G.R. No.

198680               July 8, 2013 for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of
the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.19
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON,
CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y.
PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,  As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs
vs. therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs of Magdaleno and based on the
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS. declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the
latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be
true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint,
RESOLUTION
the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in
the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case
of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents,
This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be
City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review on certiorari 1 under Rule 45 made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary
of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:
assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil
Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action. Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the
deceased must be made in the proper special proceedings in court, and not in
The Facts an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of
possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins, 4 filed a cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such
complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1
complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a
Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246. 5 In their complaint, they party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by
28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then
by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A. 6 Claiming to be the decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a
caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to status or right.
their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the
prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and
successors-in-interest.8 In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of
heirship must be made in a special proceeding, and not in an independent civil
action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:
In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as
evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from
Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court
way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights of filiation and heirship
action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case
the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10 of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who
claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an
ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of
The RTC Ruling property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order, 11 finding that the By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
subject complaint failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as
that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and
administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special
decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and
established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir hence, cannot be re-opened.24
– through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a
marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a
Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature,
passport.13 appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute the proper special
proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately
resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.
The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however,
denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which
his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether
issued.14 the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions
material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus,
concordant with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship
Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T- cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or
2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instant petition. possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this
light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship
The Issue Before the Court which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the
proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should
therefore be devoid of any legal effect.
The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or
not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint
failed to state a cause of action was proper. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to
determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
The Court’s Ruling concomitant therewith.

The petition has no merit. SO ORDERED.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right
of another.16 It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is
determined by the allegations in the complaint. 17 In this relation, a complaint is
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its
face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed
G.R. No. 200302 meters away from the scene. She further testified that she had no knowledge of
any reason why the Lipatas would kill her father, but her father’s death brought
her pain and sadness and anger against the perpetrators of her father’s killing.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 
vs.
GERRY LIPATA y ORTIZA, Appellant. The Defense[’s] Evidence

DECISION The defense presented a sole witness in the person of appellant himself.
According to appellant, he was resting in his house in Sipna Compound, Brgy.
Bagong Silangan, Quezon City on September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m. when
CARPIO, J.:
two children, namely John Paul Isip and a certain Rommel, called him and told
him to help his brother, Larry Lipata. He immediately rushed to his brother and
The Case upon arrival he saw Larry being stabbed by the victim. He instantaneously
assisted his brother but the victim continued stabbing Larry, causing Larry to fall
G.R. No. 200302 is an appeal 1 assailing the Decision2 promulgated on 31May2011 to the ground. Thereafter, appellant managed to grab the knife from the victim
by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The CA affirmed the and stab the victim. Then he fled from the scene [of the crime] because he was
Decision3 dated 23 March 2010 of Branch 85 of the Regional Trial Court of wounded. Appellant’s sister-in-law, a certain Lenlen, brought him to the Amang
Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-05-136584. The RTC found appellant Medical Center for treatment of his stab wound where he was apprehended by
Gerry Lipata y Ortiza (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of police officers.6
Murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.  The RTC
also ordered appellant to pay damages to the heirs of Rolando Cueno (Cueno).4 The RTC’s Ruling

The Facts The RTC noted that since appellant raised the justifying circumstance of defense
of a relative, he hypothetically admitted the commission of the crime. Hence,
Appellant was charged with the crime of Murder in an Information which reads the burden of proving his innocence shifted to appellant. The RTC found that
as follows: the defense failed to adequately establish the element of unlawful aggression
on the part of Cueno. There was no actual or imminent danger to the life of
appellant or of his brother Larry. On the contrary, the three Lipata brothers
That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, (appellant, Larry, and Rudy)7 employed treachery and took advantage of their
the said accused, conspiring, confederating with two (2) other persons whose superior strength when they attacked Cueno after Cueno left the house of his
true names, identities and definite whereabouts have not as sister-in-law. Cueno suffered 17 stab wounds on his trunk from the Lipata
brothers. The existence of multiple stab wounds on the trunk of the unarmed
yet been ascertained and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and Cueno is inconsistent with appellant’s theory of defense of a relative. The RTC,
with evident premeditation and treachery, and taking advantage of superior however, ruled that the prosecution failed to show conclusive proof of evident
strength, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously premeditation.

attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one RONALDO The dispositive portion of the RTC’s decision reads:
CUENO Y BONIFACIO, by then and there stabbing him repeatedly with bladed
weapons, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court here[b]y
him serious and mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate renders judgment finding the accused GERRY LIPATA Y ORTIZA guilty beyond
cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of Ronaldo Cueno y reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and he is hereby sentenced to suffer
Bonifacio. the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua  from twenty (20) years and
one (1) day to forty (40) years.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5
The accused is hereby adjudged to pay the heirs of Rolando Cueno the following
Appellant was arraigned on 11 October 2005, and entered a plea of not guilty to amounts:
the charge. Pre-trial conference was terminated on 26 October 2005, and trial
on the merits ensued. (a) Php 50,000.00 representing civil indemnity ex delicto of the
accused;
The CA summarized the parties’ evidence as follows:
(b) Php 120,550.00 representing the actual damages incurred by the
The Prosecution[’s] Evidence heirs of Rolando Cueno, incident to his death plus 12% interest per
annum computed from 6 September 2005 until fully paid;
Mercelinda Valzado, sister-in-law of the victim Rolando Cueno, testified that on
September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., she was in her house located in [sic] Lot (c) Php 50,000.00 as moral damages for the mental and emotional
34, Block 4, Sipna Compound, Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. She was about to anguish suffered by the heirs arising from the death of Rolando
leave the house to go to the market when she saw appellant, his brother Larry Cueno; and
Lipata and a certain [Rudy] attacking the victim by repeatedly stabbing him. She
was at a distance of more or less ten (10) meters from the incident. Shocked at (d) Php 25,000[.00] as exemplary damages.
what she had just witnessed, she shouted for help and pleaded the assailants to
stop, but they did not stop stabbing the victim. In her account, she recalled that
the assailants, including appellant, used a tres The accused shall be credited with the full period of his preventive
imprisonment, subject to the conditions imposed under Article 29 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
cantos, an ice pick and a broken piece of glass of Red Horse [bottle]. At one
point, the victim managed to take the knife away from appellant and
brandished the same at his attackers. Thereafter, the victim fell on the ground. SO ORDERED.8
Upon seeing the victim fall, appellant and the other assailants left the scene.
Through the help of some neighbors, Mercelinda rushed the victim to a hospital Appellant, through the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), filed a notice of
but he was pronounced dead on arrival. appeal9 on 6 April 2010. The RTC granted appellant’s notice in an Order10 dated
19 April 2010.
Criz Reymiluz Cueno, daughter of the victim, testified that she saw appellant
together with Larry Lipata and Rudy Lipata [stab] her father to death in front of The CA’s Ruling
their house. She recounted that upon arriving at home from work on
September 1, 2005 at around 6:00 p.m., her father immediately went to the
The CA dismissed appellant’s appeal and affirmed the decision of the RTC. The
house of her aunt Mercelinda Valzado, which was located only a block away
CA agreed with the RTC’s ruling that appellant’s claim of defense of a relative
from their house, to ask for malunggay leaves.
must fail. There was no actual or imminent threat on the life of appellant or of
his brother Larry. There was also no reason for appellant to stab Cueno. Cueno
Upon coming home from her aunt’s house, the victim was attacked by the was outnumbered by the Lipata brothers, three to one. The requirement of lack
Lipatas which prompted the victim to run away. Thinking that his assailants of provocation on the part of appellant is negated by the multiple stab wounds
were no longer around, the victim proceeded to their [sic] house but then the that Cueno sustained.
Lipatas stabbed him to death. She was at a distance of six (6) to eight (8)
The CA disagreed with appellant’s contention that the prosecution failed to [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil aspect of this
establish treachery. The CA pointed out that Cueno was not forewarned of any case."24
impending threat to his life. Cueno was unarmed, and went to his sister-in-law’s
house to gather malunggay  leaves. The Lipata brothers, on the other hand,
The Court’s Ruling
were readily armed with tres cantos, an icepick, and a broken piece of glass
from a Red Horse bottle. The execution of the Lipata brothers’ attack made it
impossible for Cueno to retaliate. At the outset, we declare that because of appellant’s death prior to the
promulgation of the CA’s decision, there is no further need to determine
appellant’s criminal liability. Appellant’s death has the effect of extinguishing his
The CA also disagreed with appellant’s contention that there was no abuse of
criminal liability. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides:
superior strength. The three Lipata brothers were all armed with bladed
weapons when they attacked the unarmed Cueno. The Lipata brothers refused
to stop stabbing Cueno until they saw him unconscious. Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.  – Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:
The dispositive portion of the CA’s decision reads:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
WHEREFORE, finding the appeal to be bereft of merit, the same is hereby
occurs before final judgment;
DISMISSED. The appealed decision of the trial court convicting appellant of the
crime of murder is hereby AFFIRMED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED. 11

What this Court will discuss further is the effect of appellant’s death with regard
12 to his civil liability. In 1994, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,25 reconciled the
The PAO filed a notice of appeal  on behalf of appellant on 10 June 2011. The CA
differing doctrines on the issue of whether the death of the accused pending
ordered the immediate elevation of the records to this Court in its 30 June 2011
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability. We concluded that
Resolution.13
"[u]pon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as
Appellant’s Death Prior to Final Judgment the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso factoextinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal."26
This Court, in a Resolution dated 13 June 2012,14 noted the records forwarded by
the CA and required the Bureau of Corrections (BuCor) to confirm the We also ruled that "if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil
confinement of appellant. The BuCor, in a letter dated 26 July 2012, informed liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission
this Court that there is no record of confinement of appellant as of date. In a complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 ([of the then applicable]
Resolution dated 10 September 2012,15this Court required the Quezon City Jail 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this
Warden to transfer appellant to the New Bilibid Prison and to report compliance time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
within ten days from notice. The Quezon City Jail Warden, in a letter dated 22 obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
October 2012,16 informed this Court that appellant passed away on 13 February premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced."27
2011. The former Quezon City Jail Warden wrote to the RTC about appellant’s
demise in a letter dated 23 February 2011. Attached to the 22 October 2012 letter
We proceeded to distinguish the defendants among the different causes of
were photocopies of appellant’s death certificate and medical certificate, as
action. If the act or omission complained of arises from quasidelict or, by
well as the former Quezon City Jail Warden’s letter. 17 In a Resolution dated 7
provision of law, results in an injury to person or real or personal property, the
January 2013,18 this Court noted the 22 October 2012 letter from the Quezon City
separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator of the
Jail Warden, and required the parties to submit their supplemental briefs on the
estate pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. 28 On the other hand,
civil aspect of the case if they so desire.
if the act or omission complained of arises from contract, the separate civil
action must be filed against the estate of the accused pursuant to Section 5,
The Office of the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation dated 18 March Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.29
2013,19 which stated that it had already exhaustively argued the relevant issues
in its appellee’s brief. The PAO, on the other hand, filed a supplemental brief on
We summarized our ruling in Bayotas as follows:
26 March 2013.20

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction

In view of appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the CA’s decision, this
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based
Court issued a Resolution dated 25 September 2013 which ordered the PAO "(1)
solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the
to SUBSTITUTE the legal representatives of the estate of the deceased
death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
appellant as party; and (2) to COMMENT on the civil liability of appellant within
liability and only  the civil liability directly  arising from and based
ten (10) days from receipt of this Resolution."21
solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
The PAO filed its Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the
Deceased Appellant on 29 November 2013.22 According to the Public Attorney’s
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the
Office-Special and Appealed Cases Service, the relatives of the deceased
death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
appellant have not communicated with it since the case was assigned to its
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
office on 29 September 2010. The PAO sent a letter on 4 November 2013 to Lilia
enumeratesthese other sources of obligation from which the civil
Lipata, who was appellant’s next of kin per official records. Despite receipt of
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
the letter, the relatives of appellant still failed to communicate with the PAO.

a) Law
In its Manifestation, the PAO stated that:

b) Contracts
xxxx

c) Quasi-contracts
9. Considering that the civil liability in the instant case arose from and is based
solely on the act complained of, i.e. murder, the same does not survive the
death of the deceased appellant. Thus, in line with the abovecited ruling [People d) x x x
v. Jaime Ayochok, G.R. No. 175784, 25 August 2010, 629 SCRA 324, citing People
v. Rogelio Bayotas, G.R. No. 102007, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 239], the death e) Quasi-delicts
of the latter pending appeal of his conviction extinguished his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above,
an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of
10. This being so, it is respectfully submitted that the necessity to substitute the filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the
legal representatives of the estate of the deceased as party does not arise.23 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate
civil action may be enforced either against the
On 9 July 2014, this Court issued a Resolution which declared that "the [PAO] executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on
shall continue as the legal representative of the estate of the deceased
 the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained In Lumantas v. Calapiz,39 this Court declared that our law recognizes that an
above. acquittal based on reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused does not
exempt the accused from civil liability ex delicto  which may be proved by
preponderance of evidence. This Court’s pronouncement in Lumantas is based
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his
on Article 29 of the Civil Code:
right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where
during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its
extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires
case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the
deprivation of right by prescription.30 (Emphases supplied) complaint should be found to be malicious.

The promulgation of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure in 2000 provided If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
for the effect of the death of the accused after arraignment and during the the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it
pendency of the criminal action to reflect our ruling in Bayotas: may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is
due to that ground.
Sec. 4. Effect of death on civil actions. — The death of the accused after
arraignment and during the pendency of the criminal action shall extinguish the We also turn to the Code Commission’s justification of its recognition of the
civil liability arising from the delict. However, the independent civil action possibility of miscarriage of justice in these cases:
instituted under Section 3 of this Rule or which thereafter is instituted to
enforce liability arising from other sources of obligation may be continued
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him
against the estate or legal representative of the accused after proper
from civil liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system.
substitution or against said estate, as the case may be. The heirs of the accused
It has given rise to numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the
may be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an
acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt
executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem  for the
of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil
minor heirs.
responsibility is derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved,
civil liability cannot be demanded.
The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to
appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and
notice.1âwphi1
deplorable consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of
demarcation between criminal liability and civil responsibility, and to determine
A final judgment entered in favor of the offended party shall be enforced in the the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate and distinct
manner especially provided in these rules for prosecuting claims against the from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One
estate of the deceased. is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for
reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party. The two responsibilities
are so different from each other that article 1813 of the present (Spanish) Civil
If the accused dies before arraignment, the case shall be dismissed without
Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising from
prejudice to any civil action the offended party may file against the estate of the
a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not
deceased.
thereby be extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purpose of the
imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
Contrary to the PAO’s Manifestation with Comment on the Civil Liability of the beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining
Deceased Appellant,31 Cueno died because of appellant’s fault. Appellant caused party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not
damage to Cueno through deliberate acts.32 Appellant’s civil liability ex quasi the invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a
delicto may now be pursued because appellant’s death on 13 February 2011, preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the aggrieved person any less private
before the promulgation of final judgment, extinguished both his criminal because the wrongful act is also punishable by the criminal law?
liability and civil liability ex delicto.
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform
Despite the recognition of the survival of the civil liability for claims under under discussion. It will correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, as well as from sources of inexhaustible source of injustice – a cause for disillusionment on the part of
obligation other than delict in both jurisprudence and the Rules, and our innumerable persons injured or wronged.40
subsequent designation of the PAO as the "legal representative of the estate of
the deceased [appellant] for purposes of representing the estate in the civil
In similar manner, the reform in procedure in these cases to be recommended
aspect of this case,"33 the current Rules, pursuant to our pronouncement in
by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court shall aim to provide the
aggrieved parties relief, as well as recognition of their right to indemnity. This
Bayotas,34 require the private offended party, or his heirs, in this case, to reform is of course subject to the policy against double recovery.
institute a separate civil action to pursue their claims against the estate of the
deceased appellant. The independent civil actions in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176,
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the Decision promulgated on 31 May 2011 by the
as well as claims from sources of obligation other than delict, are not deemed
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04461. The criminal and civil liabilities ex
instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended
delicto of appellant Gerry Lipata y Ortiza are declared EXTINGUISHED by his
party even without reservation.35 The separate civil action proceeds
death prior to final judgment.
independently of the criminal proceedings and requires only a preponderance
of evidence.36 The civil action which may thereafter be instituted against the
estate or legal representatives of the decedent is taken from the new provisions Let a copy, of this Decision be forwarded to the Committee on the Revision of
of Section 16 of Rule 337 in relation to the rules for prosecuting claims against his the Rules of Court.
estate in Rules 86 and 87.38
SO ORDERED.
Upon examination of the submitted pleadings, we found that there was no
separate civil case instituted prior to the criminal case. Neither was there any
reservation for filing a separate civil case for the cause of action arising from
quasi-delict. Under the present Rules, the heirs of Cueno should file a separate
civil case in order to obtain financial retribution for their loss. The lack of a
separate civil case for the cause of action arising from quasidelict leads us to the
conclusion that, a decade after Cueno’s death, his heirs cannot recover even a
centavo from the amounts awarded by the CA.
G.R. No. 221697
However, for similar cases in the future, we refer to the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules of Court for study and recommendation to the Court En MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, 
Banc appropriate amendments to the Rules for a speedy and inexpensive vs.
resolution of such similar cases with the objective of indemnifying the private COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
offended party or his heirs in cases where an accused dies after conviction by
the trial court but pending appeal.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 221698-700 Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which underlie the Philippine
Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Bill of Rights.129
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, 
vs.
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND AMADO D.
VALDEZ Respondents.

Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children."
"[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted.
persons are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings.
Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court will have jurisdiction Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive
only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic, 119 a child left by an department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens. This Court said:
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with
court may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the jus sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born
the case and over the parties, but also over the res,  which is the personal status citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are
of Baby Rose as well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show,
adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is that presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this theory, we
have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a citizen of the In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter
Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are of nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied) defenseless class which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We
cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a country which calls itself
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the civilized and a member of the community of nations. The Solicitor General's
Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other warning in his opening statement is relevant:
Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A.
No. 8552, entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of .... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic those treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on concerned that the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It
Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings as would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up using the
among Filipino children who may be adopted. international instruments which seek to protect and uplift foundlings a tool to
deny them political status or to accord them second-class citizenship.138
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling
leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner
issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her
which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive
Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino.
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect It has been contended that the data required were the names of her biological
their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to perform an act" means parents which are precisely unknown.
that the act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the
determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted.
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process One of the effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological
is certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the
citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended
a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. birth certificate "attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the
adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll records, books, and papers
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social
a foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution participating in
Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law
adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth
Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And
effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling.123 given the policy of strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not
obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987
Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic
law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a domestic law through a
constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not G.R. No. 197597               April 8, 2015
derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international
law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF DATUKAN
law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
MALANG SALIBO, DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Petitioner, 
nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from
vs.
the combination of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent
WARDEN, QUEZON CITY JAIL ANNEX, BJMP BUILDING, CAMP BAGONG DIWA,
practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as
TAGUIG CITY and all other persons acting on his behalf and/or having custody
the opinionjuris sive necessitates(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the
of DATUKAN MALANG SALIBO, Respondents.
latter element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by
the existence of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" are principles "established by a process of DECISION
reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which are "basic to legal
systems generally,"127 such as "general principles of equity, i.e.,  the general LEONEN, J.:
principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle against
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for a person deprived of liberty due to
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial mistaken identity. In such cases, the person is not under any lawful process and
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the is continuously being illegally detained.
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
This is a Petition for Review 1 on Certiorari of the Court of Appeals and argued that Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus should be dismissed. Since
Decision2 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig Salibo was charged under a valid Information and Warrant of Arrest, a petition
City (Taguig Hall of Justice) granting Datukan Malang Salibo’s Petition for for habeas corpus was "no longer availing." 27 Salibo countered that the
Habeas Corpus. Information, Amended Information, Warrant of Arrest, and Alias Warrant of
Arrest referred to by the Warden all point to Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan
Malang Salibo, as accused. Reiterating that he was not Butukan S. Malang and
From November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009, Datukan Malang Salibo (Salibo)
that he was in Saudi Arabia on the day of the Maguindanao Massacre, Salibo
and other Filipinos were allegedly in Saudi Arabia for the Hajj
pleaded the trial court to order his release from detention.28
Pilgrimage.4 "While in Saudi Arabia, . . . Salibo visited and prayed in the cities of
Medina, Mecca, Arpa, Mina and Jeddah." 5 He returned to the Philippines on
December 20, 2009.6 The trial court found that Salibo was not "judicially charged" 29 under any
resolution, information, or amended information. The Resolution, Information,
and Amended Information presented in court did not charge Datukan Malang
On August 3, 2010, Salibo learned that police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Salibo as an accused. He was also not validly arrested as there was no Warrant
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be Butukan S. Malang.7
of Arrest or Alias Warrant of Arrest against Datukan Malang Salibo. Salibo, the
trial court ruled, was not restrained of his liberty under process issued by a
Butukan S. Malang was one of the 197 accused of 57 counts of murder for court.30
allegedly participating in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao Massacre. He
had a pending warrant of arrest issued by the trial court in People of the
The trial court was likewise convinced that Salibo was not the Butukan S.
Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al.8
Malang charged with murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.
The National Bureau of Investigation Clearance dated August 27, 2009 showed
Salibo presented himself before the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station that Salibo has not been charged of any crime as of the date of the
to clear his name. There, he explained that he was not Butukan S. Malang and certificate.31 A Philippine passport bearing Salibo’s picture showed the name
that he could not have participated in the November 23, 2009 Maguindanao "Datukan Malang Salibo."32
Massacre because he was in Saudi Arabia at that time.9
Moreover, the trial court said that Salibo "established that [he] was out of the
To support his allegations, Salibo presented to the police "pertinent portions of country"33 from November 7, 2009 to December 19, 2009. This fact was
his passport, boarding passes and other documents"10 tending to prove that a supported by a Certification34 from Saudi Arabian Airlines confirming Salibo’s
certain Datukan Malang Salibo was in Saudi Arabia from November 7 to departure from and arrival in Manila on board its flights.35 A Flight Manifest
December 19, 2009.11 issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Saudi Arabian Airlines Ticket No.
0652113 also showed this fact.36
The police officers initially assured Salibo that they would not arrest him
because he was not Butukan S. Malang.12 Thus, in the Decision dated October 29, 2010, the trial court granted Salibo’s
Petition for Habeas Corpus and ordered his immediate release from detention.
Afterwards, however, the police officers apprehended Salibo and tore off page
two of his passport that evidenced his departure for Saudi Arabia on November Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
7, 2009. They then detained Salibo at the Datu Hofer Police Station for about
three (3) days.13
On appeal37 by the Warden, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and set
aside the trial court’s Decision.38Through its Decision dated April 19, 2011, the
The police officers transferred Salibo to the Criminal Investigation and Detection Court of Appeals dismissed Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus.
Group in Cotabato City, where he was detained for another 10 days. While in
Cotabato City, the Criminal Investigation and Detention Group allegedly made
Contrary to the trial court’s finding, the Court of Appeals found that Salibo’s
him sign and affix his thumbprint on documents.14
arrest and subsequent detention were made under a valid Information and
Warrant of Arrest.39 Even assuming that Salibo was not the Butukan S. Malang
On August 20, 2010, Salibo was finally transferred to the Quezon City Jail Annex, named in the Alias Warrant of Arrest, the Court of Appeals said that "[t]he
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology Building, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
City, where he is currently detained.15 before the writ [of habeas corpus] may be invoked[.]" 40 According to the Court
of Appeals, Salibo’s proper remedy was a Motion to Quash Information and/or
On September 17, 2010, Salibo filed before the Court of Appeals the Urgent Warrant of Arrest.41
Petition for Habeas Corpus16questioning the legality of his detention and
deprivation of his liberty.17 He maintained that he is not the accused Butukan S. Salibo filed a Motion for Reconsideration, 42 which the Court of Appeals denied
Malang.18 in the Resolution43 dated July 6, 2011.

In the Resolution19 dated September 21, 2010,the Court of Appeals issued a Writ Proceedings before this court
of Habeas Corpus, making the Writ returnable to the Second Vice Executive
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City (Taguig Hall of Justice). 20The Court
On July 28, 2011,44 petitioner Salibo filed before this court the Petition for
of Appeals ordered the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex to file a Return of
Review (With Urgent Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory
the Writ one day before the scheduled hearing and produce the person of
Injunction). Respondent Warden filed a Comment,45 after which petitioner
Salibo at the 10:00 a.m. hearing set on September 27, 2010. 21Proceedings before
Salibo filed a Reply.46
the trial court

Petitioner Salibo maintains that he is not the Butukan S. Malang charged with 57
On September 27, 2010, the jail guards of the Quezon City Jail Annex brought
counts of murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 221, Quezon City. Thus,
Salibo before the trial court. The Warden, however, failed to file a Return one
contrary to the Court of Appeals’ finding, he, Datukan Malang Salibo, was not
day before the hearing. He also appeared without counsel during the hearing.22
duly charged in court. He is being illegally deprived of his liberty and, therefore,
his proper remedy is a Petition for Habeas Corpus. 47 Petitioner Salibo adds that
Thus, the trial court canceled the hearing and reset it to September 29, 2010 at respondent Warden erred in appealing the Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
2:00 p.m.23 Branch 153, Pasig City before the Court of Appeals. Although the Court of
Appeals delegated to the trial court the authority to hear respondent Warden
On September 28, 2010, the Warden filed the Return of the Writ. However, on the Return, the trial court’s Decision should be deemed a Decision of the
during the September 29, 2010 hearing on the Return, the Warden appeared Court of Appeals. Therefore, respondent Warden should have directly filed his
with Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr., Legal Officer/Administering Officer of the appeal before this court.48
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology.24 Salibo questioned the appearance
of Atty. Romeo L. Villante, Jr. on behalf of the Warden and argued that only the As for respondent Warden, he maintains that petitioner Salibo was duly charged
Office of the Solicitor General has the authority to appear on behalf of a in court. Even assuming that he is not the Butukan S. Malang named in the Alias
respondent in a habeas corpus proceeding.25 Warrant of Arrest, petitioner Salibo should have pursued the ordinary remedy
of a Motion to Quash Information, not a Petition for Habeas Corpus.49
The September 29, 2010 hearing, therefore, was canceled. The trial court reset
the hearing on the Return to October 1, 2010 at 9:00 a.m.26 The issues for our resolution are:

The Return was finally heard on October 1, 2010. Assistant Solicitors Noel Salo
and Isar Pepito appeared on behalf of the Warden of the Quezon City Jail Annex
First, whether the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City on on the Petition for Habeas Corpus, therefore, was the decision of the trial court,
petitioner Salibo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of not of the Court of Appeals. Since the Court of Appeals is the court with
Appeals; and appellate jurisdiction over decisions of trial courts,75 respondent Warden
correctly filed the appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Second, whether petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is to file a Petition for
Habeas Corpus. II

We grant the Petition. Called the "great writ of liberty[,]"76 the writ of habeas corpus "was devised and
exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
I
freedom."77 The remedy of habeas corpus is extraordinary78 and summary79 in
nature, consistent with the law’s "zealous regard for personal liberty." 80 Under
Contrary to petitioner Salibo’s claim, respondent Warden correctly appealed Rule 102, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus "shall extend
before the Court of Appeals. to all cases of llegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived
of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
An application for a writ of habeas corpus may be made through a petition filed the person entitled thereto."81 The primary purpose of the writ "is to inquire
before this court or any of its members,50 the Court of Appeals or any of its into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
members in instances authorized by law,51 or the Regional Trial Court or any of relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal."82 "Any restraint which will
its presiding judges.52 The court or judge grants the writ and requires the officer preclude freedom of action is sufficient."83
or person having custody of the person allegedly restrained of liberty to file a
return of the writ.53 A hearing on the return of the writ is then conducted.54 The nature of the restraint of liberty need not be related to any offense so as to
entitle a person to the efficient remedy of habeas corpus. It may be availed of as
The return of the writ may be heard by a court apart from that which issued the a post-conviction remedy84 or when there is an alleged violation of the liberty of
writ.55 Should the court issuing the writ designate a lower court to which the abode.85 In other words, habeas corpus effectively substantiates the implied
writ is made returnable, the lower court shall proceed to decide the petition of autonomy of citizens constitutionally protected in the right to liberty in Article
habeas corpus. By virtue of the designation, the lower court "acquire[s] the III, Section 1 of the Constitution.86 Habeas corpus being a remedy for a
power and authority to determine the merits of the [petition for habeas constitutional right, courts must apply a conscientious and deliberate level of
corpus.]"56 Therefore, the decision on the petition is a decision appealable to scrutiny so that the substantive right to liberty will not be further curtailed in
the court that has appellate jurisdiction over decisions of the lower court.57 the labyrinth of other processes.87

In Saulo v. Brig. Gen. Cruz, etc,58 "a petition for habeas corpus was filed before In Gumabon, et al. v. Director of the Bureau of Prisons,88 Mario Gumabon
this Court . . . [o]n behalf of . . . Alfredo B. Saulo [(Saulo)]." 59 This court issued a (Gumabon), Blas Bagolbagol (Bagolbagol), Gaudencio Agapito (Agapito),
Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered respondent Commanding General of the Epifanio Padua (Padua), and Paterno Palmares (Palmares) were convicted of
Philippine Constabulary to file a Return of the Writ. This court made the Writ the complex crime of rebellion with murder. They commenced serving their
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila.60 respective sentences of reclusion perpetua.89

After hearing the Commanding General on the Return, the Court of First While Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares were serving their
Instance denied Saulo’s Petition for Habeas Corpus.61 sentences, this court promulgated People v. Hernandez 90 in 1956, ruling that the
complex crime of rebellion with murder does not exist.91

Saulo appealed before this court, arguing that the Court of First Instance heard
the Petition for Habeas Corpus "not by virtue of its original jurisdiction but Based on the Hernandez ruling, Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and
merely delegation[.]"62 Consequently, "this Court should have the final say Palmares filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus. They prayed for their release from
regarding the issues raised in the petition, and only [this court’s decision] . . . incarceration and argued that the Hernandez doctrine must retroactively apply
should be regarded as operative."63 to them.92

This court rejected Saulo’s argument and stated that his "logic is more apparent This court ruled that Gumabon, Bagolbagol, Agapito, Padua, and Palmares
than real."64 It ruled that when a superior court issues a writ of habeas corpus, properly availed of a petition for habeas corpus.93 Citing Harris v. Nelson,94 this
the superior court only resolves whether the respondent should be ordered to court said:
show cause why the petitioner or the person in whose behalf the petition was
filed was being detained or deprived of his or her liberty. 65 However, once the [T]he writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental instrument for safeguarding
superior court makes the writ returnable to a lower court as allowed by the individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action. . . . The scope and
Rules of Court, the lower court designated "does not thereby become merely a flexibility of the writ — its capacity to reach all manner of illegal detention — its
recommendatory body, whose findings and conclusion[s] are devoid of ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes — have always
effect[.]"66 The decision on the petition for habeas corpus is a decision of the been emphasized and jealously guarded by courts and lawmakers. The very
lower court, not of the superior court. nature of the writ demands that it be administered with the initiative and
flexibility essential to insure that miscarriages of justice within its reach are
In Medina v. Gen. Yan,67 Fortunato Medina (Medina) filed before this court a surfaced and corrected.95
Petition for Habeas Corpus. This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making it
returnable to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City. After trial on the In Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 96 the Provincial Board of Mindoro issued
merits, the Court of First Instance granted Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus Resolution No. 25, Seriesof 1917. The Resolution ordered the Mangyans
and ordered that Medina be released from detention. 68 The Office of the removed from their native habitat and compelled them to permanently settle in
Solicitor General filed a Notice of Appeal before the Court of Appeals. 69Atty. an 800-hectare reservation in Tigbao. Under the Resolution, Mangyans who
Amelito Mutuc, counsel for Medina, filed before the Court of Appeals a "Motion refused to establish themselves in the Tigbao reservation were imprisoned.97
for Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court." The Court of Appeals,
however, denied the Motion.70
An application for habeas corpus was filed before this court on behalf of Rubi
and all the other Mangyans being held in the reservation. 98 Since the application
This court ruled that the Court of Appeals correctly denied the "Motion for questioned the legality of deprivation of liberty of Rubi and the other
Certification of Appeal to the Supreme Court," citing Saulo as legal basis.71 The Mangyans, this court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered the Provincial
Court of First Instance of Rizal, in deciding Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus, Board of Mindoro to make a Return of the Writ.99
"acquired the power and authority to determine the merits of the
case[.]"72 Consequently, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal on
A Writ of Habeas Corpus was likewise issued in Villavicencio v. Lukban.100 "[T]o
Medina’s Petition for Habeas Corpus was appealable to the Court of Appeals.73
exterminate vice,"101 Mayor Justo Lukban of Manila ordered the brothels in
Manila closed. The female sex workers previously employed by these brothels
In this case, petitioner Salibo filed his Petition for Habeas Corpus before the were rounded up and placed in ships bound for Davao. The women were
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus, making expelled from Manila and deported to Davao without their consent.102
it returnable to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 153, Pasig City. The trial court
then heard respondent Warden on his Return and decided the Petition on the
On application by relatives and friends of some of the deported women, this
merits.
court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and ordered Mayor Justo Lukban, among
others, to make a Return of the Writ. Mayor Justo Lukban, however, failed to
Applying Saulo and Medina, we rule that the trial court "acquired the power and make a Return, arguing that he did not have custody of the women.103
authority to determine the merits"74of petitioner Salibo’s Petition. The decision
This court cited Mayor Justo Lukban in contempt of court for failure to make a After hearing respondents on their Return, this court ordered the temporary
Return of the Writ.104 As to the legality of his acts, this court ruled that Mayor release of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar on the recognizance of their
Justo Lukban illegally deprived the women he had deported to Davao of their counsels, retired Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and retired Associate Justice
liberty, specifically, of their privilege of domicile. 105 It said that the women, Jose B.L. Reyes.123
"despite their being in a sense lepers of society[,] are nevertheless not chattels
but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional guaranties as are
Instead of releasing Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar, however, Minister
other citizens[.]"106 The women had the right "to change their domicile from
Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue filed a Motion for
Manila to another locality."107
Reconsideration. 124 They filed an Urgent Manifestation/Motion stating that
Informations for rebellion were filed against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar.
The writ of habeas corpus is different from the final decision on the petition for They prayed that this court dismiss the Petition for Habeas Corpus for being
the issuance of the writ. It is the writ that commands the production of the moot and academic.125
body of the person allegedly restrained of his or her liberty. On the other hand,
it is in the final decision where a court determines the legality of the restraint.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism opposed
Between the issuance of the writ and the final decision on the petition for its the motion. According to them, no preliminary investigation was conducted
issuance, it is the issuance of the writ that is essential. The issuance of the writ before the filing of the Information. Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar were
sets in motion the speedy judicial inquiry on the legality of any deprivation of deprived of their right to due process. Consequently, the Information was
liberty. Courts shall liberally issue writs of habeas corpus even if the petition for void.126
its issuance "on [its] face [is] devoid of merit[.]" 108 Although the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus may be suspended in cases of invasion, rebellion, or when
This court dismissed the Petition for Habeas Corpus, ruling that it became moot
the public safety requires it,109 the writ itself may not be suspended.110
and academic with the filing of the Information against Attys. Ilagan, Arellano,
and Risonar in court:127
III
As contended by respondents, the petition herein has been rendered moot and
It is true that a writ of habeas corpus may no longer be issued if the person academic by virtue of the filing of an Information against them for Rebellion, a
allegedly deprived of liberty is restrained under a lawful process or order of the capital offense, before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and the issuance
court.111 The restraint then has become legal,112 and the remedy of habeas corpus of a Warrant of Arrest against them. The function of the special proceeding of
is rendered moot and academic.113 habeas corpusis to inquire into the legality of one’s detention. Now that the
detained attorneys’ incarceration is by virtue of a judicial order in relation to
criminal cases subsequently filed against them before the Regional Trial Court
Rule 102, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides:
of Davao City, the remedy of habeas corpus no longer lies. The Writ had served
its purpose.128 (Citations omitted)
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized.—If it appears that the
person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
This court likewise dismissed the Petitions for habeas corpus in Umil v.
process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court
Ramos.129 Roberto Umil, Rolando Dural,Renato Villanueva, Amelia Roque,
of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
Wilfredo Buenaobra, Atty. Domingo Anonuevo, Ramon Casiple, Vicky A. Ocaya,
render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the
Deogracias Espiritu, and Narciso B. Nazareno were all arrested without a
jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged
warrant for their alleged membership in the Communist Party of the
by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
Philippines/New People’s Army.130
shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged
with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment. During the pendency of the habeas corpus proceedings, however, Informations
against them were filed before this court. The filing of the Informations,
according to this court, rendered the Petitions for habeas corpus moot and
In Ilagan v. Hon. Ponce Enrile,114 elements of the Philippine Constabulary-
academic, thus:131
Integrated National Police arrested Atty. Laurente C. Ilagan (Atty. Ilagan) by
virtue of a Mission Order allegedly issued by then Minister of National Defense,
Juan Ponce Enrile (Minister Enrile). On the day of Atty. Ilagan’s arrest, 15 from It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here considered, criminal charges have
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter visited Atty. Ilagan in Camp been filed in the proper courts against the petitioners. The rule is, that if a
Catitipan, where he was detained.115 person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under
process issued by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process or make the order, or if such person is charged before any
Among Atty. Ilagan’s visitors was Atty. Antonio Arellano (Atty. Arellano). Atty.
court, the writ of habeas corpus will not be allowed. 132(Emphasis in the original)
Arellano, however, no longer left Camp Catitipan as the military detained and
In such cases, instead of availing themselves of the extraordinary remedy of a
arrested him based on an unsigned Mission Order.116
petition for habeas corpus, persons restrained under a lawful process or order
of the court must pursue the orderly course of trial and exhaust the usual
Three (3) days after the arrest of Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, the military remedies.133 This ordinary remedy is to file a motion to quash the information or
informed the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Davao Chapter of the impending the warrant of arrest.134
arrest of Atty. Marcos Risonar (Atty. Risonar). To verify his arrest papers, Atty.
Risonar went to Camp Catitipan. LikeAtty. Arellano, the military did not allow
At any time before a plea is entered, 135 the accused may file a motion to quash
Atty. Risonar toleave. He was arrested based on a Mission Order signed by
complaint or information based on any of the grounds enumerated in Rule 117,
General Echavarria, Regional Unified Commander.117
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Free Legal Assistance Group, and the
SEC. 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism filed before
information on any of the following grounds:
this court a Petition for Habeas Corpus in behalf of Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and
Risonar.118
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
This court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus and required Minister Enrile, Armed
Forces of the Philippines Acting Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
(General Ramos), and Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National Police charged;
Regional Commander Brigadier General Dionisio Tan-Gatue (General Tan-Gatue)
to make a Return of the Writ. 119 This court set the hearing on the Return on May
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person
23, 1985.120
of the accused;

In their Return, Minister Enrile, General Ramos, and General Tan-Gatue

(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do
contended that the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus was suspended as to
so;
Attys. Ilagan, Arellano, and Risonar by virtue of Proclamation No. 2045-A. 121The
lawyers, according to respondents, allegedly "played active roles in organizing
mass actions of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National (e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
Democratic Front."122
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;
 (g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; habeas corpus:146 The majority decision holds that the filing of the information
without preliminary investigation falls within the exceptions of Rule 112, sec. 7
and Rule 113, sec. 5 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Again, this is
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
erroneous premise. The fiscal misinvoked and misapplied the cited rules. The
excuse or justification; and (i) That the accused has been previously
petitioners are not persons "lawfully arrested without a warrant." The fiscal
convicted or acquitted of the offense charged, or the case against
could not rely on the stale and inoperative PDA of January 25, 1985. Otherwise,
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
the rules would be rendered nugatory, if all that was needed was to get a PDA
consent.
and then serve it at one’s whim and caprice when the very issuance of the PDA
is premised on its imperative urgency and necessity as declared by the President
In filing a motion to quash, the accused "assails the validity of a criminal himself. The majority decision then relies on Rule 113, Sec. 5 which authorizes
complaint or information filed against him [or her] for insufficiency on its face in arrests without warrant by a citizen or by a police officer who witnessed the
point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the arrestee in flagrante delicto, viz. in the act of committing the offense. Quite
information."136If the accused avails himself or herself of a motion to quash, the obviously, the arrest was not a citizen’s arrest nor were they caught in flagrante
accused "hypothetical[ly] admits the facts alleged in the delicto violating the law. In fact, this Court in promulgating the 1985 Rules on
information."137 "Evidence aliunde or matters extrinsic from the information are Criminal Procedure have tightened and made the rules more strict. Thus, the
not to be considered."138 Rule now requires that an offense "has in fact just been committed." This
connotes immediacy in point of time and excludes cases under the old rule
"If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or where an offense "has in fact been committed" no matter how long ago.
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order [the] Similarly, the arrestor must have "personal knowledge of facts indicating that
amendment [of the complaint or information]."139 If the motion to quash is the [arrestee] has committed it" (instead of just "reasonable ground to believe
based on the ground that the facts alleged in the complaint or information do that the [arrestee] has committed it" under the old rule). Clearly, then, an
not constitute an offense, the trial court shall give the prosecution "an information could not just be filed against the petitioners without due process
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment."140 If after amendment, the and preliminary investigation. 147(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
complaint or information still suffers from the same defect, the trial court shall
quash the complaint or information.141 Petitioner Salibo’s proper remedy is not a Motion to Quash Information and/or
Warrant of Arrest. None of the grounds for filing a Motion to Quash Information
IV apply to him. Even if petitioner Salibo filed a Motion to Quash, the defect he
alleged could not have been cured by mere amendment of the Information
and/or Warrant of Arrest. Changing the name of the accused appearing in the
However, Ilagan142 and Umil do not apply to this case. Petitioner Salibo was not Information and/or Warrant of Arrest from "Butukan S. Malang" to "Datukan
arrested by virtue of any warrant charging him of an offense. He was not Malang Salibo" will not cure the lack of preliminary investigation in this case.
restrained under a lawful process or an order of a court. He was illegally
deprived of his liberty, and, therefore, correctly availed himself of a Petition for
Habeas Corpus. A motion for reinvestigation will not cure the defect of lack of preliminary
investigation. The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest were issued on the
premise that Butukan S. Malang and Datukan Malang Salibo are the same
The Information and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court, person. There is evidence, however, that the person detained by virtue of these
Branch 221, Quezon City in People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, processes is not Butukan S. Malang but another person named Datukan Malang
Jr., et al.charged and accused Butukan S. Malang, not Datukan Malang Salibo, Salibo.
of57 counts of murder in connection with the Maguindanao Massacre.

Petitioner Salibo presented in evidence his Philippine passport,148 his

Furthermore, petitioner Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant. Rule identification card from the Office on Muslim Affairs,149 his Tax Identification
113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court enumerates the instances when a Number card,150 and clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation151 all
warrantless arrest may be made: bearing his picture and indicating the name "Datukan Malang Salibo." None of
these government-issued documents showed that petitioner Salibo used the
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private alias "Butukan S. Malang."
person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Moreover, there is evidence that petitioner Salibo was not in the country on
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, November 23, 2009 when the Maguindanao Massacre occurred.1âwphi1
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
A Certification152 from the Bureau of Immigration states that petitioner Salibo
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable departed for Saudi Arabia on November 7, 2009 and arrived in the Philippines
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or only on December 20, 2009. A Certification 153 from Saudi Arabian Airlines attests
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and that petitioner Salibo departed for Saudi Arabia on board Saudi Arabian Airlines
Flight SV869 on November 7, 2009 and that he arrived in the Philippines on
board Saudi Arabian Airlines SV870 on December 20, 2009.
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has V
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
People of the Philippines v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. is probably the
In cases falling under paragraphs(a) and (b) above, the person arrested without most complex case pending in our courts. The case involves 57 victims 154 and 197
a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and accused, two (2) of which have become state witnesses.155 As of November 23,
shall be proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112. 2014, 111 of the accused have been arraigned, and 70 have filed petitions for bail
of which 42 have already been resolved.156 To require petitioner Salibo to
undergo trial would be to further illegally deprive him of his liberty. Urgency
It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer dictates that we resolve his Petition in his favor given the strong evidence that
Police Station to clear his name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan he is not Butukan S. Malang.
S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the presence of the police officers of
Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting to commit
an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that In ordering petitioner Salibo’s release, we are prejudging neither his guilt nor his
he might have committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. innocence. However, between a citizen who has shown that he was illegally
deprived of his liberty without due process of law and the government that has
all the "manpower and the resources at [its] command" 157 to properly indict a
The police officers, therefore, had no probable cause to arrest petitioner Salibo citizen but failed to do so, we will rule in favor of the citizen. Should the
without a warrant. They deprived him of his right to liberty without due process government choose to prosecute petitioner Salibo, it must pursue the proper
of law, for which a petition for habeas corpus may be issued. remedies against him as provided in our Rules. Until then, we rule that
petitioner Salibo is illegally deprived of his liberty. His Petition for Habeas
The arrest of petitioner Salibo is similar to the arrest of Atty. Risonar in the Corpus must be granted.
"disturbing"143 case of Ilagan.144 Like petitioner Salibo, Atty. Risonar went to
Camp Catitipan to verify and contest any arrest papers against him. Then and WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The Court of
there, Atty. Risonar was arrested without a warrant. In his dissenting opinion in Appeals Decision dated April 19, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Ilagan,145 Justice Claudio Teehankee stated that the lack of preliminary Warden, Quezon City Jail Annex, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
investigation deprived Atty. Risonar, together with Attys. Ilagan and Arellano, Building,Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, is ORDERED to immediately RELEASE
of his right to due process of law — a ground for the grant of a petition for petitioner Datukan Malang Salibo from detention.
The Letter of the Court of Appeals elevating the records of the case to this court Also on 17 January 2014, Ku filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo
is hereby NOTED. with Interim Remedies, docketed as SP PROC. No. 14- 131282.15 On 22 January
2014, he also filed a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Amparo.16
SO ORDERED.

Finding said supple mental petition to be sufficient in form and substance,

Judge Gallegos, in an Order dated 22 January 2014, issued a Writ of Amparo.17 On
24 January 2014, Ku filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Protection
Order (TPO).18 Judge Gallegos then set the hearing on the TPO on 27 January
2014 at 8:30 a.m.,19 while he set the hearing on the petition for the issuance of a
G.R. No. 210759               June 23, 2015 writ of amparo on 29 January 2014 at 8:30 a.m.20

CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as Chairperson 1 of Bureau In the afternoon of 27 January 2014, petitioner filed his Return of the Writ.21 He
of Immigration and Deportation,2 Petitioner,  was then notified that a hearing on the TPO was held earlier in the morning and
vs. that the same was already submitted for resolution.22
HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court-Manila, Branch 47 and JA HOON KU, Respondents. Petitioner then filed an Opposition to the Motion for Issuance of TPO on 28
January 2014.23
x-----------------------x
On 28 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the first assailed Order granting the
G.R. No. 211403 motion for issuance of TPO, entrusting Ku’s custody to the Philippine National
Red Cross and/or its Chairman CEO Richard Gordon, and directing the Philippine
National Police-Police Security and Protection Group (PNP-PSPG) to protect Ku
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, as the Chairperson of Bureau of
and his immediate family.24 On 29 January 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the
Immigration and Deportation,Petitioner, 
second assailed Order directing the transfer of custody and protection of Ku to
vs.
the PNP-PSPG.25 Petitioner challenged these orders before the Court via a
HON. PAULINO Q. GALLEGOS, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court-
Petition for Certiorari26 docketed as G.R. No. 210759.
Manila, Branch 47 and JAHOONKU, Respondents.

On 4 February 2014, the Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 210759 issuing a
x-----------------------x
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the enforcement of the Orders
dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and directing the BI to retain custody of Ku, as
G.R. No. 211590 well as requiring Ku to comment on the petition.27 In issuing this resolution, the
Court intimated the possibility of misuse by Ku of the writ of amparo given that
he was validly arrested and placed under the jurisdiction and custody of the BI;
CHAIRPERSON SIEGFRED B. MISON, in his capacity as the Chairperson of
thus the case cannot be categorized as one of extralegal killing or enforced
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, Petitioner, 
disappearance.28
vs.
JA HOON KU, Respondent.
Owing to the Court’s Resolution dated 4 February 2014, in the hearing set on 11
February 2014 before the trial court, petitioner verbally moved for the dismissal
DECISION
of the amparo petition.29On 18 February 2014, however, Judge Gallegos issued
the third assailed order denying the motion to dismiss for lack of merit.30Thus,
PEREZ, J.: petitioner appealed the matter to the Court via the Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition31 docketed as G.R. No. 211403.
The privilege of the writ of amparo is .an extraordinary remedy adopted to
address the special concerns of extra-legal killings and enforced On 25 February 2014, Ku filed an appeal memorandum on his deportation order
disappearances. Accordingly, the remedy ought to be resorted to and granted addressed to the Office of the President (OP).32
judiciously, lest the ideal sought by the Amparo Rule be diluted and undermined
by the indiscriminate filing of Amparo petitions for purposes less than the desire
On 14 March 2014, Judge Gallegos issued the assailed Resolution granting the
to secure amparo reliefs and protection and/or on the basis of unsubstantiated
privilege of the writ of amparo, to wit:
allegations.3

WHEREFORE, the privilege of the Writ of Amparo is hereby GRANTED. [Ku] is

For the consideration of the Court are three consolidated petitions assailing the
ordered immediately released from [petitioner’s] custody without prejudice to
Orders dated 28 January 2014,4 29 January 2014,5 and 18 February 2014,6 as well
the institution of the proper remedy to extradition. Moreover, the [petitioner]
as the Resolution dated 14 March 2014,7 all issued by respondent Presiding
and/or agents are ordered to cease and desist from further violating the right to
Judge Paulino Gallegos (Judge Gallegos) of the Regional Trial Court-Manila,
liberty of [Ku] and the members of his family by filing cases to legitimize his
Branch 47 in SP. PROC. No. 14-131282.
detention.33

The records show that on 23 December 2013, the International Criminal Police
Meanwhile, in the Resolution dated 18 March 2014 in G.R. No. 211403, the Court
Organization (Interpol) of Seoul, Republic of Korea sent a Notice8 to Interpol
issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from enforcing the Order dated 18 February
Manila requesting assistance in the location and deportation of respondent Ja
2014 and from further proceeding with the case.34
Hoon Ku (Ku) for arbitrarily spending money allotted as reserve fund of Phildip
Korea Co., Ltd. Consequently, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea wrote a
Letter-Request9 to petitioner, Hon. Siegfred Mison, Chairperson of the Bureau On 19 March 2014, the OP granted Ku provisional liberty only until 31 August
of Immigration (BI), for the immediate arrest and deportatio n of Ku to Korea 2014 or until his appeal was resolved, whichever came first. 35Ku then moved for
for being an undesirable alien. the release of his passport before the RTC, which petitioner opposed and to
which he filed a counter-motion for the RTC to release said passport to the BI,
given that such was one of the conditions for the OP’s grant of provisional
Meanwhile, on 1 January 2014, Ku’s visa expired.10
liberty to Ku.36 In the Order dated 26 March 2014, however, Judge Gallegos
merely noted petitioner’s motion for being moot, considering that he already
On 3 January 2014, Special Prosecutor Maria Antonette Bucasas-Mangrobang released Ku’s passport on 20 March 2014, upon the personal request of Ku.37
charged Ku for being a risk to public interest pursuant to Sec. 69, Act No.
2711.11This finding was approved by the BI Board of Commissioners which, on 16
Due to the complexities involved, petitioner filed the Petition for Review on
January 2014, issued a Summary Deportation Order.12
Certiorari in G.R. No. 211590, essentially assailing the Resolution dated 14 March
2014.
On the same day, 16 January 2014, BI officers, with the assistance of the Manila
Police District-Warrant and Subpoena Section, arrested Ku. Upon arrival at the
Condensing the various issues raised in these petitions, 38 we come to the central
BI detention center, Ku was detained.13
question of whether or not the privilege of the writ of amparo was properly
granted in the case at bar.
On 17 January 2014, the Republic of Korea voided Ku’s passport.14
We rule in the negative.
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule)39 provides: More importantly, in the Return of the Writ, petitioner readily disclosed to the
trial court that Ku was in the custody of the BI pursuant to a Warrant of
Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order.50
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to
any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a These documents and pleading show that there was never any intention on the
private individual or entity. part of the BI to re move Ku from the protection of the law for a prolonged
time. Besides, when Ku was arrested at 9:30 p.m. on 16 January 2014, and
received at the BI Detention Center at 11:30 p.m. also on 16 January 2014,51 the
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats
following day or on 17 January 2014, Ku’s counsel was immediately able to file
thereof.
his Entry of Appearance with Motion for Reconsideration before the
BI,52 thereby showing that Ku’s legal rights were amply guarded and that he was
On 25 September 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule "in light of the never removed from the protection of the law.
prevalence of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances." It was an
exercise for the first time of the Court’s expanded power to promulgate rules to
Section 5 of the Amparo Rule enumerates what an amparo petition should
protect our people’ s constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance
contain, among which is the right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved
in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law
party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the
regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of
respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant
"extralegal killings" and "enforced disappearances," its coverage, in its present
circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits, to wit:
form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are ‘killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings." On the other hand, "enforced SEC. 5. Contents of Petition. – The petition shall be signed and verified and shall
disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, allege the following:
detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or where about s
of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty
which places such persons outside the protection of law."40 (b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent
responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name is
unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an
This pronouncement on the coverage of the writ was further cemented in the
assumed appellation;
latter case of Lozada, Jr. v. Macapagal-Arroyo41 where this Court explicitly
declared that as it stands, the writ of amparo is confined only to cases of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, or to threats thereof. As to (c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party
what constitutes "enforced disappearance," the Court in Navia v. violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission
Pardico42 enumerated the elements constituting "enforced disappearances" as of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed
the term is statutorily defined in Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
9851,43 to wit:
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names,
(a) that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating authority
deprivation of liberty; or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the
investigation, together with any report;
(b) that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or
acquiescence of, the State or a political organization; (e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine
the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of
the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(c) that it be followed by the State or political organization’s refusal
to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of
the person subject of the amparo petition; and (f) The relief prayed for.

(d) that the intention for such refusal is to remove the subject person The petition may include a general prayer for other just and equitable reliefs.
from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.44
Ku claims that he fears for his life and feels the serious danger of being detained
As clarified in Navia, with the enactment of R.A. No. 9851, the Amparo Rule is for a long period of time without any cause, and that he fears that the BI will
now a procedural law anchored, not only on the constitutional rights to life, fabricate criminal cases against him to hold him under detention.53
liberty and security, but on a concrete statutory definition as well of what an
‘enforced or involuntary disappearance’ is. Therefore, A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC’s According to Ku, what he seeks to obtain in filing an amparo petition is the
reference to enforced disappearances should be construed to mean the protection it will give to his person against the actions of some government
enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons contemplated in Section 3(g) officials who will likely take advantage of their positions and use the power of
of R.A. No. 9851. Meaning, in probing enforced disappearance cases, courts the government at their command. Ku adds that the longer he stays in
should read A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to R.A. No. 9851.45 confinement the more he is exposed to life-threatening situations and the
further the violation of his guaranteed rights.54
Guided by the parameters of R.A. No. 9851, we can readily discern that Ku’s
circumstance does not come under the statutory definition of an enforced or The allegations of Ku, though, are specious. It is to be noted that the Amparo
involuntary disappearance. Indeed, Ku was arrested by agents of the BI, but Rule requires the parties to establish their claims by
there was no refusal on the part of the BI to acknowledge such arrest nor was substantial evidence.55 Other than making unfounded claims, however, Ku was
there any refusal to give information on the whereabouts of Ku. Neither can it not able to present evidence that he was exposed to "life-threatening
be said that the BI had any intention to remove Ku from the protection of the situations" while confined at the BI Detention Center. On the contrary, the
law for a prolonged time. records show that he is afforded visitorial rights and that he has access to his
counsel.
Although Ku claims that he was arbitrarily arrested and detained by agents of
the BI, that he was not read his rights under the constitution and was not Moreover, his primary fear, which prompted him to file the amparo petition,
informed of the reason for hi s arrest, nor provided a copy of any document was that the BI would trump up charges against him so as to justify his
leading to his arrest and detention,46 the arresting officers are all consistent in detention. The fact remains, however, that even before his arrest, deportation
testifying that, upon Ku’s arrest, they introduced themselves as agents of the charges against him were already duly filed and ruled upon by the BI.
BI, presented to Ku the Warrant of Deportation, and informed him of his
constitutional rights as well as the expiration of his visa.47
As such, it can readily be discerned that the RTC’s grant of the privilege of the
writ of amparo was improper in this case as Ku and his whereabouts were never
More importantly, there was no attempt on the part of the BI to conceal Ku or concealed, and as the alleged threats to his life, liberty and security were
his whereabouts. Within the Bureau, Ku’s arrest and the fact that he was in their unfounded and unsubstantiated. It is to be emphasized that the fundamental
custody was not obscured as, in fact, these were well-documented as evidenced function of the writ of amparo is to cause the disclosure of details concerning
by the Return of Warrant of Deportation dated 20 January 201448 and the After- the extrajudicial killing or the enforced disappearance of an aggrieved party. As
Mission Report dated 17 January 2014.49 Ku and his whereabouts were never hidden, there was no need for the issuance
of the privilege of the writ of amparo in the case at bar.
It is to be additionally observed that Ku is guilty of forum shopping. Being the a) GRANT the present petitions, and REVERSE and SET ASIDE the
subject of a Warrant of Deportation and a Summary Deportation Order, Ku’s Resolution dated 14 March 2014 of the Regional Trial Court which
proper recourse is with the BI and, thereafter, with the DOJ and the OP.56 granted the privilege of the Writ of Amparo;

Ku knows this and, in fact, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration before the BI b) DENY the privilege of the Writ of Amparo sought via the Petition
and an Appeal before the OP. When Ku, however, injudiciously filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo and the Supplemental Petition
and a Supplemental Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo, he for the Issuance of Writ of Amparo in SP. PROC.No. 14131282 before
committed forum shopping by seeking a remedy which he had already solicited the Regional Trial of Manila, Branch 47; and
from another tribunal.
c) DIRECT the Office of the Court Administrator to file the
In Kiani v. BID,57 where petitioner therein file d before the trial court a petition appropriate administrative charge/s against Judge Paulino Q.
for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to have the detention of her husband Gallegos in accordance with the tenor of this Decision, and to
declared as illegal and to order the latter’s release, and where her husband filed forthwith submit to the Court its report and recommendation
before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) an omnibus motion thereon.
seeking to question the summary deportation order issued against him, the
Court held that petitioner indulged in forum shopping.
SO ORDERED.

The Court clarified that under Section 8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive
Order No. 292, the power to deport aliens is vested in the President of the
Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process. The Immigration
Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section 37 of the
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a
Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in G.R. No. 193636               July 24, 2012
the RTC even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus . Conformably with ruling
of the Court in Domingo v. Scheer , such party may file a motion for the
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner, 
reconsideration thereof before the BOC.58
vs.
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of
Citing Balite v. Court of Appeals,59 the Court held that there is forum shopping Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief,
when a party seeks to obtain remedies in an action in one court, which had Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte,Respondents.
already been solicited, and in other courts and other proceedings in other
tribunals. While a party may avail of the remedies prescribed by the Rules of
DECISION
Court, such party is not free to resort to them simultaneously or at his/her
pleasure or caprice. A party should not be allowed to present simultaneous
remedies in two different forums, for it degrades and wreaks havoc to the rule SERENO, J.:
on orderly procedure. A party must follow the sequence and hierarchical order
in availing of such remedies and not resort to shortcuts in procedure or playing Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court)
fast and loose with the said rules. Forum shopping, an act of malpractice, is filed pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a
considered as trifling with the courts and abusing their processes. It is improper review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the
conduct and degrades the administration of justice. Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br.
13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of
On a final note, the Court observes that Judge Gallegos knowingly disregarded habeas data.4
the Court’s directives as regards this case. The records show that the Court’s
Resolution dated 4 February 2014, wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
enforcement of the Orders dated 28 and 29 January 2014 and intimated the (Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent
impropriety of the amparo petition, was received by the RTC on 5 February Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in-
2014.60 This should have alerted Judge Gallegos to proceed with caution and Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was
restraint in granting the privilege of the writ of amparo. And yet, despite having the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch,
knowledge of the Court’s pronouncements, Judge Gallegos proceeded to grant both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6
the said privilege.

On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued

Also, the records show that the Court’s Resolution dated 18 March 2014, Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent Commission
wherein we issued a TRO enjoining the enforcement of the Order dated 18 to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country."7 The body,
February 2014 and enjoining the RTC from further proceeding with the case, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission,8 was formed to
was received by the RTC on 20 March 2014 at 9:00 a.m.61 investigate the existence of private army groups (PAGs) in the country with a
view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling
Although by then, Judge Gallegos already issued the Resolution dated 14 March them permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the
2014 which granted the privilege of the writ of amparo, his receipt of the Court’s Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted to the Office of the President a
Resolution dated 18 Marc h 2014 should have forewarned him against releasing confidential report entitled "A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent
Ku’s passport. That he did so demonstrates his resistance and unwillingness to Commission Against Private Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report).10
follow the Court’s edicts.
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos
It is well to note that a resolution of the Supreme Court should not be Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her
construed as a mere request, and should be complied with promptly and aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12Purportedly without
completely.1âwphi1 Such failure to comply accordingly betrays not only a the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
recalcitrant streak in character, but al so disrespect for the Court’s lawful order gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission, 13 thereby causing her inclusion in
and directive.62 the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More specifically,
she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
Judge Gallegos should know that judges must respect the orders and decisions
of higher tribunals, especially the Supreme Court from which all other courts (a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding
take their bearings. A resolution of the Supreme Court is not to be construed as the status of PAGs in the Philippines.15
a mere request nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately or
selectively.63 (b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated
Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to
In the Judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a necessity. monitor and counteract their activities."16
The exacting standards of conduct demanded from judges are designed to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. (c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated
When the judge himself becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn by the PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as
to apply, he places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according to
impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.64 region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities
with whom these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby resolves to:
 names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein (a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with
petitioner Gamboa.18 violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b)
the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c)
the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information. 31 They
PNP, to wit:
also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to cases
of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the proper
The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of Gamboa.32
in Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission was
also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one hundred
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-four (24)
Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in the
had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members apprehended
list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a
and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
violation of her right to privacy, to wit:

Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were

In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
based on PNP data but that the more significant fact from his report
maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated. The
is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these
violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously. The
armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the
untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be
Commission which has continued communicating with the Armed
insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her
Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to
security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may
constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner
likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to
Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts have preempted the
transgress her right to life.
formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a
body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP.
Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed
that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied
and sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19 that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative
Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to investigate the
existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an
(e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
PNP:
Code of 1987.

Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly
x x x           x x x          x x x
reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s
recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs
previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP on By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she
April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and provided
groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20 information that made the Zeñarosa Commission to include her in the list.
Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information supposedly by
respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the
portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be
maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition
appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who on the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos the subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded
Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result, she this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as their official positions, information on her may have already been
well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the body tasked to
harassment and police surveillance operations.24 gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her,
should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the
Petition.37
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned
and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the issuance of a
writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as officials of the Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September
PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following reliefs: (a) 2010,38 raising the following assignment of errors:
destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte database; (b)
withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification
1. The trial court erred in ruling that the Zeñarosa Commission be
of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain from
impleaded as either a necessary or indispensable party;
forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining respondents from
making baseless reports.26
2. The trial court erred in declaring that Gamboa failed to present
sufficient proof to link respondents as the informant to [sic] the
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br. 13,
Zeñarosa Commission;
which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the Petition
meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents to
submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa 3. The trial court failed to satisfy the spirit of Habeas Data;
Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b)
directed respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and desist 4. The trial court erred in pronouncing that the reliance of the
from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other government Zeñarosa Commission to [sic] the PNP as alleged by Gamboa is an
entity, information that they may have gathered against her without the assumption;
approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written return of the
writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the summary
hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28 5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct
to PNP as an agency.39

In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the
bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of On the other hand, respondents maintain the following arguments: (a) Gamboa
Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to failed to present substantial evidence to show that her right to privacy in life,
two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for liberty or security was violated, and (b) the trial court correctly dismissed the
murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, Petition on the ground that she had failed to present sufficient proof showing
and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a that respondents were the source of the report naming her as one who
person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder, maintains a PAG.40
docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
Meanwhile, Gamboa argues that although A.O. 275 was a lawful order, fulfilling
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to the mandate to dismantle PAGs in the country should be done in accordance
comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data: with due process, such that the gathering and forwarding of unverified
information on her must be considered unlawful. 41 She also reiterates that she
was able to present sufficient evidence showing that the subject information Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill
originated from respondents.42 of Rights, viz:

In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary remedy
that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally,
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
at bar.
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge
The Right to Privacy after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized
as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus enunciated:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus
resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
said for this view of Justice Douglas: "Liberty in the constitutional sense must security, public safety, or public health as may be provided by law.
mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is
x x x           x x x          x x x
indeed the beginning of all freedom." As a matter of fact, this right to be let
alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis "the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized men." Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and
private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes not
contrary to law shall not be abridged.
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel
respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and
interference demands respect. xxx. Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

x x x           x x x          x x x Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
x x x In the leading case of Griswold v. Connecticut, Justice Douglas, speaking
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy
for five members of the Court, stated: "Various guarantees create zones of
of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private individual
privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First
liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person,
Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition
and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The
against the quartering of soldiers ‘in any house’ in time of peace without the
Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by an officer, the
consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
explicitly affirms the ‘right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.’ The Fifth
of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual Property Code. The Rules of Court on
Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create a zone
privileged communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain information.
of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment.
The Ninth Amendment provides: ‘The enumeration in the Constitution, of
certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
the people." After referring to various American Supreme Court decisions, fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
Justice Douglas continued: "These cases bear witness that the right of privacy government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
which presses for recognition is a legitimate one." interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)

x x x           x x x          x x x Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be

protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v.
Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right to privacy is
So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded
not absolute, viz:
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is
particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has
idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true
personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights
absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry.
contrast, a system of limited government, safeguards a private sector, which In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access
belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to
the state can control. Protection of this private sector — protection, in other privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual — has become increasingly right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a technological interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v.
age — industrialization, urbanization, and organization — operate to narrow Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the
the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to
to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking
between a democratic and a totalitarian society."44 (Emphases supplied) transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities.
Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to
proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.48
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of
the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit:
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state
objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases,
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is
although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is
succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and
expressly recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights:
compelling.

Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

The Writ of Habeas Data
except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control 66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see,
hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the Rule mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A
on the Writ of Habeas Data reads: no. 28, p. 27, § 58).

Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of communication to the
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the Ordinance, should be
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the purpose of the control
aggrieved party. (see paragraph 31 above).

The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and 67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on which safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the
our own Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data is rooted, finds its origins from the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide
European tradition of data protection,51 this Court can be guided by cases on the margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to
protection of personal data decided by the European Court of Human Rights consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed
(ECHR). Of particular note is Leander v. Sweden, 52 in which the ECHR balanced over the individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The
the right of citizens to be free from interference in their private affairs with the interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to
right of the state to protect its national security. In this case, Torsten Leander have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases supplied)
(Leander), a Swedish citizen, worked as a temporary replacement museum
technician at the Naval Museum, which was adjacent to a restricted military
Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific
security zone.53He was refused employment when the requisite personnel
component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state
control resulted in an unfavorable outcome on the basis of information in the
interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the
secret police register, which was kept in accordance with the Personnel Control
writ of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case
Ordinance and to which he was prevented access.54 He claimed, among others,
entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of
that this procedure of security control violated Article 8 of the European
Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
Convention of Human Rights55 on the right to privacy, as nothing in his personal
or political background would warrant his classification in the register as a
security risk.56 The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of
the state to dismantle private armies.
The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information
relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and
opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also
respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,58 and (b) the commission.61
Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the
scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of A.O.
release of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence of
ECHR must be emphasized: PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.

58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it with
to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon witnesses,
the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24 administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation and
November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55). use compulsory processes to produce documents, books, and records. 62 A.O.
275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to deputize the Armed Forces
59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy of the Philippines, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Department of
a margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on Justice, the PNP, and any other law enforcement agency to assist the
the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular commission in the performance of its functions.63
nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest
of the respondent State in protecting its national security must be Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a)
balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and
applicant’s right to respect for his private life. properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure
public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting
national security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing
competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the
not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs,
information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in monitored them and counteracted their activities. 65 One of those individuals is
posts of importance for national security. herein petitioner Gamboa.

Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP.
access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand, Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information
the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated
(see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, §§ or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security.
34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not constitute
an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding
PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was
available to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the
legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one. latter.

x x x           x x x          x x x Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP
released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication
to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that
act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data." Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012
investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP had a Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City (RTC) in SP. Proc.
validation system, which was used to update information on individuals No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the
field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
The Facts
collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.

Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors,
Pending the enactment of legislation on data protection, this Court declines to
were, during the period material, graduating high school students at St.
make any further determination as to the propriety of sharing information
Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January 2012, while changing
during specific stages of intelligence gathering. To do otherwise would supplant
into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and
the discretion of investigative bodies in the accomplishment of their functions,
Julienne, along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only
resulting in an undue encroachment on their competence.
in their undergarments. These pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay
Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established
in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher
caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict
at STC’s high school department, learned from her students that some seniors
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the
at STC posted pictures online, depicting themselves from the waist up, dressed
authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent
only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew who the girls
to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s
in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
Lourdes Taboada (Chloe), among others.
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67

Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective

In this case, respondents admitted the existence of the Report, but emphasized
personal Facebook accounts and showed her photos of the identified students,
its confidential nature.1âwphi1 That it was leaked to third parties and the media
which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard liquor and smoking cigarettes
was regrettable, even warranting reproach. But it must be stressed that
inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing articles
Gamboa failed to establish that respondents were responsible for this
of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is
unintended disclosure. In any event, there are other reliefs available to her to
more, Escudero’s students claimed that there were times when access to or the
address the purported damage to her reputation, making a resort to the
availability of the identified students’ photos was not confined to the girls’
extraordinary remedy of the writ of habeas data unnecessary and improper.
Facebook friends,4but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5

Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her
evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her
student’s Facebook page, showed the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol),
and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter, following an
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the
investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in
investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
a manner proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
regularity, which she failed to overcome.
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, 2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the 3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
writ of habeas data must be denied.

4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of habeas 5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity;
data, is AFFIRMED. contains sexually suggestive messages, language or symbols; and 6.
Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail ample body
exposure.
SO ORDERED.

On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures
in question, reported, as required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe
(Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and ICM6 Directress. They claimed that
during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the STC
officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap
G.R. No. 202666               September 29, 2014 (Yap), Roswinda Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their
parents the following day that, as part of their penalty, they are barred from
joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID
SUZARA, Petitioners, 
vs. A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN M. Tan (Tan), filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of
DOES, Respondents. Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-38594. 7In it, Tan
prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the sanction
that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
DECISION

On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia,
VELASCO, JR., J.: joined the fray as an intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No.
CEB-38594 filed their memorandum, containing printed copies of the
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a temporary
is an equally powerful desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation
personal adjustment process in which he balances the desire for privacy with ceremony, to which STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives. Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned
students from participating in the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967) the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for reconsideration on the
issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.

The Case
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ
of Habeas Data, docketed as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of following considerations:
Court, in relation to Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the
 1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas
taken for posterity before they changed into their swimsuits on the datashould be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the
occasion of a birthday beach party; controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not there was indeed
an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or
security of the minors involved in this case.
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set
at "Friends Only." They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of
privacy which must be respected. Our Ruling

3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or We find no merit in the petition.
ought to have known of laws that safeguard the right to privacy.
Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the girls,
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not
the offenders. Worse, after viewing the photos, the minors were
called "immoral" and were punished outright; The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or
omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. 11 It is an
their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide
accounts of petitioners’ children were intruded upon;
a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful
information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12
Laboratory; and
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in
broadcasted by respondents through their memorandum submitted fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure designed to safeguard individual
to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594. To freedom from abuse in the information age." 13 The writ, however, will not issue
petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a
their children’s privacy and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas person.Availment of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the
databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender and deposit right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and a
at the preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of
declaring all information, data, and digital images accessed, saved or the right to privacy in life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable
stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally obtained before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15
inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order privacy, a habeas datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of
dated July 5, 2012, issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, the case at bar,this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online
herein respondents were directed to file their verified written return, together social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-time interaction
with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service of the among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, 16 bridging the
writ. gap created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs
leavesan indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the
control of the end-users––is there a right to informational privacy in OSN
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified
activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the
written return, laying down the following grounds for the denial of the petition,
procedural issues in this case.
viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to file the petition; (b) petitioners
are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a writ of
habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and
as there is no reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook. enforced disappearances

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted
solely for the purpose of complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas
data. The dispositive portion of the Decision pertinently states:
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby
DISMISSED. Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party,

xxxx
namely: the spouse, children and parents; or

SO ORDERED.9
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved
party within the fourth civil degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. (emphasis
threatened violation of the minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for supplied)
the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover, the court a quoheld that the
photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who may
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only
view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered
to cases of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances, the above
the photographs through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the
underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of habeas data
implementation of the school’s policies and rules on discipline.
situations, would not have been made.

Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from
pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule on Habeas Data.10
abuse in the information age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability
to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances only. In fact, the annotations
The Issues to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo,
pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for
to enforce one’s right to privacy, more specifically the right to informational judicial remedies that would allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of
privacy. The remedies against the violation of such right can include the data or information and to remedy possible violations of the right to privacy.25 In
updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark
information or files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has
Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ of Habeas Datamay also be availed to take into account the changing realities not only technologically but also
of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances. socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of the people. x x x It is
imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting
cautiously and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
what may be viewed as the Philippine model of the writ of habeas data, in
information
effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it cyberspace activities, including those that occur in OSNs.
not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected
aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
in OSNs? Bear in mind that informational privacy involves personal information.
At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is socializing––sharing a myriad of
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the
businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN
1 of the Rule:
activities

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact
person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened
and to stay connected to other members of the same or different social media
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
platform through the sharing of statuses, photos, videos, among others,
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are
aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)
under the control of each and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a
user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to music and videos––
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of
the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of the other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN
public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, phenomenon has paved the way to the creation of various social networking
collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar, www.facebook.com
correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected
be in the business of collecting or storing data. with friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share
and express what matters to them."28
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour.
To "engage" means "to do or take part in something." 19 It does not necessarily Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending"
mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is another user. By sending a "friend request," the user invites another to connect
that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or their accounts so that they can view any and all "Public" and "Friends Only"
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and both
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts,
and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for among others. "Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-
no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to to-one relationships with other users, whereby the user gives his or her
said person or entity. "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain information to
the latter.29
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the
reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose,
business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the Facebook was armed with different privacy tools designed to regulate the
effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information uploaded by the user. In H
easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
communications technology––a right which a great majority of the users of "customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states
technology themselves are not capable of protecting. in its policies that, although it makes every effort to protect a user’s
information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."33
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core
of the controversy. For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of
digital images(photos), posted on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except
The right to informational privacy on Facebook for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her desired privacy
setting:

a. The Right to Informational Privacy

(a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the
photo;
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological
advancements having an influential part therein. This evolution was briefly
recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The Common Right (b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their
to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) friends can view the photo;
locational or situational privacy;21(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy.22 Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to (b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
informational privacy––usually defined as the right of individuals to control
information about themselves.23
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends
and/or networks of the Facebook user; and
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data
sharing nowadays, not to mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every individual’s right to
control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual
should have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up
commentators regarding privacy and social networking sites, however, all agree barriers to broaden or limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content,
that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social Networking] environment, statuses, and photos, among others, from another user’s point of view. In other
privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of their
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24 Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to
disclose facts about [themselves] – and to put others in the position of
receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected setting will be based on
one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to
withhold certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be
personal information. Needless to say, as the privacy setting becomes more surmised that the photographs in question were viewable to everyone on
limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular post. Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively limited the
disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most instructive:

Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no

[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to
reasonable expectation of privacy in Facebook would, in context, be correct.
forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such imagery, particularly under
However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of said privacy tools
circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ protective
that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those
measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
to whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or
photograph itself.45
upload thereto.35

Also, United States v. Maxwell 46 held that "[t]he more open the method of
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a
transmission is, the less privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to
protected expectation of privacy inall of his or her Facebook activities.
the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from
correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is
first necessary that said user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the
the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the employment of
petitioners’ contention. In this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the
measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention
digital images under this setting still remain to be outside the confines of the
can materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools.
zones of privacy in view of the following:
In other words, utilization of these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber
world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to informational privacy.37
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by
giving its users the tools to interact and share in any conceivable
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or
way;"47
deny access to his or her post orprofile detail should not be denied the
informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies said
choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such (2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are
that if, for instance, a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or total strangers;48
her Facebook page and sets its privacy level at "Only Me" or a custom list so
that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be deemed
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the
public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and
hundreds; and
accessibility. Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of
their function but it would also disregard the very intention of the user to keep
said photo or information within the confines of his or her private space. (4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or
"tag"50 others who are not Facebook friends with the former, despite
its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook friends.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to
other Facebook users and whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In
other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of the photos such that the It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s
images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary privacy to "Friends" is no assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another
in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when user who is not Facebook friends with the source of the content. The user’s
the photos were uploaded to Facebook so that the images will be protected own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook
against unauthorized access and disclosure. friend thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook
friends or not with the former. Also, when the post is shared or when a person
is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person who shared the post or
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being
who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
violated, insist that Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts,
"Friends."
downloaded copies ofthe pictures and showed said photos to Tigol. To them,
this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook accounts,
allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not
a password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only Facebook friends. If C, A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at
limited since their profiles were not open to public viewing. Therefore, "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own Facebook friends) is dramatically
according to them, people who are not their Facebook friends, including increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public, depending
respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is
consent. Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the effectively expanded––and to a very large extent.
subjectphotos which were only viewable by the five of them,40 although who
these five are do not appear on the records. This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s
proclivity towards user interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit 41 that "my students showed privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual user posts. In fact, it has
me some pictures of girls cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting
me that these are senior high school [students] of STC, who are their friends in into the "democratization of fame."51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even
[F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos posted a post, with visibility set at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically,
on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students be said to be "very private," contrary to petitioners’ argument.
then logged into their Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the
various photographs x x x. They even told me that there had been times when As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the
these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook." sanctioned students’ Facebook friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to
task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the minors’ Facebook friends
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what
key reason: failure to question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the
disproves their allegation that the photos were viewable only by the five of information as it was voluntarily given to them by persons who had legitimate
them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with the friends of the
were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents
claim that the other students were able to view the photos, their statements imputed any violation of privacy against the students who showed the images
are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant consideration.42 to Escudero.

It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents
that her students, who are the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the reproduced and broadcasted the photographs. In fact, what petitioners
photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only goes to show that no attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no more than
special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their
to by Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that memorandum submitted to the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-
the photos were, in reality, viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) 38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of the minor’s informational
by the public at large. privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision
precise, the photos of minor students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely dated July 27, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc.
to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation of the minors enrolled in a No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other
than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the
No pronouncement as to costs.
photos visible only to them or to a select few. Without proof that they placed
the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of their protected zone of
privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with SO ORDERED.
respect to the photographs in question.

Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the
original uploader, through the "Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s
contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few, through the
"Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the
intention to limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to
the public at large or all the user’s friends en masse, becomes more manifest
G.R. No. 206248               February 18, 2014
and palpable.

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, 
On Cyber Responsibility
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s
ears."53 This means that self-regulation on the part of OSN users and internet
DECISION
consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding privacy rights violations.54 As
a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his or
her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, VELASCO, JR., J.:
fail.Responsible social networking or observance of the "netiquettes" 56 on the
part of teenagers has been the concern of many due to the widespreadnotion Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing
that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people the July 24, 2012 Decision1 and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57 (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.

Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
cyber citizenship in its curriculum to educate its students on proper online
conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC but a number of schools and
organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio)
good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although Antonio was
risks that the children are exposed to every time they participate in online at that time already married to someone else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two
activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of the cyber world and its sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on
pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly recognized by respondent
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The
the participation of the parents in disciplining and educating their children parties’ relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and Grande left for the
about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by these institutions and United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent
organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to
for parental involvement and supervision."59 take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its notarized Deed of Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
students to beresponsible in their dealings and activities in cyberspace,
particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions specified in the
Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein
students’ rights. respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that
the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are under the sole
parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to court a quo decreed the following:
whenever they engage incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should
be cautious enough to control their privacy and to exercise sound discretion
regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give up. WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants
Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind [Antonio’s] prayer for recognition and the same is hereby judicially approved. x
of data or information online, they are automatically and inevitably making it x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following Order granting the
permanently available online, the perpetuation of which is outside the ambit of other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:
their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise
private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to
parties who may or may not be allowed access to such. cause the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the father of the
aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live Birth
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the
online dealings and activities and must not be negligent in protecting their surnames of said minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande
rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the courts, as here, to Antonio;
requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right
which they allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority
afford protection to persons if they themselves did nothing to place the matter with [Grande] over the persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis
within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be mindful enough to Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information
private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as
those of Facebook, especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the
settings and the site's layout often. parties’ minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick
Grande who shall stay with [Antonio’s] residence in the Philippines
from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grande’s] custody from
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' Saturday to Sunday evening;
privacy rights, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and case
disposition of the court a quo.
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and
custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors. unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
 e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in
minors outside of the country, without the written consent of the the Civil Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.
other and permission from the court.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor reads:
children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande in the
amount of P30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
Art. 176. – Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
30% for [Grande].7(Emphasis supplied.)
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use the surname
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father
was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated November 22, 2010 8 for through the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission
being pro forma and for lack of merit. in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father.
Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on
child shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis
the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence
supplied.)
respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over her illegitimate
children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the
Decision of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads: From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an
illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her mother. The exception
provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly recognized by the
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision
father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an
of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492
admission in a public document or private handwritten instrument is made by
is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the surname of the
father.
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar
of Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition
surname of Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis, in their respective
of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for the correction or change
certificates of live birth, and record the same in the Register of Births;
of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio when a public document
acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more:
and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant, a judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an official
Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole declaration of his children’s surname as Antonio.
custody of these minor children;
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority is
only take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]; and given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the
mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is
per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the surname to
(Emphasis supplied.) that of respondent?

In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the father’s Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit
recognition of his children, the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA
custody over them absent the most compelling of reasons. 10 Since respondent 9255.
Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely
affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the
minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over their children.
surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or the
mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the surname of their illegitimate children.
recognition made by respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors,
taken in conjunction with the universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child"
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity,
clause, compels the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO."11
it must be taken to mean what it says and it must be given its literal meaning
free from any interpretation.16 Respondent’s position that the court can order
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
considering that not only did Antonio express his willingness to give support, it
is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the minor
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no
children.12Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent
ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use of the word "may" in the
Antonio of his visitorial right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent
provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
and natural right of parents over their children.13
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is
permissive and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
Not satisfied with the CA’s Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial
motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting
decreed the change of the minors’ surname to "Antonio." When her motion
children are to be measured is their best interest. On the matter of children’s
was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she
surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the
posits that Article 176 of the Family Code––as amended by Republic Act No.
father’s surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v.
(RA) 9255, couched as it is in permissive language––may not be invoked by a
Republic,18 for instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue
father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname without the
using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate father as it
consent of their mother.
serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from using
the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v.
We find the present petition impressed with merit. Republic,19 this Court, upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even
allowed the use of a surname different from the surnames of the child’s father
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a child’s surname is second
by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation
core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family Code, originally phrased as considering his circumstances.
follows:
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his mother as it would best serve
authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with his interest, thus:
this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a person’s Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live Birth and
name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents and his successional the Register of Births as follows:
rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these matters should not be
taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is
to present evidence in favor of or against such change.
hereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255."
(Emphasis supplied.)
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovanni’s petition. Giovanni availed of
the proper remedy, a petition for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot
Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements. After hearing, the
amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong
trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented
Corporation,22 We held:
during the hearing of Giovanni’s petition sufficiently established that, under Art.
176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to change his name as he was never
recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized him as her After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is found in the
by his father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mother’s legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and regulations of a law
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This Court will not cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal
stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis supplied.) a statute is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the
basic law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that prevails,
because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative issuance — an
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the
administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.
father’s surname upon his recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no
ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more,
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father
this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority to strike down and
declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution. 25 Section 5(5),
Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father, either at the back of the Certificate of Live Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Birth or in a separate document.
xxxx
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child
shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is supported by
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
the following documents:
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
xxxx underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure
for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective
unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use
the surname of the father upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted provisions of the IRR
[Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].
of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of
their father’s surname upon the latter’s recognition of his paternity.
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall
use the surname of the father upon submission of a public document or a
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment.
private handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of "may" in Art. 176 rendering the
use of an illegitimate father’s surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she children are given the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
has reached the age of majority. The consent may be contained in a separate
instrument duly notarized.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now
aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this Court declaring their
xxxx opposition to have their names changed to "Antonio."26 However, since these
letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition provide any evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence of, the
children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the
the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the dispositive portion of which shall read:
Register of Births.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the appealed Decision

xxxx of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492
is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter read as follows:
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother
a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of and Andre Lewis to the custody of their mother herein appellant,
Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a private handwritten Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole
document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of custody of these minor children;
Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new may only take the children out upon the written consent of [Grande]:
surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00
Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted. per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and

8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the
public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the Register of Legal
 d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for
Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of determining the surname to reconsideration couched in this wise:
be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative the Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the
Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and Solicitor General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned government
VOID. agencies.

SO ORDERED. SO ORDERED.12

Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding
G.R. No. 189538               February 10, 2014 required. Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an unknown
person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,  respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is
vs. not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari
DECISION under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC
Decision and Order based on the following grounds:

PERALTA, J.:
I.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the Regional Trial Court 1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE
Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in
the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for II.
reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG).
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION
OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE
The facts of the case are as follows: MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled
No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her or corrected, because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was ones provided by the person who appeared and represented herself as
already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s personal circumstances.15 In
at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of
denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio. 16Thus,
alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for declaration of
the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers. 4 She, thus, filed a nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the
entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case. We deny the petition.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from
have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of
officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then law are raised or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as
in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the
denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the
she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may be undertaken in a
her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction
an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife
who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act,
testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the
of which reads: Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of
the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and
directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be
contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune. cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal
separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments
SO ORDERED.9 declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j)
naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake.10

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of parties to the proceeding.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries
in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.11
 SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the Office24 that:
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action
newspaper of general circulation in the province.
is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
opposition thereto. determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed
is brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may
in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In
also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of
other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
the parties pending such proceedings.
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
the existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be
overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not
served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the
even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence
same in his record.
clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage
certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the
adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or evidence of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent
nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 19 in 1986, the Court speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth
has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to
appropriate adversarial proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or speak of.
proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all
relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where
Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25,
the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.21
2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be

SO ORDERED.
dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion.
However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down
in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the
petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also
requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if
any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the
proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or
issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements
in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, 
are admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however,
vs.
claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such
OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered
OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a
CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son
Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the DECISION
marriage certificate.
CARPIO, J.:
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made
the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son The Case
Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural
requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the
Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More 107, Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the
of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a document Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the
respondent’s signature appearing in some of her government issued lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
identification cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, The Facts
was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no
such marriage was celebrated.
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent
Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines 2 on 23 January 2004. The
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring
Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 subject to cancellation or correction. 18 The petition in the RTC sought (among
May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. others) to annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the
However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with
court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court
on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate
entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s
Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu proprio
be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should
be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-
Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City 11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.
to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage
between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office
reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
(NSO).6
applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person" 22 in the proceeding
because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the Japanese
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order
Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x." 23 On the
dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only
docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of
said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
dismissal of this case[,] it should be taken together with the other ground cited
No. 02-11-10-SC):
by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based
on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under
may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the
xxxx "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only
in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a
collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional
ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification
against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required under
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate
violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section dismissal" of the petition under the same provision.
5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of
the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate dismissal of the
petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the
wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare Letters of Marinay and Maekara
their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10- petition for review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated
of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor
recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31
establish a status, a right or a particular fact," 9 and not a civil action which is
"for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s
wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-
status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) 10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for
the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous
petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines 11 on bigamy and was therefore cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12 SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void [t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological only discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous,
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in
only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is
not, of course, difficult to realize that the party interested in having a bigamous the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is clearly the aggrieved
marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an
bigamous marriage. emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a
reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34
Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese
413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding. 35 In Corpuz v.
petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce
decree of the court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the his/her original cause of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded
Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, litigation."59
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status,
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign
procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the
status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of
decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in
proceeding. private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity
in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment
affecting its citizen, over whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in
status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.
assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro 39 and Niñal
v. Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be
collaterally attacked."41 A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not
require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the
to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of
concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki. 43Maekara
the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus,
also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other
Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according to
hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition. 45 She
the rules of evidence.
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause
misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or
final order against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as
The Issues
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title."
Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final
Petitioner raises the following legal issues: order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed to
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10- delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is
SC) is applicable. admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds
external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations, 61 as
to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized
foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce decree does
the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of
ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine
The Ruling of the Court courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
We grant the petition.

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy,
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4)
Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese Family Court
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48 judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,
Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
I.
II.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the
petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction
Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1,
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court. 49 Petitioner may prove the by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule
Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of
the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an
certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by the seal of office.50 Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
judgment would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67
provisions, including the form and contents of the petition, 51 the service of
summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre- Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court. 56 This is absurd because it
will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign
judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues." 57 The Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order
interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite  of the
Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of
108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a
petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed
in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in
located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the
maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property
mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the
cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil
substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No.
supported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family" 70 and preserving 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage.
the property regime of the marriage.71 It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided
under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the
petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where
Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational
one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369
rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and
define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or
modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his
marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend
substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing
the union recognized by law. trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for
law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where
husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a
marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void
divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or
from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are neither the
her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only
husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for
precisely because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No.
cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for
02-11-10-SC.
divorce.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the
the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
anomaly that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not
Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can
allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly
initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is
which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage, 78 there is more
made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree,
reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of a subsisting
which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The second
marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely
in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
civil aspect of protecting his marriage.
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served."91
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is
clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a
suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as
Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the
the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in
burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the
entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this purpose,
foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is
he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel
discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot
the entry of the bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
remarry.

III.
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts
are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover,
Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the
Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A
action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign
petition for recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara. nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed
in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign The Filipino spouse has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the
the foreign country. only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice
to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action
is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to
safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other substitute their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They
related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and
legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. a legal issue which in this case should be dealt with utmost care in view of the
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the delicate facts present in this case.
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country, Philippine In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the
courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the term “intersexuality” which is the condition or let us say a disorder that
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a
For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex
judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is
(2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the said that an organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both
foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of the land
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of
policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright denial.
default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity of nations.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere
recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
judgment serves as the basis for the correction or cancellation of entry in the That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the evidence
civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that
marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and
respondent is male. In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis
fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an
for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. The Supreme Court held
inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign
judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1 that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor
in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual
However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage
development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at
is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in
94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female.
Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take
the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago." medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently
knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live
with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to
address the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of
under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an “incompetent”
and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon
under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the
City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in respondent’s position and his personal judgment of being a male.
accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 174689 October 22 2007 [Change of name or sex]

Republic vs. Cagandahan, GR No. 166676

FACTS:
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio having undergone a sex reassignment surgery,
name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff Cagandahan and her gender from sought to have his first name changed from Rommel to Mely, and his sex from
female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from male to female. Trial court granted his petition. CA, however, upon appeal filed
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted by the Republic of the Philippines thru the OSG, reversed the trial court
persons possess both male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan decision, holding that there is no law allowing the change of entries of either
grew up with secondary male characteristics. To further her petition, name or sex in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration.
Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is
suffering from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition, explained that “Cagandahan ISSUE:
genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
Whether or not Rommel's first name and sex be changed on the ground of sex
organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female.”
reassignment.
The lower court decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General
appealed before the Supreme Court invoking that the same was a violation of
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar. RULING: No.  There is no law authorizes the change of entry as of sex and first
name through the intervention of sex reassignment surgery. Article 376 of the
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and Civil Code as amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law), together with Article 412
name of respondent as ruled by the lower court. of the same Code, change of name or sex in the birth certificate is allowed by
the courts so long as clerical or typographical errors are involved.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is
fatally defective because it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all
persons who have or claim any interest therein is not without merit. However, it
must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a Changes sought by Silverio will have serious legal and public policy
copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all consequences. To grant this petition filed by Silverio will greatly alter the laws
pleadings, orders or processes in the course of the proceedings. In which case, on marriage and family relations. Second, there will be major changes in
the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance of the provisions statutes that underscore the public policy in relation to women.
of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court
held that the determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is
BALAO V ERMITA

Under Section 20 of the Amparo rule, the court is mandated to archive, and not
dismiss, the case should it determine that it could not proceed for a valid cause,
viz. :

Section 20. Archiving and Revival of Cases. - The court shall not
dismiss the petition, but shall archive it, if upon its determination it
cannot proceed for a valid cause such as the failure of petitioner or
witnesses to appear due to threats on their lives.

A periodic review of the archived cases shall be made by

the amparo court that shall, motu proprio or upon motion by any
party, order their revival when ready for further proceedings. The
petition shall be dismissed with prejudice upon failure to prosecute
the case after the lapse of two (2) years from notice to the petitioner
of the order archiving the case.

The clerks of court shall submit to the Office of the Court

Administrator a consolidated list of archived cases under this Rule
not later than the first week of January of every year. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Jurisprudence states that archiving of cases is a procedural measure

designed to temporarily defer the hearing of cases in which no immediate
action is expected, but where no grounds exist for their outright dismissal.
Under this scheme, an inactive case is kept alive but held in abeyance until the
situation obtains in which action thereon can be taken.60 To be sure, the
Amparo rule sanctions the archiving of cases, provided that it is impelled by a
valid cause, such as when the witnesses fail to appear due to threats on their
lives or to similar analogous causes that would prevent the court from
effectively hearing and conducting the amparo proceedings which, however, do
not obtain in these cases. Here, while it may appear that the investigation
conducted by the AFP reached an impasse, it must be pointed out that there
was still an active lead worth pursuing by the PNP. Thus, the investigation had
not reached a deadend - which would have warranted the case's archiving -
because the testimony of Gonzales set forth an immediate action on the part of
the PNP which could possibly solve, or uncover new leads, in the ongoing
investigation of James's abduction. Therefore, the RTC's recommendation that
these cases should be archived is clearly premature, and hence, must be
rejected.

WHEREFORE, the recommendations of the Regional Trial Court of La

Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 63 (RTC) in the Final Report dated January 15, 2016
are PARTLY ADOPTED. Accordingly, the Court hereby resolved to:

(a) REJECT the recommendation of the RTC to archive

these cases;

(b) RELIEVE the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the

Commission on Human Rights from their respective obligations to
investigate the abduction of James Balao; and

(c) DIRECT the Philippine National Police (PNP) to further

investigate the angle presented by Bryan Gonzales and to ascertain
the identities of "Uncle John" and "Rene" who are persons-of-
interest in these cases. The PNP is given six (6) months from notice
hereof to complete its investigation. Within fifteen (15) days from
completion, the PNP shall submit the results thereof to the RTC.
Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the RTC shall submit its full report
and recommendation to the Court for final action. SO ORDERED.