Chapter 6 - FAR 5 - Note Earnings Management
Chapter 6 - FAR 5 - Note Earnings Management
1
Types/patterns/strategies/techniques of Earnings Management
Income minimization
Income maximization
Income smoothing
Similar to income maximization but try to sustain income between bogey and cap.
Reduce volatility of reported net income thus it shows a good signaling to the whole
market.
To maintain the good reputation of management / CEO.
2
Cookie jar (Normally use for income smoothing)
Bonus Motivation
Managers have incentives to maximize their bonuses, consistent with the bonus plan
hypothesis of positive accounting theory.
Consequently, they may adopt accounting policies to increase reported net income if
net income between bogey and cap (income maximization), or to reduce reported net
income if it is below the bogey (taking a bath) or above the cap of the bonus plan
(income minimization).
Please refer to typical bonus scheme figure as suggested by Healy 1985.
Contractual motivation
Managers may adopt policies to increase reported net income, or other financial
statement variables, to avoid covenant violation or even to avoid being too close to
violation.
It consistent with the debt covenant hypothesis of positive accounting theory.
Lending agreements may also induce income-smoothing behavior.
A smooth sequence of reported net incomes will reduce the probability of covenant
violation.
Also, higher reported profits will reduce the probability of technical default on debt
covenants.
For example, a smooth earnings sequence may increase the willingness of lenders and
suppliers to grant short-term credit.
This is particularly so if the firm has implicit contracts with these stakeholders.
Political motivation
By reducing its reported net income the firm may reduce government intervention
which might emerge if the public felt the firm was earning excessive profits.
3
According to the political cost hypothesis, the largest/utilities oil companies would be
most concerned because big companies are more in the public eye and because of
their size and economic power, they tend to attract media and political attention.
Also, they may be under greater pressure to behave responsibly than smaller firms
that attract little or no public attention.
Thus, big oil/utilities companies are the ones most likely to suffer adverse
consequences such as higher taxes if they take advantage of the rising price of crude
oil/increase tariff to earn high profits.
Taxation motivation
The firm may be able to postpone payment of taxes if it can minimize its reported
income, for example by managing accruals like depreciation, or using LIFO (if
allowed by the tax authority).
However, IRB have it own rules for calculating taxable income
Example: Choice of valuation of inventory between LIFO @ FIFO
In Malaysia, LIFO is not allowed for tax purposes by IRB
Motivation to manage earnings usually occurs around the time of changes of CEO.
CEO approaching retirement would likely try to maximize net income so as to
increase their bonuses.
New CEO usually motivated to take a bath to increase profitability of future earnings
Firms that report earnings greater than expected typically enjoy a significant share
price increase, as investors revise upwards their probabilities of good future
performance.
In contrast, firms that fail to meet expectations suffer a significant share price
decrease.
4
Previous studies showed that the market penalizes firms that fall short of expectations
by more than it rewards firms that exceed them.
As a result, managers have a strong motivation or incentive to ensure that earnings
expectations are met, particularly if they hold ESOs and other share related
compensations.
In this context, managers will employ earnings maximization.
It is suggested that meeting investors’ expectations is a powerful earnings
management incentive.