Structure and kinds of Anumana (inference)- Vyapti ,

Hetvabhasas | New Topic

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April 14, 2020

Notes on Indian philosophy logic system

Topic Covered Based on Latest UGC NET EXAM Syllabus – Structure and
kinds of Anumana (inference), Vyapti (invariable relation),Hetvabhasas
(fallacies of inference).
As we have already discussed the various types of Pramanas in previous unit. In this
article we will cover the details of Anumana (inference) along with the structure and
kinds of Anumana (inference).

After going through this article you will have good understanding of –

Nature of inference
Different kinds of inference
Grounds of inference in Nyaya system ; and
Vyapti (invariable relation),Hetvabhasas (fallacies of inference).

Many students has complained about the difficulties of these topic as they
are not able to understand clearly about the key concepts of Inference. As
this topic is based on philosophy so you might feel uncomfortable with the topic so
its suggested to read multiple time to gain required knowledge to solve NET EXAM
Questions.

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Structure and kinds of Anumana
In Sanskrit inference is known as ‘anumâna’. Anumâna is the second source of valid
knowledge according to the Nyâya-Vaiúeika school. Anumâna is a mediateand
indirect source of knowledge.

The word anumana is combination of ‘ANU’ which means after and ‘MANA’ which
means knowledge, so the combined meaning of the word is ‘after knowledge’.

Let’s take the example to understand it in better way –

Let us take the following example:

The hill is fiery.
Because the hill is smoky.

Whatever has fire has smoke. In the above example, we pass from the perception of
smoke in the hill to the knowledge of the existence of fire in it on the ground of our
previous knowledge of the universal relation between smoke and fire.

THE CONSTITUENTS OF INFERENCE

This may be explained with the help of the above example of inference, the presence of
fire on the perception of smoke. When one sees smoke on distant hill one remembers
one’s experience of the universal concomitance (Vyapti) between smoke and fire and
concludes that there is fire on the distant hill.

In the above mentioned example, three points are to be noted. First, there is the
perception of a mark or reason (hetu), (e.g.smoke) in a subject(hill). Secondly, there is a
recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire as we
have observed in the past. Thirdly, there is the inference of the existence of an
unperceived object ( e. g. fire) in the subject ( e. g. hill).

Three terms are involved in this inference. They are paka, sâdhya and hetu.

The character which is inferred (fire) is called sadhya; the mark on the strength of which
the character is inferred is the hetu (smoke); the subject where the character is inferred
is paksa (hill).

The three terms correspond to the major, minor and the minor terms in the Aristotelian
syllogism.

In Nyâya theory of perception, we find five propositions. These propositions are known
as ‘members’ (avayava) of Nyâya syllogism.

These five members of Indian syllogism are called Avayavas are: pratijñâ
(proposition), hetu (reason), udâharana (example), upanaya (application) and
nigamana (deduction).

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This five- member syllogism may be illustrated in the following way:

The following is a a typical nyaya syllogism.

This hill has fire (pratijna),

Because it has smoke (hetu),
Whatever has smoke has fire e.g. an oven (udaharana),
This hill as smoke which is invariably associated with fire (upanaya),
Therefore this hill has fire (nigamana).

The first, the pratijna, is the logical statement which is to be proved.

The second is hetu or reason which states the reason for the
establishment of the proposition.

The third is udaharana which the universal concomitance together with

example . the fourth is upanaya or application of the universal
concomitance to the present case. The fifth is nigamana or conclusion
drawn from the preceding propositions.

What is Vyapti (Invariable Relation) ? How is vyâpti known by us?

The word ‘Vyâpti’ literally means ‘the state of pervasion.’ It implies a correlation
between two facts, of which one is pervaded ( vyâpya), and the other pervades (
vyâpaka).

A fact is said to pervade another when it always accompanies the other. A fact is said to
be pervaded by another when it is accompanied by the other.

In the above given example, smoke is pervaded by fire, since it is always accompanied
by fire. But while all smoky objects are fiery, all fiery objects are not smoky, e. g. the red
hot iron ball.

For example, we have several times seen the smoke and the fire together in the kitchen
etc, and we have ascertained the invariable relationship between the two. Now, we
perceive smoke on the hill, so we infer fire on the hill. There cannot be smoke in the
absence of fire.

Because of this universal relationship between fire and smoke, the existence of fire is
necessarily to be admitted in every case of smoke. Without the definite knowledge of
such a relation, our inference of fire is impossible in spite of the perception of smoke.

A vyapti may be of two types-

1. Samavyâpti and
2. Asamavyâpti.

A vyâpti between terms of equal extension is called samavyâpti or equipollent

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concomitance, e.g. ‘nameable’ and ‘knowable’. Whatever is nameable is knowable and
again whatever is knowable is nameable. Here, we can infer either of the term from the
other.

On the otherhand a vyâpti between terms of unequal extension is called asamavyâpti. It

is the relation of non-equipollent concomitance between two terms. Here, we can infer
one term from the other, but not vice-versa, e.g. we may infer fire from smoke, but not
smoke from fire.Fire is present in all cases wherever smoke is present, but the reverse is
not true.

CLASSIFICATION OF INFERENCE
There are different ways of classifying inference. According to the first classification of
inference, inference is of two kinds, svârtha and parârtha.

This classification is a psychological classification of inference.

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If a person wants to infer something for himself, it is called svârthanumâna.
Therefore, it is defined as an inference for one’s own conviction. A person who
perceives a patch of smoke remembers that there is a universal relation between
smoke and fire and finally infers that there is fire in the hill.
An inference is said to be parârthanumâna when an inference is done in order to
convince others. This inference is done when someone, after inferring for himself
fire from smoke expresses it in five-membered syllogism tocarry his conviction to
another. In order to convince one’s own self either the first three propositions or
the last three propositions of the Pancavayava nyaya is sufficient.
On the otherhand, all the five propositions of pancavayava nyaya are necessary in
order to convince others.

It is to be noted here that the division of inference into svârtha and parârtha is not
mentioned in the sutras of Gautama and Kanâda. It was first observed by Prasastapâda
in the Bhâsya on the Vaiúeika sûtra.

According to another classification, an inference is divided into three kinds, pûrvavat,

sesavat and sâmânyatoda.

This distinction was drawn by Gautama.While pûrvavat and seavat inferences are based
on causation, the last is based on non-causal uniformity.

A cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an effect and an effect is the
invariable and unconditional consequent of a cause.
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1) Pûrvavat inference: When we infer an unperceived effect from a perceived cause
we have pûrvavat inference. g. we see the dark clouds in the sky in the morning and
infer future rain from the dark clouds.

2) Seavat inference : When we infer an unperceived cause from a perceived effect we

have seavat inference, e. g. when we infer previous rain from the swift muddy current of
the river.

3) Sâmânyatodta inference : When an inference is based not on causation but on

uniformity of co-existence,it is called sâmânyatodta,e.g. when we infer cloven hoofs of
an animal by its horns.

According to another interpretation, a pûrvavat inference is based on previous

experience of universal concomitance between two things, a seavat is inference by
elimination, and a sâmânyatodta is inference by analogy.

According to another classification of inference, inference is divided into three types.

They are — kevalânvayi, kevalâvyatireki and anvayavyatireki inferences. It is based on
the nature of vyâpti.
1) Kevalânvayi inference: When vyâpti between the middle and the major term is
derived from uniform agreement in presence alone, it is called Kevalânvayi inference.

In this inference the hetu has affirmative concomita- nce with sadhya only. For
example,
All knowable objects are nameable;
The pot is a knowable object;
Therefore the pot is nameable.

2) Kevalâvyatireki inference: When vyapti between middle and the major is derived
from uniform agreement in absence alone, it is called kevalâvyatireki inference. In this
inference hetu is only negatively related to the sadhya. For example,
What is not different from other elements has no smell;
The earth has smell;
Therefore the earth is different from other elements.

3) Anvayavyatireki inference : When the middle term in an inference is both positively

and negatively related to the major term, it is called anvaya-

vyatireki inference. In it there is a vyâpti or universal relation between the hetu and
the sâdhya in respect of both their presence and absence.

For example,
a) All smoky objects are fiery;
The hill is smoky;
Therefore the hill is fiery.

b) No non-fiery object is smoky;

The hill is smoky
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Therefore the hill is not non-fiery;
That is, the hill is fiery.

Kevalânvayi inference corresponds to Mill’s Method of Agreement, kevalâvyatireki

inference corresponds to his Method of Difference and anvayavyatireki inference
corresponds to his Joint Method of Agreement and Difference or the Method of Double
Agreement.

FALLACIES OF INFERENCE
In Indian logic a fallacy is known as hetvâbhâsa. This fallacy means, the middle term
appears to be a reason but is not a valid reason. In Western logic fallacies are formal in
nature. But the Naiyayikas hold that the logical forms of inference are the same for all
valid inferences.

A fallacy relates to material condition of an inference. So all fallacies are material

fallacies. There are five characteristics of a valid term. When these characteristics are
violated, fallacies arise. Five characteristics of a middle term are:

It must be present in the minor term (pakadharmatâ); e.g., smoke must be

present in the hill.
It must be present in positive instances in which the major term is present,; e.g.,
smoke must be present in the kitchen where fire exists (sapakasattva).
It must be absent in all negative instances in which the major term is absent;
smoke must be absent in the lake in which fire does not exist (vipakasattva).
It must be non-incompatible with the major term; e. g., it must not prove the
coolness of fire ( abâdhita).
It must be qualified by the absence of counteracting reasons which lead to a
contradictory conclusion; e.g., ‘the fact of being caused’ should not be used to
prove the ‘eternality’ of sound. (aviruddha).

Violation of the above characteristics leads to the following fallacies. 1)

Savyabhichâra,2) Viruddha, 3) Satpratipaka, 4) Asiddha, and 5)Bâdhita.

1)Savyabhichâra or the fallacy of irregular middle: A middle term may be irregularly

related to the major term. When the middle is not uniformly related to the major term
then that is called savyabhicâra hetu.

Let us take the following example,

All bipeds are rational.
Swans are bipeds.
Therefore, swans are rational.

Here, the middle term is ‘biped’. But it is not uniformly related to the major term
‘rational’. The middle term in this example may be related to both rational and non-
rational creatures. Therefore, it is a defective hetu.

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2) Viruddha or the contradictory middle: The viruddha hetu or the contradictory middle
is that hetu, which though offered to establish the existence of the sâdhya actually
establishes the non-existence of the sâdhya; e.g. ‘sound is eternal, because it is
produced’- here, the middle term ‘produced’ does not prove the eternality of sound, but
proves its non-eternality. Here, the middle term itself disproves the original proposition
and proves its contradictory.

3)Satpratipaka or the inferentially contradicted middle: When a hetu which is advanced

to establish a particular sâdhya in an inference is validly contradicted by an another
hetu which proves the non-existence of the sâdhya of the first inference, the fallacy of
satpratipaka arises.

In this case the first hetu is called satpratipaka hetu.

For example, ‘sound is eternal, because it is audible’ is validly contradicted by another

inference ‘sound is non-eternal, because it is produced like a pot.’ Here, the middle term
of the first inference, ‘audible’ is contradicted by the middle term of the second
inference ‘produced.’

4) Asiddha or the unproved middle: The asiddha hetu is one which is not yet proved, but
requires to be proved, like the sâdhya. This means that the asiddha hetu is not a proved
or an established fact, but an asiddha or unproved assumption.

Let us take an example,‘skylotus is fragrant, because it has lotusness in it like a natural

lotus’. The middle term of the argument is yet to be proved, because we are yet to
establish the existence of skylotus.

5) Bâdhita hetu or the non-inferentially contradicted middle :The middle term of an

inference may be contradicted by some other ‘stronger’means of knowing, such as
perception, testimony etc.

It cannot prove the major term which is disproved by another stronger source of valid
knowledge, e. g., ‘fire is cold, because it is a substance’. Here the middle term
‘substance’ becomes contradicted because its major term ‘coldness’ is directly
contradicted by perception.

These are the five kinds of defective hetus recognized in Indian logic. Of course there
are some other fallacies including the fallacy of false analogy, the fallacy of false
equivocation etc.

Keys Points to remember[You Must Know]

Inference is an indirect source of valid knowledge according to the Nyâya System.
An inference must have three terms. They are middle term(hetu), major term (
sâdhya) and the minor term( paka).

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An inference(anumâna) consists of five propositions. These propositions are
known as avayavas. These avayavas are: pratijñâ, hetu, udâharana, upanaya and
nigamana.
Vyâpti is the logical ground of inference. Parâmarsa is the psychological ground of
inference.
Vyâpti is an invariable and unconditional relation between the middle term and
the major term. There are different methods for the establishment of vyâpti.
The Naiyayikas hold that vyâpti can be ascertained by six different ways or
methods.They are: anvaya, vyatireka, vyabhicâragraha, upâdhinirasa, tarka and
sâmânyalakaa pratyaka.
Vyâpti may be of two types.1) samavyâpti and 2) visamavyâpti.
Parâmar- sa is defined as vyâpti qualified by pakadharmatâ. Presence of the
middle term in the minor term is known as pakadharmatâ.
Inference is a knowledge of the mark(middle term) as having the universal
relation with the major term and as being present in the minor term(Vyaptivisista
paka dharmatâjñânam).
There are different ways of classifying an anumâna. According to one
classification of anumâna, perception is of two kinds- Svârthanumâna and
parârthanumâna.
Another classification of anumâna divides anumâna into pûrvavat, seavat and
sâmânyatodta.
According to still another classification, anumâna is of three kinds- kevalanvayi,
kevalâ- vyatireki and anvayavyatireki.
Again,there are different material fallacies in the Nyâya system.
In Indian logic a fallacy is called hetvabhâsa. The chief fallacies recognized in the
Nyâya System are:1) savyabhichâra,2)viruddha, 2) satpratipaka,4) asiddha and 5)
bâdhita.

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