November/December 2021

Volume 100 • Number 6

Containment Beyond the Cold War

How Washington Lost the Post-Soviet Peace

M. E. Sarotte

The contents of Foreign Affairs are copyrighted ©2021 Council on Foreign Relations, Inc. All rights reserved.
Reproduction and distribution of this material is permitted only with the express written consent of Foreign
Affairs. Visit www.foreignaffairs.com/permissions for more information.

FOREIGNAFFAIRS.COM
 November 19, 1991, he had asked one of
Containment Gorbachev’s advisers, Alexander Yakovlev,
THE DIVIDED WORLD

if Ukraine’s breaking away would prompt

Beyond the violent Russian resistance. Yakovlev was
skeptical and responded that there were
Cold War 12 million Russians in Ukraine, with
“many in mixed marriages,” so “what sort
of war could it be?” Baker answered
How Washington Lost the simply: “A normal war.”
Post-Soviet Peace Now, with Yeltsin upping the ante by
calling for the Soviet Union’s complete
M. E. Sarotte destruction, Baker had a new fear. What
would happen to the vast Soviet nuclear
arsenal after the collapse of centralized

O
n December 15, 1991, U.S. command and control? As he counseled
Secretary of State James Baker his boss, President George H. W. Bush,
arrived in Moscow amid a disintegrating empire with “30,000
political chaos to meet with Russian nuclear weapons presents an incredible
leader Boris Yeltsin, who was at the time danger to the American people—and
busy wresting power from his nemesis, they know it and will hold us account-
Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. able if we don’t respond.”
Yeltsin had recently made a shocking Baker’s goal for his December 1991
announcement that he and the leaders of journey was thus to ascertain who, after
Belarus and Ukraine were dismantling the Soviet Union’s dissolution, would
the Soviet Union. Their motive was to retain the power to authorize a nuclear
render Gorbachev impotent by trans- launch and how that fateful order might
forming him from the head of a massive be delivered. Soon after arriving, he cut
country into the president of nothing. to the chase: Would Yeltsin tell him?
In the short run, it was a brilliant Remarkably, the Russian president
move, and within ten days, it had did. Yeltsin’s openness to Baker was
succeeded completely. Gorbachev partly a gambit to win U.S. help in his
resigned, and the Soviet Union col- struggle with Gorbachev and partly an
lapsed. The long-term consequences, attempt to secure financial aid. But it was
however, were harder to grasp. also a sign that he wanted a fresh start in
Even before Yeltsin’s gambit, Baker Moscow’s relations with the West, one
had begun worrying about whether the characterized by openness and trust.
desire of some Soviet republics to become Yeltsin and Baker soon began working in
independent might yield bloodshed. On tandem to ensure that only one nuclear
successor state—Russia—would ulti-
M. E. SAROTTE is Marie-Josée and Henry R.
Kravis Distinguished Professor at the Johns mately emerge from the Soviet collapse.
Hopkins School of Advanced International This collaboration survived Bush’s
Studies and the author of the forthcoming book 1992 election loss. Yeltsin continued the
Not One Inch: America, Russia, and the Making
of Post–Cold War Stalemate (Yale University effort with President Bill Clinton, U.S.
Press, 2021), from which this essay is adapted. Secretaries of Defense Les Aspin and

22 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
M. E. Sarotte

William Perry, and Strobe Talbott, the Yeltsin era and on cooperative
Clinton’s top Russia adviser, among ventures with Washington. Although
others, to ensure that former Soviet there were notable episodes reprising the
atomic weapons in Belarus, Kazakhstan, spirit of the early 1990s—expressions of
and above all Ukraine were either sympathy after the September 11, 2001,
destroyed or relocated to Russian soil. terrorist attacks and a nuclear accord in
During a 1997 summit, Yeltsin even 2010—the basic trend line was negative.
asked Clinton whether they could cease The relationship reached frightening
having nuclear triggers continually at new lows during Russia’s 2008 conflict
hand: “What if we were to give up with Georgia and its 2014 invasion of
having to have our finger next to the Ukraine, and it has sunk even further
button all the time?” Clinton responded, since 2016, owing to the revelation of
“Well, if we do the right thing in the Russia’s cyberattacks on U.S. businesses,
next four years, maybe we won’t have to institutions, and elections.
think as much about this problem.” Why did relations between Washing-
By the end of the 1990s, however, that ton and Moscow deteriorate so badly?
trust had largely vanished. Vladimir History is rarely monocausal, and the
Putin, Yeltsin’s handpicked successor, decay was the cumulative product of
divulged little in grudging 1999 conversa- U.S. and Russian policies and politics
tions with Clinton and Talbott. Instead of over time. But it is hard to escape the
sharing Russia’s launch protocols, Putin fact that one particular U.S. policy
skillfully played up his perceived need for added to the burdens on Russia’s fragile
a harder Kremlin line by describing the young democracy when it was most in
grim consequences of reduced Russian need of friends: the way that Washing-
power: in former Soviet regions, he said, ton expanded NATO.
terrorists now played soccer with decapi- Expansion itself was a justifiable
tated heads of hostages. response to the geopolitics of the 1990s.
As Putin later remarked, “By NATO had already been enlarged a
launching the sovereignty parade”—his number of times. Given that former
term for the independence movements Soviet bloc states were now clamoring to
of Soviet republics in 1990–91—“Rus- join the alliance, it was neither unprec-
sia itself aided in the collapse of the edented nor unreasonable to let them in.
Soviet Union,” the outcome that had What was unwise was expanding the
opened the door to such gruesome alliance in a way that took little account
lawlessness. In his view, Moscow of the geopolitical reality. The closer
should have dug in, both within the NATO moved its infrastructure—foreign
union and abroad, instead of standing bases, troops, and, above all, nuclear
aside while former Soviet bloc states weapons—to Moscow, the higher the
jumped ship to join the West. “We political cost to the newly cooperative
would have avoided a lot of problems if relationship with Russia. Some U.S.
the Soviets had not made such a hasty policymakers understood this problem
exit from Eastern Europe,” he said. at the time and proposed expanding in
Once firmly in power, Putin began contingent phases to minimize the
backtracking on the democratization of damage. That promising alternative

24 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Containment Beyond the Cold War

mode of enlargement would have rizes NATO enlargement as either good

avoided drawing a new line across or bad and instead focus on the manner
Europe, but it faced strong opposition in which the alliance grew. After the
within Washington. collapse of Soviet power in Europe—
Instead, advocates of a one-size-fits- and in response to urgent requests from
all manner of expansion triumphed. states emerging from Moscow’s domi-
Washington’s error was not to enlarge nation, now justifiably eager to choose a
the alliance but to do so in a way that security alliance for themselves—NATO
maximized Moscow’s aggravation and swelled in multiple rounds of enlarge-
gave fuel to Russian reactionaries. In ment to 30 states, which together were
2014, Putin justified his takeover of home to nearly one billion people.
Crimea as a necessary response to New historical evidence shows that
NATO’s “deployment of military infra- U.S. leaders were so focused on enlarg-
structure at our borders.” ing NATO in their preferred manner that
Cold wars are not short-lived affairs, they did not sufficiently consider the
so thaws are precious. Neither country perils of the path they were taking or
made the best possible use of the thaw how their choices would magnify Russia’s
in the 1990s. Today, as the United own self-harming choices. Put simply,
States and Russia spar over sanctions, expansion was a reasonable policy; the
cyberwarfare, and much else, the problem was how it happened.
choices made three decades ago carry Although NATO is an alliance of many
enduring significance. The two coun- countries, it is ultimately the United
tries still possess more than 90 percent States’ views that matter most when the
of the world’s nuclear warheads and Article 5 guarantee—the pledge to treat
thus the ability to kill nearly every an attack on one as “an attack against
living creature on earth. Yet between them all”—is at stake. Hence, a U.S.-
them, both states have shredded nearly centric, one-size-fits-all approach
every remaining arms control accord, prevailed, despite the concerns of other
and they have shown little willingness members about a crucial geographic
to replace them with new agreements. problem: the closer the alliance’s bor-
Understanding the decay in U.S.- ders moved to Russia, the greater the
Russian relations—and how the manner risk that NATO expansion would derail
of NATO expansion contributed to the newfound cooperation with Moscow
it—can help the United States better and endanger the dramatic progress
manage long-term strategic competition being made on arms control.
in the future. As the 1990s showed, the Scandinavian alliance members, such
way that Washington competes can, as Norway, savvy about living in a
over time, have just as profound an neighborhood that was Soviet-adjacent
impact as the competition itself. but not Soviet-controlled, had in earlier
decades wisely customized their NATO
WHAT WENT WRONG? memberships. As the only original
To grasp what went wrong in U.S.- NATO member sharing a border with the
Russian relations, it is necessary to look Soviet Union, Norway had decided
beyond the familiar binary that catego- against either the stationing of foreign

November/December 2021 25
M. E. Sarotte

bases or the deployment of foreign Bosnia, that “the big babies in Mos-
forces on its territory in peacetime and cow,” although “a real head case,” had
had ruled out nuclear weapons either on immense “capacity for doing harm.”
its land or in its ports. All of this was
done to keep long-term frictions with CROSSING THE LINE
Moscow manageable. That approach Understanding the collapse in U.S.-
could have been a model for central and Russian relations requires returning to a
eastern European states and the Baltics, time when things were going right:
since they, too, occupy a region close to the 1990s. The devil, in this case, really is
but not controlled by Russia. Some in the details—specifically, in three
policymakers understood this dynamic choices that Washington made about
at the time and supported the creation NATO expansion, one under Bush and
of a framework under which new allies two under Clinton, each of which
might gain contingent memberships in cumulatively foreclosed other options
phases through the so-called Partner- for European security.
ship for Peace (PfP), an organization The first choice came early. By
launched in 1994 to allow non-NATO November 24, 1989, just two weeks after
European and post-Soviet states to the Berlin Wall’s unexpected fall, Bush
affiliate themselves with the alliance. was already sensing the magnitude of
But American hubris, combined with more changes yet to come. As protesters
tragic decisions by Yeltsin—most nota- toppled one government after another
bly, to shed the blood of his opponents in central and eastern Europe, it seemed
in Moscow in 1993 and in Chechnya in clear to him that new leaders in that
1994—provided ammunition to those region would abandon the Warsaw Pact,
arguing that Washington did not need the involuntary military alliance with
phased enlargement to manage Russia. the Soviet Union. But what then?
Instead, they maintained, the United According to U.S. records, Bush put
States needed to pursue the policy of the issue to the British prime minister,
containment beyond the Cold War. Margaret Thatcher: “What if [the] East
By the mid-1990s, “not one inch”—a European countries want to leave [the]
phrase originally intended to signal Warsaw Pact. NATO must stay.”
that NATO’s jurisdiction would not Thatcher replied with her startling
move one inch eastward—had gained preferred option: she was in favor of
the opposite meaning: that no territory “keeping . . . the Warsaw Pact.” Accord-
should be off-limits to full-membership ing to British records, she saw the pact
enlargement and that there should be as an essential “fig leaf for Gorbachev”
no binding limitations on infrastruc- amid the humiliation of the Soviet
ture of any sort. And this happened collapse. She also “discouraged [Bush]
just as Yeltsin was succumbing to from coming out publicly at this stage
illness and Putin was rising through in support of independence for the
the ranks in Russia. But U.S. leaders Baltic Republics,” since now was not the
persisted, despite knowing, as Talbott time to question European borders.
put it in an internal U.S. memo on the Bush, however, was unconvinced. He
alliance’s role in quelling violence in “expressed concern about seeming to

26 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Containment Beyond the Cold War

consign Eastern Europe indefinitely to Hence, if Gorbachev had asked the

membership of the Warsaw Pact.” The Germans to trade those nuclear weapons
West “could not assign countries to stay” for Soviet permission to reunify, a sizable
in that pact “against their will.” Bush number would have gladly agreed. Even
preferred to solve this problem by push- better for Moscow, 1990 was an election
ing NATO beyond the old Cold War line. year in West Germany. The chancellor,
The West German foreign minister, Helmut Kohl, had to be particularly
Hans-Dietrich Genscher, subsequently attuned to voter sentiment on reunifica-
proposed another option: combine NATO tion and the nuclear issue. As Baker’s
and the Warsaw Pact into a “composite top aide, Robert Zoellick, put it at the
of common, collective security,” within time, if Kohl decided to signal a willing-
which the two alliances “could both ness to pay Moscow’s price, whatever
finally dissipate.” Former dissidents in that was, in advance of the election and
central Europe went even further, “the Germans work[ed] out unification
suggesting the most far-reaching option: with the Soviets,” NATO would get
their region’s complete demilitarization. “dumped.” This reality gave Moscow the
All these options were anathema to ability to undermine the established
Bush, who most certainly did not want order of transatlantic relations.
NATO to dissipate or the United States’ There were speculative discussions
leading role in European security to between the U.S. State Department
disappear with it. In 1990, however, and the West Germans on February 2,
Gorbachev still had leverage. Thanks to 1990, about how best to proceed in this
the Soviet victory over the Nazis in delicate moment and what NATO might
World War II, Moscow had hundreds of do beyond the Cold War line, such as
thousands of troops in East Germany “extend[ing] its territorial coverage to
and the legal right to keep them there. . . . eastern Europe.” Genscher raised
Germany couldn’t reunify without this idea in a negative sense, meaning
Gorbachev’s permission. And the he was certain that Moscow would not
Soviet leader had another source of allow reunification unless such coverage
power: public opinion. was explicitly ruled out. But Bush and
As the Cold War’s frontline, a divided his National Security Council sensed
Germany had the highest concentration that they might be able to finesse the
of nuclear arms per square mile anywhere way NATO moved eastward, namely by
on the planet. The weapons in West restricting what could happen on
Germany had been installed to deter a eastern German territory after Ger-
Soviet invasion, given how difficult it many joined the alliance. Although they
would have been for NATO’s conventional did not use the term, they were follow-
forces alone to stop a massive advance. ing the Scandinavian strategy.
Had deterrence failed, the missiles’ use But a week later, Baker—out of the
would have rendered the heart of Europe loop with evolving White House think-
uninhabitable—a terrifying prospect to ing because of his extended travels—un-
Germans, who, because they were living wittingly overstepped his bounds by
at ground zero, arguably had more skin in offering Gorbachev a now infamous
the game than their NATO allies. hypothetical bargain that echoed Gen-

November/December 2021 27
M. E. Sarotte

scher’s thinking, not Bush’s: What if NO SECOND-TIER GUARANTEES

Gorbachev allowed reunification to By December 1991, the Soviet Union
proceed and Washington agreed “that was gone. Soon, Bush would be gone as
NATO’s jurisdiction would not shift one well, after he lost to Clinton in the
inch eastward from its present position?” 1992 U.S. presidential election. By the
The secretary soon had to drop this time the new president got his team in
wording, however, after realizing that it place, in mid-1993, hyperinflation and
was inconsistent with Bush’s prefer- corruption were already weakening the
ences. Within a couple of weeks, Baker prospects of democracy in Russia.
was having to advise allies quietly that Worse, Yeltsin soon made a series of
his use of “the term NATO ‘jurisdiction’ tragic decisions that cast doubt on the
was creating some confusion” and country’s ability to develop into a
“should probably be avoided in the peaceful, democratic neighbor to the
future.” It was a sign that NATO would new states on its borders.
shift eastward after all, with a special In October 1993, clashing with
status for eastern Germany, which anti-reform extremists in the parliament,
ultimately would become Europe’s only Yeltsin had tanks fire on the parliamen-
guaranteed nuclear-free zone. tary building. The fighting killed an
Through this move to limit NATO estimated 145 people and wounded 800
infrastructure in eastern Germany, and more. Despite, or perhaps because of,
by playing on Moscow’s economic the attack, extremists did well in the
weakness, Bush shifted Gorbachev’s subsequent parliamentary elections, on
attention away from the removal of December 12, 1993. The party that won
nuclear weapons in the western terri- the most votes was the Liberal Demo-
tory and toward economic inducements cratic Party of Russia, which was “nei-
to allow for German reunification. In ther liberal nor democratic, but by all
exchange for billions of deutsche marks appearances fascist,” as the historian
in various forms of support, the Soviet Sergey Radchenko has put it.
leader ultimately allowed Germany to For a while, a budding friendship
reunify and its eastern regions to join between “Bill and Boris” distracted the
NATO on October 3, 1990, thus permit- world from these troubling events. The
ting the alliance to expand across the two leaders developed the closest rela-
old Cold War frontline. tionship ever to exist between an Ameri-
By October 11, 1991, Bush could even can president and a Russian leader, with
indulge in speculation about a more Clinton visiting Moscow more times
ambitious goal. He asked Manfred than any U.S. president before or since.
Wörner, then NATO’s secretary-general, But Clinton also wanted to respond
whether the alliance’s efforts to establish to demands from central and eastern
a liaison organization for central and European countries seeking to join
eastern European states might also NATO. In January 1994, he launched a
“include the Baltics.” Wörner’s feelings novel plan for European security, one
were clear, and Bush did not contradict aimed at putting those countries on the
him. “Yes,” Wörner said, “if the Baltics path to NATO membership without
apply they should be welcomed.” antagonizing Russia. This was PfP, an

28 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
November/December 2021 29
M. E. Sarotte

idea largely conceived of by General even opened its door to Russia as well,
John Shalikashvili, the Polish-born which would eventually join the part-
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, nership. Clinton later noted to NATO
and his advisers. It resembled the Secretary-General Javier Solana that
Scandinavian strategy—but writ large. PfP “has proven to be a bigger deal
PfP’s connection to NATO member- than we had expected—with more
ship was intentionally left vague, but countries, and more substantive coop-
the idea was roughly that would-be eration. It has grown into something
NATO members could, through military- significant in its own right.”
to-military contacts, training, and Opponents of PfP within the Clin-
operations, put themselves on a path to ton administration complained that by
full membership and the Article 5 making central and eastern European
guarantee. This strategy offered a countries wait to gain the full Article 5
compromise sufficiently acceptable to guarantee, the partnership gave Mos-
key players—even Poland, which cow a de facto veto over when, where,
wanted full membership and did not and how NATO would expand. They
like the idea of having to spend time in argued instead for extending the alli-
the waiting room, but understood that ance as soon as possible to deserving
it had to follow Washington’s lead. new democracies. And in late 1994,
PfP also had the benefit of not Yeltsin gave PfP critics ammunition by
immediately redrawing a line across approving what he reportedly thought
Europe between states with Article 5 would be a high-precision police action
protection and those without. Instead, a to counter separatists in the Chechnya
host of countries in disparate locations region. Instead, he started what became
could join the partnership and then a brutal, protracted, and bloody conflict.
progress at their own pace. This meant Central and eastern European states
that PfP could incorporate post-Soviet seized on the bloodshed to argue that they
states—including, crucially, Ukraine— might be next if Washington and NATO
even if they were unlikely to become did not protect them with Article 5. A
NATO allies. As Clinton put it to the new term arose internally in the Clinton
visiting German chancellor, Kohl, on administration: “neo-containment.” Such
January 31, 1994: “Ukraine is the linch- thinking, along with the relationships that
pin of the whole idea.” The president Polish President Lech Walesa and Czech
added that it would be catastrophic “if President Vaclav Havel established with
Ukraine collapses, because of Russian Clinton, increasingly made an impact on
influence or because of militant nation- the American president.
alists within Ukraine.” Clinton contin- So, too, did domestic political
ued: “One reason why all the former pressures. In the November 1994 U.S.
Warsaw Pact states were willing to midterm elections, the Republican Party
support [PfP] was because they under- took the Senate and the House. Voters
stood” that it could provide space for had endorsed NATO enlargement as part
Ukraine in a way that NATO could not. of the Republicans’ winning platform,
The genius of PfP was that it bal- the “Contract with America.” Clinton
anced these competing interests and wanted to win a second term in 1996,

30 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Containment Beyond the Cold War

and the midterm results factored into form of NATO expansion that Moscow
his decision to abandon the option of would find far more threatening.
expanding NATO through an individual- Perry held on but later regretted that
ized, gradual process involving PfP. He he “didn’t fight more effectively for the
shifted instead to a one-size-fits-all delay of the NATO decision.” As he
enlargement with full guarantees from wrote in 2015, “The descent down the
the start. Reflecting this strategy, NATO slippery slope began, I believe, with the
issued a public communiqué in Decem- premature NATO expansion,” and the
ber 1994 stating outright: “We expect “downsides of early NATO membership
and would welcome NATO enlargement for Eastern European nations were even
that would reach to democratic states to worse than I had feared.” As an unfor-
our East.” Yeltsin, conscious of these tunate corollary, the Russians immedi-
words’ significance, was enraged. ately concluded that PfP had been a
Privately, the State Department ruse, even though it had not.
sent the U.S. Mission to NATO a text
“which the U.S. believes should COST PER INCH
emerge from the alliance’s internal The significance of Clinton’s shift
deliberations on enlargement.” The would become apparent over time. On
text declared that “security must be his first European trip as president, in
equal for all allies” and that “there will January 1994, Clinton had asked NATO
be no second-tier security guaran- leaders, “Why should we now draw a
tees”—shorthand for contingent new line through Europe just a little
memberships or infrastructure limits. further east?” That would leave a
With that, although it continued to “democratic Ukraine” sitting on the
exist, PfP was marginalized. wrong side. The partnership was the
Clinton’s shift almost caused his best answer, because it opened a door
secretary of defense to resign. In but also gave the United States and its
Perry’s view, the progress on arms NATO allies “the time to reach out to
control in the early 1990s had been Russia and to these other nations of the
nothing short of astounding. A nuclear former Soviet Union, which have been
superpower had fallen apart, and only almost ignored through this entire
one nuclear-armed country had debate.” Once PfP was abandoned, a
emerged from its ruins. Other post- new dividing line became inevitable.
Soviet successor states were joining the Having jettisoned PfP’s method of
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. No allowing a wide array of countries to join
weapons had detonated. There were as loose affiliates, the Clinton adminis-
new agreements on safeguards and tration now needed to decide how many
transparency about the number and countries to add as full NATO members.
location of warheads. These were The math seemed simple: the more
matters of existential importance, on countries, the greater the damage to
which the United States and Russia had relations with Russia. But that decep-
made historic progress, and now PfP’s tively simple calculation hid a deeper
opponents were, in his view, throwing a complication. Given Moscow’s sensitivi-
spanner into the works by pursuing a ties, expansion to former Soviet repub-

November/December 2021 31
M. E. Sarotte

lics, such as the Baltics and Ukraine, or stop at the former Soviet border.
to countries with particular features, Washington brushed aside quiet expres-
such as bases that hosted foreign forces sions of concern from Scandinavian
and nuclear weapons, would yield a leaders, who noted the desirability of
much higher cost per inch. sticking with more contingent solutions
This raised two questions: To de- for their neighborhood.
crease the cost per inch, should full- Coming on top of the alliance’s
membership enlargement avoid moving March 1999 military intervention in
beyond what Moscow considered to be Kosovo—which Russia fiercely op-
a sensitive line, namely the former posed—this turned 1999 into an inflec-
border of the Soviet Union? And should tion point for U.S.-Russian relations.
new members have any binding restric- Moscow’s decision to again escalate the
tions on what could happen on their brutal combat in Chechnya later that
territory, echoing the Scandinavian year added to the sense that the post–
accommodations and the East German Cold War moment of cooperation was
nuclear prohibition? collapsing. An ailing Yeltsin reacted with
To both questions, the Clinton team’s bitterness to U.S. criticism of the
answer was a hard no. As early as June renewed violence in Chechnya, com-
1995, Talbott had already begun point- plaining to journalists that “Clinton
edly telling Baltic leaders that the first permitted himself to put pressure on
countries to enter NATO as new members Russia” because he had forgotten “for a
would certainly not be the last. By June minute, for a second, for half a minute,
1997, he could be blunter. The Clinton forgotten that Russia has a full arsenal of
administration “will not regard the nuclear weapons.” And in Istanbul on
process of NATO enlargement as finished November 19, 1999, on the margin of an
or successful unless or until the aspira- Organization for Security and Coopera-
tions of the Baltic states have been tion in Europe summit, Yeltsin’s verbal
fulfilled.” He was so consistent in this attacks on Clinton were so extreme that
view that his staff christened it “the Talbott, as he recalled in his memoirs,
Talbott principle.” The manner of decided that Yeltsin had become “un-
enlargement was set: it should proceed hinged.” According to the U.S. transcript
without regard for the cost per inch—the of a brief private conversation between
opposite of the Scandinavian strategy. Clinton and Yeltsin, the Russian leader
In April 1999, at NATO’s 50th anni- made sweeping demands. “Just give
versary summit in Washington, D.C., Europe to Russia,” Yeltsin said, because
the alliance publicly welcomed the “the U.S. is not in Europe. Europe
interest of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithu- should be the business of Europeans.”
ania (along with six more countries) in Clinton tried to deflect the tirade, but
full membership. The United States Yeltsin kept pressing, adding, “Give
could insist, correctly, that it had never Europe to itself. Europe never felt as
recognized the Soviet Union’s 1940 close to Russia as it does now.” Clinton
occupation of the Baltics. But that did replied, “I don’t think the Europeans
not change the significance of the move: would like this very much.” Abruptly,
full-membership expansion would not Yeltsin stood up and announced, “Bill, the

32 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Containment Beyond the Cold War

meeting is up. . . . This meeting has gone relieved to have no obligations for the
on too long.” Clinton would not let his first time in decades, and told his driver
Russian counterpart go, however, without to take him to his family. En route, his
asking who would win the upcoming limousine’s phone rang. It was the
Russian election in 2000. A departing president of the United States. Yeltsin
Yeltsin replied curtly, “Putin, of course.” told Clinton to call back at 5 PM, even
The two presidents had patched up though the American president was
relations after spats before, but now preparing to host hundreds of guests at
Clinton was out of time. The meeting the White House that day for a lavish
in Istanbul would be his last with millennial celebration.
Yeltsin as president. Returning home to Meanwhile, the new leader of Russia
Moscow, Yeltsin decided to exit the made Clinton wait a further 26 hours
political scene. Serious heart disease, before making contact. On January 1,
alcoholism, and fear of prosecution had 2000, Putin finally found nine minutes
worn the Russian president down. for a call. Clinton tried to put a good
Yeltsin had already decided that Putin face on the abrupt transition, saying, “I
was his preferred successor, because he think you are off to a very good start.”
believed that the younger man would, in
the words of the Russia expert Stephen DASHED HOPES
Kotkin, protect his interests, “and maybe It soon became apparent that Putin’s
those of Russia as well.” On December 14, rise, in terms of Moscow’s relations with
1999, according to his memoirs, Yeltsin Washington, was more an end than a
confided to Putin that, on the last day of start. The peak of U.S.-Russian coopera-
the year, he would make the younger tion was now in the past, not least as
man acting president. measured in arms control. Letting a
As promised, on New Year’s Eve, decades-long trend lapse, Washington
Yeltsin shocked his nation with the and Moscow failed to conclude any
broadcast of a brief, prerecorded major new accords in the Clinton era.
resignation speech. The president’s Instead, nuclear targeting of U.S.
stiff, weak delivery of his scripted and European cities resumed under a
words intensified the atmosphere of Russian leader who, in December 1999,
melancholy. Seated against the back- had started a reign that would be
drop of an indifferently decorated measured in decades. For U.S. relations
Christmas tree, he asked Russians for with Russia, these events signaled, if
“forgiveness.” He apologized, saying not a return to Cold War conditions
that “many of our shared dreams didn’t precluding all cooperation, then cer-
come true” and that “what we thought tainly the onset of a killing frost.
would be easy turned out to be pain- Of course, for central and eastern
fully difficult.” Putin would subse- Europeans who had suffered decades of
quently uphold his end of the bargain brutality, war, and suppression, enter-
by, in one of his first official acts, ing NATO on the cusp of the twenty-
granting Yeltsin immunity. first century was the fulfillment of a
Yeltsin left the Kremlin around 1 PM dream of partnership with the West.
Moscow time, feeling immensely Yet the sense of celebration was muted.

November/December 2021 33
M. E. Sarotte

As U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine The all-or-nothing expansion strat-

Albright remarked, “A decade earlier, egy also incurred those costs without
when the Berlin Wall had come down, locking in democratization. Former
there was dancing in the streets. Now Warsaw Pact states succeeded in joining
the euphoria was gone.” NATO (and eventually the European
The world created in the 1990s never Union), only to find that membership
fulfilled the hopes that arose after the did not automatically guarantee their
collapse of both the Berlin Wall and the democratic transformations. Subsequent
Soviet Union. Initially, there was a research has shown that the prospect of
widespread belief that the tenets of incrementally gaining membership in
liberal international order had suc- international organizations—the process
ceeded and that residents of all the offered by PfP—would likely have more
states between the Atlantic and the effectively solidified political and
Pacific, not just the Western ones, could institutional reforms.
now cooperate within that order. But Even as strong a supporter of NATO
both U.S. and Russian leaders repeat- enlargement as Joe Biden, then a U.S.
edly made choices at odds with their senator, sensed in the 1990s that the way
stated intentions to promote that the alliance was enlarging would cause
outcome. Bush talked about a Europe problems. As he put it in 1997, “Continu-
whole, free, and at peace; Clinton ing the Partnership for Peace, which
repeatedly proclaimed his wish to avoid turned out to be much more robust and
drawing a line. Yet both ultimately much more successful than I think anyone
helped create a new dividing line across thought it would be at the outset, may
post–Cold War Europe. Gorbachev arguably have been a better way to go.”
sought to save the Soviet Union; Yeltsin
sought lasting democratization for FOCUS ON THE HOW
Russia. Neither one succeeded. What should Washington learn from
NATO expansion was not the sole this history? One of the biggest contem-
source of these problems. But the porary challenges for the United States
manner of the alliance’s enlargement— is the way that confrontation between
in interaction with tragic Russian the West and Russia has once again
choices—contributed to their extent become the order of the day. During
and impact. Put differently, it is not Donald Trump’s divisive presidency,
possible to separate a serious assess- Democrats and Republicans agreed on
ment of enlargement’s role in eroding little, but at least some segment of the
U.S.-Russian relations from how it GOP was never comfortable with Trump’s
happened. Washington’s error was not embrace of Putin. A shared sense of
to expand the alliance but to do so in a mission in dealing with Moscow offers a
way that maximized friction with path toward a rare U.S. domestic
Moscow. That error resulted from the consensus—one that leads back to NATO,
United States misjudging both the still standing despite Trump’s toying
permanence of cooperative relations with the idea of a U.S. withdrawal.
with Moscow and the extent of Putin’s Even with Trump gone, however,
willingness to damage those relations. critics continue to question the alliance’s

34 F O R E I G N A F FA I R S
 Containment Beyond the Cold War

worth. Some, such as the historian process, can undermine even a reason-
Stephen Wertheim, do so in general able strategy—as the withdrawal from
terms, arguing that Washington should Afghanistan has shown. Even worse,
no longer “continue to fetishize military mistakes can yield cumulative damage
alliances” as if they were sacred obliga- and scar tissue when a strategy’s imple-
tions. Other critics have more specific mentation is measured in years rather
complaints, particularly regarding the than months. Success in long-term
recent chaotic withdrawal of Western strategic competition requires getting
forces from Afghanistan. Even Armin the details right.∂
Laschet, at the time the candidate for
German chancellor from the right-of-
center Christian Democratic Union (a
party normally strongly supportive of
the Atlantic alliance), condemned the
withdrawal as “the biggest debacle that
NATO has suffered since its founding.”
European allies lamented what they saw
as an unconscionable lack of advance
consultation, which eviscerated early
hopes of a new, Biden-inspired golden
age for the alliance.
Pundits should think twice about
writing off NATO, however, or letting
the chaos in Kabul derail post-Trump
attempts at repairing transatlantic
relations. European concerns are valid,
and there is clearly a need for a vigor-
ous debate over what went wrong in
Afghanistan. But critics need to think
about how a call to downgrade or
dismantle the alliance will land in a
time of turmoil. The Trump years, the
COVID-19 pandemic, and Biden’s Afghan
pullout have all damaged the structure
of transatlantic relations. When a house
is on fire, it is not time to start renova-
tions—no matter how badly they were
needed before the fire started.
There is also a larger takeaway from
this history of NATO expansion, one
relevant not just to U.S. relations with
Russia but also to ties with China and
other competitors. A flawed execution,
both in terms of timing and in terms of

November/December 2021 35