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Dela Cruz vs. Quiazon, GR No. 171961, Nov. 28, 2008

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
49 views14 pages

Dela Cruz vs. Quiazon, GR No. 171961, Nov. 28, 2008

Case Digest - Obligations and Contracts
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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2/1/22, 9:24 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 572

G.R. No. 171961. November 28, 2008.*

FERDINAND A. DELA CRUZ and RENATO A. DELA CRUZ,


petitioners, vs. AMELIA G. QUIAZON, respondent.

Remedial Law; Relief from Judgment; Party-in-Interest; The


personality to file a petition for relief from judgment resides in a person who
is a party to the principal case; The original party does not lose his
personality as a real party-in-interest merely because of the transfer of
interest to another pendente lite.—We sustain respondent’s personality to
file the petition for relief from judgment. A petition for relief from judgment
is a remedy available to a party who, through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, was prevented from taking an appeal from a judgment
or final order therein. The personality to file a petition for relief from
judgment, therefore, resides in a person who is a party to the principal case.
This legal standing is not lost by the mere transfer of the disputed property
pendente lite. The original party does not lose his personality as a real party-
in-interest merely because of the transfer of interest to another pendente lite.
Same; Same; A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy
that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or
adequate remedy.—A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable
remedy that is allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other
available or adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to
him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an adverse
decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by fraud, accident,
mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or taking such
appeal, he cannot avail himself of this remedy. Indeed, relief will not be
granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of the judgment
when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence;
otherwise, the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal
which had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.
Agrarian Reform Law; Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT); The
issuance of a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) does not vest full

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.

682

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682 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ownership in the holder; It does not sever the tenancy relationship between
the landowner and the tenant-farmer.—Contrary to petitioners’ posture, the
issuance of a CLT does not vest full ownership in the holder. The issuance
of the CLT does not sever the tenancy relationship between the landowner
and the tenant-farmer. A certificate of land transfer merely evinces that the
grantee thereof is qualified to avail himself of the statutory mechanism for
the acquisition of ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under P.D.
No. 27. It is not a muniment of title that vests in the farmer/grantee absolute
ownership of his tillage. It is only after compliance with the conditions
which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent that he acquires the
vested right of absolute ownership in the landholding—a right which then
would have become fixed and established, and no longer open to doubt or
controversy.
Same; Same; Tenancy Law; Abandonment; Personal cultivation, as
required by law, includes cultivation of the land by the tenant (lessee)
himself or with the aid of the immediate farm household, which refers to the
members of the family of the tenant and other persons who are dependent
upon him for support and who usually help him in the (agricultural)
activities.—We agree with petitioners that they have not abandoned the
subject landholding, as in fact they have continuously cultivated the
property. Abandonment requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to
renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and (b) an external
act by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect. The intention
to abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning,
resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned.
The immigration of the original farmer-beneficiary to the U.S.A. did not
necessarily result in the abandonment of the landholding, considering that
one of his sons, petitioner Renato dela Cruz, continued cultivating the land.
Personal cultivation, as required by law, includes cultivation of the land by
the tenant (lessee) himself or with the aid of the immediate farm household,
which refers to the members of the family of the tenant and other persons
who are dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in the
[agricultural] activities.
Same; Same; Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); Jurisdiction; Cancellation
of a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over the subject

683

, 683

landholding as a necessary consequence of the landowner’s exercise of his


right of retention is within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian

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Reform (DAR) Secretary, not the Department of Agrarian Reform


Adjudication Board (DARAB), as it does not involve an agrarian dispute.—
Without doubt, the landowner’s right of retention may be exercised over
tenanted land despite the issuance of a CLT to farmer-beneficiaries.
However, the cancellation of a CLT over the subject landholding as a
necessary consequence of the landowner’s exercise of his right of retention
is within the jurisdiction of the DAR Secretary, not the DARAB, as it does
not involve an agrarian dispute. Under Section 1(g), Rule II of the then
DARAB Rules of Procedure, matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of agrarian laws shall be the exclusive prerogative of and
cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. Although Section 1(f) of the said
Rules provides that the DARAB shall have jurisdiction over cases involving
the issuance of a CLT and the administrative correction thereof, it should be
understood that for the DARAB to exercise jurisdiction in such cases, there
must be an agrarian dispute between the landowner and the tenant.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of


the Court of Appeals.
   The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
  Andres, Marcelo, Padernal, Guerrero and Paras for petitioners.

NACHURA, J.:
Petitioners, Ferdinand and Renato dela Cruz, seek the review of
the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated January 19, 2006 and
Resolution dated March 21, 2006. The assailed decision affirmed the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
Resolution canceling the Certificate of Land

_______________

1 Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices


Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Sesinando E. Villon concurring; Rollo, pp. 37-50.

684

684 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Transfer (CLT) in the name of petitioners’ father, Feliciano dela


Cruz, and directing petitioners to vacate the property.
The case arose from the following antecedents:
Estela Dizon-Garcia, mother of respondent Amelia G. Quiazon,
was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 107576, situated in Sto. Domingo II,
Capas, Tarlac. The property was brought under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
27.2 On June 8, 1981, Feliciano dela Cruz, a tenant-farmer, was
issued CLT No. 0-0362073 over a 3.7200-hectare portion of the said
property.

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On March 9, 1992, the heirs of Estela Dizon-Garcia executed a


Deed of Extrajudicial Admission and Partition with Waiver
adjudicating among themselves all the properties left by both of their
parents, except for the subject property, which was adjudicated
solely in favor of respondent.
On May 15, 1993, respondent filed a Complaint with the
Provincial Adjudication Board of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) against petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz, alleging that
in 1991, he entered into a leasehold contract with respondent, by
virtue of which he bound himself to deliver 28 cavans of palay as
rental. Since 1991, petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz allegedly failed to
deliver the stipulated rental because he had already abandoned the
landholding. For this reason, respondent prayed for his ejectment
from the property and the termination of their tenancy relationship.4
In his Answer, petitioner Ferdinand dela Cruz, through petitioner
Renato dela Cruz, alleged that the execution of the leasehold
contract was erroneous considering that a CLT had already been
issued in favor of his father. He contended that

_______________

2  Decreeing the Emancipation of Tenants from the Bondage of the Soil,


Transferring to Them the Ownership of the Land They Till and Providing the
Instrument and Mechanism Therefor.
3 Rollo, p. 60.
4 CA Rollo, p. 50.

685

, 685

by virtue of the CLT, they became the owners of the landholding,


without any obligation to pay rentals to respondent but only to pay
amortizations to the Land Bank of the Philippines. He claimed that
they paid the rentals until 1992, which rentals should now be
considered as advance payments for the land.5
Later, respondent amended the complaint to implead Feliciano
and Renato dela Cruz.6 The amended complaint alleged that
petitioners Ferdinand and Feliciano dela Cruz were already
immigrants to the United States of America (U.S.A.) and that
petitioner Renato dela Cruz, the actual tiller of the land, was a
usurper because his possession of the land was without the consent
of the landowner. Respondent argued that by migrating to the
U.S.A., Feliciano was deemed to have abandoned the landholding,
for which reason his CLT should now be canceled.
In turn, petitioners amended their Answer. They averred that their
father was just temporarily out of the country and that petitioner
Renato’s possession and cultivation of the land did not need the
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consent of the landowner because it was done in aid of their father’s


cultivation of the land.7
On November 8, 1993, petitioners began paying amortizations to
the Land Bank of the Philippines.8
On December 21, 1993, Provincial Adjudicator Romeo B. Bello
dismissed the complaint based on his finding that the landholding
had not been abandoned by Feliciano considering that petitioner
Renato dela Cruz, a member of Feliciano’s immediate family, was in
actual and physical possession thereof.9

_______________

5 Id., at pp. 5.
6 Rollo, pp. 108-110.
7 Id., at p. 109.
8 Id., at p. 61.
9 Id., at pp. 156-162.

686

686 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In an Order10


dated June 8, 1994, the Provincial Adjudicator denied respondent’s
motion for reconsideration for lack of merit and directed the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Capas, Tarlac, to determine
whether the amortizations had been fully paid and, if so, to issue an
Emancipation Patent.
On July 11, 1994, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal from said
decision.11 During the pendency of the appeal, respondent executed,
on October 6, 1994, a Deed of Conveyance and Waiver of her rights
over the subject property in favor of her siblings.12 She then filed her
Appeal Memorandum on November 29, 1994.13 The appeal was
docketed as DARAB Case No. 3335.
Unknown to petitioners, respondent and her siblings, as heirs of
Estela Dizon-Garcia, had filed an Application for Retention before
the DAR Regional Office for Region III, as early as June 1, 1994.14
The application was granted on February 8, 1996. The dispositive
portion of the Regional Director’s Order reads:

“WHEREFORE, all premises considered, Order is hereby issued, as


follows:
1. GRANTING the application for retention of the Heirs of Estela
Dizon-Garcia over a landholding covered by TCT No. 107576, with a total
area of 12.5431, located at Sto. Domingo, Capas, Tarlac, to be divided
among the heirs as follows:
Rosita Garcia          – 3.9641 has.
Buena Garcia          – 2.5796 has.

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Bella Garcia            – 3.0000 has.


Estellita Garcia       – 3.0000 has.

_______________

10 Id., at pp. 167-168.


11 CA Rollo, p. 186.
12 Rollo, p. 180.
13 Id., at p. 15.
14 Id., at p. 180.

687

, 687

2. ORDERING the herein landowners-applicant to maintain in


peaceful possession the tenants of the subject landholding, namely: Renato
dela Cruz, Carlos Aquino and Francisco Manayang as leaseholders; and
3. DIRECTING the herein landowners-applicant to cause the
segregation of the retained area at their own expense and to submit report to
this Office within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.”15 

In a letter16 dated April 15, 1996, the heirs of Feliciano dela Cruz
prayed for the setting aside of the said order. DAR Secretary Ernesto
D. Garilao treated the letter as an appeal but, nevertheless, denied
the same in an Order17 dated May 13, 1997.
On July 7, 1999, the DARAB finally dismissed respondent’s
appeal (DARAB Case No. 3335) from the decision of the Provincial
Adjudicator.18 This decision became final and executory.19
On October 19, 1999, respondent filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment,20 claiming that she just arrived from the U.S.A. on
September 10, 1999 and it was only then that she found out about
the July 7, 1999 DARAB Decision. She purportedly tried to contact
her counsel only to discover that he died on December 21, 1994.
Respondent insisted that petitioners had already abandoned the
landholding and failed to pay the lease and amortization payments
therefor, thus, the cancellation of their CLT was justified. She argued
that the CLT was rendered moot by the DAR’s grant of their applica-

_______________

15 Id., at p. 174.
16 Id., at pp. 175-177.
17 Id., at pp. 178-182.
18 Id., at p. 187.
19 Id., at p. 191.

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20 Id., at pp. 195-200.

688

688 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion for retention of their property which included the subject


landholding.
In its Resolution dated February 7, 2001, the DARAB granted
the petition for relief from judgment. The DARAB set aside its July
7, 1999 Decision primarily based on the DAR Order granting the
application for retention, as well as its finding that Ferdinand and
Feliciano dela Cruz abandoned the subject landholding when they
went to the U.S.A. The dispositive portion of the Resolution reads:

“WHEREFORE, all of the above premises considered, and in the interest


of agrarian justice, the decision of this Board dated July 7, 1999 is hereby
SET ASIDE, and a new one is entered:
1. Declaring the dissolution of the tenancy relationship between the
parties-litigants;
2. Declaring the cancellation of the CLT issued in the name of
defendant Feliciano dela Cruz, the land subject thereof being part of the
retention area of petitioner per order dated February 8, 1996; and
3. Ordering the respondents or any person acting in their behalf to
vacate the subject land in favor of the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.”21

On August 7, 2002, the DARAB denied petitioners’ motion for


reconsideration. On November 27, 2003, the DARAB likewise
denied petitioners’ Ex Parte Manifestation with Motion and
Comments and Manifestation.22
Petitioners thereafter filed a petition for review with the Court of
Appeals (CA). Pending the resolution of the appeal, Feliciano dela
Cruz passed away.
On January 19, 2006, the CA denied the petition. On March 21,
2006, the CA also denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
Consequently, petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari
based on the following grounds:

_______________

21 Id., at pp. 214-215.


22 Id., at p. 94.

689

, 689

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A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE DARAB IN DSCA NO. 0151,
WHICH GAVE DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR RELIEF FROM
JUDGMENT.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE DARAB IN DSCA NO. 0151
WHEREBY IT WAS RULED THAT PETITIONERS HAD THE
OBLIGATION TO PAY LEASE RENTALS AND WERE GUILTY OF
ABANDONMENT.
C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE DARAB IN DSCA NO. 0151
WHEREBY IT WAS RULED THAT RESPONDENT HAD THE RIGHT
TO RETAIN THE SUBJECT PROPERTY BY VIRTUE OF THE
DECISION IN THE DAR RETENTION CASE.23

Petitioners argue that there was no basis for the grant of the
petition for relief from judgment because it was respondent’s own
neglect, and not her counsel’s demise, that caused the loss of her
right to appeal. They claim that as early as June 5, 1995, respondent
personally knew of the death of her lawyer and she could have
employed a new counsel by then. To elaborate, petitioners narrate
that, in another case pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Capas, Tarlac in which respondent is plaintiff, she was ordered to
replace her former counsel and a new counsel, in fact, entered his
appearance therein on June 5, 1995.24 And even assuming that
respondent learned about the July 7, 1999 DARAB Decision only on
September 10, 1999, she could have filed her appeal with the CA
within 15 days from the said date.

_______________

23 Id., at p. 363.
24 Id., at p. 234.

690

690 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Secondly, petitioners contend that respondent had no legal


standing to file the petition for relief from judgment because she no
longer had any interest in the subject property since respondent
already waived her rights over the same in favor of her siblings.
In addition, petitioners posit that with the issuance of the CLT in
favor of their father, their tenancy relationship with respondent
ceased, and ownership over the subject property was effectively

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transferred to them. In any case, they deny that they have abandoned
the landholding as it is still being cultivated by petitioner Renato
dela Cruz, son of the farmer-beneficiary. Assuming that they have
abandoned the property, the right of action to oust them from the
property lies with the Republic of the Philippines to whom the
property will revert.
Finally, petitioners assert that the DAR Decision in the retention
case is null and void for lack of due process; hence, the DARAB
erred in relying on the said decision. They complain that they were
not impleaded as parties in the said case, nor were they given notice
of its filing. Petitioners likewise point out that the retention right of
the heirs, who merely succeeded to the rights of their mother, the
landowner, should be limited to five hectares only.
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, we sustain respondent’s personality to file the petition
for relief from judgment. A petition for relief from judgment is a
remedy available to a party who, through fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable negligence, was prevented from taking an appeal from a
judgment or final order therein. The personality to file a petition for
relief from judgment, therefore, resides in a person who is a party to
the principal case. This legal standing is not lost by the mere transfer
of the disputed property pendente lite. The original party does

691

, 691

not lose his personality as a real party-in-interest merely because of


the transfer of interest to another pendente lite.25
Nonetheless, even as we acknowledge the legal personality of
respondent, we hold that the DARAB, as sustained by the CA, erred
in granting the petition for relief from judgment.
A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is
allowed only in exceptional cases when there is no other available or
adequate remedy. When a party has another remedy available to
him, which may be either a motion for new trial or appeal from an
adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented by
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such
motion or taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this remedy.
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance
from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law
was due to his own negligence; otherwise, the petition for relief can
be used to revive the right to appeal which had been lost thru
inexcusable negligence.26
In this case, respondent’s failure to avail herself of a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal to the CA was due to her inexcusable
negligence. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary
diligence and prudence could not have guarded against.27 We note
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that a copy of the July 7, 1999 DARAB Decision was in fact served
on the respondent herself at her residence, based on her narration
that when she arrived from the U.S.A., her helper handed to her the
envelope containing the DARAB Decision.28 By her own account,
she arrived on September 10, 1999. She cannot, therefore, feign

_______________

25 Marcopper Mining Corporation v. Solidbank Corporation, G.R. No. 134049,


June 17, 2004, 432 SCRA 360, 382.
26  Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 178-179; 256 SCRA 158, 167
(1996).
27 Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services, G.R. No. 147955, October 25, 2004,
441 SCRA 346, 355.
28 Rollo, p. 203.

692

692 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ignorance of the said decision and blame the death of her counsel for
such ignorance.
Moreover, we cannot disregard the fact that respondent was able
to engage the services of a new counsel to represent her in another
case pending before the RTC as early as June 5, 1995, in compliance
with the court’s directive for her to hire a substitute for her deceased
counsel. Given this, respondent cannot claim lack of knowledge of
the death of her former counsel, and use it as an excuse for her
failure to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal from the said
DARAB Decision.
Besides, the case had been pending before the DARAB for
almost five years. To recall, she filed, through counsel, her notice of
appeal on July 11, 1994 and her Appeal Memorandum on November
29, 1994. Her former counsel died barely a month later (December
21, 1994). Had respondent bothered to check the status of the case,
she would have discovered her counsel’s demise. Parties are not
expected to simply sit back and await the outcome of their case.
They should be assiduous in keeping track of the status of any
litigation to which they are a party. By allowing almost five years to
lapse without monitoring the status of her appeal, respondent
exhibited a total lack of vigilance tantamount to inexcusable
negligence.
Not only did the DARAB err in granting the petition for relief
from judgment, it also erred in canceling the petitioners’ CLT and
ordering them to vacate the property based on a finding that
petitioners had abandoned the landholding.
However, contrary to petitioners’ posture, the issuance of a CLT
does not vest full ownership in the holder.29 The issuance of the CLT
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does not sever the tenancy relationship between the landowner and
the tenant-farmer. A certificate of land transfer merely evinces that
the grantee thereof is qualified to

_______________

29 Planters Development Bank v. Garcia, G.R. No. 147081, December 9, 2005,


477 SCRA 185, 199; Vinzons-Magana v. Estrella, G.R. No. 60269, September 13,
1991, 201 SCRA 536, 540.

693

, 693

avail himself of the statutory mechanism for the acquisition of


ownership of the land tilled by him as provided under P.D. No. 27. It
is not a muniment of title that vests in the farmer/grantee absolute
ownership of his tillage.30 It is only after compliance with the
conditions which entitle a farmer/grantee to an emancipation patent
that he acquires the vested right of absolute ownership in the
landholding—a right which then would have become fixed and
established, and no longer open to doubt or controversy.31
For this reason, the landowner retains an interest over the
property that gives him the right to file the necessary action to evict
the tenant from the landholding should there be an abandonment
despite the fact that land acquired under P.D. No. 27 will not revert
to the landowner.32
Nonetheless, we agree with petitioners that they have not
abandoned the subject landholding, as in fact they have continuously
cultivated the property. Abandonment requires (a) a clear and
absolute intention to renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or
property; and (b) an external act by which that intention is expressed
or carried into effect. The intention to abandon implies a departure,
with the avowed intent of never returning, resuming or claiming the
right and the interest that have been abandoned.33 The immigration
of the original farmer-beneficiary to the U.S.A. did not necessarily
result in the abandonment of the landholding, considering that one
of his sons, petitioner Renato dela Cruz, continued cultivating the
land. Personal cultivation, as required by law, includes cultivation of
the land by the tenant (lessee) himself

_______________

30 Martillano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 148277, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA
195, 203-204.
31 Pagtalunan v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 54281, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 252, 259.
32 See Estolas v. Mabalot, 431 Phil. 462, 469; 381 SCRA 702, 709-710 (2002).
33 Corpuz v. Grospe, 388 Phil. 1100, 1111; 333 SCRA 425, 437 (2000).

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694

694 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

or with the aid of the immediate farm household, which refers to the
members of the family of the tenant and other persons who are
dependent upon him for support and who usually help him in the
[agricultural] activities.34
Without doubt, the landowner’s right of retention may be
exercised over tenanted land despite the issuance of a CLT to
farmer-beneficiaries.35 However, the cancellation of a CLT over the
subject landholding as a necessary consequence of the landowner’s
exercise of his right of retention is within the jurisdiction of the
DAR Secretary, not the DARAB, as it does not involve an agrarian
dispute.36
Under Section 1(g), Rule II of the then DARAB Rules of
Procedure,37 matters involving strictly the administrative
implementation of agrarian laws shall be the exclusive pre-

_______________

34 Verde v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 151342, June 23, 2005, 461 SCRA 97, 106-107;
Romero v. Tan, 468 Phil. 224, 238; 424 SCRA 108, 121 (2004); Palele v. Court of
Appeals, 414 Phil. 417, 429; 362 SCRA 141 (2001).
35 Daez v. Court of Appeals, 382 Phil. 742, 754; 325 SCRA 856, 866 (2000).
36 Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657 defines “agrarian dispute,” thus:
(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, stewardship or, otherwise, over lands
devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired
under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
37 Repealed and/or modified by the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure and DAR
Administrative Order No. 06-00.

695

, 695

rogative of and cognizable by the Secretary of the DAR. Although


Section 1(f) of the said Rules provides that the DARAB shall have
jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance of a CLT and the
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administrative correction thereof, it should be understood that for the


DARAB to exercise jurisdiction in such cases, there must be an
agrarian dispute between the landowner and the tenant.38
In Tenants of the Estate of Dr. Jose Sison v. Court of Appeals,39
the Court sustained the authority or jurisdiction of the DAR
Secretary to cancel the CLT issued to tenant-beneficiaries after the
landowners’ right to retain the subject landholding was upheld. The
Court ruled that the issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of
land transfer falls within the Secretary’s administrative jurisdiction
as implementor of P.D. No. 27.
To conclude, respondent’s remedy is to raise before the DAR
Secretary the matter of cancellation of petitioner’s CLT as an
incident of the order granting the landowners’ application for
retention over the said landholding. In the same forum, petitioners
can raise the issue of the validity of the DAR order granting the
application for retention based on their claim of denial of due
process, or in a separate action specifically filed to assail the validity
of the judgment. A collateral attack against a judgment is generally
not allowed, unless the judgment is void upon its face or its nullity is
apparent by virtue of its own recitals.40
But as a reminder to respondent, this tack can achieve only the
cancellation of petitioner’s CLT. Under Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657, if
the area retained is tenanted, the tenant shall have

_______________

38  See Heirs of Julian dela Cruz and Leonora Talaro v. Heirs of Alberto Cruz,
G.R. No. 162890, November 22, 2005, 475 SCRA 743, 756.
39 G.R. No. 93045, June 29, 1992, 210 SCRA 545.
40 Arcelona v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250, 264; 280 SCRA 20, 33 (1997).

696

696 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

the option to choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in


the same or another agricultural land with similar or comparable
features. Petitioners may not be ejected from the subject landholding
even if their CLT is canceled, unless they choose to be beneficiaries
of another agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The January 19, 2006 Decision and March 21, 2006 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the February 7, 2001 DARAB Decision granting the
petition for relief from judgment is SET ASIDE and the July 7, 1999
DARAB Decision is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

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2/1/22, 9:24 PM SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 572

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Chico-


Nazario and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.

Note.—While the failure of petitioner’s former counsel to notify


him of the adverse decision to enable him to appeal therefrom
constitutes inexcusable negligence, it is not a ground for relief from
judgment. (Azucena vs. Foreign Manpower Services, 441 SCRA 346
[2004])
——o0o——

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