CASE DIGEST OVERVIEW

1. In re: Pickens, 213 B.R. 818

a. Legal assistant handles the cases
b. Committed unauthorized practice of law
2. Maloney v. Schwab, 249 B.R. 71
a. Non lawyer questioning debtors in behalf of creditors
b. Not unauthorized practice of law
3. Doe v. Condon, 2000 WL 718448
a. determine whether certain tasks performed by a non-attorney employee in a law firm
constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
b. list of task constitutes unauthorized practice of law and violates Rules of Professional
Conduct
4. In re J. Gregory Caver, 97-0823
a. Multiple counts of misconduct
b. Disbarred from practice

CASE DIGEST 1: LAW FIRM MANAGING 2

ALL ARE COPIED, REVISE IF NEEDED TO PASS

In re: Pickens, 213 B.R. 818

(Bankr.E.D. Mich. 1997)

I. FACTS
a. The Castle Law Office was considered as a high-volume filer for filing an average of 77
cases per month since 1997. Castle’s standard practice is that the clients would
generally meet with a legal assistant under the firm instead of a lawyer. The client and
lawyer would mostly meet only before the meeting of creditors.
b. The said legal assistant would meet with the client and conduct an initial consultation. If
in any case the client has questions, the legal assistant would personally relay this to a
lawyer and would answer back to the client. The legal assistant is also in charge of
preparing the papers to be files based on the client’s answer on the questionnaire given
by the legal assistant.
c. Aside from the issue of the unauthorized practice of law, the amount of the fee
application was also questioned because it is greater than the agreed upon fees:
d. Courts have held that the following activities constitute the practice of law in other
jurisdictions: (1) Determining when to file bankruptcy cases. (2) Deciding whether to file
a Chapter 7 or a Chapter 13. (3) Filling out or assisting debtors in completing forms or
scheduled. (4) Solicitation of financial information and preparation of schedules. (5)
Providing clients with definitions of legal terms of art. (6) Advising debtors which
exemptions they should claim. (7) Preparing motions and answers to motions. (8)
Advising debtors on discharge ability issues. (9) Advising debtors concerning the
automatic stay. (10) Habitual drafting of legal instruments for hire. (11) Correcting
"errors" or omissions on bankruptcy forms. (12) Advising clients as to various remedies
and procedures available in the bankruptcy system.
II. ISSUE
a. Whether Castle Law Office’s legal assistants engage in the unauthorized practice of law
III. RULING
a. It is unlawful for any person to practice law, or to engage in the law business, or in any
manner whatsoever to lead others to believe that he is authorized to practice law or to
engage in the law business, or in any manner whatsoever to represent or designate
himself as an attorney and counselor, attorney at law, or lawyer, unless the person so
doing is regularly licensed and authorized to practice law in this state.
b. In Michigan law, no federal law regulating the extent to which non-lawyers may appear
before the bankruptcy court. The statute does not identify the activities that constitute
the practice of law. Accordingly, defining the practice of Law is left to the judiciary. In
Cramer, 399 Mich. at 134, 249 N.W.2d 1., providing or selling standard forms and
general instructions for completing the forms, or to provide typing services is not
considered as unauthorized practice of law. However, the court stated, "[t]o the extent
that defendant provides personal advice peculiar to [the client's particular legal
situation], that person is engaging in the `unauthorized practice of law.'"
c. This Court finds that the legal assistants of Castle perform many services that constitute
the unauthorized practice of law.
i. First, legal assistants explain to prospective clients the difference between
chapter 7 and chapter 13. (Tr. at 15.) They are thus defining and explaining
concepts and legal terms of art.
ii. The rendering of advice peculiar to a client's particular situation. because these
prospective clients meet only with a legal assistant at the initial consultation,
the Court infers that the legal assistant makes the determination that
bankruptcy is not the best choice for this particular individual and advises the
client of other options.
iii. Third, it appears that the assistant helps the client determine whether to file
chapter 7 or chapter 13. Although Lesser testified that the client makes the
choice (Tr. at 15), Lesser also later stated that the decision "by the client and the
initial consultant" (Tr. at 16) is immediately reviewed by an attorney. Regardless
of that review, the assistant's participation in this important decision constitutes
the prohibited practice of law.
iv. Fourth, Providing clients with definitions of legal terms of art. The primary
concern with this practice is that the legal assistant uses his or her own
judgment to decide which questions to refer to an attorney and which questions
to attempt to answer themselves. There is also a chance that the assistant will
not properly phrase the question to the attorney or will not communicate the
advice properly to the client. Moreover, and most importantly, the client is
entitled to the professional judgment of the attorney.
d. Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct 5.5 states in part: A lawyer shall not: (b) assist a
person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that constitutes
the unauthorized practice of law.
e. Courts have enjoined the unauthorized practice of law, disgorged fees, denied fees,
fined the service provider, and ordered the service provider to pay the bankruptcy
trustee's reasonable attorney fees. See Bright, 171 B.R. at 807 (citations omitted). The
 Court finds under the circumstances of these bankruptcy cases that it is appropriate to
deny all fees for the work of legal assistants. The Court cannot award fees for
unauthorized and unlawful services.
f. In summary, the Court denies all fees requested for the services of legal assistants and
clerical personnel. The Court further reduces the remaining fees for the services of the
attorneys by twenty percent.

DISCUSS:
The castle law office was considered a high-volume filer for they would file 77 cases per month.
However, the standard practice in Castle was that their clients would only meet will legal assistants
instead of a lawyer. The legal assistants would also conduct the initial consultation, and if in any case
that the clients had questions, the legal assistant would relay the question to the lawyer and would relay
the answers back t the client. Also, the legal assistants in Castle would be the one to prepare the papers
to be filed based on the client’s answer on the questionnaire given by the legal assistant. Also, aside
from the alleged unauthorized practice of law, the amount of application was also questioned because it
was greater than what was agreed upon
The issue is whether Castle Law Office’s legal assistant engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
The court first pointed out that it was unlawful for any person to practice law, engage in the law
business, or in any manner to represent himself as an attorney and counselor, attorney at law, or lawyer,
unless the person so doing is regularly licensed and authorized to practice law in this state. Technically,
the acts of providing or selling standard forms and general instructions for completing the forms, or to
provide typing services is not considered as unauthorized practice of law. However, the court stated,
"[t]o the extent that defendant provides personal advice peculiar to [the client's particular legal
situation], that person is engaging in the `unauthorized practice of law.” The court pointed out the
following acts committed bu the legal assistant as unauthorized practice of law. First was when the legal
assistant explained the difference between chapter 7 and 13 OF THE Bankruptcy Code to prospective
clients which constitute that they were defining concepts and legal terms. Second, would be the
rendering of advice to the clients. Since, the legal assistants were the only ones who meets with the
clients during the initial consultation, the court points out that the legal assistant makes the
determination that bankruptcy is not the best choice for this particular individual and advises the client
of other options. Third, appears that the assistant helps the client determine whether to file chapter 7 or
chapter 13. Although it has been said that the clients make the choice, Lesser also later stated that the
decision "by the client and the initial consultant" (Tr. at 16) is immediately reviewed by an attorney.
Regardless of that review, the assistant's participation in this important decision constitutes the
prohibited practice of law. iv. Fourth, Providing clients with definitions of legal terms of art. The
primary concern with this practice is that the legal assistant uses his or her own judgment, basically his
or her own discretion to decide which questions to refer to an attorney and which questions to attempt
to answer themselves. There is also a chance that the assistant will not properly phrase the question to
the attorney or will not relay the advice properly to the client. Moreover, and most importantly, the
client is entitled to the professional judgment of the attorney. Also, the court reiterated that A lawyer
shall not: (b) assist a person who is not a member of the bar in the performance of activity that
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. e. Courts have enjoined the unauthorized practice of law,
disgorged fees, denied fees, fined the service provider, and ordered the service provider to pay the
bankruptcy trustee's reasonable attorney fees. And because the Court cannot award fees for
unauthorized and unlawful services, the Court also denies all fees requested for the services of legal
assistants and clerical personnel, and reduces the remaining fees for the services of the attorneys by
twenty percent.
 Maloney v. Schwab, 249 B.R. 71
(M.D. Pa. 2000)

I. FACTS
a. On March 5, 1996, John C. and Christine Maloney ("Debtors") filed a voluntary petition
under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. A paralegal employed by the law firm retained
by Sears attended the creditors' meeting on Sears' behalf and requested permission to
question the Debtors. The Trustee refused, stating that it was his belief that if he
allowed an individual who was not an attorney or an employee of a creditor to question
the Debtors, he would be aiding in the unauthorized practice of law.
b. As per the U.S., with authority under 11 U.S.C. § 341 and 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3), the
trustee is directed to reconvene the meeting for the purpose of permitting Sears' agent
to examine the Debtors. The Trustee withdrew his objection to Sears' motion on and
notified the parties that he would reconvene the creditors' meeting. However, the
Bankruptcy Court denied Sear’s request because "the examination of a debtor at a first
meeting of creditors constitutes the practice of law as that term is interpreted in
Pennsylvania" and that "the Bankruptcy Code does not permit a party, unidentified to
conduct an examination of the debtors at their meeting, except as permitted by Rule
9010(a)(2)."
II. ISSUE
a. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in holding that the examination
of a debtor at a meeting of creditors under Section 341(a) of the Bankruptcy Code
constitutes the practice of law in Pennsylvania.
b. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in holding that only persons
listed in Section 343 of the Bankruptcy Code and their attorneys may examine a debtor
at a meeting of creditors under Section 341(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
c. Whether a non-lawyer representative of a creditor may question a debtor during the
meeting of creditors pursuant to Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code.
III. RULING
a. This Court is persuaded by the approach of the courts that have considered the issue a
matter of state law. Rule 9010(a) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, set forth
above, authorizes creditors and other specified parties to appear on behalf of
themselves, employ an attorney to represent their interests, or use agents as their
representatives in any manner that does not constitute the unauthorized practice of
law. The qualification on the use of agents and representatives to "perform any act not
constituting the practice of law" evidences an intent to permit state law to determine
the definition of the practice of law. Accordingly, the relevant question before the Court
is whether, under Pennsylvania law, the examination of a debtor at a Section 341(a)
meeting constitutes the practice of law.
b. Tennessee Code Annotated describes the practice of law as:
i. the appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity or the drawing of
papers, pleadings or documents or the performance of any act in such capacity
in connection with proceedings pending or prospective before any court,
commissioner, referee or anybody, board, committee or commission
constituted by law or having authority to settle controversies.
 c. The Clemmons court determined that by applying this definition to the activities
engaged in a by a creditor's representative at a Section 341 meeting, it was clear that
participation in a creditors' meeting did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law
because it did not involve an appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity.
d. The Kincaid court concluded that a creditors' meeting is not a judicial proceeding and
does not determine the rights and obligations of parties participating in the process.
e. The court also noted that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure require debtors to be examined by an attorney representing any
creditor. See id. Finally, the court decided that Section 341(a) meetings do not involve
the concept of advocacy as contemplated in the use of the word "advocate" in the
statute prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law.
f. The statute prohibits two actions by a non-lawyer--holding himself out as an attorney to
the public, and practicing law. There is no allegation in this case that Sears'
representative held himself out to the public as being entitled to practice law.
Therefore, to run afoul of the statute, the activities conducted by Sears' representative
would have to constitute the practice of law.
g. Accordingly, for all the reasons discussed above, the Court finds that the
Bankruptcy Court erred in its legal conclusion that the examination of a debtor at a
Section 341(a) meeting of creditors by a non-attorney representative of a creditor
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Pennsylvania. This Court holds that,
under the facts of record in this case, the proposed examination described by the Sears'
non-attorney representative does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law in
Pennsylvania. Accordingly, the Court need not address the additional issue raised by the
U.S. Trustee on appeal. The Order of the Bankruptcy Court will be reversed in
accordance with the foregoing discussion.

DISCUSS:
Maloney filed a voluntary petition under chapter 7 of the bankruptcy code. During the supposed
creditor’s meeting, a paralegal under the law firm retained by Sears attended on Sear’s behalf and
requested permission to question the debtors. However, the trustee, William Schwab, refused because
it was his belief that allowing an individual who was not a lawyer to question the debtors would be
aiding in unauthorized practice of law. Sears therefore, filed a motion to reconvene the creditor’s
meeting. The U.S. trustee directed the Trustee to reconvene the meeting for the purpose of permitting
Sears' agent to examine the Debtors which the trustee did. However, the Bankruptcy Court has given an
Opinion and Order denying Sears' request and holding that "the examination of a debtor at a first
meeting of creditors constitutes the practice of law as that term is interpreted in Pennsylvania" and that
"the Bankruptcy Code does not permit a party, unidentified in, to conduct an examination of the debtors
at their meeting, except as permitted by Rule 9010(a) (2)."
Therefore, appellants appeal the following issues: U.S. Trustee frames the issues on appeal as follows: 1.
Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in holding that the examination of a debtor at a
meeting of creditors under Section 341(a) of the Bankruptcy Code constitutes the practice of law in
Pennsylvania. 2. Whether the Bankruptcy Court erred as a matter of law in holding that only persons
listed in Section 343 of the Bankruptcy Code and their attorneys may examine a debtor at a meeting of
creditors under Section 341(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. While Sears frames the issue on appeal as
follows: 1. Whether a non-lawyer representative of a creditor may question a debtor during the meeting
of creditors pursuant to Section 341 of the Bankruptcy Code.
First the court cited section 341(a) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code provides that ". . . the United States
Trustee shall convene and preside at a meeting of creditors." The Code also provides that "[t]he court
may not preside at, and may not attend, any meeting under this section including any final meeting of
creditors." Also, in Section 343 of the Code, it provides that the debtor is required to appear for
examination under oath at the meeting of creditors. It further provides that "[c]reditors, any indenture
trustee, any trustee or examiner in the case, or the United States trustee may examine the debtor."
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2003 specifies that the United States Trustee presides at the
creditors' meeting and that the business of the meeting includes the examination of the debtor under
oath and may include the election of a trustee or a creditor committee in Chapter 7 cases. Trustees, who
generally conduct the primary examination at the creditors' meetings and who are responsible for
investigating the debtor's financial affairs, are not required to be attorneys. Rule 9010(a) provides that:
A debtor, creditor, equity security holder, indenture trustee, committee or other party may (1) appear in
a case under the Code and act either in the entity's own behalf or by an attorney authorized to practice
in the court, and (2) perform any act not constituting the practice of law, by an authorized agent,
attorney in fact, or proxy. Except for the Bankruptcy Court's decision in this case, none hold that the
examination of a debtor by a non-attorney at a Section 341(a) meeting constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law. Also, the court considered the issue as a matter of state law. So, in the case of
Clemmons in Tennessee, the bankruptcy court emphasized the informality of the creditors' meeting in
its determination that creditors should be permitted to use non-attorney agents to examine debtors at
creditors' meetings under Tennessee law. It is not an adversary process, but simply a fact-finding
process." it was clear that participation in a creditors' meeting did not constitute the unauthorized
practice of law because it did not involve an appearance as an advocate in a representative capacity.” In
the case of Kincaid, it stated that the bankruptcy court similarly found that the examination of debtors
at creditors' meetings did not constitute the unauthorized practice of law. The court concluded that a
creditors' meeting is not a judicial proceeding and does not determine the rights and obligations of
parties participating in the process. The court also noted that neither the Bankruptcy Code nor the
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure require debtors to be examined by an attorney representing any
creditor. In re Messier, the bankruptcy court determined that the negotiation of reaffirmation
agreements did not constitute the practice of law under Rhode Island law. The bankruptcy court also
stated that "an agent or employee of a corporate creditor appears at a meeting, without counsel, to
inquire of a debtor within the examination scope permitted under section 343 and the Federal rule of
Bankruptcy, this does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law within the meaning of Rhode
Island General Laws. The statute prohibits two actions by a non-lawyer holding himself out as an
attorney to the public, and practicing law. There is no allegation in this case that Sears' representative
held himself out to the public as being entitled to practice law. Therefore, to run afoul of the statute, the
activities conducted by Sears' representative would have to constitute the practice of law.
In Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that an attorney applies legal knowledge in three ways: i. He
instructs and advises clients in regard to the law, so that they may properly pursue their affairs and be
informed as to their rights and obligations. ii. He prepares for client’s documents requiring familiarity
with legal principles beyond the ken of the ordinary layman for example, wills, and such contracts as are
not of a routine nature. iii. He appears for clients before public tribunals to whom is committed the
function of determining the rights of life, liberty, and property according to the law of the land, in order
that he may assist the deciding official in the proper interpretation and enforcement of the law. The first
two categories described by the court do not apply to the facts of this case. The Sears' representative
whose conduct is at issue in this case does not instruct a client on the law. Further, the record does not
disclose that he prepares any document, even routine ones. So the last factor to determine if it was an
unauthorized practice of law was whether Sears' representative's examination of a debtor constitutes an
appearance before a public tribunal. And under Pennsylvania law, creditors' meeting not a tribunal and
the Court finds that the intended activities of the Sears' representative at the meeting as described in
the record did not require an abstract understanding of legal principles or a refined skill for their
concrete application. The record in this case indicates that the Sears' representative customarily reviews
the debtors' customer file, attends the meeting to ask questions about the merchandise purchased from
Sears, describes to the debtors what incentives Sears will offer if debtors reaffirm the debt, and asks
questions concerning the debtors' employment. The Court finds that the Bankruptcy Court erred in its
legal conclusion that the examination of a debtor at a Section 341(a) meeting of creditors by a non-
attorney representative of a creditor constitutes the unauthorized practice of law in Pennsylvania. This
Court holds that, under the facts of record in this case, the proposed examination described by the
Sears' non-attorney representative does not constitute the unauthorized practice of law in Pennsylvania.
Accordingly, the Court need not address the additional issue raised by the U.S. Trustee on appeal. The
Order of the Bankruptcy Court will be reversed in accordance with the foregoing discussion.

Doe v. Condon, 2000 WL 718448

(S.C.)

I. FACTS
a. Petitioner (paralegal) submitted a list of tasks that he wishes to perform and sought for
the declaratory judgement of the court to determine whether tasks listed performed by
constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
b. A hearing was held and the referee issued proposed findings and recommendations
stating that a non-lawyer employee conducting unsupervised legal presentations for the
public and answering legal questions for the public or for clients of the
attorney/employer engages in the unauthorized practice of law, the same finding was
adopted by the court
c. Also, a non-lawyer receiving a fee arrangement as compensation for the volume of cases
that a non-lawyer handles goes against the ethical rules against fee-splitting with non-
lawyer employees
II. ISSUES
a. whether it is the unauthorized practice of law for a paralegal employed by an attorney
to conduct informational seminars for the general public on wills and trusts without the
attorney being present;
b. whether it is the unauthorized practice of law for a paralegal employed by an attorney
to meet with clients privately at the attorney's office, answer general questions about
wills and trusts, and gather basic information from clients; and
c. whether a paralegal can receive compensation from the paralegal's law firm/employer
through a profit-sharing arrangement based upon the volume and type of cases the
paralegal handles.
III. RULING
a. The court determined that the first two scenarios constituted the practice of law in
South Carolina and that nonlawyers could not perform these tasks unless a supervising
attorney was present.' Further, the court held that the third scenario constituted
prohibited fee-splitting between a lawyer and a nonlawyer.
 b. I find that a paralegal conducting unsupervised legal presentations for the public and
answering legal questions from the audience engages in the unauthorized practice of
law.   Further, I find that a paralegal meeting individually with clients to answer estate
planning questions engages in the unauthorized practice of law.   Finally, I find the
proposed fee arrangement is improper and violates the ethical prohibition against fee
splitting.
c. I find that Petitioner's proposed actions constitute the unauthorized practice of law and
that the proposed fee agreement violates the ethical prohibition against fee splitting.
The activities of a paralegal do not constitute the practice of law as long as they are
limited to work of a preparatory nature, such as legal research, investigation, or the
composition of legal documents, which enable the licensed attorney-employer to carry a
given matter to a conclusion through his own examination, approval or additional effort.
d. I find, as other courts have, that the very structure of such “educational” legal seminars
suggests that the presenter will actually be giving legal advice on legal matters.
e. Petitioner intends to gather client information and answer general estate planning
questions during his proposed “initial client interviews.”   While Petitioner may properly
compile client information, Petitioner may not answer estate planning questions.
petitioner's answering legal questions would constitute the unauthorized practice of law
for the reasons stated above.  
f. Petitioner's law firm intends to compensate him based upon the volume and types of
cases he “handles.”   A paralegal, of course, may not “handle” any case.2  This fee
arrangement directly violates Rule 5.4 of the Rules of Professional conduct.
g. While case law provides general guidelines as to what constitutes the practice of law,
courts are hesitant to define its exact boundaries.   Thus, the analysis in ‘practice of law’
cases is necessarily fact-driven.   The Supreme Court has specifically avoided addressing
hypothetical situations, preferring instead to determine what constitutes the
unauthorized practice of law on a case-by-case basis.

DISCUSS:
Petitioner (paralegal) submitted a list of tasks that he wishes to perform and sought for the court’s
judgement to determine whether tasks listed performed by constitute the unauthorized practice of law.
(1) whether it is the unauthorized practice of law for a paralegal employed by an attorney to conduct
informational seminars for the general public on wills and trusts without the attorney being present;  (2)
whether it is the unauthorized practice of law for a paralegal employed by an attorney to meet with
clients privately at the attorney's office, answer general questions about wills and trusts, and gather
basic information from clients;  and (3) whether a paralegal can receive compensation from the
paralegal's law firm/employer through a profit-sharing arrangement based upon the volume and type of
cases the paralegal handles.  
The court finds that a paralegal conducting unsupervised legal presentations for the public and
answering legal questions from the audience engages in the unauthorized practice of law, because the
structure of an “educational” legal seminars suggests that the presenter will actually be giving legal
advice on legal matters.
Also, a paralegal meeting individually with clients to answer estate planning questions engages in the
unauthorized practice of law. While Petitioner may properly compile client information, the petitioner
cannot answer estate planning questions; because answering legal questions would constitute the
unauthorized practice of law.
Finally, the proposed fee arrangement is improper and violates the ethical prohibition against fee
splitting between a lawyer and a non-lawyer. In terms of compensation, petitioner's law firm intends to
compensate him depending on the volume and types of cases he “handles.”   However, a paralegal,
may not “handle” any case. This fee arrangement directly violates Rule 5.4 of the Rules of Professional
conduct. The activities of a paralegal do not constitute the practice of law as long as their activities are
limited to work of a preparatory nature, such as legal research, investigation, or the composition of legal
documents, which enable the licensed attorney-employer to carry a given matter to a conclusion
through his own examination, approval or additional effort. While case law provides general guidelines
as to what constitutes the practice of law, courts are hesitant to define its exact boundaries.   Thus, the
analysis in ‘practice of law’ cases is necessarily fact-driven.   The Supreme Court has specifically avoided
addressing hypothetical situations, preferring instead to determine what constitutes the unauthorized
practice of law on a case-by-case basis.

In re J. Gregory Caver, 97-0823

(La. 5/1/97, 693 So. 2d 150)

I. FACTS
a. This attorney disciplinary proceeding which came from two sets of formal charges
involving sixteen counts of misconduct instituted by the Office of Disciplinary Counsel
(“ODC”) against respondent, J. Gregory Caver, a currently disbarred attorney
i. Under formal charge no. 97-DB-066:
b. First Count: In 1994, James Waltz has retained the respondent J. Gregory Caver as his
representative in a criminal matter. As per the respondent’s instructions that James
Waltz would receive a two-year sentence, he pled guilty of manslaughter; however, he
received a forty-year sentence. Respondent also promised to file an appeal and was paid
500 dollars in return but Caver failed to file the said appeal, communicate with his
client, and account for and return the unearned portion of the legal fee
c. Second Count: The same year in May, William Moses retained the respondent as his
representative regarding traffic tickets received from an automobile accident. Although
respondent pled no contest to the violations, he did not inform his client that the plea
would be entered and that a $109 fine would be owed. At the same time, Caver was
also retained to file a personal injury suit on behalf of Mr. Moses and was paid 200
dollars for the fees and potential court costs but respondent failed to file the suit,
communicate with his client, and account for and return the unearned portion of the
legal fee and unused court costs.
d. Third Count: Sherry Dove retained the respondent for divorce proceedings in February
1996. An amount of 1,500 dollars was paid to the respondent in advance for fees and
costs. The respondent may have filed the suit but he did not complete the matter and
instead, gave his client a divorce petition with the wrong date and number, making it
seem that they were legitimately filed divorce documents. Furthermore, the respondent
was placed on suspension and failed to inform the client regarding it and that he could
not complete the matter as required under Rule XIX. Finally, respondent failed to
account for and return the unearned portion of the legal fee.
e. Fourth Count: Alan Rankin retained the respondent as his representative regarding a
criminal appeal and paid 1,000 dollars for fees in March 1995. But the respondent did
not file the appeal nor appeared as the client’s representative. He failed to
communicate with his client and failed to account for and return the unearned portion
of the legal fee.
f. Fifth Count: Julia Lightfoot has retained the respondent for a personal injury matter.
While Caver was under interim suspension, he managed to settle the case with the
insurance carrier; but instead of depositing the 20,000 dollars settlement to his client’s
trust account, he drove to Jackson, Mississippi and deposited the money to his mother’s
account as per receipt of funds. He only remitted only $8,000 to his client and
improperly converted $5,666 of the funds due his client. Julia Lightfoot never received
the remaining funds
g. Sixth Count: Marilyn-Leslie Deleon retained the respondent in 1989 to file and complete
a bankruptcy matter as her representative. Respondent failed to take any action,
resulting his client to hire another attorney in August of 1994 to file and complete the
matter.   Respondent failed to communicate with his client and failed to account for
and return the unearned portion of the fee.
h. Seventh Count: Rodwick Blow retained the respondent for 2,500 dollars in March 1996
to represent him for a criminal matter. However, the respondent never appeared in Mr.
Blow’s behalf nor performed any services on him. Along with this, Respondent failed to
advise his client he had been placed on interim suspension and that he was unable to
complete the matter. Finally, respondent failed to account for and return the unearned
portion of the legal fee
i. Eight Count: December, 1995, Cory Lamont Williams retained respondent to represent
him in a criminal matter for $1,500. Respondent never appeared on his client's behalf or
performed any services for him. Respondent also failed to communicate with his client
and account for and return the unearned portion of the legal fee
j. Ninth Count: In 1995, Robert W. Burroughs retained respondent for $750 in connection
with DWI and speeding violations. Respondent performed little or no services resulting
in his client having to retain other counsel to complete the matters.   Respondent failed
to communicate with his client and account for and return the unearned portion of the
legal fee
k. Tenth Count: Magdalen Pierce retained respondent to defend her in a contract dispute
on March 16, 1995. Respondent failed to perform any services in the matter and a
default judgment was taken against his client. Respondent failed to communicate with
his client and failed to return the unearned legal fee.
l. Eleventh Count: In November, 1990, Ellis Chatman retained respondent to defend him
in a civil matter. Respondent was unsuccessful and opposing counsel obtained a
judgment of $4,500 against Mr. Chatman. Respondent was responsible for forwarding
payments from his client to opposing counsel, yet failed to properly protect the funds
entrusted to him. When he received a $1,700 check from his client payable to opposing
counsel, respondent converted the client funds by forging opposing counsel's signature
m. Twelfth Count: In August, 1995, Elijah Thomas hired respondent for $800 to handle a
child custody matter. Respondent failed to take any action in the matter and, instead,
misrepresented to his client the status of the case. Respondent also failed to account for
and return the unearned portion of the legal fee.
n. Thirteenth Count:  In March, 1996, Lonnie Ray Brisker retained respondent for $700 to
represent him in a criminal matter.   Respondent did little or no work in the matter, as
 well as failed to advise his client of his interim suspension under Rule XIX. Respondent
also failed to account for and return the unearned fee.
o. Fourteenth Count: Respondent failed to respond to the ODC's requests for information
regarding the disciplinary complaints filed against him subject of counts I through XIII,
above.
i. Under formal charge no. 98-DB-008:
p. First Count:  In March, 1995, Darren Sloan retained respondent for approximately
$2,000 to handle a criminal matter. While respondent appeared on his client's behalf on
one occasion, he failed to communicate with his client or represent him in any further
way. Respondent also failed to account for and return any portion of the unearned legal
fee.
q. Second Count: Respondent failed to respond to the ODC's requests for information
regarding the disciplinary complaint filed by Darren Sloan.
r. After the filing of the two formal charges, numerous attempts made to serve
respondent were unsuccessful. Respondent failed to submit formal answers and the
cases were submitted on documentary evidence.
II. Ruling:
a. 97-DB-066: The respondent violated the professional rules as charged. It determined
the baseline sanction was disbarment, relying on the presence of several aggravating
factors, in the absence of any in mitigation, it recommended disbarment and payment
of restitution in the amount of $16,730.00 to his victims.
b. 97-DB-008/98-DB-008: The respondent's conduct was intentional and involved a breach
of duties owed to his clients, the profession and the disciplinary system. It
recommended disbarment and payment of restitution in the amount of $2,000 as an
appropriate sanction.
c. While noting the respondent is currently disbarred from practice, it recommended that
respondent be disbarred from practice for the instant misconduct and that his five-year
readmission period be extended to run from the date of finality of the court's judgment
in this matter. It further recommended that respondent be ordered to make full
restitution and assessed with all costs of these proceedings. Neither respondent nor the
ODC filed an objection in this court to the recommendation of the disciplinary board.
d. The record supports the findings of fact made by the hearing committee and disciplinary
board that respondent committed the professional misconduct as charged. Respondent
knowingly and intentionally neglected legal matters, converted funds from his
numerous clients, and later failed to provide restitution. This conduct, combined with
his lengthy prior disciplinary record, demonstrates respondent lacks the moral fitness to
practice law and is a threat to his clients, the profession and the public. Clearly, this
misconduct would justify disbarment.   Since respondent is already disbarred, we will
extend the minimum period for readmission pursuant to Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 
24(A) for an additional five years from the finality of the instant judgment
e. Based on our review of the recommendations of the hearing committee and disciplinary
board, and the record herein, it is the decision of this court that respondent, J. Gregory
Caver, be prohibited from petitioning this court for readmission pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule XIX, § 24(A) until five years have passed from the finality of this judgment.  
It is further ordered that respondent make full restitution to his clients with legal
 interest.   All costs and expenses of these proceedings are assessed to respondent in
accordance with Supreme Court Rule XIX, § 10.1.

DISCUSS:
This is easy to discuss. No need for summary

Committee for Public Counsel

Services v. Lookner, 47
Mass.App.Ct. 833, 716 N.E. 2d
690 (1999)

I. FACTS
a. Norman S. Lookner is a licensed attorney practicing in the Commonwealth. As part of his
practice, he was certified to, and did, accept paid assignments from the Committee for
Public Counsel Services to represent indigent clients in cases involving custody of
children, delinquency charges, and termination of parental rights. In early 1995, he
was the subject of an audit by the committee which investigated his billing practices.
b. A committee auditor found that Lookner had overbilled the committee $18,445 in fiscal
year 1994 by billing at least. In addition, Lookner's time sheets did not record the actual
amount of time spent on billable tasks or explain the nature of the work performed.
Lookner had billed the committee 2,327 hours over 364 days of the fiscal year and was
paid $79,022.63 for fiscal year 1994 services. The auditor recommended to the
committee's executive committee that Lookner repay $18,445 in overbillings within
twenty-four months.
c. Lookner appealed the auditor's recommendation and requested a hearing, a hearing
officer conducted a hearing at which Lookner was represented by an attorney pursuant
to the procedures set forth in Section E of the committee's Manual for Counsel Assigned
Through the Committee for Public Counsel Services — Policies and Procedures . The
manual, which is binding upon all "[a]ttorneys who accept assignments of cases through
the Committee," expressly provides that "[t]he action of the Executive Committee
Hearing Officer shall be final." On February 28, 1996, the hearing officer issued his
findings and final decision, concurring with the auditor's findings but reducing the
overbilled amount to $11,130, payable within twelve months on terms to be mutually
agreed upon by Lookner's attorney and the committee's audit staff.
d. The hearing officer's decision was adopted by the executive committee as its final
decision, which, by letter dated March 4, 1996, from the committee's audit staff, was
communicated to Lookner, who concededly received the letter "on or about March 4,
1996. On April 4, 1996, Lookner requested "a complete copy of the [hearing officer's]
findings and recommendations." On that same day, he purported to file a "Notice of
Appeal" with the committee, stating his intent to appeal the "Executive Committee
Judgment date[d] March 4, 1996." A committee staff auditor sent Lookner (by certified
mail, return receipt requested) a copy of the hearing officer's decision, which he
received "on or about April 16, 1996." Lookner later (on May 6, 1996) filed a second
"Notice of Appeal" stating his intent to appeal "the Executive Committee Decision and
the Findings of [the hearing officer] as reported to [Lookner] on April 16, 1996." On May
 8, 1996, Lookner filed the underlying certiorari action pursuant to G.L.c. 249, § 4. On
August 5, 1996, he filed an amended complaint seeking injunctive relief and a
declaratory judgment, pursuant to G.L.c. 231A, § 1, that the committee's "practices and
procedures . . . in determining whether billing irregularities have occurred and ordering
repayment by attorneys violate Plaintiff's rights."
II. ISSUE
a. whether the relevant time period for asserting or preserving legal rights commences
upon the sending or the receipt of notice of adverse official action.
III. RULING
a. After a hearing on the committee's motion to dismiss the complaint on August 16, 1996,
a judge of the Superior Court ruled that the time for seeking relief had expired but that
Lookner's count for declaratory relief had been timely asserted. After a further hearing,
on December 19, 1996, a second Superior Court judge allowed the committee's motion
to dismiss, not only on the ground that it was untimely, but also because Lookner's claim
for declaratory relief could not be maintained against the judiciary department of which
the committee is a part. We conclude that the dismissal of Lookner's certiorari count
was correct on this record.
b. Neither party argues the proceeding at issue was anything other than the hearing
before the Hearing Officer which concluded when the Hearing OfficeR issued his
decision on March 4, 1996." Sixty days after February 28, 1996, was April 29, 1996. Sixty
days after March 4, 1996, was May 3, 1996, a Friday. Lookner did not file his complaint
until May 8, 1996, a Wednesday. In his appeal, Lookner does not challenge the Superior
Court's decision to dismiss his claim for declaratory relief. His amended complaint
conceded that the committee was an agency within the judiciary department. See G.L.c.
211D, § 1.
c. Actions in the nature of certiorari must be commenced within sixty days after the
conclusion of the proceeding being challenged. Failure to file a certiorari action within
the statutory time period "is such a `serious misstep' that such an action must be
dismissed when not timely filed." (certiorari complaint filed beyond sixty-day period
should have been dismissed) statutory sixty days began on the date the acting
commissioner of correction approved plaintiff's placement in a segregated unit). "[a]
civil action in the nature of certiorari . . . shall be commenced within sixty days next after
the proceeding complained of." G.L.c. 249, § 4
d. the committee's manual, which all attorneys accepting assignments through the
committee agree to follow, explicitly stated that "[t]he action of the Executive
Committee Hearing Officer [with respect to attorney challenges to claimed billing
irregularities] shall be final." The last administrative action by the committee regarding
its audit of Lookner's billing practices occurred on February 28, 1996, when the
executive committee hearing officer upheld the auditor's findings but reduced the
overbilled amount to $11,130. Lookner, however, waited until May 8, 1996, more than a
week after the sixty-day statutory period had expired, to file this untimely action.
e. Even if the committee's March 4, 1996, letter, informing Lookner of the executive
committee hearing officer's final decision, is deemed "the last administrative action" for
purposes of the certiorari statute, it does not advance Lookner's cause. The letter, sent
by certified mail, return receipt requested, to Lookner's counsel, was received on or
about March 4, 1996. Thus, on this record Lookner had notice that the hearing officer's
final decision had ordered him to repay $11,130 for his excessive billing practices over
sixty days before he commenced his action (see note 1, supra). In fact, Lookner's first
 "Notice of Appeal," dated April 4, 1996, evinces that he was well aware of both the fact
and the date of the committee's final decision. Lookner argues that the statutory period
should run from April 16, 1996, the day he received a copy of the hearing officer's full
decision containing his findings. For this proposition, Lookner relies upon distinguishable
cases involving statutes in which the Legislature expressly uses the term "notice" in the
statute to specify whether the relevant time period for asserting or preserving legal
rights commences upon the sending or the receipt of notice of adverse official action.
Neither the word "notice" nor the word "receipt," however, appears in G.L.c. 249, § 4.
Had the Legislature intended to begin the relevant period from the actual receipt of a
decision, it could easily have said so, as it has done elsewhere. (aggrieved party may
appeal "within thirty days after receipt of such order or decision" of the Civil Service
Commission). (action shall be commenced "within thirty days after receipt of notice of
the final decision of the agency"). "Where the statutory language is clear, it must be
given its plain and ordinary meaning." (statute requiring mail notice within seven days
requires mailing, not receipt, within seven days); (under the zoning statute, the
statutory period runs from the date the decision is filed with the city, and not the date
notice of the decision is received).
f. the Legislature did not require "notice" or "receipt" of anything, much less findings, to
start the running of the certiorari period, but rather specified as the triggering
mechanism for the action the operative conclusion of the proceedings complained of.
That critical event occurred on February 28, 1996, the date the hearing officer issued the
final decision of the committee; or, at the latest, March 4, 1996, when Lookner received
notice of that final decision. His serious misstep in failing to file his action within sixty
days thereafter despite that seasonable notice required its dismissal. we note that
Lookner's fundamental grievance is over money, i.e., being required to repay the
committee overbilled amounts it claimed to have paid him. Accordingly, his contention
in the certiorari count of his complaint that he would "suffer irreparable harm" from the
committee's decision is of dubious merit in justifying his entitlement to extraordinary
relief such as that represented by certiorari.
g. (disputes over money damages do not ordinarily give rise to harm qualifying as
irreparable injury for purposes of the extraordinary relief of an injunction). In that
connection, we doubt whether it has been made to appear on this record that such a
dispute over money — particularly in light of the fair procedures and adequate notice
afforded Lookner here — constitutes the sort of "substantial injury," "manifest
injustice," or "adverse effect on]the real interests of the general public," which warrants
the court's discretionary exercise of the certiorari remedy

DISCUSS: