+++++++++++++++++++++

+++++++++++++++++++++
++++++++
BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR
FORCE
AIR FORCE
INSTRUCTION 91-115 1
NOVEMBER 2022 Safety
SAFETY RULES FOR
NUCLEAR
AIRLIFT OPERATIONS

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS

PUBLICATION IS
MANDATORY
ACCESSIBILITY:
Publications and forms are
available on the e-
Publishing website at
www.e-Publishing.af.mil for
downloading or ordering.
RELEASABILITY: There
are no releasability
restrictions on this
publication.
OPR: AFSEC/SEWN
Certified by: AF/SEI
(Colonel Lawrence A.
Nixon)
Supersedes: AFI 91-115,
28 July 2021 Pages: 11
This instruction implements
Air Force Policy Directive
(AFPD) 91-1, Nuclear
Weapons and Systems
Surety, and is consistent
with AFPD 13-5, Air Force
Nuclear Mission. This
instruction applies to all
civilian employees and
uniformed members of the
Regular Air Force, Air Force
Reserve, Air National
Guard, and nuclear certified
equipment, facilities
involved with nuclear
weapons, nuclear weapon
systems, and radioactive
materials-related program.
This publication does not
apply to the United States
Space Force. Ensure all
records generated as a
result of processes
prescribed in the publication
adhere to Air Force
Instruction (AFI) 33-322,
Records Management and
Information Governance
Program, and are disposed
in accordance with the Air
Force Records Disposition
Schedule, which is located
in the Air Force Records
Information Management
System. Refer
recommended changes and
questions about this
publication to the office of
primary responsibility (OPR)
using DAF Form 847,
Recommendation for
Change of Publication;
route DAF Forms 847 from
the field through the
appropriate functional chain
of command. This
publication may not be
supplemented or further
implemented/extended. The
authorities to waive
wing/unit level requirements
in this publication are
identified with a Tier (“T- 0,
T-1, T-2, T-3”) number
following the compliance
statement. See Department
of the Air Force manual
(DAFMAN) 90-161,
Publishing Process and
Procedures, for a
description of the authorities
associated with the Tier
numbers. Submit requests
for waivers through the
chain of command to the
appropriate Tier waiver
approval authority, or
alternately, to the
requestor’s commander for
non-tiered compliance
items. Compliance with the
attachment references in
this publication is
mandatory.
2 AFI91-115 1 NOVEMBER
2022
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
This document has been
revised to remove interim
weapon system safety rules
(WSSRs) restrictions for C-
17 airlift operations
transporting B61-12
weapons.
Section A—Authority and
Responsibilities
1. Additional Limitations.
These safety rules apply to
any nuclear airlift operations
on cargo aircraft. The
United States commanders
may impose more restrictive
guidance or policy than
contained in safety rules but
may not unilaterally change
the safety rules. Major
command, field operating
agency and direct reporting
unit approved publications
must conform to the safety
rules in the instruction and
the Department of Defense
(DoD) nuclear weapon
system surety standards as
described in DoD Directive
(DoDD) 3150.02, DoD
Nuclear Weapons Surety
Program. (T-0)
2. Roles and
Responsibilities.
2.1. The Air Force Chief of
Safety (AF/SE):
2.1.1. Ensures safety rules
provide maximum safety
consistent with operational
requirements.
2.1.2. Ensures major
commands follow the safety
rules.
2.1.3.
Isresponsibleforinterpretatio
nandclarificationofgeneralan
dspecificguidancein
Sections B and Section C
of this publication. 2.2.
Major Commands:
1. 2.2.1. Ensure their
units follow the safety
rules.
2. 2.2.2. Ensure all
supplemental guidance
 and procedures agree
with the approved safety
rules.
3. 2.2.3. Inspect for
compliance.
4. 2.2.4. Ensure
manuals, checklists, and
technical orders do not
conflict with the safety
rules.
Section B—General
Safety Rules
3. General Guidance.
3.1. General safety rules
apply policy to all nuclear
weapons and nuclear
weapon systems in
accordance with
Department of Defense
Manual (DoDM) 3150.02,
DoD Nuclear Weapon
System Safety Program
Manual.
3.2. Units will not
intentionally expose nuclear
weapons to abnormal
environments except in an
emergency. (T-0)
3.3. Units will not use
nuclear weapons for
training or for
troubleshooting (e.g., to
confirm the existence of a
fault, aid in fault isolation, or
verify that a fault has been
corrected except as
explicitly allowed by a
specific safety rule). (T-0)
3.4. Nuclear weapons may
be used for exercises
except when explicitly
prohibited by specific safety
rules listed in Section C of
this publication.

AFI91-115 1 NOVEMBER
2022 3
3.5. Guidance for Personnel
Reliability Assurance
Program certification of
personnel who have
physical access to nuclear
weapons is provided in DoD
Instruction (DoDI) 5210.42,
DoD Nuclear Weapons
Personnel Reliability
Assurance.
3.6. To conduct nuclear
weapon system operations,
commanders will only
employ certified
procedures, personnel,
equipment, facilities, and
organizations, authorized by
the appropriate level of
authority. (T-0)
3.7. Commanders will
restrict the total number of
personnel performing
nuclear weapon system
operations to the minimum
consistent with the
operations performed. (T-0)
3.8. At least two authorized
persons must be present
during any operation
involving a nuclear weapon,
except when authorized by
a specific safety rule (e.g.,
alert fly). (T-0) Both
authorized individuals must
be able to detect incorrect
or unauthorized procedures
in the task being performed.
(T-0) Both authorized
individuals also must have
knowledge of and
understand applicable
safety and security
requirements. (T-0)
3.9. Guidance for physical
security is provided in DoD
Directive (DoDD) 5210.41,
Security Policy for
Protecting Nuclear
Weapons.
3.10. Guidance to authorize
nuclear weapons
transportation is provided in
DoDI 4540.05, DoD
Transportation of U.S.
Nuclear Weapons.
Additionally, units
performing custody and
accountability transfers
during logistic movements
will utilize courier receipt
system to ensure positive
control. (T-0)
3.11. Units will perform Use
Control operations in
accordance with plans and
procedures prescribed by
the applicable combatant
command and technical
procedures. (T-0)
3.12. Units will verify that a
nuclear warhead is not
present in a test assembly
using non- nuclear
assurance procedures at
the last practical opportunity
agreed upon by the DoD
and/or Department of
Energy before conducting
an operational test. (T-0)
3.13. Deviations from safety
rules are permitted in an
emergency, except as
follows:
3.13.1. United States
custody must be maintained
until receipt of a valid
nuclear control order that
permits transferring United
States nuclear weapons to
non-United States delivery
forces. (T-0)
3.13.2. Nuclear weapons
will not be expended unless
a valid, properly
authenticated nuclear
control order conveying
release or expenditure
authority is received. (T-0)
3.13.3. Other permissible
deviation from safety rules:
3.13.3.1. Jettisoning of
nuclear weapons, for
applicable systems, is
permitted in the event of an
emergency, and is to be
accomplished according to
plans and procedures
prescribed for the area of
operations. (T-0)
3.14.
Thesafetyrulesmayonlybech
angedusingproceduresinAFI
91-102,NuclearWeapon
System Safety Studies,
Operational Safety Reviews
and Safety Rules.

4 AFI91-115 1 NOVEMBER
2022
Section C—Specific
Safety Rules
4. Specific Guidance.
4.1. These safety rules,
weapon system features,
operational controls, and
technical procedures
ensure the Airlift Force
meets the Nuclear Weapon
System Surety Standards in
DoDD 3150.02 and
Department of the Air Force
Instruction (DAFI) 91-101,
Air Force Nuclear Weapons
Surety Program.
4.2. Safety rules shall
always apply, even during
war. (T-0)
4.3. Violations of referenced
instructions do not
constitute weapon system
safety rules
violations unless specifically
identified in this document.
5. Nuclear Weapons
Movements and
Configurations.
5.1. Units will use shipping
configurations in the
applicable weapon -1
Technical Order and the
Technical Order 11N-45-51,
Transportation of Nuclear
Weapons Material, series.
(T-0)
5.2. Units will move nuclear
weapons by the safest,
most secure means and
routes consistent with
operational requirements.
(T-0)
5.3. Units must maintain
custody of nuclear weapons
and transfer them in
accordance with Technical
Order 11N-45-51 series
guidance. (T-0)
5.4. The following weapons
are authorized to be
transported aboard the C-
17A: 5.4.1. B61-3, B61-4,
B61-7, B61-11, and B61-12
5.4.2. W78 (See limitation in
paragraph 5.5).
5.4.3. W80-1.
5.4.4. B83-1.
5.4.5. W87-0 (See limitation
in paragraph 5.6).
5.5. Units will not air
transport designated
conventional high
explosives nuclear weapons
(e.g., W78) unless ground
transport is not feasible. (T-
0) Refer to DoDI 4540.05
for approval authorities.
5.6. Units will not air
transport the W87-0 without
the H1545 horizontal
transport fixture. (T- 0)
6. Equipment,
Procedures, and
Checklists. Units will use
only equipment,
procedures, and checklists
that are consistent with
United States Air Force
approved publications for
any operation directly
associated with nuclear
weapons. (T-0)
7. Security Criteria.
7.1. Security guidance may
be found in the following
issuances:
7.1.1.
Forsecuritypolicynuclearwe
apons:DoDD5210.41,Securi
tyPolicyforProtecting
Nuclear Weapons, 22
January 2015.
7.1.2. For security policy,
objectives, concepts, and
prescribed minimum
security criteria for
protecting nuclear weapons
on alert, in storage, in
maintenance facilities, in-
transit, and in regeneration
situations may be found in
the following issuances:
DoDM S-5210.41, (U)

AFI91-115 1 NOVEMBER
2022 5

Nuclear Weapon Security

Manual; DoD S-5210.41-
M_Air Force Manual
(AFMAN) 31- 108V1-S, (U)
The Air Force Nuclear
Weapon Security Manual;
DoD S-5210.41- M_AFMAN
31-108V2-S, (U) General
Nuclear Weapon Security
Procedures; and DoD S-
5210.41-M_AFMAN 31-
108V3-S, (U) Nuclear
Weapon Security Manual:
Nuclear Weapon Specific
Requirements.
7.1.3. For operations
security: AFI 10-701,
Operations Security
(OPSEC).
7.1.4. For transporting
nuclear weapons: AFMAN
13-526, Nuclear Airlift
Operations.
7.2. In the United States
European Command area
of responsibility, security
provided by United States
and non-United States
military services must meet
the above DoD and United
States Air Force standards
as spelled out in Allied
Command Operations
Directive 080-006, Volume
2, Part II/United States
European Command
Instruction 6801.01, Nuclear
Surety Management for the
Weapon Storage and
Security System (WS3). (T-
0)
8. Tamper Control
Program. Major
commands, field operating
agencies, and direct
reporting units will comply
with DAFI 91-101. (T-0)
9. Personnel Reliability
Assurance Program. All
personnel having access to
nuclear weapons will
comply with DoDM
5210.42_AFMAN 13-501,
Nuclear Weapons
Personnel Reliability
Program (PRP), and AFI
31-117, Arming and Use of
Force by Air Force
Personnel. (T-0)
10. Passengers and
Additional Crewmembers.
10.1. Commanders at all
levels must rigidly control
the number of people on
nuclear weapon airlift
missions. (T-0)
10.2.
Whenanuclearweaponisabo
ard,thefollowingindividualsm
aybecarriedasnecessary to
accomplish the mission:
couriers and shipper
escorts, authorized
inspectors, flying crew
chiefs, and security forces
personnel authorized in the
Mission Setup Message.
10.3. Additional
crewmembers must have a
specific in-flight duty to
perform. (T-1) 10.4.
Authorize mission-essential
personnel status only for
specific individuals who:
10.4.1. Are on a specific
mission. (T-0)
10.4.2. Have a valid
requirement to observe,
inspect, or participate in the
nuclear weapon
airlift mission. (T-0)
11. Aircraft Preparation,
Generation, and
Servicing.
11.1. Units will select the
safest, most reliable aircraft
available for nuclear airlift
operational missions. (T-0)
11.1.1.
Unitswillconsiderallavailable
safetyandstructuralenhance
mentswhenselecting an
aircraft. (T-0)
11.1.2. Units will not select
aircraft that have a history
of uncorrected repeat or
recurring system
malfunctions on any system
identified in the aircraft
Mission Essential
Subsystem Listing, Airland
and or Air Refueling. (T-0)
11.2.
Unitswillcompletegroundfuel
ing,oxygenservicing,andany
loadingofexternalflares
before loading nuclear
weapons. (T-0) Units will
perform replenishment of
external flare dispensers
and subsequent fuel and
oxygen servicing of nuclear-
laden aircraft only as

6
AFI91-115 1 NOVEMBER
2022
necessary to support
mission requirements. (T-0)
Units will not transport
replenishment flares. (T-0)
11.3. The aircrew must
control all maintenance
activities on aircraft with any
nuclear weapon aboard. (T-
0)
11.4. Units will not perform
any maintenance that
increases the probability of
fire on an aircraft with any
nuclear weapon aboard. (T-
0)
11.5. Units will not perform
concurrent servicing of
aircraft during weapon
loading or unloading. (T-0)
11.6. With any nuclear
weapon aboard, units will
not: 11.6.1. Park aircraft in
hangars. (T-0)
11.6.2. Jack aircraft, except
for lifting of one set of
landing gear (for example,
integral jacking) for minor
maintenance. (T-0)
12. Fuel Requirements.
Units will fuel Prime Nuclear
Airlift Force operational
aircraft with the best low-
volatility fuel available that
is compatible with aircraft
engine operation. (T-0)
13.
FirefightingSupportRequir
ements.
Unitswillensurethattherequir
edfirefightingsupport is
available for:
13.1. Weapon loading and
offloading. (T-0)
13.2. Aircraft engine starts,
taxi, takeoff, and landing.
(T-0)
13.3. Fuel and oxygen
servicing of nuclear
weapon-laden aircraft. (T-0)
13.4. Any replenishment of
external flare dispensers on
nuclear weapon-laden
aircraft. (T-0)
14. Airfield and Airspace
Requirements. Do not
allow aircraft with forward
firing ordnance to sweep
potential line of fire across
nuclear airlift ground
operation. (T-0) Prohibit
direct overflight of nuclear
airlift ground operations
within airspace controlled
by the installation. (T-0)
15. Pre-Load
Requirements.
15.1. Units will not load any
nuclear weapon on an
aircraft unless the aircraft is
mission capable, serviced,
and prepared for loading.
(T-0) Additionally, before
loading a nuclear weapon
on an aircraft, units will:
15.1.1. Remove all
nonessential personnel and
non-mission-related
hazardous materials.
(T-0)
15.1.2. Search and sanitize
the aircraft. (T-0) 15.1.3.
Establish Type 1 security.
(T-0)
16. Loading, Tie Down,
and Unloading.
16.1.
Theaircrewmembersareresp
onsibleforthesafetyandsecur
ityofeachnuclearweapon in
their physical possession.
Aircrew possession begins
after the courier and
loadmaster have inspected,
accepted, and taken
physical control of the
weapon. Possession
continues until the weapon
is offloaded from the aircraft
and the loadmaster
transfers physical control to
munitions personnel.
AFI91-115 1 NOVEMBER
2022 7
16.2.
Unusedspaceonnuclearwea
ponairliftmissionsmaybeuse
dforothercargoonlyifthe
cargo is searched, security
is maintained before loading
it on the aircraft, and the
cargo will not cause:
16.2.1. Mission delay. (T-0)
16.2.2. Mission rerouting.
(T-0)
16.2.3. Extra landings. (T-0)
16.2.4. Additional handling
or movement of nuclear
weapons. (T-0)
16.2.5. Security problems
due to aerial port on-loading
or off-loading. (T-0)
16.3. Units will not load
materials that are
incompatible with nuclear
weapons. (T-0)
16.4. Units will load aircraft
in a way that permits the
aircrew to offload, or jettison
in flight,
any opportune cargo
without moving any nuclear
weapon. (T-0) 17. Flight
Restrictions.
17.1. The DoD Foreign
Clearance Guide Special
Weapons Overflight Guide
Supplement applies to all
nuclear weapon airlift
missions. (T-0)
17.2. Aircrew transporting
any nuclear weapon must
not fly within an unsafe
distance of unfriendly
borders as defined in the
DoD Foreign Clearance
Guide Special Weapons
Overflight Guide
Supplement. (T-0)
17.3. Positive measures will
be required to prevent
overflight or landing in
unfriendly territories or
countries where such
actions are prohibited. (T-0)
17.4. Aircrew with any
nuclear weapon aboard
must not take off until all
destinations and planned
divert stations acknowledge
they are capable of meeting
security requirements. (T-0)
18. Air Refueling. Aircrew
will:
18.1. Minimize air refueling;
however, air refueling can
be planned when feasible to
reduce
ground exposure to the
nuclear weapons. (T-0)
18.2. Air refuel over open
ocean at least 12 nautical
miles offshore. (T-0)
18.3. Not conduct air
refueling training when any
nuclear weapon is aboard.
(T-0)
19. ContingencyTransfer.
Nuclearairliftcrewsareauthor
izedtoperformnuclearairliftai
rcraft cross-loads. (T-0)
20. Command Disable or
Jettison.
20.1. Aircrew will perform
command disable
operations in accordance
with plans and procedures
prescribed by the applicable
combatant command and
technical publications. (T- 0)
20.2. When possible, the
aircrew will activate the
Command Disable System
before crash landing,
jettisoning a nuclear
weapon, or if capture of the
weapon is imminent. (T-0)
Note: Refer to the DoD
Foreign Clearance Guide
Special Weapons Overflight
Guide Supplement for
jettison restrictions.

8
AFI91-115 1 NOVEMBER
2022
20.3. Aircrew will ensure the
Command Disable System
codes and at least one
individual qualified in
Command Disable System
procedures remains on
nuclear loaded aircraft:
20.3.1. Until Type I security
is established after arrival.
(T-0)
20.3.2. When ropes and
stanchions are removed for
taxi and departure. (T-0)
20.4.
Aircrewsmustnotusealternat
eemergencydestructproced
uresonnuclearweapons.(T-
0)
21. Emergency Nuclear
Airlift Operations.
Commanders must ensure
Emergency Nuclear Airlift
Operations will comply with
these weapon system
safety rules to the maximum
extent possible. (T-0)
JEANNIE M. LEAVITT
Major General, USAF Chief
of Safety
AFI91-115 1 NOVEMBER
2022
9
Attachment 1
GLOSSARY OF
REFERENCES AND
SUPPORTING
INFORMATION
References
AFI 10-701, Operations
Security (OPSEC), 24 July
2019
AFI 31-117, Arming and
Use of Force by Air Force
Personnel, 6 August 2020
AFI 33-322, Records
Management and
Information Governance
Program, 23 March 2020
AFI 91-102, Nuclear
Weapon System Safety
Studies, Operational Safety
Reviews and Safety Rules,
22 May 2019
AFMAN 13-526, Nuclear
Airlift Operations, 3 October
2018
AFPD 13-5, Air Force
Nuclear Mission, 17 July
2018
AFPD 91-1, Nuclear
Weapons and Systems
Surety, 24 October 2019
Allied Command Operation
Directive 080-006, Volume
2, Part II/United States
European Command
Instruction 6801.01, Nuclear
Surety Management for the
Weapon Storage and
Security System (WS3), 2
February 2016
DAFI 91-101, Air Force
Nuclear Weapons Surety
Program, 26 March 2020
DAFMAN 90-161,
Publishing Processes and
Procedures, 15 April 2022
DoD Foreign Clearance
Guide, Special Weapons
Overflight Guide
Supplement DoDD 3150.02,
DoD Nuclear Weapons
Surety Program, 24 April
2013
DoDD 5210.41, Security
Policy for Protecting
Nuclear Weapons, 22
January 2015
DoDI 4540.05, DoD
Transportation of U.S.
Nuclear Weapons, 23 June
2011
DoDI 5210.42, DoD Nuclear
Weapons Personnel
Reliability Assurance, 27
April 2016
DoDM 3150.02, DoD
Nuclear Weapon System
Safety Program Manual, 31
January 2014
DoDM 5210.42_AFMAN 13-
501, Nuclear Weapons
Personnel Reliability
Program (PRP), 19
September 2018
DoDM S-5210.41, (U)
Nuclear Weapon Security
Manual, 4 May 2022
DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN
31-108V1-S, (U) The Air
Force Nuclear Weapon
Security Manual,
2 May 2019
DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN
31-108V2-S, (U) General
Nuclear Weapon Security
Procedures, 20 May 2019
DoD S-5210.41-M_AFMAN
31-108V3-S, (U) Nuclear
Weapon Security Manual:
Nuclear Weapon Specific
Requirements, 20 May
2019
Technical Order 11N-45-51,
Transportation of Nuclear
Weapons Material, 22
March 2006
Prescribed Forms
None
10 AFI91-115 1
NOVEMBER 2022
Adopted Forms
DAF Form 847,
Recommendation for
Change of Publication
Abbreviations and
Acronyms
AFI—Air Force Instruction
AFMAN—Air Force Manual
AFPD—Air Force Policy
Directive
AFSEC—Department of the
Air Force Safety Center
AF/SE—Department of the
Air Force Chief of Safety
AF/SEI—Department of the
Air Force Safety Center,
Safety Issues Division
AFSEC/SEWN—
Department of the Air Force
Safety Center, Weapons
Safety Division-Nuclear
DAFI—Department of the
Air Force Instruction
DAFMAN—Department of
the Air Force Manual
DoD—Department of
Defense DoDI—
Department of Defense
Instruction DoDD—
Department of Defense
Directive DoDM—
Department of Defense
Manual OPR—Office of
Primary Responsibility
OPSEC—Operational
Security
PRP—Personnel Reliability
Program U.S.—United
States WSSR—Weapon
System Safety Rule
Terms
Access—Close physical
proximity to a nuclear
weapon in such a manner
as to allow the opportunity
to tamper with or damage a
nuclear weapon.
Abnormal Environment—
Environments as defined in
a weapon’s stockpile-to-
target sequence and
military characteristics in
which a nuclear weapon or
a nuclear weapon system is
not expected to retain full
operational reliability.
Command Disable—A
feature which allows
manual activation of the
nonviolent disablement of
critical weapon
components. The command
disable system may be
internal or external to the
weapon.
Custody—Responsibility
for the control of, transfer
and movement of, and
access to nuclear weapons
and components. Custody
may include accountability.
Emergency—An
unexpected occurrence or
set of circumstances in
which personnel or
equipment unavailability,
due to accident, natural
event, hostile act, or
combat, may demand
immediate

AFI91-115 1 NOVEMBER
2022 11
actions that may require
extraordinary measures to
protect, handle, service,
secure, transport, jettison,
or to employ nuclear
weapons.
Jettison—The intentional
separation of an unarmed
weapon from its delivery
system or transport carrier
in response to an
emergency.
Maintenance—Work and
oversight necessary to
ensure a system is in
proper working order and
will operate, act, or protect
in accordance with its
intended purpose.
Nuclear Weapon—A
complete assembly (i.e.,
implosion type, gun type, or
thermonuclear type), in its
intended ultimate
configuration which, upon
completion of the
prescribed arming, fusing,
and firing sequence, is
capable of producing the
intended nuclear reaction
and release of energy.
Nuclear Weapon
System—A nuclear
weapon and a means of
delivering it to the target,
with associated support
equipment, facilities,
procedures, personnel, and
any vehicles peculiar to the
system used for weapon
transport.
Positive Measures—The
combination of procedural
and administrative actions,
physical safeguards, and
design features expressly
for the purpose of ensuring
security, safety, and control
of nuclear weapons and
systems, including
associated personnel.
Prevent—To minimize the
possibility of occurrence of
an undesired event. It does
not imply absolute
assurance that the event
will not occur.
Prime Nuclear Airlift
Force—Those aircrews,
aircraft, and other functions
provided for peacetime
support of logistical airlift of
nuclear weapons and
nuclear components.
Security—Protect against
loss of custody, theft, or
diversion of a nuclear
weapon system; protection
against unauthorized
access; or protection
against unauthorized
actions, vandalism,
sabotage, and malevolent
damage.
Stockpile-to-Target
Sequence—The order of
events involved in removing
a nuclear weapon from
storage and assembling,
testing, transporting, and
delivering it on the target. A
document that defines the
logistic and employment
concepts and related
physical environments
involved in the delivery of a
nuclear weapon from the
stockpile to the target. It
may also define the logical
flow involved in moving
nuclear weapons to and
from the stockpile for quality
assurance testing,
modification and retrofit,
and the recycling of limited
life components.
Use Control—The positive
measures that allow the
authorized use and prevent
or delay unauthorized use
of nuclear weapons and is
accomplished through a
combination of weapon
system design features,
operational procedures,
security, and system safety
rules.