Principles and Practice of

CRIMINALISTICS
The Profession of
Forensic Science
 A Volume in the
Protocols in Forensic Science Series

Principles and Practice of

CRIMINALISTICS
The Profession of
Forensic Science

Keith Inman, M.Crim.

Senior Criminalist, California Department of Justice

Norah Rudin, Ph.D.

Forensic Science Consultant

CRC Press
Boca Raton London New York Washington, D.C.
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Inman, Keith.
Principles and practices of criminalistics : the profession of forensic science / Keith
Inman, Norah Rudin.
p. cm. -- (Protocols in forensic science)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-8493-8127-4 (alk. paper)
1. Forensic sciences. I. Rudin, Norah. II. Title. III. Series.

HV8073.I443 2000
363.25--dc21 00-034316

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Printed on acid-free paper
 8127/frame/fm Page v Monday, July 24, 2000 11:17 AM

v
Thinking is Allowed. This is one of the major themes of the book. Critical thinking is the first skill to be
invoked at the beginning of a case, and continues through every phase of an analysis and interpretation. Too
often, our thinking is constricted by what we believe is true, by what we expect to be true, or by commands
from the god of productivity. The competent analyst will not sacrifice thoughtfulness at any stage of his work.
8127/frame/fm Page vii Monday, July 24, 2000 11:17 AM

Series Introduction

Principles and Practice of Criminalistics: The Profession of Forensic Science, is

the flagship book of the Protocols in Forensic Science series. It provides the
intellectual basis for the work of the forensic scientist. In Principles, we review
the evolution of criminalistics, discuss the foundational concepts, and explore
general professional issues unique to forensic science. In each subsequent
volume of the Protocols series, an expert in a specific forensic discipline will
provide an enumeration and comprehensive discussion of hands-on protocols
in that particular area or will address a specific professional issue. The Protocols
series is written by the working professional for the working professional.

vii
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Preface

Thinking is allowed
Unknown

Why do we need another book about criminalistics? Many books have been
written on this subject over the last century, and several are currently in print
(Kirk, 1953, 1974; Saferstein, 1981, 1988, 1993, 1998; DeForest, 1983; Fisher,
2000). The majority of writings addressing subjects relating to science and
crime have been aimed at the police investigator or the lay public. This is
perhaps not surprising. The investigator or detective plays the unquestionably
critical role of identifying and collecting evidence from the crime scene. These
actions profoundly influence any subsequent analysis and interpretation, so
it is imperative that those duties are performed with knowledge and expertise.
Although investigators are usually not trained scientists, they must under-
stand enough about the analytical procedures to avoid confounding them by
their actions at the scene. Thus many books have been written with this goal
in mind.
The lay public, including crime and mystery writers, has always had a
morbid obsession with criminals, crime, and its detection. Many of the
fascinating tales recounting both the commission of crimes and their solution
have been recorded in various volumes directed toward the interested lay-
person. As technology has advanced and more-sophisticated methods have
been applied to the analysis of physical evidence, the interested public wants
to know not only about the criminal and the crime, but also about the various
analytical techniques and what they can contribute to the solution of the
crime (Ragle, 1995; Houde, 1999).
This book is not aimed at the investigator, attorney, crime or mystery
writer, career switcher, or beginning student. Although all of these groups
may find the information presented here both useful and interesting, they
may have to employ other resources to fill in gaps in scientific or forensic
knowledge. Rather, this volume is by and for forensic scientists; it is directed
toward the practicing or soon to be practicing criminalist. It is not introduc-
tory in nature and assumes a strong background and familiarity with the
physical and forensic sciences.

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x Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

Strangely, few volumes have been written for the forensic science profes-
sional, and the majority of those tend to be simply compilations of laboratory
methods and techniques (Kirk, 1953, 1974; Saferstein, 1981, 1988, 1993;
DeForest et al., 1983). While detailed and standardized procedures are obvi-
ously indispensable to quality laboratory work, without the proper cognitive
framework the laboratory results may be worse than useless. Therefore, we
do not present here yet another overview of forensic science or introduction
to laboratory techniques. Rather, we concentrate on topics that are discussed
in lunchrooms, around watercoolers, and on electronic mail lists by practic-
ing forensic scientists.
We outline here a logical framework for a forensic investigation, an
approach rather than a compendium of methods, a way of thinking rather
than a set of instructions. We most definitely emphasize the role of physical
evidence in providing information about criminal actions. However, as we
will stress throughout the book, physical evidence does not exist in a vacuum
and, to maximize its value, it must be considered in the total context of the
circumstances of the case. The technician who only pushes buttons and
twiddles dials, even on the most-sophisticated instrument, remains just
that — a technician. The criminalist must synthesize and interpret laboratory
results in the greater context of the crime, or risk misinterpreting them.
Thinking is allowed — consider this a framework on which to hang your
thoughts.

THINKING IS ALLOWED

We unabashedly build on the ideas of previous icons such as Edmund

Locard and Paul Kirk, both pioneers in thinking about the particular conun-
drums created by the application of scientific techniques to forensic situa-
tions. We also incorporate the ideas from leading thinkers on today’s forensic
landscape — Dave Stoney, Ian Evett, John Buckleton, and John Thornton,
to name a few. We reexamine the ideas of these men and others in light of
both technical and intellectual advances. Although others working in the field
of criminalistics are unquestionably more qualified to organize, summarize,
and comment on the current state of forensic thinking, no one has done so.
Therefore, we have decided to fill the vacuum.
The reputation of forensic science has been significantly tarnished in
recent years. A number of unethical, unprofessional, and immoral acts have
clearly been perpetrated and we condemn them. However, because of the
public impact of forensic investigations and analyses, they often become
fodder for journalists, the most well intentioned of whom has little or no
scientific expertise and likely no forensic background. We cannot allow the
media or political bodies to police our profession, especially in the forum of
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xi Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

public opinion. We must enforce standards from within the profession; if we

are unwilling to monitor analyst integrity on our own, it will be done for
(and to) us. Therefore, some of the subjects that will be addressed at various
points in these writings are standards for professional work, and professional,
ethical, and moral obligations of both the primary analyst and outside
reviewers.
Some of the ideas we present here challenge conventional wisdom and
will certainly provoke discussion, if not argument, among the forensic com-
munity. In one sense we present what we perceive to be the “state of the
debate.” We look forward to a continuation of this healthy debate and hope
this book may provide a point of discussion of some of the important dilem-
mas facing the practicing criminalist.
To paraphrase a 1970s icon, “You can’t consider yourself a member of
the congregation [read that profession] until you offend everybody” —
Daniel Berrigan, Chaplain at Yale, 1995.

References
DeForest, P., Lee, H., and Gaensslen, R., Forensic Science: An Introduction to Crimi-
nalistics, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1983.
Fisher, B. J., Techniques of Crime Scene Investigation, 6th ed., CRC Press, Boca Raton,
FL, 2000.
Houde, J. Crime Lab: A Guide for Nonscientists, Calico Press, Ventura, CA, 1999.
Kirk, P. L., Crime Investigation, Interscience, John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1953.
Kirk, P. L., Crime Investigation, 2nd ed., Krieger Publishing Co. (by arrangement with
John Wiley & Sons), Malabar, FL, 1974.
Ragle, L., Crime Scene, Avon Books, New York, 1995.
Saferstein, R., Forensic Science Handbook, Vol. 1, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1981.
Saferstein, R., Forensic Science Handbook, Vol. 2, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1988.
Saferstein, R., Forensic Science Handbook, Vol. 3, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ,
1993.
Saferstein, R., Criminalistics: An Introduction to Forensic Science, 6th ed., Prentice-
Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1998.
8127/frame/fm Page xiii Monday, July 24, 2000 11:17 AM

The Authors

Keith Inman holds a B.S. and M. Crim., both from the University of California
at Berkeley. He is a fellow of the American Board of Criminalistics. In his
professional career he has been employed as a criminalist by the Orange County
Sheriff’s Department, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, the Los
Angeles County Chief Medical Examiner-Coroner, and the Oakland Police
Department. He was in private practice for 6 years at Forensic Science Services
of California, Inc., a private crime laboratory that undertook both prosecution
and defense work. Mr. Inman is currently employed as a senior criminalist by
the California Department of Justice DNA Laboratory. He has coauthored An
Introduction to Forensic DNA Analysis, a book that has become the preeminent
reference for both attorneys and crime laboratories. He has taught in the Crim-
inal Justice Administration Department at California State University, Hayward,
and currently teaches a variety of general forensic science and forensic DNA
courses for the University of California at Berkeley Extension and online.
Norah Rudin holds a B.A. from Pomona College and a Ph.D. from Brandeis
University. She is a diplomate of the American Board of Criminalistics. After
completing a postdoctoral fellowship at Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, she
worked for 3 years as a full-time consultant for the California Department
of Justice DNA Laboratory and has also served as consulting technical leader
for the DNA programs at the Idaho Department of Law Enforcement DNA
Laboratory, the San Francisco Crime Laboratory, and the San Diego County
Sheriff ’s Department. Dr. Rudin divides her time among consulting, writing,
and teaching about forensic DNA and forensic science as well as more general
topics in biology. Dr. Rudin has co-authored An Introduction to DNA Forensic
Analysis, a book that has become the preeminent reference for both attorneys
and crime laboratories. She is also the author of the Dictionary of Modern
Biology, Barron’s Educational, 1997. Dr. Rudin teaches a variety of general
forensic and forensic DNA courses for the University of California at Berkeley
Extension and online. She is active as a consultant and expert witness in
forensic DNA for both prosecution and defense.
Please visit the Forensic Education and Consulting Web page at
www.forensicdna.com.

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Acknowledgments

The seed for this book was planted during the first class we taught at the
University of California at Berkeley Extension when a student asked us how
the principle of transfer applied to physical match evidence. Our search for an
answer to her question led us to propose the new principle of divisible matter,
and subsequently to reexamine the prevailing ideas and conventional wisdom
in forensic science. The constant challenges and critical thinking from our
students comprised the major driving force behind the writing of this book.
We are eternally grateful to Harvey Kane who rescued the proposal for
this book from apparent oblivion and insisted that it was a worthwhile
project. He remains our “Godfather.” Becky McEldowney, who inherited the
responsibility of editor for two demanding and high-maintenance authors,
helped bring the book to fruition. Her patience with our missed deadlines
and at times odd requests is appreciated. Likewise, Andrea Demby, our
project editor, maintained both a sense of perspective and a sense of humor
while expertly guiding us through the details of the publishing process. We
also would like to acknowledge the folks, many of whom we have never even
met, who labor behind the scenes in the CRC production department.
A number of individuals provided material or assistance with specific
items. E.J. Wagner and Peter Martin contributed to the Birmingham Six
sidebar; John Houde provided us with one of the original Locard quotes, and
Sharon Kruzic assisted us with the translation; Elliot Beckleman gave us
permission to reproduce the results chart from one of his cases; Jeff Silvia
and Roger Moore provided us with case transcripts; Ron Linhart and Mark
Stolorow reviewed the Fred Zain sidebar; Duayne Dillon provided assistance
in checking various historical details; John Buckleton gave us permission to
use his “absence of evidence” example previously posted to a mailing list.
Carl Selavka, Greg Matheson, Hiram Evans, Jay Henry, Peter Striupaitis,
Frank Hicks, and Joe Polski assisted us in obtaining permission for the logos
used to illustrate Chapter 12.
Finally, we are especially grateful to Peter Barnett, Ann Bradley, and Ray
Davis who provided both encouragement and a number of suggestions which
significantly improved the manuscript. Any remaining errors are our respon-
sibility alone.

xv
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Dedication

To my father, Walter Inman, and my father-in-law, Robert Petersen, who, in

their own ways, taught me that what we see depends on how we look.

KPI

To my co-author and continuing partner in crime, Keith Inman, who insisted

that I was a criminalist long before I became convinced of it. Fortunately, he
always lets me have his opinion when I don’t have one.

NR

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Table of Contents

Section I — Background and History

of Forensic Science 1

1 Introduction 3

2 The Evolution of Forensic Science 21

Section II — The Principles of Forensic Science 73

3 Overview — A Unifying Paradigm of Forensic

Science 75

4 The Origin of Evidence — Divisible Matter

and Transfer 83

5 The Recognition of Physical Evidence 101

6 Classification, Identification, and

Individualization — Inference of Source 113

7 Association and Reconstruction — Inference

of Contact 157

Section III — The Practice of Forensic Science 193

8 Good Field Practice — Processing a Crime

Scene 195

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xx Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

9 Good Laboratory Practice — Establishing

Validity and Reliability 221

10 Good Forensic Practice — Obligations of the

Analyst 245

11 Communicating Results — Where Science

Meets the Law 273

12 Ethics and Accountability — The Profession

of Forensic Science 299

13 The Future of Forensic Science 323

Appendix A — Forensic Science Timeline 329

Appendix B — American Association of Forensic
Science 343
Appendix C — American Board of Criminalistics 345
Appendix D — California Association of
Criminalists 347
Appendix E — Sample Likelihood and RMNE
Calculations 353
Appendix F — Fundamental Principles and
Concepts of Criminalistics 355
Appendix G — Physical Evidence by Origin 359

Index 361
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Section I
Background and History
of Forensic Science
8127/frame/ch01 Page 2 Friday, July 21, 2000 11:32 AM

Figure 1.1 Physical evidence. Any bit of physical matter can become evidence,
including a puff of smoke, a Mack truck, or a dab of peanut butter. Certain items
are frequently encountered in violent crimes; some are represented in this collage.
8127/frame/ch01 Page 3 Friday, July 21, 2000 11:32 AM

Introduction
1
Contents
A. Scope and Definitions .............................................................................. 3
1. What Is Forensic Science; Who Is a Forensic Scientist? ................. 4
2. The Science in Forensic Science ....................................................... 5
a. What Is Science?......................................................................... 5
b. Science Is Dynamic .................................................................... 6
c. Science Is Durable...................................................................... 7
d. Forensic Science Is an Applied Science .................................... 7
3. Science Lessons from History........................................................... 8
4. Forensic Science and Criminalistics............................................... 10
5. Physical Evidence: From Art to Science......................................... 12
B. Forensic Science and the Law ................................................................ 15
1. What Is the Question?..................................................................... 15
a. Translating the Legal Question into the Scientific
Question.................................................................................... 15
b. Physical Evidence and Circumstantial Evidence.................... 17
C. Summary ................................................................................................. 18
References ........................................................................................................ 18

I have no data yet. It is a capital mistake to theorize before one has data.
Insensibly one begins to twist facts to suit theories, instead of theories to suit
facts.
Arthur Conan Doyle
—A Scandal in Bohemia

A. Scope and Definitions

Any profession, discipline, craft, or art may potentially be invited into the
judicial arena. As criminal activity and creativity grows, and our society

3
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4 Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

becomes more litigious, it is not unusual for the court to call upon experts
in the most esoteric of pursuits to provide testimony. While acknowledging
the diversity of expertise that may impinge on legal matters, we will direct
our commentary according to our own area of expertise, the application of
the physical sciences to the solution of crime. Even so, there remains a
discussion of semantics, intent, and, to no small extent, integration of all the
various disciplines that may be called upon in any investigation. Many of the
ideas that we present here most certainly apply to areas beyond strict science,
if for no other reason than the science must integrate with the greater effort
of an investigation. But to begin, we will tackle the classic struggle to define
our territory. Even if you do not agree with the following definitions, at least
you will be able to read the rest of this book without ambiguity.

1. What is Forensic Science; Who Is a Forensic Scientist?

Put three forensic scientists in a room together and ask for an opinion on
any subject — you will receive at least six opinions. If you ask these same
folk — “What is forensic science?” and “Who is a forensic scientist?” — the
number of opinions will increase exponentially. Why should the combination
of two simple words produce such heated debate?
First of all, the noun forensics strictly refers to the art of debate. Although
the common origin of the adjective and the noun are obvious (the Latin root
is forum, and the court is a place of debate), we distinguish between them in
modern usage. We suggest that the common use of forensics to refer to forensic
science unnecessarily obscures an already imprecise term. Our natural ten-
dency to reduce any word to its most simplistic form does not legitimize its use.
The adjective forensic simply designates a connection with, or use in,
public discussion and debate or, more specifically, a court of law (Webster’s,
1996). The use of forensic as an adjective is becoming appropriately common
for practically any activity than might be invited into a courtroom: forensic
art, forensic accounting, forensic knot analysis, and so on. But do these
activities fall into the purview of forensic science? Although forensic anthro-
pology, forensic chemistry, forensic medicine, and forensic psychiatry receive
nominal definitions in the 1996 edition of Webster’s, forensic science is notable
for its absence.
It appears that the science part of forensic science is what instigates so
much consternation. Why should this be? Perhaps a partial answer may be
found in modern society’s perception of science. Science is believed by the
average person to offer hard facts, definite conclusions, and uncompromised
objectivity. Therefore, any discipline called a science gains a certain legitimacy
and credibility in society’s (the judge’s? the jury’s?) view. Conversely, other
8127/frame/ch01 Page 5 Friday, July 21, 2000 11:32 AM

Introduction 5

professions (some of which are, interestingly, called the “soft sciences” by

academicians) perceive themselves to lose credibility and worth if they are
somehow excluded from designation as a science. This unfortunate view only
detracts from the unique and useful contributions that experts in many
diverse fields may offer a case investigation.

2. The Science in Forensic Science

Science is an oft-misused term, frequently employed to lend credibility to an
idea or statement as if the aura of science automatically confers trustworthi-
ness. (It’s scientific, it must be true.) Just as often, it is used to discredit a
concept, as if ideas outside the realm of science have no merit. (It’s not
scientific, we can’t trust it.) The reality lies in understanding that science is
a process not a truth. Laboratory scientists engaged in research or develop-
ment in the natural sciences will recognize the following assertions.

a. What Is Science?
Science is the method of study we use in our attempts to understand and
describe the physical universe. We do this by identifying repeating patterns,
either spatial or temporal, and using the pattern data to try to establish
general rules. This is called inductive reasoning — extrapolating from the
specific to the general. If we think we have established a general principle,
we attempt to test that principle by predicting what will happen in a specific
situation. This is an example of deductive reasoning. The scientist obtains
qualitative data by observation and quantitative data by measurement, all in
the attempt to understand and categorize the universe. Although the quan-
titative description of data increasingly dominates our view of science, in no
small part due to advances in measuring instruments, it is important to
understand that both qualitative and quantitative descriptions of data are
useful tools — it all depends on the question (Houck, 1999).
Classical science is defined by the notion of hypothesis testing. In very
simple terms, the scientist proposes a hypothesis, performs experiments to
test the hypothesis, and obtains results that either tend to confirm or inval-
idate the hypothesis. To classify an endeavor as science, one must be able not
only to state a hypothesis, but to imagine a way to test the hypothesis (Popper,
1962). The scientific method provides a framework for hypothesis testing.
In reality, we can never prove that an idea, concept, or theory is true — we
can only fail to prove that it is false. In the absence of information that a
theory is untrue or incorrect, we accept it as correct until new information
is obtained that demonstrates otherwise. Both in science and forensic science,
we frequently have an idea in mind — this bullet came from that gun. This
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6 Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

is called the null hypothesis* (Fisher, 1949). While we cannot scientifically

prove our hypothesis, we can try very hard to disprove it. If we perform
discriminating and adequate testing, and repeatedly fail to disprove the null
hypothesis, we may become convinced that our original hypothesis is true —
that the bullet did pass through the gun. If the testing does, in fact, disprove
the null hypothesis, we must accept the alternate hypothesis (Neyman and
Pearson, 1928) — that the bullet was not fired from the gun. Although this
idea is a basic tool of the working criminalist, it is rarely recognized or
articulated. Another way of examining hypotheses is in a Bayesian framework
where competing hypotheses are compared and their relative likelihood cal-
culated (Evett, 1983; Taroni et al., 1998). As we will see, both logical frame-
works find a use in forensic science, and one may be more useful than another
at various stages in the process.
An experimental result has no standing until it is disseminated to the
relevant scientific community for review. This is usually accomplished by
presentation at a scientific meeting or publication in a peer-reviewed journal.
Publication of the methods used in obtaining the data provides a chance for
other colleagues to repeat and reproduce the experimental result. Thus, sci-
ence is a product of the community, not individuals. It is much too easy to
be led astray without the foil of other scientists to refute one’s ideas. In basic
research, an experimental result is not accepted until it can be reproduced
by an independent worker (Maddock, 1989). This concept is followed in
forensic science when specific techniques are developed or adapted for foren-
sic use. Laboratories will, for instance, carry out collaborative studies to
confirm that a new method yields equivalent results in different hands.
In actual casework, however, duplication of testing is not always possible
for a variety of reasons, not the least of which may be an inherent limitation
in sample size. Thus, in forensic casework, the confirmation of work product
frequently takes the form of independent review, either by another analyst
in the laboratory or by an expert assisting opposing counsel. It is essential
that the work be reviewed both to catch and correct any clerical errors and
to establish that the conclusions are supported by the data. It is the obligation
of the forensic scientist to interpret the data objectively and to form and state
a conclusion regarding the results.

b. Science Is Dynamic
Another common misconception about science is that it embraces immutable
truths. In fact, nothing could be further from reality. At any point in time,

* Much confusion and misunderstanding exists around the idea of the null hypothesis. The
most useful working definition is that the null hypothesis must be falsifiable (Stark, 2000).
When the null hypothesis is disproved by experimentation, we must accept one or more
alternative hypotheses.
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Introduction 7

science provides us with our best estimate of how the universe works. But
soon enough, an idea or discovery comes along either to refine or to refute
what we once “knew to be true.” This is simply the nature of scientific
discovery; our understanding changes with new information. This revelation
can be somewhat disconcerting to the layperson who perceives that science
can provide hard and fast, black and white, irrefutable answers to questions
about the physical realm. All science can provide is the best answer based on
all the information available at that point in time. This concept becomes
excruciatingly clear in forensic science when newer, more discriminating
techniques are able to distinguish between two items that were previously
indistinguishable using older techniques. One of the best examples of this
concept at work is that of convictions that have been overturned with the
advent of DNA testing. Barring the exceptional case in which an accidental
or malicious error has been committed, the previous work would not be
considered wrong; it is simply that two individuals with, for example, blood
type “O” will likely show different DNA profiles.

c. Science Is Durable
In spite of some well-known historical exceptions (the world is flat, the Earth
is the center of the solar system), most ideas in science tend to change rather
slowly and in small increments. The newer idea is usually a small variation
on the old one and tends to add rather than discard information. Our current
understanding is simply a refinement of the previous concept; one can follow
the evolution of the idea along a logical path. This idea is demonstrated in
forensic science by exactly the same example we used above to demonstrate
that science is dynamic. The methods that were originally used to include
each of these people in a class of individuals who could have perpetrated a
crime did not produce “wrong” results; repeated today (again barring cases
of intentional misrepresentation), they would provide exactly the same
answers. Rather, increasingly discriminating methods of detection enable us
to add knowledge to the previous results, allowing us to refine rather than
refute the answer. The two individuals with blood type “O” would still be
indistinguishable using that test; only with a more discriminating DNA test
are they differentiated. The critical distinction between these two kinds of
tests resides in the limitations inherent in each one. Qualified by the appro-
priate limitations, each conclusion remains valid.

d. Forensic Science Is an Applied Science

The realm of science can be divided into pure science, or research, and applied
science. Basic research seeks to understand the physical world for its own
sake; in applied science we seek to use the physical principles discovered to
obtain a desired goal. Like medicine or engineering, the forensic analysis of
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8 Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

physical evidence is an applied science, resting firmly on a foundation of the

basic scientific principles of physics, chemistry, and biology. As such, every
experiment and every case must follow the scientific method of hypothesis
testing described above. It is worth clarifying that forensic casework is not
strictly experimental in nature. By definition, the conditions under which a
scientific experiment is performed are controlled, and variables are inten-
tionally changed one at a time; in casework, reality dictates that the sample
is completely uncontrolled until its recognition and recovery by a responsible
party. Aspects of the sample are tested using procedures that have been
experimentally validated on known samples, but the results obtained from
a forensic sample are those of an examination or analysis, not an experiment.
It is worth emphasizing that this process is inherently inductive. The analyst
is gathering facts about a piece of evidence that will later be combined with
other facts and assumptions to form a theory of what happened in the case.

3. Science Lessons from History

E. O. Wilson, in his most recent work, Concilience (Wilson, 1998), reminds
us that science has not always been so narrowly defined. During the 18th-
century Enlightenment, the first scientific philosophers began to explore the
borders of knowledge. Francis Bacon, the father of the philosophy of science,
defined science more broadly as a method of investigation available to any
branch of learning including psychology, the social sciences, and even the
humanities (Bacon, 1620). He was a proponent of induction, which may be
described as amassing large amounts of data, then attempting to discern
patterns (Bacon, 1620). This was in counterpoint to deductive reasoning, the
main method of scientific inquiry in classical and medieval times, and
reclaimed later by the reductionists over the next several centuries of Western
scientific development. In simplistic terms, deductive reasoning may be
defined as proceeding from the general to the specific — suggesting a theory
and performing experiments to see if the results are predicted by the theory.
It is important to realize that inductive reasoning (proceeding from the
specific to the general), whether performed consciously or not, is necessary,
a priori, to generate the theory.
A case investigation, including the laboratory analysis of physical evi-
dence, practically defines inductive reasoning if it is performed correctly.
Interestingly, a common pitfall is to slip into deductive reasoning, latching
onto a convenient theory that may or may not follow from the data collected.
Temptation then leads us to try to fit the facts to the theory, however poor
the fit. Bacon also emphasized the importance of a minimum of preconcep-
tions, as did Descarte* (1637), who insisted on systematic doubt as the first

* Cogito, ergo sum — I think therefore I am.

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Introduction 9

principle of learning. Clearly, an open mind is prerequisite to a search for

the truth in the solution of crime.
Wilson’s definition of science harks back to those 18th-century scientific
philosophers to encompass a wider range of possibilities. He suggests that
science is “the organized systematic enterprise that gathers knowledge about
the world and condenses the knowledge into testable laws and principles.” His
corollaries share many common points with the elements of science outlined
above, but emphasize slightly different aspects of the scientific process:

The diagnostic features of science that distinguish it from pseudoscience

are first, repeatability: The same phenomenon is sought again, preferably
by independent investigation, and the interpretation given to it is confirmed
or discarded by means of novel analysis and experimentation. Second, econ-
omy: Scientists attempt to abstract the information into the form that is
both simplest and aesthetically most pleasing — the combination called
elegance — while yielding the largest amount of information with the least
amount of effort. Third, mensuration: If something can be properly mea-
sured, using universally accepted scales, generalizations about it are ren-
dered unambiguous. Fourth, heuristics: The best science stimulates further
discovery, often in unpredictable new directions; and the new knowledge
provides an additional test of the original principles that led to its discovery.
Fifth and finally, consilience: the explanations of different phenomena most
likely to survive are those that can be connected and proved consistent with
one another. (Wilson, 1998)

Sidestepping, for our limited purpose, the larger debate in the scientific
community over Wilson’s sociobiological meaning of consilience (Naess,
1998), we can certainly apply the concept to the interpretation of facts and
analyses in a case investigation. In fact, it is the goal of a criminal inquiry to
provide a reconstruction consistent with all known facts and stated assump-
tions. Additionally, the concept that the simplest explanation is often the best
is not lost in attempting crime reconstruction.*,**
Perhaps, in the end, a more flexible notion of the definition of science
will provide a stronger framework upon which to hang our notion of forensic
science. Although we will be concentrating on the natural sciences, certainly
the ideas we will present may be adopted by any branch of learning willing
to systematize its knowledge and use it to generate fundamental, testable laws
and principles.

* In the 14th century, the British monk and philosopher, William of Occam, argued that
the best explanation of a given phenomenon is generally the simplest, the one with the
fewest assumptions. This principle, called Occam’s razor, was the downfall of the Ptolemaic
model of the solar system in the Middle Ages (Horgan, 1996).
** On the other hand, we have all had the experience that truth is stranger than fiction,
particularly in the context of a criminal case.
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10 Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

4. Forensic Science and Criminalistics

So far, we have explained to you our understanding of the forensic part and
the science part of the term forensic science. But where does this leave us?
Better men and women than we have tackled this same semantic problem.
The term criminalistics, derived from the German Kriminalistic, was coined
in the late 1800s, probably by Hans Gross, in an attempt to describe better
the emerging discipline of “police science.” Criminalistics has the unfortunate
property of being even longer and harder to pronounce than forensic science.
This may lead to its common confusion with criminology, the application of
psychology and sociology to crime, criminals, and the judicial system. Per-
haps because of its seemingly unwieldy and slightly esoteric nature, the term
criminalistics has been left to the crime laboratories. In the United States the
job of the crime laboratory (public or private) is to examine physical evidence
that arises as a result of a criminal event; private laboratories extend their
services into the venue of civil law.* The person who analyzes evidence in a
crime laboratory may be properly referred to as an analyst, a forensic scientist,
or a criminalist.
This practical definition of criminalistics has taken on a life of its own,
expanding to encompass a more general philosophy and cognitive frame-
work. It is this forensic way of thinking that will comprise the central theme
of this book. Although we discuss many specific examples and practical
applications, they find a common root in the cognitive framework we will
describe. We do not take credit for inventing this approach; it has clearly
evolved with the discipline. However, little attempt has been made in the
literature to define the paradigm of criminalistics in an organized fashion.
By nature, criminalists tend to be fiercely independent thinkers, sometimes
to a fault. This has slowed a convergence of ideas in the field. While the
autonomy of the individual criminalist must be preserved, it is also essential
to formulate a common platform from which to explore each investigation.
The dictionary definitions of criminalist and criminalistics (Webster’s,
1996) contribute little to our understanding and are, in fact, discordant with
each other, reflecting the general confusion in this area. Webster’s suggests
the following:

criminalist (n.) 1. an expert in criminalistics. 2. one who studies or practices

criminology; criminologist. 3. an expert in criminal law.
criminalistics (n.) 1. The scientific study and evaluation of physical evidence
in the commission of crimes. 2. the science dealing with the detection of
crime and the apprehension of criminals.

* In Europe, where the term criminalistics originated, the laboratory’s work may be less
restricted.
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Introduction 11

An expert in criminal law is not a criminalist at all, but a criminal lawyer

(pun optional) and, as we have discussed previously, criminology is the study
of the psychological and social aspects of criminal behavior. Although, “the
science dealing with the detection of crime” is accurate, the “apprehension
of criminals” falls strictly outside the purview of the scientist. The first
definition of criminalistics, “The scientific study and evaluation of physical
evidence in the commission of crimes,” is new to this edition of Webster’s
and is, in fact, an accurate if skeletal description.
Van Heerden, in his 1982 book Criminalistics, takes a somewhat novel
approach to relating forensic science and criminalistics. He suggests that a
forensic expert is an expert in only one discipline (e.g., chemistry or medi-
cine) and that one can perform a limited examination of physical evidence
for forensic purposes without being a criminalist. While we strongly disagree
that anyone without at least an appreciation of the larger criminalistic scope
should ever lay hands on a piece of evidence, Van Heerden’s description of
criminalistics as the more general discipline required to integrate a variety
of physical analyses provides a useful starting point. He joins with Ceccaldi
(1974) in recognizing that “Because of its multidisciplinary, composite and
coordinating nature, criminalistics is not regarded as a separate* disci-
pline…”; it relies on the fundamental sciences for its methods and techniques
and depends on progress in those sciences for advancement. Van Heerden
quotes Ceccaldi as saying that criminalistics is “a technique in thinking; an
art in the collection of facts; in other words as a systematized scientific
approach to the solution of crime problems on the basis of scientifically
acquired facts.” He further quotes Jones and Gabard (1959) to say, “In this
sense criminalistics is equated with scientific crime detection: in other words
the application of science and scientific equipment to the analysis, compar-
ison and identification of objects and phenomena associated with legal prob-
lems,” and Williams (1967) “in an effort to reveal the full truth of criminal
activities.”
The California Association of Criminalists (CAC) defines criminalistics as

That professional occupation concerned with the scientific analysis and

examination of physical evidence, its interpretation, and its presentation in
court. It involves the application of principles, techniques and methods of
the physical sciences and has as its primary objective a determination of
physical facts which may be significant in legal cases.

The American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS) defines criminalistics

in a slightly different way as

* We understand separate, in this context, to mean autonomous.

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12 Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

The analysis, comparison, identification, and interpretation of physical evi-

dence. The main role of the criminalist is to objectively apply the techniques
of the physical and natural sciences to examine physical evidence, thereby
prove the existence of a crime or make connections.

A concrete definition of the profession that we call criminalistics remains

both elusive and morphotic. In large measure, this derives from our acknowl-
edged role as the flea on the hair of the dog on the leash of the judicial system.
As the needs and expectations of the criminal justice system change, our
contribution shifts accordingly. Perhaps a circumscribed definition is neither
appropriate nor useful.

5. Physical Evidence: From Art to Science

Any endeavor, when performed at its pinnacle, is an art. The genius inherent
in a musical prodigy is not fundamentally different from the genius required
to solve a recalcitrant mathematical proof (Hofstadter, 1979). Both require
a leap beyond pedestrian rationality and the courage and faith to take that
leap. Scientific breakthroughs stand on a bedrock of many small, insignificant
advances; but the final solution is often rooted in an intuition that is not
fully understandable based simply on previous data.* We do not mean to
imply that a forensic analysis is an act of genius, only that the boundaries
between art and science are perhaps less distinct than is commonly under-
stood. The nature of forensic science lends itself to an artistic and intuitive
approach. Facts are often in short supply, analytical results are rarely text-
book, and human nature prompts us to fill in the gaps. The very recognition
of this proclivity, however, and the institution of rigorous review procedures,
serves as an effective counter to our natural tendencies.
At the same time that we strive to maintain scientific objectivity, however,
we must realize that the comparison between evidence and reference, regard-
less of whether the items of interest are two fingerprints or two spectra, is
not free of human subjectivity. Nor should it be. Two items derived from the
same source are nevertheless two unique items, having experienced different
paths through time and space. The question before the forensic scientist is
not, as the uninitiated might assume, are these two items the same, but rather,
can we exclude the possibility that they originate from the same source? Even
the most-sophisticated instrumentation cannot overcome imperfections in
the samples themselves; analysts must rely on their education, training, and
experience to determine whether small differences observed between evi-
dence and reference samples qualify as significant or explainable. It is worth

* In an interview with John Horgan for The End of Science, Karl Popper insisted that a
scientific theory is an invention, an act of creation as profoundly mysterious as anything
in the arts (Horgan, 1996).
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Introduction 13

emphasizing that training in any of the forensic disciplines includes (or at

least should include) examining many patterns, some of which are known
to come from the same source and some of which come from different sources
(Murdock and Biasotti, 1997). It is the process of testing the limits — gaining
experience with the variation that occurs in samples from the same source
and knowledge of the similarity that samples from different sources might
exhibit — that generates an appropriately skeptical and cautious, yet confi-
dent, examiner.
Because this process of comparison, and the expertise to accomplish it,
is acquired through a lifetime of trial and error, it is not always a conscious
process. Part of the effort in systematizing a body of knowledge is to explicate
the guidelines for the interpretation of a particular type of analysis. This not
only encourages consistency by compelling the analyst to consciously define
the comparison process, but also allows other colleagues working in the field
to understand the guidelines by which an analyst has arrived at a conclusion.
The explication, organization, and dissemination of a common set of ground
rules provide a universal starting point for critical review by both peers and
independent reviewers. However, no matter how clear and well reasoned the
guidelines, and no matter how conscientiously applied, two competent sci-
entists may still ultimately disagree about the interpretation of a result. This
is simply the nature of science. One could program a computer with all the
interpretation guidelines in the world, but a human being still must designate
and input the guidelines. Two computers, programmed with different inter-
pretational guidelines, may also assert different conclusions.
One effort in this direction has been standardization. Is standardization
the answer? To some extent, yes. Standardization allows scientists to begin
the discussion on common ground, understand each other’s data, and share
results. However, to constrict an analyst to a particular detail in some ana-
lytical procedure, or to a set of immutable interpretational rules, risks mis-
analyzing or misinterpreting any particular piece of evidence, the special
nature of which might have been unforeseen at the time the guidelines were
established. And if anything is true about forensic evidence, it cannot be
predicted. Thinking is allowed.
It is crucial to recognize that, even among physical evidence, some cate-
gories may not fit a traditional or commonly understood definition of science,
particularly with regard to quantitation of the data (Houck, 1999). To some
extent, this is due to the historical acceptance of these types of analyses in
court without having demanded a demonstration of rigorous scientific under-
pinning, including an articulation of interpretational guidelines and a statis-
tical frequency estimate. In particular, we refer to those examinations that
require no laboratory analysis, but “only” a visual comparison. Such exami-
nations include physical match comparison, microscopic comparison of hairs
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14 Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

and fibers, and print and impression evidence. Rarely will an analyst be asked
about the fingerprint database on which a conclusion of common source has
been based (Cole, 1998; 1999), or the number or proportion of microscopic
striae that must concord between an evidence and test bullet for the analyst
to conclude that they were fired from the same gun. Some argue that inherent
differences in the nature of each type of evidence preclude a universal statistical
or interpretational model for all physical evidence (Houck, 1999).
An evolving standard for the legal admissibility of scientific evidence has
prompted a review and closer scrutiny of all methods, some of which have
been accepted without question for the last century (Cole, 1998; 1999). While
DNA analysts (recent FBI pronouncements notwithstanding) are expected
to provide an estimated frequency of a genetic profile in the relevant popu-
lation, the print or firearms analyst simply renders an opinion that the
association between evidence and reference is unique. It has been suggested
that comparison evidence might fall within the purview of an acquired skill
or expert opinion. Therefore, examiners should be able to express opinions
of identity without having to provide numeric estimates or systematic scien-
tific justification (Ashbaugh, 1996; Murdock and Biasotti, 1997). Recent court
decisions (Daubert, 1993; Kumho, 1999) that comment directly on the admis-
sibility and definition of scientific evidence, and to what standard it should
be held, have provoked this discussion anew among the forensic community.
Certainly, defining the elements of a valid shoe print or glass fracture
comparison presents a greater challenge than defining the elements of sim-
ilarity necessary for a DNA or solid dose drug analysis. This follows directly
from the nature of the evidence. Shoe wear and breaking glass generate highly
random and complex patterns that may actually require greater expertise, or
at least more experience, to interpret than the much simpler and more
constrained patterns found in a spectrum or autoradiograph. Certainly, some
criminalists debate whether any useful purpose would be served by demand-
ing a more scientific treatment of disciplines that have traditionally relied on
the experience and expertise of each individual examiner (Ashbaugh, 1996;
Murdock and Biasotti, 1997). In a 1997 editorial, John Thornton, one of the
leading forensic minds of our day, wrote, “To master statistical models to
explain much of our evidence may be a slow, reluctant march through enemy
territory, but we must begin to plan for that campaign” (Thornton, 1997).
We agree that, at least for physical evidence, providing a statistical justifica-
tion for the analyst’s opinion should be a goal. This may take different forms
for different evidence; it may be limited for certain types of evidence until
further work is done, and remain limited for some kinds of evidence due to
its nature. However, in our opinion, it is an objective that we should be
actively pursuing. The discussion within the forensic community remains
heated and current.
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Introduction 15

B. Forensic Science and the Law

Although the definition of forensic science may be debated, the relationship
of forensic science to the law is clear. Without the judicial system, the crim-
inalist has no function. The job of the analyst is to provide scientific infor-
mation to the legal community and, in doing so, to translate the story the
evidence has to tell. The scientific analysis is only performed at the behest of
someone seeking to introduce the evidence into a court of law. This could
be an investigator or the prosecuting attorney. It could also be the defendant
through a defense attorney. The evidence comes to the forensic analyst
because someone has deemed it relevant to the reconstruction of an event
in time, an event that is associated with a suspected crime.
The frequently opposing aims of science and law must be acknowledged
before they can be surmounted. While the scientist is trained to be objective
to the point of skepticism, and to present alternative explanations equally,
the U.S. legal system is constructed around a system of advocacy. The pros-
ecution is expected to strongly argue the case that she at least believes to be
the truth, and the defense attorney is required to strongly advocate for his
client and may elect to emphasize the interpretation that best supports his
position. These contradictory goals frequently make for an uneasy alliance
between science and law, with both representatives battling to maintain their
own professional ethics. Each case presents these challenges anew.

1. What Is the Question?

If you don’t ask the right question, you won’t get the right answer, no matter
how brilliant your analysis. Although that aphorism could describe most
situations in life, its consequence becomes excruciatingly clear when applied
to a case investigation. Asking the right question will be a continuing theme
throughout this book.

a. Translating the Legal Question into the Scientific Question

Before the criminalist ever picks up a magnifying glass, pipette, or chemical
reagent, he must have an idea of where he is headed; he must define a question
that science can answer. That question is determined by the circumstances
of each individual case and calls into play the experience, education, and
knowledge of the analyst. It is critical to understand that this question
depends directly on the legal question framed by the investigator or attorney.
In a criminal action, these all derive from the legal definition of the crime
itself and in some cases from the circumstances surrounding the crime. For
the legal action to proceed, the law must establish that a crime has, in fact,
been committed by defining the corpus delecti (literally, “body of the crime”).
All of the elements that legally define any particular crime must be present
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16 Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

to proceed. In this setting, the only germane questions are the legal questions.
The role of the forensic scientist is to translate the relevant legal question
into a scientific question. If this cannot be done, then forensic science has
no role to play.
One way the criminalist can assist law enforcement and legal profession-
als is by helping them to translate a legal question correctly (Did O. J.
Simpson kill Ron Goldman and Nicole Brown Simpson?) into a question
that science can answer (What genetic types are found in the bloodstains
from the scene?). The answer to the scientific question will then assist in
answering the legal question. Conversely, one of the most effective counters
to the presentation of physical evidence is to show that the wrong question
was asked. For instance, finding the suspect’s blood on the suspect’s shoes
is irrelevant to whether he attacked the victim. Similarly, the finding of an
unusual collection of fibers on the murder weapon becomes meaningless if
both the suspect and the victim were wearing uniforms composed of the
rare fiber set. Analysis of physical evidence in a crime laboratory is best
suited to answering who, what, where, and how; it is less adept at answering
when and can almost never answer why. Because the design or selection of
appropriate tests depends completely on the initial hypothesis, it must be
carefully framed at the beginning of the investigation rather than on the
witness stand.
It is crucial to note that the moment the question is translated into
science, the component of guilt or innocence is lost. Forensic science seeks
to establish connections (or lack thereof) between evidence and its source,
and secondarily, between items that may be associated by the evidence. Said
in another way, we consider the probability of the evidence in light of com-
peting hypotheses, often the prosecution’s allegation and the defense prop-
osition. Guilt or innocence may only be considered by the legal system and
decided by a judge or jury.
The focus of an analysis and its interpretation are dictated by the cir-
cumstances of the case and the question(s) facing the criminal justice system.
This is the reason the most common and useful answer to any general crim-
inalistics question is, “it depends.” The analysis of a sexual assault case serves
as a good example of this point. Sexual assault, and rape in particular, is
distinguished from other crimes in that it is not necessarily evident by mere
observation that a crime has occurred. We know that if we come home, the
window has been forced open, and our stereo is missing, that a burglary has
taken place. This is generally obvious to any other observer as well. It is rarely
possible to look at a woman or man and determine that she or he has been
raped. The crime of rape can be summarized as the act of sexual intercourse
accomplished through fear or force. Science can assist in substantiating one
of the elements (that of sexual intercourse) by determining that sperm are
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Introduction 17

present. This, of course, says nothing about the fear or force part. The mean-
ing of the scientific finding may change dramatically depending on the cir-
cumstances of the case.
The use of science in the arena of civil law has grown as pioneering and
developing societies have achieved the economic stability necessary to sup-
port elective activities. Civil litigation almost always concerns money; to
argue about it, one must have both the time and means to do so. Many of
the common areas of civil litigation, such as medical malpractice, money
fraud, and engineering, are outside the scope of this volume. Of the areas of
inquiry shared by criminal and civil investigations, the legal standards obvi-
ously differ, leading to, among other things, different questions, but the
scientific analyses remain the same.

b. Physical Evidence and Circumstantial Evidence

Before we proceed further, it is worth reviewing the concepts of circumstan-
tial evidence and physical evidence. Most physical evidence is circumstantial
evidence — that is, its involvement in the scenario requires some further
inference or assumption. Exceptions to this generality include substances that
by their very presence are illegal, such as illicit drugs. Circumstantial evidence
need not be physical, although most of it is. The term circumstantial evidence
carries with it the connotation of untrustworthiness, while eyewitness evi-
dence tends to be considered conclusive. Nothing could be farther from the
truth. In fact, numerous studies have shown eyewitness evidence to be
remarkably unreliable (Loftus, 1996).
Consider the following scenario. You are camping in a cabin deep in the
woods in Alaska. It is the depth of winter and the snow pack is many feet.
You hear a sound in the middle of the night and go to the window to see
what it is. The moon is new, and it is practically pitch dark. You see a quickly
moving shadow that seems to blend in with the snow. Is it a polar bear? Is
it a potential burglar dressed in white? You really can’t be sure. In the morning
you venture outside to behold — very clear snowshoe tracks. There is no
question in your mind that the previous night’s visitor was a human, not a
bear. You then also notice that the lock to your toolshed is hanging open,
and a reconnaissance of the interior reveals that some of your tools are
missing. Which evidence was more convincing — your midnight glimpse
(eyewitness evidence) or the prints in the snow (circumstantial evidence)
combined with the burglary? More important, which evidence will be more
convincing to the local police — your description of a dark blur or casts of
the tracks in the snow. Even if you had had a really good look at the burglar,
it’s still your word against his; the physical evidence of the tracks is inarguable.
(The issue of the significance of a match to the suspect’s snowshoes is another
issue). So much for the assertion that “the evidence is only circumstantial.”
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18 Principles and Practice of Criminalistics

C. Summary
In writing this book, we found that our subject area logically divided itself
into three sections. In Section 1, Background and History of Forensic Science,
we introduce you to definitions and concepts to that we will refer throughout
the book. We also spend some time looking backward to see how the evolu-
tion of forensic science can help us understand the issues we face today. In
Section 2, The Principles of Forensic Science, we introduce you to a unifying
paradigm for thinking about forensic science. Included in this paradigm is
a new principle, divisible matter, that we propose is necessary to invoke the
well-known principle of transfer, attributed to the great forensic scientist
Edmund Locard (Locard, 1920). We also discuss at length the forensic prin-
ciples of identification, classification, individualization, association, and recon-
struction. In Section 3, The Practice of Forensic Science, we address some of
the pragmatic issues facing the criminalist today. We start with recognizing
an item as evidence, progress through analysis and interpretation guidelines,
and finish with a discussion of ethics and accountability. We hope we have
at least intrigued you to read further.

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1 1. Introduction

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evidence and expert knowledge, Soc. Stud. Sci. , 28(5–6),
687, 1998.

Cole, S., What counts for identity? The historical origins

of the methodology of latent fingerprint identification,
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Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals , 509 U. S., 1993.

Decartes, R. Discourse on Method , 1637.

Doyle, A. C., The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes: A Scandal

in Bohemia, The Strand Magazine, 1891.

Evett, I., What is the probability that this blood came

from that person? A meaningful question? J. Forensic. Sci.
Soc., 23, 35, 1983.

Fisher, R. A., The Design of Experiments, Oliver and Boyd,

London, 1949.

Hofstadter, D. R., Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden

Braid, Basic Books, New York, 1979.

Horgan, J., The End of Science, Addison-Wesley, New York,

1996.

Houck, M., Statistics and Trace Evidence: The Tyranny of

Numbers, Forensic Science Communications, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Virginia 1(3), 1999, available at
http://www.fbi.gov/programs/lab/fsc/current/houck.htm.

Jones, L. V. and Gabard, C., Scientific Investigation and

Physical Evidence; Handbook for Investigators, Charles C
Thomas, Springfield, MA, 1959.
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1999.

Locard, E., L’enquete Criminelle et Les Methodes

Scientifique, Ernest Flammarion, Paris, 1920.

Loftus, E. F., Eyewitness Testimony, Harvard University

Press, Cambridge, MA, 1996.

Maddock, J., No evidence for cold fusion neutrons, Nature,

340, 1989.

Murdock, J. E. and Biasotti, A. A., The scientific basis of

firearms and toolmark identification, in Firearms and
Toolmark Identification, in Modern Scientific Evidence,
Faigman, D. L., et al., Eds., West Law, San Francisco,
1997.

Naess, A., Book review, New Scientist, August, 1998.

Neyman, J. and Pearson, E. S. On the use and interpretation

of certain test criteria for purposes of statistical
inference, Part I and II, Biometrika, 20, 174–240, 263–294,
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Popper, K. R., Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of

Scientific Knowledge, Basic Books, New York, 1962.

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Bayesianism in early forensic science, Jurimetrics J., 38,
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2 2. The Evolution of Forensic Science

Champod, C., Lennar, C., and Margot, P., Alphonse Bertillon

and Dactyloscopy, J. Forensic Ident., 43(6), 604–617, 1993.

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this concern. As early as 1879, Dr. Rudolph Virchow, a

German pathologist,

realized the limitations of hair evidence. In comparing

hairs, he accounted

for the reality that visible traits vary between different

hairs of an individual,

even along the same hair, and that hairs from different
people can look

similar. His understanding is evident in a portion of his

testimony, “The

appearance of the hair is such that it is not inconsistent

with having come

from the accused” (Thorwald, 1966). Unfortunately, not all

hair analysts since

that time have followed his example. In the now infamous

Canadian case of

Guy Paul Morin (Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy

Paul Morin, 1998)

Morin was arrested almost solely on the basis of a single

hair of dubious

quality found adhering to the necklace of the murder

victim. This case is a

poster child for the necessity of the criminalist

conveying, and the investiga

tors and attorneys understanding, the limitations of the

evidence. In the last paragraph of the chapter on hair in
the first edition of Crime

Investigation (1953), Kirk writes of his hopes for the

individualizing potential
of hair, in the process employing the inevitable
fingerprint comparison: That hair is actually
characteristic of the individual is very probable since, if
it were not, it would be the exception to the general rule
of biological individuality. It therefore merits the most
careful and extensive investigation aimed at fulfilling the
tremendous possibilities that it presents in this
direction.… Simple and rapid methods capable of producing
decisive results in this field may be possible, but not
without much more extensive and thorough research
investigation.… It seems safe to predict that such efforts
might well be rewarded ultimately with one of the most
valuable sets of techniques for establishing personal
identification, using evidence that cannot readily be kept
from the possession of law enforcement agents, as
fingerprints are at present.

Earlier in the chapter Kirk intimates that the

individualizing potential of hair

might lie in its transient chemical makeup rather than its

inherent biological

properties. The minor constituents of hair have received

only limited attention and it is possible that these may
lead to considerable advance from the standpoint of
criminal investigation.… The intake of arsenic, lead,
silica, and other minor constituents which are regularly
detected in hair is certainly variable and to some extent a
function of the occupation, diet, and medication of the
individual. Thus these constituents might be expected to
vary accordingly and to be useful in determining the source
of a hair, provided that sensitive enough methods for the
analysis can be developed and applied without destruction
of a prohibitively large amount of available evidence.

In the second edition of Crime Investigation (1974), buried

in a section about

using neutron activation analysis to detect trace elements

in hair, is the

acknowledgment that: It may be mentioned, however, that the

analysis of a single hair has not been found adequate for
personal identification to date, both because of the
difficulty of making a complete analysis of a single hair,
and because of the fact that variations may be considerable
from hair to hair of the same person.
Interestingly, his final paragraph in the 1974 edition,
which rests on assump

tions that hair evidence will necessarily exhibit

“biological individuality,”

remains virtually the same. In 1953, the same year Watson

and Crick elucidated the structure of

DNA, Kirk predicted, “The criminalist of the future may

well be able to

identify him directly through the hair he dropped, the

blood he shed, or the

semen he deposited.” About 30 years later, Alec Jeffreys of

the United King

dom in fact presented the first “DNA fingerprint.” Jeffreys

makes no apology

for his very deliberate descriptor of this technique. To

set the record straight,

it is worth pointing out that Jeffreys’ first efforts,

using a technique known

as multilocus RFLP, may well have been individualizing. In

this technique, a

single DNA probe is used to investigate numerous locations

(loci) in the

genome simultaneously. Complex patterns, containing

substantial amounts

of information, are produced and initial calculations

(Jeffreys et al., 1985)

suggested that the pattern produced by a single probe might

well be unique

to an individual. However, technical considerations and

interpretation concerns led to the

eventual adoption of a single-locus system, in which only

one location at a

time is analyzed. With each locus-specific result, a

segment of the population
is eliminated but, in and of itself, the result is not
individualizing. This was

even more true of the loci initially used for PCR-based

techniques, because

each locus generally exhibited less variability. For both

kinds of systems,

much of the power depends on the same concept that

Bertillon employed,

multiplication of individual trait frequencies to reduce

sequentially the por

tion of the population exhibiting the combined traits. The

difference is that

population data for genetic traits have been amassed in

great amounts allow

ing a truly quantitative assessment of the rarity of a

composite profile. In

fact, genetic-based analyses (serology and DNA) are the

only forensic tests

for which hard data exist from which to estimate the

frequency in the pop

ulation of an evidence sample exhibiting a particular. This

same concept

could certainly be employed in dermatoglyphic fingerprint

analysis, but the

underlying population data (available in a raw form in the

national finger

print database, AFIS) has not been systematically organized

and analyzed. No doubt exists that DNA analysis provides
the potential to individual

ize.* This was not true when the first few single-locus
RFLP probes came

online, however this conclusion can no longer be escaped.

When 9 RFLP
probes or 13 PCR-amplified STR loci produce population
frequencies as low

as 1 in quadrillions (that’s 15 zeros), the odds of the

evidence coming from

another person are so small that a reasonable person is

convinced of indi

viduality. Interestingly, many in the forensic community

continue to hold up

fingerprints and toolmarks, including bullet comparison, as

the standard for

determining individuality. But without the hard frequency

data now begin

ning to be expected because of the work performed for DNA,

these claims

are starting to be reexamined.

b. Nonbiological Evidence

Because physical match evidence seems so self-evident, the

basis for assuming

an individualization of two pieces of an object to each

other are not often

discussed. Nevertheless, the random nature of the

generation of physical

match evidence predicts its individualizing potential. As

we will discuss in

the next chapter, the understanding of how matter divides

is so fundamental

that it deserves a place as a tenet of forensic science.

The apparent obviousness

of physical matching seems to have precluded much mention

of notable cases

involving its use in historical reviews. One of the few

examples tells of John

Toms of Lancaster, England, who was convicted of murder

based on physical

match evidence (Kind and Overman, 1972). The piece of

newsprint that he

had used as wadding in the murder pistol was judged exactly

complementary

to the piece remaining in his pocket. Even with physical

matching, we are

not without the inescapable fingerprint comparison. In

1949, O’Hara and

Osterburg (1949) wrote of a glass fracture: “The elements

in this case which

correspond to the characteristics of a fingerprint are the

points of the curves

when they are regarded as being plotted in some system of

coordinates.” Like fingerprints, toolmarks, including their
most prominent manifesta

tion as bullet markings, have always been accepted as

inherently individual

izing evidence. With the exception of Balthazard’s first

attempts to

systematize firearms evidence with respect to marks

conferred on a cartridge

case by the moving parts of a gun (Thorwald, 1964), the

emphasis seems to

* Individualizing potential should not be confused with

certain individualization. Whether

or not a piece of evidence may be individualized using DNA

depends on many factors,

including the state of the sample (quality and quantity),

which loci are analyzed, how many

loci are analyzed, and the population frequencies of the

alleles involved. And, as with any

forensic analysis, the veracity of the results rests on the

reliability of the analysis and
thoughtful interpretation of the data.

have been directed toward perfecting the mechanics of

detection and visu

alization. From the first documented experience of Henry

Goddard in 1835,

through the first attempts at photomicrography by Jesrich

in 1898, to Waite

and Goddard’s adaptation of the comparison microscope for

bullet analysis

in about 1920 (Thorwald, 1964), no one worried much about

the basis for

a conclusion of individuality. Like fingerprints, the

markings left on a bullet

by both the barrel and the various moving parts of the

weapon are complex

and irregular. Consequently, individualizing potential is

assumed, and a rich

oral history is likely to exist around its justification.

However, like fingerprint

examiners, the opinions of toolmark and firearm examiners

have been

accepted almost without challenge regarding the

individualization of an

impression to a tool or a bullet to a gun. A landmark

exception to this trend

is presented in a paper published in The American Police

Journal in 1930 by

Luke May, in which he presents his methods for toolmark

comparison and

some case examples. In Wash. v. Clark he individualized a

knife to a cut in a

fir tree. May presents the following calculation to

substantiate his conclusion: Considering only the major
marks on this cut, it can be mathematically determined that
no other blade in the world would make a cut like this.
Invoking the law of probabilities, using the algebraic
formula for determining combinations and permutations, with
only one-third of the marks here shown as factors, there
would be only “one” chance of there being another blade
exactly like this if everyone of the hundred million people
in the United States had six hundred and fifty quadrillion
knives each. Using all of the marks, and the factors of
depth, width, shape, etc., it would be carried to infinity.

Unfortunately, he gives us no clue as to any statistical

studies on which his

numbers might be based, nor does he provide the details of

the mathematical

determination or his algebraic formula for determining

combinations and

permutations. He also fails to inform us regarding his

assumptions about

independence. One is left to wonder just how his rather

oddly expressed

frequency of the [population of the U.S.] × [six hundred

and fifty quadrillion

knives] has been determined. It is not as if no work has

been performed since May’s time to address

these questions. The study mentioned previously by Biasotti

(1959) and

numerous other analyses of consecutively manufactured gun

barrels and

other tools (reviewed in Murdock and Biasotti, 1997;

Nichols, 1997) are

commendable efforts. Although isolated pockets of work

continue (Tulleners

and Giusta, 1998), the greater toolmark and firearms

community has shown

relatively little interest in exploiting and continuing

this work to provide a
more quantitative presentation of their data.
Interestingly, Kirk, in the second edition of Crime
Investigation (1974),

mentions that increased mass-production methods were

generating tools that

were initially indistinguishable by the impressions they

made. He hastens to

add that this situation is quickly “remedied” by use of the

tool; nevertheless,

it is one of the few admissions of a limitation to toolmark

analysis. And like

fingerprint examiners, firearms and toolmark examiners may

soon be called

upon to substantiate their opinions based on experience

with scientific stud

ies and provide statistics supported by databases.

c. Uniqueness vs. Common Source

One point about which the current coterie of practitioners

in the forensic

field seem to agree is that individualization in the

forensic context refers to

the assignment of items to a common source or origin rather

than the

determination of the uniqueness of any one object. For this

reason the process

of individualization always requires a comparison between

at least two items. According to Saferstein (1998): A
comparison analysis subjects a suspect specimen and a
control specimen to the same tests and examinations for the
ultimate purpose of determining whether or not they have a
common origin.

Similarly, DeForest, Lee, and Gaensslen (1983) write: It

[individualization] may also refer to the demonstration
that a questioned piece of physical evidence and a similar
known sample have a common origin. The nature of these
individual characteristics varies from one type of evidence
to another, but forensic scientists try to take advantage
of them in efforts to individualize a piece of physical
evidence by some type of comparison process.

We will continue a discussion of these concepts in depth in

Section 2, The

Principles of Forensic Science.

3. Identification

The use of the word identification in the context of

forensic science has been

and continues to be a major source of confusion. The first

quandary results

from the common lay usage of the word identification as a

descriptor of a

unique item. In particular the standard usage in the

context of “human

identity” or “human identification” confers the impression

of uniqueness

because we have an innate understanding that each human

being is unique.

The second source of ambiguity comes from within forensic

science. The

word identification has often been restricted to describing

the appearance or

composition of an item and using those characteristics to

place it in a class

or category with other items; sometimes this is a step on

the way to individ

ualization and sometimes it is an end in itself. In any

case, the field has not

agreed on a consistent usage of the term identification and

the ambiguity is

conveyed in a passage from the first edition of Kirk’s

Crime Investigation: The determination of identity is of
importance to the criminalist in two ways: (1) in
establishing between two objects an identity of origin; and
(2) in determining the nature of a specimen of evidence.
The first category is ordinarily the more significant
because on it rests the final determination of the value of
the evidence. It is, for example, more valuable to say that
two bullets, one of known origin, were fired from the same
gun, than to say that the bullets are the same type of
ammunition. It is more valuable to be able to say that two
hairs have come from the same head, than say that both
hairs are human in origin. Contrary to widespread
conventional wisdom, individualization may not

be the necessary or even expected goal in every forensic

analysis. An example

is the analysis of solid dose drugs. If controlled

substances are identified, it

may well not matter from which laboratory or field they

came; mere posses

sion fulfills the element of illegality. According to

Saferstein (1998): Identification has as its purpose the
determination of the physical or chemical identity of a
substance with as near absolute certainty as existing
analytical techniques will permit.

Interestingly, Kirk also points out that when simply

identifying the nature of

a substance, rather than suggesting an individualization,

statistical estimates

may not be relevant because the answer is a qualitative yes

or no, rather than

a quantitative estimation of the frequency of occurrence.

However, he also

emphasizes, particularly with respect to presumptive

chemical testing, the

necessity to state clearly other substances that might give

the same result. Probability is a factor in virtually every
phase of the study of evidence. The most important
exceptions are matters of straight chemistry, physics, or
other exact science when applied directly to testing for a
constituent or property on a single choice basis.… This
type of problem in which a positive or negative but
definite answer is provided by the test is not one
requiring statistical treatment.… Even in chemical testing,
however, there are instances in which a test established
only a probability of identity. For example, many of the
commonly used tests for alkaloidal poisons are not
specific. That is, the same color may be given when the
reagent is added to different alkaloids. In the next
several chapters, we will discuss a modification to the
forensic

paradigm in which we suggest that identifying the nature of

a piece of evi

dence as an end in itself should be distinguished from the

classification that

takes place as an intermediate to possible

individualization. One of the most cogent commentaries on
individualization and statistics

was written by David Stoney (1991) in response the then new

application of

DNA profiling. Stoney draws distinctions between our

acceptance of der

matoglyphic fingerprints as inherently individualizing and

our seeming need

to prove uniqueness for DNA profiling. Secondly, we must

look realistically at the individualization process. Are we
really trying to prove uniqueness? I would offer to you
that it is a ridiculous notion. The contrast with
fingerprint comparisons is important. We hold fingerprint
specificity and individuality up as our ideal, yet this is
achieved only through a subjective process. In fingerprint
work, we become subjectively convinced of identity; we do
not prove it [emphasis ours].

If we were to pick one concept that the criminalist must

appreciate, this

would be it.

4. Association

Association may be the most misunderstood concept in the

forensic arena.

Although it is intimately associated with the concept of

transfer, and entirely
dependent on the processes of classification and
individualization, few

records exist of any academic discussion of association per

se or its relation

ship to other forensic concepts. Kirk (1953) skirts the

edges of this discussion

when he suggests that inanimate objects can serve as

intermediary evidence

in the course of linking a person with a crime. The central

problem of the criminal investigator is the establishment
of personal identity. Usually this is the identity of the
criminal, sometimes the identity of the victim.
Supplementary to the establishment of personal identity is
the establishment of the identity of physical objects,
which in turn contributes to the desired personal
identification. The identification of a murder weapon may
lead to its possessor at the time of the crime.
Identification of handwriting leads to the writer and so
forth.

Osterburg (1968) describes associative evidence merely as

“linking a person

to a crime scene.” Likewise in DeForest, Lee, and

Gaensslen’s Forensic Science:

An Introduction to Criminalistics (1983), only a couple of

sentences are

devoted to this essential notion. Depending on the degree

of individuality exhibited by the samples, various
conclusions can be drawn about the association between
people and the physical evidence in the case.… These kinds
of considerations need to be kept in mind when evaluating
the value of associative physical evidence comparisons.

Even here, we are not sure whether association is a synonym

for individual

ization or a completely different concept. As we will see

in the next chapter,

association may best fit into the forensic paradigm as the

culmination of
classification or individualization. In fact, it best
describes the basis for a

conclusion of contact between two objects. Probably the

most recent thinking on the matter comes from Evett et al.

(1998). These workers propose a “hierarchy of propositions”

within which

to consider levels of association in casework. The levels

they suggest are

(1) source (e.g., the glass fragments came from window X;

(2) activity (Mr. A

is the man who smashed window X); (3) offense (e.g., Mr. A
committed the

burglary). They emphasize that at each level, the scientist

must also consider

the alternative hypothesis, i.e., the glass fragments came

from some other

broken glass item; Mr. A did not smash the window; another
person com

mitted the burglary. In Section 2 of this book, we will see

that Evett’s hierarchy

simply provides different terms for concepts with which we

are already famil

iar. Source is analogous to

classification/individualization; activity we under

stand as association, and offense directly correlates to

reconstruction.

5. Reconstruction

Reconstruction entices us to indulge our every temptation

to create a video

tape replay of the crime event. As we’ll see in the next

chapter, reconstruction

is more properly viewed as an ordering of events in

relative space and time,
using physical evidence plus any other available
information. However, his

torically, some criminalists’ overinflated belief in their

powers of reconstruc

tion have led to skewed expectations by both the public and

judicial system

regarding the information that can be provided by physical

evidence associ

ated with a crime. Perhaps because of pressure to “solve” a

particularly

horrendous crime, even the most well-intentioned and

educated criminalists

have succumbed to overinterpreting the results of a

physical analysis. Fiction writers gave the science of
detection a jump start, in the process

quite unintentionally paving the way for far-reaching and

often unreasonable

expectations. Unfortunately, news reporters and

journalists, in their incessant

quest for sensationalism, have continued to inflate the

capabilities of physical

evidence analysis carelessly, completing a vicious circle

in which the public

expects miracles and some scientists feel compelled to

comply. In 1958,

Eugene Block, formerly a San Francisco police reporter,

published a book

entitled The Wizard of Berkeley, hardly an unassuming

title. The short leader

on the book jacket promises, “The extraordinary exploits of

American’s pio

neer scientific criminologist, the world-famous Edward

Oscar Heinrich.” The

first anecdote tells of a well-known case involving a

Southern-Pacific railroad

murder on the California–Oregon border. In keeping with the

book title,

Heinrich was apparently able to discern that a pair of

dirty overalls found at

the scene …were worn by a left-handed lumberjack accustomed

to working around fir trees. He is a white man between 21
and 25 years of age, not over five feet ten inches tall and
he weighs about 165 pounds. He has medium light brown hair,
a fair complexion, light brown eye-brows, small hands and
feet, and he is rather fastidious in his personal habits.
Apparently he has lived and worked in the Pacific
Northwest. Look for such a man. You will be hearing more
from me shortly.

We almost expect Heinrich to tell us what the man had for

breakfast the

morning of the crime. (A detailed description of the case

may be found in

Sidebar 3. These leaps of faith seem to have reached their

heyday in the 1950s in

the infamous breeding ground of modern criminalistics,

Berkeley, California.

In the first edition of Crime Investigation, Kirk reports

his deductions from

an examination of a glove left at the scene of a burglary.

a. The culprit was a laborer associated with building
construction b. His main occupation was pushing a
wheelbarrow c. He lived outside the town proper, on a small
farm or garden plot d. He was a southern European e. He
raised chickens, and kept a cow or horse

He reports that after apprehension of the suspect, all of

the inferences were

confirmed except that the individual in question drove a

tractor rather than

pushed a wheelbarrow. This, he rationalizes, was a

reasonable misinterpre

tation because his observation of greater wear on the

inside surfaces of the

fourth and fifth fingers of the glove, as compared with the

other three fingers,

could have been caused either “by thrusting forward on

wheelbarrow handles,

but it also could be — and was — caused by pulling on

sloping tractor levers.” Our intent in calling attention to
these common examples of how crim

inalistics was practiced in the earlier part of the century

is not to demean

these two very capable scientists, without whom the

profession would not

be what it is today, but to emphasize how the pressures of

the media and the

public might encourage overinterpretation of physical

evidence, and to point

out the shift in the thinking of the field that has

occurred since that time.

Sidebar 3

Edward O. Heinrich — Murder

on the Southern Pacific Express

On October 11, 1923, just outside the small town of

Siskiyou, Oregon, in the mountains of the same

name, the Portland–San Francisco Express Train No. 13

approached Tunnel 13, not far from the

California border. Unbeknownst to the crew and passengers,

two bandits hopped the mail car as it

slowly approached the north entrance to the tunnel, and a

third waited on a hillside just outside the

south exit with his trigger finger on a bomb detonator. The

train stopped unexpectedly just as the

engine and the first few cars emerged from the south side
of the tunnel; the mail car was halfway out,
and the passenger and baggage cars remained in the tunnel.
The bomb, planted in the mail car and

presumably meant only to breach its integrity, exploded

and, much to the horror of the robbers, not

to mention the crew and passengers, ignited a fire. The

mail clerk burned to death at his post, while

the engineer, fireman, and brakeman were shot to death on a

nearby hillside. The bandits were forced

to abandon their loot, presumably the securities and sums

of money carried in the mail car, and

disappeared into the surrounding hills. The conductor, who

had been riding in a rear car, and therefore

escaping detection by the robbers, emerged and immediately

called the authorities from an emergency

telephone located at the south end of the tunnel. Soon

deputy sheriffs and other officers from nearby towns
converged on the scene. On the slope

just outside the southern end of the tunnel, they found the
remains of a detonator with two batteries

attached and with wires running to the train tracks. Close

to the detonator, they found a revolver, a

pair of greasy blue-denim overalls, and a pair of gunnysack

shoes soaked in creosote, presumably to

keep tracking dogs from detecting the scent. A knapsack, a

suit of underwear, a pair of socks, a canteen,

and a water bag were collected from a cabin close to the

site. A local tramp reported seeing two men

jump aboard the mail car as the train approached the

northern end of the tunnel. Posses and canine searches led
nowhere. It was suggested that the batteries from the
detonator

might have come from a local shop. A group of men converged

on the shop and, convinced that the

grime on the lone mechanic’s hands and face resembled that

on the overalls found at the scene, forced

him to try them on. Convinced of a perfect fit, the men

hauled the mechanic, over his protests of

innocence, off to the local jail. However, the police

failed to connect him to the crime in any other way. The
blue overalls were sent to Edward O. Heinrich in Berkeley,
along with a description of the

garage mechanic. After carefully examining the overalls, he

issued the following report: You are holding the wrong
man.… The overalls you sent me were worn by a left-handed
lumberjack accustomed to working around fir trees. He is a
white man between 21 and 25 years of age, not over five
feet ten inches tall and he weighs about 165 pounds. He has
medium light brown hair, a fair complexion, light brown
eye-brows, small hands and feet, and he is rather
fastidious in his personal habits. Apparently he has lived
and worked in the Pacific Northwest. Look for such a man.
You will be hearing more from me shortly.

The garage mechanic was release on the strength of

Heinrich’s report. How did Heinrich reach such astounding
inferences? He concluded that, instead of oil and

grease, the apparent grime was tree pitch, more

specifically, fir pitch. From the right-hand pocket, he

extracted a variety of grains, particles, and chips. From a

microscopic examination, he determined

that the particulate matter comprised bits of Douglas fir

needles, fir chips, and fingernail clippings.

He also recovered a strand of hair caught in a button. From

the pocket contents, he surmised that

the wearer was a lumberjack who worked around fir trees;

the color, cross-sectional shape, and width

of the hair apparently allowed him to determine that it

came from the head of a Caucasian between

the ages of 21 and 25. Few working criminalists today would

support the extrapolation of such

specific details about a person’s life and habits from the

examination of phys
ical evidence, let alone a single glove or pair of
overalls. Such inferences were

probably overstatements even for the time, but with the

increasingly mobile

and eclectic nature of our society, they become

irresponsible at best, mislead

ing at worst. Most forensic scientists practicing in the

current climate shy away

from grand sweeping Holmesian deductions, instead limiting

themselves to Heinrich was convinced that the man was
left-handed. This conclusion was based on the finding

of wood chips in the right pocket, where he said they would

land while a left-handed person chopped

a tree (his right side would be facing the tree, and the
wood chips would fly in), the wear on the left

side pockets, and his observation that the overall had been
buttoned exclusively from the left side.

The neatness of the fingernail trimmings convinced him of

the fastidious nature of the man. The

height, he calculated by measuring the overalls between the

shoulder buckles and the bottoms of the

trouser legs. Heinrich maintained that the fact that the

left buckle was 3 / 4 inch higher than the right

was further proof of left-handedness. The creases on the

bottom of each leg told him that they had

been tucked into shoe tops, “just as a lumberjack does.”

The most concrete finding, extricated from a deep narrow
pencil pocket in the bib, was a

registered mail receipt for $50 sent by Roy D’Autrement

from Eugene, Oregon to his brother in

Lakewood, New Mexico. This piece of information led police

to Paul D’Autrement, father of three

sons, Roy and Ray (who were twins), and Hugh. The elder
D’Autrement recounted that his sons had
vanished the day before the train was held up. His
description of Roy appeared to coincide with

Heinrich’s description, and he was a left-handed

lumberjack. A number of personal items were collected from
the D’Autrement house. Heinrich matched a hair

from a towel used by Roy to the one from the overall

button. From the items in the cabin, he determined

that the knapsack contained fir needle fragments and was

mended with the same coarse black thread

that had been used to mend the overalls — it was

“identical.” From measurements of the underwear

and socks, he calculated the stature and physique of the

wearer, and, deciding that the person was larger

than the owner of the overalls, concluded that such a

person exactly matched the description of Ray

given by his father. From the Colt automatic revolver, from

which the external serial number had been partially

obliterated, he found a second, internal serial number. The

gun was traced to a store in Seattle and

had been sold to, and signed for, by a William Elliott.

Elliott’s signature was sent to Heinrich, who

established that it was — “identical” — to that of Roy

D’Autrement. According to the gun dealer, the

gun buyer fitted the description of Roy. Finally, a canteen

and water bag were reported to have been

sold from an army surplus store in Eugene to three men who

had come in together. According to

Block, “Obviously, these were the three brothers, and they

must have used the cabin as their rendezvous

before the robbery.” Three years later, in March, 1927,

Hugh D’Autrement was arrested after a former military

colleague recognized his photograph on a wanted poster. A

month later, an elderly gentleman, rec

ognized the twins’ photographs from an article in the

Sunday paper. They were picked up from the

Ohio steel mill where they had been working under false
names. Hugh was tried first, and convicted,

inspiring the twins to confess, as finally did Hugh

himself. They were all sentenced to life imprisonment

in the Oregon State Penitentiary at Salem. It is difficult

to know from a historical account what part the forensic
evidence actually played

in the investigation and conviction of the D’Autrement

brothers. Most forensic scientists working today

would agree that Heinrich’s conclusions, the significance

he accorded them, and the confidence with

which they were proffered, far exceeded the data on which

they were based. However, no one can

disagree that Heinrich was instrumental in popularizing

forensic science, and educating law enforce

ment and the public about the potential contributions of

physical evidence to the solution of crime.

Source: Based on Block, E. B., The Wizard of Berkeley,

Coward-McCann, New York, 1958.

commenting on whether evidence and reference samples could

have a com

mon origin, and inferences about whether two items were

ever in contact. Both DeForest and Saferstein emphasize the
role of physical evidence in

reconstruction as either corroborating or confuting

eyewitness reports, or

providing information in the absence of any eyewitness

evidence. DeForest,

Lee, and Gaensslen (1983) suggest that: Reconstruction

refers to the process of putting the “pieces” of a case or
situation together with the objective of reaching an
understanding of a sequence of past events based on the
record of physical evidence that has resulted from the
events. Reconstructions are often desirable in criminal
cases in which eyewitness evidence is absent or unreliable.
Identification and individualization of physical evidence
can play important roles in providing data for
reconstructions in some cases.

According to Saferstein (1998): The physical evidence left

behind at a crime scene plays a crucial role in
reconstructing the events that took place surrounding the
crime. Although the evidence alone does not describe
everything that happened, it can support or contradict
accounts given by witnesses and/or suspects. Information
obtained from physical evidence can also generate leads and
confirm the reconstruction of a crime to a jury. The
collection and documentation of physical evidence is the
foundation of a reconstruction. Reconstruction supports a
likely sequence of events by the observation and evaluation
of physical evidence, as well as statements made by
witnesses and those involved with the incident [emphasis in
the original]. Clearly, the more experienced we become in
the use of physical evidence

to provide information about crimes, the greater caution we

take in interpreting

results and making inferences about actual events. For the

most part, modern

day criminalists understand that grand feats of detection

are best left in the

literary venue. However, perhaps some have even retreated

too far into their

havens of specialty within the laboratory. Few criminalists

today consider it

within their purview to suggest a reconstruction, and for

those with only

specialty training, they are correct. Associating objects

and events in space and

time tends to be left to the old-timers or, more commonly,

the detective or

attorney. In our opinion, the well-rounded and properly

trained criminalist is

still the best-qualified person to perform a

reconstruction. Even in the midst of discerning detailed
event sequences from a single
blood spatter patter, Kirk tempers his enthusiasm with the
understanding that: A single piece of evidence is rarely
sufficient in itself to establish proof of guilt or
innocence.

D. The State of the Practice

1. Continuing Themes

Throughout the short history of forensic science, some

common themes have

developed, mostly in the form of controversies and

complaints. In the closing

section of this chapter, we enumerate the most pervasive of

these and com

ment briefly on the current state of the profession with

regard to some of

these concerns.

a. Recognition and Collection of Evidence

Perhaps the most bitter and persistent complaint throughout

the history of

criminalistics has been the lack of adequate training in

crime scene proce

dures. In fact, most of the “police science” or “crime

detection” books*

specifically address, at least in part, the audience of

nonscientifically oriented

police officers and detectives who are virtually always the

first to arrive at a

scene. More often than not, a law enforcement officer or

evidence collection

technician with minimal scientific training is the person

tasked with the all

important charge of recognizing and collecting evidence.

Less and less often
will a criminalist from the laboratory be called to the
crime scene, and the

decision to do so is usually that of those already there.

The individual making

decisions about what evidence to collect and the person

given the responsi

bility to collect it vary widely between jurisdictions, so

it is difficult to gen

eralize. Although numerous well-credentialed authors have

stressed the

importance of allowing the criminalist access to the

scene,** budget con

straints and resource management often preclude even the

possibility. For

instance, even in those jurisdictions where a homicide

might justify the

services of a criminalist, dusting for prints at the site

of a burglary might not. O’Hara and Osterburg, then members
of the New York City Police

Department, in Introduction to Criminalistics, published in

1949, are partic

ularly critical of this situation. They speak of the

“inability of civil service to

attract competent personnel” and, in the face of the

already present separa

tion of the criminalist from the crime scene, emphasize the

“importance of

field work for the working criminalist,” describing the

analysis as “a routine

affair which may be entrusted to an ordinary technician.”

They also point

out the paucity of texts written “to make a detective out

of the scientist,”

noting, even then, the trend toward training specialized

officers to collect

evidence for the criminalist waiting in the laboratory.

* A great number of these books have been written

throughout history. They include Gross,

1891; Else and Garrow, 1934; May, 1936; Grant, 1941;

Svensson and Wendel, 1955; Nickolls,

1956; Cuthbert, 1958; Jones and Gabard, 1959; Williams,

1967; Kind and Overman, 1972;

Fisher, 1992.

** Ibid. In Kirk’s 1953 Crime Investigation, he points out

that “The investigator …

must understand (a) what physical evidence is; (b) how to

collect and pre

serve it; (c) how to obtain from it the information it

carries; and (d) how to

interpret the information so obtained.” He espouses the

presence of the

criminalist at the scene stating “categorically that more

laboratory failures

are due to inadequate collection of the existing evidence

than are caused by

the failure of the laboratory to examine it properly.”

Svensson (Svensson and

Wendel, 1955) a Swedish author, in Crime Detection,

provides one of the first

specific descriptions of proper crime scene procedure. He

emphasizes the

duty of the responding officer in preserving the scene and

stresses the care

with which evidence should be handled. L. C. Nickolls, then

director of the Metropolitan Police Laboratory, New

Scotland Yard, in The Scientific Investigation of Crime,

published in 1956,
provides some of the most compelling justification for
calling the analyst to

the scene. He describes the functions of the scientist as:

• To examine the general circumstances of the crime and
form an opinion from the scientific angle of the nature of
the events preceding the police investigation. • To examine
the scene of the crime for any unusual articles or
fragments of material which have meaning to him in his
special capacity as an expert but for some reason might not
be suspected as being of value to the lay mind. • To
suggest from the examination of the scene what
possibilities of future scientific action exist and,
therefore, what kind of samples the police can expect to
find of scientific value. • Most important — to see for
himself what the exact circumstances of the crime have been
so that at the subsequent examination of the various
scientific exhibits and also, if necessary, at the trial,
the expert will know these circumstances. He will thus not
be making examinations or giving evidence when has no
first-hand knowledge of the reason why he is making the
examination or of what value or purpose is his subsequent
evidence. In 1959, Leland Jones, one-time commander of the
Scientific Investigation

Division of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), and

Gabard wrote

Scientific Investigation and Physical Evidence; A Handbook

for Investigators. In

a surreal prescient comment (re: the Simpson case) he

ironically suggests that

the most valuable physical evidence may be worthless if

inefficiently handled.

He divides the handling of physical evidence into four

phases:

1. Gathering all potential evidence at scene or elsewhere.

2. Marking it correctly.

3. Keeping the chain of continuity straight.

4. Preventing contamination.

For reasons that continue to elude us (which means they

must be adminis

trative or fiscal), the system continues to try to force

square pegs into round

holes, placing the onus of all-important evidence

collection on those least

trained to recognize it, and sequestering the criminalist

in the laboratory

with the expensive equipment.

b. Is Criminalistics an Autonomous Scientific Discipline?

Criminalistics is sometimes regarded, especially by those

outside of the pro

fession, as a bastard child, essentially a parasitic branch

of knowledge com

pletely dependent on the academic sciences for its

continued existence

(O’Hara and Osterburg, 1949). In his 1963 monograph, The

Ontogeny of

Criminalistics Kirk already had the foresight to address

the question of

whether criminalistics is an autonomous branch of learning.

In addition to

recognizing the basic attributes that categorize any

particular endeavor as

scientific, Kirk inquires whether criminalistics qualifies

as an independent

body of knowledge. Is criminalistics a science? According

to most definitions, a science consists of an orderly and
consistent body of knowledge, based on fundamental
principles that can be clearly stated. Such a body of
knowledge allows prediction as well as interpretation.
Recognized sciences are characterized by research effort
that produces constantly increasing theoretical and
technical knowledge. Does criminalistics qualify? It is
based on apparently simple but not clearly enunciated
principles of individualization and individuality. In this
sense it does not encroach on other sciences, but is a
separate and unique area. It is unfortunate that the great
body of knowledge which exists in this field is largely
uncoordinated and has not yet been codified in clear and
simple terms. The body of knowledge is constantly being
increased by a moderate research effort, largely technical
rather than theoretical. It seems fair to state that
criminalistics may now be considered a science in its own
right, but that it lacks at this time the full development
that will allow general recognition. Even in its present
state, it allows prediction as well as interpretation. It
should be developed so as to achieve full recognition as a
separate scientific discipline. The situation,
unfortunately, hasn’t changed much since Kirk described

it 40 years ago. Technical innovations, especially in

instrumentation, have far

outdistanced any attempts to establish a theoretical

framework for criminal

istics as an autonomous discipline. The dearth of, and

recent alarming

decrease in, academic programs in forensic science only

serves to underscore

the dangers of analysis without a framework for thoughtful

interpretation.

As Kirk so succinctly states, “a thoroughly competent

investigator without

much equipment is far better off than an incompetent

investigator with

unlimited equipment.”* With this volume, we hope to

contribute to the

ongoing effort to provide a rational framework within which

the results of

forensic comparisons and analyses may be thoughtfully

interpreted.

c. Is Criminalistics a Profession?

In The Ontogeny of Criminalistics (1963), Kirk lists three

criteria that a pro

fession must meet: (1) extensive training at a high

educational level, (2) a

generally recognized and accepted code of behavior or

ethics, and (3) estab

lishment of competence. The parameters that Kirk

promulgates seem both

reasonable and comprehensive. Did criminalistics in 1963

satisfy the require

ments of a profession? Has the situation changed over the

last 40 years? Kirk

cites the slow but finite expansion of academic programs in

forensic science

to meet his first standard; currently this situation seems

to be in flux. He

mentions the ethical code adopted by the California

Association of Crimi

nalists (CAC) to meet his second standard, but clearly

acknowledges a lack

of formal adherence in the field as a whole, relying mostly

on his generous

assumption that, “As a rule, even those practitioners not

bound by any official

code of ethics tend to be objective, fair and just in their

relations to the people

and the law.” His rationalization that, “The exceptions are

not more glaring

than those in many of the established professions,” is at

best equivocal. The

field has progressed in this area in that at least two

national forensic organi

zations, the American Association of Forensic Sciences

(AAFS) and the Amer

ican Board of Criminalistics (ABC) each have codes of

ethics, as have other
regional associations (see Appendices B, C, D). However,
membership in these

organizations, hence adherence to any code, is still

voluntary. Kirk concedes

the absence of any objective assessment of competence, such

as certification,

to meet his third criterion. Quite recently, only in the

1990s, the ABC was

formed and began to administer both general and specialty

certification

exams. However, like adherence to an ethical code,

participation in certifica

tion procedures is still voluntary. Kirk concludes,

“Despite the limitations

still apparent in this relatively new field, the practice

of criminalistics is clearly

meeting the requirements of a professional discipline.”

Although he may have

been indulging in a bit of wishful thinking with his

assessment of the state

of the practice in his day, Kirk clearly set the standard

and paved the way for

ongoing progress in this area. We will discuss specific

aspects of ethics and

accountability in greater detail in the last chapter of

this book. Thorwald provides a pertinent historical comment
that may explain,

though not excuse, some of the lack of focus and cohesion

that seems to have

* A concertmaster can make a cigar box sound like a

Stradivarius; a beginning student can

make a Stradivarius sound like a cigar box. — Doug Emerson,

San Gorgonio High School,

California, band director, 1970.

characterized the forensic profession in recent times. The
second world war,

even more than the first, redirected a technological

explosion toward military

efforts. Personnel and resources were pulled from academic

pursuits to assist

their country of citizenship in the war effort. While

civilian science would

ultimately benefit from advances instigated by wartime

progress, the imme

diate effect on the newly emerging forensic field was a

dissipation of focus

leading to a disorganization of the profession from which

we are still recov

ering. Although methods and procedures continued to be

disseminated, the

accompanying training in analytical details and

interpretation guidelines was

less than uniform, and the importance of quality assurance

was often lost in

the haste to get laboratories up and running. The

urbanization instigated by

the baby boom population explosion, along with the more

effective firearms

spawned by the war, created a predictable environment for

the growth of

violent crime, as did the increase in recreational drug

use. The need for

physical evidence analysis was increasing both in quantity

and variety. As forensic science has matured, the need for
high standards, professional

cohesion, and an intellectual framework has slowly come to

be acknowledged.
A systematic literature, one of the earmarks of an
autonomous discipline has

emerged. Current technological advances are directed more

toward automa

tion, efficiency, and increasing sensitivity, than toward

discovering novel or

revolutionary methods. While the battle between the

obligatory pragmatism

of an applied science and the essential cerebral discourse

of an academic

discipline remains in the balance, we can be assured that

it is only the

continuing conflict that will lead to progress.

E. Summary

In this chapter, we have taken you from the literary

beginnings of crime

detection, through the development of the practice of

criminalistics, and into

some of the preliminary concepts and principles that have

evolved, although

somewhat belatedly, along with the practice. We’ve

described the evolution

of biological evidence as a tool in crime detection.

Although fingerprints are

not traditionally grouped with blood and tissue typing,

conceptually, they

are completely analogous; both kinds of evidence contain

the potential to be

individualized directly to a person. The development of

nonbiological evi

dence has also been reviewed. By definition, nonbiological

evidence may link

a person to a crime only indirectly. Therefore, inherent

differences arise in

interpreting and presenting the results from the comparison

or analysis of

nonbiological and biological evidence. We will continue to

explore this coun

terpoint throughout the book. However, in the broader

sense, certain unify

ing concepts and principles apply to all physical evidence.

We will also

introduce additional layers that interact to impact the

forensic work product,

including the inherent nature of the evidence and the

decisions introduced

by the analyst and the forensic community. In the next

chapter, we introduce

a unifying paradigm for forensic science.

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redistribution of textile fibers, J. Forensic Sci. Soc.,
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Robertson, J., Kidd, C. B. M., and Parkinson, H. M. P., The

persistence of textile fibers transferred during simulated
contacts, J. Forensic Sci. Soc., 22(4), 353–360, 1982.

Roux, C. and Margot, P., An attempt to assess the relevance

of textile fibres recovered from car seats, Sci. Justice J.
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Saferstein, R., Criminalistics: An Introduction to Forensic

Science, 6th ed., PrenticeHall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1998.

Saiki, R. K. et al., Enzymatic amplification of beta-globin

genomic sequences and restriction site analysis for
diagnosis of sickle cell anemia, Science, 230, 1350, 1985.

Solbello, L., Application of PLM in the Industrial Minerals

Laboratory, paper presented at Inter/Micro 99, Chicago, IL,
July 1999.

Stoney, D. A. and Thornton, J. I., A critical analysis of

quantitative fingerprint individuality models, J. Forensic
Sci., 31(4), 1187–1216, 1986a.

Stoney, D. A. and Thornton, J. I., A method for the

description of minutia pairs in epidermal ridge patterns,
J. Forensic Sci., 31(4), 1217–1234, 1986b.

Stoney, D. A. and Thornton, J. I., A systematic study of

epidermal ridge minutiae, J. Forensic Sci., 32(5),
1182–1203, 1987.
Stoney, D. A., What made us ever think we could
individualize using statistics? J. Forensic Sci. Soc.,
3(2), 197–199, 1991.

Svensson, A. and Wendel, O., Crime Detection, Elsevier, New

York, 1955.

Thorwald, J. T., Crime and Science, Harcourt, Brace &

World, New York, 1966, Translation, Richard and Clara
Winston.

Thorwald, J. T., The Century of the Detective, Harcourt,

Brace & World, New York, 1964, Translation, Richard and
Clara Winston, 1965.

Tulleners, F. A. J. and Giusto, M., Striae reproducibility

on sectional cuts of one Thompson Contender barrel, AFTE
J., 30(1), 62–81, 1998.

Twain, M. [Samuel Clemens], The tragedy of Pudd’nhead

Wilson, Century Magazine, 1894.

Voltaire, F., Zadig, 1748.

Williams, E. W., Modern Law Enforcement and Police Science,

Charles C Thomas, Springfield, MA, 1967.

Wilson, E. O., Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge, Knopf,

New York, 1998.

Section 2

The Principles of

Forensic Science c r i m

c r

i m

e c r i m e c r i m e c r i m e c r i m e c r i m e c r i m
e c r i m e c r i m e c r i m e C R I M E G e n e r a t i o
n o f E v i d e n c e P r a c t i c e o f F o r e n s i c S
c i e n c e D i v i s i b l e M a t t e r T r a n s f e r T
r a n s f e r A P P E A R A N C E C O M P O S I T I O N S O
U R C E E V E N T C O N T A C T S u s p e c t V i c t i m W
i t n e s s e s S c e n e e v i d e n c e c o l l e c t i o
n ( m a t t e r ) ( t r a i t s ) A s s o c i a t i o n C l
a s s i f i c a t i o n R e c o n s t r u c t i o n I n d i
v i d u a l i z a t i o n I d e n t i f i c a t i o n R e c
o g n i t i o n
3 3. Overview — A Unifying
Paradigm of Forensic Science

Cook R. et al., A model for case assessment and

interpretation, Sci. Justice, 38(3), 151–156, 1998a.

Cook R. et al., A hierarchy of propositions: deciding which

level to address in casework, Sci. Justice, 38(4),
231–239, 1998b.

DeForest, P., Lee, H., and Gaensslen, R., Forensic

Science: An Introduction to Criminalistics , McGraw Hill,
New York, 1983.

Kirk, P. L., The ontogeny of criminalistics, J. Criminal

Law Criminol. Police Sci. , 54, 235–238, 1963.

Kuhn, K. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd

ed., University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1996.

Locard, E., Dust and its analysis, Police J., 1, 177,

1928.

Locard, E., The analysis of dust traces, Part I–III, Am.

J. Police Sci. 1, 276, 401, 496, 1930.

Osterburg, J. W., The Crime Laboratory; Case Studies of

Scientific Criminal Investigation , Indiana University
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Robertson, B. and Vignaux, G. A., Interpreting Evidence ,

John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1995.

Saferstein, R., Criminalistics: An Introduction to

Forensic Science , 6th ed., PrenticeHall, Englewood Cliffs,
NJ, 1998.

Tuthill, H., Individualization: Principles and Procedures

in Criminalistics , Lightening Powder Company, Salem, OR,
1994.
4 4. The Origin of Evidence
—Divisible Matter and Transfer

Doyle, A. C., Adventures of Sherlock Holmes: The Red-headed

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Kalia, R. K. et al., Role of ultrafine microstructures in

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Locard, E., L’enquete criminelle et les methodes

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1928.

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J. Police Sci., 1, 276, 401, 496, 1930.

Locard, E., Traité de criminalistique, J. Desvigne, Lyon,

1931-1940.

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Thornton, J. I., The snowflake paradigm, J. Forensic Sci.,

31(2) 399–401, 1986.

Figure 5.1 Detection of blood with luminol. What you see

depends on how you

look. In this illustration, blood is invisible to the naked

eye (top photograph),

but searching after applying luminol in a dark room reveals

both the presence

and pattern of blood (bottom photograph).

5 . Recognition of Physical Evidence

Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin, The

Honourable Fred Kaufman, C.M., Q.C., Queen’s Printer for
Ontario, 1998, available at http://www.
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Federal Rules of Evidence, Legal Information Institute,

Cornell Law School, 1999, available at
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Lavie, M., The Associated Press, Tel Aviv, Israel, July 5,

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May, L. S., Crime’s Nemesis , Macmillan, New York, 1936.

People v. Axell , 235 Cal.App. 3d 836, 1991.

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1998.

Stoney, D. A., Evaluation of associative evidence: choosing

the relevant question, J. Forensic Sci. Soc. , 24, 472–482,
1984.

Uniform Rules of Evidence, Biddle Law Library, University

of Pennsylvania, 1988, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/ure88.htm .

Figure 6.1 The burglar. Every criminalist yearns for

evidence that yields a

wealth of information with little analysis. Such appears to

be the case with a

photograph ascribed to either Edmund Locard or Alphonse

Bertillon. Intricate

details can be seen for items such as the buttons on the

vest and the weapon in

one hand. The missing little finger on the other hand

should also provide a useful

clue to the identity of the phantom. Alas, Duayne Dillon

(1998) reveals that this

evidence is too good to be true; he documents the

appearance of this photograph
in at least five books, each with differing descriptions of
its provenance. According

to these various accounts, an apparent burglar either

fell/stumbled/leaped into

clay/mud/sand/dust. The resulting impression was cast in

some unknown

medium. This hoax deserved some investigative work of its

own, with the results

presented at a “Last Word Society” meeting at an AAFS

meeting.
6 6. Classification, Identification, and
Individualization —Inference of
Source

Ashbaugh, D. R., Quantitative-Qualitative Friction Ridge

Analysis: An Introduction to Basic and Advanced Ridgeology,
CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2000.

Biasotti, A., A statistical study of the individual

characteristics of fired bullets, J. Forensic Sci., 4(1),
133–140, 1959.

Bodziak, W. J., Footwear Impression Evidence, Elsevier, New

York, 1990.

Burge, M., and Burger, W., Ear biometrics, in Biometrics:

Personal Identification in a Networked Society, Jain, A.
K., Bolle, R., and Pankanti, S., Eds., Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Boston, 1999.

Cassidy, M. J., Footwear Identification, Canadian

Government Printing Center, Quebec, 1980.

Cole, S., Witnessing identification: latent fingerprinting

evidence and expert knowledge, Soc. Stud. Sci., 28(5–6),
687, 1998.

Cole, S., What counts for identity? The historical origins

of the methodology of latent fingerprint identification,
Sci. Context, 12(1), 139, 1999.

Cook, R. et al., A model for case assessment and

interpretation, Sci. Justice, 38(3), 151–156, 1998a.

Cook, R. et al., A hierarchy of propositions: deciding

which level to address in casework, Sci. Justice, 38(4),
231–239, 1998b.

Deadman, H. A., Fiber evidence and the Wayne Williams

trial: Part I, FBI Law Enforcement Bull., 53(3), 12–20,
1984a.

Deadman, H. A., Fiber evidence and the Wayne Williams

trial: Conclusion, FBI Law Enforcement Bull., 53(5), 10–19,
1984b.

Evett, I. W. and Weir, B. S., Interpreting DNA Evidence,

Sinauer Associates, Inc., Sunderland, MA, 1998.

Fregeau, C. J. and Fourney, R. M., DNA typing with

fluorescently tagged short tandem repeats: a sensitive and
accurate approach to human identification, Biotechniques,
15(1), 1993.

Gaudette, B. D., Some further thoughts on probabilities and

human hair comparisons, J. Forensic Sci., 23, 758, 1978.

Gaudette, B. D., A supplementary discussion of

probabilities and human hair comparisons, J. Forensic Sci.,
27(2), 279–289, 1982.

Gill P. et al., Report of the European DNA Profiling Group

(EDNAP) towards standardization of short tandem repeat
loci, Forensic Sci. Int., 65, 1994.

Grieve, M. C. and Biermann, T. W., The population of

coloured textile fibres on outdoor surfaces, Sci. Justice,
37(4), 231–239, 1997.

Griffiths, A. J. F., Miller, J. H., Suzuki, D. T.,

Lewontin, R. C., and Gelbart, W. M., An Introduction to
Genetic Analysis, 5th ed., W. H. Freeman, New York, 1993.

Hayakawa, S. I., Language in Thought and Action, Harcourt,

Brace and Co., New York, 1939.

Homewood, S. L., Oleksow, D. L., and Leaver, W. L.,

Questioned document evidence, in Forensic Evidence,
California District Attorneys Association, Sacramento,
1999.

Horgan, J., The End of Science, Addison-Wesley, New York,

1996.

Horrocks, M., Coulson S. A., and Walsh K. A. J., Forensic

palynology: variation in the pollen content of soil on
shoes and in shoeprints in soil, J. Forensic Sci., 44(1),
119–122, 1999.

Houck, M. and Siegal, J., A large scale fiber transfer

study, paper presented at the American Academy of Forensic
Sciences, Orlando, FL, February, 1999.

Kirk, P. L., Crime Investigation, 1st ed., Interscience,

John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1953.

Kirk, P. L., Crime Investigation, 2nd ed., Thornton, J.,

Ed., Krieger Publishing (by arrangement with John Wiley &
Sons), Malabar, FL, 1974.
Kirk, P. L., The ontogeny of criminalistics, J. Criminal
Law Criminol. Police Sci., 54, 235–238, 1963.

Kline, M. C. and Jenkins, B., Non-amplification of a vWA

allele, J. Forensic Sci., 43(1), 250, 1998.

Koehler, A., Techniques used in tracing of the Lindbergh

kidnapping ladder, Police Science, 27(5), 1937.

Lewin, B., Genes VI, Oxford University Press, New York,

1997.

Moenssons, A., Lip Print Identification Anyone? (on People

v. Davis — Ill), 1999, available at
http://www.forensic-evidence.com/site/ID00004_10.html.

Murdock, J. E. and Biasotti, A. A., The scientific basis of

firearms and Toolmark Identification, in Firearms and
toolmark identification, in Modern Scientific Evidence,
Faigman, D. L. et al., Eds., West Law, San Francisco, 1997.

National Research Council, Committee on DNA Technology in

Forensic Science, DNA Technology in Forensic Science,
National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1992.

National Research Council, Committee on DNA Technology in

Forensic Science, The Evaluation of Forensic DNA Evidence,
National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1996.

Nichols, R. G., Firearm and toolmark identification

criteria: a review of the literature, J. Forensic Sci.,
42(3), 466–474, 1997.

Nordby, J. J., Can we believe what we see, if we see what

we believe? — Expert disagreement, J. Forensic Sci., 37(4),
1115–1124, 1992.

Osterburg, J. W., The Crime Laboratory; Case Studies of

Scientific Criminal Investigation, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1968.

Popper, K. R., Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of

Scientific Knowledge, Basic Books, New York, 1962.

Pounds, C. A. and Smalldon, K. W., The transfer of fibers

between clothing materials during simulated contacts and
their persistence during wear: part I: fiber transference,
HOCRE Report, Home Office Central Research Establishment,
Aldermaston, 1975a.
Pounds, C. A. and Smalldon, K. W., The transfer of fibers
between clothing materials during simulated contacts and
their persistence during wear: part II: fiber persistence,
HOCRE Report, Home Office Central Research Establishment,
Aldermaston, 1975b.

Pounds, C. A. and Smalldon, K. W., The transfer of fibers

between clothing materials during simulated contacts and
their persistence during wear: part III: a preliminary
investigation of the mechanisms involved, HOCRE Report,
Home Office Central Research Establishment, Aldermaston,
1975c.

Robertson, B. and Vignaux, G. A., Interpreting Evidence,

John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1995.

Saferstein, R., Criminalistics: An Introduction to Forensic

Science, 6th ed., PrenticeHall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1998.

Shields, W. M., The validation of novel DNA typing

techniques for forensic use: peer review and validity of
the FBI’s validation studies of PCR amplification and
automated sequencing of mitochondrial DNA, Unpublished
draft, 1998.

Smith, W. C., Kinney, R., and Departee, D., Latent

fingerprints — a forensic approach, J. Forensic
Identification, 43(6), 563–570, 1993.

Stoney, D. A., What made us ever think we could

individualize using statistics? J. Forensic Sci. Soc.,
3(2), 197–199, 1991a.

Stoney, D. A., Transfer evidence, in The Use of Statistics

in Forensic Science, Aitken, C. and Stoney, D., Eds., Ellis
Horwood, 1991b.

Stoney, D. A. and Thornton, J. I., A critical analysis of

quantitative fingerprint individuality models, J. Forensic
Sci., 31(4), 1187–1216, 1986a.

Stoney, D. A. and Thornton, J. I., A method for the

description of minutia pairs in epidermal ridge patterns,
J. Forensic Sci., 31(4), 1217–1234, 1986b.

Stoney, D. A. and Thornton, J. I., A systematic study of

epidermal ridge minutiae, J. Forensic Sci., 32(5),
1182–1203, 1987.

Taroni, F., Champod, C., and Margot, P., Forerunners of

Bayesianism in early forensic science, Jurimetrics J., 38,
183–200, 1998.

Thornton, J. I., The snowflake paradigm, J. Forensic Sci.,

31(2), 399–401, 1986a.

Thornton, J. I., Ensembles of class characteristics in

physical evidence examination, J. Forensic Sci., 31(2),
501–503, 1986b.

Tuthill, H., Individualization: Principles and Procedures

in Criminalistics, Lightening Powder Company, Salem, OR,
1994.

van der Lugt, C., Ear Identification: State of the Art,

paper presented at the Conference for Shoe Print and Tool
Mark Examiners, Noordwijkerhout, the Netherlands, 1997,
Crime & Clues, available at
http://crimeandclues.com/earprint.html.

Walsh, S., Commentary on Kline MC, Jenkins B, Rogers S.,

Non-amplification of a vWA allele, J. Forensic Sci., 43(5),
1103, 1998.

Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English

Language, Gramercy Books, New York, 1996.
7 7. Association and Reconstruction
—Inference of Contact

Aitken, L. and Stoney, D., Eds., The Use of Statistics in

Forensic Science, Ellis Horwood, Chichester, West Sussex,
U.K., 1991.

Bevel, T., Gardner, R. M., Bevel, V. T., Bloodstain Pattern

Analysis: With an Introduction to Crime Scene
Reconstruction, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 1997.

Chisum, W.J., Crime Scene Reconstruction, “California

Department of Justice Firearm/Toolmark Training Syllabus,”
reprinted in the AFTE Journal, 23(2), 1991.

Cook R. et al., A model for case assessment and

interpretation, Sci. Justice, 38(3), 151–156, 1998a.

Cook R. et al., A hierarchy of propositions: deciding which

level to address in casework, Sci. Justice, 38(4), 231–239,
1998b.

Curran, J. M., Triggs, C. M., and Buckleton, J. S.,

Sampling in forensic comparison problems, Sci. Justice
38(2), 101–107, 1998.

DeForest, P., Lee, H., and Gaensslen, R., Forensic Science:

An Introduction to Criminalistics, McGraw Hill, New York,
1983.

Doyle, A. C., Boscombe valley mystery, The Strand Magazine,

1891.

Eckert, W. G. and James S. H., Interpretation of Bloodstain

Evidence at Crime Scenes, CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 1989.

Evett, I., Expert evidence and forensic misconceptions of

the nature of exact science, Sci. Justice, 36(2), 118–122,
1996.

Evett, I. W. and Weir, B. S., Interpreting DNA Evidence,

Sinauer Associates, Inc., Sunderland, MA, 1998.

Garrison, D. H., Jr., Shooting Reconstruction vs. Shooting

Reenactment (Originally published in the AFTE Journal,
1993, available at
http://www.chem.vt.edu/ethics/garrison/shooting.html.

Haight, F., California Courtroom Evidence, 4th ed., Parker

Publications Division, Carlsbad, CA, 1996.
Jeffreys, H. Theory of Probability. Oxford University
Press, 1983.

Kaye, D. H., What is Bayesianism? in Probability and

Inference in the Law of Evidence: The Limits of
Bayesianism, P. Tillers and E. Green, Eds., D. Reidel
Publishing Co., Boston, 1988.

Kirk, P. L., Crime Investigation, 1st ed., Interscience,

John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1953.

Kirk, P., Affidavit in the matter of Marilyn Sheppard, 1955.

Kirk, P. L., Crime Investigation, 2nd ed., Thornton, J.,

Ed., Krieger Publishing Co. (by arrangement with John Wiley
& Sons), FL, 1974.

Lindley, D. V., Probability, in The Use of Statistics in

Forensic Science, Aitken, C. and Stoney, D., Eds., Ellis
Horwood, Chichester, West Sussex, U.K., 1991.

McCrary, G. O., Report for the State of Ohio in the civil

suit of The Estate of Samuel H. Sheppard v. The State of
Ohio, December, 1999, available at http://www.courttv.com/
national/2000/0131/mccrary_ctv.html.

Osterburg, J. W., The Crime Laboratory; Case Studies of

Scientific Criminal Investigation, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington, 1968.

Robertson B. and Vignaux, G. A., Interpreting Evidence,

John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1995.

Saferstein, R., Criminalistics: An Introduction to Forensic

Science, 6th ed., PrenticeHall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1998.

Stoney, D. A., Evaluation of associative evidence: choosing

the relevant question, J. Forensic Sci. Soc., 24, 472–482,
1984.

Stoney, D. A., Transfer evidence, in The Use of Statistics

in Forensic Science, Aitken, C. and Stoney, D., Eds., Ellis
Horwood, Chichester, West Sussex, U.K., 1991.

Tahir, M., Laboratory Examination Reports, Case #76629,

1997, 1999, available at
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Taroni, F., Probalistic reasoning in the law. Part 2:

Assessment of probabilities and explanation of the value of
trace evidence other than DNA, Sci. Justice, 38, 179–188,
1998.

Taroni, F. Champod, C., and Margot, P., Forerunners of

Bayesianism in early forensic science, Jurimetrics, 38,
183–200, 1998.

Thompson, W. C. and Schumann, E. L., Interpretation of

statistical evidence in criminal trials: the prosecutor’s
fallacy and the defense attorney’s fallacy, Law Human
Behav., 11, 167–187, 1987.

Section III

The Practice of

Forensic Science

Figure 8.1 Cigarette butt in the toilet. When found at a

crime scene, it is hoped

that one of the responding officers did not deposit this

evidence.
8 8. Good Field Practice
—Processing a Crime Scene

Fernandez-Rodriguez, A. et al., Microbial DNA challenge

studies of PCR-based systems used in forensic genetics,
Adv. Forensic Haemogenet., 6, 177–179, 1996.

Fisher, B. J. A., Techniques of Crime Scene Investigation,

6th ed., CRC Press, Boca Raton, FL, 2000.

Fregeau, C. J., Bowen, K. L., and Fourney, R. M.,

Validation of highly polymorphic fluorescent multiplex
short tandem repeat systems using two generations of DNA
sequencers, J. Forensic Sci., 44(1), 133, 1999.

Gaensslen, R. E., Sourcebook in Forensic Serology, U.S.

Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1983.

Geberth, V. J., Ed., Practical Homicide Investigation:

Tactics, Procedures and Forensic Techniques, 3rd ed., CRC
Press, Boca Raton, FL, 1996.

Goddard, K. W., Crime Scene Investigation, Reston

Publishing Company, Reston, VA, 1977.

Gross, A. M., Harris, K. A., and Kaldun, G. L., The effect

of luminol on presumptive tests and DNA analysis using the
polymerase chain reaction, J. Forensic Sci., 44(4), 837,
1999.

Mullin, C., Error of Judgment: The Truth about the

Birmingham bombings, Chatto & Windus, London, 1986.

Ogle, R. R., Jr., Crime Scene Investigation and Physical

Evidence Manual, 1995.

People v. Simpson, CNN trial transcripts, available at

http://www.cnn.com/US/OJ/trial/.

Ragle, L., Crime Scene, Avon Books, New York, 1995.

Saferstein, R., Forensic Science Handbook, Vol. 1,

Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1981.

Saferstein, R., Criminalistics: An Introduction to Forensic

Science, 6th ed., PrenticeHall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1998.

Stoney, D. A., The Use of Statistics in Forensic Science,

Aitken, C. and Stoney, D., Eds., Ellis Horwood, Chichester,
West Sussex, U.K., 1991.
Svensson, A. and Wendel, O., Crime Detection, Elsevier, New
York, 1955.

United States of America v. Terry Nichols, CNN trial

transcripts, 1997, available at
http://europe.cnn.com/US/9703/okc.trial/transcripts/.

Webster’s Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the English

Language, Gramercy Books, New York, 1996.

Figure 9.1 Handwriting exam. Pattern recognition is a

mandatory skill in the

practice of criminalistics. Document examiners who perform

handwriting anal

ysis are asked to discern subtle pattern similarities and

differences in tests like

the one illustrated here. This is one way in which they

demonstrate proficiency

in correctly concluding whether two samples originate from

the same writer or

not. Which rows have matching shapes and which rows have no
repeated figures?
9 9. Good Laboratory Practice
—Establishing Validity and
Reliability

ASTM, Annual Book of ASTM Standards, Volume 14.0 ,

American Society for Testing and Materials, West
Conshohocken, PA, 2000.

People v. Morganti, 43 Cal. App. 4th 643, 1996.

Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods, Guidelines

for a Quality Assurance Program for DNA Analysis, Crime
Lab. Dig. , 22 (2), 21–43, 1995.

Zeppa, Z. E., The primary examiner, paper presented at the

Spring meeting of the California Association of
Criminalists, 1999.

Reproduced from:

Guidelines for a Quality Assurance Program for DNA

Analysis, 1995

AABB Standards Committee (1990). P7.000 DNA polymorphism

testing, in Standards for Parentage Testing Laboratories,
1st ed., American Association of Blood Banks, Arlington,
VA.

Alwan, L. C. and Bissell, M. G. (1988). Time series

modeling for quality control in clinical chemistry, Clin.
Chem., 34, 1396–1406.

American National Standard ANSI/ASQC Q90-1987 (1987).

Definitions, Symbols, Formulas, and Tables for Control
Charts, American Society for Quality Control, Milwaukee,
WI.

American National Standard ANSI/ASQC Q90-1987 (1987a).

Quality Management and Quality Assurance Standards —
Guidelines for Selection and Use, American Society for
Quality Control, Milwaukee, WI.

American National Standard ANSI/ASQC Q90-1987 (1987b).

Quality Management and Quality System Elements —
Guidelines, American Society for Quality Control,
Milwaukee, WI.

American National Standard ANSI/ASQC ZI.2-1985 (1985).

Guide for Quality Control Charts, American Society for
Quality Control, Milwaukee, WI.
American National Standard ANSI/ASQC ZI.2-1985 (1985).
Control Chart Method of Analyzing Data, American Society
for Quality Control, Milwaukee, WI.

American National Standard ANSI/ASQC ZI.3-1985 (1985).

Control Chart Method of Controlling Quality during
Production, American Society for Quality Control,
Milwaukee, WI.

American National Standard ANSI/ASQC Z1.15-1979 (1979).

Generic Guidelines for Quality Systems, American Society
for Quality Control, Milwaukee, WI.

American National Standard ANSI/ASQC A3-1978 (1978).

Quality Systems Terminology, American Society for Quality
Control, Milwaukee, WI.

American National Standard ASQC Standard C1-1968 (1968).

Specification of General Requirements of a Quality Program,
American Society for Quality Control, Milwaukee, WI.

AmpliType User Guide for the HLA DQa Forensic DNA

Amplification and Typing Kit, 1990, Section — Laboratory
Setup, Cetus Corporation, Emeryville, CA.

ASCLD (1986). Guidelines for Forensic Laboratory

Management Practices, American Society of Crime Laboratory
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States 1850–1950, Doctoral thesis, University of
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New York, 1966; translation, Richard and Clara Winston. 343

Appendix B American Association of Forensic Science Article

II. Code of Ethics and Conduct

SECTION 1 — THE CODE: As a means to promote the highest

quality or

professional and personal conduct of its members, the

following constitutes
the Code of Ethics and Conduct which is endorsed and
adhered to by all

members of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences:

A. Every member of the American Academy of Forensic

Sciences shall refrain from exercising professional or
personal conduct adverse to the best interests and purposes
of the Academy.

B. Every member of the AAFS shall refrain from providing

any material misrepresentation of education, training,
experience or area of expertise. Misrepresentation of one
or more criteria for membership in the AAFS shall
constitute a violation of this section of the code.

C. Every member of the AAFS shall refrain from providing

any material misrepresentation of data upon which an expert
opinion or conclusion is based.

D. Every member of the AAFS shall refrain from issuing

public statements which appear to represent the position of
the Academy without specific authority first obtained from
the Board of Directors. 345

Appendix C American Board of Criminalistics Rules of

Professional Conduct

These rules describe conduct in the profession of forensic

science (criminal

istics) and are meant to encompass not only work done by

Applicants, Affil

iates and Diplomates, but to the extent possible, work

supervised by them

as well. They meet general acceptance by peers in that

profession. They specify

conduct that must be followed in order to apply for,

receive, and maintain

the certification status provided for by the American Board

of Criminalistics. Applicants, Affiliates and Diplomates of
the ABC shall:

1. Comply with the by-laws and regulations of the ABC.

2. Treat all information from an agency or client with the
confidentiality required.

3. Treat any object or item of potential evidential value

with the care and control necessary to ensure its
integrity.

4. Ensure that all exhibits in a case receive appropriate

technical analysis.

5. Ensure that appropriate standards and controls to

conduct examinations and analyses are utilized.

6. Ensure that techniques and methods which are known to be

inaccurate and/or unreliable are not utilized.

7. Ensure that a full and complete disclosure of the

findings is made to the submitting agency.

8. Ensure that work notes on all items, examinations,

results and findings are made at the time that they are
done, and appropriately preserved.

9. Render opinions and conclusions strictly in accordance

with the evidence in the case (hypothetical or real) and
only to the extent justified by that evidence.

10. Testify in a clear, straightforward manner and refuse

to extend themselves beyond their field of competence,
phrasing their testimony in such a manner so that the
results are not misinterpreted.

11. Not exaggerate, embellish or otherwise misrepresent

qualifications, when testifying.

12. Consent to, if it is requested and allowed, interviews

with counsel for both sides prior to trial.

13. Make efforts to inform the court of the nature and

implications of pertinent evidence if reasonably assured
that this information will not be disclosed to the court.

14. Maintain an attitude of independence and impartiality

in order to ensure an unbiased analysis of the evidence.

15. Carry out the duties of the profession in such a manner

so as to inspire the confidence of the public.

16. Regard and respect their peers with the same standards
that they hold for themselves.
17. Set a reasonable fee for services if it is appropriate
do so however, no services shall ever be rendered on a
contingency fee basis.

18. Find it appropriate to report to the Board, any

violation of these Rules of Professional Conduct by another
applicant or Diplomate. 347

Appendix D

The Code of Ethics of the California Association of

Criminalists Adopted May 17, 1957 Revised April 11, 1958
and May 17, 1985 (Section V.F)

Preamble

This Code is intended as a guide to the ethical conduct of

individual workers

in the field of criminalistics. It is not to be construed

that these principles are

immutable laws nor that they are all-inclusive. Instead,

they represent general

standards which each worker should strive to meet. It is to

be realized that each

individual case may vary, just as does the evidence which

the criminalist is

concerned, and no set of guides or rules will precisely fit

every occasion. At the

same time the fundamentals set forth in this Code are to be

regarded as

indicating, to a considerable extent, the conduct

requirements expected of

members of the profession and of this Association. The

failure to meet or

maintain certain of these standards will justifiably cast

doubt upon an individ

ual’s fitness for this type of work. Serious or repeated

infractions of these
principles may be regarded as inconsistent with membership
in the Association. Criminalistics is that professional
occupation concerned with the scien

tific analysis and examination of physical evidence, its

interpretation, and its

presentation in court. It involves the application of

principles, techniques

and methods of the physical sciences, and has as its

primary objective a

determination of physical facts which may be significant in

legal cases. It is the duty of any person practicing the
profession of criminalistics to

serve the interests of justice to the best of his ability

at all times. In fulfilling

this duty, he will use all of the scientific means at his

command to ascertain

all of the significant physical facts relative to the

matters under investigation.

Having made factual determinations, the criminalist must

then interpret and

evaluate his findings. In this he will be guided by

experience and knowledge

which, coupled with a serious consideration of his

analytical findings and

the application of sound judgment, may enable him to arrive

at opinions

and conclusions pertaining to the matters under study.

These findings of fact

and his conclusions and opinions should then be reported,

with all the

accuracy and skill of which the criminalist is capable, to

the end that all may

fully understand and be able to place the findings in their

proper relationship
to the problem at issue. In carrying out these functions,
the criminalist will be guided by those

practices and procedures which are generally recognized

within the profes

sion to be consistent with a high level of professional

ethics. The motives,

methods, and actions of the criminalist shall at all times

be above reproach,

in good taste and consistent with proper moral conduct.

I. Ethics Relating to Scientific Method:

A. The criminalist has a truly scientific spirit and should

be inquiring, progressive, logical and unbiased.

B. The true scientist will make adequate examination of his

materials, applying those tests essential to proof. He will
not, merely for the sake of bolstering his conclusions,
utilize unwarranted and superfluous tests an attempt to
give apparent greater weight to his results.

C. The modern scientific mind is an open one incompatible

with secrecy of method. Scientific analyses will not be
conducted by “secret processes”, nor will conclusions in
case work be based upon such tests and experiments as will
not be revealed to the profession.

D. A proper scientific method demands reliability of

validity in the materials analyzed. Conclusions will not be
drawn from materials which themselves appear
unrepresentative, atypical, or unreliable.

E. A truly scientific method requires that no generally

discredited or unreliable procedure be utilized in the
analysis.

F. The progressive worker will keep abreast of new

developments in scientific methods and in all cases view
them with an open mind. This is not to say that he need not
be critical of untried or unproved methods, but he will
recognize superior methods, if and when, they are
introduced.

II. Ethics Relating to Opinions and Conclusions:

A. Valid conclusions call for the application of proven

methods. Where it is practical to do so, the competent
criminalist will apply such methods throughout. This does
not demand the application of “standard test procedures”,
but, where practical, use should be made of those methods
developed and recognized by this or other professional
societies.

B. Tests are designed to disclose true facts and all

interpretations shall be consistent with that purpose and
will not be knowingly distorted.

C. Where appropriate to the correct interpretation of a

test, experimental controls shall be made for verification.

D. Where possible, the conclusions reached as a result of

analytical tests are properly verified by re-testing or the
application of additional techniques.

E. Where test results are inconclusive or indefinite, any

conclusions drawn shall be fully explained.

F. The scientific mind is unbiased and refuses to be swayed

by evidence or matters outside the specific materials under
consideration. It is immune to suggestion, pressures and
coercions inconsistent with the evidence hand, being
interested only in ascertaining facts.

G. The criminalist will be alert to recognize the

significance of a test result as it may relate to the
investigative aspects of a case. In this respect he will,
however, scrupulously avoid confusing scientific fact with
investigative theory in his interpretations.

H. Scientific method demands that the individual be aware

of his own limitations and refuse to extend himself beyond
them. It is both proper and advisable that the scientific
worker seek knowledge in new fields; he will not, however,
be hasty to apply such knowledge before he has had adequate
training and experience.

I. Where test results are capable of being interpreted to

the advantage either side of a case, the criminalist will
not choose that interpretation favoring the side by which
he is employed merely as a means of justify his employment.

J. It is both wise and proper that the criminalist be aware

of the various possible implications of his opinions and
conclusions and be prepared to weigh them, if called upon
to do so. In any such case, however, he will clearly
distinguish between that which may be regarded as
scientifically demonstrated fact and that which is
speculative.

III. Ethical Aspects of Court Presentation:

A. The expert witness is one who has substantially greater

knowledge of a given subject or science than has the
average person. An expert opinion is properly defined as
“the formal opinion of an expert.” Ordinary opinion
consists of one’s thoughts or beliefs on matters, generally
unsupported by detailed analysis of the subject under
consideration. Expert opinion is also defined as the
considered opinion of an expert, or a formal Judgment. It
is to be understood that an “expert opinion” is an opinion
derived only from a formal consideration of a subject
within the expert’s knowledge and experience.

B. The ethical expert does not take advantage of his

privilege to express opinions by offering opinions on
matters within his field of qualification which he has not
given formal consideration.

C. Regardless of legal definitions, the criminalist will

realize that there are degrees of certainty represented
under the single term of “expert opinion.” He will not take
advantage of the general privilege to assign greater
significance to an interpretation than is justified by the
available data.

D. Where circumstances indicate it to be proper, the expert

will not hesitate to indicate that while he has an opinion,
derived of study, and judgment within his field, the
opinion may lack the certainty of other opinions he might
offer. By this or other means, he takes care to leave no
false impressions in the minds of the jurors or the court
(sic)

E. In all respects, the criminalist will avoid the use of

terms, and opinions which will be assigned greater weight
than are due them. Where an opinion requires qualification
or explanation, it is not only proper but incumbent upon
the witness to offer such qualification.

F. The expert witness should keep in mind that the lay

juror is apt to assign greater or less significance to
ordinary words of a scientist than to the same words when
used by a lay witness. The criminalist, therefore, will
avoid such terms as may be misconstrued or misunderstood.

G. It is not the object of the criminalist’s appearance in

court to present only that evidence which supports the view
of the side which employs him. He has a moral obligation to
see to it that the court understands the evidence as it
exists and to present it in an impartial manner.

H. The criminalist will not by implication, knowingly or

intentionally, assist the contestants in a case through
such tactics as will implant a false impression in the
minds of the jury.

I. The criminalist, testifying as an expert witness, will

make every effort to use understandable language in his
explanations and demonstrations in order that the jury will
obtain a true and valid concept of the testimony. The use
of unclear, misleading, circuitous, or ambiguous language
with a view of confusing an issue in the minds of the court
or jury is unethical.

J. The criminalist will answer all questions put to him in

a clear, straightforward manner and refuse to extend
himself beyond his field of competence.

K. Where the expert must prepare photographs or offer oral

“background information” to the jury in respect to a
specific type of analytic method, this information shall be
reliable and valid, typifying the usual or normal basis for
the method. The instructional material shall be of that
level which will provide the jury with a proper basis for
evaluating the subsequent evidence presentations, and not
such as would provide them with a lower standard than the
science demands.

L. Any and all photographic displays shall be made

according to acceptable practice, and shall not be
intentionally altered or distorted with a view to
misleading court or jury.

M. By way of conveying information to the court, it is

appropriate that any of a variety of demonstrative
materials and methods be utilized by the expert witness.
Such methods and materials shall not, however, be unduly
sensational.

IV. Ethics Relating to the General Practice of

Criminalistics:

A. Where the criminalist engages in private practice, it is

appropriate that he set a reasonable fee for his services.

B. No services shall ever be rendered on a contingency fee

basis.

C. It shall be regarded as ethical for one criminalist to

re-examine evidence materials previously submitted to or
examined by another. Where a difference of opinion arises,
however, as to the significance of the evidence or to test
results, it is in the interest of the profession that every
effort be made by both analysts to resolve their conflict
before the case goes to trial.

D. Generally, the principle of “attorney-client”

relationship is considered to apply to the work of a
physical evidence consultant, except in a situation where a
miscarriage of justice might occur. Justice should be the
guiding principle.

E. It shall be ethical for one of this profession to serve

an attorney in a advisory capacity regarding the
interrogation of another expert who may be presenting
testimony. This service must be performed in good faith and
not maliciously. Its purpose is to prevent incompetent
testimony but not to thwart justice.

V. Ethical Responsibilities to the Profession:

In order to advance the profession of criminalistics, to

promote the purposes

for which the Association was formed, and encourage

harmonious relation

ships between all criminalists of the State, each

criminalist has an obligation

to conduct himself according to certain principles. These

principles are no

less matters of ethics than those outlined above. They

differ primarily in

being for the benefit of the profession rather than

specific obligations to

society. They, therefore, concern individuals and

departments in their rela

tionship with one another, business policies, and similar

matters.

A. It is in the interest of the profession that information

concerning any new discoveries, developments or techniques
applicable to the field of criminalistics be made available
to criminalists generally. A reasonable attempt should be
made by any criminalist having knowledge of such
developments to publicize or otherwise inform the
profession of them.

B. Consistent with this and like objectives, it is expected

that the attention of the profession will be directed
toward any tests or methods in use which appear invalid or
unreliable in order that they may be properly investigated.

C. In the interest of the profession, the individual

criminalist should refrain from seeking publicity for
himself or his accomplishments on specific cases. The
preparation of papers for publication in appropriate media,
however, is considered proper.

D. The criminalist shall discourage the association of his

name with developments, publications, or organizations in
which he has played no significant part, merely as a means
of gaining personal publicity or prestige.

E. The C.A.C. has been organized primarily to encourage a

free exchange of ideas and information between members. It
is, therefore, incumbent upon each member to treat with due
respect those statements and offerings made by his
associates. It is appropriate that no member shall
unnecessarily repeat statements or beliefs of another as
expressed at C.A.C. seminars.

F. It shall be ethical and proper for one criminalist to

bring to the attention of the Association a violation of
any of these ethical principles. Indeed, it shall be
mandatory where it appears that a serious infraction or
repeated violations have been committed and where other
appropriate corrective measures (if pursued) have failed.

G. This Code may be used by any criminalist in

justification of his conduct in a given case with the
understanding that he will have the full support of this
Association. 353

Appendix E Sample Likelihood and RMNE Calculations

3. Assuming neither race, number, nor identity of donors

1. Assuming the presence of the boyfriend The probability

of the profile is this many times more likely if the
boyfriend and suspect are the donors than if the boyfriend
and a random man of the indicated race are the donors

2. Assuming neither donor is identified The probability of

the profile is this many times more likely if the suspect
and a random man are the donors than if two random men of
the indicated race are the donors

P E

P E Boyfriend Suspect Boyfriend random man AfAm ECauc

6.6E-10 1,500,000,000 Hisp 7.7E-11 13,000,000,000 + ( ) + (
) = = 1 5 7 10 1 700 000 000 . , , ,

P E P E Suspect random man random men AfAm E ECauc EE4

,000,000 Hisp EE200,000,000 + ( ) ( ) = − = = = 2 4 0 09 1
2 16 33 000 000 4 1 08 9 1 16 5 2 7 07 1 3 15 . . , , . . .
.

RMNE Freq = 5.4E-07 = 1 in 1 800 000, , 355

Appendix F Fundamental Principles and Concepts of

Criminalistics The Crime Thinking Is Allowed

The Origin of Evidence

The Principles of Criminalistics • Divisible matter Matter

divides into smaller component parts when sufficient force
is applied. The component parts will acquire
characteristics created by the process of division itself
and retain physicochemical properties of the larger piece.
Three corollaries: Corollary 1 : Some characteristics
retained by the smaller pieces are unique to the original
item or to the division process. These traits are useful
for individualizing all pieces to the original item.
Corollary 2 : Some characteristics retained by the smaller
pieces are common to the original item as well as to other
items of similar manufacture. We rely on these traits to
classify the item. Corollary 3: Some characteristics of
the original item will be lost or changed during or after
the moment of division and subsequent dispersal; this
confounds the attempt to infer a common source. • Transfer
( Locard exchange principle ) Conventionally: every contact
leaves a trace. As defined here: when two objects come in
contact, material may be exchanged. The Crime

The Practice of Criminalistics At the crime scene What? |

When? | Where? | Who? | How? | Why? We see what we want to
see Recognition and detection of evidence Goals of
Evidence Collection •Maintain physical integrity •Limit
degradation •Prevent contamination Contamination: Any
substance inadvertently introduced into or onto an item of
evidence after its recognition by a responsible party. If
you don’t ask the right question, you won’t get the right
answer, no matter how brilliant your analysis.

The Processes of Criminalistics Identification Defining

the physicochemical nature of an evidence item.
Classification Inferring multiple potential common sources
for an evidence item. Class Characteristics Traits that are
produced by a controlled process. They are used to group
like objects into sets. Individualization Concluding a
singular common source for two items Individualizing
Characteristics Traits that are produced by a random,
uncontrolled process. They are used to individualize items
to a common source. Association An inference of contact
between two objects, the source of the evidence, and the
target on which it was found. Reconstruction The ordering
of events in relative space and time based on the physical
evidence. The results The true result A false negative
result A false positive result An inconclusive result No
result What does it mean? (A)ssumptions + (F)acts =
(I)nference Inference : to conclude from something known or
assumed. Opinion : a judgment not based on absolute
certainty or positive knowledge, but on what seems true,
valid, or probable to one’s own mind. Conclusion : the last
division of a discourse, usually containing a summing up of
the points and a statement of opinion or decisions reached.
Communication The report • Summary • Purpose • List of
evidence received and examined • Examination and results •
Interpretation and conclusion

Criminalistics and the Law • Identification evidence is

direct evidence. It does not require an inference to be
relevant evidence. • Potentially individualizing evidence
is circumstantial evidence. It requires an inference to be
relevant evidence. • Evidence must be relevant (answer a
question about a fact in question) to be admitted into a
court of law. 359

Appendix G Physical Evidence by Origin

Shape shifters do not meet these requirements.

Nonbiological Physical Match Anything that can divide and
retain its shape 1 Prints and Impressions Prints Shoeprints
Tire tracks Impressions Shoe impressions Tire impressions
Toolmarks Firearms “Trace” Fibers, Particles, Soil, Paint,
etc. Drugs Solid dose drug analysis Toxicology Questioned
Documents Handwriting/typesetting Paper and ink Biological
Physiological Biochemical/antigenic (serology, blood
groups) DNA Somatic Prints Friction ridge Other body parts
(ears, lips, etc.) Retinal patterns

This organization of physical evidence emphasizes the

difference between

biological and nonbiological physician evidence. Biological

evidence, or what

we refer to as personal identification evidence, can be

linked directly to an

individual. Nonbiological physical evidence can be linked

to a person only

through inferring multiple intervening associations.