Case 4
Case 4
Background:
the U.S. market was in the midst of deregulation short-term volatility in gas spot
prices 1. To ensure steady gas prices for the duration of the contracts, Enron entered
into long-term fixed-price agreements with its customers. 2. Enron employed financial
In North America, Enron grew to be the biggest natural gas vendor. It also created
EnronOnline.
Skilling refined the trading model further: pursued an “asset light” strategy, began
Enron’s gas-trading model was extended to other markets, including electric power,
c. International business
d. Managing talent
Enron recruited the ‘best and brightest’ and constructed a performance evaluation
e. Risk-management practices
Skilling created an independent group called Risk Assessment and Control (RAC) to
evaluate the aggregate risks and rewards of the company’s investments. It also evaluated
new business ideas by reviewing the business plans, assessing their relation to Enron’s
Enron’s downfall is the predictable mixture of human greed, poorly structured incentives, and
The root of Enron has to be the accounting tactics that enabled deception. Accountants let
Enron book more revenue than they actually earned; keep losses and debt off balance sheets.
If these were disallowed, the money-losing state of Enron would have been apparent far
sooner.
b. Complicated SPE deals allowed Enron to borrow money while keeping it off their
balance sheet
d. Deals that were actually dead were fictitiously kept alive to avoid a write-down that
quarter
A pattern of Enron’s compensation style was to reward short-term behaviors (like stock price
or closing deal sizes) without concern for long-term value (like profitability).
a. Deal makers were given bonuses for the deal value when it closed, not on the
generation of actual cashflow. With optimistic projections, deal makers got paid for
b. Employees got bonuses for short-term stock prices, thus incenting bad behavior to
c. Senior managers like Skilling got large bonuses for stock performance. This
rushing into bad businesses (Enron Broadband) and created end-of-quarter scrambles
to make earnings.
People who could have stepped in and intervened didn’t, often because they had a large
personal stake in Enron’s success. Further, the more Enron became a success (like in terms of
stock price or deal flow), the more beholden the stakeholders were to Enron.
a. Shareholders (employees and the public in general) overlooked bad behavior, as long as
b. Enron’s accountants (Arthur Andersen) couldn’t lose Enron as a client (Enron kept
accountants waiting in the wings), so they tolerated their practices despite internal
c. Investment bankers earned large fees from Enron’s complicated deals, even when they
knew they were skirting the intent of the law. Bankers who ran bigger deals got
promotions. They competed for Enron’s business.
d. Buy-side analysts at banks who were supposed to be independent were strongly pressured
to give buy ratings, since companies would only work with positive banks.
e. Short sellers were a useful counterforce, since they had a large incentive to expose
wrongdoing.