Nigerian Payments System Risk and Information Security Management Framework
Nigerian Payments System Risk and Information Security Management Framework
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................................... 1
3. SCOPE ............................................................................................................................................... 2
9.3. ACH, CHEQUE AND INSTANT PAYMENT SCHEME RISK REQUIREMENTS .............................................. 14
1. INTRODUCTION
The journey to the Payments System Vision 2020 (PSV 2020) started in 2007 with
the objective of making the Nigeria Payments System internationally recognised
and nationally utilised. The phased implementation of the vision and other
developments in the financial space including the pursuit of the Financial System
Stability Vision 2020(FSS 2020) has stimulated an exponential growth in financial
activities and hence in the volume and value of payment flows both within and
across national borders.
The rapid growth in the volume and value of financial transactions represents an
important source of revenue for the providers of payment services particularly
banks and other stakeholders. Other benefits include: fostering safety and efficiency
of payment, clearing, settlement, and recording systems, promotion of financial
system stability, speed of service and transactions, development of new lifestyle
products, financial inclusion, etc. The growth has also significantly altered the risks
associated with the payment and settlement of these transactions. As a result,
payment and settlement systems are important potential sources of systemic risks.
Furthermore, payments system may increase, shift, concentrate, or otherwise
transform risks in unanticipated ways. The failure of one or more of the
participants in a payment system to settle their payments or other financial
transactions as expected, in turn, could create credit or liquidity problems for
participants and their customers, the system operator, other financial institutions,
and the financial markets the payment system serves. Such a failure may ultimately
undermine public confidence in the nation’s financial system.
It is therefore necessary to effectively manage the risks associated with payments
system, as such systems which inherently create interdependencies among
financial institutions can create systemic risks. A disruption may originate from
any of the interdependent entities, including the system operator, participants in a
payment system, or other systems, and spread quickly and widely across markets if
the risks that arise among these parties are not adequately measured, monitored,
and managed. For example, interdependencies are usually based on a series of
complex and time sensitive transactions and payment flows which, in combination
with a payment system’s design, can lead to significant demands for intraday credit
or liquidity, on either a regular or an extraordinary basis.
Furthermore, mitigating the risks associated with payments system is important for
the effective management of monetary policy and banking supervision. For
example, the orderly settlement of Open Market Operations (OMO) and the efficient
movement of funds throughout the financial system via the financial markets and
the payments system that support those markets are critical to the effective
implementation of monetary policy. Similarly, supervisory objectives must take into
account the risks that payment systems pose to the financial system by
participating directly or indirectly in, or providing settlement, custody, or credit
services.
In the interconnected environment, the safety and efficiency of these systems may
affect the stability and soundness of financial institutions and consequently the
financial stability of the country. As a result, safeguarding the integrity of the
payments system in Nigeria has acquired additional significance and calls for the
upgrading of associated risk management procedures through concerted efforts by
market participants and the relevant authorities, notably the CBN.
In light of the above, the CBN approved the Nigerian Payments System Risk and
Information Security Management Framework (this Framework) to guide the
management of risks associated with the payments system in Nigeria.
3. SCOPE
This Framework is designed to guide the operators and users of the payment
systems across Nigeria. These systems may be organized, located, or operated
within Nigeria (domestic payments), outside Nigeria (offshore payments), or both
(cross-border payments) and may involve currencies other than the Naira (non-
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Naira systems and multi-currency systems). The scope of the Framework also
includes any payment system based or operated in Nigeria that engages in the
settlement of non-Naira transactions operating within Nigeria and those that
operate across the Nigerian borders (cross border payment systems); along with
their infrastructure providers and the Payment Service Providers (PSPs) that make
up these systems.
This Framework does not apply to arrangements for the physical movement of cash
or systems for settling securities nor apply to market infrastructures such as
trading exchanges, trade-execution facilities, or multilateral trade-compression
systems. It is also not intended to apply to bilateral payment, clearing, or settlement
relationships, where a payment system is not involved, between financial
institutions and their customers, such as traditional correspondent banking and
government securities clearing services.
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The Nigerian Payments System has rules and processes including a collateral
management framework to maintain the associated credit risk at a level that is
acceptable.
6.3. LIQUIDITY RISK:
The risk that a party in a payment flow, whether a participant or other entity, is
unable to meet its financial obligations when due, even though it may be able to
do so in the future. A payment system may bear or generate liquidity risk in one
or more currencies in its payment or settlement process based on its design or
operations. In this context, liquidity risk may arise between or among the
payment system operators, participants and other entities (such as settlement
banks, nostro agents, or liquidity providers).
6.4. OPERATIONAL RISK
The risk that inadequacies in internal processes, human errors, management
failures, information technology systems or disruptions from external events will
result in the reduction, deterioration, or breakdown of services provided by the
payment system.
6.5. COMPLIANCE, LEGAL AND REGULATORY RISK
The risk that arises from an unexpected or uncertain application of a law or
regulation. These risks also arise between financial institutions as they clear,
settle, and effect payments and other financial transactions and must be
managed by institutions, both individually and collectively.
6.6. SETTLEMENT RISK
The general term used to designate the risk that settlement in a funds or
securities transfer system will not take place as expected. This risk may comprise
both credit and liquidity risks.
6.7. INFORMATION SECURITY RISK
The risk of loss resulting from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, perusal, inspection, recording or destruction of information assets
and information systems.
Cyber security is a growing area of concern that deserves particular and
continuous attention at the highest level.
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b. analyse whether risks might be imposed on other external parties and the
financial system more broadly;
c. analyse how risk is transformed or concentrated by the settlement process;
d. consider the possibility that attempts to limit one type of risk that could lead
to an increase in another type of risk;
e. be aware of risks that might be unique to certain instruments, participants, or
market practices;
f. where payment systems have inter-relationships with or dependencies on
other Financial Market Infrastructures (FMIs), system operators should
analyse whether and to what extent any cross-system risks exist and who
bears them;
g. set risk management objectives that clearly allocate acceptable risks among
the relevant parties and set out strategies to manage these risks;
h. establish the risk tolerance of the system, including the levels of risk
exposure that are acceptable to the system operator, system participants, and
other relevant parties; and
i. re-evaluate their risks in conjunction with any major changes in the
settlement process or operations, the transactions settled by the system’s
rules or procedures, or the relevant legal and market environments.
Risk management objectives should be consistent with the objectives of this
Framework, the system’s business purposes, and the type of payment
instruments and markets for which the system clears and settles. Risk-
management objectives should also be communicated to and understood by both
the system operator’s staff and system participants. System operators shall
review the risk management objectives regularly to ensure that:
i. they are appropriate for the risks posed by the system;
ii. they continue to be aligned with the system’s purposes;
iii. they remain consistent with this Framework; and
iv. they are being effectively adhered to by the system operator and participants.
ESTABLISH SOUND GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS TO OVERSEE THE RISK MANAGEMENT
FRAMEWORK
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governance rests with a system operator’s board of directors or similar body and
with the system operator’s senior management.
Payment systems shall have rules and procedures that are appropriate and
sufficient to carry out the system’s risk-management objectives and that are
consistent with its legal framework. Such rules and procedures shall specify the
respective responsibilities of the system operator, system participants, and other
relevant parties. Rules and procedures shall establish the key features of a
system’s settlement and risk-management design and specify clear and
transparent crisis management procedures and settlement failure procedures, if
applicable.
EMPLOY THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE THE SYSTEM’S RISK MANAGEMENT
OBJECTIVES AND IMPLEMENT EFFECTIVELY ITS RULES AND PROCEDURES
System operators shall ensure that the appropriate resources and processes are
in place to allow the system to achieve its risk management objectives and
implement effectively its rules and procedures. In particular, the system
operator’s staff shall have the requisite skills, information, and tools to apply the
system’s rules and procedures to achieve the system’s risk management
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objectives. System operators shall also ensure that their facilities and
contingency arrangements, including any information system resources, are
sufficient to meet their risk management objectives.
The Scheme Boards should ensure that Operators build and implement adequate
resilience into their infrastructure and operations to limit the potential for
disruptions (operational failures) resulting from single points of failure. In
addition, Operators shall ensure that critical data including customer
information are encrypted to the standard specified in the extant CBN guidelines.
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v. Operators shall comply with CBN guidelines on the set up of Anti-Fraud desk
and fraud management system.
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iii. For payments related to clearing sessions, the Board shall ensure that rules
and appropriate arrangements exist to allow for immediate settlement of all
clearing related obligations under a wide range of potential stress scenarios.
iv. The Scheme Board shall take steps to ensure that settlement of payments
between multiple banks or participants are conducted in a safe, reliable and
repeatable manner to eliminate the need for banks to settle transactions
bilaterally.
v. Participants shall have appropriate business continuity plan in place.
Compliance with ISO 22301 shall be a minimum requirement.
vi. The scheme Board in collaboration with CBN shall ensure that annual stress
tests, quarterly vulnerability assessment and annual penetration tests of the
RTGS system is conducted.
vii. The Scheme Board in collaboration with CBN shall ensure that access to RTGS
platform is subject to a role based privileges and multi-factor authentication
to provide secure access and non-repudiation of transactions.
viii. Participants shall ensure sufficient transaction controls and monitoring
processes are implemented to prevent errors and omissions to support early
detection of fraud.
ix. In the event that a participant is unable to settle its obligation, the scheme
shall lock the participant’s account from all forms of debit transaction (debit
freeze) except from clearing. Participation in clearing is subject to clearing
rules and regulations.
9.3. ACH, CHEQUE AND INSTANT PAYMENT SCHEME RISK REQUIREMENTS
i. The Scheme Board in collaboration with CBN shall ensure that each
participant provides annual attestation on self-assessment and continuous
compliance with regulatory requirements.
ii. The Scheme Board in collaboration with CBN shall ensure that Settlement
Banks conduct appropriate due diligence on associated non-settlement
financial institutions. In addition, settlement banks shall ensure KYC and AML
/CFT monitoring on their transactions.
iii. The Scheme Board shall encourage participants to actively participate in
industry wide fraud management and information sharing initiatives.
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ii. The Scheme Board in collaboration with CBN shall ensure a minimum of two-
factor authentication shall be applied to all mobile money transactions to
reduce the risk of identity theft.
iii. The Scheme Board in collaboration with CBN shall ensure licensed agents use
visible branding/logos at all agent locations.
iv. Operators have an automated transaction alerting system with updated
balance and it is built into the platform to ensure users are notified on
completed or truncated transactions.
v. The Scheme Board in collaboration with CBN shall ensure Operators fee
structure is made public and visible at agent location.
vi. The Scheme Board in collaboration with CBN shall ensure MMOs have a
backup pathway for completing transactions when the primary path is
unavailable. Back up paths shall be tested on a regular basis.
vii. The Scheme Board in collaboration with CBN shall ensure data transmitted is
adequately secured.
viii. Participants shall ensure a maximum time allotted for a session. When
sessions timeout, transactions shall be rolled back.
ix. When sessions are terminated, an immediate alert shall be sent indicating
termination. During session time, the mobile device shall not be allowed to
send same transaction i.e. same amount to the same beneficiary.
x. Operators shall implement adequate security measures to prevent denial of
service on its platform.
xi. Operators shall conduct due diligence before on boarding and engaging
agents.
xii. Operators shall adhere to the guidelines on Agency Banking.
xiii. Operators shall ensure that all alerts containing Unique Account Identifier
are masked.
10. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Each scheme shall establish its dispute resolution mechanism to serve as an
additional dispute resolution mechanism that will help participants resolve
disputes in a timely and cost effective manner.
Disputes that arise between or across schemes may be referred through the
Director, Payments System Management Department of the CBN to the PICC for
resolution
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The terms below shall have the following meaning for the purpose of this Framework.
1. ACH Cheque & Instant Payment Scheme Board means the body that ensures that NIBSS,
as a systemically important payment system provider, is robust and has adequate business
continuity arrangements.
2. Acquirer means bank or any other legal person concluding contracts with Merchants
concerning acceptance of payment by means of an electronic payment token.
4. Automated Clearing House means an electronic clearing system in which payment orders are
exchanged among financial institutions, primarily via magnetic media or
telecommunications networks, and handled by a data processing centre.
5. Availability means the ability of services and information to be accessed by users when
requested.
7. Card Life cycle is the period from the production, storage, issuance, maintenance to the
disposal of a payment card.
8. Card Not Present Transaction means a payment card transaction made where the cardholder
does not or cannot physically present the card for a Merchant's visual examination at the
time that an order is given and payment effected, such as for mail-order transactions by mail
or fax, or over the telephone or Internet.
9. Card Payment Scheme Board refers to the Board that formulates rules, guidelines and
frameworks governing the Card Payment Infrastructure with regard to the business,
operational and risk management activities of the various stakeholders operating in Nigeria.
10. Collateral means an asset that is delivered by the collateral provider to secure an obligation
to the collateral taker. Collateral arrangements may take different legal forms; collateral
may be obtained using the method of title transfer or pledge.
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13. Information Security and Risk Management Special Interest Working Group (ISRM SIWG)
refers to the SIWG that is responsible for effectively managing the risks associated with
Nigerian Payments System.
14. Living Will means a detailed plan stipulating in advance how a systematically important
payment system should be liquidated in the event of a collapse to prevent a panic and
disorderly disposal of its assets. This is to ensure that the failure of a SIPS does not result in
the failure of National Payment System or the whole economy. The contents of living will
shall be as stipulated by the Central Bank of Nigeria from time to time.
15. Mobile Payment Scheme Board refers to the Board that formulates rules, guidelines and
frameworks governing the Mobile Payment Infrastructure with regard to the business,
operational and risk management activities of the various stakeholders operating in Nigeria.
16. Participant means a party that participates in the Nigerian payment system and which are
bound by all the rules governing the payment system.
17. Payment means the payer’s transfer of a monetary claim on a party acceptable to the payee.
Typically, claims take the form of banknotes or deposit balances held at a financial
institution or at a central bank.
18. Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) is an information security
standard for organizations that handle branded credit cards from the major card schemes.
19. Payment Initiative Coordinating Committee (PICC) refers to the body responsible for driving
and overseeing the various payments system initiatives.
20. Payment Scheme Board (PSB) or Scheme Board refers to the body that oversees the
activities of the various scheme boards. The board will ensure that there is transparency
and efficiency in the payment system.
21. Payment Service Provider (PSPs) refers to CBN licensed companies that employ the
infrastructure of the scheme operator to provide services to end users.
22. Payment System Operator, System Operator, or Operator is an entity licensed by the CBN to
engage in the operation and/or delivery of payment services within the National Payments
System.
23. Payments System is a set of instruments, procedures, and rules for the transfer of funds
between or among participants; the system includes the participants and the entity
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operating the arrangement. Payments system are typically based on an agreement between
or among participants and the operator of the arrangement, and the transfer of funds is
effected using an agreed-upon operational infrastructure.
25. PCI DSS stands for Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard. It was developed to
encourage and enhance cardholder data security and facilitate the broad adoption of
consistent data security measures globally. (See
www.pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-1.pdf)
26. Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) is a payment system in which processing and
settlement of high value funds occur on real time (that is without deferral) and gross (i.e.
transaction by transaction) among participants. The core feature is that payment
instructions are settled only on funded accounts at the Central Bank of Nigeria and
settlements are final and irrevocable.
27. RTGS Payment Scheme Board refers to the body responsible for ensuring that there is
adequate measurement and management of liquidity, credit and operational risk
management in the payment system
28. Systemically Important Payment System (SIPS) are major real time clearing, settlement and
other payment systems that share the characteristic that a failure of one or more of these
systems could endanger the operation of the National payment system or the whole
economy. Each Scheme Board shall with the approval of the CBN determine from time to
time the list of SIPS within their scheme
29. Systemic Risk is the failure of one or more participants to settle their payments obligation
leading to credit or liquidity problems for other participants.
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