precisely describable and easily imaginable. This allows for the establishment of
physical material things as represented, constructed and studied in their motion and
change by means o f mathematics exactly in the same way as geometrical figures
are represented, constructed and studied.
260 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

Engendering a geometrical figure by movement is found already in

Proclus. Imagination, considered a constructive and creative capacity, appears to
play a crucial role in producing geometrical entities, intermediate between physical
things and noetic objects. Moreover, geometrical figures tum out to be inescapably
dual, for they can be considered both as already existing and as originated by
movement. For Proclus, imagination represents geometrical intelligible matter and
is itself intermediate between discursive thinking and sense-perception.
Furthermore, imagination is taken by Syrianus and Proclus to be capable of
embodying geometrical figures by tracing them as generated or produced by the
movement of another geometrical entity (e.g., a point). The geometrical figure
appears to be divisible, formed, multiple (since an indefinite number of figures of
the same kind can be constructed) and extended only within the imagination,
because the physical representation of the figure is distorted, whereas the formative
principle o f the figure within discursive reason is unextended and indivisible. The
purpose of the construction o f a geometrical figure in the imagination for Proclus is
then a sui generis alienation o f the figure, when it is objectified as a constructible
image, according to the figure’s immanent formative principle, and then studied in
all its properties. In this way, the properties are rendered visualizable as
imaginable, as if being projected onto the screen of the imagination and into
geometrical matter, for better and clearer consideration of and by discursive
reason.
The kinematic construction of a geometrical object thus does not properly
create the object anew, but rather reproduces it under a non-geometrical and non­
physical ideal pattern o f the intellect—the noetic form—itself represented through
the formative principle in discursive reason. And the ideal form and formative
principle are not themselves constructible, in particular, within the imagination. A
geometrical object can then be considered existing as four-fold: in its intelligible
notion form in the intellect; in its formative principle in discursive thinking; as the
geometrical figure properly, conceivable and constructible in the imagination; and
as a physical imitation, accessible to sense-perception. All these levels of
representation of a geometrical entity are never confused within the Platonic
account of geometry, whereas the Cartesian acceptance of the extended as
substantial opens the possibility o f conceiving the geometrical and the physical in
similar terms, and thus of applying mathematical entities and precision to the
description o f physical things. Once the principle of construction is expanded to all
“external” reality (taken as extended substance or matter), and once geometrical
entities as intermediate are expelled, then every extended object can be considered
imaginable and constructible under a geometrical pattern. Hence the physical
becomes reducible to the geometrical, since physical bodies and geometrical
figures are considered already (re)constructed in one and the same material
extension, being subjects o f the imagination. The physical world of modem science
and philosophy is thus constructed as (and eventually substituted by) a strictly
thinkable, and properly knowable, geometrical world.
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 Index
abstraction, 7,18,24,40,18 n. 97,67 n. Anaxagoras, 74 n. 20,94 n. 138, 155
306, 72, 85, 102, 116, 123-4, 133, n. 47
215 Anselm, St., 41 n. 208,
—as apophasis, 24 antitypia, 13
accident, 2 n. 2 ,4 , 11-3, 19, 19 n. Apollodorus, 121 n. 250
98,23,29, 29 n. 154, 30 n. 154,31 Apollonius, 104,250,250 n. 461, 259
n.160, 36,40-1,61 apophatic, 22-4
—accidentia propia, 62, 64,66 appearance, 11,11 n. 60, 121, 140,
activity, 6 ,9 , 32,42, 52 n. 252, 73 164, 233,244, 247
n. 13, 74,91, 113, 123-5, 132, 138 application, applicability, 114 n. 210,
n. 329 120, 170, 187, 193,209,213,228,
— asenergeia, 146, 148, 153-6, 254,256
167,169, 173, 174 n. 34, 175, 180, —of mathematics to physics, 71,
183,187,192,195,196,196 n. 242, 109,117,119,168,172,213
196 n. 243,202,206,207,212,215, Aquinas, 40 n. 206,42, 44 n. 226, 60
217,220,226,235,237,240-2, n. 282,63 n. 291,64 n. 294,83 n. 80,
247-9 143 n. 353,158 n. 62, 174 n. 137,
actuality, 3 ,6 ,9 , 32,42, 52 n. 252, 74, 174 n. 139
74 n. 23, 90, 136, 141,146, 148, Archimedes, 70 n. 1,95 n. 147, 225 n.
153-6, 159 n. 70, 167,241,248-9, 346,250,250 n. 460, 259
258 Archytas, 70 n. 2,96 n. 150,250, 252
addition (prothesis), 12, 35 n. 178, 36, Aristotle, 2 ,2 n. 2, 3,3 n. 3, 3 n. 4, 3
55 n. 262,81,81 n. 66,81 n. 67, n. 5,3 n. 6, 3 n. 7, 3 n. 8, 3 n. 9, 3
89-91,94,94 n. 139,97, 103, 124, n. 10,4,4 n. 12,4 n. 13,4 n. 14,4
202 n. 15,4 n. 16,4 n. 18,4 n. 19, 5,5
Albert the Great, 40 n. 206 n. 20, 5 n. 21, 5 n. 22, 5 n. 23, 5 n.
Alcinous (Albinus), 24, 24 n. 125, 25 24, 5 n. 25, 6-7, 7 n. 37, 8, 8 n. 38,
n. 132 8 n. 39, 8 n. 40, 8 n. 43,9, 9 n.46,
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 70 n. 4, 73 10, 10 n. 56, 11, 11 n. 63, 12, 14,
n. 14, 134, 134 n. 309 14 n. 76,24,24 n. 126,28-9, 29 n.
algebra, 93 n. 134,106, 115, 115 n. 149,20-30 n. 154, 34-5, 35 n. 174,
219, 122 n. 253, 184 n, 193 35 n. 175, 35 n. 176,35 n. 177,35
algorithm, 224,227,233 n. 178, 36, 36 n. 180, 36 n. 181,36
analogy (see also: analogical) 25, 92, n. 182, 36 n. 183, 36 n. 184, 36 n.
102,205-6 185, 36 n. 186, 36 n. 187, 37 n.188,
analysis,25,81,99, 106, 111, 111 n. 38,48-51, 53, 55,55 n. 262, 56-7,
201, 111 n. 204, 112, 112 n. 206, 59-60,62, 64,66, 70 n. 1, 70 n. 3,
113, 186,205,209,237, 237 n. 70 n. 4, 71, 71 n. 9 ,7 2 ,7 2 n. 10,
395,251, 256 73,73 n. 13,73 n. 17,74, 76n .3 5 ,
—and synthesis, 38 78, 78 n. 45, 78 n. 4 8 ,79n. 53, 79
Anatolius, 70 n. 1 n. 54, 79 n. 55, 79 n. 57, 80 n. 62,
284 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

81 n.66, 81 n. 67, 81 n. 68,82,82 205, 207, 227,253, 256

n. 74, 82 n. 76, 83 n. 77, 83 n. 80, Amauld, A., 29 n. 151,29 n. 153, 30
86, 86 n. 93, 86 n. 96, 87, 87 n. 99, n. 155, 53 n. 257, 66, 166, 168 n.
88 n. 103, 88 n. 104, 89, 89 n. 109, 108,193 n. 226
89 n. 110, 89 n. l l l ,8 9 n . 112,90, astronomy, 14,113 n. 209, 114,114 n.
90 n. 115,90 n. 116, 92, 92 n. 123, 210,227
92 n. 125,92 n. 127, 93, 93 n. 131, attribute, 8 ,1 0 ,2 4 ,2 8 , 33,46,63, 123,
93 n. 132,93 n. 133,93 n. 135, 93 130-1, 165-6, 171 n. 114, 233
n. 137, 94 n. 138,94 n. 139,94n. — accidental, 2 n. 2, 19,23
140,94 n. 146, 100 n. 160, 100 n. —divine, 17, 32,42
162, 104 n. 170, 108, 108 n. 190, — essential, 2 n. 2, 19, 19 n. 98,
110 n. 198, 111, 111 n. 200, 111 n. 23,29, 30,30 n. 154,58,61-2, 143,
202, 116, 116 n. 222, 116n. 223, 255
116 n. 224, 117,117 n. 230, 118, — omw-attribute, 42,42 n. 21,43,
125 n. 271, 127, 128, 128 n. 283, 200
128 n. 285, 128 n. 286, 129, 129 n. — of substance, 18,18 n. 97,29,30 n.
291, 129 n. 292, 130 n. 293, 133, 154, 30 n. 158, 31,59,61,61 n.
133 n. 300,133 n. 301,133 n. 304, 285,62,157, 159, 171,198, 255
134, 134 n. 306, 134 n. 306, 134 n. Augustine, 110
311, 134 n. 313, 135 n.315, 136 n. axiom, 13,20, 33,98, 109, 111, 113,
317, 137 n. 324, 137 n. 329, 140 n. 114 n. 213, 151,224-5,225 n. 345,
337, 148, 148 n. 11, 151 n.21, 153, 225 n. 348,226
153 n. 32, 153 n. 38, 156 n. 54,159
n. 70, 167 n. 104, 171-2, 172 n. Barrow, I., 228,228 n. 362
121, 173, 173 n. 125,173 n. 126, Baumgarten, A., 8, 8 n. 44, 32 n. 136
173 n. 127, 173 n. 128, 173 n. 129, Beeckman, I., 53 n. 257, 55,108 n. 187,
173 n. 130, 173 n. 131, 174, 174 n. 124 n. 263, 191,223 n. 339, 228 n.
134, 174 n. 135, 174 n. 137, 175 n. 362
141, 177, 181, 181 n. 173, 183, 183 becoming, 9, 14, 22, 33, 36, 38,48, 53
n. 188, 184, 184 n. 194, 185 n. 195, n. 254, 56, 70-1,81,85, 89,99n.
186, 186 n. 200, 186 n. 202, 187, 157,122 n. 253,127,129,140,144,
187 n. 206, 196, 196 n. 242, 210, 210, 211,219,225, 238, 239, 247,
221 n. 329, 224,225 n. 345, 225 n. 252
346, 225 n. 348,226, 226 n. 352, being, 3-4,6-8, 10-1, 17, 19, 19 n. 98,
226 n. 353, 227,227 n. 360, 231, 20,21,21 n. 110, 22,23,23 n. 123,
231 n. 377,238 n. 399,238 n. 400, 24-8,29 n. 149,30,31 n. 160,32-3,
239 n. 406,239 n. 407,239 n. 408, 35, 35 n. 178, 37-9,40,40 n. 206,
241, 24.1 n. 424,241 n. 425,243 n. 41,42,42 n. 214,43,44 n. 220,45-
436, 244 n. 439,245, 245 n. 443, 7, 47 n. 233,48, 52, 55, 59, 62,64-
247, 247 n. 450, 248, 251, 251 n. 6,66 n. 299,68,68 n. 309,70-2,76-
463,251 n. 464,252,252 n. 470, 7,77 n. 41,78 n. 48,80,80 n. 58,80
253 n. 472,253 n. 473,255-8 n. 62,81,83,83 n. 80, 85, 88-90,
arithmetic, 14,51,55,70,70 n. 1 72-3,85 93,97-8,100,104,108 n. 190,109-
n. 88, 90-1,93-4, 104, 115 n. 219, 11,116,118,123-4, 127, 132, 135-
116, 122 n. 253, 124-6, 184n. 193, 8, 140, 143-4, 147, 151-5, 159-61,
 Index 285

161 n. 78, 164-6,168-9,172,174, 53-4 n. 257, 107, 98 n. 155, 106 n.

179,181,181 n. 175,182,201,205, 176, 108 n. 188,118 n. 233, 119n.
211,215-6,220,225-6,229, 233, 240, 144 n. 354,162 n. 81,194, 195
237-9,243 n. 436,244,253, 255, n. 235, 2012 n. 263,203-4 n. 273,
257,258 207 n. 285, 218 n. 318, 221 n. 326
— composite (syntheton), 82, 141
— as epaggellomenon, 9 Cajetan, 17
—eternal, 37, 146, 154-6,240, Calcidius, 134, 134 n. 307
254 Cantor, G , 38 n. 192,45 n. 297, 83 n.
— as noéton, noéta, 35, 74-5, 77- 77,99,99 n. 157,99 n. 158,101,122
80, 82, 84,139,146,148,150,156, capacity, 6,42, 76, 103, 107, 137-8,
167, 185-6,240,247 140, 159 n. 70, 163, 171, 172, 174-
— as on, 6,20-2, 73, 75, 77-8, 80, 6, 186, 188, 192, 192 n. 226, 195-6,
82, 84-5, 87-8,242 202,205, 215-7,219-20,230, 232,
body, 5, 5 n. 21, 6 ,9, 13, 14 n. 77, 249,258,260
15 n. 80, 18, 31-33, 36, 39-40, 58- Carpus, 225
60,62, 110, 131-2, 135, 143, 157, Caterus, 18,40 n. 206
173, 176-7, 179, 183,187-9, 189 n. causa sui, 23 n. 123, 32
215, 191, 193, 195, 198-9,206 n. causation, cause, 4, 16,16 n. 87, 19,22-
279,209 n. 288,219,227,234,250, 3,25,27,32-3,33 n. 169,40 n. 206,
259 42,47,49,60,64,66,77,104-5,110,
—as divisible, 15,29, 55-7,116, 130, 114,114n.210,121 n. 245,129,158
199, 253 n. 62, 165, 165 n. 99, 179, 194 n.
— and extension, 14, 15, 15 n. 82, 15 234,202 n. 262,204 n. 275,215,222,
n. 83,29, 59, 117, 121, 134, 171, 227.238-9,255,257
189, 190, 197, 199,208,227,229, Cavalieri, B., 53 n. 254, 57 n. 271
255 change, 7, 9, 19,37-8, 70, 88-9,95-6,
—geometrical, 16,116,117,120,197- 103, 130-1, 140, 146, 150, 155-6,
8, 228,229 n. 368 178, 183,205,211,216, 225, 227,
—and location, 15 n. 83, 134 230.238-43,257,259
— as movable, 15, 134,229 Chanut, H. -P., 42 n. 215,49 n. 237,49 n.
— physical, 16, 54, 57, 116-8, 120, 239,49-50 n. 240,199 n. 254,199 n.
130, 132, 134, 197,208,219,227, 255,221 n. 327
231,244, 255 characteristic, 21, 36,42 n. 214, 71, 83,
— and primary qualities, 16 108 n. 188, 156, 185,228, 109, 130,
— and secondary qualities, 16 132,136,156 n. 54,255
—and shape, 15 n. 87, 15 n. 97, 116, —distinctive characteristic
189,253,255 (idiotes), 12
Boethius, 83 n. 77,156 n. 54,174 n. 139 Charleton, W., 57, 57 n. 272
Bolyai, J., 96,96 n. 150 Cleserlier, C., 40 n. 205,43 n. 218,44
Bonaventure, 40 n. 206 n. 224, 56 n. 267, 123 n. 259
boundary, 41, 80, 181,238-9 cogitation, 30,41,43, 124, 80 n. 62,
Brouwer, L. E. J., 53 n. 254,122, 122 160,162, 166, 178,188, 194, 220,
n. 254, 123,124 n. 261,213 159 n. 69
Burman, 41 n. 210,47 n. 233,50 n. 242, cogito, 43, 58,68, 104,104 n. 174, 105,
286 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

111, 158, 167, 170, 172, 172, 196, Damascius, 24,25 n. 132, 100, 100 n.
202,215-6, 222 163, 146 n. 1,239,
cognition, 9, 32,48, 51, 55, 58-9, 61-2, Dante, 174 n. 139
67-8, 92, 108-9, 120, 129, 146, 151, De Beaune, F., 33 n. 169, 120 n. 241
159, 172, 193, 195,218,219,220, Dedekind, R., 98 n. 156,125 n. 270,213,
238, 245,248, 139 n. 332 213 n. 304
cognitive faculty, 51,112,125,129,131- deductio, 157,204 n. 275
2, 146,151, 159-60, 176, 187, 191- deficiency (elleipsis), 28,39, 81, 148
3, 195, 198,209, 219, 226, 230-1, definition, 28, 35-8,46,49, 51, 56, 64,
234-5, 256-8 66,66 n. 303,99,100,109,137,140,
Colvius, A., 33 n. 171 114-5 n. 213
common sense (sensus communis, —negative, 238
aisthësis koine), 183, 187, 187 Descartes, 2, 35, 37,42-51, 53
n. 206, 190, 192 n. 226, 193, 227 —and matter, 12-9
communication (koinônia), 37, 149, —and substance, 28-34, 39-41
153-4, 156, 169, 191,242,244,258 Desargues, G , 41, 96,96 n. 149,96 n.
concept, 151.228, 228 n. 362
—formal, 17-9,45,64 n. 214, 101, dichotomy, 23, 129, 152, 195, 199, 208
161-70,214 — into inner and outer, 59
—objective, 47, 64 n. 214, 161-70, dimension, 5 n. 21, 13, 15,49, 91-2,
165 n. 98 108 n. 188, 117, 169, 174, 185-6,
consciousness, 33,170, 177, 216,138 191.223.228, 232, 250-1
construction, constructibility Dionysius the Areopagite, 24, 53-4 n.
—divine, 119, 121,230-1,259 257
—of a geometrical or mathematical discrete, 55,55 n. 262, 82,86-7, 89, 92-
object, 57, 73,81,90, 92, 97, 101, 4, 122, 124-6, 205-7, 237-8, 252-3,
106, 115, 119, 124, 131, 191,203, 256
205-6, 210-1, 217, 219,222-9,229 discursive reasoning, thinking (dianoia),
n. 368, 230, 230 n. 371, 239,245-9, 23,48 56, 72,91, 112, 150, 157-8,
252-3, 257, 259-60 158 n. 62, 160, 172-5, 177, 180-2,
—kinematic (by movement), 210,223- 184,186,204 n. 275,207,222,226,
229,237,244-5,250-1,254,259-60 234-6,243-50, 252
— and reconstruction of the world, 119, —as intermediate, 129-31, 151, 153,
210,213,221-2,224, 227,235-6, 258-60
245, 260 distinction
continuum, 15 n. 82, 54-5, 57, 122, 127 —conceptual, 15, 16 n. 89, 17-8, 198
cosmos, 2 n. 2,5,39,115, 126, 129, 150, —formal, 17-8, 126, 165
158 n. 62,211,251 —mental, 17, 29,64, 72, 152,242
— intelligible (kosmos noëtos), 74, —modal, 15,17,18,18 n. 94,42,123,
74 n. 22,75, 80,90, 135, 148, 151, 176, 198
157,242 —real, 14,17,18,44,49,58,65,66 n.
creation, 34, 64, 174,212,214,218, 301,152,156,193,198,200-1,204,
231-3 231,242-3
creative power, 37,42, 49, 139, 171, divisibility, division,
174-5, 221,233,260 —conceptual, 239
 Index 287

— indefinite, 54-7 —corporeal, 2 n. 2, 18

— infinite, 37 n. 180,39,55-6,95,100, essence, 2 ,4 ,1 2 , 13,16,18,19 n. 97,
202,215,235 19 n. 98,21 n. 110,29,34,36,40,40
—mathematical, 36, 81, 124 n. 206,41, 58, 62,66 n. 298, 83 n.
—o f number, 37, 55 n. 262, 81,81 n. 80, 160, 167, 169, 186, 188-9, 197-
66, 87, 94 n. 139,256 8,201-2, 202,204,207-8, 216,220,
—physical, o f physical bodies, 15,184 255,259
Dirichlet, G L., 97 n. 153,125 n. 270 —and existence, 21-2,45-6,48, 63-5,
20 n. 104, 239 66 n. 301,67,67 n. 303,68, 68 n.
dualism, duality, 6, 20 n. 104,21-6, 26 306, 105, 118, 121, 135, 158, 161,
n. 137, 74, 77, 79, 82, 84,117,124, 163, 169,218,227,225 n. 348
136,138,147,150-3,169,176,185, —divine, 43-49, 59,62,64, 102
239,241,253-4 — including existence, 22,32,45-6,48,
duration, 18n. 97,21,34,123,147,156, 105, 154
187 n. 206 eternal, eternity, 14,31,2 1 ,3 9 ,6 8 ,9 5 ,
Duns Scotus, 17, 17 n. 91,231 n. 376 127,129,141,147,154-6,201,207,
dyad (aoristas dyas), 6 ,2 6 ,2 6 n. 137, 215,240,241-2, 156 n. 54, 201 n.
26 n. 138,27, 37-8, 74, 77-8, 78 n. 262, 243 n. 436
48, 78-9, 79 n. 53, 79 n. 54, 79-80 —vs. sempiternal, 5 n. 26, 11 n. 61
n. 58, 80-6, 86 n. 93, 89-90, 90 n. Euclid, 25 n. 133, 77 n. 41, 82 n. 77, 91,
113,92, 125, 134, 137-42, 148, 91 n. 122,92,92 n. 130,93 n. 132,
168,176,179,185-6,240,246,255, 93 n. 134, 94,94 n. 140, 94 n. 141,
257 94 n. 143, 94 n. 144,94 n. 145,94 n.
dynamis, dynamei, 3-5, 9 ,2 1 ,2 6 , 37, 146,96, 104, 109, 112,112n. 206,
88,90, 143, 143 n.351, 147 n. 5, 114n. 211, 122, 125-6,128, 141-2,
157, 172-3, 182,243 n. 436 151, 220,224-5, 226 n. 350,227,
235, 237-8, 239 n. 405,250-2,252
Eckhart, M., 63 n. 291 n .466,259
Elizabeth, Princess, 15 n. 84,42 n. 215, Eudoxus, 82 n. 77, 91, 96 n. 150, 125
49 n. 239, 123 n. 255, 194 n. 232, evil, 8, 8 n. 42, 9 n. 53, 11 n. 61, 28, 39,
200 n. 260, 206 n. 279, 221 n. 327 135, 140,243 n. 436
emptiness (khaos) 28, 179 existence, 8, 19 n. 97, 21-2,28, 30-1,
end,35,78,89, 111, 139,146,155,172, 31 n. 159, 36, 36 n. 169,36 n. 180,
175,206, 238, 251 40 n. 204,42-5,45 n. 226,46,48,
— as per as, 80,100,138,93,160,242, 49 n. 238, 51, 54, 54 n. 257, 59, 61
242 n. 426 n. 284,63,63 n. 289,64,64 n. 281,
energy, 254 65,65 n. 296,66,66 n. 298, 67, 67
—and actuality, 53 n. 252 n. 305,68,68 n. 306,68 n. 308, 68
entity, 8, 18, 27, 35-7,41,45, 55, 57-8, n. 309, 73, 76, 85,97,98 n. 155,
72,91-3,97-8, 98 n. 155, 99,99 n. 99, 102-5,105 n. 176, 106 n. 179,
157, 102, 108, 111-2, 122, 123, 108-9, 112, 118, 128, 132, 135,
131-2, 134, 140,165 n. 97, 166, 140, 142, 143 n. 353, 146-7, 154,
202, 207 n. 285,208,208 n. 285, 158,161, 164, 166, 169, 182, 198,
219,222, 226-7,229, 238,238 n. 200-3, 203 n. 270, 208,211,213,
399, 239,247,249, 251-3,260 216, 218, 220-1,223-5, 225 n. 348,
288 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

226-7,233-4,239,250,252 73 n. 12, 77 n. 41,99 n. 157

extension, 50-1, 59,93,95-8, 102, 117, Fromondus, L., 57,57 n. 270,63 n. 289,
U 7n. 227,127,132,134n. 310,143 120 n. 242
n. 353, 156-7, 159,168,171, 175,
179, 183-6, 194, 199-200,203-4, Galilei, Galileo, 16, 13, 115 n. 215
207-8,216, 221-3,227-8, 230,234, Gassendi, P., 33,46, 34 n. 173, 56 n.
237-8 269,105 n. 176,118,118 n. 235,127
—and body, 12-4,15 n. 83, 16-9,29, n. 279, 162-3 n. 84,165 n. 97, 188
60,63,63 n. 289,67, 143,190,209, n. 209, 190, 197 n. 244,204 n. 275
229,231,257-60 Geminus, 124 n. 266,225
—continuous, 15 n. 82, 56-7,209,218 generation, 42, 11 n. 61, 139,224,238,
—as diastasis, 134, 155,246, 249 241,250
—spatial, 12-9,49, 202, 209, 229 —kinematic, 85, 85 n. 88, 90,
geometrization, 13,116,116 n. 221,
Fermat, 101-2 120, 122 n. 253, 132
Ferrier, J., 122 n. 251 geometry, 14,41,48, 51, 55,70-1, 91,
figure, 5 n. 21,6, 9, 193,232 93-4,96, 96 n. 150, 103,103 n.
—geometrical figure, 16,51,54,70,86, 168, 104, 106, 106 n. 182, 110-1,
91-3,93 n. 134,95-8, 106, 108 n. 113, 115, 115 n. 213, 115 n. 217,
188, 111 n. 204, 115-6, 117 n. 227, 115 n. 219, 115,220, 116-9, 119 n.
118-22, 125-7, 127 n. 279, 130-1, 238, 120-1, 122 n. 253, 124-6, 126
134, 134 n. 310,135, 141-2, 143 n. n. 274, 126 n. 275, 126 n. 276, 126
353,151, 160,178,181,183,185-6, n. 277, 126 n. 278, 130, 142, 142
189 n. 214, 198, 200, 203-4,204 n. n. 345,184, 184 n. 193, 204 n.273,
273,205-10, 212,212 n. 301, 217, 205-7, 209,209 n. 290,210,212-
219-20,222-3, 226-8,228 n. 362, 3,213 n. 304,214 n. 307, 218 n.
229-31,234,236-9, 245-6, 248-53, 316,219,223,223 n. 339, 224,
256-60 225 n. 348, 227 n. 359,259-60
— immaterial, 235 —non-Euclidean, 96
finitude, 34,39-40,43,47,50-1,54,101 - geometrical figure, object (see also:
2, 105, 108,215 figure)
form, 3, 9 n. 53, 11 n. 6, 12,26, 28, 34, —chiliagon, 195 n. 238,203,204
36-7,47,54-5,81,95,106,108,119, n. 273,204 n. 275, 218,220,227,
124,128,131,146-8, 190,206,208- 231,246
9,211,216,237,241 —circumference, 250
—as eidos, 2 n. 2,3 n. 10,4,5 n. 21,6- —circle, 96, 134, 131, 160, 178-9,
9,80,125,133-8,140-1, 143 n. 353, 182, 184, 210, 217-8,223,234-8,
149-50, 162, 169, 178, 181-2, 184- 247,251, n. 466,252
6, 234-6, 239,242,244-7 —corporeal, 2 n. 2, 14, 15 n. 83,
— as endees, 9 18n .9 7 ,4 7 n .233 ,6 0 n .281, 111 n.
—not bom (ageneton), 207 204,119,127,127 n. 279,187,189,
—as thinkable or intelligable, 15,170, 190-1,191 n. 223, 192, 194,200,
179, 182, 184-7,197,242,244 203, 205-6,208-9,227,230-1
formless, 6, 7,26, 136,223 —divisible (diérimenos), 54,92 n.
Frege, G , 53 n. 254, 72, 72 n. 11, 73, 127,93, 116-7,130-1, 142,178,
 Index 289

182-5, 199,234,236, 239, 245-7, 40,153,177-8,185,212,231 n. 376

250,252-4,256-8,260
—extended, 14,15 n. 83,93,95,116- harmony, 115
7,134 n. 310, 135, 142, 157, 178, Hegel, GW .F, 24, 53, 147 n. 8
182-5, 199 206-9,234,236,247, henad, 77, 81-4, 84 n. 85, 85-6, 86 n. 93,
252,257-60 87-8, 88 n. 102, 89-95
-fo u r-fo ld , 235,260 henology, 19,20-1,23,25 n. 132,27,66
—having parts, 116, 130-1, 142, 180, Henry of Ghent, 40 n. 206
250,256-7 Heron, 70 n. 1
—line, 14,92 n. 127,96, 125, 131, Hilbert, D., 70, 83, 83 n. 78,96 n. 150,
160,223,238,253 101,123,226
—polygon, 51,96-7,198,228,247 Hippocrates, 226
—as having shape Hobbes, Th., 24 n. 52, 158, 158 n. 65,
(eskhèmatsimenos), 246 162,197 n. 244,212,212 n. 298
—triangle, 45,71,95, 113, 119, 119 Hogelande, C., 106,107 n. 184,122 n.
n. 240, 158, 163,203, 204 n. 273, 252,214,214 n. 308,229 n. 367
210-1,218-9, 234-5 Hooke, R., 114 n. 213,115 n. 214
Gibieuf, G , 14 n. 78, 56 n. 266, 60 n. Huygens, C., 105 n. 176,122 n. 251
284, 188, 188 n. 209, 196 n. 242 hylomorphic structure, 4
Goclenius, R., 164,165 n. 95,165 n. Hyperaspistes, 33 n. 169,41 n. 221,44
98 n. 224,61 n. 284,65 n. 298, 123 n.
God, 18 n. 97, 23 n. 123, 30, 33 n. 169, 256, 163 n. 86,233 n. 384
35 n. 178,40 n. 206,41 n. 213,42 n. hypothesis, 21,24-5,70, 74, 81-2, 92,
216,43 n. 219,44,44 n. 226,46 n. 135, 147, 147 n. 7, 148, 150, 177,
232,49 n. 238, 50 n. 241, 53, 54 n. 199
257, 56-61, 61 n. 284, 64,65, 65 n.
296,66-8, 68 n. 308,68 n. 309 lamblichus, 20 n. 104,24,26 n. 138, 77,
—attributes o f (omn/'-attributes), 17, 77 n. 39,77 n. 41, 83 n. 77,85 n. 86,
30,42-3 92 n. 122,94,94 n. 140, 125 n. 272,
—as being, infinite being, 40 n. 206, 129,129 n. 288,130,134 n. 305,137
47 n. 233,53-5, 146,255 n. 325,142,142 n. 349,146 n. 1,182,
—as ens necessarium, 41 n. 208 182 n. 177,182 n. 181, 182 n. 182,
—as ens perfectissimum 182 n. 183, 182 n. 184, 183,236 n.
—supremely perfect, 41,53,66 n. 299 392, 238 n. 404,256
—as infinite mind, 33,45,49, 56-7, idea, 2 n. 2 ,4 , 9, 13, 15,27 n. 143,28
68,158,161,163-5,167,171, 199, n. 145, 33-4,40-1,42,42 n. 214,
200-1,201 n. 262,204,214-5,217, 43-4,44 n. 220,45-7, 55, 55n. 254,
220,222,231-3 60, 63 n. 289,64,66 n. 299,67 n.
—omnipotent, 53 289,68 n. 309, 80,97-8, 99 n. 158,
—as substance, infinite 100, 102-3,114 n. 211, 119, 119 n.
substance, 29 n. 149,39,50 48-9, 240, 123-4, 126-7, 131, 141, 143,
58-62, 64-6, 101, 105, 110-1, 166, 143 n. 352, 144 n. 354, 149, 160-1,
199-200 161 n. 76, 162,162 n. 79, 162 n.
good (agatnon) goodness, 20,21 n. 110, 82, 162 n. 84, 163, 163 n. 84, 164-
22-3,26-7,27 n. 142,104,138,139- 5,165 n. 97, 165 n. 98, 165 n. 99,
290 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

166, 168-70, 178, 181-2, 184, 188 36, 64, 108, 127,157, 174 n. 139,
n. 209, 190, 190 n. 221, 191, 196, 175-80, 183, 184 n. 214,186, 191,
198,202, 205,212-4, 220, 225 n. 191 n. 223,208,222,256-60
348,231-6,242 n. 426, 245-50, —geometrical objects as, 128-32,
253 144, 160, 181,211
image, 7, 11, 14,26-7, 34, 73, 75, 79, intuitus, 157-8, 204 n. 275
138,150,155,157,160-3,172-4,174 irrationality, 135, 173,175, 179, 182,
n. 135, 175-8, 178 n. 161, 179-80, 186, 196, 258
186, 188 n. 209, 190-1,192 n. 226, —as inexpressible (arrhéton), 94-5
195-6, 198,200, 203-6,208, 212,
220,232, 235-6,240,245, 245 n. John Damascene, 40 n. 206, 157 n. 57
443,248, 250-1,260 John of Gent, 17
—of imagination (phantasma, judgement, 12 23,27,49, 103-4, 151,
phantasmata), 182 159, 163, 168-9, 177 n. 157, 180,
imagination, 14-5,15 n. 82,21, 34,47, 194 n. 233,213,231,236
49,60-1,57-8,63,68,72,93,96,106, —as hypolépsis, 173
123, 125, 127 n. 279, 131, 137-8,
141-2,152,159-62,164,171-4,174 Kant, 62,62 n. 287, 123,164, 168, 173
n. 135, 175, 175 n. 141,176, 176 n. n. 132, 174,213 n. 305
151, 177-8, 178 n. 162, 179, 179 n. Kepler, 113,113 n. 2 0 9 ,1 1 4 n .2 1 0 ,114
166,180,180 n. 170,181,181 n. 175, n. 211,114 n. 212, 114 n. 213, 115
182-4,184n. 193,185-7,187n. 204, n. 214, 115 n. 215, 158 n. 62,212,
188,188 n. 209,189,189 n. 212,190, 212 n. 301, 212 n. 302, 213 n. 303
190 n. 220,191,191 n .2 2 3 ,192,192 knowledge, 7, 14,40-1,43,43 n. 219,
n. 225,192 n. 226,193-4,194 n. 233, 44-6,51 -2,52 n. 250,61,61 n. 285,
194n. 234,195-6,196 n. 242,196 n. 62,66-7,67 n. 305,100,104-5,105
243, 197-203,203-4 n. 273,204 n. n. 176,106-7,107 n. 185, 109-11,
275, 205-6,206 n. 279, 207, 207 n. 111 n. 200, 157, 159 n. 69, 159 n.
285, 208-10, 217-23,227-8,228 n. 70,160-1,170,194 n. 233,197,199,
362, 229-39, 243-53, 257-60 203,212,214,222 n. 332,248,256
immutability, 70, 211 —analogical knowledge, 8
impassibility, 6 n. 28, 135, 187 —as epistémé, 70-1,78,116,151,173,
impenetrability, 13, 15 213,224
imperfection, 37, 39-41, 50-1, 53-4, 54 —knowing vs. grasping, 246
n. 257, 61 n. 284 — objects o f (mathémata), 217,
inalterability, 6 n. 28,9, 12 224-7,235,246, 250
incommensurability, incommensurable,
92 n. 127, 125 Leibniz, G W , 99 n. 157,165 n. 98,170,
—o f geometrical magnitudes, 95 170 n. 113, 189,212, 226
indefiniteness (apeirori), 3 ,5 ,9 ,2 6 ,3 5 life (zóe), 152, 156 n. 54, 182,233-4
n. 175,37-9,79, 81,88 n. 105,99 n. —and being, 74, 74 n. 21,75,96,
158,137,139,157,167,186,202,255 153-4, 156-7,243 n. 436
independence, 39-41,71,75,215,218, —and intellect, 38 n. 195,74-6,153-
243 n. 436 4, 155, 155 n. 44, 156, 241-2,243,
—and being in itself (hath ’ hayto), 243 n. 436, 258
 Index 29 !

— and noèta, 74-5, 153-4 mass, 2, 244

limit, 7,23, 35-8,40-1,49-51, 54-5, 55 mathematics, 2 ,4 4 ,5 3 ,5 3 , n. 254, 55,
n. 262, 88, 9 0 ,9 2 ,9 2 n. 127, 93-4, 59,70 n. 1,71,83,90,91,93 n. 134.
97,99,103,109,134,142-3,156 n. 95,97-9, 100-5, 105 n. 176, 106-7,
54, 157, 181, 238-9,252-3, 255-6 107 n. 183,108-9,111-6,116 n. 220,
—as peras, 80, 100, 160, 242 117, 117 n. 2 2 9 ,117n. 230,118-20,
— as horiston, 26, 80 122, 122 n. 253,124-5, 125 n. 270,
line, 14, 54, 85, 85 n. 9 2 ,92,92 n. 127, 126-8, 133, 143 n. 53, 161, 184 n.
93, 95-6, 96 150, 100, 116-7, 117, 193, 194 n. 234,204-6, 206 n. 279,
117 n. 227, 118-9, 125-6, 128, 131, 207,207 n. 285,209-10,213,213 n.
134,142,155,160,177,206-7,222- 305,214,225 n. 348,226,229,230,
4,228,228 n. 362,237-9,248,250- 239,241,251,257, 259
1,251 n. 466, 252-3 —and physics, 14,70, 168, 256
Lobachevsky, N., 96, 96 n. 150 mathematization of the world, 117, 211
Locke, J., 40 n. 207, 50 n. 241, 62, 62 mathesis universalis, 106-7, 107 n.
n. 287,63 n. 291,203,272,212,212 185, 108-9
n. 297,222 n. 332 matter
logos, 100, 154 —and actuality, 3 ,6 ,9 , 32
—as discursive thinking, 178, 181, —bodily, 9, 63 n. 289
184,235,244 —as bulk, 2
—as relation, 36, 75,92 n. 122, 94, —and extension, 12, 19,49, 259
126 —and hypostasis, 8
—as speech, 37,49,64,66 n. 303,154 —idea of, 13,63 n. 289
— as formative principle, 136, 234- — intelligible, 3,9, 27, 37-8, 85 n.
6,239, 244-8, 250 36,93, 126, 132-4, 134 n. 310, 134
— as rule o f construction, 235, 244, n. 313, 135-43,143 n. 353,146,148,
249, 252 160,166, 168,179,183-7,208,210,
226,229,233-5,237-41,244-8,250,
machine, 121, 122 n. 251 257-8, 260
magnitude, 9, 36 n. 180,44, 57, 94 n. —knowledge of, 62
138,229 —and mass, 2
—as continuous, 51, 55, 55 n. 262, —and negativity, 8 -9,17,19,24,26,
56,94, 122, 125-6, 191,207, 253, 45, 50
256 —as non-being, 2, 4, 6, 7-8,22-4, 26-
—as geometrical figure, 206,237,253 7,29 n. 149,37,39,41-2,51-3,63 n.
— as megethos, 36, 71 n. 7, 92,234 289
—and multitude, 82,91, 122 —and otherness, 2, 6-7, 11, 11 n. 60
Malanbranche, N., 4 n. 17, 119 n. 238, 12,21-3,25-6,26 n. 137,26 n. 139,
143 n. 352 27-8, 34, 37- 8,43, 52, 58-9
many (polla), 9, 21-3,25-6,26 n. 137, —particles of, 58
28 n. 147,38,43, 53, 55 n. 262,60, —and potentiality, 4-5,7,9,11,26,28,
74,76, 76 n. 36, 77, 80 n. 58,81, 3 6 ,4 2 ,6 0 ,6 7 ,6 7 n. 305
84-6, 90,128, 136-8, 142, 146-7, —and predication, 7, 39, 52, 64
147 n. 7,147 n. 8,148-50,157,202, —prime, materia prima, 5, 5 n. 21, 57
223, 234,237,243,243 n. 436,246 —and receptacle, 5 n. 20, 6, 39, 142,
292 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

185,235,255 — divine, 33,47, 101, 104-5, 144,

—as substance, 2 n. 2,29 n. 149, 143 158, 160, 171,200,204,212,214,
n. 252,255 218, 231-2
—subtle, 223,223 n. 334 —finite, 30-3,40-6,46 n. 232,49,
—two matters, 13, 140-2,143 n. 352 51-7,62, 66-8,95-9, 101-2, 105,
measure, 11, 38-9, 57,72, 81, 83 n. 80, 109, 111, 113, 119-20, 157-8, 164-
88-9,92 n. 127, 94-5,106,107,107 9, 171,188,199-201,207,212-5,
n. 185,109-10,124-6,151,185,204 218-22,231,245, 259
n. 275,210,224,241,256-7 —infinite, 33,45,49, 56-7,68, 99,
mechanics, 114-5, 120,224 101, 105, 119, 144, 157-8, 161,
memory, 159, 171, 186,191, 192 n. 163-5, 167, 171, 199-201,201 n.
226, 193, 199, 262,204,214-5, 217, 220, 222,
mental faculty, 181, 195,203, 232 231-33
Menechinos, 225 mode, modus, 4, 14 n. 77, 15, 17-9, 19
Mersenne, M., 15 n. 82, 16 n. 86, 29 n. n. 98,29,41-2,63,123-4,127,135,
152,40 n. 204,43 n. 219, 44 n. 187, 198
221,44 n. 224,44,45 n. 229,46 n. Moderatus, 9
232,47 n. 234,47 n. 235, 48 n. monad, 77-8, 78 n. 4 8 ,7 9 ,7 9 n. 54, 80
236, 54 n. 260, 58 n. 274, 63 n. n. 62, 81-5, 89,91-3, 131,237-8,
289,67 n. 306,68 n. 308, 97, 55 n. 252-3
264,97 n. 153,98 n. 154, 104 n. monism, 20 n. 104
175, 105 n. 176, 106 n. 179, 111 n. More, H., 13,13 n. 73, 14 n. 77,15, 15
199, 113, 113 n. 207, 115 n. 217, n. 83,42 n. 215,49 n. 238,49 n. 239,
115 n. 119, 115 n. 220, 117 n. 229, 50 n. 240, 55 n. 263,65 n. 297, 121
122 n. 252, 137 n. 328, 149 n. 15, n. 245, 198, 198 n. 249, 199, 199 n.
160, 160 n. 74, 162, 162 n. 80, 162 254,208 n. 286,232 n. 379
n. 83, 163, 163 n. 90, 187 n. 205, Morin, J.-B., 16 n. 86,223 n. 334
190 n. 219, 190 n. 221, 192 n. 226, motion, movement, 5, 29, 15 n. 83, 16
193 n. 228, 194 n. 234, 196 n. 242, n. 87, 18 n. 97, 63 n. 289,71,71 n.
198 n. 251,201 n. 261,202,202 n. 7, 78, 78 n. 48, 79-81, 85, 85 n. 92,
268,203 n. 269,203 n. 271,223 n. 86-7,92,113,114 n. 211, 115,116,
334,223 n. 356, 229 n. 368,230 n. 120-1, 121 n. 245, 124, 129, 130 n.
370,231 n. 376 293, 131, 133, 140, 144, 147 n. 8,
Mesland, D., 44 n. 233, 53 n. 256, 54 152-5,155 n. 4 4 ,156n.54,157,163,
n. 259, 54 n. 261, 56 n. 266, 192 n. 173-5, 181, 187 n. 206, 190, 206 n.
226,200 n. 260,200 n. 261 279,212,221 -5,227-30,230 n. 371,
metaphysics, 4 n. 17, 13, 36,48, 59, 68, 237,239-41,242 n. 433,243-5,247,
76 n. 33, 86, 103-5, 105 n. 176, 106 249-53, 257-60
n. 179, 108-11, 117 n. 230,204 —and “flow” (rhysis), 228, 237,
method, 25 n. 132,101-4,106-8,109, 253
109 n. 193, 112 n. 206, 113, 116-7, —intellectual, 154-5,241-2
120, 122, 124, 126-7,204 n. 275, —as kinesis, 78 n. 48, 139, 153-5,
209, 143,226-7,229,232, 256,259 240, 242, 242 n. 426,250
mind, mens, 60 —and locomotion, 130,241,250,252
—attentive, 30,157 —physical, 241,243-4,249-50
 Index 293

—primary movement, 78,139, 140 n. —nihil negativum, 8-9, 11-12, 24,26,

338,239, 243-4 140
—self-movement (aytokinesis), non-being, 10,22, 23,24, 26-7,29 n.
153,242 149, 37,39,41,42,51-3,90,94,120,
multiplicity, multitude (see also: many), 131.138.156.172.182.185-6,220,
20, 22-6,26 n. 137,27, 71-2, 74-6, 255
78, 79 n. 53, 80, 82, 84, 86-8, 92, —as me on, 6, 20, 63 n. 289, 76
94, 137-9, 142, 147-8, 152-3, 157, non-existence, 22,28, 63
177, 179, 184, 186,234-5,237, —as nothingness, 2 ,6 ,1 3 2
242, 244-6, 249, 255, 258 —as privation, 4, 7, 76
non-contradiction,
natural light (lumen naturale), 30,45, —the principle of, 4,10,12,14,43,52-
67, 105, 114, 168,200 4, 127
nature, 2 ,9 n. 53,10,10 n. 57, 12-4,16, number,
16 n. 8 7 ,3 1 ,4 2 ,4 6 ,4 7 n. 233,61 n. —addition in numbers, 94, 94 n.
285,62, 85-6,103, 113, 114 n. 210, 139,124
120, 127-8, 138, 140, 143 n. 352, —commensurable, 89, 94-5,126
153,159,163,179,187,187n. 206, —as composite unity, 90
192 n. 226,204 n. 275,207, 207 n. —discrete, 86, 125
285,209 n. 288,219, 231 n. 376, —division in numbers, 81,81 n. 64, 81
243, 243 n. 436,253 n. 67,94 n. 139, 100, 124
—o f body, 16 —essential or substantial (oysiddés),
—corporeal, 109,115,118 n. 234, 157 73, 75-7, 80, 81-2, 84-91
—composite, 141,170 —ideal, 38,38 n. 192,73,81,88 n. 103,
—o f extension, 116,197 89-90
— intelligible, 154 —infinite, 38,45, 54, 56, 59, 88, 88 n.
—material, o f matter, 13, 140 103, 96 n. 150, 97-102, 126, 142,
— of the mind, 62 171 n. 114,197,204,230-1,235,246
—simple, 157 —mathematical, 91
—universal, 17 —monadic, or quantitative (monadikos,
negation (negatio negationis), 8-10, 16, toyposoy), 73, 77, 83, 87-91
23-4,24 n. 130, 5, 27,4 1 ,4 3 , 58, —numbering, 83, 85, 89-91, 100, 124
79, 119, 147, 147 n. 8, 163, 167, —transfinite, 38, 38 n. 192, 99, 102
188,238 —zero, 90,97,140
—as aphairesis, 24, 58 Numenius, 79 n. 54, 137 n. 324
negativity, 9,17, 12,24,45,50, 78,
138,147 n. 8,173,175,178-9,182, object
194,196, 234 —geometrical, 34, 72, 93, 95, 96,97,
—o f matter, 8, 19,26 116-8,120,122,124, 126, 128, 130-
Neoplatonists, 20, 70, 175, 179, 196 4, 134 n. 313, 135, 141-4, 146, 168,
Newton, I., 16, 24, 57, 96 n. 151, 115, 178.184.185-6,189,192,206,208-
115 n. 213, 134,223,223 n. 338 9,214, 217,220,222-4, 225 n. 348,
Nicholas o f Cusa, 24, 53,63,212 226-30,234-40,244-9, 251,253,
nihil, 187 256-60
—nihil privativum, 17, 40, 50 — intelligible, 11 n. 60, 28, 38, 75,
294 Maller, Imagination and Geometry

78, 84, 87, 130-1, 137-8,140,148- 84, 87, 88 n. 103, 91, 97-8, 104-5,
50,152,155-7,164,178,180-2,184- 105 n. 176,107, 107 n. 135, 107 n.
6, 233-6,240-2,245,246, 250 137, 109-11, 112 n. 206, 114, 123-
—mathematical, 45,47,57,67,95,97, 6,129,135,143 n. 352, 150-1,159,
101-2, 104, 113, 126-7, 130, 132, 168, 181, 184, 191,204 n. 274,204
135,138,205,207,210-2,236,256- n. 275,206,206 n. 281,207,211-2,
7 212n.301, 220,223,231,238,244,
—material, 13, 113 251.256-8
—physical, 14,57,71-2, 109, 113,115, Origen, 54, 54 n. 258
118-120, 128-9, 161, 177-8,205-6, otherness (heterotës, thateron),
210,217,229-30 the other, 11 n. 60,12, 19,21,22-3,
—of thinking, of thought (noèton, 25,25 n. 135,26,26 n. 137, 26 n.
noèta), 74-5, 78, 80, 82, 84, 87, 139,28,29 n. 150, 34,37-8,43, 52,
148, 150-4, 156, 158, 160-1, 164, 58-9,62,78,78 n. 48,79-81,85, 85
166-7,178,180-2,184-7,188 n. 209, n. 87,86 n. 93, 89,120,124-6,138-
233,235,240-1,242,245,247,250, 40, 140 n. 338, 142, 146-8, 150-3,
257-8 155, 159-60, 175, 182, 184, 187,
Ockham, 17,66,66 n. 301,231 n. 376 211,237,239-41,243,247,251-3,
Oenopides, 226 255.257-8
One, 9, 20,20 n. 104,21,21 n. 109,21 —principle of otherness, 2 ,6 , 7, 11,
n. 110,22-3,23 n. 123,24,24 n. 130, 27, 77, 120, 142, 238, 245-6
25,25 n. 132,26,26 n. 137,27-8,28
n. 147,37-8,38 n. 195, 38 n. 197, Pappus, 104,112,112 n. 206,227 n. 359
39, 51 n. 248, 52, 52 n. 252, 72, 74- paradigm, 39, 67, 86, 88-90, 105, 109,
7,77 n. 41,78,78 n. 48,79-80, 80 n. 135, 146, 148, 150, 155, 161, 172,
58, 83-4, 85 n. 90, 88-90, 92, 100, 182,211,214,226,235-6,240
134, 136-40,143,147, 147 n. 5, 147 paradox, 6-7, 9-12,22,26-7,49 n. 238,
n. 7, 147 n. 8, 148, 150, 152, 154, 51-3, 53 n. 254, 54, 54 n. 257, 55,
176-7, 179, 185,240, 243,255 83,92n. 127,96,101,132,139,141,
ontology, ontological, 5, 8, 19,20-1, 28, 215,-6,235,241,255-6
30, 30 n. 154,32,34-5,35 n. 178, Parmenides, 22 n. 117, 131, 146, 146
43-4,49-50,53,58-9,66,68,70,72, n. 1, 167, 167 n. 105
74-7,81-5,97, 99, 105, 108, 114, “Parmenides”, 21,24-5,74,82,92,100,
124-5, 129-31, 152, 156, 174, 176, 127, 131, 137, 147, 147 n. 7
178,188-9,191,192,199,200,207- participation (methexis, metokhè,
8,210,227,230,234,237,238,245, metalêpsis), 20 n. 104,25, 73,
249,255-9 76 n. 36,77,78 n. 48,81,83,88,90,
opinion (doxa), 45,13,71,105, 131,150, 185, 226
151, 172-3, 176, 180, 180 n. 170, Pascal, B.,35 n. 178, 67 n. 305
181,181 n. 175,256 Peano, G, 90,90 n. 114,98 n. 156
opposite, 3-5,10-1,11 n. 60,23-4,29 perception, 16,23,30,33,46 n. 232,72,
n. 149,32,39, 50-1,53-5,58,74, 93,124,157,159,162-4,165 n.97,
76, 79, 111, 112 n. 206, 127, 130-1, 166, 168-9, 169 n. 110, 170, 170 n.
137, 147, 180, 240 113, 172-6, 176 n. 151, 177, 177 n.
order, 27, 39, 54, 79 n. 58 60, 68, 75, 157-8, 180, 180 n. 183, 186-8, 192-
 Index 295

8,200,204,213,216,219,220,236, 105,108n. 189, 111, 114n .211,116,

245 n. 443, 258, 260 116 n. 222, 117 n. 228,118, 118 n.
perfection, 5,29, 30, 35 n. 178, 37,40, 237,125 n. 271,127,127 n. 282,128,
40 n. 206,41,41 n. 213,42-3,45-7, 128 n. 283, 129,129 n. 289, 129 n.
47 n. 233,50 n. 241,54 n. 257,61 n. 290,130,130 n. 293,132,133 n. 299,
285,65,98-9,103,114,123, 161 n. 133 n. 304, 135,138 n. 329, 138 n.
78,165 n. 99,166,199, 220,242, 330,140 n, 338,143 n. 352,146,147
255 n. 4, 147 n. 6, 147 n. 7, 148, 148 n.
Peter Olivi, 231 n. 376 II,1 4 9 ,1 4 9 n. 13, 149 n. 15, 150,
Philo, 24 150 n. 16,150 n. 20, 151,151 n.21,
Philo o f Byzantium, 121 n. 250 152,152 n. 27, 153 n .3 1 ,153 n. 37,
Philolaus, 6 n. 30, 143 n. 352 153 n. 38, 154, 154 n. 39,156 n. 54,
Philoponus, 5 n. 21, 181, 181 n. 174, 157 n. 56,158 n. 62,160 n. 71, 164,
182 n. 178,182 n. 179 164 n. 93,165 n. 99,167,171 n. 115,
physics, 3 n. 2, 13-4,14 n. 76, 15-6,48, 171 n. 116, 172 n. 117, 172 n. 118,
51.59.63 n. 289, 70-1,71 n .7 ,9 1 , 172 n. 119, 172 n. 120,175,175 n.
95,105-6,106 n. 179,108-9,113-4, 141,178 n. 161,178,178 n. 163,180-
114 n. 210, 115,115 n. 217, 116-7, 1,181 n. 175, 183,183 n. 188,184 n.
117 n. 227,117 n. 230, 118, 120, 192, 184 n. 193, 185, 185 n. 197,
128,144,161,168,208 n. 285,210- 207,207 n. 282,208,210,211,211
1,213,213 n. 305,214 n. 305,227, n. 210 292,211 n. 293,213, 213 n.
256-7 306,214 n. 310,220,225,225 n. 346,
place, 2 n. 2, 5 ,6 ,1 3 ,2 1 n. 109, 30,38, 225 n. 348, 226 n. 354, 234, 237 n.
34.44.51.58.63 n. 289,72, 83,90, 395,238 n. 399,238 n. 404,239,239
96, 110, 128, 132, 134, 144, 158, n. 408,240,240 n. 416,240 n. 417,
179, 187,197 n. 243,199,218-9, 255-6,258
228 n. 362,229-30,233-4,241-2, Plempius, V.P., 57 n. 271,63 n. 289,120
245,248, 249-51,253-4 n. 242
—imaginary place, 185-6 Plotinus, 2 n. 2, 3 ,4 n. 17, 6, 6 n. 27, 6
plane, 36, 92, 96,125, 131, 134, 158, n. 28,6 n. 29,7 n. 32,7 n. 34,7 n. 35,
222,224,251 7 n. 36,8,8 n. 40,8 n. 42,8 n. 43,8 n.
Plato, 2-3, 3 n. 7, 6 ,6 n. 28,6 n. 29, 7, 44,9 n. 45,9 n. 47,9 n. 48,9 n. 49,9
7 n. 32, 7 n. 35, 8 n. 41,9, 10 n. 55, n. 51,9 n. 52,9 n. 53,10,10 n. 54,10
1 4,14n.76,21,21 n. 109,22n. I l l , n. 55,10 n. 58,10 n. 59,11 n. 61,11
22 n. 117,23 n. 123,25 n. 132,26 n. n. 63,12,12 n. 65,12 n. 66,12 n. 67,
135,29 n. 149, 37, 38 n. 194,43, 12 n. 68,15, 19-20,20 n. 100, 20 n.
48, 52 n. 248, 53 n. 253,62, 66 n. 101,20 n. 102,20 n. 103,20 n. 104,
301.67.71.71 n. 8,73,73 n. 13,73 20 n. 105,21,21 n. 106,21 n. 107,
n. 17, 74,74 n. 21, 74 n. 22, 76 n. 21 n. 108,21 n. 109,21 n. 110,21 n.
37.71 n. 41,71 n. 43,79 n. 53,79 n. III, 22, 22 n. 112,22 n. 113,22 n.
54, 80 n. 62, 81, 81 n. 66, 81 n. 67, 115,22 n. 116,23,23 n. 121,23 n.
81 n. 70,82 n. 71,82 n. 74,85 n. 88, 122, 23 n. 123,24, 24 n. 127,24 n.
87, 88 n. 102, 88 n. 103, 88 n. 104, 130,24 n. 131,25 n. 132,25 n. 134,
89,91 n. 121,92, 92 n. 127, 94 n. 25 n. 135,26,26 n. 136,26 n. 139,26
139,96 n. 150,99, 100,100 n. 160, n. 140, 27 n. 141,27 n. 142, 27 n.
296 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

143.27 n. 144,28,28 n. 145,28 n. 152 n. 26,152 n. 27,152 n. 28,153

146.28 n. 147,29 n. 149, 34, 35 n. n. 29, 152 n. 33, 153 n. 34, 153 n.
178,37,37 n. 191,38,38 n. 194,38 35, 152 n. 36, 153 n. 37,154 n. 39,
n. 195, 38 n. 196, 39, 39 n. 198, 39 154 n. 40,154 n. 41,155,155 n.43,
n. 199,39 n. 200,42,48, 51,51 n. 155 n. 44,155 n. 45, 155 n. 46,155
245, 52, 52 n. 249, 52 n. 250, 52 n. n. 47, 155 n. 48, 155 n. 49, 156 n.
251, 52 n. 252, 54-5,57-8,66,71 50, 156 n. 51, 156 n. 52, 156 n. 53,
n. 7, 72-3, 73 n. 12, 73 n. 13, 73 n. 156 n. 54,157 n. 55, 157 n. 56,164,
15, 73 n. 16, 73 n. 17, 73 n. 18,74, 167,167 n. 105, 171, 175, 175 n.
74 n. 19,74 n. 21,74 n. 22,74n. 23, 142, 175 n. 143, 175 n. 145, 176,
74 n. 24,75,75 n. 26,75 n. 27,75 n. 176 n. 147, 176 n. 148, 176 n. 149,
28, 75 n. 31, 75 n. 36, 76,76 n. 33, 176 n. 150,177,177 n. 153, 177 n.
76 n. 34,76 n. 36,76 n. 37,76 n. 38, 154, 177 n. 155, 177 n. 156, 177 n.
77, 77 n. 41, 77 n. 42, 78, 78 n. 44, 157, 177 n. 158, 177 n. 159, 177 n.
78 n. 46,78 n. 47,78 n. 48,78 n. 49, 160, 178, 178 n. 161, 178 n. 162,
78 n. 50,78 n. 51,79 n. 53,79 n. 54, 178 n. 163,179 n. 164, 179 n. 165,
79 n. 55,79 n. 56,79 n. 58,80,80 n. 180, 183-5, 185 n. 196, 185 n. 198,
59.80 n. 60,80 n. 61,80 n. 62,80 n. 186, 186 n. 200, 186 n. 201, 187,
63.81 n. 64,81 n. 65,81 n. 66,81 . 187 n. 203,196,208,220,234,236,
68, 81 n. 69, 82, 82 n. 70, 82 n. 72, 236 n. 393,236 n. 394,237 n. 395,
82 n. 73,82 n. 75,83,83 n. 80,83 n. 237 n. 397,238 n. 399, 239,239 n.
81,84 n. 82, 84 n. 83, 84 n. 85, 85, 408,239 n. 413,240, 240 n. 414,
85 n. 86,85 n. 87,85 n. 88,85 n. 89, 240 n. 418, 240 n. 419,240 n. 420,
85 n. 90, 85 n. 91, 86, 86 n. 94, 86 241, 241 n. 422,241 n. 423, 242,
n. 95, 86 n. 97, 86 n. 93, 87, 87 n. 242 n. 426,242 n. 427,242 n. 428,
100, 87 n. 101,88, 88 n. 104, 88 n. 242 n. 429,242 n. 430,242 n. 431,
105, 88 n. 106, 88 n. 107, 89, 89 n. 242 n. 432, 242 n. 433,243, 243 n.
108, 90, 90 n. 115,91 n. 117,91 n. 434, 243 n. 435,243 n. 436,243 n.
118,91 n. 119,91 n. 120,99 n. 121, 437, 244, 244 n. 438,244 n. 440,
92, 92 n. 125,93 n. 132,96 n. 152, 244 n. 441, 245,245 n. 442, 253,
100, 100 n. 161,100 n. 162, 125 n. 253 n. 473,255-8
271, 131-2, 132 n. 297,132 n. 293, Plutarch, 70 n. 1,90, 90 n. 113, 129 n.
134, 135 n. 314,136 n.316, 136 n. 290, 153 n. 31, 181-2, 182 n. 179
319, 136 n. 320,136 n. 321, 136 n. Plutarch of Athens, 258
322, 136 n. 323, 137 n. 324, 137 n. point, 56, 63, 85 n. 92, 86, 86 n. 93, 92
325, 137 n. 326, 137 n. 329, 138, n. 127, 91-3, 96, 96 n. 150, 101,
138 n. 330, 139, 139 n. 335, 139 n. 108, 109, 113, 118, 120, 125, 128,
336, 140, 140 n. 337, 140 n. 338, 131, 132, 142, 155, 184, 205,222,
140 n. 339, 140 n. 340, 141, 141 n. 228, 229,230 n. 371,237-8,238
341, 142, 146, 146 n. 1, 146 n. 2, n. 399,239,246, 250-1,251 n.
146 n. 3, 147, 147 n. 4, 147 n. 5, 466, 252-3, 256-7,260
147 n. 7, 147 n. 8, 148, 148 n. 9, Pollot, A., 59, 59 n. 278
148 n. 10,148 n. 11,149,149 n. 14, Porphyry, 6 n. 28, 6 n. 29, 9, 20,29 n.
149n. 15, 150,150 n. 16,150 n. 17, 154,81 n. 66, 111, 114 n. 211, 132
150 n. 18,150 n. 18,151 n. 22,152, n. 297, 142, 146 n. 1,180 n. 170,
 Index 297

179, 182 n. 181, 182 n. 183, 183, 137,94 n. 142,96 n. 150,100 n.

183 n. 189, 184 n. 194, 247 n. 450, 160,106, 109, 111, 111 n .202, 112
258 n. 205, 114, 114 n. 211,117 n. 228,
position, 5 ,1 3,39,47,86 n. 93,93,172, 124 n. 266, 125,125 n. 268, 126 n.
175, 177, 186, 190,210, 234, 236, 273, 128, 128 n. 287, 129 n. 288,
247 130, 131 n. 294,137 n. 394, 141, n.
positivity, 8, 50, 342, 142, 142 n. 343, 143 n. 351,
possibility, 3,4, 6, 8-9, 35,42, 52,67- 143 n. 352, 146 n. 1, 148 n. 10,151
8,75,99, 111, 116n.220,120,138- n. 23,152, 152 n. 25,153, 153 n.
9,154,163,167,171,185,192,196, 30, 164, 167,171, 179-80, 180 n.
200-1,213,222,224,247,253,255 167,180 n. 168,180 n. 170, 180 n.
postulate (aitema), 224-5, 225 n. 328 171, 180 n. 172,182 n. 177, 182 n,
potency, 3 ,2 1 ,2 6 ,2 8 ,3 7 , 81,139,143- 180,183, 183 n. 186, 183 n. 186,
4, 147 n. 5, 157, 175, 186 183 n. 190, 184,184 n. 193,184 n.
—negative potency, 8, 28 194,207 n. 283,208,215 n. 311,
potentiality, 4 -5 ,7 ,9 ,1 1 ,2 6 ,2 8 ,3 6 ,4 2 , 225,225 n. 346,226, 234, 234 n.
60,67,67 n. 305,90-1,122, 136-7, 386,234 n. 387,235 n. 388,236 n.
139-41, 143, 148, 154, 185-6,213, 391, 237 n. 396,237 n. 398,238 n.
238, 240-1,249,255,257 400.238 n. 402,238 n. 403, 238 n.
praxis, 212 404.239 n. 406,239 n. 409, 239 n.
predicate, 3-4, 6-8, 12, 22-26, 29,43, 410,245, 245 n. 444,246 n. 445,
51-2, 55, 60, 64,71,76, 78,81-2, 246 n. 446,247,247 n. 448,247 n.
106, 140, 242, 252 449, 247 n. 450,248 n. 452,249 n.
principle 453,249 n. 454,249 n. 455, 249 n.
—o f being, 43, 52, 75-7, 131, 167, 456, 249 n. 457,450,450 n. 458,
237 251,251 n. 465,251 n.467,251 n.
— limiting principle (horizon), 26,93 468, 252, 252 n. 469, 253, 253 n.
—o f number, 76,98,93,253 474, 253 n. 475, 256-8, 260
—o f otherness, 2 ,6 , 11,27, 83 n. 80, production, 11 n. 61, 28, 33-4, 38 n.
77,120, 142,238, 245-6 197,47,82, 113,119,141,143,147
—productive principle, 9, 143 n. 8,157,180,198,213-15,218,222-
—o f sameness, 77, 140 3, 228 n. 362, 232
privation (steresis), 4, 6-9, 17, 24- —kinematic production of a
5,27-8,40-1,63 n. 289, 76, 138, geometrical figure, 85-8, 185,222-
143-4, 144 n. 354 3,232, 229,245-251
Proclus, 4 n. 17, 5 n. 26, 8 n. 40, 14 n. property, 13,34, 93, 101, 151,223 n.
76, 23,23 n. 124, 24,25 n. 132, 338,225,229
37, 37 n. 189, 39, 39 n. 201,42 n. —accidental, 11
216, 55, 57,70 n. 2, 72, 75, 75 n. —essential, 11
27, 75 n. 29, 76 n. 33, 77, 77 n. 40, proof, 40-1,44,105, 111,111 n. 200,
77 n. 41, 79 n. 58, 83 n. 77, 85, 85 181, 184,213,232,235
n. 92,86 n. 93,91 n. 121,92, 92 n. —as apodeixis, 225, 225 n. 347,205
122, 92 n. 124, 92 n. 125, 92 n. proportion, 25, 94-5, 108 n. 188, 117,
126, 92 n. 128,93 n. 131,93 n 117 n. 228, 125-6, 141
134, 93 n. 135,93 n. 136,93 n. purpose, 4 ,22,188,230,248,
298 Matter, Imagination and Geometry

—as telos, 35, 213,216-7 — “from which”, ex hoy , 4

Pythagoras, 26 n. 138 —“into which”, eis ho, 4,242
Pythagoreans, 26,36, 70, 77, 77 n. 41, res, 33 , 48 , 64 , 66 , 105,201 n. 262
89-90,93,125,143 n. 352,251 — res extensa, 30, 49 , 50, 62 , 68 , 117,
123. 126- 7, 132, 143, 166, 198, 200 ,
quality, qualities, 6 ,9 ,1 2 ,1 4 , 19,24,31, 205, 209- 10, 216- 7, 229,231
40, 72,114 n. 210, 118, 133,143 n. — res cogitans, 30 , 44 , 50, 62 , 68, 113,
353, 159, 190,223,237,241 117. 123. 126- 7 , 132, 143, 166, 198,
—bodily, 16 205, 207, 215, 216 , 229,231
—elementary 2 n. 2 “Regulae”, 15, 106- 7 , 115 n. 219 , 124,
—primary, 16 157- 8, 189-90, 190 n. 220 , 191-2 ,
—secondary, 16 201 n. 262 , 205-7
quantity, 9,15 n. 80,16,16 n. 89,17,29, rest (stasis), 240,242
35-6,49,55,49 n, 238, 73, 86,94,
99,107,113,114 n. 210, 121 n.245, sameness, the same (tayton), 10, 12, 16,
123, 143 n. 353,202,210,228 25 -6 , 37, 52, 77- 80, 94 , 138, 140,
quidditas, 17 142, 146- 8, 152-3 , 157, 238-41 , 243,
245 , 251,255
ratio, 70 n. 6,91,94-5, 157 n. 57, 158 scholasticism, 17, 31,40
n. 62, 194 n. 233,212,222 n. 332 science, 2 ,4 n. 17, 5, 12, 14, 16, 19,
reality, 17-19,29-30,41-2,49 n. 238, 35-6,53 n. 254, 55, 57, 59, 70,70 n.
64, 80 n. 62, 98,104,130,136,161 1, 71,73 n. 12, 83, 91 , 94, 97 , 103-
n. 78,165,165 n. 97,165 n. 99, 166, 7,107 n. 135, 108,108 n. 190, 109-
174, 176, 194,203,206, 231,255, 10, 112-3 , 116-7 , 119-22 , 124, 127,
259-60 131, 152, 161, 184-5 , 195, 201 , 204 ,
—physical reality, 117-8,150 209- 10, 213 , 213 n. 305 , 204 , 221 ,
reason, 14-5, 17, 30,35 n. 178,43-4, 224 -6 , 228 -9 , 235 , 245 -6 , 250 , 252 ,
46,50,61 n. 284,63,72,77,97,101, 255-6 , 258-60
103-4,106,114,121,123, 125, 146, self-awareness, 30 , 43 , 45 , 104, 170,
157-8,160,162,167,168,171-2,176 216 -7 , 222 ,
n. 151,184-5,189-90,190 n. 22,191, self-causation, 42,255
191 n. 223, 193-4, 194 n. 233, 194 sense-perception, sensation
n. 234,195-6,196 n. 243,197-8,200, (aisthesis), 21 , 33 , 93 , 176 n.
202,203 n. 273,204-5,208-10,216- 151, 177, 177 n. 157, 180 n. 170,
22,222 n. 332,232-3,244,246,251, 181, 183, 187 n. 206 , 258 , 260
253,258-60 separability, separable (khoriston), 3,
receptivity, 9, 143 5
reflectivity, 10-1, 11 n. 61, 167, 169-71, Sextus Empiricus, 75 n. 27 , 79 n. 53,
177, 196,242,258 81 n. 66,174
relation, 3 ,4 n. 17,7-8,12, 19,23,25, shape, 15, 15 n. 33 , 16,16 n. 37 , 18 n.
37,44-5,60, 75, 81, 81 n. 68, 92 n. 97 , 33 n., 108 n. 188, 169, 72 , 113,
122,94-5,106-7, 107 n. 185,117-8, 127, 132, 141-2 , 157, 179, 181-2 ,
122-8,140-1, 192,204 n. 275,205, 187, 189, 198- 9 , 220 , 227 - 8, 234 ,
209,212 n. 301,229,236 239 , 246 , 248 , 250,253
—of equivalence, 30 —as morphe, 136,237
 Index 299

simplicity, 2, 25,29, 30,42 n. 216, 60, substance

106, 115, 126, 130, 159, 170,223, —corporeal, 13, 18,18 n. 97, 117,
246, 249 188
Simplicius, 9 ,6 n. 28,6 n. 29, 8 n. 40, —created, 33, 170-1, 222, 232
38 n. 196,70 n. 4,72 n. 10,76 n. 33, —and essence, 58,108,127
81 n. 64,81 n. 66, 94 n. 138, 129, —extended, 15,29, 50,59, 194,
180 n. 168, 183 260
size, 15 n. 83, 18 n. 97, 19 n. 97, 49 n. —finite, 29,29 n. 129, 30-34, 36, 39-
238,94-5,126,187 n. 206,190,202, 42,48-9, 58-60, 62,64-8, 98, 105,
210 155,166
soul (anima) (see also: mind), 11 n. 61, — immaterial, 33
18,43, 59,60 n. 281, 68, 78 n. 48, —knowledge of, 61 n. 285, 62
79 n. 54,85,104,110-1,114 n. 210, —notion of, 28, 31-2, 39,40, 58, 65,
115 n .2 1 3 ,129-31,136,139,147 n. 123
7, 155, 157 n. 57,167 n. 104, 171- —as oysia 2 n. 2, 3 n. 10,21 n. 110,4,
3, 175-6, 176 n. 151, 177,179,183 8,28, 73, 117,242
n. 137,188,190,192,199,203,206 —spiritual, thinking, 13,30,34,41,58-
n. 279,212,214,219,221,236,243 61,61 n. 284,62,66,157,159,161,
n. 436,244, 253 166-7, 188, 199, 207,215,258
space —as subject, 30 n. 154
—and corporeal substance, 13 Synesius, 182,182 n. 185
—empty, 49, 185-6 synthesis, 38,74, 82,92,110-2, 112 n.
—as extension, 13,209 206,115,139,147,147 n. 8,150,191,
—idea of, 13 255
— imaginary, 49, 51,202,217, 233 Syrianus, 73 n. 14,73 n. 17,77 n. 41,142
—real, 51, 185, 202,252 n. 349,151 n. 24, 171, 179, 180 n.
Spinoza, 30 n. 158, 31 n. 163, 32, 32 168, 181 n. 176, 183-4, 184 n. 190,
n. 165, 35 n. 178, 59, 59 n. 780,60 234,234 n. 285,235 n. 389, 236 n.
n. 781,65,65 n. 705,110, 146 n. 390,246 n. 447,248,248 n. 451,258,
78,165 n. 97,165 n .9 9 ,171 n. 114, 260
222 n. 332
Stampioen, 124 n. 265 telos, 35, 146, 155, 213,216, 241-2
status movendi, 241 Thales, 83 n. 78
Suarez, F., 17,17 n. 90,18,40 n. 206,63 Themistius, 70 n. 3,92 n. 125, 137 n.
n. 291 324, 146 n. 2,156 n. 54, 186 n. 202
subject, 187 n. 206,225 n. 305,227 n. 359,
— finite, 113 243 n. 436
—and predicate, 51 Theophrastus, 70 n. 4,225 n. 345
—and substrate ([hypokeimenon), 3,53, thing,
21 n. 110, 79 n. 34, 135-6 —as ti, 4
subjectivity —as tode ti, 3
—finite, 34, 103,110,164,214-7, thinking (see: discursive reasoning or
231 thinking, dianoia, intellect, noys, and
— infinite, 47, 113,132,211,214-7, spiritual or thinking substance)
221 time, 10,20-1,85,89,124,131,139,150,
300 Maller, Imagination and Geometry

155,239, 257 Vegetius, 121 n. 250

Toletus, 143 n. 253 verum factum principle, 210-3, 222,
trajectory, 228,252 229, 259
transcendence, 49, 62, 216 via negativa, 22-4, 46
truth, 6, 30, 34, 48, 56, 58,60, 65,68, via positiva, 23
103-22,162-3,168,170-1,194,196, Vico, G , 211 n. 296
199,203-4,212-3,220,231 Ville-Bressieu, E. de, 122 n. 251
Voetius, G , 117 n. 226, 222 n. 333
unit (monas), 55 n. 262, 77, 89 Vorstius, A., 55 n. 265, 113 n. 207
— in number (numeric unit), 77
unity, 4, 10, 12, 15-7, 2 3 ,25,43, 72, 74- Walter of Brugge, 231 n. 376
8, 78 n.48, 79-80, 80 n. 58, 82-3, 83 whole, 11,19-21,35 n. 178,37-41, 50,
n. 80, 86, 88-9, 90 n. 113, 91,99 n. 68,77-8,97,98,99 n. 158,100,102,
158, 108 n. 188,99 n. 138, 136-9, 122, 149-50, 152, 196,235,238,
146-7, 147 n. 8, 148-55, 170, 174, 244-5,251-2, 256
177,184, 187 n. 206,191,228,235, — holon, 35
238-9,241,245, 248,255-6 Wittgenstein, L., 169 n. 110,173 n.
unlimited, 9, 11, 26, 37,40 n. 206, 76, 133
80, 80 n. 58, 81, 88, 90 n. 113, 92,
122, 125, 142-3, 143 n. 352, 147, Xenocrates, 73 n. 14,73 n. 17, 79 n. 54,
180,204,215,230,231 n. 376,238- 89,92,92 n. 127, 134
9,252-3, 255
Zeno, 3 n. 2, 92 n. 127
Vatier, A., 161 n. 78