Execution is a matter of right upon the expiration of the period to appeal and no appeal was

perfected from a judgment or final order that disposes of the action or proceeding. 1 Once a
judgment becomes final and executory, issuance of a writ of execution becomes a matter of
right to the prevailing party, except when subsequent judgment would render execution of
judgment unjust.

[ G.R. No. 227917, March 17, 2021 ]

SPOUSES RUDY FERNANDEZ AND CRISTETA AQUINO, PETITIONERS, VS. SPOUSES

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

An easement is an encumbrance on a property for the benefit of another property owned by another.
It involves a grant to use a portion or aspect of the property, without relinquishing ownership or
possession over it. The property on which the easement is imposed, and which will be used by the
other, is called the servient estate. The property to which the use is granted is the dominant estate.
The Civil Code provides:

ARTICLE 613. An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.

The immovable in favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate; that
which is subject thereto, the servient estate. (530)

In an easement of right of way, there is a portion of the servient estate dedicated to the passage of
the dominant estate's owner. It is thus a discontinuous easement, used only in intervals and
depending on whether a person needs to pass through another person's property. In Bogo-Medellin
Milling Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:42

Under civil law and its jurisprudence, easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to
the manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications of the existence of such easements. Thus, easement is continuous if its use is, or may
be, incessant without the intervention of any act of man, like the easement of drainage; and it is
discontinuous if it is used at intervals and depends on the act of man, like the easement of right of
way.

The easement of right of way is considered discontinuous because it is exercised only if a person
passes or sets foot on somebody else's land.

... In other words, the very exercise of the servitude depends upon the act or intervention of man
which is the very essence of discontinuous easements.

. . . The presence of physical or visual signs only classifies an easement into apparent or non-
apparent. Thus, a road (which reveals a right of way) and a window (which evidences a right to light

1
Sec.1, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
and view) are apparent easements, while an easement of not building beyond a certain height is
non-apparent.43(Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)

As a discontinuous easement, an easement of right of way is acquired only by title:

ARTICLE 622. Continuous nonapparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or
not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title. (539)

Generally, title over the use an easement of right of way is acquired voluntarily (by contract between
the two estates) or legally (by filing a case in court for its conferment):

But when is a party deemed to acquire title over the use of such land (that is, title over the easement
of right of way)? In at least two cases, we held that if: (a) it had subsequently entered into
contractual right of way with the heirs for the continued use of the land under the principles of
voluntary easements or (b) it had filed a case against the heirs for conferment on it of a legal
easement of right of way under Article 629 of the Civil Code, then title over the use of the land is
deemed to exist. The conferment of a legal easement of right of way under Article 629 is subject to
proof of the following:

(1) it is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway;

(2) payment of proper indemnity;

(3) the isolation is not the result of its own acts; and

(4) the right of way claimed is at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and, insofar
as consistent with this rule, the distance from the dominant estate to the highway is the
shortest.44(Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)

Every buyer of a registered land who takes a certificate of title for value and in good faith
shall hold the same free of all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate. It has
been held, however, that "where the party has knowledge of a prior existing interest that was
unregistered at the time he acquired a right to the same land, his knowledge of that prior
unregistered interest has the effect of registration as to him."

G.R. Nos. 173148               April 6, 2015

ELSA DEGAYO, Petitioner, 
vs.
CECILIA MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN, JOHNNY DINGLASAN, ASUNCION MAGBANUA-PORRAS,
MARIANO P ASCUALITO and AMADO JR., all surnamed MAGBANUA, Respondents.

This provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment.
The first aspect is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action. 18 In traditional terminology, this aspect is known as merger
or bar; in modern terminology, it is called claim preclusion. 19

The second aspect precludes the relitigation of a particular fact of issue in another action between
the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. This is traditionally known as collateral
estoppel; in modern terminology, it is called issue preclusion. 20

Conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in
issue, judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction. The
fact or question settled by final judgment or order binds the parties to that action (and persons in
privity with them or their successors-in-interest), and continues to bind them while the judgment or
order remains standing and unreversed by proper authority on a timely motion or petition; the
conclusively settled fact or question furthermore cannot again be litigated in any future or other
action between the same parties or their privies and successors-in-interest, in the same or in any
other court of concurrent jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. 21 Thus,
only the identities of parties and issues are required for the operation of the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment.22

While conclusiveness of judgment does not have the same barring effect as that of a bar by former
judgment that proscribes subsequent actions, the former nonetheless estops the parties from raising
in a later case the issues or points that were raised and controverted, and were determinative of the
ruling in the earlier case.23 In other words, the dictum laid down in the earlier final judgment or order
becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties, their privies and
successors-in-interest, as long as the facts on which that judgment was predicated continue to be
the facts of the case or incident before the court in a later case; the binding effect and enforceability
of that earlier dictum can no longer be re-litigated in a later case since the issue has already been
resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.24

In the present case, it is beyond dispute that the judgment in Civil Case No. 16047 has attained
finality in view of the tenant’s abandonment of their appeal to the CA. Moreover, records show that
that decision was adjudicated on the merits, i.e., it was rendered after a consideration of the
evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case25 by a court which had
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.

We likewise find that there is an identity of parties in Civil Case No. 16047 and the present case.
There is identity of parties where the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between
them, or they are "successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action,
litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. 26 Absolute identity of
parties is not required, shared identity of interest is sufficient to invoke the coverage of this
principle.27 Thus, it is enough that there is a community of interest between a party in the first case
and a party in the second case even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case. 28

It is not disputed that respondents were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 16047. Degayo, however
insists that she is not bound by the decision in Civil Case No. 16047 as she was not made a party in
that case. We, however, refuse to subscribe to this technical interpretation of the Rules. In Torres v.
Caluag,29 we held that a real litigant may be held bound as a party even if not formally impleaded
because he had his day in court and because her substantial rights were not prejudiced. In that
case, J. M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. (Tuason) commenced Civil Case No Q-3674 in the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City against Isidro Conisido to recover from him the possession of a parcel of
land. Conisido answered the complaint alleging, that he was occupying the land in question as a
mere tenant of Dominga Torres (Torres), who owned both the land and the house thereon. Torres
was not impleaded in the said case but she nonetheless appeared as witness for Conisido and
asserted her ownership over the disputed property because she had purchased it from Eustaquio
Alquiroz on October 20, 1951 and constructed a house thereon worth ₱500.00, which she had
leased to Conisido for a rental of ₱20.00 a month. The CFI eventually decided in favor of Tuason
and that decision became final and executory. Subsequently, Torres filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court to set aside the decision of the CFI. Indismissing the petition, we ruled:

"x x x, it appears that DomingaTorres who, according to the defendant Conisido was the true owner
ofthe land in question, testified as his witness and asserted on the witness stand that she was really
the owner thereof because she had purchased it from Eustaquio Alquiroz on October 20, 1951 and
constructed a house thereon worth ₱500.00 which she had leased to Conisido for a rental of ₱20.00
a month. In other words, petitioner herein had really had her day in court and had laid squarely
before the latter the issue of ownership as between her, on one hand, and respondent Tuason, on
the other.