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an “ambiguity” in the statute. It is in this sense that the words “ambiguity” and “ambiguous” are widely used in
judgments.62. Although the words of the statutory provision as a matter of language may be clear enough, ambiguity
may arise as to the scope or subject matter of their intended reference, eg, scope of the power or right conferred.63.

Difference of judicial opinion as to the true meaning of certain words need not necessarily lead to the conclusion
that those words are ambiguous. Instances are not wanting where eminent judges agreed that the meaning was
plain but they differed on the question as to what that meaning was. In construing section 1 of the Merchant
Shipping (International Labour Convention) Act, 1925, all the speeches delivered in the House of Lords were in
agreement that the meaning of the section was plain, but Lord Blanesburg differed from the majority on the issue as
to what that meaning was.64. Similarly, opinions of judges of equal weight and authority may differ on the question
whether a particular language is ambiguous or not.65. In construing the words “is sold” as they occur in section
17(1)(a) of the Income-tax Act, 1945, the majority in the House of Lords took the view that these words were plain
and did not include the case of compulsory acquisition of property on payment of compensation. Lord Morton,
however, was of opinion that the words were readily capable of more than one interpretation and in the context
covered the case of compulsory acquisition.66. As to how the approach should be made by each individual Judge is
brought out in the speech of Viscount Simonds where he said:

Each one of us has the task of deciding what the relevant words mean. In coming to that decision, he will necessarily give
great weight to the opinion of others, but if, at the end of the day, he forms his own clear judgment and does not think that
the words are ‘fairly and equally open to diverse meanings’ he is not entitled to say that there is an ambiguity.67.

Even when the meaning is obscure, judges may not be prepared to accept that the language is ambiguous. In his
dissenting opinion in Ellerman’s case, Lord Blanesburg speaking of section 1 of the Act in question said: “I do not
suggest that section 1 bears its meaning, as I have interpreted it, upon its sleeve. It yields up to its secret only to the
patient enquirer; its truth lies at the bottom of the well. It is obscure; it remains oblique, but it is not in the result
ambiguous”.68.

Use of syllepsis in a section does not make it ambiguous. “It is not an ambiguity if a term “T” means “X” in relation to
“a” and “Y” in relation to “b”. It is only an ambiguity if “T” means either “X” or “Y” in relation to “a” or “b”.”69.

Warning has sometimes been given that ambiguity should not be assumed where there is none.70. In a case71.
relating to the construction of the words “a submission made in pursuance of an agreement” as they occur in
section 3 of the Foreign Awards (Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961, the Supreme Court by a majority of two
against one held that the word “submission” meant actual submission or completed reference and not merely an
agreement to refer or an arbitral clause. The majority adopted this meaning on the view that the words were plain.
They refused to give an extended meaning to the word “submission” although the restricted meaning adopted by
them failed to achieve the object of the Act which was to give effect to the convention on the recognition and
enforcement of foreign arbitral awards which was set forth in a Schedule to the Act. In so holding, they differed from
an English case72. where a wider construction was adopted of the word “submission” in a similar enactment. Grover
J, speaking for the majority said:

We are aware of no rule of interpretation by which rank ambiguity can be first introduced by giving certain expressions a
particular meaning and then an attempt can be made to emerge out of semantic confusion and obscurity by having resort to
presumed intention of the Legislature to give effect to international obligations.73.

Ramaswamy J in his dissenting opinion, did not find the language that plain and construed the word “submission” in
a wide sense as including an agreement to submit to arbitration. The case illustrates how sharp divergence of
opinion may result on the question whether certain words are plain or ambiguous.

Apparently clear and simple language at times in its analysis is so ambiguous as to present great difficulty in
construction.74. Regarding Article 105(2) of the Constitution which provides that “no member of Parliament shall be
liable to any proceeding in respect of anything said or any vote given by him in Parliament”, the Supreme Court in
Tej Kiran Jain v N Sanjeeva Reddy75. said: “The Article means what it says in language which could not be plainer”.
But look at the sharp divergence of opinion that it later created in PV Narsimha Rao v State.76. Though all the five
judges agreed that a member of Parliament who receives bribe for voting but does not vote can be prosecuted for
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1.6 APPRAISAL OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PLAIN MEANING

the offence of bribery under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, it was held by a majority of three against two
that a member who voted in Parliament after receipt of bribe cannot be prosecuted as his prosecution would be a
proceeding in respect of a vote given by him and barred by Article 105(2). The words “Suit for land” occurring in
clause 12 of the Letters Patent of Calcutta, Madras and Bombay High Courts have given rise to great divergence of
judicial opinion and “the numerous cases in the books on the construction of that clause reveal what a prodigious
amount of judicial time has been expended on endless debate as to its meaning”.77. The court of the Judicial
Commissioner of the Central Provinces in two Full Bench decisions held that certain decrees passed under that
clause by the Bombay High Court following its own Full Bench view were in excess of jurisdiction and absolute
nullities. That led to the passing of the Decrees and Orders Validating Act, 1936.78. Even in the Federal Court where
the matter came up before five eminent judges of our country, there was no unanimity and the question whether the
suit out of which that appeal arose was a “suit for land” remained undecided.79. Another example is the word “Court”
itself which should prima facie appear to the courts quite simple and clear but has given rise to an “endless
oscillation between two views—each verging on a fringe of obscurity and vagueness”.80.

Language which on its construction results in absurdity, inconsistency, hardship or strange consequences is not
readily accepted as unambiguous. “Judges are not always prepared”, says Maxwell, “to concede as plain language
which involves absurdity and inconsistency.81. It is true as noticed earlier that when the language is fairly and
reasonably open to only one meaning, hardship or inconvenience or surprising results are no considerations for
refusing to give effect to that meaning. But such cases are rare for absurd and unreasonable results are not
intended by the Legislature and the language used is seldom so plain or inflexible that the courts are not able to
avoid them.”82.

Sometimes it is said that “though a construction according to plain language should ordinarily be accepted, such a
construction should not be adopted where it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities”.83. This and similar
statements84. are not accurate statements of the rule and all that they really mean is that prima facie plain language
may not be plain.85. As already seen, plain meaning rule applies at the stage when the words have been construed
in their context and the conclusion is reached that they are susceptible to only one meaning.86. In that event the
meaning so derived is to be given effect to irrespective of consequences for no alternative construction is really
open. This, of course, is subject to the qualification in India that the statute is constitutional and unreasonableness,
and that the injustice or absurdity is not of the nature and gravity which makes the statute offend the Constitution.87.

54. D Saibaba v Bar Council of India, AIR 2003 SC 2502 [LNIND 2003 SC 510], 2507 : (2003) 6 SCC 186 [LNIND 2003 SC
510] : (2003) 2 KLT 669. (This proposition is approvingly referred from p 45 of 8th Edn of this book). See further
Ibrahimpatnam Taluk Vyavasaya Coolie Sangham v K Suresh Reddy, (2003) 7 SCC 667 [LNIND 2003 SC 687], pp
677, 678; Special Land Acquisition Officer v Karigowda, (2010) 5 SCC 708 [LNIND 2010 SC 399] para 35 : AIR 2010
SC 2322 [LNINDORD 2010 SC 180].
55. Hutton v Phillips, 45 Del 156, 70A, 2nd 15; Ried Macdonald and Fordham, Cases and other Materials on Legislation,
2nd Edn, pp 1013, 1014; UOI v Sankalachand, AIR 1977 SC 2328 [LNIND 1977 SC 268], p 2374 : (1977) 4 SCC 193
[LNIND 1977 SC 268] : 1977 SCC (L&S) 435; Manohar Nathrao Samarth v Marotrao, AIR 1979 SC 1084 [LNINDU
2014 BOM 2391], p 1089 : 1979 (4) SCC 93 [LNIND 1979 SC 277]; Life Insurance Corp v DJ Bahadur, AIR 1980 SC
2181 [LNIND 1980 SC 442], p 2191 : 1981 (1) SCR 1083 [LNIND 1980 SC 442]; Special Land Acquisition Officer v
Karigowda, (2010) 5 SCC 708 [LNIND 2010 SC 399] para 36 : AIR 2010 SC 2322 [LNINDORD 2010 SC 180].
56. Ormond Investment Co v Betts, (1928) AC 143, p 156 (HL); referred to in Kirkness v John Hudson & Co, (1955) 2 All
ER 345, p 350 (HL) (Viscount Simonds). See further: Imperial Chemical Industries Plc v Colmel (Inspector of Taxes),
(2000) 1 All ER 129, p 133 (HL) (“An ambiguity is a word or phrase fairly open to diverse meanings, the classic
example being ‘twelve O’clock’ which, save for users of the 24 hour clock, could equally mean midday or midnight.”)
57. Kirkness v John Hudson & Co, supra, p 366. See further UOI v Hansoli devi, AIR 2002 SC 3240 [LNIND 2002 SC
569], p 3246 : (2001) 4 SCC 404 [LNIND 2001 SC 987]; State of Orissa v Joginder Patjoshi, AIR 2004 SC 1039, p 1042
: (2004) 9 SCC 278.
58. Attorney-General v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, (1957) 1 All ER 49, p 55 (HL); UOI v Sankalchand, AIR
1977 SC 2328 [LNIND 1977 SC 268], p 2336 : (1977) 4 SCC 193 [LNIND 1977 SC 268] : 1977 SCC (L&S) 435.
59. Attorney-General v HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, supra, p 62 (Lord Somervell of Harrow).
60. Nyadar Singh v UOI, AIR 1988 SC 1979 [LNIND 1985 SC 377], p 1984 : 1988 (4) SCC 170 [LNIND 1985 SC 377].
61. See text and Notes 59 to 69, pp 38-40.
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1.6 APPRAISAL OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PLAIN MEANING

62. Inland Revenue Commissioner v Joiner, (1975) 3 All ER 1050, pp 1058, 1059 : (1975) 1 WLR 1701 : 50 TC 449 (HL)
(Lord Diplock).
63. A Oliver Ashworth (Holdings) Pvt Ltd v Ballard (Kent) Ltd, (1999) 2 All ER 791, pp 807, 808 (CA) (Laws LJ).
64. Ellerman Lines Ltd v Murray, 1931 AC 126 : (1930) All ER Rep 503 (HL).
65. RL Arora v State of UP, AIR 1964 SC 1230 [LNIND 1964 SC 31]: 1964 (6) SCR 787. According to the majority opinion
in this case, clause (aa) of section 40(1), Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was capable of bearing two constructions whereas
according to the dissenting opinion of Ayyanger J, the clause could bear only one meaning).
66. Kirkness v John Hudson & Co Ltd, (1955) 2 All ER 345 (HL).
67. Kirkness v John Hudson & Co Ltd, (1955) 2 All ER 345, p 351 (HL).
See for similar observations: Director of Public Prosecutions v Ottewell, (1968) 3 All ER 153, p 157 (HL) (Lord Reid);
Farrel v Alexander, (1976) 3 All ER 721, p 744 (HL) (Lord Edmund Davies). But “a sense of modesty and respect for
the ability of his fellow Judges who think otherwise may make a Judge hesitate before deciding that the words are not
equally capable of bearing the meaning which they prefer and he does not”: Inland Revenue Commissioner v Joiner,
(1975) 3 All ER 1050, p 1063 : (1975) 1 WLR 1701 (HL) (Lord Diplock).
68. Ellerman Lines Ltd v Murray, (1930) All ER Rep 503, p 511 (HL).
69. Customs and Excise Commissioners v Thorn Electrical Industries Ltd, (1975) 3 All ER 881, p 884 (HL). For example in
the sentence—she went home in a sedan chair and a flood of tears,—“in” is not ambiguous.
70. Powell v Kempton Park Racecourse Co, (1899) AC 143, p 185 (HL); Mahadeolal Kanodia v Administrator General of
WB, AIR 1960 SC 936 [LNIND 1960 SC 128], p 940 : 1960 (3) SCR 578 [LNIND 1960 SC 128]; CIT v Indian Bank Ltd,
Madras, AIR 1965 SC 1473 [LNIND 1964 SC 279], p 1474 (para 8) : 1965 (1) SCR 833 [LNIND 1964 SC 279];
Patangrao Kadam v Brithviraj Sayajirao Yadav, AIR 2001 SC 1121 [LNIND 2001 SC 551], p 1126 (para 13); Duports
Steels Ltd v Sirs, (1980) 1 All ER 529, p 541 : (1980) 1 WLR 142 : 124 SJ 133 (HL); Inland Revenue Commissioners v
Rossminster Ltd, (1980) 1 All ER 80, p 90 (HL).
71. VO Tractoroexport v Tarapore & Co, AIR 1971 SC 1 [LNIND 1969 SC 438], p 9 : (1969) 3 SCC 562 [LNIND 1969 SC
438].
72. T B & S Batchelor & Co Ltd v Owners of SS Merak, (1964) 3 All ER 638, p 649; upheld in appeal (1965) 1 All ER 230
(CA).
73. VO Tractoroexport v Tarapore & Co, AIR 1971 SC 1 [LNIND 1969 SC 438], p 9 : (1969) 3 SCC 562 [LNIND 1969 SC
438]. For construction of statutes enacted to give effect to international conventions; see title 5(b2) Chapter 6 and see p
705 where this case is referred.
74. “It is often found that the more common place a word is, the more difficult it is to arrive at its exact meaning—and for a
very good reason, since it is the commonplaces which are used most vaguely and with the least attention to precise
significance”: Allen, Law in the Making, 7th Edn, p 489. “The simpler and more common the word or expression, the
more meanings and shades of meaning it has”: Shah J, in Madhava Rao Scindia v UOI, AIR 1971 SC 530 [LNIND 1970
SC 481], p 577 : (1971) 1 SCC 85 [LNIND 1970 SC 481]. See further observations of Lord Upjonh in Commissioner of
Customs v Top Ten Promotions Ltd, (1969) 3 All ER 39, p 90 (HL).
75. (1971) 1 SCR 612 [LNIND 1970 SC 274] : (1970) 2 SCC 272 [LNIND 1970 SC 274] : AIR 1970 SC 1573 [LNIND 1970
SC 274].
76. JT 1998 (3) SC 318 [LNIND 1998 SC 1259]: AIR 1998 SC 2120 [LNIND 1998 SC 1259]. See further R v Chaytor,
(2011) 1 All ER 805 (UKSC) (Prosecution of MPs for making false claims for attending Parliament does not amount to
breach of privilege as making expenses claims are not proceedings in Parliament and within exclusive cognizance of
Parliament).
77. Moolji Jaitha & Co v Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills Co Ltd, AIR 1950 FC 83, p 101 : 1949 FCR 849.
78. See Statement of Objects and Reasons, AIR Manual, 5th Edn, Vol 20, p 603.
79. Moolji Jaitha & Co v Khandesh Spinning and Weaving Mills, AIR 1950 FC 83, p 101 : 1949 FCR 849. In Adcon
Electronics Pvt Ltd v Daulat, AIR 2001 SC 3712 [LNIND 2001 SC 2019]: (2001) 7 SCC 698 [LNIND 2001 SC 2019] a
two- Judge Bench of the Supreme Court noticed the divergence of opinion in the Federal Court but preferred the
opinion of Mahajan J, in holding that a suit for specific performance of a contract of sale without claiming relief for
possession is not a “suit for land”.
80. Baliram Waman Hiray (Dr) v Mr Justice B Lentin, AIR 1988 SC 2267 [LNIND 1988 SC 442], p 2280 : 1988 Supp (2)
SCR 942 : (1988) 4 SCC 419 [LNIND 1988 SC 442]. The word “court” must be read in the context and in a certain
context it can comprehend court of civil jurisdiction and other courts or tribunals exercising curial or judicial powers.
Company Law Board was held to be a court in the context of section 9A of Special Court (Trial of offences relating to
Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992: Canara Bank v Nuclear Power Corp of India Ltd, 1995 (2) Scale 162: 1995 Supp
(3) SCC 381 : (1995) 84 Com Case 70; Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) functioning under section 41 of the Tamil
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1.6 APPRAISAL OF THE PRINCIPLE OF PLAIN MEANING

Nadu Shops and Establishment Act, 1947 held to be a “court”: P Sarathy v State Bank of India, AIR 2000 SC 2023
[LNIND 2000 SC 896]: (2000) 5 SCC 355 [LNIND 2000 SC 896]; Compensation officer appointed under the Bihar Land
Reforms Act, 1950 held not to be a “court” for section 195(1)(b) CrPC, 1973: Keshab Narayan Banerjee v State of
Bihar, AIR 2000 SC 485 [LNIND 1999 SC 1498]: (2000) 1 SCC 607 [LNIND 1999 SC 1498]; Manoharlal v Vinesh
Anand, AIR 2001 SC 1820 [LNIND 2001 SC 3142]: (2001) 3 SCC 401 [LNIND 2001 SC 435] (Arbitrator is not a court
in section 195 CrPC, 1973); K Shamrao v Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2003) 3 SCC 563 [LNIND 2003 SC 281] :
2003 Cr LJ 1575 (Assistant Charity Commissioner appointed under section 5 of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 is
a “court” for the purposes of the Contempt of courts Act, 1971); Prakash H Jain v Marie Fernandes, (2003) 8 SCC 431
[LNIND 2003 SC 826], pp 437, 438 : AIR 2003 SC 4591 [LNIND 2003 SC 826](Competent Authority functioning under
chapter VIII of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999 is not a court); Manuverma (Dr) v State of UP, (2005) 1 SCC 73
[LNIND 2004 SC 1143], p 82 (Chief Justice transferring a case which was being heard at Lucknow Bench to Allahabad
after noticing and hearing the parties acts as a judicial authority with all the attributes of a court and his order is atleast
quasi judicial amenable to correction in appeal under Article 136 of the constitution). Greater Bombay Co-op Bank Ltd v
United Yarn Tex Pvt Ltd, (2007) 6 SCC 236 [LNIND 2007 SC 420] (para 76) : AIR 2007 SC 1584 [LNIND 2007 SC
420]: (2007) 5 JT 201 (Registrar or an officer designated as arbitrator under Cooperative Societies Act, is not a court in
the context of section 31 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993). State of MP v
Anshuman Shukla, (2008) 7 SCC 487 [LNIND 2008 SC 1149] : AIR 2008 SC 2454 [LNIND 2008 SC 1149]. Is the
tribunal constituted under MP Madhyastham Adhikaran Adhiniyam 1983 a courtmatter referred to a larger Bench;
Jagadguru Annadamishwar Maha Swamy v GC Allipur, (2009) 4 SCC 625 [LNIND 2009 SC 624] para 12 : (2009) 5 JT
414 (Director of Pre-University Education is not a court for purposes of Contempt of courts Act, 1971). Nahar Industrial
Enterprises Ltd v Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corp, (2009) 8 SCC 646 [LNIND 2009 SC 1554] paras 67, 68, 92 :
(2009) 10 JT 199 (Debt Recovery Tribunal constituted under Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions
Act, 1993 are not civil court or court subordinate to High Court and the High Court has no jurisdiction to transfer a suit
filed in the civil court to the tribunal under sections 22 to 25 and section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908). On
the question as to when a court can be said to be constituted. See Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee (Representing
Undertrial Prisoners) v UOI, JT 1994 (6) SC 544 [LNIND 1989 SC 165], pp 556, 557: 1995 (4) SCC 695 : 1995 SCC
(Cri) 822.
81. Maxwell, Interpretation of Statutes, 11th Edn, p 6.
82. “If the words of an Act are so inflexible that they are incapable in any context of having any but one meaning, then the
court must apply that meaning, no matter how unreasonable the result—.But such cases are rare because the English
Language is a flexible instrument”. Lord Reid in Zenith Investment (Torquay) Ltd v Kammins Ballrooms Co Ltd, (1970) 2
All ER 871, p 874 (HL). “A statutes true meaning” according to Prof Allan, “is as much the product of legal and moral
judgment as of rules of semantics and syntax; and its authority is grounded in the reasons that best explain and qualify
the text enacted.—The doctrine of legislative supremacy gives the last word to Parliament, then, only in a purely formal
sense; even ‘the last word’ must be interpreted in accordance with those precepts of rule of law that distinguish
constitutionalism from dictatorship and populism”. ALLAN, Legislative Supremacy and Legislative Intention:
Interpretation, Meaning and Authority, (2004) 63 Cambridge Law Journal 685, p 708. See further Chapter 2, Title 4
“Regard to consequences”.
83. Girdharilal and Sons v Balbir Nath Mathur, (1986) 2 SCC 237 [LNIND 1986 SC 45], p 246: AIR 1986 SC 1099 [LNIND
1986 SC 585]; UOI v Hansoli Devi, AIR 2002 SC 3240 [LNIND 2002 SC 569]p 3246 : (2002) 7 SCC 273 [LNIND 2002
SC 569].
84. “Statutory enactment must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered
or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable,
unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the test of the statute”: Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mill Pvt Ltd,
(2003) 2 SCC 111 [LNIND 2002 SC 765], p 121 : AIR 2003 SC 511 [LNIND 2002 SC 765], p 517 : (2003) 2 Cuj LR
1154. See further the following statement of the rule in Jagdish Ch. Patnaik v State of Orissa, 1998 (2) Scale 662
[LNIND 1998 SC 429], p 668 : (1998) 4 SCC 456 [LNIND 1998 SC 429] : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1156; which too it is
submitted, suffers from the same defect: “When the language in the statute is unambiguous and on a plain grammatical
meaning being given to the words in the statute, the end result is neither arbitrary, irrational or contrary to the object of
the statute, then it is the duty of the court to give effect to the words used in the statute.”
85. Girdharilal and Sons v Balbirnath Mathur, supra, p 242 of SCC.
86. Pages 59 to 62, supra.
87. Unreasonableness may attract Article 14; (Ajay Hasia v Khalid Mujib, AIR 1981 SC 487 [LNIND 1980 SC 456]: (1981)
1 SCC 722) [LNIND 1980 SC 456] and clauses 2 to 6 of Article 19 of the Constitution. For example, see Bhagwanti v
UOI, AIR 1989 SC 2088 [LNIND 1989 SC 825]: (1989) 4 SCC 397 [LNIND 1989 SC 825]; State of Kerala v Travancore
Chemicals and Manufacturing Co, JT 1998 (7) SC 558 [LNIND 1998 SC 1150]: (1998) 8 SCC 188 [LNIND 1998 SC
1150] : AIR 1999 SC 230 [LNIND 1998 SC 1150].

End of Document