5 Security strategies:

acceptance, protection
and deterrence
Context analysis and What is the context and who are the actors?
actor mapping What impact will your organisation and
programmes have on the context and actors?

Module 5
BEFORE DEPLOYMENT OR
STARTING PROGRAMME

Risk assessment What are the threats you face? What are your
organisation’s vulnerabilities to those threats?
What is the probability and impact of risks?

Digital security What technology will you need in this context to

programme safely, effectively and securely?
What are the associated risks for your
organisation, staff and communities?

Security strategies Understanding your organisational approach:

Acceptance, protection what strategies do you use generally and in this
and deterrence context in particular?

Security plan NGO security

coordination and other
sources of support
WITHIN FIRST
1-2 WEEKS

Standard Operating Contingency plans

Procedures (How management will
(How staff will mitigate respond to anticipated
the threats identified in situations)
the risk assessment)

Hibernation,
IMPROVEMENT

Office/compound/ relocation and

ONGOING

facility security evacuation

Communications Travel safety: Medical support

and information Airports/vehicles/ and evacuation
security other

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There are typically three security strategies used by humanitarian aid
organisations in all contexts.

Acceptance
Building a safe operating
environment through consent,
approval and cooperation from
individuals, communities and
local authorities.

Protection Deterrence

Module 5
Reducing the risk, but not Reducing the risk by
the threat by reducing containing the threat
the vulnerability of the with a counter threat
organisation (e.g. fences, (e.g. armed protection,
guards, walls). diplomatic/political
leverage, temporary
suspension).

Generally, international and national aid organisations prioritise the

acceptance strategy as their preferred approach. However, this can take
time and organisations deploying to new areas cannot just assume they will
have the acceptance of the community. An organisation may focus initially on
protection and deterrence measures until acceptance has been developed.
However it is important to note that behaviours from day one will impact
future efforts to develop acceptance.

Acceptance
After a rapid onset emergency it is challenging for host governments and
communities to distinguish between different organisations when a flood of
new international and national NGOs, and United Nations agencies arrives
in the area. This can be complicated by rapid turnover of staff in the first few
weeks as first responders hand over to longer-term staff. All staff deployed
and local employees – including managers, community mobilisers and
drivers – should be briefed on how your organisation will employ the three
strategies and how acceptance will be built with all stakeholders.

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Building acceptance is not only about the communities an organisation
works with, but about all its stakeholders. An actor mapping will help the
organisation identify which stakeholders may be affected by its programmes
and what allies it may have in developing acceptance with them. Remember
that what an organisation and its employees say locally is not the only means
stakeholders can get information. Many communities now have access to the
internet, so the messages communicated must be consistent with what is on
your website and social media accounts.

Acceptance has to be earned and can be lost very easily, and the
behaviour of one responder can affect the whole community.
Acceptance must be approached proactively.

Module 5
Key points:
 Be clear about who you are, your agency’s background and priorities,
where your funding comes from and how your programmes are
developed.
 If you are a faith-based or secular organisation, be clear about how
this does or does not affect your work, especially in a strong religious
environment. Also be aware of how you will be perceived.
 Understand who your partners are, how they are perceived and what
impact your relationship will have on their, and your own, acceptance.
 Ensure stakeholders are engaged before commencing any work.
 Have a rigorous complaints system and be seen to follow up on concerns.
 Do not isolate your staff from communities. Stay visible and accessible.

Protection
Protection measures should be developed in line with the risk assessment,
and it should be ensured that they are applied equally across all staff (local
and international), and seniority levels. Organisations should provide training
in security measures to staff, give orientations to new employees, and pursue
coordination with other agencies or security forums.
See Module 6 – NGO security coordination and other sources of support
The physical protection of buildings, compounds and/or distributing sites
should not make it appear that the organisation is building a bunker or a
fort. Compounds and other office or working space should blend in with the
buildings in the vicinity.
See Module 8 – Security of facilities

EISF guide  /  Security to go 5:03

It is important to focus on the best communications systems the organisation
can afford, or that are available, including radio, internet, mobile, landline,
satellite, fax, informal couriers or other. Communications systems should be
accompanied by policies for staff reporting in (regularly or on a schedule) to
ensure safety.
See Module 9 – Communications and information security

Deterrence
Deterrence is usually the last resort strategy. It is used when acceptance
and protection have not been successful or have proven inadequate. In
some contexts, it may also be required by host governments (e.g. Somalia,
Chad, Niger).

Module 5
Withdrawal of services is the main threat that can be used in an insecure
area but the organisation must ensure first that local governments and donor
agreements are not compromised. Do not make empty threats.
Armed guards or military and police escort should be avoided where
possible as they will often make acceptance impossible or very difficult –
even at a later stage. They may also increase the risk of injuries from crossfire,
or the risk of extortion or harassment.
See EISF briefing paper ‘Engaging private security providers: a guideline for
non-governmental organisations’
When considering the different security strategies it is important to
understand the mission, vision and mandate of the organisation. All
organisations are different in not only their mission and programmes, but
also in their vulnerabilities and capacity to respond to them. Just because
one organisation is implementing a particular strategy does not mean it
will work for another agency, even if they are working in the same context.

EISF guide  /  Security to go 5:04