SCHOOL OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

GEC 106: ETHICS 3 Units, First Semester, AY 2022-2023

(Name of Instructor)
Module Number 3 Topi Value and the Quest for the Good
c
Week Number 3 Date

I. INTRODUCTION

In this module, you will be introduced to the following subtopics: Nicholas Rescher’s eight categories of values,
Intrinsic and Instrumental Values, The Value of Pleasure, Are Values Objective or Subjective?, The Relation of Value to
Morality, and the Good Life in relation to Values.

II.INTENDED LEARNING OUTCOMES (ILOs)

At the end of this lesson, you should be able to:

1. Identify what do they consider as valuable
2. Establish the connection between Value and Goodness
3. Answer the question “do we desire the Good because it is good, or is the Good good because we desire it?”

III. STIMULATING RECALL

Before you proceed to the discussion, please list down:

5 things you value at the moment:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

5 Ideas you value at the moment

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

5 Persons you value at the moment

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

IV. PRESENTATION OF TOPIC/LEARNING MATERIAL

The human life is just one example of a wide range of things that we find valuable, and a complete list of
them would probably be impossible to create. Nicholas Rescher, though, classifies some basic values into these
eight categories:
1. Material and physical value: health, comfort, physical security
2. Economic value: economic security, productiveness
3. Moral value: honesty, fairness, kindness
4. Social value: generosity, politeness, graciousness
5. Political value: freedom, justice
6. Aesthetic value: beauty, symmetry, grace
7. Religious value: piety, obedience, faith
8. Intellectual value: intelligence, clarity, knowledge

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 It is easy enough to devise a list of values like this: just think about what you do during the day and
reflect on what is most important to you. What is less easy, though, is understanding why things are valuable to
begin with and what, if anything, our various values have in common. In this chapter, we explore the notion of
value and how value connects with issues of morality.

INTRINSIC AND INSTRUMENTAL VALUE

When we look at Rescher’s list of basic values, we see that some seem to be valuable for their own sake,
such as beauty and justice, while others are valuable because of their beneficial consequences, such as physical
and economic security. The essential difference here is between intrinsic and instrumental goods. Intrinsic
goods are good because of their nature and are not derived from other goods. By contrast, instrumental goods
are worthy of desire because they are effective means of attaining our intrinsic goods. Plato makes this
distinction in his book, The Republic, where the characters Socrates and Glaucon are talking:

SOCRATES: Tell me, do you think there is a kind of good which we welcome not because we desire
its consequences but for its own sake: joy, for example, and all the harmless pleasures
which have no further consequences beyond the joy which one finds in them?
GLAUCON: Certainly, I think there is such a good.
SOCRATES: Further, there is the good which we welcome for its own sake and also for its
consequences, knowledge, for example, and sight and health. Such things we somehow
welcome on both accounts.
GLAUCON: Yes.
SOCRATES: Are you also aware of a third kind, such as physical training, being treated when ill, the
practice of medicine, and other ways of making money? We should say that these are
wearisome but beneficial to us; we should not want them for their own sake, but because
of the rewards and other benefits which result from them.

The question “What things are good or valuable?” is ambiguous. We need first to separate the kinds of
values or goods there are. In the above, Socrates distinguishes three kinds of goods: (1) purely intrinsic goods
(of which simple joys are an example); (2) purely instrumental goods (of which medicine and making money
are examples); and (3) combination goods (such as knowledge, sight, and health), which are good in themselves
and good as a means to further goods.
The essential difference is between intrinsic and instrumental goods. We consider some things good or
worthy of desire (desirable) in themselves and other things good or desirable only because of their
consequences. Intrinsic goods are good because of their nature. They are not derived from other goods, whereas
instrumental goods are worthy of desire because they are effective means of attaining our intrinsic goods. We
may further distinguish an instrumental good from a good instrument. If something is an instrumental good, it is
a means to attaining something that is intrinsically good; but merely to be a good instrument is to be an effective
means to any goal, good or bad. For example, poison is a good instrument for murdering someone, but murder
is not an intrinsically good thing; thus poison, in this use at least, is not an instrumental good.
Many things that we value are instrumental values. Socrates in our selection from The Republic
mentions two instrumental values: medicine and money. Medicine is an instrumental good in that it can hardly
be valued for its own sake. We can ask “What is medicine for?” The answer is, “It is to promote health.” But is
health
an intrinsic value or an instrumental one? Can we ask “What is health for?” Some will agree with Socrates that
health is good for itself and for other things as well, such as happiness and creative activity. Others will dispute
Socrates’ contention and judge health to be wholly an instrumental good. Money is Socrates’ other example of
an instrumental value. Few, if any, of us really value money for its own sake, but almost all of us value it for
what it can buy. When we ask “What is money for?” we arrive at such goods as food and clothing, shelter and
automobiles, and entertainment and education. But are any of these really intrinsic goods, or are they all
instrumental goods? When we ask, for example, “What is entertainment for?” What answer do we come up
with? Most of us would mention enjoyment or pleasure, Socrates’ example of an intrinsic good. Can we further
ask “What is enjoyment or pleasure for?”
We examine this question in the next section, but, before we do, we need to ask whether the notion of
intrinsic values makes any sense. Are there any intrinsic values? Are there any entities whose values are not
derived from something else—that is, that are sought for their own sake, that are inherently good, good in
themselves? Or are all values relative to desirers—that is, instrumental to goals that are the creation of
choosers? Those who espouse the notion of intrinsic value usually argue that pleasure is an example of an
intrinsic value and pain an example of an intrinsic disvalue: It is good to experience pleasure and bad to
experience pain. Naturally, these philosophers admit that individual experiences of pleasure can be bad, because
they result in some other disvalue such as a hangover after a drinking spree. Similarly, individual painful
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experiences can be valuable, for example, having a painful operation to save one’s life. The intrinsicalist affirms
that pleasure is just better than pain. We can see this straight off. We do not need any arguments to convince us
that pleasure is good or that gratuitous pain is intrinsically bad. Suppose we see a man torturing a child and
order him to stop at once. If he replies, “I agree that the child is experiencing great pain, but why should I stop
torturing her?” we would suspect some mental aberration on his part.

THE VALUE OF PLEASURE

Philosophers divide into two broad camps: hedonists and nonhedonists. The hedonist (from hedon,
Greek for “pleasure”) asserts that all pleasure is good, that pleasure is the only thing good in itself, and that all
other goodness is derived from this value. An experience is good in itself if and only if it provides some
pleasure.
Sometimes, this definition is widened to include the lessening of pain, pain being seen as the only thing bad in
itself. For simplicity’s sake, we will use the former definition, realizing that it may need to be supplemented by
reference to pain.
Hedonists subdivide into two categories: (1) sensualism, the view that equates all pleasure with sensual
enjoyment; and (2) satisfactionism, the view that equates all pleasure with satisfaction or enjoyment, which may
not involve sensuality. Satisfaction is a pleasurable state of consciousness such as we might experience after
accomplishing a successful venture or receiving a gift. The opposite of sensual enjoyment is physical pain; the
opposite of satisfaction is displeasure or dissatisfaction. The Greek philosopher Aristippus (ca. 435–366 BCE)
espoused the sensualist position; that is, the only (or primary) good was sensual pleasure, and this goodness was
defined in terms of its intensity.
Most hedonists since the third century BCE follow Epicurus (342–270 BCE), who had a broader view of
pleasure: Life is not made pleasant through continued drinking and partying, or sexual encounters, or feasts of
fish and other such things as a costly banquet offers. It is sober contemplation which examines into the reasons
for all choice and avoidance, and which chases away vain opinions from which the greater part of the confusion
arises which troubles the mind.
The distinction between pleasure as satisfaction and as sensation is important, and failure to recognize it
results in confusion and paradox. One example of this is the paradox of masochism. How can it be that the
masochist enjoys—that is, takes pleasure in—pain, which is the opposite of pleasure? “Well,” the hedonist
responds, “because of certain psychological aberrations, the masochist enjoys (as satisfaction) what is painful
(as sensation).” But he or she does not enjoy (as sensation) what is painful (as sensation). There is also a two-
level analysis to explain the masochist’s behavior: On a lower, or basic, level, he is experiencing either pain or
dissatisfaction, but on a higher level, he approves and finds satisfaction from that pain or dissatisfaction.
Nonhedonists divide into two camps: monists and pluralists. Monists believe that there is a single
intrinsic value, but it is not pleasure. Perhaps it is a transcendent value, “the Good,” which we do not fully
comprehend but that is the basis of all our other values. This seems to be Plato’s view. Pluralists, by contrast,
generally admit that pleasure or enjoyment is an intrinsic good, but they add that there are other intrinsic goods
as well, such as knowledge, friendship, aesthetic beauty, freedom, love, moral goodness, and life itself.
Hedonists such as Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) argue that although these qualities are good, their
goodness is derived from the fact that they bring pleasure or satisfaction. Such hedonists ask of each of the
previously mentioned values, “What is it for?” What is knowledge for? If it gave no one any satisfaction or
enjoyment, would it really be good? Why do we feel there is a significant difference between knowing how
many stairs there are in New York City and whether or not there is life after death? We normally do not value
knowledge of the first kind, but knowledge of the second kind is relevant for our enjoyment.
The hedonist asks, “What are friendship and love for?” If we were made differently and got no
satisfaction out of love and friendship, would they still be valuable? Are they not highly valuable, significant
instrumental goods because they bring enormous satisfaction? Even moral commitment or conscientiousness is
not good in itself, argues the hedonist. Morality is not intrinsically valuable but is meant to serve human need,
which in turn has to do with bringing about satisfaction. And, life certainly is not intrinsically good. It is quality
that counts. An amoeba or a permanently comatose patient has life but no intrinsic value. Only when
consciousness appears does the possibility for value arrive. Consciousness is a necessary but not a sufficient
condition for satisfaction.
Imagine two lives, those of Suzy and Izzy. Suzy possesses 100 hedons (units of pleasure), even though
she is severely retarded and physically disabled, whereas Izzy enjoys great mental acumen and physical prowess
but has only 99 hedons. Isn’t it obvious that Izzy has the better life? But, hedonists are committed to saying that
Suzy’s life is better, which seems implausible. It was these sorts of cases that led John Stuart Mill (1806–1873)
—in his classic work, Utilitarianism—to modify the hedonic doctrine, admitting that “it is better to be a human
dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” He suggested that there
were different qualities of pleasure and that those who had experienced the different kinds could distinguish
among them. Whether the notion of quality of pleasure can save hedonism is a controversial matter, but many of
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us feel uneasy with the idea that pleasure alone is good. Some broader notion, such as happiness or object of
desire, seems a more adequate candidate for what we mean by “value.”

ARE VALUES OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE?

Do we desire the Good because it is good, or is the Good good because we desire it? The objectivist
holds that values are worthy of desire whether or not anyone actually desires them; they are somehow
independent of us. The subjectivist holds, to the contrary, that values are dependent on desirers, are relative to
desirers.
The classic objectivist view on values (the absolutist version) was given by Plato (428–348 BCE), who
taught that the Good was the highest form, inexpressible, godlike, independent, and knowable only after a
protracted education in philosophy. We desire the Good because it is good. Philosophers in the Platonic
tradition hold to the independent existence of values apart from human or rational interest. For example, G. E.
Moore claims that the Good is a simple, unanalyzable quality, such as the color yellow, but one that must be
known through intuition. Moore believes that a world with beauty is more valuable than one that is a garbage
dump, regardless of whether there are conscious beings in those worlds:
Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine it as beautiful as you can … and then
imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap of filth.

Moore asks us whether, even if there were no conscious beings who might derive pleasure or pain in
either world, we would prefer the first world to exist rather than the second. Moore believes that it is obvious
that the beautiful world is inherently better, but the objector asks, “What good is such a world if there is no one
(even God) to enjoy it?” Other, weaker objectivist versions treat values as emergent properties, or qualities in
the nature of things. That is, just as the wetness of water is not in the H 2O molecules but in the interaction of our
nervous system with millions of those molecules, and just as smoothness is not in the table that I am touching
but in the relationship between the electrical charges of the subatomic particles of which the table is made up
and my nervous system, so values (or good qualities) emerge in the relationship between conscious beings and
physical and social existence. They are synergistic entities, depending on both our nature and their objective
properties.
For example, if we were not beings with desires, we would not be in a position to appreciate values; but
once there are such beings, certain things—such as pleasure, knowledge, freedom, friendship, and health—will
be valuable, and others—such as pain, suffering, boredom, loneliness, disease, and death—will be disvalued or
not valued for their own sake. This synergistic view recognizes both a subjective and an objective aspect to
value.
Subjectivism treats values as merely products of conscious desire. The American pragmatist Ralph
Barton Perry (1876–1957) states that a value is simply the object of interest. Values are created by desires, and
they are valuable just to that degree to which they are desired: The stronger the desire, the greater the value. The
difference between the subjectivist and the
weak objectivist position (or mixed view)
is simply that the subjectivist makes no
normative claims about “proper desiring,”
instead judging all desires as equal.
Anything one happens to desire is, by
definition, a value, a good. The study of
philosophy, especially moral philosophy,
has as one of its main goals such an
ability.

THE RELATION OF VALUE TO

MORALITY
Typically, value theory is at the
heart of moral theory. The question,
however, is whether moral right and
wrong are themselves intrinsic values (as
Kant states, the moral law is “a jewel that
shines in its own light”) or whether
rightness and wrongness are defined by
their ability to further non-moral values
such as pleasure, happiness, health, and
political harmony. To begin to understand
this question and to get an overview of the
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workings of morality, let me offer a schema of the moral process (see image at the side), which may help in
locating the role of values in moral theory.
The location of values in the schema of the moral process (box 3) indicates that values are central to the
domain of morality. They are the source of principles (box 4) and rooted in the forms of life (box 2). Examples
of values are life, loving relationships, freedom, privacy, happiness, creative activity, knowledge, health,
integrity, and rationality. From our values, we derive principles (box 4), which we may call action-guiding
value “instantiators” or “exemplifiers” (because they make clear the action-guiding or prescriptive force latent
in values). From the value “life,” we derive the principles “Promote and protect life” and/or “Thou shall not
kill.” From the value “freedom,” we derive the principle “Thou shall not deprive another of his or her freedom.”
From the value “privacy,” we derive the principle “Respect every person’s privacy.” From the value
“happiness,” we derive the principle “Promote human happiness,” and so forth with all the other values. This
schema makes no judgment as to whether values are objective or subjective, intrinsic or instrumental. Neither
does it take a stand on whether values or principles are absolute; they need not be absolute. Most systems allow
that all or most values and principles are overrideable. That is, they are considerations that direct our actions,
and whenever they clash, an adjudication must take place to decide which principle overrides the other in the
present circumstances.
We often find ourselves in moral situations in which one or more principles apply. We speak of making
a judgment as to which principle applies to our situation or which principle wins out in the competition when
two or more principles apply (box 5). The correct principle defines our duty. For example, we have the
opportunity to cheat on a test and immediately judge that the principle of honesty (derived from the value
integrity) applies to our situation. Or there might be an interpersonal disagreement in which two or more people
differ on which of two values outweighs the other in importance, as when Mary argues that Jill should not have
an abortion because the value of life outweighs Jill’s freedom and bodily integrity, but John argues that Jill’s
freedom and bodily integrity outweigh the value of life.
Even after we judge which principle applies, we are not yet finished with the moral process. We must
still decide to do the morally right act. Then finally, we must actually do the right act. Note the possibilities for
failure all along the way. We may fail to apply the right principle to the situation (the arrow between boxes 4
and 5). For example, we may simply neglect to bring to mind the principle against cheating. This is a failure of
application. But even after we make the correct judgment, we may fail to make the right choice, deciding to
cheat anyway. In this case, we have a perverse will (the arrow between boxes 5 and 6). Finally, we may make
the correct choice but fail to carry out our decision (the arrow between boxes 6 and 7). We call this weakness of
will: We mean to do the right act but simply are too morally weak to accomplish it. In our example, we meant to
refrain from cheating but could not control ourselves.” The good that I would, I do not, but the evil that I would
not, that I do.”
A more controversial matter concerns the deep structure in which values are rooted. Some theories deny
that there is any deep structure but assert instead that values simply exist in their own right—independently, as
it were. More often, however, values are seen as rooted in whole forms of life (box 2) that can be actual or ideal,
such as Plato’s hierarchical society or Aristotle’s aristocracy or the Judeo-Christian notion of the kingdom of
God (the ideal synagogue or church). Ways of life or cultures are holistic and hierarchical combinations of
beliefs, values, and practices.
The deepest question about morality is whether and how these forms of life are justified (box 1). Are
some forms of life better or more justified than others? If so, how does one justify a form of life? Candidates for
justification are ideas such as God’s will, human happiness, the flourishing of all creation, the canons of
impartiality and knowledge, a deeply rational social contract and the like. For example, a theist might argue that
the ideal system of morality (that is, the ideal form of life) is justified by being commanded by God.
A utilitarian would maintain that the ultimate criterion is the promotion of welfare or utility. A naturalist
or secular humanist might argue that the ideal system is justified by the fact that it best meets human need or
promotes human flourishing or that it would be the one chosen by ideally rational persons. Some ethicists would
make level 2 the final source of justification, denying that there is any ideal justification at all. These are the
ethical relativists, who contend that each moral system is correct simply by being chosen by the culture or
individual.
The main point of the schema, however, is not to decide on the exact deep structure of morality but to
indicate that values are rooted in cultural constructs and are the foundation for moral principles upon which
moral reasoning is based. We could also devise a similar schema for the relationship between values and
virtues. Each virtue is based on a value and each vice on a disvalue.

THE GOOD LIFE

Finally, we want to ask what kind of life is most worth living. Aristotle (384–322 BCE) wrote long ago
that what all people seek is happiness:

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 There is very general agreement; for both the common person an people of superior refinement
say that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to
what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as th wise. For the former
think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth or honor.

What is happiness? Again, the field divides up among objectivists, subjectivists and combination
theorists. The objectivists, following Plato and Aristotle distinguish happiness from pleasure and speak of a
single ideal for human nature if we do not reach that ideal, then we have failed. Happiness (from the Greek
eudaimonia, literally meaning “good demon”) is not merely a subjective state of pleasure or contentment but the
kind of life we would all want to live if we understood our essential nature. Just as knives and forks and wheels
have functions, so do species, including the human species. Our function (sometimes called our “essence”) is to
live according to reason and thereby to become a certain sort of highly rational, disciplined being. When we
fulfill the ideal of living the virtuous life, we are truly happy.
Plato speaks of happiness as “harmony of the soul.” Just as the body is healthy when it is in harmony
with itself and the political state is a good state when it is functioning harmoniously, so the soul is happy when
all its features are functioning in harmonious accord, with the rational faculty ruling over the spirited and
emotional elements. Although we no doubt know when we are happy and feel good about ourselves, the
subjective feeling does not itself define happiness, for people who fail to attain human excellence can also feel
happy via
self-deception or ignorance.
The objectivist view fell out of favor with the rise of the evolutionary account of human nature, which
undermined the sense of a preordained essence or function. Science cannot discover any innate telos, or goal, to
which all people must strive. The contemporary bias is in favor of value pluralism—that is, the view that there
are many ways of finding happiness: “Let a thousand flowers bloom.” This leads to subjectivism. The
subjectivist version of happiness states that happiness is in the eyes of the beholder. You are just as happy as
you think you are—no more, no less. The concept is not a descriptive one but a first-person evaluation. I am the
only one who decides or knows whether I am happy. If I feel happy, I am happy, even though everyone else
despises my lifestyle. Logically, happiness has nothing to do with virtue, although—because of our social
nature—it usually turns out that we will feel better about ourselves if we are virtuous.
The combination view tries to incorporate aspects of both the objectivist and the subjectivist views. One
version is John Rawls’s “plan of life” conception of happiness: There is a plurality of life plans open to each
person, and what is important is that the plan be an integrated whole, freely chosen by the person, and that the
person be successful in realizing his or her goals. This view is predominantly subjective in that it recognizes the
person as the autonomous chooser of goals and a plan. Even if a person should choose a life plan,
…whose only pleasure is to count blades of grass in various geometrically shaped areas such as
park squares and well-trimmed lawns, … our definition of the good forces us to admit that the good for
this man is indeed counting blades of grass.

However, Rawls recognizes an objective element in an otherwise subjective schema. There are primary
goods that are necessary to any worthwhile life plan: “rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and
wealth … self-respect … health and vigor, intelligence and imagination.” The primary goods function as the
core (or the hub of the wheel) from which may be derived any number of possible life plans (the spokes). But
unless these primary goods (or most of them) are present, the life plan is not an authentic manifestation of an
individual’s autonomous choice of his or her own selfhood. Thus, it is perfectly possible that people believe
themselves to be happy when they really are not.
Although subjectivist and plan-of-life views dominate the literature today, there is some movement back
to an essentialist, or Aristotelian, view of happiness as a life directed toward worthwhile goals. Some lifestyles
are more worthy than others, and some may be worthless. Philosopher Richard Kraut asks us to imagine a man
who has as his idea of happiness the state of affairs of being loved, admired, or respected by his friends and who
would hate to have his “friends” only pretend to care for him. Suppose his “friends” really do hate him but
“orchestrate an elaborate deception, giving him every reason to believe that they love and admire him, though in
fact they don’t. And he is taken in by the illusion.” Can we really call this man happy? Or suppose a woman
centers her entire life around an imaginary Prince Charming. She refuses to date—let alone marry—perfectly
eligible young men; she turns down educational travel opportunities lest they distract her from this wonderful
future event; for 95 years, she bores all her patient friends with tales of the prince’s imminent appearance. As
death approaches at age 96, after a lifetime of disappointment, she discovers that she’s been duped; she
suddenly realizes that what appeared to be a happy life was a stupid, self-deceived, miserable existence. Would
we say that our heroine was happy up until her deathbed revelation? Do these thought experiments not indicate
that our happiness depends, at least to some extent, on reality and not simply on our own evaluation?

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 The objective and subjective views of happiness assess life from different perspectives, with the
objectivist assuming that there is some kind of independent standard of assessment and the subjectivist denying
it. Even though there seems to be an immense variety of lifestyles that could be considered intrinsically
worthwhile or happy and even though some subjective approval or satisfaction seems necessary before we are
willing to attribute the adjective “happy” to a life, there do seem to be limiting conditions on what may count as
happy. We have a notion of fittingness for the good life, which would normally exclude being severely retarded,
being a slave, or being a drug addict (no matter how satisfied) and which would include being a deeply fulfilled,
autonomous, healthy person. It is better to be Socrates dissatisfied than to be the pig satisfied, but only the
satisfied Socrates is happy.
This moderate objectivism is set forth by John Stuart Mill. Happiness, according to Mill, is not a life of
rapture; but moments of such, in an existence made up of few and transitory pains, many and various pleasures,
with a decided predominance of the active over the passive, and having as the foundation of the whole, not to
expect more from life than it is capable of bestowing.
This conception of happiness is worth pondering. It includes activity, freedom, and reality components,
which exclude being satisfied by the passive experience in the Happiness Machine, and it supposes that some
pleasing experiences are better than others. I would add to Mill’s definition the ingredients of moral character
and loving relations. A closer approximation might go like this: Happiness is a life in which there exists free
action (including meaningful work), loving relations, and moral character and in which the individual is not
plagued by guilt and anxiety but is blessed with peace and satisfaction. The satisfaction should not be confused
with complacency; rather, it means contentment with one’s lot—even as one strives to improve it. Whether this
neoobjectivist, Millian view of happiness is adequate, you must decide.

CONCLUSION
In this module, we have seen that there is a range of ways to dissect the notion of moral goodness. Some
goods are intrinsic because of their nature and are no derived from other goods, and others are instrumental
because they are effective means of attaining intrinsic goods. Goods are often connected with pleasure;
sensualism equates all pleasure with sensual enjoyment, whereas satisfactionism identifies all pleasure with
satisfaction or enjoyment, which may not involve sensuality.
There is a debate whether values are objective or subjective. Plato held the former position, maintaining
that goods have an independent existence of values apart from human o rational interest; Perry held the latter
view that values are merely products of conscious desire. Although value theory is at the center of moral theory
there is dispute about whether the moral notions of right and wrong are themselves intrinsic values. Finally,
there is the issue of how values are connected with human happiness and the good life, particularly whether
there is a human purpose, or telos that defines our capacity for happiness in terms of specific values.

V. OTHER READING MATERIALS OR SOURCES

Ethics: Discovering Right and Wrong (Pojman and Fieser, 2009) pg 44-60

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