Ch1Crowdfunding Anintroduction
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insight into the firm’s products and business model, test demand, build
brand awareness and make advance sales. But there are downsides to this
engagement. First, entrepreneurs are often unprepared for the flood of
feedback from these audiences. Second, it is time-consuming to maintain
positive social engagement (Hui et al., 2014). Third, social engagement
is likely to generate conflicting or even erroneous advice from audience
members. Moreover, the increasing use of automated lending, particularly
on P2P platforms in which software is used to allocate the funds of lenders
based on their specified lending criteria with the available investments
(CAF, 2017), is removing the direct connection between the investor and
the investee business.
An emerging concern is that it is no longer just the crowd who are par-
ticipating on crowdfunding platforms. Financial institutions are becoming
increasingly involved on both debt and equity crowdfunding platforms
which, as Salomon (Chapter 13 in this book) notes, is ‘crowdinvesting
without a crowd’. P2P platforms are attracting investment from traditional
banks, mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds and asset management
firms (CAF, 2017). For example, the peer-to-peer lender Funding Circle
now secures most of its funding from institutions (Financial Times, 2018a).
Some French banks have launched their own crowdfunding platforms,
others have developed affiliations with existing platforms, while yet others
have acquired existing platforms (Attuel-Mendès, 2017). Professional
investors, including venture capital (VC) funds, corporate finance houses
and business angels, also have a growing presence on equity crowdfunding
websites (Financial Times, 2017b) for example, co-investing alongside
individual investors.
At least one major crowdfunding platform, Syndicate Room, only
features deals that have attracted backing from professional investors
(Financial Times, 2017b). Large corporations are also recognizing the
benefits of working with crowdfunding platforms. For example, General
Electric, toymaker Hasbro and brewer Anheuser-Busch have worked
with Indiegogo to aid their product development. GE Appliances
successfully crowdfunded Opal, an ice maker, and Paragon, a cook-
ing device. The benefits from this collaboration include a significant
shortening of the time taken to go from concept to production (just four
months) and a reduction in upfront costs compared with a traditional
product roll-out (one-twentieth of what would be expected) (Financial
Times, 2017c). Chinese Internet giants (for example, Alibaba) have
entered the equity crowdfunding industry by setting up their own
crowdinvesting platforms that serve the various needs of these firms.
Meanwhile, Zopa, the world’s oldest P2P lender, is expanding into
traditional banking. This is seen as a way for Zopa to broaden its
funding base with ‘sticky’ retail deposits, with the motivation for the
move interpreted as a response to anticipated regulatory crackdown on
crowdfunding (Financial Times, 2018b).
The consequences of these developments remain to be seen. The
participation of institutional investors in the funding process can give
retail investors a positive signal about the creditworthiness and repayment
ability of borrowers (Lin et al., 2017). Similarly, the involvement of profes-
sional investors, such as venture capital firms and business angels, plays
an important role in legitimating deal sourcing and the start-up evaluation
process and leveraging the fundraising (Salomon, 2018). However, there is
evidence of a shift towards ‘growth stage’ rather than smaller ‘seed stage’
investments on UK equity crowdfunding platforms, which is consistent
with the preference of institutional investors such as venture capital funds
for such businesses (Financial Times, 2017b). More generally, the entry
of big institutional investors may cause crowding-out effects for small
investors (Lin et al., 2017).
A final concern is the level of risk that investors are exposed to on
crowdfunding platforms. This has three dimensions. First is the lack of
regulation, especially on reward crowdfunding platforms. Equity crowd-
funding platforms have greater regulation, although this varies between
countries (see Tenca and Franzoni, Chapter 12 in this book). Regulators
in several countries are increasingly expressing concerns that crowd-
funding platforms are giving a misleading or unrealistically optimistic
impression of the investment while attracting retail customers with little
experience of investing. The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)
has raised concerns that some investors are overexposed to P2P lending,
putting more than 10 per cent of their net investible wealth and retirement
savings into P2P lending (FCA, 2018).
Second is that crowdfunding platforms lack governance mechanisms.
The consequence of enabling entrepreneurial ventures to raise finance
from numerous individuals, each making small financial investments, is
that there is no incentive for anyone to pay for the costs of monitoring
risk. It also means that there are no mechanisms in place that address
the problems associated with moral hazard, adverse selection and overall
shirking that arise from the lack of alignment of goals and the difficul-
ties created by asymmetric information that occur when ownership and
control are separated (for example, investment instruments, independent
boards, chief executive officer dismissals, and direct and active monitoring
of the entrepreneur). The most obvious risk to investors is fraud. There
have been cases of fraudulent crowdfunding platforms (for example, in
China where the P2P crowdfunding has been ‘routinely described by
analysts and investors as the “wild west” of online lending’; Financial
Times, 2017d3) in which investors have lost their money. These issues are
being addressed by tighter regulation (Financial Times, 2017d, 2018c).
At the individual project scale the evidence suggests that although fraud
occurs, it is rare (Mollick, 2014). However, Hainz (2018) raises the concern
that the fact that we observe a limited amount of fraud in crowdfunding
may be due to the low incentive to detect them in the first place. Since
funders contribute only small amounts and so are unable to coordinate
their efforts to detect frauds, this may result in the true dimension of the
problem being underestimated.
Third, and of greater concern, is the risk of adverse selection: that
entrepreneurs will fail to deliver the projects. This may be a particular
risk on crowdfunding platforms if – as has been suggested – they are
dominated by projects that have been rejected by conventional financi-
ers or have been discouraged from seeking finance from these sources.
However, investors may lack the skills to do their own due diligence.
More significantly, because of the small investments that investors are
making, they have no economic incentive to undertake due diligence.
Indeed, most investors are reported to spend less than 20 minutes per
week on selecting investments (CAF, 2017). This is likely to encourage
herding behaviour. In the absence of information about a venture, an
investor often looks at the actions of other investors as a way of making
their decision (see Dushnitsky and Zunino, Chapter 3 in this book).
Meanwhile, automated lending removes the possibility of doing personal
due diligence. Concern has also been expressed that investors on equity
crowdfunding platforms are paying a much higher price for the shares
that they buy in start-ups than professional investors do, and receive
B-class shares that have no voting rights or contractual protection against
dilution (Financial Times, 2017c, 2018d).
There is very little evidence on the financial outcomes of businesses
that have raised debt or equity finance from crowdfunding platforms.
One recent study in the UK by AltFi Data and law firm Nabarro found
that one in five companies that raised money on equity crowdfunding
platforms between 2011 and 2013 had gone bankrupt (Financial Times,
2017b). However, such concerns may be irrelevant. Townsend and Hunt
(Chapter 6 in this book) argue that the dominant ethos of crowdfunding is
shared commitment rather than investment. Backers are not motivated by
financial return even on lending and equity platforms. They suggest that
crowdfunding is not a diffuse version of traditional debt and equity mar-
kets, but is an entirely different model of funding. However, such attitudes
may vary by type of investor and type of investment. For example, the
different motivations of investors in film projects and theatre projects have
been highlighted, with investors in film being investment-focused whereas
theatre investors are motivated by their general passion for the theatre and
‘first night experiences’ (Financial Times, 2017e).
A further emerging concern about the risk to investors is that the vast
majority of crowdfunding platforms have been established since the
Global Financial Crisis and so have not been through a full economic
cycle. The UK’s Financial Conduct Authority has commented that ‘it is
important to recognise that the sector is still relatively new and has not
been through a full economic cycle. When economic conditions tighten,
losses on loans and investments may increase’ (FCA, 2018). This is a
particular issue for P2P platforms, where the concern is that a rise in
interest rates could trigger a spate of defaults on loans. These concerns
prompted Lord Adair Turner, the chairman of the UK’s former financial
regulation body, the Financial Services Authority, to predict that ‘the
losses which will emerge from peer-to-peer lending over the next five to
ten years will make the bankers look like lending geniuses’ (Financial
Times, 2016).
Part III of the book synthesizes our knowledge on the crowdfunding pro-
cess. In Chapter 7, Chandresh Baid and Thomas Allison ask the question:
Why are some crowdfunding campaigns successful while others are not?
In order to answer the question, the authors make use of signalling theory,
communication and social capital to show how each of these theoretical
lenses can help us to understand whether, and how, crowdfunding deals get
done. Chapter 8 by Tom Vanacker, Silvio Vismara and Xavier Walthoff-
Borm asks the question: What happens after a crowdfunding campaign? The
authors argue that ‘success’ in the crowdfunding context is often defined as
raising funds in a crowdfunding campaign, but although this is an important
milestone, it only represents a beginning of building a viable business. This
chapter reviews what is known about firms and projects after they have suc-
cessfully raised funds (or failed to raise funds) on crowdfunding platforms.
Some of the suggestions that the authors in Part III identify for future
research are as follows:
1.4.6 Summary
NOTES
1. Three types of platform models have been identified by the FCA (2018): (a) the conduit
platform in which the investor picks the investment opportunity (loan or security) and
the platform administers the investment arrangements; (b) the pricing platform in which
the platform sets the price but the investor picks the underlying loan; and (c) the discre-
tionary platform in which the platform sets the price and chooses the investor’s portfolio
to generate a target rate of return.
2. For example, the chief executive officer of equity crowdfunding platform Seedrs said
that it gives individuals the chance to buy shares in high growth firms at an early stage, ‘a
privilege once restricted to institutions and private equity firms’ (Financial Times, 2017a).
3. In China many investors have lost money investing in P2P platforms, some of which
were fraudulent Ponzi schemes, while others have closed down either because of liquidity
problems resulting from high risk lending or because of tougher regulation (Bloomberg,
2018; Reuters, 2018). This has resulted in a decline from 6000 to less than 2000 P2P
platforms (Financial Times, 2018c).
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