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Ker V Illinois Digest

1) Frederick Ker, a US fugitive, was indicted in Illinois for larceny but fled to Peru. 2) A US agent kidnapped Ker from Peru and brought him to California and then Illinois for trial without following extradition procedures. 3) The Supreme Court ruled that while the agent's actions violated the extradition treaty, Ker was not entitled to asylum in Peru and could still be tried in Illinois since he was now within its jurisdiction. Irregularities in how a defendant is brought to trial do not invalidate the trial itself.

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69 views1 page

Ker V Illinois Digest

1) Frederick Ker, a US fugitive, was indicted in Illinois for larceny but fled to Peru. 2) A US agent kidnapped Ker from Peru and brought him to California and then Illinois for trial without following extradition procedures. 3) The Supreme Court ruled that while the agent's actions violated the extradition treaty, Ker was not entitled to asylum in Peru and could still be tried in Illinois since he was now within its jurisdiction. Irregularities in how a defendant is brought to trial do not invalidate the trial itself.

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dave bermil
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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09 Ker v Illinois (1886) Universal Jurisdiction Court: US SC

Facts: Frederick Ker is a US Fugitive in Peru. He was guilty of Larceny in the State of Illinois.
Pursuant to an extradition treaty with Peru, the US Government arranged the necessary documents for the
extradition.
Upon the issuance of the warrant of extradition, it was directed to a Henry Julian as a messenger to Peru.
Julian, having the necessary papers on hand, arrived in Peru but didn’t interact with the executive officials
in charge of the extradition. Instead Julian kidnapped Ker and shipped him off to the US in a series of boat
transports while keeping Ker as a prisoner.
Before the arrival of the prisoner in the state of California, the governor of Illinois requested for the delivery
of Ker as a fugitive of justice.
Upon arrival in San Francisco, he was put under the custody of a Frank Warner, who was under the orders
of the governor of California and was thereafter sent to Cook County, Illinois where he was indicted, tried
and convicted.
Ker filed a writ of error in the Supreme Court contending that the judgment of the Illinois Court was invalid
on the grounds that it failed to afford him the rights found in the extradition treaty with the Republic of Peru
and that he was not supposed to be charged with an indictment and was entitled to an asylum.
Issue and Holding: WON the judgment of the court was invalid for failing to afford the due process rights
of the petitioner emanating from the Constitution in compliance with the extradition treaty. (No)
Ratio: The "due process of law" here guaranteed to the petitioner is complied with when the party is
regularly indicted by the proper grand jury in the state court, has a trial according to the forms and modes
prescribed for such trials, and when, in that trial and proceedings, he is deprived of no rights to which he is
lawfully entitled.
In the case at bar because of irregularities in the manner in which he was brought into custody of the
law, we do not think he is entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is
charged in a regular indictment.
When the petitioner was found within the jurisdiction of the State of Illinois and liable to answer for a
crime against the laws of that state, unless there was some positive provision of the Constitution or of the
laws of this country violated in bringing him into court, it is not easy to see how he can say that he is there
"without due process of law" within the meaning of the constitutional provision.
When the petitioner is in court and required to plead to an indictment, as it would have stood upon a
writ of habeas corpus in California, or in any of the states through which he was carried in the progress of
his extradition, to test the authority by which he was held, and upon the mere fact that the papers under
which he was taken into custody in California were prepared and ready for him on his arrival from Peru, no
sufficient reason for an abatement of the indictment against him in Cook County, or why he should be
discharged from custody without a trial.
There is no language in this treaty or in any other treaty made by this country on the subject of
extradition of which we are aware which says in terms that a party fleeing from the United States to escape
punishment for crime becomes thereby entitled to an asylum in the country to which he has fled. Indeed,
the absurdity of such a proposition would at once prevent the making of a treaty of that kind. It will not be
for a moment contended that the government of Peru could not have ordered Ker out of the country on his
arrival or at any period of his residence there. If this could be done, what becomes of his right of asylum?
The right of the government of Peru voluntarily to give a party in Ker's condition an asylum in that
country is quite a different thing from the right in him to demand and insist upon security in such an asylum.
The treaty, so far as it regulates the right of asylum at all, is intended to limit this right in the case of one
who is proved to be a criminal fleeing from justice, so that, on proper demand and proceedings had therein,
the government of the country of the asylum shall deliver him up to the country where the crime was
committed.
In the case before us, the plea shows that although Julian went to Peru with the necessary papers to
procure the extradition of Ker under the treaty, those papers remained in his pocket, and were never
brought to light in Peru; that no steps were taken under them, and that Julian, in seizing Ker and carrying
him out of the territory of Peru into the United States, did not act, nor profess to act, under the treaty. The
treaty was not called into operation, was not relied upon, was not made the pretext of arrest, and the facts
show that it was clear case of kidnapping within the dominions of Peru, without any pretense of authority
under the treaty or from the government of the United States.
In invoking the jurisdiction of this Court upon the ground that the prisoner was denied a right
conferred upon him by a treaty of the United States, he has failed to establish the existence of any such
right.
The question of defendant’s kidnapping to resist trial in the state court for the offense now charged upon
him is not a question for this court, for in that transaction we do not see that the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States guarantee him any protection. There are authorities of the highest
respectability which hold that such forcible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not
answer when brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for such an offense,
and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court.

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