Casibang, Merlyn Jr., M.

Rule 131, Section 3- Disputable Presumptions

People of the Philippines vs. Juanito Entrampas

LEONEN, J.

FACTS: This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the
ruling of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) finding Juanito Entrampas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape.

Entrampas and BBB co-habited for eight years, from 1995 to 2003. AAA, BBB’s
daughter from a previous relationship, lived with them. Sometime in February 2003, at
about 5:00 p.m., AAA arrived from school and was asked to go to the room upstairs by
Entrampas. Once in the room, Entrampas forced AAA to lie down on the floor and took
off the child’s panty, undressed himself and inserted his penis into her vagina. As he
consummated the act, she noticed a knife on the wall within his reach. She became
more fearful. After satisfying himself, he again warned the child that he would kill her
mother if she informed anyone about the incident. The incident occurred again a week
later. By September 2003, AAA’s belly had become noticeably bigger. She was brought
to the dispensary where her urine test was submitted for analysis. AAA’s pregnancy test
yielded positive. Thereafter, Entrampas was charged with two count of qualified rape
under the Revised Penal Code before the RTC. The RTC found the accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape which was affirmed by the CA.

Before the Supreme Court, Entrampas questioned the RTC’s appreciation of the age of
the victim at the time of the commission of rape. He claimed that the birth certificate cast
doubt on whether the victim was indeed below 12 years old in February 2003, when the
offense was first committed. According to him, AAA’s birth certificate should be
questioned as it was registered late.

ISSUE: Whether the birth certificate as a public document be used as a basis of the
victim’s age in a case for statutory rape?

RULING: Yes, the birth certificate is a public document enough to establish the age of
the victim in a case of statutory rape.

Absent proof to the contrary, Entrampas objection must be set aside. In Baldos vs. CA,
the Court held that a public document such as a birth certificate generally enjoys the
presumption of regularity. Entrampas failed to present any evidence to overturn this legal
presumption.

Thus, it is not for AAA to prove that the Certificate of Live Birth reflects the truth of the
facts stated in it, rather, it is for Entrampas to rebut the presumption that AAA’s birth
certificate sufficiently established her birth on November 11, 1991. Entrampas miserably
failed to do this. A careful examination of the records show that there is nothing that
would warrant a reversal of the Decisions of the RTC and the CA. when a woman,
especially a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was committed.
Thus, the CA was correct in affirming RTC’s decision finding Entrampas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two counts of statutory rape.

ADELFA DIO TOLENTINO, VIRGINIA DIO, RENATO DIO, and HEIRS OF ROBERTO DIO,
represented by ROGER DIO, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES MARIA JERERA AND EBON LATAGAN, substituted by his heirs, namely:
MA. JANELITA LATAGAN-BULAWAN, YVONNE LATAGAN, LESLIE LATAGAN,
RODOLFO H. LATAGAN, EMMANUEL NOEL H. LATAGAN, GEMMA LATAGAN-DE
LEON, MARIE GLEN LATAGAN-CERUJALES, and CELESTE LATAGAN-BO; and
SALVE VDA. DE JERERA, Respondents.

GR No. 179874, June 22, 2015

PERALTA, J.

FACTS: Guillermo Jerera died and left the subject property (a parcel of land) to be
divided among his 6 heirs. In 1933, Servillano, Dionisia, Teofilo, and Cipriano (four of the
6 heirs) sold their shares with right to repurchase to Amado Dio.

In 1967, Dio executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership, stating that the four
abovementioned heirs have neither exercised their right to repurchase the subject
property nor paid the purchase price back. Dio succeeded and gave his children and
legal heirs the right to inherit it. Respondents alleged that in 1970, the subject property is
sold back by Dio to Servillano.

In 1971, Servillano sold this to his daughter respondent Maria Jerera evidenced by a
Deed of Sale. Interestingly, in 1977, the subject property is the subject of another Deed
of Sale by Servillano to the respondent.

In 1978, Servillano subdivided the property prompting the petitioners to file a complaint
for quieting of title alleging that they are the successors-in-interest of Dio over the
subject property.

Petitioners assert that the 1970 sale by Dio to Servillano is simulated and/or fictitious for
being a forgery, hence, all transactions emanating from it are null and void. They also
raise the lack of consideration by respondent Maria as based on her testimony (that the
1977 sale is without consideration)

Respondents answered that they have acquired the subject property thru Servillano on
the 1971 sale, and 1977 sale only confirmed it.

RTC held that the Deed of Sale executed by Dio in favor of Servillano is simulated or
fictitious for being a forgery because the signature of Dio in the questioned document of
sale is significantly different from that as appearing in his cedula. Also, respondent is
aware of this when she took the land thru the 1971 sale. Therefore, she cannot be
considered a buyer in good faith and for value. CA reversed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 1971 sale to respondent one for consideration.
 HELD: YES, Petitioner alleges that respondent, in her testimony admitted that she did
not pay her father the purchase price of the property subject of the Deed of Sale
executed on 1977. Therefore, such is proof that such contract is void ab initio for lack of
valuable consideration.

As to the SC the lack of consideration for the 1977 sale: it is presumed that a written
contract is for a valuable consideration. Thus, the execution of a deed purporting to
convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie evidence of the existence of a
valuable consideration and the party alleging lack of consideration has the burden of
proving such allegation. Petitioners failed to present clear and convincing evidence to
overturn such disputable presumption. Respondent Maria was able to explain her
testimony that she did not pay anymore because such sale is only confirmatory of the
1971 sale. The petition was DENIED.

JACINTO BAGAPORO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

J. REYES, JR., J.

FACTS: On March 10, 1986, Accused Bagaporo married Dennia Dumlao in a ceremony
solemnized by Quezon City Judge Perfecto Laguio. 

On Sept. 11, 1991, without his marriage with Dumlao having been dissolved or annulled,
Bagaporo contracted a second and subsequent marriage with Milagros Lumas. Because of
this, Bagaporo was charged with Bigamy. 

RTC of QC found him guilty and on appeal of his conviction to the CA, Bagaporo’s former
counsel, Atty. Cerdon, broached the idea that Bagaporo might want to engage a new lawyer
based near in Manila to handle the appeal, prompting Bagaporo to consult his present
counsel, Atty. Causing who advised Bagaporo to secure Atty. Cerdon’s formal withdrawal
but nonetheless filed a Motion to Withdraw Notice of Appeal and MR before the RTC (copies
furnished Atty. Cerdon as Bagaporo clarified with the former’s secretary that Atty. Cerdon
remains his counsel despite the engagement of Atty. Causing for post-judgment remedies.

CA sent notice to Atty. Cerdon requiring his client Bagaporo to file an appellant’s brief. For
failure to file, CA dismissed the case.

Hence, Bagaporo filed this Petition for Relief from Resolution or Judgment in Case Entry
was Already Ordered, alleging gross negligence on the part of Atty. Cerdon. On the merits,
Bagaporo insists the elements of bigamy were not proved and that the ast clause thereof
(i.e., “or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of
a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings”) violates the equal protection clause
and the due process clause. 

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a need for a judicial declaration of a disputable

RULING: YES, Bagaporo’s arguments: 

Alleged good faith and that there is no need for a judicial declaration of a disputable
presumption (of death of the absent spouse) that has already been provided by law; and 

That it was the prosecution's burden to prove that his absent wife was still alive when he
contracted his second marriage. He asks, what if his absent spouse was in fact already
dead, which is undeniably possible? He argues that there is no substantial distinction
between such a situation and that of a present spouse who contracts a subsequent
marriage with the knowledge that the absent spouse is already dead. 

SC ruled against Bagaporo, and reiterated its ruling in the case of Manuel vs. People
(2005), to wit: 

1. Such judicial declaration constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith
and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private
complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such
case. The petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

2. The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Art. 349 RPC requires a
judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse for the benefit of: 
 The spouse present, as protection from the consequences of a second
marriage, precisely because /he could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the
defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible; and 

The State since under Article II, Sec. 12 Const., "the State shall protect and strengthen
the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Public policy, good morals and the
interest of society require that the marital relation should be surrounded with every
safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes specified by
law. Parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the proceedings.