TEAM CODE-

THE 28TH ALL INDIA MOOT COURT COMPETITION FOR KERALA

LAW ACADEMY TROPHY

BEFORE THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

WRIT (CIVIL) NO. ____/2016

IN THE MATTER OF

SOMANI- - - - - - - - - -PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF I NDIA AND ANR. - - - - - - -RESPONDENT

WITH

DHARMASTHAN STATE PENSIONER ’S ASSOCIATION- - - -PETITIONER

V.

UNION OF I NDIA AND ANR. - - - - - - - RESPONDENT

UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA

BEFORE SUBMISSION TO

THE HONOURABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND HIS COMPANION JUSTICES

OF

THE HONOURABLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

-Table of Contents- -Respondents-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................................ III

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS..................................................................................................... XIV

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ........................................................................................... XVI

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... XVII

QUESTIONS PRESENTED ................................................................................................... XVIII

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS .................................................................................................... XIX

PLEADINGS................................................................................................................................. 1

I. THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME
COURT ARE NOT MAINTAINABLE. ....................................................................................................... 1

1.1. PETITIONERS DO NOT HOLD A LOCUS STANDI. ............................................................ 1

1.1.1. Somani is not the aggrieved party. .................................................................... 2
1.1.2. The petition filed by Petitioner-2 is not a public interest litigation.................. 3
1.1.3. Unauthenticated newspaper reports cannot be a basis for entertaining the
PIL……………………………………………………………………………..4

1.2. FUNDAMENTAL R IGHTS CAN BE ENFORCED ONLY AGAINST THE ACTION OF THE
STATE………………………………………………………………………...…….6

1.3. THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL R IGHT. ..................................... 7

1.3.1. There has been no violation of Art. 21. ............................................................. 8

1.4. THERE EXISTS AN A LTERNATIVE REMEDY. .............................................................. 10

1.4.1. The remedy under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. ................................ 11
1.4.2. The remedy under the Indian Penal Code, 1860. ........................................... 11

II. THE DECISION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE ORDER OF THE RESERVE
BANK OF INDIA ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL. .................................................................. 12

2.1. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S DECISION AND THE ORDER OF RBI IS A ‘LAW’ AS
DEFINED UNDER ART. 13(3)( A) AND ‘LAW IN FORCE’ UNDER ART. 372. ................ 12

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2.2. EXECUTIVE DECISION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE ORDER OF RBI IS
NOT IN CONFLICT WITH ANY PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION . .......................... 14

2.2.1. There is a presumption of constitutionality. ................................................... 14

2.2.2. The executive decision and the RBI’s order is not in conflict with any of the
fundamental right. ........................................................................................... 14
a. The executive decision and the RBI’s Orders are not violative of Art. 14 of
the Constitution. .......................................................................................... 15
b. The executive decision and the Orders of the RBI are not violative of Art. 19
of the Constitution. ...................................................................................... 17
c. The executive decision and the RBI’s orders is not violative of Art. 21 of the
Constitution. ................................................................................................ 19

2.3. THE DECISION OF THE G OVERNMENT AND RBI’ ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ANY
OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW....................................................................................... 21

2.4. POLITICAL QUESTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL

REVIEW………………………………………………………………………………………..22

PRAYER .................................................................................................................................. XX

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES REFERRED

SUPREME COURT

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, -21- ¶ 65
(1963) Supp 2 S.C.R. 887
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, (1976) Supp S.C.R. 172 -19, 20- ¶ 59, 60
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 -6, 20- ¶ 19, 61
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 2 S.C.R. 272 -15- ¶ 46
Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa, (1963) 2 S.C.R. 691 -18- ¶ 55
Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh v. State of A.P., (2006) 3 S.C.R. 543 -14- ¶ 43
Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 6 S.C.R. 403 -4, 5- ¶ 12, 15
Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India, (1995) 2 S.C.R. 25 -15- ¶ 44
AP Co-op. Oil Seeds Growers Federation Ltd. v. D. Achyuta Rao, -15- ¶ 46
(2007) 4 S.C.R. 1
Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp 1 S.C.R. -18- ¶ 56
92
Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., (2003) Supp 5 S.C.R. 716 -2, 3- ¶ 6, 10
Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, (2005) Supp 1 S.C.R. 299 -4- ¶ 10
Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145 -15, 17- ¶ 45, 53
Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. v. Sir Shadi Lal Enterprises Ltd., (2011) 1 S.C.C. -14, 22- ¶ 44, 69
640
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 -6, 10- ¶ 19, 29
Bar Council of India v. Surjeet Singh, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 946 -11- ¶ 34
Basant Kumar v. Eagle Rolling Mills, (1964) 6 S.C.R. 913 -10, 11- ¶ 31, 34
Bennett Coleman and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 S.C.R. 757 -17, 22- ¶ 53, 69
Bhagwandas v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 175 -10- ¶ 29
Bhavesh D. Parikh v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 1 S.C.R. 291 -23, 24- ¶ 70, 72
Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 1 -17- ¶ 52
S.C.R. 1137
Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar -20- ¶ 62
Raghavendranath Nandkarni, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 828

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Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Shubha Chakravarti, (1995) Supp 6 S.C.R. 731 -6- ¶ 19

Bombay Dyeing Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group and -14- ¶ 43
Ors., (2006) 2 S.C.R. 902
Chairman, Coal India Ltd. v. Madan Prasad, (2000) 10 S.C.C. 597 -11- ¶ 34
Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 6 -1- ¶2
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, (1950) S.C.R. 869 -2- ¶5
Commercial and Ahmedabad Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 -17- ¶ 53
(Guj.) 20
Coffee Board v. Jt. C.T.O., Madras, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 147 -8- ¶ 24
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union of India, (2006) -19- ¶ 59
Supp 4 S.C.R. 872
Cooverjee v. Excise Commissioner, (1954) S.C.R. 873 -18- ¶ 55
D.D. Suri v. Union of India, (1980) 1 S.C.R. 24 -23- ¶ 69
Daryao v. State of U.P., (1962) 1 S.C.R. 574 -8- ¶ 24
Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of Maharashtra and Ors., (2004) Supp -4- ¶ 11
6 S.C.R. 900
Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 S.C.R. 767 -23- ¶ 70
Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., (2007) -22- ¶ 68
10 S.C.R. 199
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, (2003) Supp 6 S.C.R. 151 -17- ¶ 53
District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2004) Supp 5 S.C.R. -9- ¶ 27
833
Dr B. Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (2004) 2 S.C.R. 1061 -5- ¶ 14
Dr B.K. Subbarao v. K. Parasaran, (1996) Supp. 4 S.C.R. 574 -4- ¶ 11
Dr Jayakumar R. v. State of Kerala, decided on August 11th, 2015. -23- ¶ 70
Dushyant v. Sushma, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1026 -2- ¶5
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P., (1954) 1 S.C.R. 803 -18, 19- ¶ 54, 58
Dwarkadas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co., (1954) 1 S.C.R. 674 -17- ¶ 53
Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 735 -12- ¶ 37
English M.S.P.A. v. State of Karnataka, (1993) Supp 3 S.C.R. 934 -14- ¶ 43
Esmail v. Competent Officer, (1967) 3 S.C.R. 134 -8- ¶ 24
Essar Steel Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 11 S.C.C. 1 -12- ¶ 38

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Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1959) 1 S.C.R. 12 -17- ¶ 53

Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 382 -6- ¶ 19
Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 -1, 10- ¶ 2, 29
Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of Delhi, -20- ¶ 61
(1981) 2 S.C.R. 516
Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 3 S.C.R. 244 -14- ¶ 43
Ghulam Quadir v. Special Tribunal, (2001) Supp 3 S.C.R. 504 -2- ¶6
Glass Chatons Importers and Users Asso. v. Union of India, (1962) 1 -23- ¶ 70
S.C.R. 862
Gopal Das v. Union of India, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 773 -8- ¶ 23
Gujarat University v. Rajguru, (1988) 1 S.C.R. 899 -11- ¶ 34
H.C. Narayanappa v. State of Mysore, (1960) 3 S.C.R. 742 -12- ¶ 37
Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India, (1960) 2 S.C.R. 671 -17, 18- ¶ 53, 55
Harakchand v. Union of India, (1970) 1 S.C.R. 479 -18- ¶ 55
Heena Kausar v. Competent Authority, (2008) 6 S.C.R. 967 -14- ¶ 43
Hema Mishra v. State of U.P. and Ors., (2014) 1 S.C.R. 465 -9- ¶ 27
Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India, (1990) 1 S.C.R. 588 -14- ¶ 43
Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1979) 3 -20- ¶ 61
S.C.R. 532
Hussainara Khatoon (2) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1979) 3 -20- ¶ 61
S.C.R. 169
India Cement Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3 S.C.R. 850 -24- ¶ 71
Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1985) 2 S.C.R. 287 -10- ¶ 29
Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, (1992) Supp 1 S.C.R. 226 -1, 4- ¶ 6, 11
Jashbhai Motibhai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 S.C.R. 58 -1, 2- ¶ 3, 5
Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India and Ors., (1996) -21- ¶ 63
Supp 4 S.C.R. 443
Jolly George Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 913 -20- ¶ 61
Jyoti Prasad v. U.T. of Delhi, (1962) 2 S.C.R. 125 -18- ¶ 54
K. Kochunni v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp 2 S.C.R. 316 -8- ¶ 24
K. Narayan v. State of Karnataka, (1993) Supp 2 S.C.R. 105 -23- ¶ 69
Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 2 S.C.R. 314 -10- ¶ 31
Karnataka Bank Ltd. v. State of A.P., (2008) 1 S.C.R. 986 -14- ¶ 43

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Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 375 -8, 20- ¶ 26, 60
Kasturi and Sons v. Salivakeswaran, (1959) S.C.R. 1 -10- ¶ 29
Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1980) 3 -20- ¶ 61
S.C.R. 1338
Kerala Education Bill, In re., (1959) 1 S.C.R. 995 -17- ¶ 53
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) Supp S.C.R. 1 -15- ¶ 46
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 S.C.R. 332 -8- ¶ 26
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1995) Supp 6 S.C.R. -16, 19- ¶ 47, 56
759
Kirloskar Brothers v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, (1996) 1 -9- ¶ 28
S.C.R. 884
Krishnan Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala, (1996) Supp 7 S.C.R. 487 -14, 18- ¶ 43, 56
Kushum Lata v. Union of India, (2006) Supp 3 S.C.R. 462 -4- ¶ 12
Laxmanappa v. Union of India, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 769 -6, 8- ¶ 19, 24
Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India, (1984) 3 S.C.R. 676 -23- ¶ 70
Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 787 -22- ¶ 66
M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 1 S.C.R. 192 -20- ¶ 61
M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka, (1995) 3 S.C.R. 329 -18- ¶ 56
M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., (1997) Supp 1 S.C.R. 671 -14- ¶ 43
Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Education v. -23- ¶ 70
Paritosh, (1985) 1 S.C.R. 29
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 -9, 20- ¶ 28, 61
Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India, (1974) 2 S.C.R. 398 -19- ¶ 58
Mohammad Zahir Khan v. Union of India, (1993) Supp (2) S.C.C. 12 -8- ¶ 24
Mohd. Ikram v. State of U.P., (1964) 5 S.C.R. 86 -2- ¶5
Muneeb-ul-Rahman v. Govt. of J&K, (1985) 1 S.C.R. 344 -8- ¶ 24
Municipal Corp. of City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammad Usman Bhai, -18- ¶ 54
(1986) 2 S.C.R. 700
Mylapore Club v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2005) Supp 4 S.C.R. 996 -15- ¶ 45
Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1181 -15- ¶ 46
Nanhoomal v. Hiramal, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 809 -11- ¶ 34
Narendra v. Union of India, (1960) 2 S.C.R. 375 -19- ¶ 58
Niranjan Tripathy v. State of Orissa, 119 (2015) C.L.T. 426 -5- ¶ 13

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Northern Corporation v. Union of India, (1990) 3 S.C.R. 621 -6, 14- ¶ 19, 43
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, (1963) Supp 1 S.C.R. 789 -19- ¶ 56
Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) Supp. 2 S.C.R. -10- ¶ 29
51
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 4 S.C.R. 693 -16, 21- ¶ 49, 63
P.N. Kumar v. Municipal Corp. of Delhi, (1988) 1 S.C.R. 732 -10- ¶ 31
Papanasan Labour Union v. Madhura Coasts Ltd., (1994) Supp 6 S.C.R. -18- ¶ 54
369
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.R. 997 -9- ¶ 28
Paschim Bang Khet Majdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) -9- ¶ 28
Supp 2 S.C.R. 331
Peerless General Finance & Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of -24- ¶ 72
India, (1992) 1 S.C.R. 406
People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India, (1983) 1 -10- ¶ 29
S.C.R. 456
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) -6, 15- ¶ 18, 47
3 S.C.R. 100
Prag Ice and Oil Mills v. Union of India, (1978) 3 S.C.R. 293 -24- ¶ 72
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, (1963) Supp -7- ¶ 23
1 S.C.R. 885
Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 1 S.C.R. 579 -14, 22- ¶ 43, 69
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 530 -17- ¶ 53
R.K. Jain v. Union of India, (2013) 5 S.C.R. 411 -24- ¶ 74
R.K. Pandey and Ors. v. Steel Authority of India and Ors., A.I.R. 2000 -10- ¶ 31
S.C. 3548
Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 225 -12- ¶ 39
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, (1959) 1 S.C.R. 279 -15- ¶ 45
Ram Sharan Autyanuprasi v. Union of India, (1988) Supp 3 S.C.R. 870 -9- ¶ 28
Rameshwar Proshad v. Commissioner of Land Reforms, A.I.R. 1959 -10- ¶ 29
S.C. 498
Ramji Lal v. I.T.O., (1951) S.C.R. 127 -6- ¶ 19
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, (1950) S.C.R. 566 -10- ¶ 31
Rohit Pandey v. Union of India and Ors., (2005) 13 S.C.C. 702 -4- ¶ 13

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S. T. Mutthuswami v. Natarajan, (1988) 2 S.C.R. 759 -11- ¶ 34

Sadhu Ram v. Custodian General, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 1113 -10- ¶ 29
Sanjay Musale v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1998) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 646 -3- ¶ 10
Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration, (1973) 3 S.C.R. 533 -17- ¶ 52
Satyanarayana Sinha v. Lal and Co., (1974) 1 S.C.R. 615 -1- ¶2
Scooters India v. Vijai, (1998) 6 S.C.C. 549 -11- ¶ 34
Shantabai v. State of Bombay, (1959) S.C.R. 265 -7- ¶ 23
Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P. (2001) Supp 5 S.C.R. 390 -16- ¶ 47
Sheikh Mohd. v. Collector of Customs, (1971) 2 S.C.R. 35 -22- ¶ 66
Sivarajan v. Union of India, (1959) 1 S.C.R. 779 -18- ¶ 55
Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia, (1998) 2 S.C.R. 428 -11- ¶ 32
Srivastava K.K. v. Bhupendra Kumar Jain, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1703 -11- ¶ 34
St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1991) Supp 3 S.C.R. 121 -16- ¶ 50
Star Sugar Mills v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 37 -8- ¶ 24
State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 S.C.R. 721 -14, 15- ¶ 44, 46
State of Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik, (1952) 1 S.C.R. 674 -4- ¶ 13
State of Himachal Pradesh v. A parent of a student of Medical College, -4- ¶ 11
Shimla and Ors., (1985) 3 S.C.R. 676
State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 1 -14- ¶ 43
State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Aandolan, (2011) 6 S.C.R. 443 -14- ¶ 43
State of Madras v. Row, (1952) S.C.R. 597 -18- ¶ 55
State of Maharashtra v. Lok Shiksha Sanstha, (1971) S.C.R. 879 -23- ¶ 69
State of Maharashtra v. Rao Himmatbhai Narbheram, (1969) 2 S.C.R. -18- ¶ 55
392
State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Chawla, (1996) Supp 10 S.C.R. 279 -9- ¶ 28
State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1998) 1 S.C.R. 1120 -9, 23- ¶ 28, 69
State of U.P. v. U.P. University College Pensioners Asso., (1994) 2 -23- ¶ 69
S.C.R. 171
State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chaudhary Ran Beer Singh, (2008) 4 S.C.R. -14- ¶ 43
610
State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors., (2010) 2 S.C.R. -3- ¶8
678
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 S.C.R. 5 -4- ¶ 10

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Sukhnandan v. Union of India, (1982) 3 S.C.R. 371 -17- ¶ 53

Suman Gupta v. State of J&K, (1983) 3 S.C.R. 985 -23- ¶ 69
Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 557 -20- ¶ 61
Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration, (1979) 1 S.C.R. 392 -20- ¶ 61
Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, (2000) 1 S.C.R. 945 -20- ¶ 62
Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 S.C.R. -18- ¶ 56
821
Sushma Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 243 -23- ¶ 69
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 2 S.C.R. 122 -22- ¶ 68
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 2 S.C.R. 824 -10- ¶ 31
Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration, (2001) 2 S.C.R. 630 -23- ¶ 70
Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778 -6, 8- ¶ 20, 24
Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, (1993) 3 S.C.R. -14, 23- ¶ 43, 69
128
Union of India v. S.B. Vohra, (2004) 1 S.C.R. 36 -21- ¶ 65
Vidharbha Shikshan Vyawashapak Sahsangh v. State of Maharashtra, -23- ¶ 69
A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 135
Villianur v. Union of India, (2009) 9 S.C.R. 225 -14- ¶ 43
Vinoy Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2001) 2 S.C.R. 1196 -2- ¶6
Virendra v. State of Punjab, (1958) 1 S.C.R. 308 -18- ¶ 55
Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 1 S.C.R. 400 -15- ¶ 45

HIGH COURT AT ALLAHABAD

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Sahil Society for Welfare of the Aged, Poor and Homeless v. Union of -9- ¶ 28
India, A.I.R. 1999 (All.) 87
Vashisht Kumar Jaiswal v. State of U.P., A.I.R 2004 (All.) 105 -15- ¶ 47

HIGH COURT AT KERALA

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NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Gopalan v. Job, A.I.R. 1965 (Ker.) 216 -14- ¶ 43
Niyamakendram, Kochi v. Secretary, Corporation of Cochin, A.I.R. -9- ¶ 28
1997 (Ker.) 152

HIGH COURT AT KARNATAKA

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

H. Sawbhaghya v. N.G.E.F. Ltd., A.I.R. 2004 (Kant.) 155 -15- ¶ 47
S. Krishna and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., A.I.R. 1989 (Kar.) -9- ¶ 28
291

HIGH COURT AT ORISSA

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Bijayalakshmi Tripathi v. Managing Committee of Working Women’s -6- ¶ 19
Hostel, A.I.R. 1992 (Ori.) 242
Oriental Insurance Co. v. Kishore Chandra Sahu, 1999 A.C.J. 122 -15- ¶ 47

HIGH COURT AT ANDHRA PRADESH

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

G. Gurunadha Reddy v. A.P. Road Transport Corporation, A.I.R. 1999 -8- ¶ 25
(A.P.) 179
P.R. Subhash Chandran v. Govt. of A.P., A.I.R. 2000 (A.P.) 272 -9- ¶ 28
Shantha v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1998 (A.P.) 51 -9- ¶ 28

HIGH COURT AT GUWAHATI

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NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

State of Assam v. Omega Printers and Publishers Pvt. Ltd., A.I.R. 1995 -15- ¶ 47
(Gau.) 49

HIGH COURT AT DELHI

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Chander Prakash v. Ministry of Health, A.I.R. 2002 (Del.) 188 -9- ¶ 28
J.S. Sachdev v. Reserve Bank of India, (1973) 2 L.L.J. 204 -13- ¶ 41

HIGH COURT AT PUNJAB AND HARYANA

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Dr Amar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 2004 (P&H) 67 -15- ¶ 47

HIGH COURT AT PATNA

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Umesh Chandra Sinha v. V.N. Singh, A.I.R. 1968 (Pat.) 3 -12- ¶ 37

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL C OMMISSION, NEW DELHI

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

Cosmopolitan Hospital v. Vasantha P. Nair, (1992) 24 D.R.J. 310 -11- ¶ 32

FOREIGN J URISDICTION

NAME OF CASE REFERRED TO IN

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A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, (2005) 2 A.C. 68 -14- ¶ 43

Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp., (1947) -16- ¶ 49
2 All E.R. 680
Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 U.S. 327 -18- ¶ 54
McCabe v. Atchinson, (1914) 235 U.S. 151 -2- ¶5
McKart v. United States, (1969) 395 U.S. 185. -11- ¶ 35
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 -9- ¶ 27
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. State of Chicago, 57 L.Ed. 730 -22- ¶ 68
R (Tesema and Limbuela) v. Secretary of the State for the Home, [2004] -14- ¶ 43
EWCA (Civ) 540
R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind, (1991) -24- ¶ 73
1 All E.R. 720

BOOKS REFERRED

1. 1, 2, 3 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA (Universal Law Publishing Co.,

4th ed. 2010).
2. 3, 4, 5, 6 D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, 9th ed. 2015).
3. 1, 2, 3, 4 D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Lexis Nexis
Butterworths, 8th ed. 2007).
4. A.P. DATAR, DATAR ON CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Wadhwa and Co., 1st ed. 2007).
5. 3 DJ DE, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Asia Law House, 3rd ed. 2008).
6. 1, 2 L.M. S INGHVI, J AGDISH SWARUP, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Modern Law
Publication, 2nd ed., 2007).
7. 1 M.P. J AIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Lexis Nexis Butterworths Wadhwa, 6th ed.,
2010).
8. MAHENDRA P. S INGH, V.N. SHUKLA 'S CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Eastern Book
Company, Lucknow, 12th ed. 2007).
9. 7, 8, 9, 10 MANOHAR AND CHITALEY, THE AIR MANUAL C IVIL AND CRIMINAL (All
India Reporter Pvt. Ltd., Nagpur, 6th ed. 2011).
10. 2 P.K. MAJUMDAR AND R.P. KATARIA, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
(Orient Publishing Co., New Delhi, 10th ed. 2009).

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[XII]
-Index of Authorities- -Respondents-

11. P.M. BAKSHI, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Universal Law Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd., 3rd
ed. 2007).
12. 2 S.C. KASHYUP, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (Universal Law Publishing Co., 4th ed. 2006).
13. 25 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 4th ed. 2008).

STATUTES REFERRED

1. THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ACT, 1934.

2. THE BANKING REGULATION ACT, 1949.
3. THE INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860.
4. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT, 1986.
5. THE GENERAL CLAUSES ACT, 1897.

LIST OF DATABASES REFERRED

1. www.manupatra.com
2. www.scconline.com
3. www.jstor.org
4. www.westlawindia.com
5. www.lexisnexis.com
6. www.epw.in

DICTIONARIES REFERRED

1. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)

2. Justice C.K. Thakker, Encyclopaedic Law Lexicon (Ashoka Law House, 2010)
3. P. Ramnatha Aiyar’s, Advanced Law Lexicon (Wadhwa, 3rd ed. 2007)

MISCELLANEOUS

1. The Constitution of India, 1950

2. Supreme Court Rules, 2013

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[XIII]
-List of Abbreviations- -Respondents-

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATIONS WORDS
& And
§ Section
¶ Paragraph
A.C. Appeal Cases
A.I.H.C. All India High Court Cases
A.I.R. All India Reporter
A.L.D. Andhra Legal Decisions
All. Allahabad
All ER All England Reporter
Anr. Another
A.P. Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
Asso. Association
ATM Automated Teller Machine
Co. Company
Const. Constitution of India
Co-op. Co-operative
COPRA Consumer Protection Act
Corp. Corporation
CPC Code of Civil Procedure
C.P.J. Consumer Protection Judgements
Del. Delhi
D.R.J. Delhi Reported Journal
DSPA Dharamasthan State Pensioners Association
Ed. Edition
F.L.R. Factory Law Reporter
Govt. Government
Hon’ble Honourable
IPC Indian Penal Code
I.T.O. Income Tax Officer

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[XIV]
-List of Abbreviations- -Respondents-

J&K Jammu and Kashmir

J. Justice
J.T. Judgement Today
Ker. Kerala
L.L.J. Labour Law Journal
Ltd. Limited
M.L.J. Madras Law Journal
M.P. Madhya Pradesh
N.C.D.R.C. National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission
N.G.E.F. New Government Electrical Factory
Ori. Orissa
Ors. Others
p. Page Number
Pat. Patna
PIL Public Interest Litigation
Pvt. Private
RBI Reserve Bank of India
S.C. Supreme Court of India
S.C.A.L.E. Supreme Court Almanac
S.C.C. Supreme Court Cases
S.C.J. Supreme Court Journal
S.C.R. Supreme Court Reporter
Supp S.C.R. Supplementary Supreme Court Reporter
T.N. Tamil Nadu
U.P. Uttar Pradesh
U.S. United States
U.T. Union Territory
Vol. Volume
v. Versus
W.B. West Bengal
W.L.R. Weekly Law Reports

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[XV]
-Statement of Jurisdiction- -Respondents-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE RESPONDENTS HUMBLY SUBMIT THIS MEMORANDUM IN RESPONSE TO THE PETITION

FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT UNDER ARTICLE 32 1 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1950 AND ORDER XLVII R ULE V2 OF THE SUPREME COURT
RULES, 1966.

IT SETS FORTH THE FACTS, CONTENTIONS AND ARGUMENTS IN THE PRESENT CASE.

1
“(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights
conferred by this Part is guaranteed. (2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or
writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari,
whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part. (3) Without
prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by law
empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (3). (4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be
suspended except as otherwise provided for by this Constitution.”
2
“Where there are two or more appeals arising out of the same matter, the Court may at any time on its own
motion or on the application of any party, order that the appeals be consolidated.”

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[XVI]
-Statement of Facts- -Respondents-

STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. BACKGROUND

Mrs Somani (hereinafter referred to as the ‘petitioner-1’), is the wife of Mr Janeshwar

who is a Data Entry Operator in the State Civil Service in the capital city of
Dharmasthan, Trobay. The petitioner, being pregnant, was under the care of Dr. Manu
Nath at White Fort Clinic since June 18, 2016. On November 8 2016, the petitioner
underwent certain tests and sonography at the hospital and was told that the baby was
due around December 7 2016. On a day prior to November 8 2016, the Prime Minister
declared the decision to withdraw ₹ 1000 and 500 notes from circulation.

II. DELIVERY AND DEATH OF THE INFANT

On the morning of November 9 2016, the petitioner underwent labour and her baby was
delivered under the care of relatives and neighbours. Due to the premature delivery and
loss of blood during the delivery, she was taken to Dr. Manu Nath. After giving primary
care, Dr. Manu Nath refused to admit her because of the inability of the family
concerning payment of ₹ 6000 in currency notes. Even after repeated requests of the
family and despite of the fact that banks and ATMs were shut that day, Dr. Manu Nath
did not relent and sent the petitioner and her baby back. On the next day, when the
condition of the baby worsened, the petitioner and her husband brought him to Dr. Manu
Nath. During the course of waiting for the doctor, the infant died. The incident was
reported in a newspaper in which it was stated that Dr. Manu Nath stated that along with
the inability of the family to pay deposit, another reason for denying admission was non -
availability of the NICU facility in her clinic.

III. FILING OF WRIT PETITIONS

Somani filed a writ petition for the violation of her Fundamental Rights with a prayer for
payment of ₹ 10 lakhs as palliative. In light of the ongoing chaos, another writ petition
was filed by the Dharmasthan State Pensioner’s Association (hereinafter referred to as
‘petitioner-2’). By citing the newspaper reports, it is alleged that there has been death of
numerous persons by standing in the queue of the banks. It has been prayed that the
Court should declare the decision of the Government and orders of RBI regarding
demonetisation be declared illegal and unconstitutional.

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[XVII]
-Questions Presented- -Respondents-

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THE HON’BLE
SUPREME COURT ARE MAINTAINABLE OR NOT.
2. WHETHER THE DECISION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE ORDERS OF THE

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AND ILLEGAL OR NOT .

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[XVIII]
 -Summary of Pleadings- -Respondents-

SUMMARY OF PLEADINGS

I. THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THE H ON’BLE SUPREME
COURT ARE NOT MAINTAINABLE.

It is humbly submitted that the instant writ petitions are not maintainable in the court of law.
The counsel would base its argument majorly on three premises, firstly, that neither of the
petitioners hold a locus standi under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950; secondly, that
fundamental rights can be enforced only against the action of the State; thirdly, that there has
been no violation of fundamental right; and lastly, that there exists an alternative remedy.

Somani’s fundamental right has not been directly invaded, and hence she is not the aggrieved
party. In the instant case, the DPSA has filed the writ petition under Art. 32 in the form of
PIL. It is submitted that the petitioner does not have the locus standi to file the PIL. The
counsel would base its argument majorly on three premises; firstly, the unauthenticated
newspaper reports cannot be a basis for admission of PIL; secondly, no substantial public
interest is involved in it, and; thirdly, economic policy can’t be challenged through the
instrument of PIL.

II. THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND THE ORDER OF THE RESERVE BANK OF INDIA
ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL .

It is humbly submitted that the executive decision of the Central Government is

Constitutional and legal according to the provisions of law. The counsel would base its
argument majorly on four premises; firstly, the Central Government’s decision is a law as
defined under Art. 13(2) and 'law in force' under Art. 372; secondly, executive decision is not
in conflict with any provisions of the Constitution; thirdly, executive decision is intra vires
the other established laws, and; fourthly, political question is not subject to judicial
interference by court.

The decision of the Government on November 7 2016, and the subsequent order released by
the RBI is constitutional and legal. The argument is twofold; firstly, that the decision of the
Government qualifies to be termed as law as per Art. 13, does not violate any of the
Fundamental Rights, and; secondly, that the order of the RBI under the aegis of subordinate
legislation withstands the test of Art. 13, is not arbitrary and is thereby intra vires.

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[XIX]
 -Pleadings- -Respondents-

PLEADINGS

I. THE WRIT PETITIONS FILED BY THE PETITIONERS BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT
ARE NOT MAINTAINABLE.

1. It is humbly submitted that the instant writ petitions are not maintainable in the court of law.
The counsel would base its argument majorly on three premises, firstly, that neither of the
petitioners hold a locus standi under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (hereinafter
referred to as ‘the Constitution’) (1.1); secondly, that fundamental rights can be enforced only
against the action of the State (1.2); thirdly, that there has been no violation of fundamental
right (1.3); and lastly, that there exists an alternative remedy (1.4).

1.1. PETITIONERS DO NOT HOLD A LOCUS STANDI.

2. The locus standi of the petitioner is a sine qua non and condition precedent for the exercise of
power and jurisdiction by the court.3 The issue of locus standi touches the jurisdiction of the
court whenever a remedy is sought is to be achieved and legal capacity in any litigation is
challenged. It is, therefore, necessary to keep in mind the principle relating to locus standi.4
Lord Denning has rightly said that, “In administrative law the question of locus standi is the
most vexed questions of all.”5 Locus standi means legal capacity to challenge and act or
decision.6 The issue of locus standi in case of violation of fundamental right is of utmost
importance because the court may not entertain such a petition if not presented by an
aggrieved person.7 If the petitioner has no locus standi to file a petition, he cannot be heard
on merits.8

3. In the context of locus standi, a petitioner may ordinarily fall in the following categories;
firstly, person aggrieved; secondly, stranger, and; thirdly, busybody or meddlesome
interloper.9 In Halsbury’s Laws of England,10 it has been stated-

3
1 V.G. RAMACHANDRAN, LAW OF WRITS 26 (Eastern Book Company, 6th ed. 2006); Fertilizer Corporation
Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 11).
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id, p. 27. See also, Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, (1992) Supp 1 S.C.R. 226 (¶ 109).
7
Satyanarayana Sinha v. Lal and Co., (1974) 1 S.C.R. 615 (¶ 11).
8
Charan Lal Sahu v. Giani Zail Singh, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 6 (¶ 15-16).
9
Jashbhai Motibhai v. Roshan Kumar, (1976) 3 S.C.R. 58 (¶ 37).
10
25 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 293 (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 4th ed. 2008).

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[1]
 -Pleadings- -Respondents-

“The expression ‘person aggrieved’ is nowhere defined and must be construed

by reference to the context of the enactment in which it appears and all the
circumstances.”11

4. Going by the factual matrix of the present case, the petitioner has filed the current petition
under the Art. 32 of the Constitution. Art. 32(1) guarantees the right to move Supreme Court
by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by Part
III of the Constitution.12 As a general rule, infringement of fundamental right or prejudice to
the ‘petitioner’(emphasis supplied) itself is necessary to give locus standi in the matter and
the petitioner cannot be heard to say that the actions of the State or the other public authority
is calculated to prejudice somebody else’s right and should, therefore, be struck down.13

1.1.1. Somani is not the aggrieved party.

5. In a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution for enforcement of rights guaranteed under Part
III, it is necessary that the rights must ordinarily be those of the petitioner ‘himself’
(emphasis supplied) who complains of the infraction of such rights and approaches the court
for any relief, and the proper subject for investigation by the court would be what rights, if
any, of the petitioners have been violated by the impugned law. 14 An exception to the above
general proposition is admitted in the case of habeas corpus.15 It was held in a case following
the observation of Hughes, J., in McCabe v. Atchison,16 that a complainant cannot succeed
because someone else may be hurt by the impugned decision.17

6. It is further submitted that a person shall have no locus standi to file a writ petition under Art.
32 if she is not personally affected by the impugned order, and her own fundamental right
guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution has not been directly invaded.18 In order to
invoke the jurisdiction of this court under Art. 32, it is necessary to prima facie make out the
case of violation of her own fundamental right.

11
Supra Note 10.
12
INDIA CONST., art. 32.
13
Supra Note 9 (¶ 34).
14
Chiranjit Lal v. Union of India, (1950) S.C.R. 869 (¶ 46). See also, Jashbhai Motibhai v. Roshan Kumar,
(1976) 3 S.C.R. 58 (¶ 12); Bangalore Medical Trust v. B.S. Muddappa, (1991) 3 S.C.R. 102 (¶ 34, 35); 1(1)
HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND 82-84 (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 4th ed. 2008), ¶ 56.
15
Id (¶ 84). See also, Dushyant v. Sushma, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. 1026 (¶ 3-4); Mohd. Ikram v. State of U.P.,
(1964) 5 S.C.R. 86 (¶ 13).
16
McCabe v. Atchinson, (1914) 235 U.S. 151.
17
Supra Note 14 (¶ 84).
18
Vinoy Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2001) 2 S.C.R. 1196 (¶ 2). See also, Ghulam Quadir v. Special
Tribunal, (2001) Supp 3 S.C.R. 504 (¶ 38); Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B., (2003) Supp 5 S.C.R.
716 (¶ 4, 12, 14).

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[2]
 -Pleadings- -Respondents-

7. Going by the factual matrix of the case, it is humbly submitted that the petitioner did not
suffer because of any direct action of the State, but because of the doctor’s negligence.19 It is
contended that the claim of the petitioner regarding violation of right to life and personal
liberty by the direct action of the State is not based on any substantial ground. Therefore, she
is therefore not entitled to file the present writ petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution due
to lack of locus standi.

1.1.2. The petition filed by Petitioner-2 is not a public interest litigation.

8. PIL means a legal action initiated in a court of law for the enforcement of public interest or
general interest, in which the public or a class of the community have a pecuniary interest, or
some interest by which their legal interest or liabilities are affected. 20 The Hon’ble Apex
Court, in the case of State of Uttaranchal v. Balwant Singh Chaufal and Ors.,21 has laid down
certain guidelines in relation to genuine public interest litigation after due examination of the
nature of cause of action for PIL, and locus standi of a person to bring to notice a public
cause. Firstly, the courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL’s which involves larger
public interest and gravity aimed at redressal of genuine public harm; secondly, the courts
should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents of the petition before
entertaining a PIL, and; thirdly, the courts should also ensure that there is no personal gain,
motive or oblique motive behind filing the PIL.

9. In the instant case, the DPSA has filed the writ petition under Art. 32 in the form of PIL. It is
submitted that the petitioner does not have the locus standi to file the PIL. The counsel would
base its argument majorly on three premises; firstly, the unauthenticated newspaper reports
cannot be a basis for admission of PIL; secondly, no substantial public interest is involved in
it, and; thirdly, economic policy can’t be challenged through the instrument of PIL.

10. The petitioner does not have the locus standi to file the present PIL. The major crux of
admitting any PIL is the presence of element of public interest in the petition. In case of
absence of public interest involved in the petition, the petition stands to be rejected under this
article.22 In the landmark judgement of Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of W.B.,23 the ambit and
scope of public interest and public interest litigation has been examined. A PIL is meant to
vindicate or enforce the fundamental rights of a group of persons or community, which are

19
The Moot Proposition, ¶2.
20
6 D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 6035 (Lexis Nexis, 9th ed. 2015).
21
(2010) 2 S.C.R. 678 (¶ 181).
22
Sanjay Musale v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1998) Supp. 1 S.C.R. 646 (¶ 2).
23
(2003) Supp 5 S.C.R. 716 (¶ 11).

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[3]
 -Pleadings- -Respondents-

not able to enforce their fundamental rights on account of their poverty, or ignorance of law.
PIL cannot be invoked by a person or body of persons to “satisfy his or its personal grudge or
enmity”.24 Personal interest cannot be enforced through the process of this court under Art.
32 of the Constitution in the garb of public interest litigation.25

11. It is an established and reiterated principle that only a person acting bona fide and having
sufficient interest in the proceeding of PIL will have a locus standi and can approach the
court for vindicating the grievances suffered by public at large, due to the violation of their
fundamental rights.26 However, there has been an increasing trend of rushing to the Hon’ble
Apex Court regarding any matter under the attractive nature of the PIL. 27 It was held that the
judiciary should not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the Constitution for the executive
and the legislature and use PIL as a legal weapon.28 It is submitted that in the instant case that
there exists no clinching fact either to illustrate that DSPA is a public spirited body working
in public interest or to prove that a large number of people’s fundamental right have been
affected by the decision of demonetisation.

1.1.3. Unauthenticated newspaper reports cannot be a basis for entertaining the

PIL.

12. It is submitted that a PIL based on newspaper reports cannot be entertained unless and until
they qualify as evidence. A petition based on unconfirmed news reports without verifying the
authenticity will not be entertained.29 Affidavit in a PIL must conform to Order XIX Rule III
of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and in the absence of proper affidavit will not be
entertained.30

13. In the landmark judgements of Rohit Pandey v. Union of India and Ors.31 and State of
Bombay v. Purushottam Jog Naik,32 certain guidelines have been issued by the Supreme
Court with regard to the filing of PIL. It is to be observed here that if the petition is based on

24
Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar, (1991) 1 S.C.R. 5 (¶ 7).
25
Janta Dal v. H.S. Chowdhury, (1992) Supp 1 S.C.R. 226 (¶ 109-112). See also, State of Uttaranchal v.
Balwant Singh, (2010) 1 S.C.R. 678 (¶ 181); Ashok Lanka v. Rishi Dixit, (2005) Supp 1 S.C.R. 299 (¶ 42).
26
Supra Note 25 (¶ 109).
27
Dr B.K. Subbarao v. K. Parasaran, (1996) Supp. 4 S.C.R. 574 (¶ 11).
28
State of Himachal Pradesh v. A parent of a student of Medical College, Shimla and Ors., (1985) 3 S.C.R.
676 (¶ 4). See also, Ashok Kumar Pandey v. State of West Bengal, (2003) Supp 5 S.C.R. 716 (¶ 14); Dr B.
Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (2004) 2 S.C.R. 1061 (¶ 14); Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware v. State of
Maharashtra and Ors., (2004) Supp 6 S.C.R. 900 (¶ 14).
29
Kushum Lata v. Union of India, (2006) Supp 3 S.C.R. 462 (¶ 17).
30
Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 6 S.C.R. 403 (¶ 29, 64).
31
(2005) 13 S.C.C. 702 (¶ 2).
32
(1952) 1 S.C.R. 674 (¶ 14-15).

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[4]
 -Pleadings- -Respondents-

a news report, it is necessary that the petitioner has personally verified the truth and veracity
of facts by personally visiting the place, or by talking to the people concerned, or has verified
from the reporter or editor of the newspaper concerned.33 The verifications of facts pleaded in
the writ petition and miscellaneous case are mandatory under Order VI Rule XV read with
Order XIX Rules I and III, CPC, 1908.34 Rules VI, VII, VIII and IX of the PIL Rules, 2010
deal with aspects to satisfy the correctness of the contents of the petition. In relation to all
these mandates, there is no clinching evidence in the present case to prove that they have
been followed by the petitioner-2.

14. In this regard, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr B. Singh v. Union of India and
Ors.35 has specifically observed as follows-

“It is too much to attribute authenticity or credibility to any information or

fact merely because, it found publication in a newspaper or journal or
magazine or any other form of communication, as though it is gospel truth.
It needs no reiteration that newspaper reports per se do not constitute
legally acceptable evidence.”

15. It is humbly submitted that in the instant case, neither are there any documents produced in
the writ petition, nor any authenticated documents or certified copies. Further, there is no
reference in the verifying affidavits with regard to which it could be proved that the
document is a certified copy and/or authenticated copy and the averments made are within
petitioner's knowledge, belief, and information, which are mandatory under the provisions of
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XIX Rule III.36 Further, it is not clear from the facts
that whether or not the petitioner has verified the truth of the facts personally by visiting the
place, or by taking consent of the people, or has verified from the reporter or editor of the
newspaper concerned.

16. Considering the factual matrix of the case, there is nothing to establish a direct and mutual
connection between the death of the people standing in the queue of the bank and the law of
demonetisation. In view of the above law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, non-
compliance of the mandatory rules prescribed by this Court for filing PIL, the instant petition
is not maintainable.

17. As per the settled proposition of law, newspaper reports without being verified through
affidavits cannot be held as a sufficient ground to admit any PIL in order to hold a law
33
Niranjan Tripathy v. State of Orissa, 119 (2015) C.L.T. 426 (¶ 5).
34
Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 6 S.C.R. 403 (¶ 29, 64).
35
(2004) 2 S.C.R. 1061 (¶ 3).
36
Supra Note 34 (¶ 29, 64); The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, Order XIX Rule III.

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[5]
 -Pleadings- -Respondents-

unconstitutional.37 Further, there exists no sustainable and justifiable grounds on the basis of
which the impugned law can be declared as illegal and unconstitutional, or violative of any
fundamental right. Therefore, in light of the above arguments, it will be an error to conclude
that present writ petition is filed in the public interest.

1.2. FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CAN BE ENFORCED ONLY AGAINST THE ACTION OF THE STATE.

18. While deciding whether or not a writ would lie in a given set of circumstances, the first and
foremost inquiry to be made is that against whom a writ can be issued. 38 As a general rule,
under Art. 32, a writ lies against the ‘State’ as defined in Art. 12 of the Constitution.39
Depending upon the parameters laid down in the landmark judgement of Pradeep Kumar
Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology,40 i.e. formation of body, objects and
functions, management and control and financial aid etc., the expression ‘State’ would
include government hospitals and clinics, private clinics having the financial aid from the
State, public hospitals, and other State regulated clinics and hospitals. The phrase does not
include any private individual.

19. Further, a writ does not lie against the private persons or corporations.41 In case of breach of
the fundamental rights, the petitioner can inevitably approach the Supreme Court under Art.
32 of the Constitution.42 It is, however, necessary that whenever a person complains and
claims that there is a violation of his fundamental right, it does not automatically involve
breach of fundamental right for the enforcement of which alone Art. 32 of the Constitution is
attracted.43

20. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh,44 has observed
that it is necessary to establish a “direct connection between the actions of the state and the
violation of a fundamental right.” The Central Government has followed the proper

37
Dr B. Singh v. Union of India and Ors., (2004) 2 S.C.R. 1061 (¶ 3-4).
38
Supra Note 3, p. 66.
39
Id, p. 67.
40
(2002) 3 S.C.R. 100 (¶ 27, 40).
41
Bijayalakshmi Tripathi v. Managing Committee of Working Women’s Hostel, A.I.R. 1992 (Ori.) 242 (¶ 21).
42
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 (¶ 173). See also, Ramji Lal v. I.T.O., (1951) S.C.R. 127
(¶ 12); Laxmanappa v. Union of India, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 769 (¶ 5); Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(1963) 1 S.C.R. 778 (¶ 22); Fertilizer Corp. Kamgar Union v. Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 11);
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (¶ 11); Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v.
Union of India, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 382 (¶ 76); Bodhisattwa Gautam v. Shubha Chakravarti, (1995) Supp 6
S.C.R. 731 (¶ 6-7).
43
Northern Corporation v. Union of India, (1990) 3 S.C.R. 621 (¶ 11).
44
(1963) 1 S.C.R. 778.

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procedure established by law to demonetise the currency notes.45 Since, the family was
unable to access the health care facility due to their inability to pay the entire deposit,46 hence
there exists no direct nexus between the inability of the petitioners, and the government’s
action of demonetisation of notes. The insufficiency of money with the people and
consequential denial of treatment to the people in the hospital is a case different from
violation of fundamental rights by the State action because the State is not regulating the
private hospitals and such clinics.

21. Further, the responsibility that can be levied on the State to provide health care is through the
establishment of public healthcare institutions and other government hospitals. However, the
ambit of such responsibility cannot be extended to private hospitals and clinics as they are not
governed by the State. Since the Central Government does not govern such institutions by
any regulations, they are therefore not entitled to compensate for the negligence committed
by the private hospitals towards the petitioners.

22. The Central Government and the RBI acknowledge the inconvenience caused to the people
because of the closure of banks on November 9 2016, but at the same time, it cannot be
negated that this step was required to prevent the larger hardships that would have arisen in
the days to follow. Therefore, this restriction was in the larger interest of the public, and
hence not unreasonable and arbitrary. Hence, there is no violation of any fundamental rights
by the direct action of the State and the petitioner holds no locus standi in the given case.

1.3. THERE HAS BEEN NO VIOLATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT.

23. The sole purpose of Art. 32 is to protect and preserve the fundamental rights of the people47
and thus act as a guardian48 and sentinel on the qui vive to protect the substratum of
fundamental rights.49 Further, the article itself provides that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has
the power to issue writs for the enforcement of fundamental rights to make those rights
accessible for the petitioner.50 Art. 32 of the Constitution of India envisages the importance of
judicial remedies as a part of the fundamental rights in order to enforce them.51 However, the

45
The Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, § 24(2) and 26 (2).
46
Supra Note 19.
47
Supra Note 12.
48
Makhan Singh Tarsikka v. The State Of Punjab, (1964) 4 S.C.R. 932 (¶ 9).
49
Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commissioner, Uttar Pradesh, (1963) Supp 1 S.C.R. 885 (¶ 2).
50
Id.
51
Shantabai v. State of Bombay, (1959) S.C.R. 265 (¶ 4).

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jurisprudence of Art. 32 can’t be invoked in case where there is no violation of fundamental

right.52

24. Since the main objective of the Art. 32 is the enforcement of fundamental right, this article
can’t be invoked where no fundamental right has been infringed, and there are other remedies
open to the petitioner.53 It follows that no question other than that relating to a fundamental
right will be determined in a proceeding under Art. 32, including interlocutory relief.54 As per
the factual matrix of the case, there is no question of enforcement of any fundamental right of
the petitioner by the State through any of its direct or inevitable actions.

1.3.1. There has been no violation of Art. 21.

25. Going by the provisions of Art. 21, no person can be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to the due procedure established by law.55 The object of Art. 21 is to
prevent encroachment upon personal liberty by the government, save in accordance with
law.56 While examining the width, scope and content of the expression “personal liberty” in
Art. 21, it was held that this includes within itself a wide range of rights, which go on to
constitute the ‘personal liberty’ of man.

26. While Art. 19(1) deals with particular species or attributes of that freedom, “personal liberty”
in Art. 21 takes on and comprises the residue.57 It is submitted that the right to life and liberty
so guaranteed under Art. 21 is also subject to the rule of proportionality. 58 Liberty is the right
of doing an act which the law permits.59 Liberty is a regulated freedom which is confined &
controlled by law and is not an abstract or absolute freedom and may, by law, be forfeited or
abridged.60

52
Gopal Das v. Union of India, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 773 (¶ 5).
53
Mohd. Zahir Khan v. Union of India, (1993) 23 A.T.C. 812 (¶ 10-11) S.C. See also, Esmail v. Competent
Officer, (1967) 3 S.C.R. 134 (¶ 8); Muneeb-ul-Rahman v. Govt. of J&K, (1985) 1 S.C.R. 344 (¶ 1); Ujjam
Bai v. State of U.P., (1963) 1 S.C.R. 778 (¶ 4); A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, (1950) S.C.R. 88 (¶ 4,
173); Ramjilal v. I.T.O., (1951) S.C.R. 127 (¶ 11-12); Daryao v. State of U.P., (1962) 1 S.C.R. 574 (¶ 7-8);
K. Kochunni v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp 2 S.C.R. 316 (¶ 10, 12).
54
Coffee Board v. Jt. C.T.O., Madras, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 147 (¶ 15). See also, Star Sugar Mills v. State of U.P.,
A.I.R. 1984 S.C. 37 (¶ 2); Express Newspaper v. Union of India, (1985) Supp 3 S.C.R. 382 (¶ 76);
Laxmanappa v. Union of India, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 769 (¶ 5).
55
Supra Note 12, art. 21.
56
G. Gurunadha Reddy v. A.P. Road Transport Corporation, A.I.R. 1999 (A.P.) 179 (¶ 7).
57
Kharak Singh v. State of U.P., (1964) 1 S.C.R. 332 (¶ 13).
58
Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 4 S.C.R. 693 (¶ 68, 71).
59
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 2 S.C.R. 375 (¶ 448).
60
A.D.M. Jabalpur v. Shivkant Shukla, (1976) Supp S.C.R. 172 (¶ 35).

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27. The Hon’ble Apex Court observed that liberty is not absolute, but must arm itself within the
confines of the law.61 In other words, there can be no liberty without social constraint. The
essence of liberty is to keep alive the freedom of the individual, subject to the limitation of
social control, which could be adjusted according to the needs of the dynamic social
evolution.62 While interpreting the essence of Art. 21, ‘procedure’ means the manner and
form of enforcing the law.63 Art. 21 simply means that a man cannot be deprived of his
personal liberty, such deprivation should be in accordance with the law which provides for
the deprivation of such liberty.64 The expression ‘procedure established by law’ in the
Constitution is akin to the law declared in McNabb v. Unites States,65 wherein it was held that
the history of liberty has largely been the history of the observance of procedural
safeguards.66

28. Art. 21 of the Constitution provides for protection of life and personal liberty of every
individual from encroachment by the government, save in accordance with the law.67 Several
judicial precedents have led to widening of the ambit of this article.68 A liberal interpretation
of Art. 21 by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, with the objective of protection of the right to life
has included several aspects of a human life which make a man’s life more dignified and
worth living.69 Considering health as an indispensable element of leading a dignified and
meaningful life, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by widening the ambit of Art. 21, has
recognised the right to primary medical healthcare.70 The right to medical healthcare can be
enforced against the State only in cases where a government hospital or any institution under
the control of the State has denied medical aid to a person in situations of emergency.71

61
Hema Mishra v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2014) 1 S.C.R. 465 (¶ 16).
62
Supra Note 59 (¶ 373).
63
Supra Note 42.
64
District Registrar and Collector v. Canara Bank, (2004) Supp 5 S.C.R. 833 (¶ 56).
65
318 U.S. 332.
66
318 U.S. 332.
67
Supra Note 12, art. 21.
68
Paschim Bang Khet Majdoor Samity v. State of West Bengal, (1996) Supp 2 S.C.R. 331 (¶ 16). See also,
Kirloskar Brothers v. Employees’ State Insurance Corporation, (1996) 1 S.C.R. 884 (¶ 6-8); Maneka Gandhi
v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (¶ 4-7); S. Krishna and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., A.I.R.
1989 (Kar.) 291 (¶ 8, 11); Niyamakendram, Kochi v. Secretary, Corporation of Cochin, A.I.R. 1997 (Ker.)
152 (¶ 2); State of Punjab v. Mohinder Singh Chawla, (1996) Supp 10 S.C.R. 279 (¶ 4); Shantha v. State of
A.P., A.I.R. 1998 (A.P.) 51 (¶ 15); State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1998) 1 S.C.R. 1120 (¶ 26);
Sahil Society for Welfare of the Aged, Poor and Homeless v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1999 (All.) 87 (¶ 3-4);
Chander Prakash v. Ministry of Health, A.I.R. 2002 (Del.) 188 (¶ 6); P.R. Subhash Chandran v. Govt. of
A.P., A.I.R. 2000 (A.P.) 272 (¶ 3).
69
Francis v. Administrator, Union Territory, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516 (¶ 7-8). See also, Ram Sharan Autyanuprasi
v. Union of India, (1988) Supp 3 S.C.R. 870 (¶ 13).
70
Parmanand Katara v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.R. 997 (¶ 7-8).
71
Supra Note 68 (¶ 9).

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29. It is humbly submitted that by considering the factual matrix of the case and by application of
the above rulings in the case, it is contended that there is no direct relationship established
between the act of the government and the denial of medical treatment given to the petitioner.
Where there is no question of enforcement of any fundamental right, Art. 32 has no
application.72 After placing reliance on the above submissions and application of the law
settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case at hand, the counsel contends that there is no
violation of right to primary medical care and thus the instant petition is not maintainable.

1.4. THERE EXISTS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY.

30. It is humbly submitted that in the case at hand, it has been established that there is no
violation of any fundamental right of the petitioner. Instead, the cause of action in the present
case ideally arises due to negligence and callous approach of the doctor and the hospital.73
The petitioner had various other alternative remedies under different statutes which could
have been exhausted before approaching the Hon’ble Supreme Court through the writ remedy
under Art. 32 of the Constitution. The petitioner has effective alternative remedies under the
relevant Acts.

31. In this regard, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the existence of an alternative
remedy would be a factor which would be taken into account while granting relief under Art.
32.74 The court may even decline to interfere if there is an alternative statutory remedy
available.75 In the case of Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi,76 it was held that it would
be equitable to require the petitioner to resolve the dispute through ordinary remedies
provided under law before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 32.

72
Bhagwandas v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 175 (¶ 5). See also, Sadhu Ram v. Custodian General,
(1955) 2 S.C.R. 1113 (¶ 4); Kasturi and Sons v. Salivakeswaran, (1959) S.C.R. 1 (¶ 14); Rameshwar Proshad
v. Commissioner of Land Reforms, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 498 (¶ 17); Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union v.
Union of India, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 52 (¶ 22-24); People’s Union for Democratic Rights v. Union of India,
(1983) 1 S.C.R. 456 (¶ 11); Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 2 S.C.R. 67 (¶ 80); Olga Tellis
v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, (1985) Supp. 2 S.C.R. 51 (¶ 31); Indian Express Newspapers v. Union of
India, (1985) 2 S.C.R. 287 (¶ 111).
73
Id.
74
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana, (1950) S.C.R. 566 (¶ 6).
75
Venkateswaran v. Wadhwani, (1962) 1 S.C.R. 753 (¶ 9); Basant Kumar v. Eagle Rolling Mills, (1964) 6
S.C.R. 913 (¶ 7).
76
Tolikchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 2 S.C.R. 824 (¶ 5, 10). See also, P.N. Kumar v. Municipal
Corp. of Delhi, (1988) 1 S.C.R. 732 (¶ 2); R.K. Pandey and Ors. v. Steel Authority of India and Ors., A.I.R.
2000 S.C. 3548 (¶ 4); Kanubhai Brahmbhatt v. State of Gujarat, (1987) 2 S.C.R. 314 (¶ 3-4).

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1.4.1. The remedy under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986.

32. It has been held by Kerala State Commission that medical and legal service of the medical
practitioner is covered under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986,77 which was upheld by the
National Commission in the case of Cosmopolitan Hospital v. Vasantha P. Nair.78 Further,
the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that when a child who has suffered damage due to
negligence of hospital and doctor, his/her parents can claim compensation under this Act.79
Therefore, the petitioner has a sustainable cause of action under the COPRA, 1987 for
obtaining remedy in relation to harm suffered.

1.4.2. The remedy under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

33. The § 304-A of the IPC, 1860,80 provides punishment for causing death by negligence. In the
instant case, considering the fact that the child died due to the negligence of the doctor, the
family could have filed case under this section for seeking the ends of justice which would
have been the effective remedy.

34. The petitioner has directly approached this Hon’ble Court instead of exhausting such other
remedies. The authorities constituted under the aforementioned statutes are to be approached
by any aggrieved party at the first instance. In case of denial of a remedy under such statutes
or violation of any procedure, their action can be challenged under writ jurisdiction.81
Without approaching the authorities empowered under the law, the petitioner cannot
approach the highest court even under writ jurisdiction as rights have not been asserted at all
and issue of denial or enforcement through writ would come only thereafter.82 Moreover, a
writ petition is not an appropriate legal remedy in the present case.

35. The rule that an aggrieved person should first approach the administrative authorities is well
established in most jurisdictions. The American Supreme Court in McKart v. United States,83
held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well established in the
jurisprudence of administrative law. Therefore, the petitioner had several remedies available

77
Cosmopolitan Hospital v. Vasantha P. Nair, (1992) 24 D.R.J. 310 (¶ 22).
78
Id.
79
Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjol Ahluwalia, (1998) 2 S.C.R. 428 (¶ 13-14).
80
The Indian Penal Code, 1860, § 304-A.
81
Carl Still G.m.b.H. v. State of Bihar, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1615 (¶ 17); Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State of
Bihar, (1955) 2 S.C.R. 603 (¶ 8, 53).
82
Basant Kumar v. Eagle Rolling Mills, (1964) 6 S.C.R. 913 (¶ 7). See also, Scooters India v. Vijai, (1998) 6
S.C.C. 549 (¶ 2); Chairman, Coal India Ltd. v. Madan Prasad, (2000) 10 S.C.C. 597 (¶ 2-3); Nanhoomal v.
Hiramal, (1976) 1 S.C.R. 809 (¶ 3); Srivastava K.K. v. Bhupendra Kumar Jain, A.I.R. 1977 S.C. 1703 (¶ 4);
Bar Council of India v. Surjeet Singh, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 946 (¶ 18); Gujarat University v. Rajguru, (1988) 1
S.C.R. 899 (¶ 6); S. T. Mutthuswami v. Natarajan, (1988) 2 S.C.R. 759 (¶ 16).
83
395 U.S. 185 (1969).

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to him under different statutes for redressal of his grievances. A writ petition is not an
appropriate remedy for seeking ends of justice in the present case.

II. THE DECISION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE ORDER OF THE RESERVE BANK
OF INDIA ARE CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL.

36. The impugned decision of the Central Government to demonetise the currency notes of ₹ 500
and ₹ 1000 and the order of RBI in this regard are Constitutional and intra vires to law. This
argument is based on three premises; firstly, the Central Government’s decision and the
RBI’s order is a ‘law’ as defined in Art. 13(2)84 and 'law in force' under Art. 372 (2.1);85
secondly, the Central Government’s decision and the RBI’s order is not in conflict with any
provisions of the Constitution (2.2), thirdly, Central Government’s decision and the RBI’s
order is intra vires to other laws (2.3), and; fourthly, political question is not subject to
judicial interference by court (2.4).

2.1 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT’S DECISION AND THE ORDER OF RBI IS A ‘LAW’ AS DEFINED
UNDER ART. 13(3)(A) AND ‘LAW IN FORCE’ UNDER ART. 372.

37. The phrase ‘law in force’ as used in Art. 37286 is wide enough to include not merely a
legislative enactment, but also any regulation or order which has the force of law. 87 It is to be
noted that the ambit of the definition of law includes any ordinance, order, notification,
having in the territory of India the force of law.88

38. The Union Government is empowered to take policy decision under the Constitution. Further,
by virtue of Entry 35, 36, 38, and 45 of List I read with Art. 7789 of the Constitution, the
Central Government is denuded of all power to determine standards and take such decisions
with regards to the monetary policy of the country. Such power is an integral component of
the power to demonetize any currency having legal tender. Therefore, this power was
exercised within the competency of the government.

84
Supra Note 12, art. 13(2).
85
Id, art. 372.
86
Id, art. 372.
87
Edward Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Ajmer, (1955) 1 S.C.R. 735 (¶ 14). See also, H.C. Narayanappa v. State of
Mysore, (1960) 3 S.C.R. 742 (¶ 12); Umesh Chandra Sinha v. V.N. Singh, A.I.R. 1968 (Pat.) 3 (¶ 32).
88
Supra Note 12, art. 13.
89
Id, art. 77(2). Essar Steel Ltd. v. Union of India, (2016) 11 S.C.C. 1 (¶ 49).

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39. The current decision to demonetise the currency notes is an executive function. It was held in
the case of Ram Jawaya Kapur v. State of Punjab,90 that ordinarily executive power connotes
the residue of government function which remains after legislative and judicial junctions are
taken away. The current declaration by the Prime Minister of the decision was followed by a
notification which is mandated as per the RBI Act to demonetize the currency notes.91

40. According to Black’s law dictionary, following are the important definitions that need to be
considered in order to examine the legality of the demonetisation exercise

Decision- A determination by anybody after consideration of the fact and the law.92

Declared- A formal statement, proclamation, or announcement, especially, once embodied in

an instrument.93

Demonetisation- The withdrawal of the value of a currency as money.94

Withdrawal- To take back (something presented or allowed).95

41. It is submitted that the RBI falls within the definition of State for the purposes of Part III of
the Constitution and thus any order issued by the RBI is a law under Art. 13(3)(a).96 Further,
RBI being a subordinate legislation has been given the power to issue such order and rule in
the monetary interest of the country.97 The expression “subordinate legislation” would mean
the act of making the statutory instruments by the subordinate body in exercise of power
delegated by the legislature and the statutory instruments themselves.98 Therefore, in light of
the above submissions, it is submitted that any order issued by a subordinate legislation, i.e.
RBI, is a law for the purpose of Art. 13 of the Constitution.

42. After contextualising the above definitions and applying the same into the factual matrix of
the case, it is contended that the current declaration of decision of the Central Government to
demonetise the currency notes of ₹ 500 and ₹ 1000 by the Prime Minister and the Order
issued by RBI in this regard is both an executive decision and order. Further, by the
application of the Arts. 13 and 372 of the Constitution in the present case, the current

90
(1955) 2 S.C.R. 225 (¶ 12).
91
Supra Note 19, ¶ 1.
92
Black’s Law Dictionary (Thomson West, 8th ed. 2004).
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
J.S. Sachdev v. Reserve Bank of India, (1973) 2 LLJ 204 (¶ 19).
97
Statement of Object, the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
98
SIR JOHN WILLIAM SALMOND & PATRICK JOHN FITZGERALD SALMOND ON JURISPRUDENCE 210 (Sweet &
Maxwell, 12th ed.).

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decision of the Central Government and the Order of RBI is a law and thus holds a binding
effect.

2.2 EXECUTIVE DECISION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE ORDER OF RBI IS NOT IN
CONFLICT WITH ANY PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION.

2.2.1 There is a presumption of constitutionality.

43. The legislature is best placed in a position where it can consider competing claims. In
complex matters, government takes such decision keeping in view several factors and it is not
possible for the courts to interfere in such matters.99 The court will interfere with the law
making process only when a law is clearly violative of the fundamental rights of the
people.100 However, there is a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of a law or an
enactment.101 Further, the court tends to take an assumption which is in favour of holding the
statute as constitutional.102 The Constitution does not impose impossible standards of
determining validity of the law. The present decision of government is not violative of any
fundamental rights, therefore interference by court should not be sought for.

2.2.2 The executive decision and the RBI’s order is not in conflict with any of the
fundamental right.

44. The power to make law is a plenary power vested in the legislature or executive,103 and
unless that law is challenged by someone for violation of fundamental right or legislative
competency, they do not succeed in their challenge to the enactment brought forward in the
wisdom of the executive.104 A law cannot be struck down merely because the court considers

99
M.P. Oil Extraction v. State of M.P., (1997) Supp 1 S.C.R. 671 (¶ 41). See also, State of M.P. v. Nandlal
Jaiswal, (1987) 1 S.C.R. 1 (¶ 34); Krishnan Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala, (1996) Supp 7 S.C.R. 487 (¶ 35-
36); Premium Granites v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1994) 1 S.C.R. 579 (¶ 54); State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao
Aandolan, (2011) 6 S.C.R. 443 (¶ 38); Bombay Dyeing Co. Ltd. v. Bombay Environmental Action Group
and Ors., (2006) 2 S.C.R. 902 (¶ 107, 123); State of Uttar Pradesh v. Chaudhary Ran Beer Singh, (2008) 4
S.C.R. 610 (¶ 13); Hindi Hitrakshak Samiti v. Union of India, (1990) 1 S.C.R. 588 (¶ 6, 7, 9); Union of India
v. Hindustan Development Corporation, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 988 (¶ 33, 35); Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh v.
State of A.P., (2006) 3 S.C.R. 543 (¶ 59, 66); R (Tesema and Limbuela) v. Secretary of the State for the
Home, (2004) E.W.C.A. Civ 540; A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2005) 2 A.C. 68;
English M.S.P.A. v. State of Karnataka, (1993) Supp 3 S.C.R. 934 (¶ 23, 24); Villianur v. Union of India,
(2009) 9 S.C.R. 225 (¶ 167, 168).
100
Supra Note 43 (¶ 11).
101
Karnataka Bank Ltd. v. State of A.P., (2008) 1 S.C.R. 986 (¶ 19). See also, Heena Kausar v. Competent
Authority, (2008) 6 S.C.R. 967 (¶ 20); Gauri Shankar v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 3 S.C.R. 244 (¶ 8);
Gopalan v. Job, A.I.R. 1965 (Ker.) 216 (¶ 13, 14).
102
Karnataka Bank Ltd. v. State of A.P., (2008) 1 S.C.R. 986 (¶ 19).
103
Bakhtawar Trust v. M.D. Narayan, (2003) Supp 1 S.C.R. 1 (¶ 14). Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. v. Sir Shadi Lal
Enterprises Ltd., (2011) 1 S.C.C. 640 (¶ 21).
104
State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 S.C.R. 721 (¶ 43).

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it to be arbitrary or unreasonable.105 Any such ground of invalidity must be related to a

Constitutional provision, such as, Arts. 14, 19 or 21.106

45. Challenge on ground of wisdom of legislation is not permissible as it is for the legislature to
balance various interests.107 The government appreciates and understands the needs of the
people, it knows what is good or bad for them, the laws it enacts are directed to problems
which are made manifest by experience, the elected representatives in a legislature enact laws
which they consider to be reasonable, for the purposes for which these laws are enacted and
that the legislature would not deliberately flout a constitutional safeguard or a right.108

a. The executive decision and the RBI’s Orders are not violative of Art. 14 of
the Constitution.

46. A law can’t be struck down on the ground of being arbitrary or unreasonable unless it
involves some constitutional infirmity.109 Mere factor that some hardship or injustice is
caused to someone is no ground to strike down the rule altogether if otherwise the rule
appears to be just, fair and reasonable and constitutional.110 The State action should neither be
unjust or unfair, lest it attracts the vice of unreasonableness, thereby vitiating the law. In
India, State action, in order to survive, must not be susceptible to the vice of arbitrariness,
which is the crux of Art. 14 and basic to the rule of law.111

47. It has been held that the right to equality now means protection against arbitrary and
irrational act of the State.112 In order to be described as arbitrary, the action of the state
should be manifestly arbitrary and unreasonable, fixed or done capriciously, or at a pleasure,
without adequately determining the principle , not founded in the nature of thing, irrational
and depending on the will alone.113 The test of arbitrariness of delegated legislation should be

105
Mylapore Club v. State of T.N., (2005) Supp 4 S.C.R. 996 (¶ 8, 9); State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell &
Co., (1996) 3 S.C.R. 721 (¶ 43).
106
Amrit Banaspati Ltd v. Union of India, (1995) 2 S.C.R. 25 (¶ 6).
107
Mylapore Club v. State of T.N., (2005) Supp 4 S.C.R. 996 (¶ 10, 15).
108
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. S.R. Tendolkar, (1959) 1 S.C.R. 279 (¶ 11, 13). See also, Vrajlal Manilal & Co. v.
State of Madhya Pradesh, (1970) 1 S.C.R. 400 (¶ 11); Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 145
(¶ 126, 175).
109
Nand Lal v. State of Haryana, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1181 (¶ 14). See also, A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 2
S.C.R. 272 (¶ 86, 87); State of Andhra Pradesh v. McDowell & Co., (1996) 3 S.C.R. 721 (¶ 43).
110
AP Co-op. Oil Seeds Growers Federation Ltd. v. D. Achyuta Rao, (2007) 4 S.C.R. 1 (¶ 41).
111
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) Supp S.C.R. 1 (¶ 1529).
112
Supra Note 40 (¶ 9-10). See also, H. Sawbhaghya v. N.G.E.F. Ltd., A.I.R. 2004 (Kant.) 155 (¶ 9); Vashisht
Kumar Jaiswal v. State of U.P., A.I.R 2004 (All.) 105 (¶ 13); Dr Amar Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 2004
(P&H) 67 (¶ 17); State of Assam v. Omega Printers and Publishers Pvt. Ltd., A.I.R. 1995 (Gau.) 49 (¶ 23);
Oriental Insurance Co. v. Kishore Chandra Sahu, 1999 A.C.J. 122 (¶ 7).
113
Natural Resources Allocation, In re., Special Reference No. 1 of 2012, (2012) 9 S.C.R. 311 (¶ 159, 170-
172); Sharma Transport v. Govt. of A.P. (2001) Supp 5 S.C.R. 390 (¶ 25).

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whether it is manifestly arbitrary, such as could not be reasonably expected from an authority
delegated with the law-making power.114

48. It is contended that in the instant case, the impugned decision was declared with regard to the
object of the law i.e. to remove the unaccounted money and fake currency in circulation.
Further, this decision is not something new, such decision has been declared in the past, and
it is not something which can’t be found in nature of thing. In addition to this, considering the
fact that reasonable time has been given to exchange old currency with the new currency, it
can’t be termed as wholly unreasonable. Therefore, by the application of the above principle
of arbitrariness in the present case, it is submitted that the impugned decision and orders of
RBI is not arbitrary.

49. Further, this decision, being not contrary to law, was taken keeping in mind certain objectives
that were meant to be achieved after considering all the relevant factors and ignoring
irrelevant factors. Therefore, this decision is not violative of the doctrine of Wednesbury
unreasonableness as held in the case of Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v.
Wednesbury Corp.,115 which was affirmed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Om
Kumar v. Union of India.116

50. The Hon’ble Apex Court held in the case of St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi,117
that the expression ‘equal protection of the laws’ is now being read as a positive obligation on
the state to ensure equal protection of laws so that everyone may enjoy equal protection of the
laws and nobody is denied such protection. In the instant case, the law of demonetisation was
in force and the applicability of this law was throughout the country with no exceptions.

51. In the present case, the Central Government has been continuously monitoring the policy and
thus have been taking decision to remove the inconveniency faced by the common people
with regards to the effective implementation of the policy. The government has taken certain
steps in order to provide equal protection of law so that everyone is protected.

114
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1995) Supp 6 S.C.R. 759 (¶ 13).
115
(1947) 2 All ER 680.
116
(2000) Supp 4 S.C.R. 693 (¶ 68, 71).
117
(1991) Supp 3 S.C.R. 121 (¶ 85, 128).

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b. The executive decision and the Orders of the RBI are not violative of Art. 19
of the Constitution.

52. There are certain basic rights in the Constitution which are inherent part of human being and
are essential for their development of full personality118 which cannot be taken away by a law
and have only reasonable restrictions in the exercise of the right.119 It has to be subservient to
the rights of the public at large. In Krishnan Kakkanath v. State of Kerala,120 it was held that
the test of reasonableness of restriction has to be considered in each case in the light of the
nature of right infringed, the purpose of the restriction, the extent and nature of the mischief
required to be suppressed and the prevailing social order and conditions at the time. There
can be no abstract standard of reasonableness.

53. When a law imposes a restriction upon a fundamental right, the substance of the legislation
has to be seen.121 The determining factor will be the substance of legislation and not the mere
appearance of the legislation.122 The term “reasonable restriction” signifies that the limitation
should not be arbitrary or excessive in nature.123 Where the restrictions imposed are so
stringent that business cannot be carried on at all, the restrictions shall be unreasonable.124
The power of imposing restrictions cannot disobey the constitutional prohibitions by
implying indirect methods.125 ‘Regulation’ and not ‘extinction’ is, the extent to which
permissible restriction may go in order to satisfy the test of reasonableness.126 The possible or
remote effects of a law upon any fundamental right cannot be said to constitute a restriction
upon the right.127

118
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (¶ 211, 213).
119
Bishamber Dayal Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1982) 1 S.C.R.1137 (¶ 33).
120
Santokh Singh v. Delhi Administration, (1973) 3 S.C.R. 533 (¶ 11). Krishnan Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala,
(1996) Supp 7 S.C.R. 487 (¶ 9).
121
Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., (1954) S.C.R. 674 (¶ 9). See also, Bennett
Coleman and Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 S.C.R. 757 (¶ 42); Sukhnandan v. Union of India, (1982) 3
S.C.R. 371 (¶ 18).
122
Dharam Dutt v. Union of India, (2003) Supp 6 S.C.R. 151 (¶ 49).
123
Commercial and Ahmedabad Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1993 (Guj.) 20.
124
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 530 (¶ 23).
125
Supra Note 121 (¶ 9). See also, Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 898 (¶ 58, 60); Hamdard
Dawakhana v. Union of India, (1960) 2 S.C.R. 671 (¶ 7, 8); Kerala Education Bill, In re., (1959) 1 S.C.R.
995 (¶ 31, 32).
126
Bennett Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 S.C.R. 757 (¶ 100).
127
Express Newspapers v. Union of India, (1959) 1 S.C.R. 12 (¶ 31, 33). See also, Bennett Coleman and Co.
Ltd. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 S.C.R. 757 (¶ 159); Sukhnandan v. Union of India, (1982) 3 S.C.R. 371 (¶
23).

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54. There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between the
restriction imposed and the object sought to be modified.128 Reasonableness means not only
that the proper procedure must be followed, but the restriction itself must not be
unreasonable, unnecessary, or excessive.129 The test of reasonableness has to be viewed in the
context of issues faced by the legislature.130 On the other hand, in determining procedural
reasonableness, the legislature is concerned with the procedure of enforcing the restrictions
and to find whether it is fair, just or arbitrary.131

55. If the legislation indirectly or incidentally affects a citizen’s right under Art. 19(1), it will not
introduce any infirmity to the validity of the legislation.132 In determining the reasonableness
of a law, public interest should be kept in mind133 and the court has to balance the need for
individual liberty with the magnitude of the evil which is the purpose of the restrictions to
curb so that the freedom guaranteed to the individual subserve the larger public interest.134 A
restriction which is to commensurate with the need for protection of the public cannot be said
to be unreasonable,135 even though it may cause hardship in individual cases.136

56. No restriction can be said to be unreasonable merely because in a given case it operates
harshly.137 The limitation imposed in the interests of public in order to be a reasonable
restriction, should be one which has a proximate connection or approximate and reasonable
connection138 or nexus with public order, but not one which is far-fetched, hypothetical,
problematic or too remote.139 It must be rationally proximate and direct to be called

128
Papanasan Labour Union v. Madhura Coasts Ltd., (1994) Supp 6 S.C.R. 369 (¶ 59). See also, Superintendent
v. Ram Manohar, (1960) 2 S.C.R. 821 (¶ 13); Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp
1 S.C.R. 92 (¶ 5).
129
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P., (1954) 1 S.C.R. 803 (¶ 6). See also, Lochner v. New York,
(1905) 198 U.S. 327.
130
Municipal Corp. of City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammad Usman Bhai, (1986) 2 S.C.R. 700 (¶ 17). See
also, Jyoti Prasad v. U.T. of Delhi, (1962) 2 S.C.R. 125 (¶ 23).
131
Supra Note 118 (¶ 4-7).
132
Akadasi Padhan v. State of Orissa, (1963) 2 S.C.R. 691 (¶ 12). See also, Hamdard Dawakhana v. Union of
India, (1960) 2 S.C.R. 671 (¶ 10).
133
State of Madras v. Row, (1952) S.C.R. 597 (¶ 11). See also, Cooverjee v. Excise Commissioner, (1954)
S.C.R. 873 (¶ 18); Virendra v. State of Punjab, (1958) 1 S.C.R. 308 (¶ 8).
134
Harakchand v. Union of India, (1970) 1 S.C.R. 479 (¶ 21).
135
State of Maharashtra v. Rao Himmatbhai Narbheram, (1969) 2 S.C.R. 392 (¶ 9).
136
Sivarajan v. Union of India, (1959) 1 S.C.R. 779 (¶ 8).
137
Krishna Kakkanth v. Govt. of Kerala, (1996) Supp 7 S.C.R. 487 (¶ 12). See also, Municipal Corporation,
City of Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohd. Usmanbhai, (1986) 2 S.C.R. 700 (¶ 13); M.J. Sivani v. State of Karnataka,
(1995) 3 S.C.R. 329 (¶ 17).
138
Arunachala Nadar, M.C.V.S. v. State of Madras, (1959) Supp 1 S.C.R. 92 (¶ 3).
139
Superintendent Central Prison v. Ram Manohar Lohia, (1960) 2 S.C.R. 821 (¶ 13).

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reasonable.140 For the purpose of imposing restriction, “law” includes subordinate legislation
or executive order.141

57. It is humbly submitted that the executive decisions of Central Government and orders of the
RBI being a law has the power impose restriction on the withdrawal of money from the banks
and ATMs which was in the public interest so that there is equitable distribution of the money
amongst the people irrespective of their economic status and thus was a reasonable restriction
which was just and reasonable keeping in mind the larger interest involved in the whole
objective. It is contended that here, the restriction was a mere regulation and not per se full
prohibition, which provides that it was a reasonable restriction.142

58. Since these restrictions were imposed to ensure the equitable distribution and availability of
money to the people, this is a reasonable restriction. To support this view, reliance can be
placed on the case of Dwarka Prasad v. State of U.P.143 Further, this restriction was imposed
keeping in mind the larger public interest involved and issue faced by the government in in
the whole process of facilitating the flow of money in the market. Hence, by the application
of the above law settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court to the factual matrix of the case, the said
order of RBI imposing restriction was a reasonable restriction and thus, does not violate Art.
19.

c. The executive decision and the RBI’s orders is not violative of Art. 21 of the
Constitution.

59. Individual rights cannot be absolute in a welfare state. It has to be subservient to the rights of
the public at large.144 The right of life and liberty so guaranteed under Art. 21 is also subject
to the rule of proportionality.145 Liberty is the right of doing an act which the law permits.146
Liberty is confined and controlled by law as it is regulated freedom. It is not an abstract or
absolute freedom. Liberty is itself the gift of law and may bye law be forfeited or abridged. 147

60. The right to life and personal liberty guaranteed under the Constitution had a fairly literal
interpretation at the time of its inception.148 But in due course of time human dignity was

140
O.K. Ghosh v. E.X. Joseph, (1963) Supp 1 S.C.R. 789 (¶ 15).
141
Khoday Distilleries Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (1995) Supp 6 S.C.R. 759 (¶ 17).
142
Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N. Tikappa Gowda, (1970) 3 S.C.R. 846 (¶ 10).
143
Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of U.P., (1954) 1 S.C.R. 803 (¶ 9); Narendra v. Union of India, (1960)
2 S.C.R. 375 (¶ 14); Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India, (1974) 2 S.C.R. 398 (¶ 69, 86).
144
Confederation of Ex-serviceman Association v. Union of India, (2006) Supp 4 S.C.R. 872 (¶ 65-66).
145
Supra Note 58 (¶ 28, 30, 31, 53, 54, 66, 67, 68, 71).
146
Supra Note 59 (¶ 448).
147
Supra Note 60 (¶ 33, 35).
148
Supra Note 42 (¶ 284).

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given the highest precedence and the liberal interpretation of the said article was
propounded.149 It is hence the anti-thesis of physical restraint or coercion.150 The right to
personal liberty so guaranteed under Art. 21 is also subject to the rule of proportionality.151
The Hon’ble Supreme Court has defined ‘liberty’ as the right of doing an act which the law
permits.152 Liberty is not an abstract or absolute freedom, uncontrolled or unconfined by
statute. This right in itself is the gift of law and may by law be forfeited or abridged.153

61. The Supreme Court has defined procedure as “the manner and form of enforcing the law.’ It
simply means that the state cannot deprive a man of his personal liberty unless it follows a
due procedure to that effect.154 The procedure prescribed by law for the deprivation of law
conferred by Art. 21 must be just fair and reasonable.155

62. Where individual liberty comes into conflict with an interest of the security of the State or
public order, the liberty of the individual must give way to the larger interest of the nation. 156
Liberty of each citizen is born of and must be subordinated to the liberty of the greater
number. The essence of civil liberty is to keep alive the freedom of individual subject to the
limitation of social control, which could be adjusted according to the needs of the dynamic
social evolution. Every individual in the society has been guaranteed the rights under Art.
21.157 However, since the interests of the society as a whole, takes precedence over the
singular interests of one person, any law which prescribes specific limits on the exercise of
the rights enshrined under Art. 21 cannot be said to be violative of Art. 21.158

63. It is manifest that the impugned law was brought into effect to avoid the grave menace of
unaccounted money which had resulted not only in affecting seriously the economy of the
country but had also deprived the State Exchanger of vast amounts of its revenue.

149
Supra Note 69 (¶ 7-8). See also, Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 2 S.C.R. 621 (¶ 28); Ramsharan
v. Union of India, (1988) Supp 3 S.C.R. 870 (¶ 15).
150
Supra Note 42 (¶ 207).
151
Supra Note 58 (¶ 28, 30, 31, 53, 54, 66, 67, 68, 71).
152
Supra Note 59 (¶ 448).
153
Supra Note 60 (¶ 33, 35).
154
Supra Note 42 (¶ 277).
155
Supra Note 118 (¶ 221-227); M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra, (1979) 1 S.C.R. 192(¶10-12); Sunil Batra
v. Delhi Administration, (1979) 1 S.C.R. 392 (¶ 4, 27, 30); Hussainara Khatoon (1) v. Home Secretary, State
of Bihar, (1979) 3 S.C.R. 532 (¶ 2, 5); Hussainara Khatoon (2) v. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, (1979) 3
S.C.R. 169 (¶ 2, 5); Sunil Batra (II) v. Delhi Administration, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 557 (¶ 4, 27, 30); Jolly George
Verghese v. Bank of Cochin, (1980) 2 S.C.R. 913 (¶ 2, 4, 10); Kasturi Lal Lakshmi Reddy v. State of Jammu
and Kashmir, (1980) 3 S.C.R. 1338 (¶ 12, 15); Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Union Territory of
Delhi, (1981) 2 S.C.R. 516 (¶ 4,5,7,8).
156
Sunil Fulchand Shah v. Union of India, (2000) 1 S.C.R. 945 (¶ 20, 33(1)).
157
Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nandkarni, (1983) 1 S.C.R. 828 (¶
13).
158
Supra Note 60 (¶ 37, 45, 78, 90, 136).

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Considering the evil the above act sought to remedy, the restriction imposed on the personal
liberty is reasonable and it cannot be said that it was not enacted for a public purpose.159
Further, this restriction on the life and liberty was a proportionate restriction which is in
consonance with the rule of proportionality.160

64. It is humbly submitted that in the instant case, the decision and the RBI’s order with regards
to the policy decision of demonetising currency notes and thereby asking the banks and
ATMs to be closed for one day on November 9 2016, to wipe out all the old currency notes
and replace it with new currency notes was not in conflict with the personal liberty of the
public at large. This step was necessary in the larger interest of the public to prevent further
inconveniences that would have been caused. Further, all this power and directions was
exercised and given by following the due procedure established by law which is just, fair and
reasonable, thus, this does not violate Art. 21 of the Constitution.

2.3 THE DECISION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND RBI’ ORDER IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF ANY OTHER
PROVISIONS OF LAW.

65. If the law is ultra vires to any act or statute or any other established law, or decision was
taken against the statute, the law would be ultra vires and illegal.161 It is contended that the
current decision of demonetisation and the order of RBI is in consonance with the other
related provisions of the acts.162 The government’s decision is based upon § 24(2) and § 26(2)
of the RBI Act, 1934, which gives it the power to discontinue and cease any series of bank
notes, of any denomination, as legal tender. Under § 35-A of the Banking Regulation Act,
1949,163 the RBI reserve the power to issue any directions in public interest or in the interest
of the banking policy to expedite any policy. While exercising such power, RBI can issue any
order, rule to that effect.164 The RBI is empowered to exercise this power by the objectives
laid down in the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.165

66. The plain language of § 26(2) of the Act shows that the government has the power to
demonetise any currency notes. § 26(2) empowers the government to demonetise any series
of denominations. However, several leading judgements illustrate the fact that the Supreme
Court in a number of cases has interpreted the word ‘any’ to mean ‘every’, based on the
159
Jayantilal Ratanchand Shah v. Reserve Bank of India and Ors., (1996) Supp 4 S.C.R. 443 (¶7, 8).
160
Supra Note 58.
161
A. Lakshmanaswami Mudaliar v. Life Insurance Corporation of India, (1963) Supp 2 S.C.R. 887(¶15).
162
Supra Note 45, § 24(2) and 26(2).
163
The Banking Regulation Act, 1949, § 35-A.
164
Union of India v. S.B. Vohra, (2004) 1 S.C.R. 36 (¶15).
165
Supra Note 45, § 26(2).

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context and the subject matter of the statute.166 In the case of Shiekh Mohd. v. Collector of
Customs,167 the Hon’ble Court interpreted the phrase ‘any prohibition to mean ‘every
prohibition’. Similarly, in the case of Lucknow Development Authority v. M K Gupta,168 the
Apex Court interpreted ‘service of any description’ in § 2(o) of the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 to mean service of ‘every’ description.

67. Therefore, by the application of the above ruling and laws to the current case, it is contended
that the government has the power to demonetise all the currency notes of any
denominations. submitted that the order of RBI and Central Government’s decision to
demonetise all the ₹ 1000 and ₹ 500 notes and imposing restrictions on the withdrawal of
money from banks and ATMs is according to the other provisions of the law and thus intra
vires and not illegal.

2.4 POLITICAL QUESTION IS NOT SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL REVIEW.

68. It is a settled law that executive must have the liberty and freedom in framing policies.169
Further, in complex social and economic matters, decisions have to be taken by governmental
authorities keeping in view several factors, and it is not possible for the courts to consider
competing claims and conflicting interest and conclude which way the balance tilts.170 As
observed by Holmes J.,171 in such matters, the courts must give certain measure of ‘play in
the joints’ to the executive. Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether a particular
policy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair. 172 It is only
concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken.173 The extent of the
duty to act fairly will vary from case to case.174

69. In the landmark judgement of Bennett Coleman v. Union of India,175 the Hon’ble Supreme
Court categorically stated that this court cannot be propelled into the unchartered ocean of
government policy. As long as there is no violation of fundamental rights and if the principles
of natural justice are not offended, it is not for the courts to interfere with the policy leading

166
Lucknow Development Authority v. M.K. Gupta, A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 787 (¶ 4); Sheikh Mohd. v. Collector of
Customs, (1971) 2 S.C.R. 35 (¶ 11).
167
(1971) 2 S.C.R. 35 (¶ 11).
168
A.I.R. 1994 S.C. 787 (¶ 4).
169
Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. v. Sir Shadi Lal Enterprises Ltd., (2011) 1 S.C.C. 640 (¶ 21).
170
Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors., (2007) 10 S.C.R. 199 (¶ 78).
171
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. State of Chicago, 57 L Ed 730.
172
Tata Cellular v. Union of India, (1994) Supp 2 S.C.R. 122(¶ 77).
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
(1973) 2 S.C.R. 757(¶ 22); Bajaj Hindustan Ltd. v. Sir Shadi Lal Enterprises Ltd., (2011) 1 S.C.C. 640 (¶
21); Premium Granites v. State of T.N., (1994) 1 S.C.R. 579 (¶ 54).

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up to such assessment.176 It is not normally within the domain of any court to weigh the pros
and cons of a policy or to assess it to test the degree of beneficial or equitable effect for the
purpose of verifying, modifying or annulling, based on sound and good reasons, except where
it is arbitrary or violative of any statutory, constitutional or any other provisions of law,177
unreasonable or against public interest.178 Further, when an action is taken pursuant to change
in the government policy, which, by itself, does not vitiate the action if the changed policy is
rational and reasonable.179

70. There may be crudities or inequities in complicated experimental economic legislation, but
on that account alone it cannot be struck down as invalid.180 In economic regulation cases,
there are good reasons for judicial self-restraint, if not judicial defence to legislative
judgement.181 The courts are not expected to express their opinion as to whether at a
particular point of time or in a particular situation any such policy should have been adopted
or not.182 The court cannot sit in judgement over the wisdom of the policy evolved by the
legislature and subordinate legislation body.183 Any drawbacks in the policy incorporated in a
rule or regulation will not render it ultra vires.184 Courts do not possess the expertise and are
consequently incompetent to pass judgement on the appropriateness or adequacy of a policy
decision.185

71. H.M. Seervai, in his book Constitutional Law of India,186 noted that the principle of though
the doctrine of separation of powers has no place in strict sense in the Constitution, but the
functions of different organs of the government have been sufficiently differentiated and it is
expected that each organ will perform its work independently. It was held that even if some

176
State of Maharashtra v. Lok Shiksha Sanstha, (1971) S.C.R. 879(¶ 9). See also, D.D. Suri v. Union of India,
(1980) 1 S.C.R. 24 (¶ 7); Suman Gupta v. State of J&K, (1983) 3 S.C.R. 985 (¶ 7); Maharashtra State Board
of Secondary and Higher Education v. Paritosh, (1985) 1 S.C.R. 29 (¶ 14); Sushma Sharma v. State of
Rajasthan, (1985) 3 S.C.R. 243 (¶ 38); Vidharbha Shikshan Vyawashapak Sahsangh v. State of Maharashtra,
A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 135 (¶ 5).
177
State of Punjab v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga, (1998) 1 S.C.R. 1120. See also, K. Narayan v. State of Karnataka,
(1993) Supp 2 S.C.R. 105.
178
State of U.P. v. U.P. University College Pensioners Asso., (1994) 2 S.C.R. 171 (¶ 8).
179
Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corporation, (1993) 3 S.C.R. 128(¶ 14).
180
Morey v. Doud, (1957) 354 U.S. 457. See also, Bhavesh D. Parikh v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 1 S.C.R.
291 (¶ 26, 13); Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India, (1996) 2 S.C.R. 767 (¶ 13).
181
Bhavesh D. Parekh v. Union of India, (2000) Supp 1 S.C.R. 291(¶ 26). See also, Delhi Science Forum v.
Union of India, (1996) 2 S.C.R. 767 (¶ 13).
182
Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi Administration, (2001) 2 S.C.R. 630 (¶ 23, 24).
183
Dr. Jayakumar. R. v. State Of Kerala, W.A. No. 467 of 2010(¶ 4).
184
Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Education v. Paritosh, (1985) 1 S.C.R. 29 (¶ 133).
185
Liberty Oil Mills v. Union of India, (1984) 3 S.C.R. 676 (¶ 26, 27). See also, Glass Chatons Importers and
Users Asso. v. Union of India, (1962) 1 S.C.R. 862 (¶ 6).
186
1 H.M. SEERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA 23 (Universal Publishing Co., 3rd ed. 2010).

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persons are at soe disadvantage and suffered loss on account of implementation of any policy,
that itself won’t be a ground for interference by the court.187

72. In the landmark judgement of Peerless General Finance & Investment Company Ltd. v.
Reserve Bank of India,188 wherein describing the directions issued by RBI as a policy
decision, it was observed that-

“The function of the Court is not to advice in matters relating to financial

and economic policies for which bodies like RBI are fully competent. It
would be hazardous and risky for the courts to tread an unknown path and
should leave such unknown task to the expert bodies.”189

73. In R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Brind,190 Lord Diplock refers
specifically to one development namely, the possible recognition of the principle of
proportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that the court should, ‘consider
whether something has gone wrong of a nature and degree which requires its intervention.’

74. According to the factual matrix of the present case, demonetisation is a purely economic
policy decision and involves the political question. It has been held by the Hon’ble Apex
Court in the case of R.K. Jain v. Union of India,191 that courts will not go into the merits of
the policy while judicially reviewing it, therefore, in the instant case, the court is not entitled
to go into the merits of the case and interfere such decisions to review them.

75. It is submitted that in the present case, decision of the Central Government was taken by the
Union Cabinet based on their wisdom and political judgment, and it is difficult to evolve
judicially manageable norms for scrutinizing such political decisions. To do so would be
entering the political arena and questioning the political wisdom is something which the
courts of law must avoid. The executive decision is not unconstitutional, is within the
competency of the Central Government and the RBI and the power was exercised as per the
provisions of law, thus the same is not subject to the judicial review.

187
India Cement Ltd. v. Union of India, (1990) 3 S.C.R. 850 (¶ 5).
188
(1992) 1 S.C.R. 406 (¶ 10).
189
Peerless General Finance and Investment Co. Ltd. v. Reserve Bank of India, (1992) 1 S.C.R. 406 (¶ 321).
See also, Prag Ice and Oil Mills v. Union of India, (1978) 3 S.C.R. 293 (¶ 54); Bhavesh D. Parekh v. Union
of India, (2000) Supp 1 S.C.R. 291 (¶ 26, 13).
190
(1991) 1 All ER 720.
191
1993 S.C.R. (3) 802 (¶ 53).

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

[24]
-Prayer- -Respondents-

PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of facts presented, issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities
cited, the Counsel on behalf of the Respondents humbly pray before this Hon’ble Court that it
may be pleased to adjudge and declare that:

1. The writ petitions filed by Somani and the D.S.P.A. be held not maintainable.
2. The executive decision of the Central Government to demonetise the currency notes
of ₹ 500 and ₹ 1000 and the said order of R.B.I. in this regard be held constitutionally
valid and intra vires the provisions of Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 and Banking
Regulation Act, 1946.

Or pass any other order that the court may deem fit in the light of equity, justice and good
conscience.

And for this Act of kindness of Your Lordships the Respondents shall as duty bound ever
pray.

Sd/- _____________________

COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENTS

UNION OF INDIA

AND

RESERVE BANK OF INDIA

-MEMORANDUM for THE RESPONDENTS-

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