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Kami Export - Lisbeth Pacheco Escorcia - Cuban Missile Crisis Student Materials - 7

The documents discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis between the US and Soviet Union in October 1962. Khrushchev proposes removing Soviet missiles from Cuba if the US removes its missiles from Turkey. Kennedy agrees to this deal in a letter to Khrushchev while keeping the Turkey part secret due to NATO obligations. In a private meeting, Robert Kennedy warns the Soviet ambassador that the US remains determined to remove the Cuban missiles by any means, including bombing, and hopes to resolve the crisis quickly through negotiations.
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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
62 views5 pages

Kami Export - Lisbeth Pacheco Escorcia - Cuban Missile Crisis Student Materials - 7

The documents discuss the Cuban Missile Crisis between the US and Soviet Union in October 1962. Khrushchev proposes removing Soviet missiles from Cuba if the US removes its missiles from Turkey. Kennedy agrees to this deal in a letter to Khrushchev while keeping the Turkey part secret due to NATO obligations. In a private meeting, Robert Kennedy warns the Soviet ambassador that the US remains determined to remove the Cuban missiles by any means, including bombing, and hopes to resolve the crisis quickly through negotiations.
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Textbook Passage

After the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Soviet Union gave Cuba more
weapons. In October 1962, President Kennedy learned that the Soviets were
secretly building missile bases on the island. If the bases were completed, atomic
missiles could reach American cities within minutes.

Kennedy announced that American warships would stop any Soviet ship
carrying missiles. The world waited tensely as Soviet ships steamed toward
Cuba. At the last minute, the Soviet ships turned back. “We’re eyeball to eyeball,”
said Secretary of State Dean Rusk, “and I think the other fellow just blinked.”

Kennedy’s strong stand led the Soviets to compromise. Khrushchev


agreed to remove Soviet missiles from Cuba. In turn, the United States promised
not to invade the island. Still the Cuban missile crisis had shaken both American
and Soviet officials. In all the years of the Cold War, the world never came closer
to a full-scale nuclear war.

Source: The American Nation, Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Pearson Prentice Hall,
2003, p. 823.

Cuban Missile Crisis


Document A: Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy
(Modified)

Moscow, October 27, 1962.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT,

I understand your concern for the security of the United States…

You wish to ensure the security of your country, and this is understandable. But
Cuba, too, wants the same thing; all countries want to maintain their security. But
how are we, the Soviet Union, to [understand] the fact that you have surrounded
the Soviet Union with military bases; surrounded our allies with military bases;
placed military bases literally around our country; and stationed your missile
armaments there? This is no secret. . . .Your missiles are located in Britain, are
located in Italy, and are aimed against us. Your missiles are located in Turkey.

You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is 90
miles by sea from the coast of the United States of America. But you have placed
destructive missile weapons, which you call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to
us.

I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from Cuba the [missiles]
which you regard as offensive. Your representatives will make a declaration to
the effect that the United States, for its part, . . . will remove its [missiles] from
Turkey.

We, in making this pledge, will promise not to invade Turkey. . .The United States
Government will promise not to invade Cuba . . .

The greatest joy for all peoples would be the announcement of our agreement.

These are my proposals, Mr. President.

Respectfully yours,

N. Khrushchev

Source: Letter from Soviet Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy. U.S.,


Department of State, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1961-
1963, Volume XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath.

Cuban Missile Crisis


Document B: Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev
(Modified)

Washington, October 27, 1962

Dear Mr. Chairman:


I have read your letter of Oct. 26th with great care and welcomed the
statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. As I read your
letter, the key elements of your proposals…are as follows:
1) You would agree to remove these weapons from Cuba under
appropriate United Nations observation and supervision; and halt the further
introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.
2) We, on our part, would agree…a) to remove promptly the [blockade]
now in effect and (b) to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba, I am
confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do
likewise.

There is no reason why we should not be able to complete these arrangements


and announce them to the world within a couple of days. The effect of such a
settlement on easing world tensions would enable us to work toward a more
general arrangement regarding "other armaments", as proposed in your letter.

But the first step, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on missile sites in
Cuba . . . . The continuation of this threat by linking these problems to the
broader questions of European and world security, would surely [be] a grave risk
to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree along the
lines outlined in this letter and in your letter of October 26.

John F. Kennedy

Source: Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev. New York


Times, Oct 27, 1962, pg. 30.

Vocabulary
Cessation: end

Cuban Missile Crisis


Document C: Russian Ambassador Cable to Soviet Foreign Ministry
(Modified)

Dobrynin’s (Russia’s Ambassador to the United States) cable to the Soviet Foreign
Ministry, October 27, 1962.

Late tonight Robert Kennedy (President Kennedy’s Attorney General) invited me to


come see him. We talked alone.

Kennedy stated that, “The US government is determined to get rid of those bases [in
Cuba]—up to, in the extreme case, of bombing them, since, I repeat, they pose a
great threat to the security of the USA. In response I am sure the Soviets will
respond and a real war will begin, in which millions of Americans and Russians will
die. We want to avoid that in any way we can, I’m sure that the government of the
USSR has the same wish.”

“The most important thing for us is to get an agreement as soon as possible with the
Soviet government to halt further work on the construction of the missile bases in
Cuba and take measures under international control that would make it impossible to
use these weapons.”

“And what about Turkey?” I asked R. Kennedy

“If that is the only obstacle to achieving the rules I mentioned earlier, then the
president doesn’t see any difficulties in resolving this issue” replied R. Kennedy.
“The greatest difficulty for the president is the public discussion of the issue of
Turkey. The deployment of missile bases in Turkey was officially done by special
decision of the NATO Council. To announce now a unilateral decision by the
president of the USA to withdraw missile bases from Turkey—this would damage the
entire structure of NATO and the US position as the leader of NATO. However,
President Kennedy is ready to come to agreement on that question with Khrushchev.
I think that in order to withdraw these bases from Turkey we need 4-5 months.
However, the president can’t say anything public in this regard about Turkey.”

R. Kennedy then warned that his comments about Turkey are extremely confidential;
besides him and his brother, only 2-3 people know about it in Washington.

“The president also asked Khrushchev to give him an answer within the next day,”
Kennedy said in conclusion.

Source: Russian Ambassador Dobrynin cable to Foreign Ministry, October 27, 1962.
Russian Foreign Ministry archives; publicly released in the early 1990s.

Vocabulary
Unilateral: one-sided

Cuban Missile Crisis


Guiding Questions Lisbeth Pacheco
Name___________

Document A: Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy

1. What deal does Khrushchev propose to Kennedy?


That the soviets are willing to remove from Cuba the missiles which they regard as offensive.

2. What is the tone of this letter? Provide a quote to support your claim.

Khrushchev is applied by U.S. and that they dared threaten the Soviets.

3. Do you think Khrushchev has the upper hand? Why or why not?
He does because Khrushchev´s telling the U.S. that if they step down, he will.He has them in a
corner and is forcing them to make a decision.

Document B: Letter from President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev

4. In this letter Kennedy restates Khrushchev’s proposals. Does Kennedy include


everything Khrushchev proposed? If not, why might have he left something out?
Yes, he agrees to remove the missiles in Turkey as long as the Soviet Union removes
theirs from Cuba.

5. What is the tone of this letter? Provide a quote to support your claim.
Optimistic, he is telling Khrushchev that the U.S. is willing to discuss and make amends.

6. Do you think Kennedy has the upper hand? Why or why not?
No, Kennedy is under Khrushchev's thumb because he just agreed to disarm and take
away his missiles; his only way of protecting the U.S. before they can be attacked.

Document C: Russian Ambassador Cable to Soviet Foreign Ministry

7. What new information do you learn from Robert Kennedy?


That the U.S. does still intend on bombing the Soviet Union, even after the Soviets agreed to
remove and disarm their missiles.
8. Why do you think this exchange happened in a private meeting (rather than in an
official letter)? [Remember, Document B was published in the New York Times].

Because it more likely that a letter will get copied or stolen and the most secure way for
this discussion to take place would be to have a conservation.

9. How do you think Robert Kennedy felt during this meeting? Provide evidence.
Kennedy felt frustrated because Russia was nonchalant about the whole conservation
about the Soviet Union attacking the U.S.

Cuban Missile Crisis

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