Monetary systems

Monetary systems
Julia M. Puaschunder*

The New School, Department of Economics, Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis,
6 East 16th Street, 9rd floor 89, New York, New York 10003, USA,
[email protected], http://juliampuaschunder.com/

Columbia University, Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 116th Street Broadway, New York,
New York 10027, USA, [email protected],
http://blogs.cuit.columbia.edu/jmp2265/

*
The author thanks Professor Willi Semmler for most excellent lectures on ‘International
Finance’ during Fall 2019. The author declares no conflict of interest. All omissions, errors
and misunderstandings in this piece are solely the author’s.
 Monetary systems

Abstract
Throughout modern international finance, different monetary regimes existed. International
monetary arrangements initially arose from the need to provide international trade with easy
means of settling trans-border payments (Semmler, 2019). For centuries, both domestic and
international trade was carried out using gold and silver (Semmler, 2019). The Gold standard
during the Interwar Period since 1870, the Bretton Woods system and the following Euro
currency introduction. This essay summarizing the differences between the three Monetary
and currency systems: Gold standard, Bretton Woods and Euro-System and highlights the
success and failures of the different approaches to guide monetary matters throughout history.
 Monetary systems

1. Introduction
Money has different forms and faces.1 From precious gold, silver and copper coins to
paper claims on gold and finally fiat money guaranteed by a sovereign in the 19 th century
emerged first the Gold standard period since 1870, which featured a stable peg and exchange
rate of international currencies to gold, later on the dollar and pound were starting to take over
that role, while stably being pegged to gold. The banking crisis of the Great Depression
during the prolonged crisis in the interwar period and the success of the Gold standard being
seen as highly controversial and unsuccessful attempts to restore the gold standard led to the
Bretton Woods system (Fisher, 1933; Galbraith; Kindleberger & Alibar, 2006; Minsky). The
Bretton Woods system featured a fixed exchange rate system of the USD (=United States
Dollar) and gold as well as the GBP (=Great Britain Pound) to gold. Both currencies were
meant to be fully convertible to gold at all time, which created problems of feasibility and
current account deficits for the monetary authority countries United States and Great Britain.
The European Monetary Union (EMU) was created in 1978 when all back-then European
Union-predecessor members joined and Britain followed in 1990. The EMU started out with
the creation of the so-called snake within a tunnel, a construct to have currency fluctuations
ranging only between a margin of +/- 2.25 percent and the central bank intervening when
currency fluctuations move beyond the set limited bandwith. From the European Currency
Union featuring the European Currency Unit (ECU) a fictitious banking currency, the
European Union incepted the Euro as single fiat payment method in most economically
developed European Union (EU) member states.
The current system in place is a mixture of systems, ranging from groups of
economies that peg their exchange rates to each other, to countries whose exchange rates are
determined primarily by economic forces, with a wide range of manged floaters’ in between
(Semmler, 2019).
The paper summarizes the differences between the three major monetary and currency
systems: Gold standard, Bretton Woods and Euro-System highlighting the differences and
success and failures of these historically grown, most important monetary regimes.

2. Monetary regimes
2.1 Gold standard and Interwar Period
In Great Britain emerged from the Peel’s Act in 1819, the gold standard was
significant for gold and silver coexisting but bank notes circulated alongside. Gold as a
medium of exchange was too costly (less than 100% coverage) and too precious.

1
The functions of money are being a medium of exchange, balance of account, measure and store of
value, international money and most recently crypto currency side market.
 Monetary systems

The Gold standard evolved out of the variety of commodity-money standards that
emerged before the development of paper money and fractional reserve banking. The
predecessor was the Latin Monetary Union, in wich Belgium, France, Italy, Switzerland and
Greece harmonized their silver coinage on a common basis (Eichengreen, 1996). Starting in
1870, from 1879 to 1914 the bimetallism was abandoned (Eichengreen, 1996). Central banks
were created following the goal to defend the exchange rate with gold as the underlying
currency. First the fixed exchange rate was active in terms of the dollar to ounce and British
pound to ounce, later this shifted into an exchange rate between dollars and British pounds.
No discretionary monetary policy was possible (Semmler, in speech). The Gold standard is
often seen as an automatic mechanism that takes the money supply (monetary policy) out of
the hands of policy makers. The Gold standard gives rules priority to discretion (Kydland &
Prescott, 1977; Barro & Gordon, 1984). By the beginning of the twentieth century, there had
finally emerged a truly international system based on gold (Eichengreen, 1996). The
association of the gold standard with deflation dissolved and the dollar’s position was
solidified by passage of the Gold Standard Act of 1900 (Eichengreen, 1996). The political
period of peace in Europe from 1871 to 1913 facilitated the interational cooperation that was
needed to support the system.
The second phase of the Gold standard was the Interwar Period, which featured free
floating from 1919 to 1926 in the interwar period. Thereby most countries went off the Gold
standard except the US. Great Britain returned in 1919, whereby the British pound was first
under-valued and then over-valued. Countries like Germany that had been international
creditors were reduced to debtor status and became dependent on capital imports from the US
for the maintenance of external balance. Germany joined the gold standard after
hyperinflation in 1924, then France too. And among the first countries to reestablish gold
convertibility were those that had endured hyperinflation, such as Austria, Germany, Hungary
and Poland. New currencies were issues whose supplies were governed by the provisions of
gold-standard laws. Reserves were replenished by loans endorsed by the League of Nations.
Yet the growth of political and military tensions between Germany, France and Britain after
the war eroded the solidarity upon which financial cooperation has to be based (Eichengreen,
1996). Characterized by various periods of monetary instability and economic chaos (such as
the 1921-1923 hyperinflation of the Weimar Republic and the 1929-1933 Great Depression);
the interwar period saw fluctuating exchange rates as countries widely used “predatory”
depreciations of their currencies as a means of gaining advantage in the world export market.
Attempts were made to restore the gold standard, but participants faced various domestic
problems and lacked the political will to “follow the rules of the game.” The result for
international trade and investment was profoundly detrimental. The interwar gold standard
resurrected in the second half of the 1920s with labor and commodity markets lacking
traditional flexibility. The new system could therefore not accommodate shocks. In the
interwar period precious metal became an essential resource for purchasing abroad the
supplies needed to fuel war preparations. With gold market arbitrage disrupted, exchange
rates began to float. Of all major currencies, only the dollare remained freely convertible into
gold. Central banks did not intervene in foreign-exchange markets and therefore the first half
of the 1920s provides a relatively clean example of a floating exchange rate regime
(Eichengreen, 1996).
The weak gold standard period between 1927 to 1931 weakened gold as reserve
currency for the dollar and pound. Britain – with low stock of gold – suspended 1931
convertibility with the Sterling floating.
 Monetary systems

The third period of managed float from 1931 to 1939 during the Great Depression
featured competitive devaluation of currencies, decline of world trade, a US embargo on gold
export in 1933 and finally the collapse of the gold standard. By 1932, the international
monetary system featured three blocs: The residual gold standard countries led by the US, the
sterling area led by Britain with countries pegged to the pound sterline and Central and
Eastern European countries led by Germany, where exchange control prevailed.
Advantages of the gold standard are the function as an automatic stabilizer of the
balance of payment. The Hume mechanism is a self-correcting mechanism through outflow
and inflow of gold, which allows inflation rate and export competitiveness adjustments.
Perhaps the most remarkable feature of the model remains its durability – developed in the
eighteenth century, it remains the dominant approach to thinking about the gold standard
today (Eichengreen, 1996). Another cornerstone of the prewar gold standard was the priority
attached by governments to maintaining convertibility. In the countries at the center of the
system – Britain, France and Germany – there was commitment that officials would
ultimately do what was necessary to defend the central bank’s gold reserve and maintain the
convertibility of the currency (Eichengreen, 1996). Central banks therefore followed the
market, adjusting bank rates to track market interest rates.
The gold standard lasted less than fourty years from 1879 to 1914 as the success of the
Gold standard remains highly controversial. The one-target-focus of the central bank to
manage exchange rates through gold is seen critical amidst inflation and unemployment
fluctuations during the time the Gold standard was practiced. Therefore, today central banks
pursue multiple targets. With the liberalization of capital markets and cross-border financial
investment and trade, gold flows are only a fraction of trade flows and balance of payments
positions. The net capital movements are larger than trade balances. Reaction of capital
flows to financial market returns underline the role of the interest rates and discount rates for
the stability of economies. Adjustment mechanisms create huge fluctuation in unemployment
and deflationary periods. There is a conflict of gold being a reserve and serving other
functions.2 The change of financial centers and rise of other reserves held in the shift from
gold to US dollar and British pound took away the power of gold. 19 th century globalization
has leveraged capital flows more welfare enhancing than trade flows, yet since the 1970s
capital flows are less welfare enhancing.
During the Great Depression, asset and equity prices fell after 1929, leading to a home
and agriculture price fall. With the price fall occurred a fall of farmers’ revenues. Due to
fixed nominal debt pament and real interest rate rising (Fisher effect) banks had large loan
losses. Central banks then changed reserve holdings towards gold in a run into gold, leading
to a giving up of the gold standard and reserves being run down. The expected depreciation
of the currency triggered then capital flights and put pressure on the banks’ liability side
during banks runs, which caused insolvency of US banks. Banks closed in Austria and
Germany during similar financial crises to avoid banks as magnifiers of the crisis in the
economy (Semmler, 2019).

2
BoP=BoT+Change of Reserves, whereby BoP=Balance of Payments, BoT=Balance of Trade
 Monetary systems

Comparing to post-war periods, the gold standard period is marked by lower and
variable growth, little inflation, and lower monetary supply growth. Benefits of the gold
standard include that money supply is strictly determined by the stock of gold, which
increases credibility of monetary policy and maintains long run price stability (hyperinflation
is almost impossible). The price-specie-flow mechanism automatically regulates the balance
of payment for each country. It does not require a particular country to be at the center,
avoiding conflicts about which country it should be.
Major drawback in the gold standard was that this regime required a rigid monetary
rule and a fixed exchange rate regime. By the Hume mechanism, a trade deficit caused a
shrinking money supply, while a surplus meant an expanding money supply. Both processes
act to equilibrate trade imbalances (Semmler, 2019). Countries on gold standard
circumvented the tight theoretical link between gold tenders and sales at the central bank,
trade balances and changes in the nonetary supply. In reality only four countries (England,
Germany, France and the United States) maintained a pure gold standard in the sense that
money circulating internally took the form of gold coin. And even in those four countries,
adherence to the gold standard was tempered. Devices were needed for encourining gold
inflows and discouraging outflows such as central banks extending interest-free loans to gold
importers to encourage inflows. Gold physically had to be moved from one central bank to
another. Those with multiple branches, like the Bank of France and the German Reichsbank,
could obtain gold by purchasing it at branches near the border or at a port, reducing transition
time and transportation costs. They could discourage gold exports by redeeming their notes
only at central office. They could raise the buying and selling price for gold bars or redeem
notes only for worn and clipped gold coins. Profitability of central banks became an issue, as
if the central bank set the discount rate above market interest rates, it might find itself without
business. Another consideration was that raising interest rates to stem gold outflows might
depress the economy. Interest rate hikes increase the cost of financing investments and
discourage the accumulation of inventories. Finally, central banks hesitated to raise interest
rates because this would increase the cost to the government of servicing its debt
(Eichengreen, 1996). Gold standard implies favoring rules over discretion. Domestic money
supply is largely a function of external balance and there is little room for monetary policy.
This makes the economy vulnerable to macroeconomic shocks; problems like unemployment
and economic distress tends to persist. The total supply of gold depends on discovery of gold
mines (which is usually random). The growth of international trade tends to be hampered by
the limited growth of liquidity. Since the total world reserve of gold is limited, the total
money supply is also limited, an economy under gold standard will be constantly subjects to
deflation problems. Another limitation of the gold standard was the inability to anticipate and
moderate predictable cycles. For this, central bank rates had to lead market rates rather than
follow them. The harmonization of policies throughout a compound of countries yet was
difficult in turbulent times and there was often a conflict between domestic and international
financial stability. In terms of economy policy, Gold standard was prioritized over domestic
economic concerns (such as unemployment and inflation) because of the ignorance of
necessity of governmental intervention.

2.2 The Bretton Woods System

The evolution of a new monetary system after the First World War can be seen as a series of
ad hoc responses to international crises and system inadequacies (Semmler, 2019). The
Bretton Woods system was designed to void the competitive devaluations of the interwar
period by establishing a system of fixed exchange rates based on the US dollar’s link to gold
(Semmler, 2019). Partially emerged out of the European Payments Union that was formed to
deal with Europe’s trade and payments problems; the Bretton Woods System monetary
regime started in July 1944 and was the predominante monetary world order until 1971/3.
The IMF and central banks were thereby enacting global monetary and financial stability.
Based on the Keynes and White Plans, the Bretton Woods system was created in July
1944 in order to combat problems of competitive devaluations, volatility of floating exchange
rates and dual financial power centers of the US and UK. While the US argued for a fixed
exchange rates regime and the UK for an adjustable, the compromise was enacted by
following an adjustable peg. Countries were required to declare par values for their
currencies in terms of gold or a currency convertible into gold, which in practice meant the
dollar, and to hold their exchange rates within 1 percent of those levels (Eichengreen, 1996).
Par values could be changed to correct a fundamental disequilibrium by 10 percent following
consultations with the Fund but without its prior approval, by larger margins within the
approval of three-quarters of Fund voting power (Eichengreen, 1996). The Bretton Woods
system substantially improved the degree of exchange rate stability and dispatched payments
problems, permitting the undprecedented expansion of international trade and investment in
the postwar boom period (Eichengreen, 1996). A new institutional arrangement featured
(1) the creation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
(2) a fixed exchange rate (with only 1% fluctuations around par value allowed and
actual currency convertibility since 1958). These pegged exchange rates became adjustable,
subject to specific conditions known as fundamental disequilibrium.
(3) gold dollar parity (USD 35 per ounce of gold);
(4) and the IMF was created by funds provided by its member states, of which was
25% in gold, which were used as resources for lending to member states to keep parity and
special drawing rights (SDR) since 1967 based on the credit positions of its member states
(Eichengreen, 1996). The IMF was meant to monitor national economic policies and extend
balance-of-payments financing to countries at risk. Overall, capital controls were permitted to
limit international capital flows (Krugman & Obstfeld, 1977).
 Monetary systems

Problematic appears in the exchange rate stabilization the Triffin Paradox with the US
dollar being pegged to gold requiring the US to hold gold reserves. As the US provides the
world dollars, this leads to a constant trade deficit of the US with the world. The constant
claims of the world of dollars required to higher the gold reserves in Fort Knox. The US
current account deficit with world trade rising also created a constant and rising need for USD
of the world, but the US had no additional sources to acquire gold. An economic crash after
the Vietnam War and De Gaulle turning USD into gold led to the abandoning of the Bretton
Woods system for IMF control. Thereby the US could not guarantee dollar to gold
convertibility anymore. So convertilibity problems from the end of the 1960s on led to the
final collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971. While the pegging to the dollar was
strong as a principal reserve currency, it was weak in the growing negative dollar balance that
raised doubts in its actual convertibility and costs of supporting the dollar became high
(Eichengreen, 1996). In addition, the restoration of current-account convertibility limited the
possibility of tightening import licensing requirements (Eichengreen, 1996). Countries
became reluctant to devalue in response to external imbalances as they had to obtain fund
approval before changing and fear that this signal leaking to the market would change
outcomes for countries to a negative (Eichengreen, 1996). The willingness to devalue gave
rise to expectations that the authorities would value again and exposed currencies to attacks
by speculators (Eichengreen, 1996). Problems of imbalances include maintaining a fixed-
exchange-rate systems between convertible currencies require credit to finance imbalances.
Weak-currency countries tend to need more generous credits (from IMF) to offset speculative
outflows, while strong currency countries are not happy with it (because strong currency
countries are major contributors of the sIMF funds).
As long as foreigners were willing to hold dollars, the US could finance the large
balance of payments deficits by increasing holdings of official assets. Yet as the gold reserve
of the US declined over the entire period, the gold backing diminished leading to
convertibility and credibility problems. As a consequence to all the outlined deficiencies,
since 1972 the price of gold compared to the USD and GBP went up and fluctuated freely.
The end of the dollar-gold convertibility is associated with less volatility of inflation rates and
output compared to before. Parity changes, especially by the industrial countries at the center
of the system, were extraordinarily rare. Fixed exchange rates having no transaction cost
fluctuations may also invite too much risk taking without being penalized or facing risk in
markets (Summers in Semmler, 2019).
Since then, the IMF took over a leading role in monetary stabilization with special
drawing rights and as watch-dog in terms of the conditionality of loans (Burda & Wyblosz,
1997). IMF provides surveillance and monitoring of national institutions. Especially the IMF
research department focuses on developmental and global issues as well, such as inclusive
growth, stabilizing unemployment, wealth distribution, sustainable development, gender
equality, poverty alleviation and climate stabilization. Problems faced by the IMF research
department include the merit-based appointment of its staff members who need to convince
politically-appointed executives within the institution. Overall, the collapse of the Bretton
Woods system was due to the internal inconsistency of a system that required increasing
mounts of international reserves to be provided by the US, which were needed to be
convertible into gold by definition (Semmler, 2019). The large US balance of payment
deficits that emerged in the late 1960s out of that necessity created a dolar overhang of
official external liabilities which by far exceeded the American real gold assets (Semmler,
2019).

2.3 European Monetary Union

The end of the Bretton Woods system around 1971-3 led to the creation of the European
Monetary System (EMS) first called Snake, which lasted until September 1991 and later
became the European Monetary Union from 2000 on, which featured the Euro as a single
currency for most of the European Union member states.
From the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 to the Stability Pact in 1996 in Dublin and the
Amsterdam Treaties in 1997 the European single market project developed with a European
Exchange Rate Mechanism, leading to a 1999 to 2002 transition stage, in which there was the
introduction of a single currency within most of the EU countries since 1.1.2002 (Burda &
Wyblosz, 1997). The Euro featured advantages of saving on transaction and hedging costs of
highly integrated economies, avoid volatility of exchange rates and lower the dominance of
the Deutsche Bundesbank, the German central bank, within the European compound.
First the snake would imply that if a currency would move close to a set ceiling of
marginal fluctuation bandwith of +/- 2.25 percent, then the central bank would intervene in
speculations. This kind of fixed or pegged exchange rate regime was aimed at stabilization
between banks and monetary realignments system of currency fluctuations. In the emergence
of the Snake bank curreny fluctuations bandwith was broadened, which either led to flexible
exchange rate systems or a single currency monetary union (EMU) featuring a European
Currency Unit (ECU) and borrowing facilities among members of central banks’ consortia
that realigned decisions strategically. The monetary policies remained thereby independent.
Between 1999 and 2002, the EMU arraged monetary policies to once central bank, the
European Central Bank (ECB), within 12 member banks with a two pillar concept of
monetary decisions – to set the interest rate and determine the optimal quantity of money via
the exchange rate, now the Taylor rule of the interest rate. The fiscal policy was laid out in the
Maastricht treaty in 1992 with a deficit of lower than or equal to 3 percent of GDP and a
penalty mechanism for violations – although Germany violates this often themselves – and a
debt rato of lower than or equal 60 percent of GDP. Due to feasibility contraints, the debt
limit has been relaxed. Weak fiscal arrangements and no bail out clauses or fiscal union cause
for later sovereign debt crises in the EU, foremost Greece in 2009 and 2010.
Lastly, the EMU introduced the Euro as single currency in a common European Union
financial union in which the member states have given up monetary policy fixed exchanges
rates for the lead by the European central bank. The central banks thereby use a sterilization
policy through open market operations, such as in the case of money transfers between
countries.
The European Monetary System in practice features exchange rate stability and
convergence of the interest rate. A special feature is the closeness to the Deutsche
Bundesbank and countries joined borrowing the Bundesbank credibility (Burda & Wyblosz,
1997).
The Euro as a single currency within Europe was successful until the 2008 world
financial recession, when the US financial market meltdown led to the Euro crisis or
sovereign debt crisis pressuring Grexit – or exit of Greece – talks. Advantageous appears that
countries are allowed for a higher bankd of fluctuations; but the downside is that there can be
huge or lasting currency crisis such as in Greece.
 Monetary systems

To this day, problems remain – foremost EU crises such as the 2007/08 financial
market and banking crisis, the 2011/12 sovereign debt crisis and the 2015 policy crisis with
Greece debt repayment requirements. Today Italy as highly indebted country using the Euro
and Spain and Portugal being in debt as well. Financial stress tests indicate that there is a
doom loupe of governmental spread between interest rates – foremost between Italy and
Germany, but also Germany to Spain, Belgium, France and Greece. Amplification
mechanisms of EU banking and sovereign debt crises are externalities, contagion, fire sale of
asses and vicious cycles that are triggered by bad shocks that lead to a decline in net worth,
capital demand and prices to drop (Brunnermeier & Ohmke, 2013; Brunnermeier & Sannikov,
2010, 2011). If net worth declines, the refinancing and prices of assets in markets decline,
which makes loan financialization harder. When sovereign debt risks rise, within banks the
loans to firms decline as bank debt rises and equity risks increases. This leads to an overall
growth decline or contraction in the real economy, leading to a tax decline, which again raises
the sovereign debt risk. In this doom loup the bailout probability rises causing additional
stress to sovereign debt accumulation. The economy and crises can thereby become to a self-
fulfilling prophecy, in which there are overall two equilibria, one stable and one unstable (De
Grauwe, 2012; Draghi, 2012; Mittnik & Semmler, 2014; Schleer & Semmler, 2014). The
stable equilibrium economy features low interest rates, sustainable debt levels and no crisis; in
the unstable equilibrium, the probability of default rises, because of high debt, interest rate
rising, which raises the debt and default risk and adverse macro feedbacks set in. Low
moving debt crises follow that are still not resolved today (Arellano, 2008, 2014; Mittnik &
Semmler, 2013; Roch & Uhlig, 2014; Schleer & Semmler, 2014; Semmler & Proano, 2015;
Werning et al., 2013). The so-called “bad equilibrium” is an “equilibrium where you have
self-fulfilling expectations…that generate, that feed upon themselves, and generate adverse…
scenarios” (Draghi, 2012). While these negative developments in markets were not
mentioned or thought of in the original treaties to form the EMU or Euro; foremost central
banks are now needed to intervene to break these expectations. The default risk equilibrium
thereby is a slow moving debt crisis. In a so-called corridor stability (Keynes), small shocks
do not have any impact, the shock gets absorbed. Yet, if there is a big shock, these have
impacts on inventory, buffers and price stability. The role of central banks and the IMF is to
monitor and make stability predictions of different countries. After the crisis there appears a
divergence of different fiscal policy approaches in the EU, which appears problematic. Future
endeavors may construct a fiscal union or more aligned fiscal cooperation to combat debt
crises but also two equilibria problems of a stable and an unstable equilibrium in modern
economies.
Problematic appears the question if the Euro-area is an optimum currency area
(Mundell, 1961 in Semmler, 2019). Contemporary concerns are spillovers fron private to
sovereign debt in the EU. Mortage debt are rising in the EU in Italy, Spain, Ireland and
Greece (Stein, 2011, 2012 in Semmler, 2019). If leading to a debt explotion in the banking
system leading to loan losses, the banks become more constraint. Sovereign debt can thereby
trigger a banking crisis that leads to bail of banks and increases sovereign debt crisis in a self-
fulfilling prophecy or doom loup.

3. Discussion
The current system in place is a mixture of systems, ranging from groups of economies that
peg their exchange rates to each other (e.g., Argentinean Peso pegged to the USD), to
countries whose exchange rates are determined primarily by economic forces, with a wide
range of manged floaters’ in between (Semmler, 2019). The advantage of fixed and floating
exchange regimes are still debated to this day. Flexible exchange rates were declared
 Monetary systems

acceptable to the IMF members and gold was abandoned as an international reserve asset
(Yang, 2019). Floating (Flexible) ex rates – the ex rates are determined by the market forces
of demand and supply and no intervention is needed in general (Yang, 2019). Some countries
maintain quasi-fixed exchange rate regime in usually around a band of the fixed rate against
an anchoring currency such as US dollar or British Pound Sterling (Yang, 2019). Floating
exchange rates may subject countries to large and costly short-run swings in nominal and thus
real exchange rates. Fixing the exchange rate not only requires knowledge of the appropriate
real exchange rate, but also presupposes the ability to discern changes in underlying
fundamentals – real shocks to competitiveness and wealth, among other things – that would
require change sin the real exchange rate (Semmler, 2019). As economic policies of countries
have external effects on their neighbors, summitry is a rational economic response to this
problem and demonstrates the potential value of economic cooperation (Semmler, 2019).
 Monetary systems

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Eichengreen, B. (1996). Globalizing capital: A history of the International Monetary System.
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Krugman, P.R. & Obstfeld, M. (1977). International economics: Theory and policy. Boston,
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Semmler, W. (2019). International Finance class notes. New York: The New School for
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Yang, X. (2019). International Finance class notes. New York: The New School for Social
Research.