Assignment Submission

for

Continuous Evaluation II

In the course of

Legal Writing and Legal Research

CASE ANALYSIS: P.N. DUDA V P. SHIV SHANKAR & OTHERS

Guided By: Submitted By:

Prof. Medha Singh Pawni Nagawat

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 CASE ANALYSIS

P.N. DUDA
Vs.
P. SHIV SHANKAR & OTHERS
(1988) SCR (3) 547
DATE – 15TH APRIL, 1988
CORAM - Mukharji, Sabyasachi (J)

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 CONTENT

FACTS OF THE CASE 04

ISSUES INVOLVED 05

PETITONER’S ARGUMENT 06

RESPONDENT ARGUMENT 07

CONTEMPT OF COURT’S ACT 08

JUDGEMENT 10

ANALYSIS 11

FACTS OF THE CASE

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At an assembly of the Bar Council of Hyderabad, P Shiv Shankar, the minister of law, justice,
and corporate affairs at the time, made a speech. The complainant, PN Duda, claimed that
Shankar used highly intemperate and undignified language and made disparaging remarks
about the Supreme Court's reputation, attributing to the court favouritism toward rich
citizens. He also claimed that the speech contained slander directed at the judges and the
functioning of the court.

The petitioner asserted that he had requested permission to begin contempt proceedings from
India's Attorney General and Solicitor General. After both refused to respond to his prayer, a
request for the initiation of contempt under section 15(1)(a) and (b) of the act read with
definition (1) and rules 3(a), (b), and (c) of the Supreme Court Rules, 1975, was made,
wherein Shankar, the attorney general, and the solicitor general were made as parties.
Following that, the court gave notice.

In response, Shankar filed an affidavit indicating that he had delivered the speech on the issue
of responsibility of the legislature, executive, and judiciary, and had made comments on the
accountability of the three organs and the theoretical repercussions thereof and that he had
meant no disrespect to any of the institutions or their functionaries, let alone the Supreme
Court. It was also stated that the contempt motion should not be filed without the approval of
the attorney general or the solicitor general.
The Attorney General and Solicitor General should not have been declared parties to the
contempt petition, according to lawyer RN Trivedi, who also argues that their purported
failure to exercise their authority did not amount to contempt under section 2(c) of the Act.
Trivedi filed an application to be impleaded as a party.

ISSUES INVOLVED

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 1. Whether this application was maintainable without the consent of the Attorney
General or the Solicitor General?
2. Whether the speech had the effect of bringing this Court into disrepute?

ARGUMENT OF THE PETITIONER’S

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 1. The petitioner argues that certain passages in the speech appear to attribute an
unconscious partiality, bias, or predilection on the part of judges in how they decide
on various matters that are brought before them, and that these statements fall under
the purview of this Court's decision under the "law of contempt."
2. Initiate court contempt proceedings Suo motu in conjunction with rule 3(a) of the
Supreme Court (Contempt of Court) Rules, 1975, see section 15(1) of the Contempt
of Court Act of 1971.
3. He approached the Attorney General of India and the Solicitor General of India for
their written consent to enable him to file a petition under Section 15(1) read with rule
3(c) but that they have refused to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by law.

4. Whether even if the petitioner was particular about his right to file a petition under
rule 3(C), would be able to take legal action against the Attorney General and the
Solicitor General if they withheld their approval or, as is claimed in this case, refused
to process the petitioner's application.

ARGUMENTS OF RESPONDENT’S

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 1. The Respondent stated that no disrespect was committed in the speech as a whole,
given the limited audience to which it was delivered.
2. The charges in the petition make it clear that respondent No. l, and only he, is to be
charged with contempt, according to the complainant. Nonetheless, the Attorney
General of India, the Solicitor General of India, and Sri 13 Ramoji Rao, Editor of
"Newstime," have been added as respondents to the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition
by the petitioner.
3. The plaintiff has submitted this "petition" asking that this Court act Suo motu on the
grounds that he missed the last two courses, which will be covered subsequently. To
the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition, the petitioner has still included the Attorney
General of India, the Solicitor General of India, and Sri 13 Ramoji Rao, Editor of
"Newstime," as respondents.
4. If the applicant can obtain the approval of another law official, such as the Additional
Solicitor General if neither the Attorney General nor the Solicitor General is in a
position to accept a request under Section 15(1)(c).
5. If the claim is valid, what recourse, if any, should be given to the plaintiff in response
to the Attorney General and Solicitor General's alleged refusal to consent to the
petitioner's filing of a contempt lawsuit, and whether or not they believe they are
unable to proceed on the application, the Additional Solicitor General may be called
upon to respond or to perform the aforementioned function.

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

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Although the Indian Constitution does not define contempt specifically, section 2 (a) of The
Contempt of Courts, 1971 specifies that it can be either civil or criminal. Sections 2(b) and
2(c) of The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defined civil and criminal contempt, respectively.
Despite not having outlined what exactly constituted contempt, the state has defined both
civil and criminal contempt. Thus, disdain cannot be contained within the four-cornered
confines of a description. It is up to the court to decide what constitutes an offence against the
court's reputation and what harms the court's standing, and each case of contempt must be
handled according to its particular facts and circumstances.

Contempt is divided into two broad groups in India:

1. Civil contempt

Civil contempt, as described in section 2 (b) of the 1971 Contempt of Courts Act, is
wilful defiance of a court's judgement, decree, instruction, order, writ, or other
procedure, or wilful violation of an undertaking provided to a court.

2. Criminal contempt

Criminal contempt, as described in section 2 (c) of The Contempt of Courts Act,

i. Scandalizes or tends to scandalise, or diminishes or tends to diminish the

Section 5 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971

Section 5 of the Contempt of court Act, 1971 states that a person shall not be guilty of
criminal contempt for publishing any fair comment. In short, rational criticism means that
criticism which while challenging the act of a Judge does not impute any ulterior motive
to him. In the case of Arundhati Roy, the Supreme Court has ruled that judicial dissent
cannot be cited under the garb of Freedom of Speech and Expression under Article 19(1)
(a) of the Constitution of India.

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 JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENT

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 1. This petition, treated as one filed defined in section 15(1) read c. with rule 3(a), is not
in proper form and, if treated as one filed according to rules 3(b) and 3(c), is
unmaintainable because it was not filed by the Attorney General/Solicitor General or
any person with his consent.
2. In either event the petitioner should not have added to the petition respondents other
than the person who, according to the petitioner, is guilty of contempt of court and so
their names should be deleted from the array of parties.
3. If the Attorney General/Solicitor General refuses to act or is unable to act, their
decision is not reviewable in court, and the petitioner's only recourse is to petition the
Court for action under rule 3. (a).
4. In this case, the Attorney General/Solicitor General made the correct decision by
failing to deal with the petitioner's application in any direction; and
5. Considering the petition as mere information according to Rule 3(a) upon which this
Court may or may not act Suo motu and after hearing counsel for the alleged
contemner, we believe there is no reason to initiate contempt.

Therefore, the petition was dismissed.

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE

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In P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker & Others, (1988) 3 SCC 167, the then-Minister of Law,
Justice, and Corporate Affairs P. Shiv Shankar asserted that the Supreme Court was made up
of wealthy people who had an "unmistakable sympathy for the haves" and therefore
interpreted the word "compensation" in a particular way. He asserts that the Supreme Court
found that the proclamation represented an opinion regarding a pattern of institutional
behaviour. The Court purportedly ruled that the contempt case was not made notwithstanding
the seriousness of the proceedings. The Court then debated whether Shri Duda's petition
should have been considered without him present. In the aforementioned plea, Shri Duda
wrote to the Attorney General requesting authorization to bring a contempt case against Shri
P. Shiv Shankar. The letter was also forwarded to India's Solicitor General. The plaintiff also
claimed that the Attorney General's integrity and authority had been questioned as a result of
the allegations and that the Attorney General would be embarrassed to consent to the Law
Minister's proceedings, but the Attorney General offered neither a denial nor permission for
prosecution. The defendant shall not bring any action for contempt against the respondent
without the approval of the Attorney General and the Solicitor General.

The Indian judiciary is held in high regard by the country's people. When a person has used
up all other potential routes for justice, turning to the court is considered a last resort. The
ultimate court of the Indian legal system is the Supreme Court of India. An attack on the
court causes not only common litigants but even certain judges in the nation to lose faith in
the court.

It's impossible to rule out the chance that other justices will believe they are the targets of
malicious attacks given the Supreme Court's inability to defend itself against false
accusations. For the benefit of the general public, such assaults on the nation's top courts
must be treated seriously. Without a doubt, the Court must maintain its magnanimity when
judges or the legal system as a whole are criticised. But such magnanimity cannot be strained
to the breaking point, endangering the fundamental foundations of democracy, in the face of a
vicious, scurrilous, and determined assault on the heart of the court.

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