Environmental Ethics, Overview

R Sandler, Northeastern University, Boston, MA, USA

ª 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Subject Matter emergence of modern ecology (and the publication of

Aldo Leopold’s A Sand County Almanac), and accumulating
Environmental ethics is the study of ethical relationships evidence of the detrimental ecological and human health
between human beings and the natural environment, effects of many of the rapidly proliferating pesticides and
including the nonhuman individuals that populate/con­ chemicals (e.g., as described in Rachel Carson’s Silent
stitute it. The following are the core questions of Spring). By the late 1960s and early 1970s, there was a
environmental ethics: robust environmental movement that was pushing for,
and often succeeding in establishing, conservationist, pre­
• What is the proper way to understand the relation­
ship between humans and the natural environment?
servationist, and pollution prevention policies and
regulations.
• What values are part of or emerge from that
relationship?
Early environmental ethicists were interested in iden­
tifying and assessing possible conceptual and value
• What principles and rules of action and character do
those goods and values justify?
underpinnings of this environmental awakening. They
were also interested in whether traditional evaluative
• What do those principles and rules imply for how
humans should interact with and treat the natural envir­
and normative frameworks were adequate for character­
izing and providing guidance regarding society’s
onment (and the nonhuman individuals that populate it)
scientifically and technologically transformed relation­
and live more generally?
ship with the natural environment. As a result, many
After a brief background on the origins of environmental (e.g., Richard Routley and Holmes Rolston, III) advocated
ethics, this article treats each of these interrelated ques­ for and began to develop new ethical concepts, norms, and
tions in turn. principles for our new ecological situation. They also
began reconsidering the moral status of nonhumans,
exploring the possibility of human-independent values
in nature, and developing ethics capable of handling
Origins of Environmental Ethics nonlocal, non-immediate, impersonal collective action
problems. These features are characteristic of many
Environmental ethics began to emerge as a distinct dis­ environmental problems, such as global warming and
cipline during a period of increased environmental pollution, but were not much addressed within Western
awareness and concern in the late 1960s and early 1970s. ethical traditions that focused instead on individual, per­
Ethicists, philosophers, and Western thinkers more gen­ sonal, immediate, and interpersonal interactions and
erally had reflected on nature and the human relationship relationships.
to it throughout recorded history. However, with the Not all early environmental ethicists agreed that a new
industrial revolution, scientific discovery and technologi­ ethical or conceptual framework was needed. Some
cal innovation, implementation, and dissemination began (e.g., John Passmore) argued that traditional ethical fra­
to rapidly and substantially alter the relationship. It led to meworks could be adequately extended or modified.
increases in our population size, our capacity for consum­ However, there was consensus that, at a minimum, the
ing and depleting environmental resources, and our conception of nature as a boundless resource for human
geographical mobility. It also changed our understanding use needed revision, and that a full accounting of envir­
of the links between human health and the environment, onmental values, as well as sorting out what those values
ecological relationships, and human origins and unique­ imply for how we should live, was required.
ness. In North America, for example, thinkers such as
Henry David Thoreau, John Muir, Theodore Roosevelt,
and Gifford Pinchot began to write of the need for
restraint in our use and treatment of nature as it became The Human–Nature Relationship
clear that Earth was not in fact a boundless resource.
Are Human Beings Part of Nature?
These early environmental sentiments were amplified in
the period following World War II by a number of factors Within Western intellectual traditions, conceptions of the
ranging from the potential for nuclear environmental human–nature relationship are largely dichotomous
destruction to images of a finite Earth from space, the (i.e., human being are separate and distinct from nature),

105
106 Environmental Ethics, Overview

exceptionalist (i.e., human beings, although in some Complementary to the naturalistic challenge to tradi­
respects part of nature, occupy a special or privileged tional conceptions of the human–nature relationship,
place in it), or hierarchical (i.e., human beings, although ecological feminism has provided robust critiques of the
part of nature, are its superior part). Some early modern basic dualistic and hierarchical structure of the view that
philosophers, such as Spinoza and Hobbes, challenged human beings have a separate, unique, privileged, or
this conception, arguing that human beings are a material superior position in the order of nature. A crucial part of
part of nature just like any other part. Some ancient Greek this critique emphasizes the similarities between the logic
and Roman philosophers, such as Lucretius, did so as well. of claims of human superiority over nature and the logic
However, these are exceptions. For the most part, human of other types of exploitation, such as sexism and racism.
beings have been conceived as crucially set apart from the In this ‘logic of domination,’ a dichotomy is created on the
rest of nature. basis of a specious (or irrelevant) difference, and then the
Darwinian evolutionary theory, genomics, and ecol­ superiority of one side of the dichotomy over the other is
ogy have provided the scientific background for asserted. This ‘superiority’ is then taken as a basis for the
reconsidering these traditional conceptions. Evolution privileging or dominance of the one side over the other
provides a naturalistic account of the origin of Homo side. As a result, the view that humans have a superior
sapiens that is shared with all other species. It also provides position over nature and that humans can treat nature and
an explanation for the appearance of human beings that the nonhuman individuals that populate it however
does not involve intention and design. Even if, as some humans please is referred to by many as ‘human
argue, evolution is compatible with guided or interven­ chauvinism.’
tionist events by a supernatural power, it does not require Some approaches to environmental ethics, notably
it. Therefore, evolution provides, at a minimum, a natur­ deep ecology, have argued that human beings are part of
alistic alternative to supernatural accounts of human nature in a metaphysical sense that goes beyond the
origins and an account in which, at a minimum, human naturalistic and ecologically interconnected/interdepen­
dent sense described previously. On this view, which has
origins have much (if not everything) in common with the
similarities (and intellectual debts) to Eastern philosophi­
origins of other species.
cal traditions such as Buddhism, the conception of
Contemporary genomics and developmental biology
individual human beings as distinct, isolated selves is a
provide a similar picture with respect to the human life-
misconception. The reality is that all individuals, includ­
form. Human physiology, psychology, morphology, cap­
ing all human beings, are part of a larger metaphysical
abilities, and predispositions can be explained through
whole. Self-realization, which on this view is developed
genes operating in the environment in the same way as
through both biological knowledge and spiritual or
with any other species. In fact, the human genome is
meditative reflection, involves seeing oneself as part of
neither exceptionally large nor complex, and it is 99%
the larger metaphysical reality, and ecological awareness
similar to that of our nearest phylogenetic relatives
involves the identification of oneself with other parts of
(chimpanzees and bonobos). Again, it may be that con­ the natural world (biotic and abiotic).
temporary genomics and developmental biology are Nevertheless, some environmental ethicists, including
consistent with accounts of human beings as soul- many who accept a naturalistic (or deep ecologist)
endowed, for example. However, it does establish active account of human beings, reserve the term ‘nature’ or
intervention in the design and animation of each human ‘natural’ to refer to anything that is independent of the
being as unnecessary. design, control, and impacts of human beings. In this sense
Modern ecology has demonstrated that human beings of natural, wilderness areas are more natural than gardens,
are, like individuals of all other species, dependent on which are more natural than parking lots. The persistence
their natural environment for development, survival, and of this terminology (and its associated concept), even
thriving. Human beings depend on the natural environ­ among those who do not think there is anything non­
ment for basic goods, such as air, food, and water, as well natural about human beings, is due to its utility. It is
as for natural resources that provide benefits ranging from useful to have a term that picks out that part of the natural
medicines to recreation. Moreover, human beings do not environment that is separate from human beings, even if
stand at the top of a food chain but are just another node human beings are (in important senses) natural too.
in the food web of nutrient and energy exchanges. Thus, Thus, whether human beings are properly considered
ecology completes the naturalist picture of human beings: part of nature depends on what one means by the notor­
With respect to origins, life-form, and environment, iously ambiguous ‘nature.’ If by nature one means
humans are natural in the same ways as other species. ‘everything independent of human beings,’ then human
As Aldo Leopold stated in A Sand County Almanac, from beings are not part of nature. If by nature one means
this perspective human beings are ‘‘plain members and ‘everything that is,’ ‘everything subject to the laws
citizens of the biotic community.’’ of nature,’ ‘everything that is not supernatural or
 Environmental Ethics, Overview 107

non-natural,’ or ‘all the world’s flora and fauna,’ then our genome. In this way, culture is made possible by our
human beings are part of nature. There is no singularly biology. In turn, our culture affects our biology, including
correct definition of nature. There are only more or less our genetic makeup, because culture is part of
useful ones. Therefore, it is crucial in environmental (and shapes) our environment. In these ways, our cultural
ethics to clarify the sense or meaning of nature that is capacities are not set apart from our biological nature but,
being used. As I use the term in the remainder of this rather, are made possible by and interact with it.
article, something is natural to the extent that it is inde­ Our cultural capacities distinguish us from other spe­
pendent of human design, control, and influence. cies in several ways. We have been able to develop
Whether something has value because it is natural is a destructive power on a scale unlike other species
prominent question in environmental ethics and one that (e.g., nuclear weapons). We are able to adapt to more
I discuss further later. environments (and adapt more environments to us) than
are individuals of other species. Moreover, we have a
broader set of goods constitutive of our flourishing than
What Is Special or Unique about Human Beings?
do individuals of other species. For us, a good life is not
Several of the considerations discussed previously might just (or even primarily) about bare survival and reproduc­
suggest that there is nothing special or unique about tive success. Rich and complex relationships, long-term
human beings. However, even if we have the same sort projects, and other goods (e.g., aesthetic/spiritual) are
of origins, ecological interconnectedness, and material open to us that are not to individuals of (most) other
makeup as other species, we are not the same as them. species. Finally, and crucially for environmental ethics,
At a minimum – that is, even if we do not have special we are full moral agents, whereas individuals of other
souls or unique places in the great chain of being – we are species are not. As far as we know, only human beings
a unique form of life (we are, after all, a distinct species). have the cognitive and psychological capabilities to raise
Several common claims regarding the features of moral questions, understand moral concepts, formulate
human beings that distinguish us from individuals of principles using those concepts, deliberate on those prin­
other species have turned out to be at least partially ciples and how they should be applied in concrete
mistaken. Human beings are not the only species that situations, and act on the basis of those deliberations. It
communicate through language, use tools, teach their is for this reason that human beings can be held morally
offspring, solve novel problems, are social, enforce responsible for their actions, but lions and silver maples
group ‘rules,’ or are altruistic. In a Darwinian world, cannot.
differences between species tend to be matters of degree. There is thus much that is distinctive about human
Our form of life is distinguished by the extent to which beings, even though we are in an ecological sense plain
many of these play a role in it. So far as we know, no members and citizens of the biotic community. Of course,
other species has such complex languages, social being distinctive is nothing unique to us. Every species is
systems, or technologies as we do. No other species distinctive (otherwise, they would not be a separate spe­
innovates, disseminates, and accumulates knowledge, cies). The question, then, is in what ways our distinctive
ideas, technologies, or social structures at the rate or features are ethically significant. One commonly recog­
on the scale that we do. As a result, no other species nized difference is that mentioned previously – that
exhibits the range of ways of going about the world as do human beings (but not individuals of other species) are
human beings. There is substantial diversity in types of moral agents and therefore can be morally responsible for
foods, social systems, ways of raising young, modes of their actions. The more controversial question within
production, and forms of organizations among human environmental ethics is whether our distinctive features
societies (or populations). Again, it is not that this is make us more valuable than individuals of other species.
only found in humans. There is diversity in the food This topic is discussed later.
sources and tool use of different populations of chim­
panzees, for example. However, the extent of the
diversity in human society and the rate and magnitude
of social and technological innovation, dissemination, Environmental Values
and accumulation distinguish us from other species. In
Types of Values
this way, human beings are, more than any other known
species, cultural animals. A comprehensive account of environmental values
The source of our capacity for culture is biological. It involves identifying (1) the types of value that are found
is due to our cognitive, psychological, and social capabil­ in nature or emerge from the human relationship to
ities, which are the product of the standard (i.e., for most nature, (2) which entities (e.g., objects, living things,
members of our species under appropriate environmental species, ecosystems, and landscapes) in the natural
conditions) biological development of individuals with environment possess each type of value (and how much
108 Environmental Ethics, Overview

of it they possess), and (3) the basis for their possessing the Intrinsic objective value is the value that something
value. has for what it is, independent of whether anyone actually
The following is a typology of the values that are values it. It is, like inherent worth, a type of value that
commonly discussed in environmental ethics. Different (if it exists) is valuer independent. This sort of value
environmental ethicists often use different value termi­ would be discovered (not created) by valuers. Some
nology. Thus, although the following are common uses of environmental ethicists have suggested that aesthetic
the terms, it is also not uncommon to find the terms used value is an objective value. That is, they believe that
differently (or different terms used). some environmental entities possess properties that are
Instrumental value is the value that something has as aesthetically valuable, even if there is no one around to
a means to realizing a desired or worthwhile end. appreciate them. Valuers then discover these properties
Different environmental entities have different sorts of and thus the value. (As indicated previously, other envir­
instrumental value. For example, one plant species onmental ethicists believe that aesthetic value is a valuer-
might have medicinal value (i.e., be useful as a means dependent intrinsic value.) The most prominent propo­
to health), whereas another does not. An environmental nent of intrinsic objective value in nature is Holmes
entity can have different instrumental value to different Rolston, III, who has argued that species and ecological
people (or valuers). For example, some people enjoy systems have intrinsic objective value due to their crea­
rock climbing and therefore a rock face is instrumentally tive and generative capacities. Others have argued that
valuable to them in ways it is not to others. Economic environmental entities can have intrinsic objective nat­
value, medicinal value, recreational value, option value, ural value due to their independence of human control,
scientific value, natural resource value, ecological value, design, and impacts. It is controversial among environ­
and ecosystem services value are all varieties of instru­ mental ethicists (as it is among moral philosophers more
mental value found in nature. Overall, the instrumental generally) whether there are intrinsic objective values.
value of ecosystem processes, other species, and abiotic These types of value – that is, instrumental value,
components of the natural environment to humans is valuer-dependent intrinsic value, inherent worth, and
intrinsic objective value – are not mutually exclusive.
enormous and varied. We depend on the natural envir­
A particular environmental entity might possess more
onment for basic goods (e.g., food and water). It is the
than one type (as well as several varieties of one type).
material source from which we produce material goods.
For example, gray wolves in the United States have
It provides unique and diverse opportunities for human
intrinsic value (many people value them for their wild­
development and enrichment (e.g., knowledge, recrea­
ness and what they represent), inherent worth (on many
tion, and creative activity).
views they have interests of their own that we ought to
Valuer-dependent intrinsic value is the value that
care about), and intrinsic objective value (on many views
something has because we value it for what it is rather
they have aesthetic value and value as a species). They
than what it can do for us. Commonly cited examples of
also have ecological value (they are a keystone species in
non-environmental entities with intrinsic value are works
some ecosystems), scientific value (they are much studied
of art, historical sites, and mementos. These things are
by ecologists, conservation biologists, zoologists, and
valuable because of what they are (including geneticists), and economic value (with respect to both
their history), not because they are useful for accomplish­ tourism and hunting), so they are instrumentally valuable
ing something we desire. Many environmental entities are (in several ways) as well.
valued intrinsically. For example, many places are valued
as religiously or spiritually significant because they are
wild, historically significant, or beautiful. Moral Standing
Inherent worth is the value that something has because A central value issue in environmental ethics is determin­
it has its own interests or good that we ought to care about ing which environmental entities have direct moral
for its own sake. It is commonly recognized that human standing. An entity has direct moral standing if it is
beings have inherent worth. A human being is valuable for morally considerable (i.e., needs to be considered in delib­
what she is, and it is not permissible to disregard her erations regarding how we ought to act) for its own sake.
interests, even if she is not instrumentally or intrinsically An entity has indirect moral standing if it is morally
valuable. Many environmental ethicists have argued that considerable (i.e., one cannot do whatever one pleases to
nonhuman environmental entities have inherent worth as it) because of its relationship to something else that has
well. However, there is considerable divergence on which direct moral standing. It is uncontroversial that many
entities those are – for example, living things, sentient environmental entities have indirect moral standing. For
animals, species, or ecosystems. Different views on which example, the trees in my backyard have indirect moral
entities have inherent worth (and the basis of their having standing by virtue of being my property. Other people
it) are discussed later. have duties regarding them: They cannot come onto my
 Environmental Ethics, Overview 109

property and chop them down because in doing so they respect toward a plant amounts to is something quite
would be violating my rights (or claim) over them. In this different than respect toward a sentient animal, for exam­
way, others have duties regarding my trees but not to my ple, precisely because one is sentient and one is not.
trees. Views on which environmental entities have only Animal welfare/rights views are those on which all
indirect (or derivative) moral standing are often referred animals with sufficiently complex psychological capaci­
to as indirect duties views. ties have direct moral standing. The most prominent
Although it is uncontroversial that many environmen­ proponent of such a view is Peter Singer. On Singer’s
tal entities have indirect moral standing (e.g., because view, the criterion for direct moral status is sentience, the
they are people’s property, are protected by national or capacity to experience pleasure and pain. He argues that
international law, or people care about them), it is much there is no morally relevant reason why some pain and
less settled whether environmental entities have direct suffering should be considered in ethical deliberations
moral standing. Crucially related to this is the issue of and some should not. Pain is equally bad for the sufferer,
determining the basis for direct moral standing. regardless of who suffers it (or their species membership).
Biocentric environmental ethics are those on which As a result, like pain (and pleasure) must be considered
all living things have direct moral standing. Albert alike. There are many other types of animal
Schweitzer and Paul Taylor are the most influential welfare/rights views. However, they standardly empha­
proponents of this view. Standard versions of biocentr­ size that to have direct moral standing an individual must
ism emphasize that all living things (plants and animals) be conscious and capable of psychological experience.
have a good of their own. It is possible to benefit or harm Some also argue that an individual must in some way be
them, without reference to anything else. The reason for capable of caring about his or her own life. Having inter­
this is that they are teleologically organized. Their ests is not enough to have direct moral standing on this
parts, processes, and operations are organized toward view; an individual must also be capable of taking an
accomplishing things such as survival and reproduction. interest in his or her interests. (Proponents of biocentrism
Damaging or interfering with these is harmful to them, challenge this claim for the reasons discussed previously.)
whereas promoting conditions under which they thrive One type of objection to animal welfare/rights views is
or flourish is beneficial. Biocentrists often emphasize that they are absurd because they would require us to
the similarities between and among all species (includ­ treat animals as if they were humans. However, as with
ing humans) in arguing that there is no adequate reason biocentrism, this is a misunderstanding of the view. Equal
to disregard the good of some living things and not consideration is not the same as equal treatment. There
others. Thus, we ought to care about the good of all are factual differences among species that justify different
living things – that is, they all have inherent worth. treatment; for example, the conditions under which a
One criticism of biocentrism focuses on its implica­ whale thrives are quite different from those under which
tions. Some critics believe that the ethic is unlivable. It is a human thrives.
simply not possible, or else too onerous, to live a human Another common, and better informed, response to
life without killing other living things. Another criticism animal welfare/rights views is to challenge the claim
emphasizes that most living things are microorganisms. that there is no morally relevant difference between
The ethic appears to imply that every bacteria has inher­ human and nonhuman animals that would justify differ­
ent worth and is due respect, which strikes some as absurd ential consideration. Candidates for difference-making
(as well as unlivable). Another type of criticism focuses on properties include being capable of mutual or reciprocal
the argument for biocentric individualism. It points out concern and responsibility, being a member of a commu­
that proponents of biocentrism often emphasize the simi­ nity of deliberative agents, and being a moral agent.
larities between all living things (e.g., ecological Nonhuman animals are not capable of these. Therefore,
interconnectedness and having a good of their own) if any of them are necessary for direct moral standing,
while not attending to the differences (e.g., only some nonhuman animals do not have such standing; only full
are sentient or self-aware). rational agents (i.e., human beings, so far as we know) do.
Biocentrists standardly respond to these concerns by Such views are called anthropocentric (although rational-
arguing that to claim that all living things have inherent centric might be a more appropriate term) because on
worth is not equivalent to the claim that all living things them only human beings (or rational beings) have direct
have rights, the same level of inherent worth, or that they moral standing. Views (e.g., biocentrism and animal wel­
should all be treated the same. It is to claim that all living fare) on which some nonhuman entities have direct moral
things have direct moral standing and therefore are not standing are called nonanthropocentric.
mere things (as rocks are) that can be treated thoughtlessly The standard theoretical criticisms of anthropocentr­
or without consideration. As a result, living things are due ism are those from biocentrism and animal welfare/rights
respect, even when we appropriately use them (as we must) views discussed previously; that is, anthropocentrism
for our own ends. However, the response continues, what asserts a morally relevant difference where there is not
110 Environmental Ethics, Overview

one. What matters for direct moral standing is whether an nonhuman individuals might have inherent worth, they
individual has interests, can suffer, or cares about its own do not have as much worth as do human beings.
good. Anthropocentrism emphasizes the conditions
necessary for an individual to be a moral agent or morally
responsible for its actions. Thus, the response concludes, Rules and Principles
anthropocentrism conflates moral agency with moral The Normativity of ‘Natural’
standing. Moreover, if it is true that only full deliberative
or moral agents have direct moral standing, then many Rules and principles provide general prescriptions
humans (e.g., newborns and severely mentally disabled regarding how we ought or should act or be. In environ­
people) will not have direct moral standing. Many take mental ethics, it is not uncommon to find the concept of
this to be a problematic implication of the view. nature or naturalness functioning prescriptively – for
All of the views of direct moral standing discussed example, that we ought to follow nature, that we ought
previously – biocentrism, animal welfare/rights, and not interfere with nature, or that something (e.g., geneti­
anthropocentrism – are individualistic. On each, it is cally modified crops) is unnatural and therefore wrong.
individual organisms that have direct moral standing. However, it is an increasingly prevalent view among
However, in some views environmental collectives (e.g., environmental philosophers that prescriptive uses of ‘nat­
species and ecosystems) also have direct moral standing. ure’ are problematic.
According to these views, which are often called eco­ Regarding the prescription that we ‘ought to follow
centric, it makes sense to talk about the collective being nature,’ the problem (which was identified by John Stuart
benefited or harmed, and thus having a good, separate Mill) is that there is so much in nature that would be
from that of the individual organisms that comprise it. For barbaric if we were to follow it, such as predation, decep­
example, predation of the weakest members of a popula­ tion, and rape. Proponents of the prescription that we
tion is bad for those individuals, but it is good for the ought to follow nature might argue that these are not
health of the population as a whole. On one interpreta­ the parts on which we ought to model our behavior.
However, if there is some standard external to nature by
tion, Aldo Leopold’s view expressed in A Sand County
which we judge which parts of nature to follow, then the
Almanac is ecocentric because he suggests that ‘‘a thing is
normativity (the prescription) is not based in something’s
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and
being found in nature but, rather, in whatever adjudicates
beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends
which aspects of nature are worth following.
otherwise.’’ Deep ecology also favors ecocentric accounts
The prescription that we ought not interfere with
of direct moral standing.
nature is problematic because it ultimately fails to give
Critics of ecocentrism typically argue that the health
guidance. On any definition of nature, human beings are
or flourishing of collectives such as species or ecosystems
either part of nature or not part of nature. If we are part of
are really only derivative on the well-being of the indi­
nature, then everything we do is natural, so nothing we do
viduals that comprise them. Moreover, ecosystems or
interferes with nature. Thus, the prescription to not inter­
species are not really internally organized or goal direc­ fere with nature is vacuous – everything we do fulfills it. If
ted. Their appearance of being so is only a by-product of we are not part of nature, then everything we do is
individual organisms pursuing their own good in response unnatural. Again, the prescription to not interfere with
to each other and abiotic features of the system. Some nature is unhelpful because everything we do interferes
environmental collectives of some species may be excep­ with it. In either case (whether we are part of nature or
tions, such as ant colonies and beehives. However, for the not), the prescription to not interfere with nature fails to
most part, individuals within a species and within an help us distinguish actions we ought to perform from
ecosystem are competitors or predator/prey. They are those we ought not perform.
not organized and do not behave for reasons related to The claim that we ought not act unnaturally (or
the collective good or the good of the ecosystem. ought to do what is natural) is problematic because it
Many environmental ethicists have advocated plura­ assumes its conclusion or else equivocates on the mean­
listic accounts on which different environmental entities, ing of ‘natural.’ The following is an example of this form
such as individual animals and collectives, have different of argument: (1) Genetically modified crops are unna­
types of direct moral standing. For example, it may be that tural. (2) Anything unnatural is wrong. (3) Therefore,
plants are due respect, but animals are due respect and genetically modified crops are wrong. If by ‘unnatural’ is
compassion. On other views, there is only one type of meant ‘wrong,’ then the argument does not prove its
direct moral standing, but it can be had in degrees; for conclusion but, rather, it just asserts it; that is, premise
example, psychologically complex animals have greater 1 is just the claim that genetically modified crops are
inherent worth than other living things. Weak anthropo­ wrong. However, if ‘unnatural’ does not mean ‘wrong,’
centric views, for example, hold that although some then there must be some meaning of the term unnatural
 Environmental Ethics, Overview 111

that makes both premises 1 and 2 true. It is difficult The previous examples demonstrate that the general
(many would argue impossible) to find any such mean­ principles that an environmental ethic advocates are the
ing, however. product of both the environmental values that it endorses
The upshot of these considerations is that it is proble­ (including their comparative significance) and the broader
matic to try to generate prescriptions on the basis of what is theoretical framework in which they are situated. They
or is not natural. Instead, rules and principles in environ­ also demonstrate that disagreements within environmental
mental ethics need to be based on environmental values. ethics arise not only from different views about environ­
mental values but also from different theoretical
commitments. For example, animal rights and animal wel­
From Values to General Principles
fare theorists generally agree that animals (or sentient
The general principles that an environmental ethic advo­ beings) have direct moral standing, but they disagree
cates are substantially informed by the values that it about what this implies because animal welfare advocates
endorses. However, the values are not sufficient for deter­ (e.g., Peter Singer) are consequentialists, whereas animal
mining the general principles. They must be set in a rights advocates (e.g., Thomas Regan) are deontologists.
theoretical context, and it matters if the context is deon­ According to animal rights views, it is always wrong to
tological (e.g., rights based), consequentialist, or virtue use animals in experimentation (because it violates their
ethics, for example. According to consequentialist ethical rights), whereas on animal welfare views, using animals in
theories, an action is right if and only if it brings about the experimentation is acceptable when there are sufficiently
best (or good enough) consequences of the courses of large goods to be gained and there is no alternative to
action available to the agent in the circumstances. achieving those goods that would cause less suffering.
Therefore, on a strong anthropocentrism – that is, one on
which all and only human beings have direct moral stand­
Environmental Virtue Ethics
ing – set within a consequentialist ethical theory, the right
way to treat the environment is in whatever way brings In the previous section, virtue ethics was presented as a
about the best (or good enough) consequences for human distinctive theoretical framework for environmental
beings (e.g., maximizes human well-being or preference ethics, one that is an alternative to consequentialist and
satisfaction). However, according to deontological ethical deontological ethical theories. That is one conception of
theory, an action is right if and only if it conforms to the environmental virtue ethics. However, there is another
moral law, and on rights based deontological theories this conception on which it is complementary to consequen­
means respecting (i.e., not violating) the rights of others. tialist and deontological ethical theories rather than a
Therefore, on a strong anthropocentrism set within a rival to them. On this conception, the rules and principles
rights-based normative theory (e.g., libertarianism), the of environmental ethics are not limited to norms of action
right way to treat the environment is in any way that or conduct but also include norms of character.
does not violate the rights (e.g., property rights or bodily As with rules and principles of action, the virtues or
integrity) of human beings. According to virtue ethics, an vices that an environmental ethic endorses and empha­
action is right if and only if it expresses or hits the target of sizes depend on the environmental values that it
virtue. Therefore, on a strong anthropocentrism set within prioritizes. For an ethic on which the criterion for moral
virtue ethics, the right way to treat the environment is in standing is the capacity to experience pleasure and pain,
ways that are compassionate, caring, and just toward the virtue of compassion and the vice of cruelty are
human beings. central. For a biocentric ethic on which all living things
Similarly, on consequentialist ethical theory, if all are regarded as having direct moral standing, the virtue of
human and nonhuman pain and pleasure are equally respect for nature and the vice of malevolence are crucial.
considerable, then an action or policy is right if it brings One reason that norms of character are crucial to
about the greatest balance of pleasure over pain for all environmental ethics is that one’s character is relevant
those affected (human and nonhuman). However, within a to how one behaves. Virtue is conducive to right action.
rights-based theory, if all animals have inherent worth, For example, a compassionate person is more likely to
then they must always be treated as an end and not a respond well or do what is right regarding the suffering of
means only. On a pluralistic account of environmental others than is a person who is cruel or indifferent. Another
values set within a virtue ethic, one ought to be respectful reason is that virtue is conducive to realizing environ­
of living things, compassionate toward animals, and eco­ mental goods. Many people find pleasure, reward, beauty,
logically sensitive, for example. On an ecocentric view set invigoration, and meaning in their experiences of and
within a communitarian ethical theory – that is, one on relationships with aspects of the natural environment.
which an action is right to the extent that it promotes the Character traits such as wonder, gratitude, and humility
good of the community – an action is right insofar as it open a person up to these goods, whereas character traits
tends to promote the integrity of the biotic community. such as hubris, indifferences, and laziness are inimical to
112 Environmental Ethics, Overview

them. For these reasons, a complete environmental ethic, that environmental problems are urgent and therefore
even if it is consequentialist or deontological, includes time ought not be wasted on trying to resolve theoretical
both norms of action and norms of character. (and, in some pragmatists’ view, intractable) disagree­
ments if there are no practical differences at stake. Other
proponents of environmental pragmatism believe that
Divergence and Convergence within
theory-oriented approaches to environmental ethics are
Environmental Ethics
misguided because there is no basic foundation for ethics
On many environmental issues, different general princi­ (including environmental ethics) or that a process or
ples have different implications. For example, sport discursive approach to ethics is necessary. As a result,
hunting of a healthy (but not over carrying capacity) environmental pragmatism is sometimes associated with
population of ungulates would not be permissible on an being antitheoretical.
animal rights view, whereas it is on a strong anthropo­ Critics of environmental pragmatism argue that there
centric view. Also, animal rights advocates and ecocentric is in fact much less convergence than pragmatists gener­
communitarians often advocate different policies regard­ ally believe, so adjudicating among theories of
ing ecological restorations and non-native species when environmental ethics does have practical importance.
these involve culling animals. As these examples illus­ They also argue that if we give up on identifying core
trate, sometimes there are dilemmas in environmental values or foundations for environmental ethics, then we
ethics – situations in which any policy or course of action are left with no ethic at all, only a power struggle among
will require compromising some environmental value. In people with different views.
such cases, different environmental ethics will advocate
different practices or policies based on which values are
prioritized within the ethic. From Rules to Implications
However, on many other environmental issues and in
many other situations, different general principles have The rules and principles of environmental ethics do not
very similar implications. For example, almost all theories by themselves provide action or policy guidance regard­
of environmental ethics, regardless of their particular ing our treatment of or interaction with the natural
value axiology and theoretical framework, favor pollution environment. In order to generate such guidance, they
reduction because pollution is detrimental to humans, must be applied to concrete issues and situations.
animals, and ecosystems. There will be disagreement Therefore, the transition from principles to implications
about how much pollution is acceptable and the means in environmental ethics requires identifying which rules
by which it should be controlled. Nevertheless, in general or principles are operative in a particular situation and
and in most circumstances, there is convergence in favor then determining what course of action (or policy) they
of cleaner air, water, and land. There is also convergence favor in that situation. The latter often requires consider­
on the importance of addressing global climate change able factual knowledge regarding the situation.
because the social and ecological effects of unchecked For example, many principles of environmental
global climate change will be detrimental to humans, ethics converge on the conclusion that many people
animals, plants, and ecosystems. There is often conver­ ought to consume far fewer (non-necessary) consumer
gence as well on protecting green spaces and national goods than they do currently because all consumer
parks because they are beneficial to both people and goods involve ecological costs. They require extracting
their nonhuman inhabitants. natural resources (or recycling materials), refining the
As with rules and principles of action, there are some raw materials, production or manufacture of the good,
norms of character on which theories of environmental consumption of the good, and disposal of the good, as
ethics converge. For example, most theories recognize well as transportation along the way, and each of these
hubris, indifference, apathy, greed, and laziness as envir­ has associated ecological impacts (e.g., pollution,
onmental vices because they are detrimental to protecting habitat loss, or greenhouse gas emissions).
and promoting many environmental goods and values; Moreover, there is considerable evidence from eco­
most theories recognize humility, courage, benevolence, nomics and sociology that above a certain threshold,
and wonder as virtues because they are conducive to reduced levels of consumption are not associated
promoting a diversity of environmental goods and values. with lower levels of subjective well-being; and mate­
Environmental pragmatism is the view that rather than rialistic value dispositions are, in general, detrimental
prioritizing development of and adjudication among dif­ to a person’s well-being. However, knowledge of the
ferent theories of environmental ethics, the focus in resultant rule – that is, that people ought to reduce their
environmental ethics should be on identifying areas of consumption of non-necessary consumer goods, particu­
convergence and promoting the associated goals. Some larly those with high ecological costs – does not by itself
environmental pragmatists argue for this on the grounds generate action guidance. Applying the rule requires
 Environmental Ethics, Overview 113

knowledge of what sorts of goods are non-necessary, which constitute a distinctive ethical domain but, rather, is a
goods have high ecological costs, and what the alternatives crucial component of a complete and comprehensive
are (e.g., nonconsumption or alternative consumption) in a human ethic.
particular instance or domain. For example, a diet high in
farmed meat consumption is unnecessary for most people See also: Animal Rights; Anthropocentrism; Biocentrism;
with culinary alternatives in most circumstances (because Vegetarianism.
one can get adequate nutrition and culinary pleasure from
a nonmeat diet), and production of a meat-based meal has
high ecological costs in comparison to the production of Further Reading
many non-meat-based meals (due to the inefficiency cre­
Carson R (1962) Silent Spring. New York: Fawcett World Library.
ated by the calories and nutrition the animal uses for Jamieson D (2003) Morality’s Progress: Essays on Humans, Other
biological processes other than growing muscle and fat). Animals, and the Rest of Nature. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Thus, application of the principle to the case generates the Leopold A (1968) A Sand County Almanac. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
conclusion that those with culinary alternatives ought to Light A and Katz E (eds.) (1996) Environmental Pragmatism. New York:
reduce the proportion of farmed meat in their diet. Routledge.
As the previous example indicates, the implications Light A and Rolston H, III. (eds.) (2003) Environmental Ethics: An
Anthology. Oxford: Blackwell.
generated from application of a rule or principle can Naess A (1992) Ecology, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an
often depend on particulars about the case. For this reason, Ecosophy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
the details of a situation or issue can be very important in O’Neill J (1993) Ecology, Policy, and Politics: Human Well-Being and the
Natural World. London: Routledge.
environmental ethics, and ecological, psychological, Passmore J (1974) Man’s Responsibility for Nature: Ecological
economic, and other types of empirical information can Problems and Western Traditions. New York: Scribner.
be crucial for applying rules and principles well in envir­ Plumwood V (2002) Environmental Culture and the Ecological Crisis of
Reason. London: Routledge.
onmental ethics. Regan T (1983) The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of
California Press.
Rolston H, III. (1989) Philosophy Gone Wild. Amherst, NY: Prometheus.
Sandler R (2007) Character and Environment: A Virtue-Oriented
Conclusion Approach to Environmental Ethics. New York: Columbia University
Press.
Environmental ethics is rich both philosophically and Schmidtz D and Willott E (2001) Environmental Ethics: What Really
Matters, What Really Works. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
practically. Philosophically, it involves issues in meta­
Singer P (1975) Animal Liberation. New York: New York Review.
ethics, value theory, and ethical theory. It also concerns Taylor P (1986) Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics.
the nature of human beings, our relationships to the rest of Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
the world, and the constituents of (and means to) human
flourishing. Practically, it encompasses any issue for
which our actions, policies, or perspectives have implica­ Biographical Sketch
tions for environmental values. Because human beings are
ecologically situated animals, this is a diverse and Ronald Sandler is an associate professor of philosophy in the
dynamic set of topics. For example, it includes agriculture Department of Philosophy and Religion, a researcher in the
and food, land use, treatment of other species, responsi­ Nanotechnology and Society Research Group, and a research
bilities to future generations, technology innovation and associate in the Environmental Justice Research Collaborative at
implementation, human population, consumption (and Northeastern University. He is author of Character and
Environment: A Virtue-oriented Approach to Environmental Ethics
thus economics), and energy.
(Columbia University Press, 2007) and Nanotechnology: The
As the set of issues listed previously indicates, there is Social and Ethical Issues (Woodrow Wilson Center, 2009). He is
no strong separation between environmental ethics and co-editor of Environmental Virtue Ethics (Rowman & Littlefield,
interpersonal ethics. The philosophical issues overlap, the 2005) and Environmental Justice and Environmentalism: The Social
practical issues overlap, and human beings are simulta­ Justice Challenge to the Environmental Movement (MIT Press, 2007).
neously social and environmental agents (and His primary areas of research are environmental ethics, ethics
dependents). Therefore, environmental ethics does not and technology, ethical theory, and Spinoza.