Modern Power System Protection:

Applications and Performance Analysis

June 6-10, 2011

Madison, WI
Course #L578

Willis F. Long, P.E., Ph.D.

Program Director
[email protected]

Department of Engineering Professional Development

432 North Lake Street ! Madison, Wisconsin 53706 ! 800-462-0876 ! epd.engr.wisc.edu
 Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis
Table of Contents

TAB 1 Introduction to the Course

Arun G. Phadke

TAB 2 Relaying Fundamentals

Stanley H. Horowitz

TAB 3 Transducers
Arun G. Phadke

TAB 4 Transient Phenomena

Arun G. Phadke

TAB 5 Interpreting Oscillograms I

John R. Boyle

TAB 6 Non-Pilot Line Protection of Transmission Lines I & II

Stanley H. Horowitz

TAB 7 Response of Distance Relays

Arun G. Phadke

TAB 8 Fault Location

Arun G. Phadke

TAB 9 Pilot Line Protection of Transmission Lines

Stanley H. Horowitz

TAB 10 Transformer Protection

John R. Boyle

Department of Engineering Professional Development

 Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis
Table of Contents

TAB 11 Transmission Station Design

Stanley H. Horowitz

TAB 12 Bus, Capacitor, and Reactor Protection

John R. Boyle

TAB 13 Rotating Machinery Protection

Stanley H. Horowitz

TAB 14 Power System Protection

Arun G. Phadke

TAB 15 Interpreting Oscillograms II

John R. Boyle

TAB 16 Introduction to Computer Relaying

Arun G. Phadke

TAB 17 Adaptive Protection Principles

Stanley H. Horowitz

TAB 18 Distribution System Protection

John R. Boyle

TAB 19 Operating Problems Affecting Human Safety

John R. Boyle

TAB 20 Distribution Transformer Excitation

John R. Boyle

TAB 21 Phasor Estimating and the Smart Grid

Arun G. Phadke
 Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis
Table of Contents

TAB 22 Blackouts: Causes and Countermeasures

Stanley H. Horowitz

TAB 23 More Intelligent Controls

Arun G. Phadke

TAB 24 Notebook Paper

Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

Instructor Biographical Information

Department of Engineering Professional Development

JOHN R. BOYLE
Principal Engineer

PSA/Power System Analysts

Signal Mountain, Tennessee

John Boyle is a graduate of Duke University and the University of Tennessee, a

Life Fellow of IEEE, past Chairman of the IEEE Power System Relaying
Committee, and is past Chairman of the Technical Sessions Improvement
Committee of the Technical Council of the Power Engineering Society. He is a
member of the Executive Committee of the Georgia Tech Relay Conference and
past president of the Chattanooga Chapter of the Tennessee Society of
Professional Engineers.

He retired from Tennessee Valley Authority in 1987 after 39 years of service.

During that time he was the Relay Protection Supervisor, Assistant Chief
Dispatcher, and Special Projects Manager in the Office of Power.

He is the author of more than a dozen papers dealing with transmission and
substation protection.
S. H. HOROWITZ

Consultant

Columbus, Ohio

Stan Horowitz is a graduate of the City College of New York, a member of the
National Academy of Engineering, Life Fellow of IEEE, past member of the IEEE
Executive Board, past chairman of the IEEE Power System Relaying Committee
and past chairman of CIGRE Committee 34-Protection and Control, editor-in-
chief of Computer Applications in Power.

He retired from American Electric Power Service Corporation in 1989 after 37

years of service. During that time he was the Relay Section Manager,
responsible for relay protection and control of transmission lines and generators;
Assistant Chief Electrical Engineer responsible for protection, communication,
metering, and electrical research; Assistant Division Manager responsible for
electrical aspects of nuclear and fossil power plants and Consulting Electrical
Engineer reporting to the Senior Vice-President of Electrical Engineering.

He has co-authored a textbook "Power System Relaying", authored over a dozen

technical papers covering system and generator protection and control. He was
editor of the first and second volumes of the IEEE Press Book on Protective
Relaying of Power Systems.
WILLIS F. LONG P.E.

Professor Emeritus

Department of Engineering Professional Development

and

Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering

University of Wisconsin-Madison

Dr. Long received his B.S. and M.S. degrees from the University of Toledo in
1957 and 1962. He was employed from 1957 to 1960 by Doehler-Jarvis
Division, National Lead Company, as Project Engineer. He was Instructor,
Electrical Engineering at the University of Toledo from 1962-1966. In 1966 he
was awarded an NSF Science Faculty Fellowship to attend the University of
Wisconsin-Madison and received the Ph.D. from that institution in 1970.

In 1969 Dr. Long joined the Hughes Aircraft Company Research Laboratories
in Malibu, California, as a Member of the Technical Staff of the High Voltage
Systems Program. He has been with the Department of Engineering,
University of Wisconsin-Extension (now Department of Engineering
Professional Development, University of Wisconsin-Madison) since 1973,
serving as Program Director, Electric Power Systems. He was Professor and
Chairman from 1980 until 1983.

In 1983, while on leave from the University of Wisconsin, Dr. Long joined
ASEA as Director of their Power Systems Center in New Berlin, Wisconsin. He
was responsible for technical and managerial activities at the Center, a new
facility for the analysis and simulation of integrated ac/dc power systems. He
returned to the University in July 1985. In 1992 he was on sabbatical leave at
the Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm, Sweden.

Dr. Long's principal research interests are in power electronic applications in

electric utility systems. He is a Life Fellow of IEEE; a member of CIGRE and
immediate past Secretary of Study Committee B4, HVDC and Power
Electronics; a registered Professional Engineer in Wisconsin; and is listed in
Who's Who in America, Who's Who in Engineering, and American Men and
Women in Science. In 1987 he received an Award for Excellence from
University of Wisconsin-Extension for the development of distance learning
education programs, and in 1992 he received the IEEE Educational Activities
Board Meritorious Achievement Award in Continuing Education. In 1996 he
received the UW College of Engineering's Ragnar E. Onstad Award for Service
to Society. He is a recipient of the 2004 Attwood Associate Award from the US
National Committee of CIGRE, the 2009 CIGRE Technical Committee Award,
and the 2010 CIGRE Distinguished Member designation. In 2008 he received
the Uno Lamm HVDC Award from the IEEE’s Power and Energy Society.
ARUN G. PHADKE

Professor Emeritus

Bradley Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

Blacksburg, Virginia

Dr. Phadke received his Ph.D. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He

has taught undergraduate and graduate courses in Electric Power
Engineering at Virginia Tech, conducting and directing research in the area of
power system analysis, protection and control with special emphasis on the
use of distributed microprocessor networks. In 1999 he was named
University Distinguished Professor of Electrical and Computer Engineering.

Dr. Phadke completed his undergraduate education in India in 1959. He

received an M.S. in Electric Power Engineering from the Illinois Institute of
Technology, Chicago in 1961, and his Ph.D. in Electric Power Engineering
from the University of Wisconsin in 1964. He was a System Engineer with
Allis-Chalmers from 1963-1967. He joined the faculty of the University of
Wisconsin, Madison in 1967 as an Assistant Professor. In 1969, he joined the
American Electric Power Service Corporation as a Staff Engineer. He became
a Consulting Engineer in the Computer Application Division of AEP in 1976.
He joined Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in 1982.

Dr. Phadke has taught short courses for practicing power engineers at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison since 1970, and also lectures at other
universities in the United States and abroad. He is past Chairman of the
Power System Relaying Committee of IEEE, and is past Chair of the Technical
Committee of USNC CIGRE. Dr. Phadke is a member of HKN, Tau Beta Pi,
Sigma Xi, and a Fellow of IEEE. He received a Prize Paper Award from the
U.S. National Committee of CIGRE in 1986. An earlier paper received the
Outstanding Paper Award of the Power System Relaying Committee in 1978.
In 1986 he was honored by the Edison Electric Institute as Power Engineering
Professor of the year. In 1987, Dr. Phadke received the Distinguished
Service Award from the College of Engineering, University of
Wisconsin-Madison. He also received the 1991 Outstanding Power
Engineering Educator award from IEEE Power Engineering Society. Dr.
Phadke was elected to the National Academy of Engineering in 1993. He
received the IEEE Herman Halprin Award for Transmission and Distribution
for 2000. In 2006 he was awarded an honorary doctorate from the Institut
National Polytechnique de Grenoble, France. In 2008 he received the
Benjamin Franklin Medal in Electrical Engineering.
 1
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 1
Introduction to the Course

Arun G. Phadke

Professor Emeritus
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Bradley Dept. of Elect. Engineering
Center For Power Engineering
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0111
 MODERN POWER SYSTEM PROTECTION

Applications and Performance Analysis

INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE

• Course Organization

• Assumptions regarding audience background

• Relaying from traditional to computer based

• Special attention to problem areas in relaying
• Field experiences and practical examples

1-1
• Course Organization

• Organization of Course Notes

• Text books
• Other source material

• Course Organization

• Traditional Protection Principles

• Relay input sources

• Transient phenomena important to relaying

• Line, Transformer, bus protections

• Rotating machine protection
• Substation protection design
• Response of distance relays to various
system conditions
• System protection concepts

1-2
• Course Organization

• Computer Relaying Concepts

• What is different

• Mathematical techniques

• Adaptive Relaying

• Course Organization

• Field Experiences

• Transients observed, DC offset, CT saturation

• Distribution System protection problems

• Line, Transformer, bus protection recordings

and problems

• System protection concepts

1-3
• Course Organization

• Testing of Protective Systems on a Simulator

ELEMENTS OF A
PROTECTION SYSTEM

Breaker Transducer

Relay

Battery

1-4
Modern Power System Protection: Applications

2
and Performance Analysis

TAB 2
Relaying Fundamentals

Stanley H. Horowitz

Consultant
3143 Griggsview Court
Columbus, OH 43221
 Fundamental References
Power System Relaying--Horowitz, Phadke
Art and Science of Protective Relaying--C.R. Mason
(Distributed by General Electric)
Applied Protective Relaying (distributed by ABB)
Protective Relaying for Electric Power Systems, Volumes I &II
-IEEE Press
Protective Relaying Systems- IEEE Standards Collection

2-1
Breaker-Insulating &/or cooling medium- oil, air, gas

2-2
Relays will perform correctly if the input signals agree with the setting of the
relay. The action may or may not be the desired system response.

2-3
The purpose of power system protection is to detect faults or abnormal operating
conditions.
In general, as faults occur, currents go up and voltages go down. Other changes
such as phase angle, harmonics and frequency may change and relay operating
principles may be based upon detecting these changes.
Differential relays operate on the theory that current in and out of equipment is
equal if no fault exists.
Distance relays measure the impedance to a fault.
Pilot relays provide a communication path between two terminals.

2-4
2-5
Relays will perform correctly if the input signals agree with the setting of the
relay. The action may or may not be the desired system response.

2-6
Note the difference between system reliability which is a term used by system planners and operators and relay reliability.
Selectivity is the major concern for relay reliability.
Speed-Instantaneous (not zero time);Time Delay (intentional); High Speed (>3cycles); Ultra High Speed (<4ms)
Primary vs Backup
Primary protection provides the fastest
clearing of a fault and removes the least system elements.
Backup protection may be slower and/or removes more elements than may be necessary

2-7
2-8
Contact status- !a" switches are normally open; !b" switches are normally
closed. (refers to position when relay is !on the shelf"}
Seal-in - isolates relay contact from trip current.
Time delay. Relay operating time is !instantaneous". Time is added with a timer.
Relays are designated by Standard Device Function Number; #e.g 50 is an
instantaneous relay, 51 is a time delay relay, 21 is an impedance relay, etc. See
Appendix.

2-9
Definition used by system operators and planners

2-10
System is reliably designed.
System security is stressed
when breakers are opened.

2-11
Relays are usually biased towards dependability because the system is robust
and must tolerate outages.
This concept changes when the system is stressed

2-12
Elements can be contacts of a relay or complete relay systems.
Combined circuit with electromechanical or solid state relays usually used only
by military and nuclear.
Digital relays may be more adaptable.

2-13
All elements must be encompassed by at least one zone. Good relaying practice
is to be sure important elements are included in two zones.
Zones must overlap.
Closed zone- all entry points are monitored. (differential, unit, absolutely
selective)
Open zone- degree of uncertainty,

2-14
2-15
Instantaneous-no intentional time delay
Time-delay-intentional delay. Can be internal or external.
High speed-50 ms or less.
Ultra High speed-not defined in standards-understood to be 1/4 cycle

2-16
Protection against a failed breaker. It is initiated by all relays that attempt to trip
the breaker. Connect to separate dc circuits. Inst. o/c relays determine that the
breaker has not interrupted the fault. Can supervise timer or be supervised by
timer.

2-17
Level Detector-simplest, fuse, overcurrent--pickup & time delay
Magnitude Comparison-compares ratio of operating quantities, not common for
transmission lines, used in hydro machines.

2-18
2-19
2-20
2-21
Plunger-type is instantaneous and operates on all harmonics,
including
dc. External timing device can be added.

2-22
Induction-disc requires two fluxes which can be derived from the same
current separated by an R-C circuit or a separate current or voltage input.
Only operates on ac and the two fluxes must be of the same frequency.
Time delay is obtained by adjusting the disc.

2-23
Note the abcissa is not current but a multiple of the current pickup. This
is done to make the relay characteristic universal, i.e. independent of the
specific relay.
The curves, however, are manufacturer specific.

2-24
Typical e-m relay for high speed relays.
Torque is developed by combinations of current and voltage which
determines the specific relay characteristics.
(see page 33)

2-25
The input current I is passed through the resistive shunt R, full-wave rectified and
filtered to remove the ripple and applied to a high gain amplifier A. The other
input of the summing amplifier is supplied with a reference voltage er. When the
input exceeds he reference setting, the amplifier output goes high. The timer can
provide immunity against spurious transient signals or can make the relay either
an instantaneous or a time delay overcurrent relay.

2-26
An electromechanical or electronic relay is actually an analog computer. It
accepts inputs, processes them to develop a torque or logic output. Modern
rugged, high performance digital computers can perform the same function. This
is done by sampling the analog signals and using an appropriate algorithm to
create suitable digital representations of the signals. This figure is a possible
configuration for a digiital relay.

2-27
Security of system is the actual operating configuration. Reclosing
restores system to normal configuration
Manual -from control device or SCADA
Automatic-High speed-within 1 sec.
Delayed-minutes
Interlocks-voltage, equipment,
Synchronizing-Full or Check

2-28
When one phase is opened in response to a single phase-to-ground fault,
the two healthy phases maintain synchronizing torque but also tend to
maintain the fault arc.
Shunt reactors may be used to extinguish the secondary arc.
Negative sequence is a concern

2-29
2-30
2-31
2-32
 !"#$$%&'$(%)($*)+,$-./-0.*$1/%),%/$

2-33
2-34
2-35
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

3
TAB 3
Transducers

Arun G. Phadke

Professor Emeritus
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Bradley Dept. of Elect. Engineering
Center For Power Engineering
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0111
 TRANSDUCERS

TRANSDUCERS

• Current Transformers
• Voltage Transformers

- Scale the signals for safety reasons

- Small size of protection and control
equipment
- Standards for ease of interchangeability

3-1
TRANSDUCERS

• Standard ratings
• CTs 5 amp and 1 amp secondary
• VTs 120 volts line-line, 69.3 line-neutral

TRANSDUCERS

CURRENT TRANSFORMERS

• Bushing type CTs

• inexpensive
• must be built in
• not possible with
hot tank breakers

• Stand-alone CTs
• more expensive
• higher accuracy

3-2
TRANSDUCERS

• Current Transformer Class Designations

• Examples

10 C 600
10 T 200
• Multi-ratio CTs

• Steady state errors not significant

for relaying applications

• Transient Errors of greatest concern

TRANSDUCERS

Current transformer performance (steady-state)

I1! Zl1! 1:n I2 Z l2

Equivalent
Zm! E 2 EL ZL
Circuit

!
Zm" n2 Zm
I1 I2
Z l2
I1!
I1 "
n
ZL Simplified
Zm Em EL
equivalent Circuit

3-3
TRANSDUCERS

I1 I2
Z l2 Current
Transformer
Zm Em ZL EL Phasor Diagram

Em

Zl2I2
El
I2
Im I1

TRANSDUCERS

Multi-Ratio Current Transformers

Increasing
Em Ratio

Im

3-4
TRANSDUCERS
I1 I2
Solving the non-linear Z l2
problem
Zm Em ZL EL
Let Z = ZL+Zl2
The current source I1 in parallel with Z can be replaced
by a Thevenin voltage source:
Z Non-linear
Em
Em
I 1Z
Im linear

linear Non-linear
Im

TRANSDUCERS

Some Standard CT ratios for M-R transformers

600:5 MR 1200:5 MR 2000:5 MR 3000:5 MR

50:5 100:5 300:5 300:5

100:5 200:5 400:5 500:5
150:5 300:5 500:5 800:5
200:5 400:5 800:5 1000:5
250:5 500:5 1100:5 1200:5
300:5 600:5 1200:5 1500:5
400:5 800:5 1500:5 2000:5
450:5 900:5 1600:5 2200:5
500:5 1000:5 2000:5 2500:5
600:5 1200:5 3000:5

3-5
TRANSDUCERS

Current transformer performance (steady-state)

I1 I2
Z l2 Assume linear Zm

Zm Em ZL EL I2 = I1 - Im
where Im = Em/Zm
• If Im is 0, there is no error of transformation,
and the CT is perfect.

• Smaller the voltage Em, smaller will be the

error current.
• If the CT works into a short circuit, it gives
its best performance.

TRANSDUCERS

Current transformer performance (steady-state)

I1 I2 The ratio correction
Z l2
factor R is defined as
Zm Em ZL EL
R = I1 /I2
The name-plate ratio of the CT should be
multiplied by R to obtain the actual CT ratio
achievable for that loading condition.

Although R could be complex, it is generally

assumed that it is real. It is always greater
than 1.

3-6
TRANSDUCERS

VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS

• Potential Transformers (two-winding)

• Capacitive voltage dividers

TRANSDUCERS
VOLTAGE TRANSFORMERS
• Two winding transformers
Similar to power transformers
• Capacitive Voltage Transformers

• Bushing type

• Stand alone type

3-7
TRANSDUCERS
• Equivalent Circuit and Steady State performance

C1
L T
Ld is the drain
C2 coil which blocks
ZF ZL power line carrier
signal.
Ld L and (C1+C2)
resonate at
C1 + C2 L T power
frequency

Eth ZF ZL 1
2#f =
L(C1+C2)

TRANSDUCERS
• The two-winding voltage transformer (PT)
has no significant steady state or transient
errors as far as relaying is concerned.
• The capacitive coupled voltage transformer (CVT)
has no significant steady state errors when the
inductance is tuned to (C1+C2).
• However, the tuning does not hold under
transient conditions, and transient errors of
the CVT need to be considered in relaying.
• Ferroresonance phenomena are important
for CVTs, and should be damped by a
properly designed ferroresonance suppression
circuit

3-8
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 4
Transient Phenomena

Arun G. Phadke

4
Professor Emeritus
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Bradley Dept. of Elect. Engineering
Center For Power Engineering
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0111
 TRANSIENT PHENOMENA

INTRODUCTION TO TRANSIENT PHENOMENA

AND RELAY PERFORMANCE

By

Arun Phadke

4-1
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA

Fault current dc offset:

e(t) = Emax sin (!t)

Then the steady state current is given by

E max
i ( t) " {sin( !t # % ), where
Z
X
Z " R 2 $ X 2 , and % " arctan
R

e(t)
i(t)
dc offset

&
Steady state Transient

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Current transformer saturation

I1' Zl1' 1:n I2 Z l2

Equivalent
Zm' E 2 EL ZL
Circuit

'
Zm" n2 Zm
I1 I2
Z l2
I1'
I1 "
n
ZL Simplified
Zm Em EL
equivalent Circuit

4-2
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Current transformer saturation

I1 I2
Z l2 Assume linear Zm

Primary current
Zm Em ZL EL with a dc offset:

i1(t) = Imax[cos(!t-&) - e-t/Tcos &] for t(0

= 0 for t<0

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Current transformer saturation

LaPlace transform can be used. Flux in the core

and the secondary current are given by (see
numerical example in Book) :

FOR A PRIMARY CURRENT OF

i1 = 147.24 e-99.5t - 141.4 cos(!t)
THE FLUX AND SECONDARY CURRENT ARE
) = - 0.7399 e-99.5t + 0.786 e-10t - 0.184 cos(!t - 1.3127)
i2 = 147.24 e-99.5t - 15.72 e-10t + 136.02 sin(!t - 1.3127)

4-3
 TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Current transformer saturation

Flux

Primary current Secondary current

CT PERFORMANCE CALCULATION

Z = rct + Zl= rct + rl + j!ll

I2
E2
rct rct Zl
Em Em
I1 Zl I1 Z
Im
Im

Mag Load linear Non-linear

Load voltage: E2 = Zl(I1-Im)=(rl+lld/dt)(i1-im)

4-4
 Flux, Currents, and load voltage in per unit Flux, Currents, and load voltage in per unit

4-5
 Flux, Currents, and load voltage in per unit Flux, Currents, and load voltage in per unit

4-6
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
DC offset near a generator

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Current transformer saturation

IMPORTANT ISSUES

Time to saturate
Effect of burden impedance
Effect of transformer core size

Reference: Transient Response of Current

Transformers, PSRC Report, 76-CH1130-4 PWR

4-7
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
CVT subsidence transient

C1
A fault occurs at L T
the high voltage
terminal and
C2
the voltage collapses. ZF ZL
The question is, what
does the relay see?
Ld

C1 + C2 L T

Eth ZF ZL

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
CVT subsidence transient
Consider the
C L equivalent circuit
obtained by
reflecting all
e'(t) Rc Lm Rb quantities on the
secondary side
of the ideal
transformer.
• The burden is assumed to be resistive for this
example.
• Rc is the core-loss component of the magnetizing
branch, and Lm is the magnetizing inductance.
• L and C are the tuning inductance and (C1+C2)
reflected on the secondary, and e'(t) is the Thevenin
voltage as seen on the secondary.

4-8
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
CVT subsidence transient
C L
e2'(t) The circuit is entirely linear,
Rc Lm Rb and hence can be solved by
e'(t)
using LaPlace Transform.

Let the source voltage be represented by

e'(t) = Emax cos(!t+&) for t( 0, and

e'(t) = 0 for t*0
Solving for e2'(t) , and assuming Rc = 1000, Rb = 2000, and
L = 1.33 H (See text book, Chapter 3), and &+"+,-.
e2'(t) = - 1.336Emax/ -250tsin(282.2t)
&+"+,-. specifies that the fault has occurred at voltage zero.

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
CVT subsidence transient

e'(t) e'(t)
e2'(t) e2'(t)

&+"+,-. &+"+0
Note that the subsidence transient is more dominant when
fault occurs at or near voltage zero. Also, a more complete
representation of the circuit components produces the
response shown in white for the case of &+"+,-.1
Subsidence transients are aperiodic and their zero crossings
are not related to the zero-crossings of the power frequency
voltage.

4-9
 TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Magnetizing Inrush currents

i(t)

e(t)

e(t)
2
2(t)
i(t)

Steady State

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
i(t)
Magnetizing Inrush currents

e(t)
remanance

e(t)
2
2(t) i(t)

t=0

4-10
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Magnetizing Inrush currents

0 3 2,

a n /a
1
Harmonic
3 =604 3 =904 3 =1204
2 0.705 0.424 0.171
3 0.352 0.000 0.086
4 0.070 0.085 0.017
5 0.070 0.000 0.017
. … … …
. … … …

4-11
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Ferroresonance
unstable
decreasing
capacitance
ec OR
increasing ec
voltage
e el e
el
el = ec + e inductive

capacitive

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Ferroresonance small increase
in source voltage

source voltage
ec

current
e el

el = ec + e capacitor
voltage

Transition between two stable points

4-12
 TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Ferroresonance

ec Unstable point effects

during transient discharge
in a capacitive voltage transformer
e el

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Arcing in capacitive circuits

Circuit breaker
opening at E
current zero

E
I

4-13
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Arcing in capacitive circuits

Circuit breaker
opening at E
current zero

•Circuit breaker arcing leaves medium ionized

•If the breaker is stressed, it could restrike

•Similar phenomena could occur due to arcing

ground faults

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Arcing in capacitive circuits

i = {E/s}/(sL+1/sC)
E 1/2 2
i = {E/(L/C) }{ !+/(s + ! 2 )}

2
e c = E { 1/s - s /(s + ! 2 )}
1/2
i(t) = {E/(L/C) }{sin !+t)

e (t) = E { 1 - cos !+t}

4-14
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Arcing in capacitive circuits
restrike

e source e
i

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Arcing in capacitive circuits 7e

3e
capacitor voltage

e source e
i

restrikes

4-15
TRANSIENT RECOVERY VOLTAGE
Superposition

complete circuit
I I

pre-opening opening

TRANSIENT RECOVERY VOLTAGE

Superposition
I

opening

-i
fault

e
breaker

4-16
TRANSIENT RECOVERY VOLTAGE
voltage across circuit breaker

i
fault

e
source
e
breaker

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Trapped charge oscillations

e line
e source
i

4-17
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Trapped charge oscillations
50 % compensation

X
l
= 2.0 X c Xc

e line
e source
i

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Trapped charge oscillations on transposed 3 phase line

3(X -X )
c1 c0

X c0

4-18
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Trapped charge oscillations on transposed 3 phase line

unequal pole opening

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Trapped charge oscillations on transposed 3 phase line

50 % compensation

3(X -X )
c1 c0

X c0

X = 2.0 X
l c1

4-19
TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Trapped charge oscillations on transposed 3 phase line

TRANSIENT PHENOMENA
Trapped charge oscillations on UNTRANSPOSED
3 phase line

4-20
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 5
Interpreting Oscillograms I

John R. Boyle

Principal Engineer
PSA/Power System Analysts
496 Pine Ridge Drive
Signal Mountain, TN 37377
5
 TRANSIENTS
•! AC and DC Saturation
•! Restrike
•! Switching Surge
•! Capacitor Switching
•! Ferroresonance
•! Overexcitation
•! Inrush Currents
•! Arcing Grounds

X Y Z
LINE 2 LINE 1
D C A X B
FAULT
OSC LINE CURRENT

BUS OSC
PT NEUTRAL
OSC

A-G FAULT
A
BUS PT

C
LINE CURRENT

C
DEAD TIME LINE
LOAD CURRENT
NEUTRAL CURRENT CHARGING

OFF OFF LINE 1

RECEIVED CARRIER ON OFF LINE 2
OFF

5-1
5-2
5-3
 RESTRIKE

CLEARED WITHIN THE

INTERRUPTER

RESTRIKE

5-4
5-5
5-6
 FERRORESONANCE

C1
L T

ZF ZL
C2

Ld SUPPRESSION CIRCUIT
SUPPLIED BY MANUFACTURE

105%
100%

EM

IM

5-7
5-8
5-9
5-10
5-11
 6
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 6
Non-Pilot Line Protection of Transmission Lines I & II

Stanley H. Horowitz

Consultant
3143 Griggsview Court
Columbus, OH 43221
Transmission line protection using local voltages and currents.

6-1
Offers opportunity to examine many fundamental relaying considerations that apply in one degree or another to all power
system equipment.

Transmission lines exposed to short circuits between phases or phase and ground.
Factors that must be considered are fault magnitude, coordination, directionality and zones of protection..

6-2
Coordination begins with protective device closest to fault and allows time for it to clear the fault..

Coordinate with relay pickup and time delay

The relay operating characteristics (time vs multiples of pick up) is manufacturer sensitive

6-3
 setting rules
Choose pickup
-phase relays--twice load, 1/3 minimum fault
-ground relays-no load concern-twice !normal
unbalance", 1/3 minimum fault.
Set time delay

6-4
 Select CT ratio to give 5.0 amps secondary at maximum load-95/5=19/1. Not a
standard ratio- use 20/1 (100/5)
2x95=190/20-9.5 amp use 10.0 amp tap
10.0 amp tap=200 primary amp pick up.
200/95 = 2.1 xpu
Minimum fault = 600/200=3xpu
No coordination required. Set lever at 1/2

6-5
Pu at R2 =10 a. @1/2/dial
For R1-Use same CT ratio,
set at 10 amps but longer.
Operating time at 1500 amps/ 200 7.5x pu = 0.25 sec (Fig. 4.5).
Add 0.3 sec = .55 sec
@1500/200 =7.5 x pu = time dial of 1.5

6-6
Application of time delay setting rules means the closer to the source the longer the time to clear and the greater the fault
current.
Instantaneous relays correct this for most of the line section.

Instantaneous relays must not overreach line section..

Set for 110-135% of stub fault depending on relay design..

6-7
Avoid overreaching end of line
Rb @ 135% max fault =1350 amps primary-1350/20 = 67.5 amps
Check against min and max fault
800/1350 -0.59 xpu
1500/1350=1.1xpu Do not us inst.
Rab—135%x1500=2025/20=101.25amp sec.
Ok but may be a problem with saturation.
Change CT ratio to 40/1-1000/40=0.49 ng
3000/40=1.48 xpu ok but must recalculate TDOC

6-8
Contrasted with single-quantity relays, directional relays are actuated from 2
different, independent, sources either current-current relays or current-voltage
relays.
Current-current- the fault current and a polarizing current
Current voltage= the fault current and a polarizing voltage.
The polarizing quantity is constant regardless of the direction of the fault.
Negative sequence units are applied when mutual effects can cause zero
sequence to lose directionality.
Readily available today in digital relays

6-9
For phase faults, the polarizing quantity is almost invariably the system voltage at the relay location.Can be bus or line
side.
For ground faults, the operating current is derived from the residual circuit of the phase CTs. Since this can be any phase it
is necessary to obtain a related voltage

6-10
Current Polarizing is obtained from the neutral of a wye-grounded/delta
transformer.
Use all neutrals in station to allow for transformer maintenance. CT ratios are
inverse of transformer rating.
An autotransformer is not always a suitable polarizing source since the direction
of current in the neutral can be up or down depending on the system parameters.
(See page 96)

6-11
There are two ways to utilize directional o/c elements
1-directional element controls the operation of the overcurrent element.
2-overcurrent element can operate but directional element supervises
its operation and the relay cannot operate if the fault is in the non-trip direction.

6-12
Referring again to the diagram, with the directional o/c design, if a fault occurs in
the non-trip direction (breaker 4) the o/c element can pick up from the
contribution in that direction. Only the directional element prevents tripping
Breaker 4. If breaker 4 opens before breaker 1 than the reversal of current
through 4 will cause a race between the o/c element opening ad the directional
element closing. If the directional element wins the race, there will be a false trip.
With the directional control design, the o/c element will not pick up for faults in the
non-trip direction.

6-13
Digital relays include voltage memory
so the problem can be solved easier.

6-14
Distribution systems are becoming very similar to transmission systems, i. e.,
distributed generation is resulting in the direction of power flow for a fault
difficulty in dispatching generation with IPP#s and NUG#s
Clearing a fault now depends on removing all generators

!Smart Grid" is the new buzz word.

6-15
Zf = E/ I = Apparent impedance seen b y the relay
Both System impedance and Distance Relay characteristic are plotted on the
same diagram.
As load changes characteristic circle changes. The larger the load, the smaller
the circle.
The relay operates for impedance within the characteristic

6-16
Impedance Relay-(Ohm) --Non-Directional. Used for fault detector.
Admittance Relay-(Mho)--Directional--. tripping relay.. Solid-state relay can be shaped to coincide with line angle .
Digital relay can have any shape it requires
Reactance Relay.--Insensitive to resistance- Used for short transmission lines

6-17
When fault resistance is same order of magnitude as line impedance:
Reactance Relay is not affected
Relay reach of Ohm and Mho relays are reduced.

6-18
Admittance (MHO) Relay, used as principal tripping relay in most relaying schemes.
Although not exact, the Angle of Maximum torque usually taken coincident with line angle
Typical line angles--138-345 kV--70-80 degrees

345-800 kV—80-90 degrees

Relay angle of maximum torque adjustable depending on relay design.

6-19
Most commonly used backup relay.
Zone 1 set for 80-90% of line section.and is instantaneous.
Zone 2 set for 120-180% of adjacent line section and has 15-30 cycle time delay
Zone 3 set to overreach adjacent line section and is set for 60 cycles or more
Zone 2 must not overreach adjacent line section#s zone 1.

All settings must be checked against load.

6-20
Mho relay Zone 1 set for 80-90% of line section--Instantaneous.
Mho relay Zone 2 set for 125-150% line section--15-30 cycle time delay .
Must not overreach Zone 1 of adjacent line section.

6-21
Typical stepped distance protection. Note the possible load encroachment,
particularly into zone 3.
Zone 1 is instantaneous
Zone 2 has a time delay of 15 cycles
Zone 3 has a time delay of 30 cycles
This has led to many discussions and rule making.
Digital relays alleviate the problem to a considerable degree.

6-22
6-23
The traditional relaying bete noir for non-pilot transmission line relays .
Relays use local measurements which do not give the entire fault magnitude picture. The contribution from the tap is not
measured at the relay location.

6-24
Series Capacitor is used to improve maximum power transfer.
Pm=E/(xL-XC)
Introduces a discontinuity which effects impedance relays. Add time delay to
allow capacitor protective devices to operate.
Reactor is used to limit short circuit current or regulate voltage. Minimum impact
on relays

6-25
Modern Power System Protection: Applications

7
and Performance Analysis

TAB 7
Response of Distance Relays

Arun G. Phadke

Professor Emeritus
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Bradley Dept. of Elect. Engineering
Center For Power Engineering
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0111
RESPONSE OF DISTANCE RELAYS

VISUALIZING IMPEDANCE RELAY RESPONSE

FROM PHASOR DIAGRAMS

The impedance relay responds to the ratio of applied

secondary voltages and currents.

Z = R + jX = E / I
I

E R

The response is in secondary ohms.

7-1
 VISUALIZING IMPEDANCE RELAY RESPONSE
FROM PHASOR DIAGRAMS

If the current is
I = 1.0 + j0.0
Then, the impedance is equal to the voltage.
Z=E/I=E
This is the key to understanding the impedance
relay response:
• Draw voltage and current on the same phasor
diagram.
• Use units of secondary volts and amperes.
• Re-orient the complete phasor diagram so that
the current phasor is horizontal.
• Stretch or shrink the complete phasor diagram
until the current phasor fits in R = 1.0

VISUALIZING IMPEDANCE RELAY RESPONSE

FROM PHASOR DIAGRAMS

Example:

E = 120 ! 0" secondary volts

I = 60 ! -30" secondary amps

X (secondary ohms)

Z = 2 ! 30"
= 1.732 + j 0.5
0.5

1.0 1.732

R (secondary ohms)

7-2
 VISUALIZING IMPEDANCE RELAY RESPONSE
FROM PHASOR DIAGRAMS
More examples

1. Forward lagging load 4. Reverse lagging load

5 1

R
2. Forward leading load 6
4 2

5. Forward fault

3. Line charging 6. Reverse fault

DISTANCE RELAYS IN UNFAULTED PHASES

• Six distance relays at each terminal

• Three ground distance relays: a-g, b-g, c-g

• Three phase distance relays: a-b, b-c, c-a

• On a given fault, only the corresponding

relay responds correctly.

• All other relays do respond, but are generally

harmless.
• Sometimes the other relays may respond
incorrectly.

7-3
 DISTANCE RELAYS IN UNFAULTED PHASES

Example: Phase a-g fault. What is the response

of phase distance relays?
I
x
R
a-g
E

• Assume no pre-fault load current.

• a-g relay responds to Ea/(Ia + mI0)
THIS IS CORRECT RESPONSE

• a-b relay responds to (Ea-Eb)/(Ia-Ib)

• b-c relay responds to (Eb-Ec)/(Ib-Ic)
• c-a relay responds to (Ec-Ea)/(Ic-Ia)
THESE WILL BE INCORRECT RESPONSES

DISTANCE RELAYS IN UNFAULTED PHASES

Ec

Ea

I0
Eb
Unfaulted Ia
voltages and currents
Ia + mI0
Faulted
voltages and currents

7-4
 DISTANCE RELAYS IN UNFAULTED PHASES

Ec
Ea
Ea
a-g relay
I0
Eb
Ia
Ia + mI0 Ia + mI0
Faulted
voltages and currents
Ib-Ic = 0 Ic-Ia = -Ia

Ea-Eb Ec-Ea

a-b relay Eb-Ec

Ia-Ib = Ia b-c relay c-a relay

DISTANCE RELAYS IN UNFAULTED PHASES

Ea
Ib-Ic = 0 X
a-g relay

a-b relay c-a relay

Ia + mI0
Eb-Ec

b-c relay
a-g relay
Ea-Eb

a-b relay 1.0 R

Ic-Ia = -Ia
Ia-Ib = Ia
Ec-Ea

c-a relay
b-c relay at #

7-5
 MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

Relay
E

DYNAMIC TESTING
Alternatives:

•Apply load box, and decrease impedance

•Hold voltage constant, increase current
•Hold current constant, decrease voltage

MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

I PRINCIPLE OF MHO RELAY

Relay E o = E - I Zr (operating
E quantity)
Ep = (polarizing quantity)
should have 90º or greater
between them

If the voltages are divided by currents, the same

phase angle relation will hold for impedances.

Z0 = (E - I Zr)/I the operating impedance

Zp = Ep/I is the polarizing impedance

7-6
 MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

Relay
E

SELF-POLARIZING MHO RELAY

Epol = E

MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

I
E
Relay
E

I
Zr
Zop = (E - I Zr)/I
= Zapp - Zr Zop = Zapp - Zr

Zp = Ep/I
Zpol = Zapp

7-7
 MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

Zs
I

Es Relay E

100% CROSS-POLARIZING MHO RELAY

Epol = ES

(a) Forward fault

(b) Reverse fault

7-8
 MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

(a) Forward fault Zs

I

Relay
Es E

Zr Es

Zop = Zapp - Zr
E IZS

Zs Zpol = Zs + Zapp
I

MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

7-9
 MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

(b) Reverse fault I I

Relay Zq
Eq
E
Zpol = -Zq - Zr + Zapp

Zq Eq = E +I(Zr+Zq)
Eq
Zr I
E
Zop = Zapp - Zr - I (Zr+Zq)

Zapp I (Zr+Zq) Eq

MHO CHARACTERISTICS
AND POLARIZATION

(b) Reverse fault

7-10
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

8
TAB 8
Fault Location

Arun G. Phadke

Professor Emeritus
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Bradley Dept. of Elect. Engineering
Center For Power Engineering
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0111
 FAULT LOCATION

By

Arun Phadke

Fault Location

• Motivation for fault location

• Digital relays and digital fault recorders

• Limit to the accuracy of fault location

Errors in inputs, errors in algorithms
• Sources of errors in the input signals
CTs and CVTs, A/D conversion

• Errors in model parameters

• Complexity of data input requirements

8-1
Fault Location

Types of fault locators:

• Based upon positive sequence line impedance

measurement to fault point
• This is the distance relaying principle
• Fault locators could be single ended or
double ended
• Digital relays or digital fault recorders
can provide fault location
• Based on travelling wave principle
• These require specialized hardware
• The principal interest is in locating ground faults

The unknown resistance of the ground fault is the

chief cause of errors in fault estimation.

Fault Location

• Double ended fault locator

In this development, single phase lines are considered. The

principle of fault location for three phase systems is very
similar, except that all variables become vectors.

• We assume that synchronized phasors of voltages and currents

from both ends are available for fault location. Later on we
consider alternatives to the synchronization.

Z is the total line

IS kZ (1-k)Z IR
EF impedance. k is the
fractional distance to
ES ER the fault.
IF RF
RF is the fault path
resistance

k and RF are both unknowns. We need to find k.

8-2
Fault Location

IS kZ EF (1-k)Z IR

ES ER
IF RF

ES = EF + IS kZ
ER = EF + IR (1-k)Z

Subtracting one equation from another eliminates EF

(ES - ER) = kZ(IS + IR) - IRZ
Or,
(ES - ER) IR
k= +
Z(IS + IR) (IS + IR)

In case of a three phase transmission line, the equations

are matrix equations, and hence the equation for k is
a polynomial, and must be solved numerically.

Fault Location

IS kZ EF (1-k)Z IR

ES j(1-k)YC ER
jkYC jkYC IF RF
2 2 2
j(1-k)YC
2
If the YC is the total charging susceptance of the line, it is
distributed as shown above in the two sections.

The two equations now become

jkYC
ES = EF + (IS - ES )kZ
2
j(1-k)YC
ER = EF + (IR - ER )(1-k)Z
2
EF can be eliminated as before, and the resulting polynomial
in k can be solved.

8-3
Fault Location

IS Z IR

ES jYC ER
jYC
2 2

If the phasors from the two ends are not synchronized at

source, the prefault load current can be used to synchronize
the phasors.
It is recognized that the measurements from within a station
are synchronized. Thus, assume the samples at the sending
end lead those at the receiving end by an unknown angle !".
! can be determined by comparing the phase angles of the
current in Z as measured from the two sides:
jYC jY
IS’ = IS - ES = - IR’ = - IR + ER C
2 2

Fault Location

• Double ended fault location provides the most reliable

answer. The only uncertainty is introduced by the
line parameters, which could be in error. This should
be checked thoroughly.

• However, the single ended fault location is the most

commonly implemented, as it places no special
requirements on measurements. In consequence
it is not as accurate as the double ended measurement
technique.

• Most single ended fault location techniques are based

upon the Takagi technique, which is explained next.

8-4
Fault Location
• Single ended fault location

IS kZ (1-k)Z IR
EF

ES ER
IF RF

Phasors from one end only are now available. Hence

ES = EF + IS kZ = IS kZ + IF RF

If we assume that the current in the fault IF is related to the

change in the sending end current (#IS) through a factor d,
the equation becomes
ES = IS kZ + d # IS RF
The factor d is known as the distribution factor. Assumption
of the above relationship is based upon the principle of
superposition.

Fault Location

• The distribution factor d and the principle of superposition

#IS kZ (1-k)Z #IR

RF
ZS IF ZR
- EF

ZS and ZR are the equivalent Thevenin impedances of

the power system behind the sending and the receiving
end buses.

ZR+ (1-k) Z ZR + ZS + Z
#IS = IF , or if IF = d #IS d=
ZR + ZS + Z ZR+ (1-k) Z

8-5
Fault Location

Returning to the original equation,

ES = IS kZ + d # IS RF

This single complex equation is two real equations. Denoting

the real and imaginary parts of d and of the phasors by the
subscripts r and i respectively,

ESr + j ESi = (ISr+ j ISi) k(R + j X) + (dr + j di) (#ISr+ j #ISi) RF

Separating into real and imaginary equations

ESr = k(RISr- X ISi) + (dr #ISr - di #ISi) RF

ESi = k(XISr+ R ISi) + (dr #ISi + j di #ISr) RF

ESr (dr #ISi + j di #ISr) - ESi (dr #ISr - di #ISi)

k=
(RISr- X ISi) (dr #ISi + j di #ISr) - (XISr+ R ISi) (dr #ISr - di #ISi)

Fault Location

• It is often sufficiently accurate to assume that d is real.

In this case, the equation for k becomes much simpler:

ESr (dr #ISi) - ESi (dr #ISr)

k=
(RISr- X ISi) (dr #ISi ) - (XISr+ R ISi) (dr #ISr)
In fact, now the result is independent of d because dr cancels
from the numerator and the denominator
ESr#ISi - ESi #ISr
k=
(RISr- X ISi)#ISi - (XISr+ R ISi)#ISr

As before, if the charging capacitors are significant, the

circuit can be modified to $ sections, and the result
is once again a polynomial in k.

8-6
Fault Location

• Takagi algorithm has a simple graphical interpretation.

Recall that from the current and voltage phasors used

to find an impedance, one could convert the phasor diagram
to an R-X diagram:
E
Z= , if I is set equal to 1.0 + j0.0, then Z is equal to E
I

X
E
Z

1.0 R
I

Fault Location

IS kZ EF (1-k)Z IR

ES ER
IF RF

ES
ES = IS kZ + IF RF ZS =
IS
ZS
X
ES

RFIF kZ
IR ISkZ

IS R
1.0
IF

8-7
Fault Location

• Three phase faults require positive, negative, and zero

sequence circuits. However, it can be shown that the
distribution factor for positive sequence circuits is
the only one needed for the analysis.

• The assumption that positive sequence distribution

factor is real is quite good.

• If charging currents are important, a correction can be

applied to the Takagi formula.

• If unbalance effects are important, a correction can also be

applied to the Takagi formula.

Fault Location

• Fault location based on travelling waves:

• Nature of travelling wave currents and voltages

• Special transducer needs

• Multi-mode propagation on three phase lines

• Specialized equipment needed

• GPS signals used to synchronize the records

8-8
Travelling waves

• Travelling waves on single phase lines

Reverse waves Forward waves

i i
e
i i
x

Currents in the upper wire

Travelling waves

• Travelling wave fault locator

x

T1
T2-T1
T2

x = L/2 - v(T2-T1)/2

Beweley Diagram

8-9
Travelling waves

• Travelling wave fault detector

x
%&'&( waves
are launched by
the fault

Each of the
%&'&( waves
produces three
components
at each discontinuity

Beweley Diagram

8-10
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 9
Pilot Line Protection of Transmission Lines

Stanley H. Horowitz

9
Consultant
3143 Griggsview Court
Columbus, OH 43221
The primary weakness of non-pilot relaying is the inability to cover 100% of the
line instantaneously. To do this, and avoid overreaching the adjacent line
segment, it is necessary to use a communication link in which each end tells the
other end either the direction or the phase angle of the fault current.

9-1
Power line carrier is an on-off signal in the 10-490 kHz band. The frequency is
not licensed in the U.S.
Microwave operates at frequncies between 150MHz and 20GHz. Usually in a
frequency shift mode.
Communication cable can be telephony-type cable either owned or leased.
Fiber optic has virtually unlimited capacity and is present preferred
communication link. Installtaion practices vary.

9-2
9-3
9-4
Most common pilot relaying scheme in U.S. Not so in Europe or Asia.
No impedance to power frequency transfer.
High frequency (30-300kHz) trapped on line section.
CCVT used for coupling.

9-5
Fault detector can be directional (mho) or non-directional (ohm).
Tripping relay is directional (mho)

9-6
The non-directional blocking relay is an impedance relay centered at each relay
location.
It I set for at least 150% of the largest tripping element. It may result in
continuous carrier.

9-7
The directional blocking relay is a reversed mho relay set 150% beyond the
tripping relay of the remote terminal.
An electromechanical relay may be offset to cover the bus at the relay location.

9-8
In blocking scheme, blocking signal sent only when fault occurs. Failure such that
no signal is sent results in failure to block, i.e. a false trip.
Unblocking scheme uses a low energy continuous signal and frequency shifts
when fault occurs.

9-9
Each terminal only receives the remote transmitter.
Scheme is not secure- Can trip on noise.
Two sets can be used, requiring both receivers to operate.

9-10
Requires Ru functions that have the capability to be switched when trip signal is
received.
For internal fault, trip is initiated at local end and extends remote zone 1 reach
beyond beyond line to allow remote end to trip

9-11
PUTT-. Local instantaneous relay trips for close-in fault.

POTT-most common. Concept is similar to Directional Comparison Blocking

scheme.
Adding step distance relays provides full backup.

9-12
Differential scheme that compares the phase angle between currents at the two ends of the
line.
No voltage is required. No phase fault identification. No inherent backup. May require
distance relay for fault initiation.

9-13
Uses a metallic or fiber cable to compare a voltage signal developed at each end.
Voltage is derived from current at each end through a mixing circuit.
Depending on relay design can be a tripping or a blocking scheme.

9-14
There are two main types of current differential relaying
schemes.
The currents at each terminal are combined into a
composite signal which is compared at each terminal. Similar
to wire pilot.
Individual phase currents are sampled and
converted into a digital signal.Similar to phase comparison.
Current differential schemes are more sensitive than distance
relay schemes and they do not require a potential source.
They are not affected by system swings but do not have
inherent backup.

9-15
Current differential schemes tend to be more sensitive than distance type
schemes since they respond only to current. This makes them more dependable
at a cost to security.
The communication channel is a vital factor And must be highly dependable.
There is no inherent backup.

9-16
In a digital implementation, the traditional percentage restraint current differential
characteristic can be improved with an adaptive restraint based on fault current

9-17
Master-Remote configuration
Includes 2nd and 5th harmonics
Voltage inversion has no effect
Master station directs trip output
Can provide o/c, and distance functions

9-18
9-19
The Master relay receives current from all other relays and performs the
current differential calculation.

The Remote relay transmits current data but does not receive current data.

9-20
Typical current differential application on a three-terminal line.each relay
exchanges current differential with both remote terminals.
All relays operate in the Master mode.
Redundant channels increase dependability at a cost

9-21
An adaptive approach for charging current has been developed which allows the relay
setting to compensate for this factor.
A useful estimating number is 0.2 megohms per mile regardless of transmission line
voltage.
Short lines vs long lines

9-22
Allows multi-terminal protection by Master-Remote
configuration. Current value sent to all terminals
Includes 2nd and 5th harmonics for transformer
Protection.
With series compensation, voltage inversion has no effect
Master station directs trip output
Can provide o/c, and distance functions provided
voltage is connected to relay

9-23
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 10
Transformer Protection

John R. Boyle

Principal Engineer
PSA/Power System Analysts
496 Pine Ridge Drive
Signal Mountain, TN 37377
10
 Transformer Protection
Part 1

FUSE COORDINATION

USE OF THERMAL OVERLOAD

CURVES ( C37.91 )

10-1
•! Category I Transformers
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000

2000
THROUGH-FAULT PROTECTION CURVE
FOR FAULTS WHICH WILL OCCUR
1000 FREQUENTLY OR INFREQUENTLY
900
800
700
600
500
400
300

200

100
90
80
70
TIME (seconds)
60
50
40
CATEGORY I TRANSFORMERS
30
5 to 500 kVA Single-Phase
20 15 to 500 kVA Three-Phase

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

DOT-DASH CURVE
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

0.2

0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50

TIMES NORMAL BASE CURRENT

•! Category II Transformers
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000 THROUGH-FAULT PROTECTION CURVE FOR THROUGH-FAULT PROTECTION CURVE FOR
5000
4000 FAULTS WHICH WILL OCCUR FREQUENTLY FAULTS WHICH WILL OCCUR INFREQUENTLY
(TYPICALLY MORE THAN 10 IN A (TYPICALLY NOT MORE THAN 10 IN A
3000
TRANSFORMER LIFETIME) TRANSFORMER LIFETIME)
2000

1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300

200
TIME (seconds)

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30

20

10
9
8
7
6

2 12 12 10 8 7 6 5 4 4
% TRANSFORMER IMPEDANCE THIS CURVE MAY ALSO BE USED FOR BACKUP
1
PROTECTION WHERE THE TRANSFORMER IS
0.9 EXPOSED TO FREQUENT FAULTS NORMALLY
0.8 CLEARED BY HIGH-SPEED RELAYING
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
CATEGORY II TRANSFORMERS
0.3 501 to 1667 kVA Single-Phase
501 to 5000 kVA Three-Phase
0.2

0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50

TIMES NORMAL BASE CURRENT

10-2
•! Category III Transformers
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000 THROUGH-FAULT PROTECTION CURVE FOR THROUGH-FAULT PROTECTION CURVE FOR
5000
4000 FAULTS WHICH WILL OCCUR FREQUENTLY FAULTS WHICH WILL OCCUR INFREQUENTLY
(TYPICALLY MORE THAN 5 IN A (TYPICALLY NOT MORE THAN 5 IN A
3000
TRANSFORMER LIFETIME) TRANSFORMER LIFETIME)
2000

1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300

200

TIME (seconds)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30

20

10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

2
12 12 10 8 7 6 5 4 4
% TRANSFORMER IMPEDANCE THIS CURVE MAY ALSO BE USED FOR BACKUP
1
PROTECTION WHERE THE TRANSFORMER IS
0.9 EXPOSED TO FREQUENT FAULTS NORMALLY
0.8 CLEARED BY HIGH-SPEED RELAYING
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
CATEGORY III TRANSFORMERS
0.3 1668 to 10000 kVA Single-Phase
5001 to 30000 kVA Three-Phase
0.2

0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50

TIMES NORMAL BASE CURRENT

•! Category IV Transformers
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000

2000
THROUGH-FAULT PROTECTION CURVE
FOR FAULTS WHICH WILL OCCUR
1000 FREQUENTLY OR INFREQUENTLY
900
800
700
600
500
400
300

200
TIME (seconds)

100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
CATEGORY IV TRANSFORMERS
20 Above 10000 kVA Single-Phase
Above 30000 kVA Three-Phase
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3

2 12 12 10 8 7 6 5 4
4
% TRANSFORMER IMPEDANCE
1
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

0.2

0.1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 20 30 40 50

TIMES NORMAL BASE CURRENT

10-3
 INRUSH

7.8%
IMP
Transf 3Ph 7500 kVA Thermal A347.22

Transf 3Ph 7500 kVA Mechanical A347.22

65E
115KV
7.5MVA 12KV 65E-Total Clear

560 Amp: Curve--D A5.60

280 A RECLOSER
560 A ( MIN. TRIP )

1,000 60,000

100 6,000 Tiime In Cycle s (60-hz basiis)

Trans forme r 3Ph 7500 kVA The rmal A347.22

Time In Se conds

10 600

Trans forme r 3Ph 7500 kVA M e chanical A347.22

1 60

65E-Total Cle ar

.1 6

560 Amp: Curve --D A5.60

.01 .6
1100

1,0000

10,0000

100,0000

1,000,0000

Curre nt in Ampe re s FIGURE 1

10-4
 1,000 60,000

12% 65E FUSE

IMP PROTECTION
100 6,000
12 KV GRD FAULT

Time In Cycles (60-hz basis)

Transf 3Ph 7500 kVA Thermal A347.22
10 600
Time In Seconds

65E Transf 3Ph 7500 kVA M echanical A347.22

1 115KV 60
12KV 3 PH FAULT
7.5MVA 12KV
.1 65E-Total Clear 6
280 A RECLOSER
560 A ( MIN. TRIP )
560 Amp: Curve--D A5.60

.01 .6
100

1,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000
FIGURE 4

Current in Amperes

1,000 60,000

INRUSH
100 6,000
12.5 KV OC
TAP 8, TD 3
Tr 3Ph 12000 kVA Thermal A555.56 Time In Cycles (60-hz basis)
10 12% 600
Time In Seconds

IMP
51 20/1
Tr 3Ph 12000 kVA M echanical A555.56
1
115KV 12% 51 HI SIDE 60
60/1
OC 115KV
12/16/20 MVA
N TAP 8, TD 3
.1
60/1 O G 6

12.5KV INST 480PU, TD 3.00 160PU, TD 3.00

.01 .6
100

1,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000

Current in Amperes
10-5
 1,000 60,000

GRD COORDINATION

100 BU GRD 6,000

TAP 5, TD 8

Time In Cycles (60-hz basis)

Tr 3Ph 12000 kVA Thermal A555.56
10 600
Time In Seconds

51 20/1 Tr 3Ph 12000 kVA M echanical A555.56

1 60
115KV 12% HI SIDE 0C 115KV
60/1 TAP 8, TD 3
12/16/20 MVA
N
160PU, TD 3.00
.1 60/1 O G
6

FDR,
300PU,TAP 4, TD 4
TD 8.00
12.5KV
240PU, TD 4.00
4000A
.01 .6
FAULT
100

1,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000
Current in Amperes

1,000 60,000

GRD COORDINATION

100 6,000 Tim

me In Cycle s (60-hz bas iis)

Tr 3Ph 12000 kVA The rmal A555.56

Time In Se conds

10 600

Tr 3Ph 12000 kVA M e chanical A555.56

1 60

160PU, TD 3.00
.1 6

300
300PU, TD 88.00
00

240PU, TD 4.00
.01 .6
00

00

00

00

00
10

1,00

10,00

100,00

1,000,00

Curre nt in Ampe re s

10-6
 230 KV

TAP 5 51 300/5
60 MVA
( 151 A )
25 MVA 40 MVA
(1047A) (335 A) 87
TAP 5 51 2000/5 51 600/5

13.8 KV 69 KV

O G G O

1,000 60,000
60 MVA = 151 A @ 230 KV

THERMAL DAMAGE
100 6,000

MECHANICAL DAMAGE

10 600 Time In Cycles (60-hz basis)

Time In Seconds

1 60

300PU, TD 3
.1 6
25MVA = 1047 A @ 13.8 KV

2000PU, TD 3.00

.01 .6
1,000

10,000

100,000

1,000,000

Current in Amperes
10-7
10-8
 Transformer Protection
Part 2

•! Power Transformer Failure Statistics

•! 1975-1982

Winding failures = 51%

Tap changer failures = 19%
Bushing failures = 9%
Terminal board failures = 6%
Core failures = 2%
Miscellaneous failures = 13%

10-9
 Transformer Fusing
•! Normally used at 10MVA and below
•! Reference transformer damage curves IEEE
C37.90
•! Selected to fit below damage curve
•! Fuses must be coordinated with relays

FAULT CURRENTS IN 69KV FUSE FOR

3 O FAULTS ON THE 13KV BUS

ON 100 MVA BASE

SYSTEM !Z" 20% CASE 1, 4 % = 33 %
1579 A CASE 2, 12 % = 100 %
FUSE SIZE 125 A
= 15 MVA @ 69KV 3 PH FAULT ON 13KV BUS
CASE 1, I = 1579 A @ 69KV
BANK = 12 MVA

13KV

8378 A

10-10
FAULT CURRENTS IN 69KV FUSE FOR
3 O FAULTS ON THE 13KV BUS

ON 100 MVA BASE

SYSTEM !Z" 20% CASE 1, 4 % = 33 %
697 A CASE 2, 12 % = 100 %
FUSE SIZE 125 A
= 15 MVA @ 69KV 3 PH FAULT ON 13KV BUS
CASE 1, I = 1579 A @ 69KV
BANK = 12 MVA CASE 2, I = 697 A @ 69KV

13KV

3701 A

FAULT CURRENTS IN 69KV FUSE FOR

GRD. FAULTS ON THE 13KV BUS

ON 100 MVA BASE

SYSTEM !Z" 20% CASE 1, 4 % = 33 %
1047 A CASE 2, 12 % = 100 %
FUSE SIZE 125 A
= 15 MVA @ 69KV
BANK = 12 MVA GRD. FAULT ON 13KV BUS
CASE 1, I = 1047 A @ 69KV

13KV

9633 A

10-11
FAULT CURRENTS IN 69KV FUSE FOR
GRD. FAULTS ON THE 13KV BUS
ON 100 MVA BASE
SYSTEM !Z" 20% CASE 1, 4 % = 33 %
427 A CASE 2, 12 % = 100 %
FUSE SIZE 125 A
= 15 MVA @ 69KV
BANK = 12 MVA GRD. FAULT ON 13KV BUS
CASE 1, I = 1047 A @ 69KV
CASE 2, I = 427 A @ 69KV
13KV

3930 A

TRANSFORMER FUSE PROTECTION

427 A 427 A

A GROUND FAULT ON THE

LOW SIDE OF A DELTA - WYE
BANK LOOKS LIKE A
PHASE – TO – PHASE FAULT
ON THE HIGH SIDE

X 3930 A

10-12
 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 6 ,0 0 0 ,0 0 0

1579 125 AM P FUSE ON 69KV SID E

1 0 ,0 0 0 3 PH 12M VA B AN K 6 0 0 ,0 0 0
B K 4%

1 ,0 0 0 6 0 ,0 0 0
697

Time In Cyccles (6 0-hz bas iss )

3 PH
B K 12%
Time In S e conds

100 6 ,0 0 0

10 600

T ran sfo
f rm er 3 P h 1 2 0 0 0 k VA T h erm all A 1 0 0 .44 1

1 60
427
GR D
B K 12%%
.1 1047 6
GR D
B K 4% 1 2 5 E -T o t al Clear

.0 1 .6
10 0

1,00 0

10,00 0

100,00 0
Current in Amperes

FAULT CURRENTS IN 69KV FUSE FOR

FAULTS ON THE 13KV BUS

ON 100 MVA BASE

SYSTEM !Z" 20% CASE 2, 12 % = 100 %

FUSE SIZE 125 A

= 15 MVA @ 69KV 3 PH FAULT ON 13KV BUS
I = 3172 A IN EACH BANK
BK 12 MVA I = 598 A @ 69KV

GRD. FAULT ON 13KV BUS

13KV
I = 3508 A IN EACH BANK
I = 381 A @ 69KV

10-13
FAULT CURRENTS IN 69KV FUSE FOR
FAULTS ON THE 13KV BUS
ON 100 MVA BASE
SYSTEM !Z" 20% CASE 2, 12 % = 100 %
381 A 381 A
FUSE SIZE 125 A
= 15 MVA @ 69KV

BK 12 MVA

GRD. FAULT ON 13KV BUS

13KV
X I = 3508 A IN EACH BANK
7016 A I = 381 A @ 69KV

TRANSFORMER FUSE PROTECTION

PARALLEL BANKS

381 A 381 A 381 A 381 A

X
7016 A

10-14
 •! Transformer Differential Relays

•! Faster than fuses

•! More sensitive than fuses
•! Eliminates single phasing problem
•! More selective than fuses

Percentage Differential
PROTECTED
ZONE
(PHASE A)

OP
R1 R2

87T

10-15
External Fault
PROTECTED
ZONE
(PHASE A)

OP
R1 R2

87T

Internal Fault
PROTECTED
ZONE
(PHASE A)

OP
R1 R2

87T

10-16
Current Matching

5
OPERATING
COIL
R1 5 R2
10 5

RESTRAINT
COILS

Current Matching

RELAY
INPUT
MATCHING
CTS
TAPS

ELECTRONICS

OPERATE RESTRAINT
COMPARATOR

10-17
 ANSI Standard 3 Phase
Transformer
X1-X3
H3 X3

H2 X2

H1 X1
H0

H2 X2

X1
H1 H3
X3

Phase Shift Compensation

87
T

10-18
 Phase Shift Compensation
1 A 1 A
C C
3 3 2 B 3 3 3 2 B 3
1 A 1 A
3 3 3 3
2 B 2 B
0 0
3 C 3 C
0 0
3 3

0
C C
0 0 3 6 6 3
3 3
B B
3 3 3 3
A A

10-19
 •! Percentage Differential Characteristic

OPERATING CURRENT (IN MULTIPLES OF TAP)

THRU-CURRENT RESTRAINT SETTING

0.35

2.33

MAXIMUM RESTRAINT CURRENT (IN MULTIPLES OF TAP)

Transformer Differential Limitations

•! • Unequal secondary currents, because of
•! the different turns ratios of the power
•! transformer windings and the CTs.
•! • Phase shift of wye-delta banks.
•! • Tap changing under load.
•! • Magnetizing inrush.

10-20
 Magnetizing Inrush
ie
Æ
ÆR ÆR Time

Transformer Transformer
Deenergized Reenergized
at This Point at This Point

Magnetizing Inrush
is
!Max
!1

+!Max
ie
! !R !R
Time

!Max
Transformer Transformer
Deenergized Reenergized
at This Point at This Point

10-21
 Inrush Waveform
DEAD SPOT

SUB. 202
500/230kV TX 2
500kV Current

A Phase

B Phase

C Phase

10-22
 Sympathetic Inrush

IE
IS XS SOURCE

IP
RS

IE IP

T2 T1
IS

Overexcitation
OPEN
A) G S

LONG LINE OPEN

B) S

LONG LINE OPEN

C) S

S - POWER SYSTEM

10-23
•! Figure 17 in Transformer Protection Application Guide

%
100

and its harmonic components

I1 (% of IM )

M agnetizing current Im
80
I3 (% of I1 )

60
IM (% of In )

40
I5(% of I1 )

20
I7 (% of I1 )

100 110 120 130 140 150 160

Voltage in percent of nominal voltage

Autotransformer Application

R1

R2 0P

R3

10-24
Bus/Transformer Application

CS
R1 R2 R3 R4
0P

R5

Bus/Transformer Application
1 2 3 4

30A 20A R1

50A 20A 20A

20A

0P

R2
0

10-25
 CT Error Produces Incorrect
Operation
20A OPERATING
POINT
OPERATING
OPERATI NG
ZONE

20A
MAXIMUM RESTRAINT

Sudden Pressure Protection

•! Operates on rate of change in gas or oil
pressure
•! Detects incipient low magnitude faults
•! Protects for faults differential may not see
•! Backs up differential for high magnitude internal
faults
•! Users are split between using sudden pressure
for trip or alarm

10-26
Sudden Pressure Relay (SPR)
under oil
GAS

TANK WALL

SPR

VALVES

TOP VIEW

Sudden Pressure Relay (SPR)

Tapchanger Compartment
GAS

SPR
SPR

LOAD TAP CHANGING TRANSFORMER

10-27
 Sudden Pressure Relay (SPR)
Gas Space
GAS SPR

SPR

LOAD TAP CHANGING TRANSFORMER

Sudden Pressure Relay Mounted in Gas Space

2
1 SUDDEN PRESSURE RELAY
1 2 TRANSFORMER TANK
5 3 INSULATING OIL LEVEL
7 4 4 MAIN PORT
8 5 BELLOWS
6 6 GAS CUSHION
7 SNAP SWITCH

3 8 EQUALIZER PORT

TRANSFORMER CONTROL PANEL

(+)

63X
63

63X
63 TRIP AND/OR
86 ALARM
86 86
RESISTORS
DETERMINED
BY BATTERY
VOLTAGE
(-)
63-FAULT PRESSURE RELAY
63X-FAULT PRESSURE AUXILIARY RELAY

10-28
 Sudden Pressure and Gas
Accumulation Relay
OIL LEVEL BUCKHOLZ RELAY

Sudden Pressure and Gas

Accumulation Relay
PETCOCK
TESTCOCK
ALARM SWITCH
CYLINDER
OIL LEVEL
TEST JET FROM
TRANSFORMER
TRIP SWITCH
CYLINDER

TO OIL TRIPPING FLAP

CONSERVATOR

BUCKHOLZ RELAY

10-29
 115kV A

•! Application CS

•! Examples
T1 T2
30
MVA

RG

RG

D
13.8
C kV
N.C. F2

F1

115kV A

•! DIFFERENTIAL CS

300/5

T1 T2
30 87
MVA T
RG

2000/5 RG

D
13.8
C kV
N.C. F2

F1

10-30
 115kV A

•! PARTIAL CS

•! DIFFERENTIAL

T1 T2
30
MVA

RG

RG

2000/5

51N- 51
3
B

D
13.8
C kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2

F1

115kV A

•! GROUND CS

•! PROTECTION
T1 T2
200/5 30
MVA

RG

51N- RG
2

2000/5

51N-
3
B

D
13.8
C kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2

F1

10-31
 115kV A

•! PHASE CS

•! OVERCURRENT 50/
51
300/5

T1 T2
30
MVA

RG

RG

2000/5

D
C 13.8
kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2

F1

115kV A

•! GROUND CS

•! DIFFERENTIAL

T1 T2
200/5
30
MVA

RG

RG

2000/5
87N
POL

87N 1/10 ACT

OP
51N- 51
3
B

D
13.8
C kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2

F1

10-32
 115kV A

•! GROUND
CS
•! DIFFERENTIAL
•! Bkr C Open
200A
T1 T2
200/5
30
External O-G Fault MVA

200A RG
5A
RG

0.5A
2000/5
87N 200A
5A
POL
5A

87N 5A 5A 0.5A
OP 0.5A
10/1 51N- 51
ACT 3
0A B

D
13.8
C kV
OPEN 2000/5 F2

F1

200A

115kV A

•! GROUND
CS
•! DIFFERENTIAL
•! Bkr C Closed
200A
T1 T2
200/5
30
MVA

200A RG
5A

200A RG 200A

2000/5
200A
5A 87N
POL 5A 0.5A

87N 5A 5A 1.0A
OP 0.5A
1/10 51N- 51
ACT 3
0A B 0.5A
0.5A
D
13.8
C kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2
200A
F1
External O-G Fault
400AMPS

10-33
 115kV A

•! GROUND
CS
•! DIFFERENTIAL
•! Bkr C Closed
200A
T1 T2
200/5
30
External O-G Fault MVA

RG
5A
RG

0.5A
2000/5
200A
5A 87N 0.5A
POL

87N 5A 5A
OP 0.5A
1/10 51N- 51
ACT 3 200A
0A B
0.5A
0.5A
D
13.8
C kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2
200A
F1
400AMPS

115kV A

•! GROUND
CS
•! DIFFERENTIAL
•! Bkr C Closed
200A
T1 T2
200/5
30
MVA
Internal O-G Fault 200A RG
5A
400AMPS

200A RG

200A
2000/5 0.5A

5A 87N
POL 5A

10A 87N 5A 5A 0.5A

OP
1/10 51N- 51
ACT 3
B
0.5A D
10A
13.8
C kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2

200A
F1

10-34
 115kV A

•! CURRENT CS

•! REVERSAL
T1 T2
200/5
30
MVA

RG

RG
67
2000/5
67N 67N
POL OP

1/10 ACT

51N- 51
3
B

D
13.8
C kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2

F1
67
POL

115kV A
•! CURRENT
•! REVERSAL CS
•! 13.8kV
•! Phase
•! Fault

T1 T2
200/5 30
MVA

RG
5A 2000A
RG
67
2000/5
67N 67N
POL OP
2000A

1/10 ACT 5A

51N- 51
3
B
5A 5A
D
13.8
C kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2

F1 2000A
67
POL

4000A

10-35
 OPEN

115kV A
•! CURRENT PHASE P2 P1

•! REVERSAL FAULT CS G2 G1
•! 115kV Phase
•! Fault -
•! CS Fails to Open

T1 T2
200/5 30
MVA

RG
2000A
RG
67
2000/5 REVERSE
67N 67N
POL OP
2000A

1/10 ACT

5A
51N- 51
3
B
5A
D
13.8
C kV
N.C. 2000/5 F2

F1 2000A
67
POL

115kV A

•! 115kV
CS
•! RESIDUAL
•! GROUND 51N-
1

T1 T2
30
MVA

RG

RG

D
13.8
C kV
N.C. F2

F1

10-36
 115kV A
•! Combine all P2 P1

•! relays and CS G2 G1

•! add trip 86-

2
•! functions ALARM
50/
51
51N-
1
49

63
T1 T2
30 87
MVA T

RG 86-
51N- 1
2 RG

67N 67
POL
67N
87N OP
POL

87N
0P
51N- 51
3

D
13.8
C kV
N.C. F2
F1

•! Differential Protection Connection

•! Two-Winding Wye-Delta Transformer Bank

Power Transformer:
50 MVA 138/69kV ! - Wye

10-37
•! Differential Protection Connection Two-Winding Wye-Delta
Transformer Bank
•! (138kV, 69kV, 50MVA)

FULL LOAD
209A RELAY

4.18A

250/5

Differential Protection Connection Two-Winding Wye-

Delta Transformer Bank
(138kV, 69kV, 50MVA)

209A FULL LOAD

RELAY 418A

4.18A 7.25 4.18

250/5 500/5

10-38
Differential Protection Connection Two-Winding Wye-
Delta Transformer Bank
(138kV, 69kV, 50MVA)

209A RELAY 418A

5 9

4.18A 7.25 4.18

250/5 500/5

•! Transformer Differential Relays

•! CT Ratio Selection

1) Don#t exceed continuous current.

2) Maximum fault current should not
exceed ratio error (10%).

•! Consider forced air ratings

•! Keep burden low
•! Don#t connect additional load through
step up aux CTs

10-39
 •! Transformer Differential Relays
•! Load Tap Changing Transformer (10%)

Mismatch = 3.78% + 10% = 13.78%

Don#t set near extreme tap.

•! Differential Protection Connections

•! For Multiwinding Transformer Bank

Power Transformer:
230 / 69 / 13.8kV
230kV = 60MVA Wye
69kV = 40MVA Wye
13.8kV = 25MVA Delta

10-40
 DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION FOR
MULTIWINDING TRANSFORMERS

60 MVA 25 MVA 40 MVA

(230 KV) (13.8 KV) (69 KV)

3.33 5.88 4.36A 7.25 4.18

150/5 400/5

PRI SEC 1200/5

230 40,000 100

69 "3 230 30 = 3.33A x "3 = 5.8A

SEC CURRENT RELAY TAPS

230 KV 5.8 230 KV 5
RATIO = 0.8 = 0.833
69 KV 7.25 69 KV 6

DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION FOR

MULTIWINDING TRANSFORMERS

60 MVA 25 MVA 40 MVA

(230 KV) (13.8 KV) (69 KV)

2.09 3.63 4.36A 7.25 4.18

150/5 400/5

PRI SEC 1200/5

230 25 MVA 62.8

13.8 "3 230 30 = 2.09A x "3 = 3.63A

SEC CURRENT RELAY TAPS

230 KV 3.63 230 KV 5
RATIO = 0.83 = 0.833
13.8 KV 4.36 13.8 KV 6

10-41
 •! Transformer Differential Relays
•! CT Ratio Selection

1) Check that maximum load current

does not exceed continuous tap
rating.
2) Check that CTs don#t saturate for
internal or external faults.

•! Potential loss of restraint that may result by paralleling

circuits in differential protection (no restraint)
Breaker open
Transformer

Sources 52 52 Sources

52

Difference
Current

Fault

OP
R R

10-42
 •! Potential loss of restraint that may result by paralleling
circuits in differential protection (full restraint)
Breaker open
Transformer

Sources 52 52 Sources

52

Fault
OP

R R

•! Single-line differential connections for multiple connections to

transformers
52 52

Auto or
Three Winding
Transformer
Bank
52 52

OP

R R

R R

10-43
•! Single-line differential connections for multiple connections to
transformers

52 52

Transformer
Bank

52 52

OP

R R

R R

10-44
 Relay Operation Analysis 1

X Y Z
LINE 2 LINE 1
D C A X B
FAULT
OSC LINE CURRENT

BUS OSC
PT NEUTRAL
OSC

A-G FAULT
A
BUS PT

C
LINE CURRENT

C
DEAD TIME LINE
LOAD CURRENT
NEUTRAL CURRENT CHARGING

OFF OFF LINE 1

RECEIVED CARRIER ON OFF LINE 2
OFF

10-45
 CATEGORIZING REC' CARRIER
"A" GOOD, "B" QUESTIONABLE
FAULT
RECLOSE TIME

LOAD
A CARRIER OFF
INTERNAL FAULT

LOAD LOAD
CARRIER ON
A
EXTERNAL FAULT

CATEGORIZING REC' CARRIER

"A" GOOD, "B" QUESTIONABLE

FAULT 3 CYC. FAULT 5 CYC.

B
CARRIER "ON".
B TRIP DELAYED
CARRIER "OFF". CARRIER "OFF".
2 CYCLES AT
RECLOSURE

INTERNAL FAULT

10-46
 CATEGORIZING REC' CARRIER
"A" GOOD, "B" QUESTIONABLE

FAULT

B
LOAD

ON ON
B OFF OFF

ON / OFF SLOW CARRIER "ON" AFTER

1.5 CYCLES LOAD RESTORED

INTERNAL FAULT

CATEGORIZING RECEIVED CARRIER AS "A" GOOD,

OR "B" QUESTIONABLE ON LINE 2, IN FIGURE 1

EXT. FAULT
EXT. BKR. "A" TRIP EXT.LINE "1" REEN.

LOAD
LOAD
ON
A GOOD OFF

LINE 1 TRIP
LINE 2 TRIP

LOAD
ON
B BAD OFF

1.5 CYC. DELAY

EXTERNAL FAULT

10-47
X Y Z
LINE 2 LINE 1
D C A X B
FAULT
OSC LINE CURRENT

BUS OSC
PT NEUTRAL
OSC

A-G FAULT
BUS PT A

C
LINE CURRENT

C
DEAD TIME LINE
LOAD CURRENT
NEUTRAL CURRENT CHARGING

OFF OFF LINE 1

RECEIVED CARRIER ON OFF LINE 2
OFF

!"#$%&'()(*%+&,$'"#(&*-+
!""+%&&./+!0"+12$-#(&*"03$+

A
B

A MAGNITUDE
B

D.C. OFFSET
RESTRIKE

10-48
 3 ~ BKR 5 ~ BKR z2
PRE
FAULT 1000 A
z1

FAULT FAULT

z1

z2 EXPECTED RELAY TARGETS

Z1 + Z2 + CARRIER
z3

3 ~ BKR
PRE
FAULT z1 z2 z3
800A
z2
FAULT Z2 + CARRIER
z1

EXPECTED
TARGETS

3000 A Z1
Z2 + CARRIER
INSTANTANEOUS
OVERCURRENT

10-49
 z1 z2 z3
3 ~ BKR
PRE
FAULT
600A

FAULT
30 CYCLES
B z2
TARGETS Z2 TIME
INDICATIONS: z1
BKR. @ !A" TRIPPED TO :
A
1) CLEAR STUCK BKR @ !B"
2) BACKUP LOCAL BKR. FAILURE AT !B:

LINE POTENTIAL VERS BUS POTENTIAL

FAULT
A X B

R R

LINE PT
BUS PT
FAULT CURRENT

BUS VOLTAGE

LINE VOLTAGE

10-50
 LINE POTENTIAL WITH LINE REACTOR
FAULT
A X B

R R

LINE PT
BUS PT

FAULT CURRENT

LINE VOLTAGE

RECLOSING TIME

FAULT
A X 161 KV LINE
B

R R
BKRS A @ B TRIP BKRS A @ B RECLOSE

LOAD LOAD

3 CYC 13 CYC. DEAD TIME

FAULT

TIMING WAVE

BKR A TRIP 6 CYC FAULT

10 CYC. DEAD TIME
LOAD

BKR B TRIP 3 CYC BKR B RECLOSE

10-51
 CURRENT REVERSAL
14000 A
X A B Y
2000 A
X
LINE 1
2000 A 2000 A
LINE 2
2000 A OSC
C D
P P

G G

8000 A
2000 A

OSC

INITIAL FAULT
"D" BLOCKS "C"

CURRENT REVERSAL

X A B Y
6000 A
X
LINE 1
1000 A 1000 A
LINE 2
4000 A OSC
C D
P P

G "B" TRIPS IN 3 CYCLES G

3000 A
1000 A

OSC
"C" BLOCKS "D"

10-52
 CURRENT REVERSAL

X A B Y
LINE 1

LINE 2
OSC
C D
P P

G "B" TRIPS IN 3 CYCLES G

OSC
"A" TRIPS IN 4 CYCLES
"C" TRIPS IN 6 CYCLES

PRE-FAULT FAULT POST-FAULT

REVERSAL @ BKR D 4000A

LINE 2 LOAD CURR LINE 2 LOAD CURR

2000A BKR C TRIP

BKR B TRIP BKR A TRIP

8000A

NEUTRAL CURRENT
@ STATION Y
3000A

"ON" FROM D "ON" FROM C

LINE 2 CARRIER
OFF OFF
"HOLE" THAT SET UP ERRONEOUS
TRIPPING OF BKR C
FIGURE

10-53
 W1 W2

W1
OSCILOGRAPHY FROM
OP MICRO-PROCESSOR RELAY
W2

CT ROLLED
0
NOTE 30 SHIFT AS A RESULT OF
CONNECTING CTS WYE-WYE ACROSS
A DELTA-WYE TRANSFORMER
MOTOR

W1 W2
R

W1

OP
W2
0 OSCILOGRAPHY FROM
R 30 SHIFT
MICRO-PROCESSOR RELAY

CT CORRECTED
MOTOR

10-54
10-55
10-56
 51X FAST BUS PROTECTION

FAST !51F" DIR. O.C. RELAYS

ASSERT FOR FEEDER FAULTS
TO BLOCK !51X". NO SIGNAL
SIGNIFIES A BUS FAULT AND
23 KV 51X INITIATES AN INST. TRIP
51F TO HIGH SIDE BKR.
A NEGATIVE SEQUENCE DIR. RELAY
(32Q) DETECTS PHASE AND GRD.
FAULTS
A POSITIVE SEQUENCE DIR. RELAY
(32P) DETECTS 3 PHASE FAULTS.
BY DESIGN, THE 32Q HAD PRIORITY & THE 32P
COULD NOT ASSERT UNTIL 32Q DROPPED OUT.

67P2 SESITIVE DIR.OC BLOCK RELAY

OUT103 CONTACT OUTPUT SENDS BLOCK

OUT103
F32Q
F32P
67P2

10-57
 SOLUTION

0 BLOCKING
672P 2~ SIGNAL

67P2 SESITIVE DIR.OC BLOCK RELAY

OUT103 CONTACT OUTPUT SENDS BLOCK

OUT103
F32Q
F32P
67P2

10-58
 Relay Operation Analysis 2

Three-winding Transformer Impedance

Equivalent
P S
T

GIVEN: (MANUFACTURE INFORMATION)

Zps=IMPEDANCE BETWEEN PRIMARY WINDING !P"#
AND SECONDARY WINDING !S"
Zpt=IMP. BETWEEN !P" AND TERTIARY WINDING !T"
Zst=IMP. BETWEEN !S" AND TRETIARY WINDING !T"

10-59
 Three-Winding Transformer
!Zero-Sequence Equivalent"
Zp Zs

Zt

Zp=1/2 (+ Zps + Zpt - Zst)

Zs=1/2 (+ Zps - Zpt + Zst)
Zt=1/2 (- Zps + Zpt + Zst)

Typical Values, 161/69/13kv Transformer Impedance on Its

Own Base
GIVEN: MVA RATING = 60 / 80 / 100
161 / 69 = 60 MVA
161 / 13 = 30 MVA
69 / 13 = 30 MVA
Zps = 9%, Zpt = 13%, Zst = 3.5%

100MVABASE
Zps = 15%, Zpt = 43.3%, Zst = 11.67%

CALCULATIONS
Zp = 1/2 (+15 + 43.3 - 11.67) = +23.3%
Zs = 1/2 (+15 - 43.3 + 11.67) = - 8.3%
Zt = 1/2 ( -15 + 43.3 - 11.67) = +20.0%

10-60
 Calculations
161 KV BANK 69 KV
SYS SYS

1.0 23.3 - 8.3 10

Z1 and Z2
P1 S1

10 23.3 - 8.3 30
Z0
P0 S0

20

161 KV BANK 69 KV
SYS
CALCULATIONS SYS
Z 1 = Z 2 1.0 23.3 - 8.3 10
1 + 1 = 1 X
P1 S1
X Y Z Z
1 + 1 = 1
10 10 Z Z0 10 23.3 - 8.3 30
Y
2 = 1 =Z=5 P0 S0
10 Z 20

1 1 1 1 1 1
+ = + =
1 25 Z1 21.7 20 Z0
1 1
1 + .04 = ! Z 1 = 0.96 .046 + .05 = ! Z0 = 10.4
Z1 Z0 23.3
1 1 1 33.7
+ =
33.7 10 Z0
1
.03 + .10 = Z ! Z 0 = 7.7
0
Z g = Z1+Z2+Z0 = 2 (0.96) + 7.7 = 9.62 = 3.2
3
3

10-61
 161 KV BANK 69 KV
SYS SYS

Z 1 = Z 2 1.0 23.3 - 8.3 10

CALCULATIONS P1 S1

161 KV FAULT @ P1 & P0 Z0 10 23.3 - 8.3 30

Z1 25 .04 P0 S0
1 1.0 20
.96 1.04

Z0 21.7 .046 1,239 (161/69 KV) = 2,891 AMP @ 69 KV

20 0.05 1,347
10.4 .096 2,586
23.3
33.7 .03 2,586 BANK CONTRIBUTION
10 .10 8,620 161 KV SYSTEM CONTRIBUTION
7.7 .13 11,206 TOTAL FAULT CURRENT
1.92 (Z1 + Z2)
9.62 / 3 = 3.2

THEREFORE, IG = 358.6/.032 = 11,206 AMP @ 161 KV

(358.6 AMPERES FROM 100,000KVA / 161 x 1.732)

161 KV GRD. FAULT

8,620 A P
S
T
CALCULATIONS 11,206 A
2,586 A 2,891 A

161 KV FAULT @ P1 & P0

300/5 600/5
Z1 25 .04 43 A 24 A
1 1.0
.96 1.04 19 A

Z0 21.7 .046 1,239 (161/69 KV) = 2,891 AMP @ 69 KV

20 0.05 1,347
10.4 .096 2,586
23.3
33.7 .03 2,586 BANK CONTRIBUTION
10 .10 8,620 161 KV SYSTEM CONTRIBUTION
7.7 .13 11,206 TOTAL FAULT CURRENT
1.92 (Z1 + Z2)
9.62 / 3 = 3.2

THEREFORE, IG = 358.6/.032 = 11,206 AMP @ 161 KV

(358.6 AMPERES FROM 100,000KVA / 161 x 1.732)

10-62
 161 KV BANK 69 KV
SYS SYS

Z 1and Z 2 1.0 23.3 - 8.3 10

P1 S1
CALCULATIONS
69 KV FAULT @ S1 & S0 Z0 10 23.3 - 8.3 30
P0 S0
Z1 16 .0625
10 .1 20
6.15 .1625

Z0 33.3 .03 5,263 (69/161 KV) = 2,256 AMP @ 161 KV

20 .05 8,772
12.5 .08 14,035
-8.3
4.2 .24 14,035 BANK CONTRIBUTION
30 .03 1,754 69 KV SYSTEM CONTRIBUTION
3.7 .27 15,789 TOTAL FAULT CURRENT
12.3 (Z1 + Z2)
16.0 / 3 = 5.3

THEREFORE, IG = 836.8/.053 = 15,789 AMP @ 69 KV

(836.8 AMPERES FROM 100,000KVA / 69 x 1.732)

69 KV GRD. FAULT
S 1754 A
P
T
15,789 A
CALCULATIONS 2,256 A
14,035 A
69 KV FAULT @ S1 & S0 300/5 600/5
39 A 117 A
Z1 16 .0625
10 .1 79 A
6.15 .1625

Z0 33.3 .03 5,263 (69/161 KV) = 2,256 AMP @ 161 KV

20 .05 8,772
12.5 .08 14,035
-8.3
4.2 .24 14,035 BANK CONTRIBUTION
30 .03 1,754 69 KV SYSTEM CONTRIBUTION
3.7 .27 15,789 TOTAL FAULT CURRENT
12.3 (Z1 + Z2)
16.0 / 3 = 5.3

THEREFORE, IG = 836.8/.053 = 15,789 AMP @ 69 KV

(836.8 AMPERES FROM 100,000KVA / 69 x 1.732)

10-63
 Current Distribution
8620 A P S 1754 A
S P
T T
11,206 A 15789 A

2586 A 2891 A 2256 A 14,035 A

300/5 600/5 300/5 600/5

43 A 24 A 39 A 117 A

19 A 79 A

161 KV GRD. FAULT 69 KV GRD. FAULT

161 KV GRD. FAULT

8620 A 1200/5 1200/5 2891 A

T
11,206 A
P 2586 A 2891 A P

10.8 A 300/5 600/5 12 A

43 A 24 A

START START
G 19 A G

DIR DIR
G G
10.8 A 12 A

10-64
 CT SATURATION CAUSES REVERSED
POLARIZATION OF LINE GROUND RELAY
500 KV 161 KV
X

E
Z A
FAULT
C
CT SAT
C -G
CARRIER B C
500 KV
NEUTRAL
STA. NEUTRAL

BKR B C CURRENT

500 KV NEUTRAL

STA. NEUTRAL

LINE Z CARRIER
BKR. E C! CURRENT

500 KV NEUTRAL

STA. NEUTRAL

LINE Z CARRIER

10-65
 D.C. OFFSET

PRIMARY AND
A SECONDARY CURRENT

D.C. OFFSET NO SATURATION

PRIMARY CURRENT

SECONDARY CURRENT

D.C. OFFSET WITH SATURATION

161kV NEUTRAL REACTOR FAILURE

4
A!
B!
1200 MVA
161 KV C!

500 KV
400 MVA DITTO DITTO DITTO

NEUTRAL
REACTOR 400
FAILURE 1 MVA G 2
3

1
2

3
4
A!
B!
C!

6/22/84 4/27/85 6/10/85 6/29/85

10-66
 RESTRIKE PHENOMENA

VOLTAGE
DIELECTRIC

TIME a
INTERRUPTER
LIGHTNING RESTRIKE LINE BAYONET

b
LINE FAULT

c
BUS FAULT
TANK

10-67
 RESTRIKE

CLEARED WITHIN THE

INTERRUPTER

RESTRIKE

TANK FLASHOVER
FAULT TO TANK
(Bus Fault)

RESTRIKE ACROSS
INTERRUPTER

RESTRIKE : Fault not cleared

within the interrupter,
resulting in fault to tank
and destruction of breaker.

10-68
10-69
 P

P P
START G
0.5 A

G G DIR
G
1A

ASSUME PU OF
G G ALL GRD RELAYS

P P P P

300/5 600/5

G G G G

1A
G G G G

TO ALL GROUND RELAYS IN STATION

ZERO CURRENT FLOW

P

P P
START G
0.5 A

G G DIR
G
1A

ASSUME PU OF
G G ALL GRD RELAYS

P P P P

300/5 600/5

G G G G

1A
G G G G

TO ALL GROUND RELAYS IN STATION

10-70
AIR BLAST BREAKER

X
LINE RELAYS

RESISTOR FAILED
B.F. RELAYS

10-71
10-72
 Va
Vb
Vc

CHARLESTON
Ic BOWATER ATHENS
Vb ATH

Ir
In
MOTORS

Va
Vb
Vc
CHARLESTON

Ic BOWATER ATHENS
Vb ATH

Ir
In
MOTORS

10-73
 Va
Vb
Vc

CHARLESTON
Ic BOWATER ATHENS
Vb ATH
UNDER FREQ = 58HZ
Ir TRIP TIME = 40CY
UNDER VOLT = 85%
In
MOTORS TRIP TIME = 60CY

Cranbrook 500 kV Substation

To 230 kV

DFR DFR

5L92 5L94

5MB1

87 87
B BS Lightning
Arrestor

Transformer
T1
To 230 kV

10-74
A Real World Signal (During Lightning Storm)

Surge arrester conduction

5L94 Line protection near miss Fwd fault detector
Received permissive Trip

5MB1 Bus Protection Undesirable Trip

10-75
 11
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 11
Transmission Station Design

Stanley H. Horowitz

Consultant
3143 Griggsview Court
Columbus, OH 43221
11-1
Simplest, least cost, least flexible maintenance, requires outage of line.

11-2
To maintain a breaker switch all breakers to bus 1, bypass the breaker
and use bus tie breaker as line breaker. During switching, Bus differential is
disabled. Bus tie line relays must accommodate all settings.

11-3
Most expensive. Most flexible..
No switching required.
Allows any bus or breaker to be removed without outage
Bus fault affects only one bus.

11-4
Usually a breaker-and a-half station in transit.

No switching required for breaker maintenance.

A permanent line fault will split the system

11-5
Breaker-and-a-half is most commonly used EHV bus arrangement . Allows same
flexibility as 2-bus,2-breaker scheme at lower cost.
No switching required for maintenance
Bus faults do not effect system integrity

11-6
Actually the line relays consists of duplicate primary and backup relays.
The middle breaker, therefore, has 4 set of CTs plus metering.
No switching required for maintenance.

11-7
Loss of remote ends results in loss of intermediate loads.

As systems mature it is increasingly difficult for remote ends to see all faults
because of infeed.

Major problem is unequal CT core saturation

11-8
When conditions are normal, the bridge is balanced and no current flows in the relay.
When an external fault occurs, if all of the CT!s reproduce the current accurately, the
is still balanced.
When an internal fault occurs, the balance is disrupted and current will flow through the
relay.
If the CT!s do not reproduce the current accurately, the error will flow through the relay
and it must be set above this error.

11-9
 Avoids reduced protection from setting above error current
Relays have restraint and operating coils
Use one restraint coil for each phase of each source circuit
Use on operating coil per phase
Required operating current is proportional to the current in the restraint windings

11-10
This relay design avoids the CT core saturation by assuming
complete CT saturation

The relay discriminates between internal and external faults by the relative
magnitude of the voltage across junction points

11-11
External fault on line C-CT will saturate
and produce no secondary current.

Internal fault on bus, no CT saturation

11-12
 V87B =2 x 60 a = 120 volts

Set relay above 120 v (say 240 v.)

11-13
V 87B = 70 x 2600 = 182 kV
Limited by the variable resistor

11-14
Uses Linear couplers (air core mutual reactors)

Secondaries are connected in series

No iron, therefore, no saturation
Problem is it is a special device, very low energy output
Problem with bus changes

11-15
Moderately high impedance relay is a variation of the High Impedance relay.
Directional Impedance relay looks back through the bus a short distance into
connected circuits. Requires directional, relay fault detector and timer. All
contacts connected in series.

Partial bus differential set above unmetered load.

11-16
Modern Power System Protection: Applications

12
and Performance Analysis

TAB 12
Bus, Capacitor, and Reactor Protection

John R. Boyle

Principal Engineer
PSA/Power System Analysts
496 Pine Ridge Drive
Signal Mountain, TN 37377
 !"#$%&'(()*+(
&,,&-./0/-!+(

TYPICAL BUS ARRANGEMENTS

SINGLE BREAKER - SINGLE BUS

DOUBLE BUS WITH BUS TIE
DOUBLE BUS - SINGLE BREAKER
DOUBLE BUS - DOUBLE BREAKER
RING BUS
BREAKER - AND - A - HALF BUS
BUS & TRANSFORMER - SINGLE BKR.
MAIN AND TRANSFER BUS
ZIG - ZAG BUS

12-1
 SINGLE BREAKER - SINGLE BUS
1 2

BUS DIFF ZONE

A B

BUS

C D

3 4

FIGURE B1

SINGLE BREAKER - SINGLE BUS

FIGURE B1
POSITIVE COMMENTS
THE MOST BASIC
SIMPLE
ECONOMICAL
NEGATIVE COMMENTS
NO OPERATING FLEXIBILITY
ALL BKRS. MUST OPEN
FOR BUS FAULTS
CKT. MUST BE REMOVED FOR
MAINTENANCE OR PROBLEMS

12-2
 DOUBLE BUS WITH BUS TIE
BUS A DIFF ZONE
BUS B DIFF ZONE

BUS A BUS B
T

F1 F2 F3 F4

1 2 3 4

FIGURE B2

DOUBLE BUS WITH BUS TIE

FIGURE B2
USED WHERE TWO LINES
FEED TWO BUSES
IF ONE LINE LOST LOAD
TRANSFERRED TO GOOD LINE
IF ONE BUS LOST PARTIAL
SERVICE STILL AVAILABLE
CIRCUIT MUST BE REMOVED FOR
MAINTENANCE OR PROBLEMS
BKR."T" FAILURE WILL DEENERGIZE
BUSES "A" AND "B"

12-3
DOUBLE BUS - SINGLE BREAKER

BUS 1 DIFF ZONE

F1 F2

BUS 1

BUS 2

F3 F4
BUS 2 DIFF ZONE

FIGURE B3
(NORMAL)

DOUBLE BUS - SINGLE BREAKER

F1 F2

BUS 1

BUS 2

F3 F4
BUS 2 DIFF
ZONE

FIGURE B4
(F1 OFF LINE)

12-4
DOUBLE BUS - SINGLE BREAKER
FIGURES B3 AND B4

HIGH FLEXIBILITY

ANY LINE CAN BE OPERATED FROM

ANY BUS

ONE BUS CAN BE USED AS

TRANSFER BUS

DOUBLE BUS - SINGLE BREAKER

FIGURES B3 AND B4
DISADVANTAGES
COMPLICATED SWITCHING
BUS DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION
LINE PROTECTION
TIE BREAKER RELAYS MUST BE
SUITABLE FOR EACH CIRCUIT
WHEN LINE BREAKER BYPASSED,
DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION MUST BE
REMOVED FROM ONE BUS
FAULTS IN TIE BREAKER MUST TRIP ALL
BREAKERS

12-5
 DOUBLE BUS - DOUBLE BREAKER
BUS 1 DIFF. ZONE
BUS 1

A1 B1 C1

A2 B2 C2

BUS 2
BUS 2 DIFF. ZONE

FIGURE B5

DOUBLE BUS - DOUBLE BREAKER

FIGURE B5
VERY HIGH FLEXIBILITY
ALL SWITCHING DONE WITH BREAKERS
EITHER BUS CAN BE REMOVED
BUS FAULT DOES NOT INTERRUPT SERVICE
BREAKER FAILURE ONLY INTERRUPTS
FAULTED LINE
DISADVANTAGES
TWO BKRS. OPERATE TO CLEAR LINE FAULTS
LINE PROTECTION FROM TWO CT'S
DURING BREAKER MAINTENANCE RELAYS
REMAIN IN SERVICE
LINE SIDE PT'S REQUIRED

12-6
 RING BUS

LINE 2

A B

LINE 1 1 2
4 3 LINE 3

C D

LINE 4

FIGURE B6

RING BUS
ADD LINE 5 AND BREAKER "E"
LINE 2 LINE 5

A E B

LINE 1 1
2
4 5 3 LINE 3

C D

LINE 4

FIGURE B7

12-7
 RING BUS
FIGURES B6 AND B7

ADVANTAGES
HIGH FLEXIBILITY
MORE COMMON AT HIGH VOLTAGES
MINIMUM NUMBER OF BREAKERS
ECONOMICAL
EASY TO EXPAND RING (FIGURE B7)

RING BUS
FIGURES B6 AND B7

DISADVANTAGES
WITH RING OPEN (BKR. MAINTENANCE), A
FAULT MAY SPLIT RING
FOR A BREAKER FAILURE A REMOTE
BREAKER MUST CLEAR THE FAULT
DURING BREAKER MAINTENANCE RELAYS
MUST REMAIN IN SERVICE
MUST USE LINE PT'S
ALL FAULTS MUST TRIP TWO BREAKERS
CURRENTS IN LOOP MAY NOT BALANCE

12-8
BREAKER - AND - A - HALF
BUS 1 DIFF ZONE

BUS 1

T T

LINE 1 LINE 2

BANK
T T
DIFF
ZONE

LINE 3

T T

BUS 2

BUS 2 DIFF ZONE

FIGURE B8

BREAKER - AND - A - HALF

BUS 1 DIFF ZONE

BUS 1

T T

LINE 1 LINE 2

BANK
T T
DIFF
ZONE

LINE 3

T T

BUS 2

BUS 2 DIFF ZONE

FIGURE B8

12-9
 BREAKER - AND - A - HALF
FIGURE B9

COMMENTS
GOOD OPERATING FLEXIBILITY
REQUIRES MORE BKRS. THAN RING BUS
LINE SIDE POTENTIALS
RELAYS MUST REMAIN IN SERVICE
FOR BREAKER OUTAGE
"B2" OUT FOR MAINT. A FAULT ON
LINE 2 WILL ALSO INTERRUPT LINE 3
A BUS FAULT WILL NOT INTERRUPT
LINES

12-10
 MAIN AND TRANSFER
BUS

MAIN AND TRANSFER BUS

161 KV MAIN BUS

LR LR
SR

A C
LO

BK
B I

TRANSFER
BUS

BUS
LO BK
OC I
13 KV
BK
69 KV
FIGURE B10

12-11
 A C

MAIN
BUS
BUS

B
BK

13 KV

69 KV

MAIN AND TRANSFER BUS

161 KV MAIN BUS

LR LR
SR

A C
LO

BK 1A 1A
B I

2A TRANSFER
BUS

BUS
2A LO BK
3.5A OC I
13 KV 2A BK POSITION
BK NORMAL
1.75A 69 KV 1.75A

FIGURE B11

12-12
 MAIN AND TRANSFER BUS
161 KV MAIN BUS

LR LR
SR
A C
LO

BK 1A 1A
B I

2A TRANSFER
BUS

BUS
2A LO BK
3.5A OC I
13 KV 2A INTERMEDIATE
BK POSITION
69 KV 1.75A
1.75A

FIGURE B12

A C

MAIN
BUS

B
BK

13 KV

69 KV

12-13
 MAIN AND TRANSFER BUS

161 KV MAIN BUS

LR LR
SR
A C
LO

BK 1A 1A
B I
Z
TRANSFER
BUS

Y X BUS
LO BK
3.5A OC I
13 KV 2A INTERMEDIATE
BK LO SEQUENCE
1.75A 69 KV 1.75A

FIGURE B13

MAIN AND TRANSFER BUS

161 KV MAIN BUS

LR LR
SR

A C
LO

BK 0.5A 1A
B I
Z
0.5A TRANSFER
BUS

1A
Y X BUS
LO BK
3.5A OC I
13 KV 2A BKRS A & B
BK PARALLELED
69 KV 1.75A
1.75A

FIGURE B14

12-14
 TRANSFER
BUS

B A C
L L
S

MAIN
BUS

BK

13 KV

69 KV

MAIN AND TRANSFER BUS

161 KV MAIN BUS

LR LR
SR
A C
LO

BK 1A
B I
Z
1A TRANSFER
BUS

1A
Y X BUS
LO BK
3.5A OC I
13 KV 2A SWITCHING
BK FINISHED
69 KV 1.75A
1.75A

FIGURE B15

12-15
 TRANSFER
BUS

B A C
L L
S

MAIN
BUS

BK

13 KV

69 KV

SPARE OUT BREAKER "A"

•!NORMAL
•!SELECTOR SWITCH IN THE BANK "BK" POSITION
•! ( FIG B11 )
•!START ( FIG B12 )
•!OPEN TRIP - CUT - OUT - SWITCH "TCO" TO BOTH BUS
AND BANK DIFF. RELAYS
PLACE SELECTOR SWITCH IN THE INTERMEDIATE "INT"
POSITION
•!CLOSE "TCO" TO BANK DIFFERENTIAL RELAY
•!DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION IS NOW EXTENDED TO
LINE SIDE CTS AND THE LOW SIDE OF EACH
TRANSFORMER WINDING

12-16
 LINE "OFF" SEQUENCE FIGURE B13

•!CLOSE SW. "X" TO PLACE BANK ON MAIN BUS

•!NOTE: WITH THE SELECTOR SWITCH IN THE "BK"
POSITION THE CTS AROUND BREAKER "B" ARE
SHORTED TOGETHER AND CLOSING " X " DOES NOT
AFFECT THE DIFFERENTIAL CURRENT BALANCE
•!OPEN SW. "Y". THIS LEAVES BREAKER "B"
•!ENERGIZING THE TRANSFER BUS
•!OPEN BANK TCO
•!PLACE SELECTOR SWITCH IN THE "LINE OFF" (LO)
•!POSITION
•!CLOSE BANK TCO

FINISH SWITCHING SEQUENCE

•!SETUP SPARE RELAYS (SR) TO PROTECT LINE "A"

(INDIVIDUAL SELECTOR SW NOT SHOWN)
•!CLOSE SPARE RELAY TRIP - CUT - OUT SWITCH
•!TRIP BKR "B" BY ONE OF THE SPARE RELAYS
•!CLOSE BREAKER "B"
•!OPEN "a" SW OF BREAKER "A"
(PREVENTS AUTOMATIC RECLOSING)
•!CLOSE SWITCH "Z" WHICH PARALLELS BRKS "A" & "B"
NOTE: CURRENT MAY DIVIDE IN BOTH BREAKERS BUT
THE SUM WILL STILL BALANCE THE BK. DIFF. (FIG. B14)
•!CHECK THAT ALL THREE PHASE CURRENTS ARE
PRESENT IN BREAKER "B".
•!OPEN BREAKER "A"

12-17
12-18
 +,-./011-,2#34*5+.14),4#4*3657+#
!"!#$%#

!'#$%#

'(#)%*#
"(#)%*#

'(#)%*#

"&#$%#
!#

389::/;<=><=?#39@=ABC9D:9#6DE:>@=F:#
,GH<I@J:=K#
P# S#
T#

GIVEN: (MANUFACTURE INFORMATION)#

Zps=IMPEDANCE BETWEEN PRIMARY WINDING “P” #
AND SECONDARY WINDING “S”#
Zpt=IMP. BETWEEN “P” AND TERTIARY WINDING “T”#
Zst=IMP. BETWEEN “S” AND TRETIARY WINDING “T”#

L#

12-19
3ME<F@J#%@JH:AN#!"!O"&O!'PI#39@=ABC9D:9#6DE:>@=F:#C=#6KA#1;=#
Q@A:#
GIVEN: MVA RATING = 60 / 80 / 100#
161 / 69 = 60 MVA#
161 / 13 = 30 MVA#
69 / 13 = 30 MVA#
Zps = 9%, Zpt = 13%, Zst = 3.5%#

100MVABASE
# #
Zps = 15%, Zpt = 43.3%, Zst = 11.67%#

CALCULATIONS#
Zp = 1/2 (+15 + 43.3 - 11.67) = +23.3%#
Zs = 1/2 (+15 - 43.3 + 11.67) = - 8.3%#
Zt = 1/2 ( -15 + 43.3 - 11.67) = +20.0%#
'#

513,S#.*T-3#0T44,53#0*-0T-*3615+#*4,#Q*+,2#
+,-./011-,2#4*3657#1.#34*5+.14),4#
!"!#$%#

!'#$%#

R(#)%*#
!((#)%*#

R(#)%*#

4,-*U#VT#Q*+,2#15#W.1*X#4*3657+#
"&#$%#
Y#

12-20
 0@JFHJ@ZC=A#
161 KV# BANK# 69 KV#
SYS# SYS#

1.0# 23.3# - 8.3# INFINITE#

Z1#and Z 2# #
P1# S1#

I 3PHASE = 1.0+23.3+20 = 44.3%

20#
I13KV = 4441 (BASE AMP @100MVA)
0.4333#
= 10,256 AMPERES @ 13KV

= 828 AMPERES @ 161 KV

NOTE: FULL LOAD @ 161 KV = 100,000 = 372 AMP X 1.25 = 465 AMP
161X 3# (APPROX. RELAY P.U.)
161 KV RELAY PU FOR 13 KV FAULT = 828 / 465 = 1.78 #

R#

+1-T3615######

Q4,*$,4##.*6-T4,##4,-*U+##65+3*--,2##15##*--###
############################!'#$%##Q4,*$,4+##

"#

12-21
 741T52#Q*5$#+6[,#
3UV60*--U#[67/[*7#741T52657#Q*5$+#*4,#+6[,2#+1#3\*3#W[(X#6+##
51#-*47,4#3\*5#'#36),+#3\,#V1+636%,##%*-T,#31#V4,%,53#3\,##
T5.*T-3,2#V\*+,+#.41)#,]0,,2657#!^'#V,4#T563#%1-3*7,^#

3\,4.14,S##[!##_##[L#`#Y'^'a##_#[(#`#'#]#Y'^'#`#!'(a#
.41)#3\6+##67#`#######YYY!#*)V,4,+############`####"!R!#*)V,4,+#b#!'#$%#
#############################(^Y''##c#(^Y''#c#!^'(#O#'##
#
.41)##67###`##'#6(###`#6!##c##6L##c##6(####S##6!###_##6L####_##6(###`#"!R!##`#L(R(##*)V,4,+#
############################################################################################'#
3\T+#S######L(R(##*)V,4,+######`###Lde#*)V,4,+##65#!"!#$%#V\*+,#W03f+X##
##################!"!#O#!^e'###
####################!'#
#
#

e#

Lde#*# Lde#*#
!"!#$%#

!'#$%#

]# '(#)%*#
"(#)%*#

"!R!#*#

'(#)%*#
5#

"&#$%#
d#

12-22
GROUNDING BANKS

GROUNDING BANK
13 KV

161 KV

c
a A
69 KV
b C
B

51N
FIGURE Z 1

12-23
 ZIG – ZAG GROUNDING BANK
13 KV

161 KV

A
69 KV
C
b B
a

51N
FIGURE Z 2

ZIG – ZAG GROUNDING BANK

13 KV

161 KV

a b c c

A
69 KV
C
b B
a
A B C

51N
FIGURE Z 2

12-24
Overcurrent relays are commonly used to provide protection for
grounding banks as shown in figure 9.33c

ZIG – ZAG OVERCURRENT PROTECTION

51

51 51

51N FIGURE 9.33c

ZIG – ZAG DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

51N
FIGURE Z 3

12-25
 ZIG – ZAG GROUNDING BANK
0A
0A
900 A x
15 A
51

51 51
15 A
900 A NOTE: ALL CT!S
300 / 5

NO 900 A EXTERNAL FAULT

15 A
51N
FIGURE Z 5

ZIG – ZAG GROUNDING BANK

1 1
0
2 2 2 2
0
1
x 5A
1

5A 300A=I 0
900 A 51
5A 5A 300A=I 0
3I0

51 51
300 A 300 A 300 A NOTE: ALL CT!S
300 / 5

900 A EXTERNAL FAULT

15 A
51N
FIGURE Z 6

12-26
 ZIG – ZAG GROUNDING BANK
1 1
0
2 2 2 2
0
1 1
10 A 5A
300A=I 0
5A 51 300A=I 0
600 A 5A 5A
15A
15A
900 A x 51 51

300 A 300 A 300 A NOTE: ALL CT!S

300 / 5

900 A INTERNAL FAULT

15 A
51N
FIGURE Z 7

ZIG – ZAG DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

X
900 A 5A 5A 5A
15 A

3I0
5A 10 A 15 A

R
300 A 300 A 300 A O
0A
R
15 A
900 A
EXTERNAL FAULT
NOTE: ALL CT!S
15 A
300 / 5 51N
FIGURE Z 8

12-27
 ZIG – ZAG DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

0A
10 A 5A 5A
600 A
10 A
0A
900 A X
R
300 A 300 A 300 A O

15 A
R
900 A
INTERNAL FAULT
NOTE: ALL CT!S
51N 15 A
300 / 5 FIGURE Z 9

TWO ZIZ-ZAG BANKS IN PARALLEL

51 51

51 51 51 51

51N

FIGURE Z 10

12-28
 ZIG-ZAG GRD. BANK RATINGS

•! ZERO SEQ. IMP. OF BANK CALCULATED ON 100 MVA

BASE

•! FOR SINGLE GRD. BANK TRANSFORMER

Z0 / Z1 = 3 OR LESS

•! FOR TWO GRD. BANKS IN PARALLEL

Z0 / Z1 = 2 OR LESS.
THEREFORE, DURING AN EMERGENCY WITH ONLY
ONE BANK IN SERVICE Z0 / Z1 = 4 OR LESS

FIGURE Z 11

CONSIDER ONE ZIG-ZAG BANK

•!ASSUME Z1 = 21 % ON 100 MVA BASE

THEN Z0 = 3 X 21 = 63 % (FOR ONE GRD. BANK)

•!I = 100,000 / 13.2 ( 1.73 ) = 4374 AMPERES. THEREFORE:

IG = 4374 / ( Z1 + Z2 + Z0 ) / 3 ( NOTE: ALL "Z# IN PU )
Z1 = 21%, Z2 = 21%, Z0 = 63% : SUM = 105% ( PU = 1.05 )

•!THEREFORE:
IG = 4374 / 1.05 / 3 = 12,497 A
PURCHASE ZIG – ZAG BANK WITH
A 10 SECOND RATING = 13,000 A
ASSUME A LOAD UNBALANCE NOT TO EXCEED A
CONTINUOUS RATING OF 200A PER PHASE
OR 600A IN NEUTRAL
FIGURE Z 12

12-29
CONSIDER TWO ZIG-ZAG BANKS

ASSUME Z1 = 21% ON 100 MVA BASE

THEREFORE, Z0 = 2X 21 = 42% FOR TWO BANKS

TWO BANKS: ( AT 13.2 KV )

FROM : IG = 4374 / ( Z1 + Z2 + Z0 ) / 3
Z1 = 21%, Z2 = 21%, Z0 = 42% : SUM = 84% ( PU = 0.84 )

THEREFORE, IG = 4374 / 0.84 / 3 = 15,620 A

CURRENT IN EACH BANK = ( 15,620 A ) / 2 = 7,810 A

FIGURE Z 13

CONSIDER TWO ZIG-ZAG BANKS

ASSUME ONE BANK REMOVED FROM SERVICE

THEN Z0 = 4 X 21 = 84%

Z1 = 21%, Z2 = 21%, Z0 = 84% : SUM = 126 ( PU = 1.26 )

IG = 4374 / 1.26 / 3 = 10,414 A

( NOTE: 10 SECOND RATING FOR TWO BANKS IS

BASED ON ONE BANK NEUTRAL CURRENT OF 10,414 A.
NOT 7,810 A AS SHOWWN ON PREVIOUS SLIDE.

FIGURE Z 14

12-30
 !"#$$%&'()*(+',$

5 OHMS BUS & B.U.

120 KV

A 26
Z3
21 OHMS 21

66.4 KV

C
RELAY REACH @ BREAKER !A"
120,000 / 2554 A = 47 OHMS
26 OHMS

X FAULT = 2554 A
D ON 230 KV SYS.

12-31
 5 OHMS BUS & B.U.
116.8 KV

A A
1600 A 1600 A
21 OHMS 21 OHMS
52
Z3
B B

21

83.2 KV
C
RELAY REACH @ BREAKER !A"
116,800 / 1600 A = 73 OHMS
26 OHMS
THIS IS CALLED !APPARENT OHMS"
ACTUAL OHMS = 47 OHMS
X FAULT = 3200 A
D ON 230 KV SYS.

5 OHMS BUS & B.U.

116.8 KV Z3
1 2 3 G
A A
1600 A 1600 A
52
21 OHMS 21 OHMS
B
B B
21
1 2 3 G Z2
A
83.2 KV

26 OHMS !Z3" RELAY REACH @ BREAKER !B"

83,200 / 1600 A = APPARENT 52 OHMS
X FAULT = 3200 A REDUCED FROM 73 OHMS
D ON 230 KV SYS. AT BREAKER !A"
( LOCAL CLEARING )

12-32
 BUS & B.U.

SINGLE BREAKER - SINGLE BUS

NO OPERATING FLEXIBILITY
BUS FAULT CLEARS ALL LINES
BKR. MAINTENANCE TAKES LINE OUT
MINIMAL COST

BUS & B.U.

C
RELAYS AT !A" CAN NO
LONGER REACH FAULT AT !D"

X
D

12-33
 DOUBLE BUS WITH BUS TIE BUS A

BUS B

PROVIDES FLEXIBILITY WHERE TWO

LINES TERMINATE ON SAME BUS

BUS A TIE BREAKER COMMON MODE FAILURE

ZIG - ZAG BUS WITH BUS TIE

12-34
 ZIG - ZAG BUS WITH TRANSFER BUS

TRANSFER BUS

BU

S
BU

ZIG - ZAG BUS BREAKER FAILURE & B.U.

OHMS
15 23 9 4
BF Z1 Z2 Z3 G

TRANSFER BUS

G Z2 Z1

S
BU

12-35
 ZIG - ZAG BUS BREAKER FAILURE & B.U.
OHMS
15 23 9 4
BF Z1 Z2 Z3 G

TRANSFER BUS

G Z2 Z1

S
BU

ZIG - ZAG BUS BREAKER FAILURE & B.U.

OHMS
15 23 9 4
BF Z1 Z2 Z3 G

TRANSFER BUS

G Z2 Z1

S
BU

12-36
 BREAKER - & - A - HALF BUS

! N0 !

BREAKER - & - A - HALF BUS

BUS X

E CONSIDER

B A BREAKER !D" OPEN

FOR MAINTENANCE

F FAULT ON LINE !B"

TRIPS BKRS !E" & !F"
A DEENERGIZES BK. !Z"

D OPEN

BK Z
BUS Y

12-37
 BREAKER - & - A - HALF BUS
BUS X
CONSIDER

X
E OPEN X
J H BREAKER !H" FAILURE
BK T BUS !X" BKRS
!E" & !J" OPEN

F X
G BREAKER !G" OPENS
DEENERGIZING BK !T"

NOTE: NO LINES LOST

D & !BK Z" IS RETAINED
ON BUS !Y"
BK Z
BUS Y

RING BUS

A D
ZA ZB OC ZD

DIFF

12-38
 RING BUS

B E

A D
ZA ZB OC ZF ZD
ZE

DIFF
F

FREE STANDING CTS

A B

R
R

BUS
DIFF
BK R
DIFF

12-39
12-40
 BUS DIFFERENTIAL
•! HIGH IMPEDANCE
–! Pros and Cons
•! LOW IMPEDANCE
–! Pros and Cons
•! CONCLUSIONS

•! Dr. Juergen Holback, Siemans Energy

LOW IMPEDANCE BUS DIFFERENTIAL SCHEME

NUMERICAL RELAY

I1#

I2#
I1#+ I1# + I1# + I1# = IDIFF
I3#

I4#

I1 I2 I3 I4

CAN ACCOMMODATE DIFFERENT CT RATIOS

12-41
 I differential

TRIP AREA

Min Diff Slope

Pick up
I restraint

PERCENT RESTRAINT

I differential

TRIP AREA

Min Diff Slope 1 Slope 2

Pick up
I restraint

PERCENT RESTRAINT WITH SECOND SLOPE

12-42
 CT "X#

BUS
DIFF
CT "Y# CT "X#

FAULT X

12
11 2
10 TRIP
9
8 5
7
6
5
4 HIGH
3 FAULT
2 RESTAIN
1 1
0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
6

RCT = 0.5 OHM

RRELAY = 0.01 OHM
RSTAB = 200 OHM

( I1+ I2 + I3 ) * ( I - K )
RRELAY
RCT
RSTAB

X FAULT ( I1+ I2 + I3 ) * ( K )
I1 I2 I3 I4
RCT RRELAY + RSTAB
K =
RRELAY + RSTAB
0.5 * ( 0.01 + 200 )
0.5 + ( 0.01 + 200 )
K = = 0.0025
0.01 + 200

12-43
 X FAULT

IM IM IM
RRELAY
RCT
VARISTOR RSTAB

NO SOURCE INPUT 800V

I1
( WORST CASE )
400V
40 AMP X 200 OHM = 8000 V TRANSFORMER

VOLTAGE
EXCITATION CURVE
VARISTOR CLIP VOLTAGE 800 V
ASSUME CT!S C400
MAGNITZING CURRENT HIGH

0.1 1.0 10 100

EXCITATION CURRENT

X FAULT

IM IM IM
RRELAY
RCT
VARISTOR RSTAB

I1 NO SOURCE INPUT
( WORST CASE )
800V
40 AMP X 200 OHM = 8000 V TRANSFORMER
EXCITATION CURVE
VARISTOR CLIP VOLTAGE 400 V 400V
ASSUME CT!S C800
VOLTAGE

MAGNITZING CURRENT HIGH

0.1 1.0 10 100

EXCITATION CURRENT

12-44
REQUIREMENTS FOR HIGH IMPEDANCE DIFFERENTIAL RELAYS

1.! ALL TRANSFORMERS MUST HAVE SAME RATIO

2.! CT!S SHOULD HAVE A LOW MAGNITIZING CURRENT (INTERNAL FAULTS)

3.! WIRING RESISTANCE FROM CT!S TO JUNCTION POINT MUST BE LOW

4.! WIRING INSULATION MUST BE RATED HIGER THAN THE VARISTOR VOLTAGE LIMIT

5.! CT!S SHOULD NOT BE SHARED WITH OTHER APPLICATIONS

6.! EACH BUS ZONE NEEDS A DEDICATED RELAY WITH DEDICATED CT!S

ADVANTAGES OF THE LOW IMPEDANCE PRINCIPAL

1.! CT!S CAN BE SHARED WITH OTHER APPLICATIONS (FEEDER PROTECTION)

2.! FAULT ANALYSIS IS AVALIBLE BECAUSE ALL CURRENTS ARE RECORDED

3.! HIGH VOLTAGE SPIKES ARE NOT PRODUCED

4.! COMMISSIONING AND INSTALLATION IS EASIER

5.! ASSIGNMET OF FEEDER CURRENTS TO A BUS ZONE ON COMPLEX SYSTEMS

IS MANAGED INSIDE THE NUMERICAL RELAY AND DOES NOT REQUIRE

SWITCHING OF CT!S

12-45
12-46
 !"#"!$%&'((#'&%)!%$&*(

PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS

•! CAPACITOR UNITS SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF CONTINUOUS

OPERATION TO 110 % rms VOLTAGE (INCLUDE. HARMONICS)
AND CARRY 135 % OF NOMINAL CURRENT.
•!THE 135 % RATING MUST INCLUDE THE COMBINED
EFFECTS OF:

1 ) VOLTAGES UP TO 110 % RATED rms

2 ) HARMONIC VOLTAGES SUPERIMPOSED ON THE
FUNDAMENTAL FREQUENCY
3 ) REACTIVE POWER MANUF. TOLERANCE UP TO 115%
RATED REACTIVE POWER.

12-47
 BASIC CAPACITOR BANK CONNECTIONS

DELTA UNGRD WYE GRDED WYE

DISTRIBUTION CAPACITOR PROTECTION

UNGROUNDED
A
A A

B B

C
C C
!CAN" FAILURE AT !B" RESULTS IN A 1.73 % INCREASE
IN VOLTAGE & CURRENT ACROSS CAPACITORS !A" & !C"
AND A 3 FOLD INCREASE IN POWER CONSUMPTION ON
REMAINING CAPACITORS AT !A" & !C" UNTIL !B" FUSE
OPENS. THEN VOLTAGE REDUCES TO 0.867 OF NOMINAL

12-48
 DISTRIBUTION CAPACITOR PROTECTION
GROUNDED

A A

C C
!CAN" FAILURE AT !B" RESULTS IN A BLOWN FUSE AT
!B" AND NOMINAL VOLTAGE ACROSS REMAINING FUSES.
HOWEVER, SYSTEM IS SUBJECTED TO HIGH GROUND
FAULTS AT THE STATION.

DISTRIBUTION CAPACITOR PROTECTION

GROUNDED
A

SOLUTION:
PLACE TWO CANS IN
SERIES PER PHASE
C

12-49
 DISTRIBUTION CAPACITOR PROTECTION
UNGROUNDED
A

C
PARALLEL CONNECTION
OF CAPACITOR UNITS

12-50
 EXTERNALLY FUSED CAPACITORS

EARLIER UNITS NEEDED FUSES BECAUSE PCB SOAKED KRAFT

PAPER MADE THE UNITS VULNERABLE TO CASE RUPTURE.
MANY LAYERS NEEDED TO INSURE ADEQUATE INSULATION.

IN THE EVENT OF A PUNCTURE THE PAPER CHARRED, THE

ELECTRODES KEPT SEPARATED AND A SUSTAINED ARCING
RESULTED IN GASSING AND POTENTIAL CASE RUPTURE.
(REFER TO NEXT SLIDE)

PERCEIVED ADVANTAGE BECAUSE A BAD UNIT CAN BE DETECTED

BY A BLOWN FUSE. HOWEVER, IT MAY HAVE TO BE TAKEN OUT
OF SERVICE AND REPLACED TO PREVENT OTHER CAPACITOR
FAILURES CAUSED BY OVERVOLTAGE. CONTAMINATION AND
CORROSION REDUCE THE RELIABILITY OF EXTERNAL FUSES
REQUIRING PERIODIC REPLACEMENT. EXTERNAL FUSE EXPOSURE
MAY CAUSE UNDESIRABLE FLASHOVERS AND BANK OPERATIONS

12-51
 CAPACITOR FUSING
CAPACITOR UNIT CASE RUPTURE WILL
BE AVOIDED IF, FOR ALL NUMBER OF
SERIES GROUPS OF PACKS SHORTED,
THE TOTAL CLEARING TIME OF THE
FUSE IS LESS THAN THE TIME
PERMITTED ON THE CASE RUPTURE
CURVE.

CAPACITOR FUSING

TO ACHIEVE PROMPT ISOLATION OF A

FAILING CAPACITOR UNIT, SELECT THE
SMALLEST PRACTICAL CAPACITOR BANK
FUSE AMPERE RATING.

12-52
 CAPACITOR FUSING

THE SMALLEST FUSE MAY BE SUBJECT TO

NUISANCE-MELT WHEN EXPOSED TO TRANSIENT
OUTRUSH CURRENTS WHICH CAN OCCUR WHEN:

!!NEARBY BANKS ARE REPEATEDLY ENERGIZED

!!NEARBY SYSTEM FAULTS RESULT IN HIGH

CAPACITOR CURRENTS

12-53
 CAPACITOR FUSING

TRANSIENT INRUSH FORMULA:

I2t = kE2 C3
L

E = Peak L-L Voltage

C = Capacitance In Farads
L = Inductance Of Oscillatory Circuit In Henrys
k = 3.7 which represents an inrush current damping
factor of 0.81 which is appropriate for
overhead distribution systems.

TRANSIENT INRUSH FORMULA:

I2t = kE2 C3
L
EXAMPLE:
Single 1200 KVAR , 13.8 kv , With Two 200KVAR Capacitor Units
Per Phase with an available station short circuit current of 5000 amperes

The I2t = 630 ampere-squared seconds.

The unpreloaded high frequency surge I2t capability of the capacitor

bank fuse will range from 5,500 to 15,700 ampere-squared seconds.

12-54
 CAPACITOR FUSING
Example: Outrush Currents For Nearby Faults

600 Kvar, 13.8 kv bank grounded wye

A phase-to-phase fault can occur as close as

166 feet from a capacitor bank and not
produce an nuisance operation of a capacitor
bank fuse.

12-55
 69KV
Es
Es

BANK = 12 MVA Er IX
7% = 58% on I IR
13KV
100mva Base
Er Es
Es

Formula: IX
% Rise = Kvar ( jX) Er
I IR
105
Unity PF
! = 5400 (58) = 3.1 %
105

LARGE CAPACITOR PROTECTION

PHASE A B C
A

C 51

50

12-56
 GROUNDED UNBALANCED PROTECTION

•!PROVIDES NO COMPENSATION
FOR INHERENT CAPACITOR
BANK UNBALANCES

•!NEUTRAL CT MUST HAVE HIGH

RATIO TO WITHSTAND THE HIGH
CHARGING CURRENTS DURING
SWITCHING AND FAULTS.
THEREFORE, THIS SCHEME IS
51G NOT SENSITIVE TO ISOLATION
OF ONE CAPACITOR UNIT.

•!REQUIRES HARMONIC FILTER

TO PREVENT SENSING ERRORS
DUE TO SYSTEM HARMONIC
VOLTAGES.

UNGROUNDED UNBALANCED PROTECTION

•!PROVIDES COMPENSATION
FOR INHERENT CAPACITOR
BANK UNBALANCES

•!BLOCKS GROUND
HARMONIC CURRENTS

VR

12-57
 UNGROUNDED UNBALANCED PROTECTION
VLN
ASSUME 14 CANS IN EACH
PARALLEL GROUP

TASK:
CALCULATE VO FOR ONE CAN FAILURE

VO 3 P VLN
FROM: VO =
2 F + ( 3 S )( P-F )
VR

WHERE:
P = # OF CANS IN PARALLEL GROUP
VLN = LINE TO NEUTRAL VOLTAGE
F = # OF CANS !OUT" IN PARRALEL GROUP
S = # OF SERIES GROUPS

UNGROUNDED UNBALANCED PROTECTION

VLN
ASSUME 14 CANS IN EACH
PARALLEL GROUP
EXAMPLE:
VLN = 66,394 VOLTS (115 KV O TO O)
P = 14
F = 1
S = 3
V0
3 P VLN
FROM: VO =
VR 2 F + ( 3 S )( P-F )

VO = 23,433 VOLTS
23,433
VO PER UNIT =
22,130 (RATED)

VO PER UNIT = 1.059 = (5.9%)

12-58
 UNGROUNDED UNBALANCED PROTECTION
VLN EXAMPLE:
ASSUME 14 CANS IN EACH VLN = 66,394 VOLTS (115 KV O TO O)
PARALLEL GROUP P = 14
F = 2 ( CHANGE )
S = 3

3 P VLN
FROM: VO =
2 F + ( 3 S )( P-F )
VO
VO = 24,898 VOLTS
24,898
VO PER UNIT =
VR 22,130 (RATED)

VO PER UNIT = 1.125 = (12.5%)

F = 3 ( 11 CAPS IN ), VO P.U. = 1.20 = (20%)

NOTE: A 5% INCREASE IN SYSTEM VOLTAGE WILL
RESULT IN A 25% INCREASE IN VO ACROSS ALL
REMAINING 11 CAPACITORS IN THE PARALLEL GROUP

UNGROUNDED UNBALANCED PROTECTION

VLN
ASSUME 14 CANS IN EACH
PARALLEL GROUP
TASK:
CALCULATE VR FOR ONE CAN FAILURE

F VLN
FROM: VR =
2 F + ( 3 S )( P-F )
VO
F =1
66,394
VR = = 558 VOLTS
VR 119
F =2
2 X 66,394
VR = = 1186 VOLTS
112

SET VR = ~ 1/2 ( 558 ) = 280 VOLTS TO !ALARM"

SET VR = ~ 1/2 ( 1186 - 558 ) + 558 = 872 VOLTS TO !TRIP"

12-59
12-60
 LARGE !EHV" CAPACITOR BANK
OVERCURRENT RELAYS
GROUNDED WYE MIN. PU.
52 50 135 % OF NOMINAL PHASE !I"
51N
51 UNGROUNDED WYE MIN. PU.
BUS DIFF 50 125 % OF NOMINAL PHASE !I"
51 INST. RELAYS SET TO OVERRIDE
INRUSH OR OUTRUSH TRANS.
59B REDUNDANT OVERCURRENTS
SHUNT
CAP. TRIP CAP. BANK INST. FOR
27B
BANK SEVERE OV CONDITIONS.
VOLT PROVIDE TIMER TO OVERRIDE
DIFF TRANSIENT OVERVOLTAGES
RELAY
DETECTS LOSS OF SYS. VOLT.
TRIPS WITH TIME DELAY
UNBAL
PROT
RELAY

LARGE !EHV" CAPACITOR BANK

PHASE DIFFERENTIAL
52 50 ADJUSTABLE TO DETECT
51N
51 THE LOSS OF ONE !CAN"
BUS DIFF 50 TYPICALLY
51 ONE CAN -- ALARM
TWO CANS -- TRIP
59B
SHUNT
CAP. UNBALANCE PROT.
27B
BANK
VOLT •!TRIP BANK QUICKLY TO
DIFF PREVENT CASCADING FAULT
RELAY •!PROVIDE EARLY DETECTION
OF FUSE OPERATIONS
•!TRIP BANK IF UNBALANCE
UNBAL LARGE ENOUGH TO DAMAGE
PROT CAPACITORS FROM
RELAY OVERVOLTAGES

12-61
 LARGE !EHV" CAPACITOR BANK
UNBALANCE CONTINUED
52 50 FAILURE TO PROVIDE MAY CAUSE:
51N
51
•!EXCESSIVE DAMAGE TO BANK
BUS DIFF 50 •!ADVERSE SYSTEM EFFECTS
51 •!DAMAGE TO OTHER EQUIPMENT
•!UNAVAILABILITY OF DAMAGED
59B EQUIPMENT
SHUNT •!CASE RUPTURE, DISCHARGE OF
CAP. LIQUID AND FIRE
27B
BANK
VOLT
DIFF
RELAY

UNBAL
PROT
RELAY

12-62
 A A

B B

C C

12-63
 INTERNALLY FUSE CAPACITORS

INTERNAL FUSES ARE CURRENT LIMITING FUSES WHICH ISOLATE

A DEFECTIVE UNIT AND ALLOW THE REMAINING UNITS TO
CONTINUE FUNCTIONING. TO REDUCE STRESS ON REMAINING
UNITS IN PARRALEL A LARGE NUMBER OF UNITS ARE
CONNECTED IN PARRALEL.

THE BENEFITS OF THIS TYPE OF INSTALLATION ARE:

ELIMATION OF EXTERNAL FUSES
FUSES OPERATE PROPERLY WITHOUT LARGE CLEARANCES
MORE COMPACT BANK DESIGN.
SIZE OF BANK NOT LIMITED TO THE SIZE OF EXTERNAL FUSE
COMPACT BANK DESIGN

12-64
 FUSELESS CAPACITORS

HIGH QUALITY INSULATING MATERIALS

USE ONLY A FEW LAYERS OF POLYPROPYLENE FILM.
A PUNCTURE CAUSES THE FILM TO DRAW BACK AND
THE ELECTRODES TO WELD TOGETHER SHORTING
OUT THE SERIES GROUP. ARCING IS ELIMATED.
NO GASSING AND NO CAN RUPTURE. THE UNIT STAYS
IN SERVICE UNTIL ADDITIONAL SERIES FAILURES
RESULTING IN UNIT REMOVAL BY RELAY ACTION.

MULTIFUNCTION NUMERICAL REALYS PLAY A

SIGNIFICANT ROLE IN THE PROTECTION OF FUSELESS
SHUNT CAPACITOR BANKS. REFER TO LATEST
REVISION OF ANSI/IEEE C37.99-1990 !GUIDE FOR
PROTECTION OF SHUNT CAPACITOR BANKS"

12-65
12-66
 !"#$%&!''(!&%"$%)&*'

!"#$%&!+'''',!-'.'%-("'
500 KV

13 KV
X

161 KV A A A

RES
PD PD PD

12-67
 !"#$%&!'''(!)'*'%)+"'',-%.'''/!(0'%!#1230'

RES
52
PHASE OV
SHIFTER
59
SUM - AMP
FIGURE 1

REACTOR DRY - TYPE WITH GRD. TRANSF.

RES
52 Phase
Shifter
OV
59
SUM - AMP
FIGURE 2

12-68
 VOLTAGE UNBALANCE SCHEME

TERTIARY BUS GROUND RELAY (59N) SET TO TRIP SOURCE

-RESPONSE OF REACTOR NEUTRAL VOLTAGE RELAY IMMATERIAL
IF 59N SET TO ALARM
-DESIREABLE TO KEEP REACTORS IN SERVICE
UNDER FAULT CONDITIONS
-NEUTRAL VOLTAGE AND BROKEN – DELTA VOLTAGE WILL BE HIGH
AND SHOULD CANCEL IN COMPARATOR CIRCUIT (FIGURE 1)
-COMARATOR MUST BE LINEAR UP TO THE MAXIMUM VOLTAGE
FAILURE OF VOLTAGES TO CANCEL COULD RESULT IN REACTOR TRIP

AN ALTERNATE SCHEME (FIGURE 2) KEEPS THE COMPARATOR FROM

SEEING THE LARGE NEUTRAL AND BROKEN DELTA VOLTAGES
-THE CONNECTION SUMS THE TWO VOLTAGES SO THAT THE
COMPATATOR SEES ONLY THE DIFFERENTIAL VOLAGE DURING
A REACTOR FAULT.

IF THE PHASE SHIFTER IS AFFECTED BY A TERTIARY BUS GROUND

FAULT, A PHASE –TO - PHASE RATHER THAN A PHASE – TO – GROUND
TRANSFORMER CAN BE USED AS ILLUSTRATED IN FIGURE 2

(!)''%)+"''!"#$%&!2''%4!1*%&*'%4!1''
3#45%2'

VOLTAGE SIGNAL BETWEEN NEUTRAL

CONNECTION OF REACTOR AND GROUND
CAN BE THE RESULT OF:

•! REACTOR BANK UNBALANCE DUE TO A FAULTED REACTOR

•!REACTOR UNBALANCE DUE TO MANUF. TOLERANCE

•!TERTIARY BUS VOLTAGE WITH RESPECT TO GROUND

•!SENSITIVITY DECREASES AS ADDITIONAL REACTORS ADDED

12-69
 !"#$%&!''&6"!$4!!0'+!&%"$%-&1'

X
50 51
50 51
50 51

TRIPS !X"

52

!"#$%&!'',)//"!"*%)#0'

X
50 51
DITTO
50 51
50 51

87

52 TRIPS !X"

12-70
 !"#$%&!''2+5-%*'+.#2"'
%.!""'*'+.#2"''2"12-1/'

51

REACTOR SPLIT- PHASE

SINGLE - PHASE SENSING
X

51 51 51

12-71
 DRY - TYPE
REACTORS
ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

•!NEGATIVE SEQUENCE PROTECTION

•!INCLUDE IN BANK DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

•!IF PHASE SHIFTING NETWORK IS AFFECTED BY A
TERTIARY BUS GOUND FAULT, THEN COMPENSATION
FOR REACTOR UNBALANCE MAY BE CHANGED IN
MAGNITUDE OR PHASE ANGLE, RESULTING IN A
FALSE TRIP. SOLUTION: USE A PHASE - TO - PHASE
VOLTAGE

12-72
 OIL - IMMERSED REACTORS

500 KV LINE

SWITCHER OR BREAKER

500 KV REACTOR OVERCURR. PROTECTION

52
50 51
50 51
50 51
50G 51G

TRIPS !52"

12-73
 500 KV REACTOR DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTION

X Y
TRIPS !52"
52 IF !52" IS A SWITCH
ALL REACTOR RELAYS
DITTO MUST TRIP !X" AND
TRANSFER TRIP !Y"

87R
87O WITH RESTRAINT
87R

OIL - IMMERSED REACTORS

ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS:

•!D.C. OFFSETS WITH LONG TIME CONSTANTS &

LOW FREQUENCY COMPONENTS CAN CAUSE TRIPS.
HIGH - !Z" DIFF. RELAYS MAY PREVENT UNWANTED
OPERATIONS
•!GROUND FAULT BACKUP PROTECTION CAN BE
PROVIDED BY A NEUTRAL OVERCURRENT REALY.
•!SUDDEN PRESSURE AND / OR GAS-ACCUMULATOR
RELAYS CAN PROVIDE PROTECTION AGAINST
TURN - TO - TURN FAULTS

12-74
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

13
TAB 13
Rotating Machinery Protection

Stanley H. Horowitz

Consultant
3143 Griggsview Court
Columbus, OH 43221
There are probably more failures in Rotating Equipment than in any other
electrical equipment.
Both electrical and mechanical failures have to be considered.
Frequency of failures may be low, but the consequences in cost and the effect on
system performance is very high.
Principles of protection are relatively simple

13-1
In evaluating rotating machinery protection we must analyze the usual electrical
faults such as short circuits but we must also consider abnormal operating
conditions (and here we must determine what is abnormal and whether
corrective action is possible) and electrical or mechanical problems.

13-2
All major generating units and large motors are protected by differential relays.
All motors are protected by TDOC relays. Large motors may use instantaneous
or differential relays.
Negative sequence relays are required for unbalanced system conditions,
V/Hz is a function of flux conditions which. in turn, is a function of system or
machine voltage and frequency or speed.
Mechanical devices protect against temperature, vibration and other mechanical
problems.

13-3
Concern is cost and delay in restarting.
Alarms and oscilographs vital to determine if a fault exists.
Sequential tripping is a sequence of closing the steam valves before opening the
circuit breakers. Mechanical failures usually require sequential tripping.
Cost of restarting a 1300 MW unit in 1990 was $250,000, not including the cost
of energy replacement

13-4
Almost universal protection for stator faults of large generators uses a differential
connection. Modern differential relays have extreme sensitivity ( 0.2 amps) with
fault current in tens of amperes. No incentive to change to solid state or digital.
However, other advantages such as data recording influences the decision to
change.

13-5
To accommodate heavy loads or errors in the current transformer output a
straight overcurrent relay is replaced by a percentage differential relay. The
greater the through current, the more operating current is required.
In e-m relays there must be current in both restraint windings to operate correctly.

13-6
Operating current = I1-I2
Restraint current = (I1 + I2) / 2

13-7
Method of grounding effects the amount of protection provided. Solidly grounding
provides enough ground current to operate any differential relay.
Refer to page 168 (3rd edition)

13-8
Adding neutral impedance limits ground current to minimize damage but too
great an impedance and the differential relay will not operate.
Balance between limiting fault current and providing enough current to operate a
relay.
Relay must be set above 3rd harmonic

13-9
The most common grounding scheme for large units. Secondary resistance is
reflected back into the primary as the inverse of the square of the transformer
ration. Limits fault current with sufficient voltage for relaying
Does not see 100% of the winding. There are many schemes to cover 100% of
the winding.

13-10
Third harmonic is introduced into the generator winding at the neutral or phase
end and the voltage is measured.

13-11
Overvoltage is prevented by voltage regulator and excitation logic.
Undervoltage is not a problem except for auxiliary bus (constant KVA loads).
Frequency variations affect turbine blades
Problems occur when unit is off-line.

13-12
Industry standards control generators. No standards for k for motors but is
usually around 40.
Basic question is to determine the cause of the unbalance. For generators this is
usually external to the unit, probably on the system.
For motors this would be in the supply system or fused disconnects, etc.

13-13
Field circuit of modern generators are ungrounded.
Single ground has no effect, second ground produces flux distortion, vibration,
iron heating.
Relays used to alarm and allow ground to be

13-14
When a Synch. Generator loses excitation it runs as an induction generator with
system providing reactive support. Without damper windings, rotor iron overheats
and unit can go unstable. Despite complexity of event, impedance swing is
known.

13-15
13-16
 5/23/11

Actual capability curve of a 1300 MW generator

13-17
Impedance-type relays can detect impedance swing into the generator portion of
the R=X diagram.
Trip or Alarm?
Underexcitation can occur just after the unit is connected to the system. The
voltage is matched to the system but is not increased as load is increased. The
alarm will remind the operator. It is more common today to put the voltage
regulator in service prior to parallelling.

13-18
A cross-compound unit consists of two shafts which must be synchronized during
start-up to allow the unit to be synchronized to the system.
Excitation is applied when the unit is on turning gear. A fault at speeds less than
synchronous cannot be detected by the differential relays.
A tandem unit (single shaft) does not need excitation until the unit is at
synchronous speed.

13-19
Without steam flow, last stages of turbine heat up.
For hydro units, if water is above the tailrace, reverse power is low; if below the
tailrace, the reverse power is high.
Solution is not to trip immediately.
Attempt to correct the problem

13-20
The problem is almost always when unit is off line.
If separate protection is used, transformer protection is by inverse time-delay and
generator protection is provided by the manufacturer in the excitation system.

13-21
At low frequencies, e-m disc differential relays are not operative.
Plunger-type relays and induction disc relays are inserted during start-up. Solid-
state and digital relays may not have the same problem.
Required for cross-compound units or inadvertent energization of tandem units.

13-22
This circuit is applicable during start-up of a cross compound unit to allow the
instantaneous relay to operate at less than 55Hz, but is cut out above 55Hz.
The circuit is also applicable if the unit is inadvertently connected to the system
when on turning gear or coming up to synchronous speed.

13-23
Common, catastrophic misoperation. Inadvertent closing of circuit breaker or
switches while unit is on turning gear.
Potential for shaft damage following reclosing, especially when sub-synchronous
resonance is possible

13-24
Usually, generators do not have overload protection. Motors always have.
Problem is heating. Analog relays do not replicate heating limits. Digital relays
can solve thermodynamics.

13-25
Unequal output of CTs may be due to non-simultaneous starting currents,
unequal CT burdens

13-26
If 3-phase conductors are passed through the window, the secondary current is
proportional to (Ia + Ib +Ic) = 3Io.
Cable shields must be grounded outside the toroid. See Power System Relaying
pages 64 and 174.
The relay must be made insensitive to capacitor inrush, lightning arrester or
surge protection current.

13-27
Unit connected generator requires start-up source.
Requires transferring from start-up to unit when synchronized and transfer back
again when shutting down.
Transfer procedures vary from instantaneous to time delay.
Generator breaker avoids the problem.

13-28
Decision to use instantaneous or differential relay depend on the margin between
relay setting and minimum bus fault current.

For differential relay the two ends of the motor winding must be brought out to
accommodate the CTs.

13-29
CT ratio is selected to provide some margin above trip setting so meters will not
read off scale.
Set 51 relay @ 125%x245-306.25. If motor is vital use 115% service
factor=352.5a. Use 400/5 CT.
TDOC sees 352.5/80=4.4a. Use 5.0a. Tap
Set time delay @1609/400=4xpu above .97 sec. Set 1.5 time lever.
Set 50 relay above 1.7x 1609=2735 pri.amp=34.19 sec amp-use 35a. pu.
20000/(35x80) =7.14 xpu—good
51G set at 1/3 minimum ground fault of 1200a.
1200/80= 15a. #1 dial

13-30
As with the 2000HP motor; pickup of 51 is 1.15x1.25x918=1320a.
Select CT ratio of 1500/5. 51 relay pickup is 1320/300=3.7a. Time delay must
exceed 3 seconds—use #6 dial.
51G set at 1/3 x1200/300=1.33a.
Set at 1.0 amp #1 dial
With toroid also set at 1.0a,but instantaneous.
Setting 50 relay is a problem. If set at 1.7x5512-9370a. --But minimum 4kv bus
fault is 20000a.-- 20000/9370=2.1xpu. No good
Use differential relay (87) set at lowest setting!

13-31
13-32
GENERATOR PROTECTION

13-33
13-34
 Limited by Core & 0.85 PF
1200 30 psig
Field Heating
15 psig
0.5 psig
900 0.90 PF

Limited by
600
Stator Heating
MVA REACTIVE

300

0 MEGAWATTS
300 600 900 1200 1500

300 Stability Limit for

Voltage Regulator
0.95 PF
600
Limited by End Core & Field Heating

GENERATOR END CORE HEATING

Eg is generated voltage on flux due to field F-net is the difference
Et is terminal voltage of flux due to field
It is terminal current and flux due to
Flux and related current are in phase armature
Flux and related voltage are 90 degrees apart
Increased flux leads to concentration
of flux in the high permeance path
F-arm
along the end windings of the stator
F-net
F-field It
F-arm F-field

F-net
Eg
Eg

Et
Et
Lagging PF Leading PF
It

13-35
 500 kv
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant

22 kv

4kv
22,500 / 2.5 22,500 / 2.5
STATION
SERVICE
DIFF

2.5 / 5

22,500 / 2.5 22,500 / 2.5

85 kva
22kv / 120 0.18 OHM
720 AMP OV

WATTS BAR HYDRO

13-36
 WATTS BAR HYDRO

13-37
 WATTS BAR HYDRO
OVER CURRENT
PH, GR, NEG SEQ
OVER
50 VOLT FREQ
VOLTS / SYC UNDER PH, GR OVER
HERTZ CK VOLT NEG SEQ UNDER 87 DIFF

24 25 27 59 81

NEG OC GR
GEN SEQ PH TIME
OC GR OC

32 78 40 46 50 51G 21P 60
DIR OUT LOSS LOSS
PWR OF OF FIELD OF
STEP POT
NEUT
50N 51N 87N DIFF 64G
I OC TIME OC

PH DIST 100 %
VOLT REST STATOR
TIME OC GROUND

MICROPROCESSOR BENEFITS

•! EVENTS REPORTS
•! SEQUENTIAL EVENTS RECORDER
•! BREAKER WEAR MONITOR
•! STATION BATTERY MONITOR
•! METERING

13-38
 WILSON HYDRO

OC

GEN GEN
OPEN

3500 A
875 A

8 OHM
2 OHM

OC OC
NC
NC NC

LINK ?

NC

SEQUOYAH
SECONDARY FAULT CURRENT = 138.6 V / 0.312 OHMS
= 444 AMP

PRIMARY FAULT CURRENT = 4.44 AMPS

X = 61 Kva

GEN
81 % ABOVE BANK RATING

24,000 / 240
75 kVA 444 A 0.156 OHM
OV

0.156 OHM
4.44 A

13-39
 SEQUOYAH
SECONDARY FAULT CURRENT = 138.6 V / 0.078 OHMS
= 1777 AMP

PRIMARY FAULT CURRENT = 17.77 AMPS

X = 246 Kva

GEN
328 % ABOVE BANK RATING

BANK EXPLODED

24,000 / 240
75 kVA 1777 A
OV

17.77 A 0.078 OHM

SEQUOYAH
SECONDARY FAULT CURRENT = 138.6 V / 0.078 OHMS
= 1777 AMP

PRIMARY FAULT CURRENT = 17.77 AMPS

X = 246 Kva

GEN
328 % ABOVE BANK RATING

OC
BANK EXPLODED

24,000 / 240 TEST OVERVOLTAGE RELAY

75 kVA 1777 A
OV AS VOLTAGE APPLIED
CURRENT FLOWED IN
RESISTORS AND BLEW
17.77 A THE FUSE
0.078 OHM

13-40
AUXILIARY BUS TRANSFERS

13-41
13-42
 STARTUP UNIT
TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER

EA
IB IA

B NO EU NC A

X Y Z

CONDENSER CONDENSER HOT

CIRCULATING BOOSTER WELL
WATER PUMP PUMP PUMP
CCWP CBP HP
3,000 HP 1,750 HP 1,250 HP

13-43
 STARTUP UNIT
TRANSFORMER TRANSFORMER

VA (A-B)
IA IA
VB (A-B)
1522 NO NC 1112

X Y Z

CONDENSER CONDENSER HOT

CIRCULATING BOOSTER WELL
WATER PUMP PUMP PUMP
CCWP CBP HP
3,000 HP 1,750 HP 1,250 HP

13-44
13-45
13-46
13-47
13-48
13-49
UNDERFREQUENCY LOAD SHEDDING
AND REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS

13-50
 SYSTEM LOAD SHEDDING
INITIALLY REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS WERE SET TO TRIP
BEFORE SYSTEM LOAD SHEDDING WAS INITIATED.
THE FINAL AGREEMENT ALLOWED THE REACTOR COOLANT
PUMPS TO TRIP AFTER ALL ATTEMPTS HAD BEEN MADE
TO SHED SYSTEM LOAD.
THE UNDERFREQUENCY LOAD SHEDDING PHILOSOPHY
IS AS FOLLOWS:

STEP 1, 59.5 Hz, 10 CYCLES

STEP 2, 59.3 Hz. 15 CYCLES
STEP 3, 59.1 Hz, 20 CYCLES
STEP 4, 58.9 Hz. 25 CYCLES
STEP 5, 58.7 Hz, 30 CYCLES

REACTOR COOLANT PUMPS 57.5 Hz, 6 CYCLES

RACCOON MTN. PUMP STORAGE UNITS IN PUMPING MODE

UNITS 1-4, 59.7 Hz WITH DELAYS OF 6, 15, 26, AND 36 CYCLES

13-51
13-52
 PUMP STORAGE PLANT

INVERTER
1 4 00 2400 4800 7200

2 5

3 6 1
6
2
THYRISTORS 4

3
S N MACHINE 5

2 4
INVERTER
CONTROL 3
ENCODER
THYR 6

5
THYR 1

13-53
 START BUS

161 kv CURRENT
COMMUTATION REACTORS

START START CONTROL

CONTROL

SHAFT ANGLE DECODER

CONTROL SET SMOOTHING REACTOR

23 kv

550 v
S
4kv
STATION
G M SERVICE

50 kva
23kv / 120 Sa
OV OV

IEEE C37.102
A)! Plunger type current relay
B)! Induction overcurrent relay
C)! Generator differential relay
D)! Generator ground relay
E)! Harmonic restraint differential relay
F)! Plunger type voltage relay

13-54
 IEEE C37.102
A)! Plunger type current relay
B)! Induction overcurrent relay
C)! Generator differential relay
D)! Generator ground relay
E)! Harmonic restraint differential relay
F)! Plunger type voltage relay

13-55
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 14
Power System Protection

14
Arun G. Phadke

Professor Emeritus
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Bradley Dept. of Elect. Engineering
Center For Power Engineering
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0111
 RELAYING FOR STABILITY
A.G. Phadke

LOSS-OF-FIELD RELAYING

• Loss of field relays are designed to protect

a generator against steady state instability

• Usually, the steady-state stability limit

is determined, and then a safety margin
is applied

• Distance relays at the terminals of the

generator are used to respond to loss of
field of the generator

• Loss of field is a balanced condition as

far as phase currents are concerned

14-1
 LOSS-OF-FIELD RELAYING

Es!" E1 E2 !0

Xs Xt

• Consider the two machine system. Bus 1 is the

terminal of a generator with an internal voltage
of Es.

• Xs is the machine impedance.

• The generator is connected to a large system,

with a Thévénin voltage of E2, and system impedance
of Xt.

LOSS-OF-FIELD RELAYING

Electrical power transfer between the

generator and the system is

Pe = {[EsE2]/[Xs+Xt]} sin"

Pe
The steady-state
stability limit is
(-#/2) < " < (#/2) -#/2
#/2 "
This is shown on
the accompanying
sinusoidal P-" curve.

14-2
 LOSS-OF-FIELD RELAYING

The generator current is given by

"
E % j & E % j0
I ' s 2
1 j( X $ X )
s t
The voltage at the generator terminal E1 is given by

E 1 ' E s & jX sI1

The real and reactive power output at the generator

terminal is given by

P1 + jQ1 = E1 I1*

LOSS-OF-FIELD RELAYING

At the steady-state stability limit, "

is equal to #/2, and using this value, Q
and eliminating Es and E2, it can be
shown that the generator output real
and reactive powers are related by:

E2 1 1 E2 1
2 $
P [Q & 1 { & }] [ 1 { $ 1 }]2
2 ' P
1 1 2 X X 2 X X
t s t s

This is the equation of a circle in

the P-Q plane. If the terminal
voltage is assumed to be 1.0 pu
the resulting circle is shown here.

14-3
 LOSS-OF-FIELD RELAYING

• A circle in the P-Q plane transforms into a

circle in the R-X plane.
• Inside of the P-Q circle maps into the outside
of the R-X circle.

Q P0 ' 0
2 X
E1 1 & 1
Q0 ' { }
2 Xt Xs R
2
E 1 $ 1
S0 '
1
(P0,Q0) { }
2 Xt Xs
(R0,X0)
P
R ' 0
S0 0
X ' & (X & X ) / 2
0 t s Z0
Z ' (X t $ X s ) / 2
0

Loss of field

Es E1

If
jXs

I 1,
Es, * If, If
Es* If
x jXsI1
+ E1

I1

14-4
Loss of field

I 1, Field current If
Es, * If, If
Es* If Field voltage

x jXsI1
+ E1
[cos+ /x]!-+
I1
&+ 1/x
E1 =1.0
I1 =[x/cos+]!+
Z = [cos+ /x]!-+

LOSS-OF-FIELD RELAYING

• The manufacturer of the generator

provides the end-iron heating limit

• The system impedance determines

the steady-state stability limit

• Which limit will be the determining factor

depends upon the relative position of
these two curves

• An offset-impedance relay is used to

determine approach to the limiting condition

14-5
 FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF STABILITY SWINGS

Es!" E1 E2 ER !0

RELAY
Xs Xt XR

d 2" ESER
M ' Pm & sin "
dt 2 (X S $ X t $ XR )

The symbols have the usual meaning. " is the angle

difference between the two generator rotors.

The receiving end generator is the power system

equivalent.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF STABILITY SWINGS

Es!" E1 E2 ER !0
RELAY
RELAY

Xs Xt XR

" Unstable
-# swing HOW DOES
THE
# Stable swing DISTANCE
RELAY
RESPOND?
time

14-6
 PHASOR DIAGRAMS DURING STABILITY SWINGS
Es!" E1 I E2 ER !0

RELAY
RELAY
Xs Xt XR

(ES & ER )
I' ' & jB(ES & ER )
j(X S $ X t $ XR )
3 X t $ XR 0 3 X t $ XR 0
E1 ' ES & jX SI ' ES 2 / $ ER 21 & /
1 (X S $ X t $ XR ) . 1 (X S $ X t $ XR ) .
' k1ES $ (1 & k1 )ER
similarly
3 XR 0 3 XR 0
E 2 ' ER $ jXR I ' ES 2 / $ ER 21 & /
1 (X S $ X t $ XR ) . 1 (X S $ X t $ XR ) .
' k 2ES $ (1 & k 2 )ER

PHASOR DIAGRAMS DURING STABILITY SWINGS

ES

E1

-jBES "
"
k1ES E2
jBER
k2ES
ER
I (1-k1)ER (1-k2)ER

14-7
PHASOR DIAGRAMS DURING STABILITY SWINGS
ES

E1

E2

ER

PHASOR DIAGRAMS DURING STABILITY SWINGS

S 1 C 2 R

ES E1 Ec E2 ER

14-8
 PHASOR DIAGRAMS DURING STABILITY SWINGS

Magnitude plot, stable swings Magnitude plot, unstable swings

ER ER

E2 E2

E1 E1

EC EC

ES ES

I I

PHASOR DIAGRAMS DURING STABILITY SWINGS

R Impedance diagram
XR
2
O
C
Xt
S
1
XS
S 1

1+j0 C
2

Phasor diagram R
I

14-9
PHASOR DIAGRAMS DURING STABILITY SWINGS

R
O’
2
O
C

1
"

S "4’

PHASOR DIAGRAMS DURING STABILITY SWINGS

t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7

2
C

t3 t2 t1 t4
1 t6 t5 t7

S Stable swing

14-10
PHASOR DIAGRAMS DURING STABILITY SWINGS
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7

t7 t6 t5 t4 t3 t2 t1

Un-stable swing

OUT OF STEP RELAYING

14-11
 OUT OF STEP RELAYING

• Out-of-step blocking
G1 5 L1 + L2
• Out-of-step tripping
G2 5 L3 + L4 + L5

Desired split
G1 Block here G2

Trip here
L1 L2 L3 L4 L5

DYNAMICS OF
POWER SYSTEM FREQUENCY

14-12
Outline

• Control of power system frequency

• Frequency dynamics

• Frequency in an islanded system

• Load shedding and generator tripping

• Load restoration

• Control of power system frequency

• The primary control is through the speed governor
(steady-state analysis)
Reset control

Speed Steam
governor Valve

f
HP LP
f0
Supplementary Generator
(reset) control

load

14-13
• Control of power system frequency
• Tie-line bias control (steady-state)

T0

Area Control Error (ACE) = 644T & 746f0

For each area, ACE is calculated, and if non-zero,

generation is adjusted. This keeps the interconnection
frequency on schedule.
Time error and inadvertent interchange.

• Control of power system frequency

• Tie-line bias control (steady-state)

f0 Pre-disturbance balance

ACE

T0
Tie-line flow

14-14
• Control of power system frequency

Time scale of normal and abnormal (catastrophic)

frequency excursions.

frequency

Normal frequency excursions

Unusual
(non-catastrophic) change
Time (minutes)

Catastrophic
changes.
What are the Supplementary control action
dynamics?
What to do?

• Frequency dynamics

J2, S2
J1, S1

Ji, Si

• Power system in balance, generation meets

loads and losses, frequency is f0
• Machine inertias and ratings are Ji and Si
• Generator outputs are Gi
• Loads are Li

14-15
• Frequency dynamics (catastrophic changes)

Our interest in aggregate behavior

f Individual rotor
responses
(transient stability oscillations)

Aggregate response

time

• Frequency dynamics (catastrophic changes)

J0 ' 8JS
i i
"' 8" S i i

8S i 8S i

Aggregate inertia Aggregate rotor angle

d2 "
J0 2 ' Tm & Te
dt
Here Tm and Te are aggregate mechanical and
electrical torques on the rotors

d2 "
9J0 2 ' 9Tm & 9Te ' Pm & Pe Multiplying both
dt sides by aggregate
' 8 Gi & 8 Li rotor speed 9

14-16
• Frequency dynamics (catastrophic changes)

Traditionally, the inertia constant is normalized by

converting it to the H constant:

H = (K.E. stored at synchronous speed) / (Rated MVA)

1
J0 92s
H0 ' 2
S0
Substituting for J0 in terms of H0

df fs2 (8 Gi ) 3 8 Li & 8 Gi 0
f '& 2 /
dt 2H0 S0 1 8 Gi .

• Frequency dynamics (catastrophic changes)

If the average power factor

(8 Gi )
of the generators is p, then p =
S0
Also, the relative load excess in the system L can
be defined as
3 8 Li & 8 Gi 0
L= 2 /
1 8 Gi .
We get:

df pLfs2
f '&
dt 2H0

14-17
• Frequency in an islanded system

If the load and generation are in balance

the frequency remains constant: f=f0

If the load is in excess, the frequency decays:

f = f0 :[1- (pLfs2)t /(H0f02)]

As t increases, the frequency continues to decay:

f0
Such a decay
rate is
unrealistic!
t

• Frequency in an islanded system

The load power decreases with frequency.

A common phenomenon is that load decrease is

proportional to frequency decrease. If the total
load at a frequency f is Pl, and f0 at Pl0:
[1 & Pl / Pl0 ]
d'
[1 & f / f0 ]
In terms of the decrement factor d, the excess load
ratio L at a frequency f (L0 being the load excess at f0) is

f
L ' [L 0 & (1 $ L 0 )d(1 & )]
f0

14-18
• Frequency in an islanded system

df p f
f '& [L 0 & (1 $ L 0 )d(1 & )]fs2
dt 2H0 f0
The solution to this equation, with f = f0 at t=0 is
3 L0 0 3 1 0
( f0 & f ) & f0 2 & 1/ ln2 /'
1 (1 $ L 0
)d . 1 1 & ( f0
& f )(1 $ L 0
)d / L f
0 0.

p f 2

(1 $ L 0 )d s t
2H0 f0
As t ; < the frequency reaches a limit

3 L0 0 at which the reduced load

f< ' f0 21 & / and the generation once
1 (1 $ L 0 )d . again match.

• Frequency in an islanded system

f0
frequency dependent
load

f<
constant
load

14-19
 • Frequency in an islanded system

L3 > L2 > L1
f0
L1

L2

L3

t
The actual decay must be determined by simulating
the event(s) in detail. Typically, stability programs
with extended capabilities are necessary.

• Load shedding and generator tripping

Parameters which influence load shedding programs.

(1) Generator trip relays which are designed to

protect turbine blades or other critical
equipment.

These could be in the range of 58 Hz for modern

steam turbines.

(2) Generator overspeed relays which determine the

upper limits before load must be restored.

These could be in the range of 61~62 Hz.

14-20
 • Load shedding and generator tripping

(3) Operating speed of frequency relays, and the

operating time of circuit breakers.

Newer relays should act within 6 cycles. Circuit

breakers on distribution circuits could be slower
~ 10 cycles or longer.

(4) Voltage increases may be caused by automatic

voltage regulators after load is shed. This may
lead to over-shedding.

(5) Load restoration, and saturation in transformers

may limit voltage increase and load increase.

• Load shedding and generator tripping

Range
f0
of
safe
Load operation
shedding
must Simulation
be completed Safety margin of events
in this
window
t
Relay and breaker
operating times

14-21
• Load shedding and generator tripping
• Generator tripping generally based upon
certain network conditions detected by
loading conditions, switch and breaker
positions, etc.

• Load shedding steps determined by possible

(credible) conditions which may lead to
frequency decay.

• Number of steps selected varies between

5 and 13.

• Modern solid state or computer relays should

be used, possibly supplemented by rate of
change of frequency signals.

• Load shedding and restoration

Load
Time delay
restoration
Step 2
f0
Step 1
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Step 4
Step 5
Load
shedding

14-22
• Summary

• Credible contingencies selected

• Sophisticated stability program chosen

• Voltage regulation, capacitor switching

and other control actions simulated
• Realistic relay and breaker times used

• A safe load shedding and restoration program

put in service

• Where appropriate, generator tripping employed

• Coordination with neighbor’s policy achieved

14-23
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 15
Interpreting Oscillograms II

John R. Boyle

Principal Engineer
PSA/Power System Analysts
496 Pine Ridge Drive
Signal Mountain, TN 37377
15
CT SATURATION 1

15-1
15-2
15-3
 FACTORS INFLUENCING TIME TO
SATURATE

DEGREE OF CURRENT OFFSET

•! SYSTEM X/R
•! FAULT – INCIDENCE ANGLE
•! GREATER OFFSET, FASTER SATURATION
FAULT CURRENT MAGNITUDE
•! GREATER MAGNITUDE, FASTER SATURATION
REMANENT FLUX
•! ADDS OR SUBTRACTS TO FLUX PRODUCED
BY FAULT
•! IF ADDS, SHORTER SATUATION TIME

FACTORS INFLUENCING TIME TO

SATURATE

SECONDARY CIRCUIT IMPEDANCE

•! HIGH BURDEN WILL HAVE SHORTER TIME TO SATURATE
•! FLUX PROPORTIONAL TO VOLTAGE SO HIGHER BURDEN
HAS HIGHER VOLTAGE FOR SAME CURRENT
•! INDUCTIVE LOADS TAKE LONGER TIME TO SAT. THAN
RESISTIVE LOADS

SATURATION VOLTAGE
•! HIGHER VOLTAGE RATING, LONGER TIME TO SATURATE

TURNS RATIO
•! INCREASE IN TURNS RATIO REDUCES FLUX DENSITY AND
INCREASES TIME TO SATURATE

15-4
 A B C

FLASH-OVER WOULD NOT

OCCUR AT VOLTAGE ZERO

15-5
15-6
CT SATURATION 2

BK 2 BK 1
T
I
E
BUS 2 BUS 1
LINE B LINE A

15-7
 51
OL

BK 2 T BK 1
I
BUS 2 E BUS 1 51 51N
L B LA

DITTO BUS 1
BUS 2 DIFF

2.5 A BUS DIFF

CONNECTIONS

2.5 A 5A
BK 1

T
BUS 1

NO
LINE A
EXTERNAL FAULT
10 A
C
BUS
DIFF
5A
AB C

15-8
 BUS DIFF
2.5 A
CONNECTIONS

2.5 A 5A
BK 1

T
BUS 1

LINE A
0A
C
BUS
DIFF

AB C 5A

5A

A
5A

OPEN BK 1
5A 5A C
T
BUS 1
A

BUS
C DIFF
LINE A

5A
CONSIDER 2000A
PHASE TO PHASE
EXTERNAL FAULT
X X 5A
AB C
BUS DIFF CONNECTIONS

15-9
 1.67A 1000 A
BUS DIFF
CONNECTIONS
4000/5 5/6.67
10L800 3.34A
1.67 A
1000 A BK 1
5 ALL AUX
7.5 CTS T 200
T
3000/5 5.0A
BUS 1
C 800
2000/5
10L800 C
ASSUME 2000 A
FLOW THROUGH LINE A BUS
DIFF
LINE !A" 2000 A
AND 1000 A IN
BKRS !T" & !BK 1" 2000/5
10L800

A B C 5.0A

100 AMPS

BAD CT GOOD CT
100/5 CTS SOURCE
5A

5A

SCOPE
4/1 1/4
1 OHM CL STEP R STEP CL 1 OHM
DOWN UP

3 OHMS 3 OHMS

15-10
 100 AMPS

BAD CT GOOD CT
100/5 CTS SOURCE

5A

5A
SCOPE
4/1 1/4
1 OHM CL STEP R STEP CL 1 OHM
DOWN UP

6 OHMS 6 OHMS

100 AMPS

BAD CT GOOD CT
100/5 CTS SOURCE
5A

5A

SCOPE
4/1 1/4
1 OHM OP STEP R STEP OP 1 OHM
DOWN UP

Z=(1/4)2 0 OHMS 0 OHMS Z=(4/1)2

Z=1/16 OHMS Z=16 OHMS

15-11
 BUS#1 OL Current Waveform #1

50000
A Phase Current
40000 C Phase Current
B Phase Current
30000 Ground Current

20000

10000
Am ps

-10000

-20000

-30000

-40000

BUS 2 BUS 1
-50000
Tim e (m illiseconds)

15-12
 BUS#1 OL

50000

40000
Phase A Current
30000 Phase C Current
Phase B Current ~300 ms
20000 time-gap
Ground Current
betw een
10000 w avefor

0
Am ps

-10000

-20000

-30000

-40000

-50000

-60000
Tim e (m illiseconds)
BUS 2 BUS 1

BUS#1 OL

50000

40000
Phase A Current
30000 Phase C Current
Phase B Current ~300 ms
20000 time-gap
Ground Current
betw een
10000 w avefor

0
Am ps

-10000

-20000

-30000

-40000

-50000

-60000
Tim e (m illiseconds)
BUS 2 BUS 1

15-13
 DIFF & OL (A Phase only)
40000

30000

20000

10000

0
Am ps

-10000

-20000

-30000

-40000

-50000

-60000
BUS 2 BUS 1
Tim e (m illiseconds)

OL A PH DIFF A PH

40000
30000
20000
10000
PRI AMPS

0
1
11
21
31
41
51
61
71
81
91
101
111
121
131
141
151
161

-10000
-20000
-30000
-40000
-50000
CYCLES

15-14
 DIFF & OL (C Phase only)
50000

40000 OL C Phase WF#1

OL C Phase WF #2
30000 DIFF C Phase WF #1
DIFF C Phase WF #2
20000

10000
Am ps

-10000

-20000

-30000

-40000 BUS 2 BUS 1

Tim e (m illiseconds)

Differential Current Waveform #1

10000

8000
Phase A Current
Phase C Current

6000 Phase B Current

4000
A
Am ps

2000 BK
T
C
0
BUS 1 A
-2000 C BUS
LA DIFF
-4000

-6000 X X
Tim e (m illiseconds) B
A C

15-15
 Differential Current Waveform #1
10000

8000
Phase A Current
Phase C Current

6000 Phase B Current

4000
A
Am ps

2000 BK
T
C
0
BUS 1 A
-2000 C BUS
LA DIFF
-4000

-6000 X X
Tim e (m illiseconds) B
A C

Differential Current Waveform #2

40000

30000

Phase A Current
Phase C Current
20000 Phase B Current

10000
Am ps

-10000 A
BK
-20000 T
C
BUS 1 A
-30000
C BUS
Tim e (m illiseconds)
LA DIFF

X X
B
A C

15-16
 Differential Current Waveform #2
40000

30000

Phase A Current
Phase C Current
20000 Phase B Current

10000
Am ps

-10000 A
BK
-20000 T
C
BUS 1 A
-30000
C BUS
Tim e (m illiseconds)
LA DIFF

X X
B
A C

BUS#1 DIFF
40000

Phase A Current
30000 Phase C Current
Phase B Current

20000

~285 ms
time-gap
10000
betw een
Am ps

w avefor

BK
-10000
T
BUS 1 A
-20000
BUS
C
A LA DIFF
-30000
Tim e (m illiseconds)
C
X X
B
A C

15-17
10000 DIFF A DIFF C
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
-2000 1 11 21 31 41 51 61 71 81 91 101 111 121 131 141

-4000
-6000
CYCLES

40000 DIFF A DIFF C

30000

20000

10000

0
1
10
19
28
37
46
55
64
73
82
91
100
109
118
127
136

-10000

-20000

-30000
CYCLES

15-18
 BUS#1 OL Voltage Waveform #1

50000
A Phase Voltage C Phase Voltage B Phase Voltage
40000

30000

20000

10000
Volts

-10000

-20000

-30000

-40000

-50000
Tim e (m illiseconds)

WAVE FORM DATA CAPTURE

RANGES
2 X 2048, 4 X 1024, 8 X 512, 16 X 256

FIRST NUMBER INDICATES THE NUMBER OF EVENTS

THAT CAN BE STORED IN MEMORY

SECOND NUMBER INDICATES THE NUMBER OF DATA

SAMPLES CAPTURED PER CHANNEL FOR EACH EVENT

NOTE: THE RELAY CAPTURES 16 SAMPLES PER CYCLE

EXAMPLE: @ 4 X 1024 THE LAST THREE EVENTS WITH

1024! DATA SAMPLES PER CHANNEL (64 CYCLES) CAN
BE STORED IN MEMORY
NOTE: ONE BUFFER MUST BE RESERVED TO CAPTURE
THE NEXT EVENT

15-19
 16
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 16
Introduction to Computer Relaying

Arun G. Phadke

Professor Emeritus
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Bradley Dept. of Elect. Engineering
Center For Power Engineering
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0111
 COMPUTER RELAYING FUNDAMENTALS

INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Beginning in Early 1960s

• Papers by Rockefeller,
& by Morrison and colleagues

• Substation computer, vs. dedicated

computer for relaying function

• Importance of transmission line

relaying

• Manufacturers and University

researchers
• Present status and industry
acceptance of computer relays

16-1
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Fundamental processes in computer relaying

Analog inputs: currents and voltages

Sampled data at a fixed rate

Data processed to determine

relaying quantities: for example phasors

Relaying logic based upon the

conditions of computed quantities

INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

Computer relay hardware organization
From Substation Switchyard
Currents & voltages Contact Inputs Contact outputs

Surge Surge Signal communicatioons

Filters Filters Conditioning

Signal Signal Digital Serial

Conditioning Conditioning output Port
Sampling
clock

A/D and S/H Parallel

PROCESSOR
port

Power Supply

ROM/ Mass
RAM E2 PROM
PROM memory

16-2
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Surge Filtering
Surges induced on wiring connected to the
relays. Wiring includes power supply, analog
and digital inputs.
• Industry standards define the requirements:
• IEEE standard: C37.90a, generally called the
SWC standard.
Oscillatory wave: 1-1.5 MHz, 2.5-3 kV, decay
to half value in greater than 6 !sec.
Unidirectional (Fast Transient) 4-5 kV, rise time
less than 10 nsec, decay to half value in 100-200
nsec.

• IEC standard 255- 4, has similar specifications

INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Surge filters are low pass filters with

cut-off frequencies of the order of hundreds
of kHz. They do not affect the relaying
input signals.

• MOVs may also be used in addition to the

low pass filters in some designs.

Signal wires

16-3
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Hierarchical system of computers

in the substations
Central
Computer Level III

Substation Substation Substation

host host host Level II

Relay Relay Relay

computer computer computer
Level I

Input/Output Input/Output Input/Output

INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Data Acquisition System

• Analog to digital conversion
Analog signal levels: plus-minus 10 volts

Quantization error 12 bit converter

with 10 volt range
analog has quantization
error of 4.9 mV.
digital
A 16 bit converter
with similar range
has quantization
error of 300 !v.

16-4
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

Aliasing and Nyquist rate

Signal frequency: f0 Sampling frequency: fs = f0

Apparent signal
frequency from
sampled data: 0

Amplitude No aliasing error

Aliasing error

0 fs 2fs Frequency

Nyquist criterion: Input must be band limited to

one-half the sampling frequency.

INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Anti-aliasing filter design

considerations. Active and passive
filter design

• A typical passive anti-aliasing filter

Gain

fc frequency

16-5
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Conflict between desirable frequency-response

and step-function response

Gain

frequency fc time

Frequency response Step-function response

• Stability of filter performance

INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Sampling rate considerations

• Higher sampling rate:
Smaller window for computation
More computations
Smaller error due to random noise
Smaller delay in anti-aliasing filter

• Lower sampling rate:

Larger window for computation
Fewer computations
Greater error due to random noise
Greater delay in anti-aliasing filter
• Typical sampling rates range from 4 samples
per cycle to 96 samples per cycle

16-6
 MOTIVATION FOR COMPUTER RELAYING

1. 1965 Blackout in Northeast US - 1965

Event
Event
No. 1
No. 2

Sir Adam
Beck No. 2

MOTIVATION FOR COMPUTER RELAYING

2. 1977 Blackout in New York City

3
6
2 1 7

5 4

10

9 8

16-7
 MOTIVATION FOR COMPUTER RELAYING

3. 1979 Incident on the AEP system

1
3

INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Advantages of computer relaying

• Self-diagnostic capability of digital relays

• Economic incentives

• Technical incentives. Improved performance

of certain relays.

• Computer relays in the digital

environment of substations

• Electronic transducers. Integrated

substation system of computers

16-8
INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER RELAYING

• Problem areas of computer relays

• Problems of standardization.
Interfaces between data input systems

• Life of digital hardware.

Responsibility for maintenance

• Management of software costs.

Higher level languages

• Software errors and maintenance

16-9
Modern Power System Protection: Applications

17
and Performance Analysis

TAB 17
Adaptive Protection Principles

Stanley H. Horowitz

Consultant
3143 Griggsview Court
Columbus, OH 43221
Adaptive relaying had its start with the acceptance of digital relays.
All settings are a compromise limited by necessity of not tripping during
emergency load conditions.
Dependability vs Security
Relays may need to change characteristics to suit prevailing system conditions.
This predetermined characteristic is based upon assumptions embodied in off-
line studies

17-1
NERC identified outage causes-70% involved relays or associated devices.
Increased use of digital devices permits adaptability.
Hidden failures are relay problems that are not evident until some other event
occurs. e.g directional element or timing device becomes inoperative. Adaptive
relays can analyze circuit

17-2
Hidden failures can be corrected by monitoring and internal or external control

Continuous review and update of settings essential.

Settings are usually made under system normal conditions. When system state
changes, assumptions and margins are incorrect.

Failures can occur between maintenance.

17-3
TDOC setting assumes some value of maximum load and minimum fault. When
system is abnormally stressed these values may not be correct.
Voltage during a fault or the direction of the fault relative to the relay are good
indicators for a correct trip.

Depending on the logic used in the digital relay, load can be removed from the
algorithm or load power factor can be used to ignore it.

Relay performance can be changed from dependable to secure

17-4
Blinders limit operation of impedance relay but create a complex
tripping circuit.
Easier with digital logic than analog contacts.
Load can be determined by power factor or voltage.
Load power factor vs fault power factor a good discriminator
Continuous load monitor can subtract it from algorithm.

Relay can !carve" out the impedance circle known as

!load encroachment"

17-5
Elements can be contacts of a relay or relay systems.
Combined circuit used by military and nuclear.
Under normal system conditions relays should be dependable.
Under stressed system relays should be secure.
Adaptive relaying seeks to convert the parallel scheme to the series scheme.

17-6
With S/N, all protection systems operate in parallel
providing redundancy and backup.

As system becomes stressed, the incorrect trip of some

lines will increase the danger of causing a widespread or
cascading outage.

Reconfiguring the tripping functions of the protective

systems increases the security of the relaying.

17-7
 A hidden failure does not imply a bad relay design, a misapplied relay, or an
error in calibration. These factors should be unlikely or should be discovered
in normal engineering reviews.
A hidden failure occurs as a random event, and by definition is undetected by
normal alarms or monitoring.

For example, a fault on the power system may lead to a fault detector to pick up
in several relays, and thus armed, a relay could have a failed subsystem of a
nature which would lead to a second undesirable operation, starting the system
on the way to a cascading failure.

17-8
If Z1 fails closed a trip is immediate. If Z1 fails to close backup or redundant
relays will cause a trip. This is not a hidden failure.

If R2 or T2 or T3 fail closed no trip occurs until R1 or Z2

or Z3 close for a fault on another line.

17-9
Not all hidden failures are equally likely.

Not all hidden failures are equally disastrous

Consequential load flow and stability checks are necessary

17-10
For o/c relays, when the remote breaker opens, the current will change.
In the non-adaptive case, the instantaneous relay must be set above the worst
case current, i.e. the system configuration that provides the maximum fault
current. For any other configuration the current may be less and the relays may
not pick up.
With adaptive relaying, system configuration can be communicated to all
terminals and the resulting current change when the remote breaker opens can
be determined and the relay settings changed accordingly.
For impedance relays, zone 1 must be set less than 100% of the line
When remote breaker opens, zone 1 setting can be adjusted to cover 100% of
the line. This is same as zone accelerating scheme.

17-11
Relay at A sees VA/IA but does not monitor Ic. Ic affects the Impedance to the
fault. Setting must be a compromise to assure that coordination is maintained.
Set Zone 1 without infeed
Set Zone 2 and Zone 3 with infeed
Adaptive relays communicate all current values to all relays

17-12
Instantaneous or zone 1 relays must never overreach the end of the line.
TDOC and zone 2 relays must always overreach the end of the line to cover the
area not protected instantaneously.

Zone 2 relay of one line must not overreach zone 1of adjacent line.

Communication of conditions at other terminals can be slow speed to monitor

breaker positions and adjust settings during steady-state or high speed to
present actual currents and adjust setting accordingly..

17-13
Cold Load Pickup is that condition which may occur following an outage of
several minutes to several hours. When the circuit is reenergized the diversity of
cyclic loads is lost. The inrush may be greater than normal load levels for that
circuit. Instantaneous and/or TDOC may operate.
Conventional solution leaves circuit without protection after initial trip. Results in
possible unnecessary trip if setting is below relay pickup.

Logic is straightforward. Magnitude of cold load current can be determined by

simulation or tests and relay set above this value.
Factors to consider are: outage duration, load type (resistance vs motor),
weather, time of day and presence of distributed generation.

17-14
A Smart Grid Includes:
Sensors, Meters, Distribution automation,
Communication, Advanced analysis, Active
participation by customers and utility, !green"
generation, storage.

!!

17-15
The utility and consumer must work closely together.
Federal, State and local are watchdogs to protect
costs and service
FERC and NERC establish rules and parameters
Vendors provide equipment and service
Advocacy groups protect environment

17-16
Non-adaptive
Hot line reclose used to pick up a load from the system
Dead line reclose used to pick up a line from a station
Full synchronizing required for generators
Check synchronizing required if two systems can be separated. May also be use
to control the load angle across a breaker
1 phase vs 3 phase reclosing is used to prevent torsional vibration of generator
shafts or to mitigate stability problems.
Adaptive
Provide detecting component or functional error and initiate correction

17-17
Pilot Wire (aerial or buried systems)
band width from 0 (dc) to 4 kHz
line length limited to maintain bandwidth
Power Line Carrier
operates from 30-300 kHz
provision for one 4 kHz channel
transmission over several hundred miles
Microwave
operates from 150 MHz to 20 GHz
provision for many 4 kHz channels
transmission limited to line of sight (can use repeaters)
Fiber Optic Links
virtually unlimited channel capacity

17-18
Attracting most attention in industry and research laboratories.
Load shedding and islanding
FACTS and SVC
Active Working Groups

17-19
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

18
TAB 18
Distribution System Protection

John R. Boyle

Principal Engineer
PSA/Power System Analysts
496 Pine Ridge Drive
Signal Mountain, TN 37377
 !"#$%"&'$"()*+%($,-$"()*

TAPPED SUBSTATION

C A
B

E F S

18-1
C
$./0123.45.*!675.508/9* A

87T
D

E F S

$./0123.45.*!675.508/9*/0:**
;<=>*&?1*!675.508/9* A

B
87T

D
87B

E F S

18-2
,96460/@5*&.5/=5.*!!"A**
&BC/11*&.5/=5.*!&"*
A

B
87T

87B

E F S

,96460/@5*&.5/=5.*!!"A**
&BC/11*&.5/=5.*!&"*
A

87T

87B

E F S

18-3
 &BC/11*&.5/=5.*!&"*
A
50
51

B
RESTRICT TRANSF.
DIFF. AND ADD HIGH
87T
SIDE PHASE OVER-
CURRENT RELAYS

50
51 87B

E F S

%543D5*EF&A*,G@50:*%5/HI*32*EF$*
A

87T

E F S

18-4
 J::*+I/15*%59/B1*KLMK;*
A
50
51

87T

50
51

E F S

Phase Overcurrent Coordination

E 51 B 51
50

B 51
CYCLES

50

E 51

B 50
E 50
13 KV BUS FAULT

CURRENT

18-5
Add Ground Feeder Relays 50N/51N
A
50
51

87T

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET
F S

N.3?0:*(D5.H?..50@*+.3@5H830*
!E" LOW SET
51N

POLE TOP GRD

CYCLES

!E" HIGH SET

51N
POLE TOP PHASE BUS GND
FAULT

!E" HIGH SET 50N

CURRENT

18-6
Add Station Backup Ground Relay 51G
A
50
51

B
51G

87T

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET
F S

Ground Overcurrent Protection

!E" LOW SET
51N STA. BACKUP GROUND

POLE TOP GRD

CYCLES

!E" HIGH SET

51N
POLE TOP PHASE BUS GRD
FAULT

!E" HIGH SET 50N

CURRENT

18-7
 Add High Side Ground Relay

50 50 50N
51 51N
51

B
50N 51G
51N

87T

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET
F S

!"#$%&'()*%+,'-.'!/"'01'2#'!"#$%&'
3)4-5'6%,.-44)&'-.'7-88)&'($9,.-:#%'
250 A 1200 A

50
C 51 51
B 50
CYCLES

51

50N
B 51 51N

C51N
C 50N
B 50

CURRENT

18-8
 !"#$%&'()*%+,'-.'!/"'01'!"#$%&'3)4-5'
!6%,.-44)&"'-.'7-8'(.-:#%'
60 A 90 A 250 A
1200 A

50
C 51 51
B 50
CYCLES

51

B 51 50N
51N
B 51N 50N
51N

C51N
C 50N
B 50N B 50

CURRENT

J::*&/H=?C*N.3?0:*#O6@HI*

50 GS
51
50 50N
51 51N

B
50N
51N
51G

87T

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET
F S

18-9
 J::*&/H=?C*N.3?0:*#O6@HI**
[email protected]/@5*P3H/830"*

50 50 50N
51 51 51N

B
GS
50N 51G
51N

87T

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET
F S

%5C9/H5*&.5/=5.*O6@I*-6.H?6@*#O6@HI5.*

50 GS
51
RATCHET
BY PASS CIRCUIT
SWITCHER
50N
51N
51G
50
51

87T

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET
F S

18-10
%5C9/H5*&.5/=5.*O6@I*N.3?0:*#O6@HI*
/0:*Q(!*
50 MOD
51

GS
50N
51N 51G
50
51

87T AUX

UV

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET
F S

J::*-/C/[email protected]*

50 MOD
51

GS
50N
51N 51G
50
51

87T

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET

18-11
 !""#!$"#%&"#!'()"#*+,%-.#%&"##
/01#2301#%&"#24""+&#56+..46+#*+,%-.#
OTHER TAPPED
SUBSTATIONS
50 MOD
51 R

GS
50N
51N
51G SUD
PRE IOC
Z

HOT
SPOT 87T AUX

AUX

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET

7/(#8+6.4.#(9+6:466+&1#);%6%:1+6<.=:.#
7 IMP. RELAY SET TO PICK UP
AT 29 MVA @ 68 DEGREES
REACTANCE OHMS @ 13 KV

6 BANK OC SET TO
PICK UP AT 29 MVA
5
4
Z PICK UP
3
!MHO"
2
29 MVA
1
42 MVA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
RESISTANCE OHMS @ 13 KV

18-12
!"#$%&'()($#*&'+)''&,-$./0'0+-&'1(2+($
7 397 ACSR.

REACTANC E OHM S @ 13 KV
6 11.4 MI. BANK OC MODIFIED
TO PICK UP AT 42 MVA
5
7.7 MI. 1/0 ACSR.
4
Z PICK UP
3
!MHO"
2
29 MVA
1
42 MVA
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
RESISTANCE OHMS @ 13 KV

"01@/99*"4C5:/0H5*%59/B1*/@*&.5/=5.*!-"*
C
OTHER TAPPED
SUBSTATIONS
GS
Z1 R
C
Z2 S

Z3 SUD
51G IOC
PRE
Z

50N HOT
51N SPOT 87T AUX

50 50N 51N
51 51N

E HIGH
SET
LOW
SET

18-13
 C

Z1
C
S
Z2
E 51 IOC Z
Z3

Z3 120 CY 50N
51N 87T
50
51
Z 100 CY
E
CYCLES

Z2 25 CY
IOC 15 CY
E 50
CURRENT 13 KV BUS FAULT

-33.:60/830*J430R*SA*"(-A*/0:*
"4C5:/0H5*%59/B1*/@*&.5/=5.*!-"*
E 51

Z3 120 CY
Z 100 CY
CYCLES

!REMOVAL OF E 50 Z2 25 CY
COULD RESULT IN
IOC 15 CY
UNDESIRABLE BANK
TRIP" 13 KV BUS FAULT

CURRENT

18-14
 -33.:60/830*J430R*SA*"(-A*/0:*
"4C5:/0H5*%59/B1*OI50*!,KL*&93H=5:"*
E 51

Z3 120 CY
Z 100 CY
CYCLES

Z2 60 CY
IOC 40 CY

13 KV BUS FAULT

CURRENT

POLE - TOP RECLOSER COORDINATION

SUBSTATION
BREAKER 1A 3B 2A 2B
FAULT
70L 50L X
LOAD LOAD LOAD LOAD
1A 2A 1B 2B

FIRST TRIP 2.0

SECOND TRIP 2.5
THIRD TRIP 3.5
FOURTH TRIP 9.5
FIFTH TRIP 10.0 CYCLES

18-15
18-16
18-17
 POLE - TOP RECLOSER COORDINATION

SUBSTATION SECTIONALIZER
BREAKER 1A 3B 2A 2B
FAULT
70L 50L S X
LOAD LOAD LOAD LOAD

1A 2A 1B 2B

FIRST TRIP 2.0

SECOND TRIP 2.5
THIRD TRIP 3.5
FOURTH TRIP 9.5
FIFTH TRIP 10.5 CYCLES

GROUND SWITCH ON LOAD SIDE OF CS

D
Z1

Z2
RATCHET
BY PASS CIRCUIT
Z3 SWITCHER

50N
51N GS

BATTERY CHARGER

18-18
 TWO CIRCUIT SWITCHERS IN SERIES

D
Z1

Z2
CIRCUIT
A SWITCHER
Z3

CIRCUIT
50N
B SWITCHER
51N

BATTERY CHARGER

BATTERY CONTROL OF CS
D 28 A START
Z1 15 A - 5 SEC
M
Z2
RATCHET
BY PASS CIRCUIT
Z3 SWITCHER
8A
50N
60 MS
51N

STATION BATTERY
CHARGER

18-19
TRANSFORMER FUSE PROTECTION

427 A 427 A

A GROUND FAULT ON THE

LOW–SIDE OF A DELTA - WYE
BANK LOOKS LIKE A
PHASE – TO – PHASE FAULT
ON THE HIGH SIDE

X 3930 A

TRANSFORMER FUSE PROTECTION

FUSE BADLY DAMAGED
BUT STILL VIABLE
SMALL CHARGING
CURRENT FLOWING

X 0A

18-20
 FUSE CONDITIONS

Normal Fuse

Fuse Blown By High Fault Current

Fuse Blown By Low Fault Current

Fuse Almost Blown By Low Fault Current

TRANSFORMER SWITCHER PROTECTION

MOTOR CONTACTS CLOSED
ALL CONTACTS CLOSED TWO GAS CONTACTS OPEN

M M

427 A 427 A EXCITE.

CURRENT

X X
3930 A 0A

18-21
 TRANSFORMER SWITCHER PROTECTION
MOTOR CONTACTS CLOSED
ALL CONTACTS CLOSED TWO GAS CONTACTS OPEN

M M

427 A 427 A EXCITE.

CURRENT

X X
3930 A 0A

REVIEW

CIRCUIT SWITCHER FLASH OVER

•! Clear by TVA breakers
TWO CIRCUIT SWITCHERS IN SERIES
•! If one fails the other will serve as backup
•! No inadvertent ground switch operation
•! Battery fails neither circuit switcher operates
–!Utility transformers not protected
•! Approximately $90,000 added cost
•! Added real estate

18-22
 REVIEW

ONE CIRCUIT SWITCHER

•! Isolate blade and gas bottle
•! Two battery systems
–!Battery backup
•! Blade battery failure
–!Faults cleared by gas bottle interrupters
•! Gas bottle battery failure
–!Blade flashover
*! Cleared by 161 kv breakers
*! Utility transformers protected

18-23
18-24
DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

D
Z VA
VB
OSC ABC VC
51G
50
51

50N 87T
51N

OSC N 50 50N
51 51N

E F S

18-25
 DISTRIBUTED GENERATION

VA

VB

VC

18-26
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 19
Operating Problems Affecting Human Safety

19
John R. Boyle

Principal Engineer
PSA/Power System Analysts
496 Pine Ridge Drive
Signal Mountain, TN 37377
 RESPONSIBILITY
LIABILITY
ETHICS

IN PROTECTION DESIGN

A RELAYING NIGHTMARE
DEFICIENCIES

•! Design
•! Control schemes
•! First line protection
•! Operating procedures
•! Backup protection
•! Responsibilities

19-1
 161 kv

134 MVA (6.5%)

13.8 kv

440 v
460 v
STATION
SERVICE

161 kv

134 MVA (6.5%)

13.8 kv

440 v
460 v
STATION
SERVICE

19-2
 161 kv
87T
50 21
T

134 MVA (6.5%)

13.8 kv

440 v S
G 460 v
STATION
SERVICE

161 kv
87T
T 50 21

134 MVA (6.5%)

13.8 kv

440 v S
G
460 v
STATION
SERVICE

19-3
 161 kv
87T
21
CLOSED SWITCH TO
T 50
ENERGIZE EXCITATION
TRANSFORMER
134 MVA (6.5%)

13.8 kv

440 v S
G 460 v
STATION
SERVICE

19-4
 161 kv
87T
61 A
50 21
T

134 MVA (6.5%)

13.8 kv

X S
G 714 A 22,400 A 460 v
STATION
SERVICE

714.4963
1,000 60,000

TYPE 65E FUSE ON 13.8 KV SIDE

OF EXCITATION TRANSFORMER
3 PHASE FAULT
100 6,000
Time In Cycles (60-hz basis)

10 600
Time In Seconds

1 60
0.5524

.1 6

.01 .6
1,000
100

10,000

Current in Amperes

19-5
 618.0164
1,000 60,000

TYPE 65E FUSE ON 13.8 KV SIDE

OF EXCITATION TRANSFORMER
PHASE - PHASE FAULT
100 6,000
Time In Cycles (60-hz basis)

10 600
Time In Seconds

1
0.9757 60

.1 6
65E-TOTAL CLEAR

.01 .6
1,000
100

10,000

Current in Amperes

19-6
 1,000 60,000

100 6,000

618.0000

Time In Cycles (60-hz basis)

PHASE-PHASE
10 600
Time In Seconds

1 60
TYPE 65E FUSE ON 13.8 KV SIDE
OF EXCITATION TRANSFORMER
DIFF. TIME = 0.42 SEC. = 25 CYC.

.1 6
714.0000 65E-TOTAL CLEAR
3 PHASE

.01 .6
100

1,000

10,000
Current in Amperes

19-7
19-8
 BKR. FAILURE
OFF
WHEN BKRS.
"G! & "S! OPEN
161 kv
87T
4,430 A LOCAL REMOTE
T 50 21 OFF ON
87T 87T
50 50
134 MVA (6.5%) 21 43 L / R 21
BKR!T!
13.8 kv

X S
G 51,650 A
460 v
STATION
SERVICE

OUTCOME

•! 134 MVA bank failed

•! 7 men died
•! 24 men severely injured
•! 5 men indicted for manslaughter

•!3 MEN SERVED 2 & 1/2 YEARS IN PRISON

19-9
 134 MVA BANK FAILURE
•! Tank ruptured
•! Oil on fire
•! Thick smoke
•! Pump storage plant
•! All men trapped

51641.6367
10,000 600,000

134 MVA TRANSFORMER

THERMAL DAMAGE CURVE

1,000 60,000

TRANSF. DAMAGE / FAILURE

Time In Cycles (60-hz basis)

OCCURRED IN APPROX.
15 SECONDS
Time In Seconds

100 6,000

14.7342
10 600

5.5793
3Ph 134000 kVA Thermal A5606.46

3Ph 134000 kVA Mechanical A5606.46

1 60
10,000

100,000

1,000,000

Current in Amperes

19-10
19-11
A RELAYING NIGHTMARE
DEFICIENCIES

•! Design
•! Control schemes
•! First line protection
•! Operating procedures
•! Backup protection
•! Responsibilities

19-12
 DESIGN

o! BREAKER FAILURE
o! WHY KEY TO THE POSITION OF GENERATOR
AND STATION SERVICE BREAKERS ?

o! LOCAL / REMOTE SWITCH

o! WHY REMOVE RELAYS WHEN IN THE
"LOCAL! POSITION ?

o! ONE ESCAPE TUNNEL

o! WHEN IS SECOND TUNNEL JUSTIFIED ?

CONTROL SCHEMES

o! RELAYS INDEPENDENT OF LOCAL / REMOTE

SWITCH (BACKUP OC AND GRD)

o! TRIP BKR DIRECTLY BY PHASE OC

o! REDUNDANT AUXILIARY TRIP RELAYS

o! PANIC MANUAL TRIP SWITCH IN POWER

HOUSE

19-13
 FIRST LINE PROTECTION

o! FUSE / DISCONNECT SWITCH

o! WHY ACTIVATE SWITCH AFTER FIRST FUSE BLOWS ?

TURN FUSE / SWITCH AROUND

FUSE ON SOURCE SIDE

13.8 kv
51,650 A

PROBLEM: DISCONNECT SWITCH

DOES NOT ISOLATE FUSE

19-14
 EXTEND DIFFERENTIAL

87T
50 21
T

134 MVA (6.5%)

13.8 kv

S
440 v
G 460 v
STATION
REMOVE FUSES SERVICE

OPERATING PROCEDURES

WHEN OPERATOR COULD NOT CLOSE THE

HIGH SIDE BREAKER WITH "LOCAL / REMOTE"
SWITCH IN THE "REMOTE! POSITION SHOULD
HE HAVE STOPPED TO FIX THE PROBLEM ?

19-15
 OBSERVATIONS

•! Breaker Failure
•!DO NOT KEY TO POSITION OF OTHER BRKS.

161 kv
87T
61 A CHARGE
T 50 21 CONTRACTOR SHOULD
HAVE ANTICIPATED LBS
FAILURE AND ACTIVATED
134 MVA (6.5%) THE BF SCHEME.

13.8 kv
LBS
X S
G 714 A 22,400 A 460 v
STATION
SERVICE

LBS = LOAD BREAK SWITCH

19-16
 OBSERVATIONS

•! Breaker Failure

•! LBS Fuse Selection

•! 1973 and 1990 IEC #420 Documents
•! When to end modifications ?

OBSERVATIONS

•! Breaker Failure

•! LBS Fuse Selection

•! 440 Volt Fuses

•! One Phase Grounded (No Problem)
•! Two Phases Grounded (No Problem)
•! Three Phases Grounded (Big Problems)

19-17
 1,000 60,000

100 6,000

618.0000
Time In Cycles (60-hz basis)

PHASE-PHASE
10 600
Time In Seconds

1 60
TYPE 65E FUSE ON 13.8 KV SIDE
OF EXCITATION TRANSFORMER
DIFF. TIME = 0.42 SEC. = 25 CYC.

.1 6
714.0000 65E-TOTAL CLEAR
3 PHASE

.01 .6
100

1,000

10,000

Current in Amperes

19-18
 OBSERVATIONS

•! Breaker Failure

•! LBS Fuse Selection

•! 1973 and 1990 IEC #420 Documents
•! DO NOT KEY TO OPERATION OF SW
•! 161 kV Backup protection
•!IMPLIMENT BEFORE ENERGIZING BANK

161 kv
TRANSFER BUS

134 MVA (6.5%)

13.8 kv

440 v
460 v
STATION
SERVICE

19-19
5 OHMS
80.9 KV APPARENT OHMS EFFECT
A

21 OHMS RELAY REACH @ BREAKER "A!

80,900 / 2410 A = 33.57 OHMS
B

50.61 KV

134 MVA (6.5%) 12.57 OHMS

X FAULT = 2410 A
AT 161 KV
D

5 OHMS
76.38 KV
APPARENT OHMS EFFECT

A A
1657 A 1657 A
21 OHMS 21 OHMS

B B

RELAY REACH @ BREAKER "A!

76,380 / 1657 A = 46.1 OHMS
41.58 KV
THIS IS CALLED "APPARENT OHMS!
C ACTUAL OHMS = 33.57 OHMS

134 MVA (6.5%) 12.57 OHMS

FAULT = 3314 A
X AT 161 KV
D

19-20
 SETTING GROUPS
1) Normal
2) Extend Reach of 50
161 kv
3) Reduce Time of 21
87T
50 21 4) Breaker Failure Not
T
Dependent On Position
Of L/R Switch
134 MVA (6.5%)

13.8 kv

440 v S
G 460 v
STATION
SERVICE

RESPONSIBILITY

o! FOR COORDINATION ?
o! CONTRACTOR
o! UTILITY

o! FOR PROTECTION ?
o! CONTRACTOR
o! UTILITY

19-21
 ONE LAST THING

THE STATION WAS

DEENERGISED MANUALLY

2 – 3 MINUTES LATER

A THOUGHT

" Experience is a wonderful thing.

It enables you to recognize a
mistake every time you repeat it !!

19-22
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 20
Distribution Transformer Excitation

John R. Boyle

Principal Engineer
PSA/Power System Analysts
496 Pine Ridge Drive
Signal Mountain, TN 37377
20
 69 KV
A

P B C

G
G IN

M 13 KV
IA, IB, IC
PT
E S
V
VA, VB, VC
LONG LINE

URBAN INDUSTRIAL

P A B C

G
IN

IA, IB, IC
E S

VA, VB, VC

URBAN INDUSTRIAL

20-1
 P A B C

G IN

IA, IB, IC
E S

VA, VB, VC

URBAN INDUSTRIAL

P A B C

G IN

IA, IB, IC
E S
VA, VB, VC

URBAN INDUSTRIAL

20-2
20-3
P A B C

G
IN

IC
E S
VC

URBAN INDUSTRIAL

TIME = 1 SEC TIME = 7 – 13.5 SEC

A

P B C

G IN = 233A
IN = 254A G IN
180 HZ (IN = 305A) VC = 7.03KV
M VC = 7.80KV
IC = 910A
IC = 423A PT
E S
V

LONG LINE
VC = 7.73KV
VC = 8.58KV

URBAN INDUSTRIAL
DEENERGIZED

20-4
 LOAD

COMP.

134
132
130
128
126
124 126
122 124
120
118
116
114

20-5
 VP
VS
LOAD

VP

IX LAGING PF
VS
IR
I=910A VP

IX UNITY PF

VS VS
IR
I=910A

VP
I=423A IX LEADING PF
VS
IR
VS

69KV
EACH BANK = 12 MVA OPEN
7% = 58% on 100mva Base
THEREFORE TWO BANKS
EQUAL 29% OPEN
13KV
Formula:
10,800 KVAR
% Rise = Kvar ( jX)
105

= 10,800 (29) = 3.1 % 10,800 (58%) = 6.2 %

105 105

20-6
20-7
P A B C

G IN 8.5KV
7.5KV

IA, IB, IC TRANSFORMER

E S
EXCITATION CURVE
VA, VB, VC
LONG LINE
VOLTAGE

URBAN INDUSTRIAL

0.1 1.0 10 100

EXCITATION CURRENT

20-8
 THINGS TO CONSIDER
•! Reduce Regulator Compensation & Float Pt
•! Reduce Regulator Time To Move
•! Replace Regulator Backup Ground Relay
To One That Rejects High Harmonics
•! Purchase Low Loss Transformers
•! Trip Capacitors When Voltage Goes to Zero
(may not be practical)

20-9
 21
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 21
Phasor Estimating and the Smart Grid

Arun G. Phadke

Professor Emeritus
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Bradley Dept. of Elect. Engineering
Center For Power Engineering
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0111
 GPS SYNCHRONIZED MEASUREMENTS
IN
POWER SYSTEMS AND THEIR APPLICATIONS

A.G. Phadke

TOPICS PRESENTED

• Introduction to phasors

• Motivation for synchronization

• Sources of synchronization

• State estimation with synchronized phasors

• Improved control with synchronized phasors

• Adaptive protection with synchronized phasors

• Future prospects

21-1
 • Introduction to phasors

Imaginary
!

Real

t=0
• The starting time defines the phase angle of the phasor.
• This is arbitrary.
• However, differences between phase angles are
independent of the starting time.

• Sampling process, Fourier filter for phasors

Input signal
samples

cosines
sines

sin and cos

Data

functions
xn
xn-1
.

.
x1

#2
Phasor X = --!
N
xk(cosk" - j sink")
t

21-2
• Sampling process, Fourier filter for phasors

Fourier filters can also be described as:

• Least-squares on a period
• Cross-correlation with sine and cosine
• Kalman filters (under many circumstances)

• Phasors from fractional cycle:

High speed relaying

#2
Xc - jXs = --"
N
xk(cosk! - j sink!)

Phasor X = (AXc+BXs)+j(CXc+DXs)
t

• Non-recursive phasor calculations

"1 "2

"2 = "1 + k$
t "1
The non-recursive phasor rotates in the forward
direction, one sample angle per sample.

21-3
• Recursive phasor calculations

"1 "2= "1

"2 = "1
t "1
The recursive phasor remains fixed if the input
waveform is constant.

• A mechanical analogy

Cosine

Xr
Xa = Xr + jXi

Xi
Newest
data sample Sine

21-4
 • Effect of noise on phasor calculations

• Harmonics eliminated correctly if Nyquist

criterion is satisfied.
• Non-harmonic components

• Random Noise

Size of circle of
Circle of

uncertainty
uncertainty

True Phasor
Measurement
data window

• Motivation for synchronization

Substation A Substation B

At different locations

By synchronizing the sampling processes for

different signals - which may be hundreds of miles
apart, it is possible to put their phasors on the same
phasor diagram.

21-5
• Sources for Synchronization

• Pulses
• Radio
• GOES
• GPS

• A phasor measurement unit

GPS
receiver
Analog
Inputs Phase-locked
oscillator Modems

Anti-aliasing 16-bit Phasor

filters A/D conv micro-
processor

Except for synchronization, the hardware is the same

as that of a digital fault recorder or a digital relay.

21-6
• Frequency measurement with phasors

Positive sequence
voltage at %
3-phase voltages
at %

"
frequency

%'%(
d"&dt

time

• State Estimation in Energy Management Systems

•History : Blackout of 1965

•How to determine the condition of the

network in real time?

•The network is assumed to be in steady state

•Redundant measurements

•Bad data detection and elimination

21-7
• State estimation with phasor measurements
Measurements
Present practice
are scanned
and are NOT
simultaneous
Measurements
are primarily
P, Q, |E| = [Z]
Measurements
Control
Center are non-linear
functions of the
state E :
Z = h(E)
Iterative weighted least square solution

[Z - Zk] = [ * h ]k )Ek
*E

• State estimation with phasor measurements

Estimation with phasors

Positive sequence
Phasors are the
state vector
Because they are
synchronized at
source, they
are simultaneous
Control
regardless of
Center
the speed of
communication
Redundancy in measurement is provided by the
positive sequence current measurements

21-8
• State estimation with phasor measurements

Estimation with phasors Since the

currents and
voltages are
linearly related
to the state vector,
The estimator
equations are
Control linear, and no
Center iterations are
required.

[Z] = [A] [E] , and once again the weighted least

square solution is obtained with a constant
gain matrix.

• State estimation with phasor measurements

It is possible to
obtain phasors
from widely
Monitoring
or control
separated locations.
site

How many PMUs must be installed? PMU

For complete observability, Indirect
about 1/3 the number
of buses (along with the
currents in all the connected
lines) in the system
need to be monitored.

21-9
USES OF PHASOR MEASUREMENTS
ADVANCED CONTROL FUNCTIONS
Present system: model based controls
Controller

Measurements Controlled
Device

USES OF PHASOR MEASUREMENTS

ADVANCED CONTROL FUNCTIONS
Phasor based: Feedback based control
Controller
Measurements

Controlled
Device

21-10
• Improved control with synchronized phasors

Power System Stabilizer study (Snyder, INPG, EdF)

PSS

PMU
Generator power

With PMU feedback

Without PMU feedback

60 sec
time

• Improved control with synchronized phasors

Defense plan (EdF)

PMUs distributed
in seven regions
of the country.

Real time phase

angle differences
of a region with
the rest of the
country monitored
at the center.

The tie lines of the region broken with the rest of the
country disconnected if angle separation exceeds limits.

21-11
• Improved control with synchronized phasors

Real-time monitoring for voltage stability and control

(In progress, Virginia Tech and Iowa State University)

Power
System

State based Off-line inputs

on Phasor
measurements
Margin Margin to voltage
and instability
Jacobian
Control
estimator Countermeasures

• Stabilizing a network

Georgia

Out of step
condition

Out of step Florida

relays
detect
incipient
instability

21-12
• Adaptive protection with synchronized phasors

Transient stability swing exposes

distance relays to possible trips

• Adaptive protection with synchronized phasors

Blocking

Tripping

Zone
and Timer
settings

21-13
• Adaptive protection with synchronized phasors

S-PMU S-PMU

Relay Relay

• Adaptive protection with synchronized phasors

Pre-fault

Post-fault
Interval
Prediction
Observation
Interval

21-14
• Future prospects

• PMU technology continues to advance

• IEEE synchrophasor standard

• Workshops and symposia on Phasor

measurements and their applications
• Activity in state estimation with Phasors

• Control and protection applications

National
Center

Regional
Center

21-15
HOW TO DISPLAY WIDE AREA PHASORS

+
1
Center Of Angles

+2

HOW TO DISPLAY WIDE AREA PHASORS

Center Of Angles
+
1

+2

21-16
21-17
Modern Power System Protection: Applications

22
and Performance Analysis

TAB 22
Blackouts: Causes and Countermeasures

Stanley H. Horowitz

Consultant
3143 Griggsview Court
Columbus, OH 43221
System is stressed beyond normal conditions
Generator and/or transmission line outages
Control room operators trained to respond to abnormal conditions provided
information is timely and correct
Additional system elements are lost
System loses synchronism, low voltage, low frequency
Insufficient or delayed response
Blackout

22-1
22-2
Blackouts follow the same experience curve as natural disasters.
Expect an event affecting 50 million people every 38 years.!

22-3
Five 230kV lines from Adam Beck Hydro plant in New York were feeding Ontario Province at
peak load (5:16PM). A load change from a tap changer in NY increased the load to Ontario
slightly. A third zone relay set for breaker failure two line sections away operated. This relay
was set in 1956 and never revised. As one line tripped, the remaining 4 lines increased their
load and each in turn tripped, separating Canada from the US, The reversal of power had
unanticipated results. Several transmission lines in New York were overloaded and tripped.
The governing oil system at Adam Beck tried to follow the load change and tripped all units,
several loss-of-field relays in New England misoperated, probably from a blooming of their
characteristics with the voltage changes, severely reducing generation and reactive support.
The entire New England and New York area went black. NYC took several days to restore all
of its load

22-4
22-5
22-6
On a double circuit tower line feeding power to NYC from Indian Point Nuclear
plant, a steam power plant and interconnections with New England, two severe
lightning storms within ten minutes of each other cut off all power into the City.
Lightning hit phase 1 on one circuit and flashed across the tower arm to phase 3
of the other circuit, causing a phase-to-phase-to ground on both circuits.
A directional relay had been calibrated recently but in returning the cover to the
electromechanical relay the directional contact was bent and could not operate.
All High Speed Reclosing on the CON ED system was removed as a result of
the subsynchronous resonance studies. The check synchronizing settings were
reduced to 10 degrees. As a result, none of the lines reclosed in the 10 minutes
between faults.
A breaker failure relay timer was corrupted by adding several auxiliary relays in
parallel to obtain additional circuit breaker auxiliary contact. This caused several
breakers at the Indian Point Station to operate
Some NYC load may have been saved, enough to match the local generation,

22-7
22-8
Replaced the 1965 Blackout as a defining event.
Occurred after several units tripped for a number of reasons, tree
trimming was lax and resulted in many line outages. Key element,
however, was the failure in the First Energy control room to recognize
what was happening. The technicians working on the monitoring
computer went to lunch, leaving the computer shut down, the operators
ignored messages from the PJM and AEP control rooms that there
were excessive line and unit outages and to drop load.

22-9
A major contributor to cascading outages is the effect of the zone distance relay particularly
third zone.

22-10
Blinders limit operation of impedance
relay but create a complex tripping circuit. Easier with digital logic than with analog
contacts.
Load power factor vs. fault power factor is a good discriminator. Continuous load
monitor can subtract it from the algorithm.
Load encroachment is a logic entry

22-11
A key outage occurred on the Sammis-Star line separating the First Energy System from AEP.

22-12
One of the recommendations of NERC was to eliminate the
third zone completely. This chart shows where such a move is not always advisable.

22-13
22-14
22-15
22-16
22-17
22-18
22-19
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

23
TAB 23
More Intelligent Controls

Arun G. Phadke

Professor Emeritus
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Bradley Dept. of Elect. Engineering
Center For Power Engineering
Blacksburg, VA 24061-0111
 PRESENTATION OUTLINE:

1. Rare Events

2. New York City blackout of 1977

3. Analysis of Causes

4. Countermeasures

CAN BLACKOUTS BE MADE LESS LIKELY ?

Power system design

Stressed system
to make stress less likely

Random events beyond

Outages
control

Inappropriate control actions More intelligent controls

Design of a ductile system

Cascading
instead of a brittle system

Loss of synchronism
and blackout

23-1
MORE INTELLIGENT CONTROLS

The main operational control we are concerned with are

the HIGH SPEED controls, including protection

• High speed
protection equipment

• Autonomous for speed

• Very large numbers

• High speed wide area

measurements

• A phasor measurement unit

GPS
receiver
Analog
Inputs Phase-locked
oscillator Modems

Anti-aliasing 16-bit Phasor

filters A/D conv micro-
processor

23-2
 ADVANCED CONTROL FUNCTIONS
Phasor based: Feedback based control
Controller
Measurements

Controlled
Device

Adaptive Relaying

Controlled Security & Dependability

System State
Protection
No 1
Logic
Arbitration

Or
Breakers
To Circuit

Protection
And
No 2
Vote
Protection
No 3

23-3
 Remedial Action Schemes
• Wide Area Protection Schemes
SPS or RAS
• System Protection Schemes came into being as
control functions which required protection system
interventions.
• Often the inputs may be derived from protection
systems, and certainly the outputs of protection systems
are used to execute the controls.

Wide Area Protections

• The role is to prevent major system failures.

• Voltage instability, angular instability are the main

driving considerations.

Remedial Action Schemes

• Wide Area Protection Schemes
Example:

Large System If Pt > P0

And
If Pg > P0’
Pt And
S1 , S2 , S3 If S1 OR S2 OR S3 open
Pg
Then
Drop load L
L

23-4
Design of a ductile system instead of a brittle system

Ductile and Brittle structures

Brittle
System

Initiating event

Ductile
System
Initiating event

To achieve ductility,
• New network elements
• New configurations
• Renewable architectures

Strategic placement of controllable elements:

Brittle
System

Contingency set which

leads to catastrophic
failures

Contingency set which

leads to catastrophic
failures with strategically
placed controllable elements

23-5
EFFECTS OF OPEN ACCESS AND DEREGULATION

• A paradigm shift in load generation relationship

• Public good vs. stockholder good

• Lack of incentives for infrastructure improvements

• Restrictions on information exchange

• Lack of signals for future technical manpower needs

23-6
Modern Power System Protection: Applications
and Performance Analysis

TAB 24
Notebook Paper

24