International Journal of Technology and Design Education 7: 141Ð159, 1997.

 1997 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Conceptual and Procedural Knowledge

ROBERT MCCORMICK

Open University, Milton Keynes, UK

ABSTRACT: The ideas that underlie the title of this chapter have been part of a familiar
debate in education, namely that of the contrast of content and process. In both science and
mathematics similar arguments have taken place, and these debates represent a healthy
examination of, not only the aims of science and mathematics education, but the teaching
and learning issues, and as such they reflect the relative maturity of these subject areas.
Even in technology education, which is still in its infancy as a subject, echoes of these debates
exist and there are contrasts of approaches to the balance of process and content across the
world. The ÔdebateÕ in technology is evangelical in nature, with for example, proponents
making claims for problem-solving approaches as a basis for teaching with few accounts
and almost no empirical research of what actually happens in classrooms. There is insuffi-
cient consideration of the learning issues behind this, or other proposals, and it is timely to
turn our attention to student learning. This article examines the nature of technological knowl-
edge and what we know about learning related to it. The article argues that learning procedural
and conceptual knowledge associated with technological activity poses challenges for both
technology educators and those concerned with research on learning.

Keywords: conceptual knowledge, procedural knowledge, problem solving, design process.

INTRODUCTION

The ideas that underlie the title of this article have been part of a familiar
debate in education, namely that of the contrast of content and process.
In science education this contrast has been the subject of apparent changes
of fashion and much discussion (Millar & Driver, 1987; Millar, 1988;
Screen, 1988; Wellington, 1988 & 1989; Woolnough, 1988). The disputed
stances have included: process as a relief from the tyranny of a content-
laden and dominated curriculum, and as being more relevant in a world
where there is an ever-changing (content) knowledge base; process as
more relevant to a Ôscience for allÕ curriculum, and as more representa-
tive of the nature of ÔrealÕ (as opposed to ÔschoolÕ) science. In mathematics
education the argument has been about Ôskills verses understandingÕ, with
the operation of procedures of computation being contrasted with under-
standing of numbers, place values etc. (Hiebert, 1986). There is of course
a parallel debate in language, between learning the phonological skills and
the meaning, characterised by the argument over the Ôreal bookÕ method
of teaching reading. These debates represent a healthy examination of not
only the aims of science and mathematics education, but the teaching and
learning issues, and as such they reflect the relative maturity of these subject
areas. Even in technology education, which is still in its infancy as a subject,
echoes of these debates exist and there are contrasts of approaches to
the balance of process and content across the world. In the USA, content-

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142 ROBERT MCCORMICK

dominated curricula are giving way to those where the role of design or
problem-solving processes is increased, and in England and Wales there has
been a swing from a design process-based curriculum to one with more
of an emphasis upon content knowledge, but with the balance still being
in favour of process.1 (The debate in England and Wales is also complicated
by the debate over the role of skills of ÔmakingÕ artefacts.)
The ÔdebateÕ in technology is evangelical in nature, with, for example,
proponents making claims for problem-solving approaches as a basis for
teaching with few accounts and almost no empirical research of what
actually happens in classrooms.2 There is insufficient consideration of the
learning issues behind this, or other proposals, and it is timely to turn our
attention to student learning. My aim in this chapter is to follow the few
who have attempted to encourage those involved in technology education
to consider carefully the learning issues (Johnson, 1994a & b; Johnson &
Thomas, 1994; Waetjen, 1993; Jones and Johnson in their articles in this
volume), and to argue that research in areas such as cognitive psychology
and anthropology provides a number of challenges to the assumptions and
practices of technology educators. However, this is not a one way affair
because technology education, in being concerned with both the practical
and the intellectual, offers challenges to learning researchers. I will there-
fore examine the understandings we have from research and explore the
challenges that we all have to meet.

TERMINOLOGY

Already in my introduction you will see some of the problems that termi-
nology gives, with words such as ÔproceduresÕ, ÔprocessÕ, ÔcontentÕ giving
a seemingly clear rationale for the curriculum, but actually hiding some
important ideas. The terms in my title are more precise, but are neither
familiar to most technology educators, nor complete descriptions of all kinds
of knowledge of relevance to technology education. Let me, therefore,
expand on the terms and with it some of the issues that surround them. A
discussion of terminology and associated ideas is no mere academic
semantic endeavour, but an effort to make several important points:
¥ some ideas that technology educators have about the two are often not
borne out by research, and this in part stems from a misunderstanding
of their nature;
¥ an understanding of the nature and relationship of the two is crucial to
the teaching and learning of technology;
¥ that the two ideas of conceptual and procedural knowledge are often seen
as separate, with their relationship being ignored.
The most common understanding in relation to the two terms is of the
contrast of Ôknowing howÕ and Ôknowing thatÕ (Ryle, 1949). Some see the
distinction as a contrast between the tacit knowledge of technology and
the explicit knowledge of science, the latter which results in explanation

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(Cross et al., 1986). This is remarkably close to the idea of Ôknow howÕ
as procedural knowledge and the Ôknow thatÕ as conceptual knowledge;
such conceptual knowledge allows us to explain why, hence the distinc-
tion of Ôknow howÕ and Ôknow whyÕ (Plant, 1994). Although it is true that
technology is geared to action, and hence Ôknow howÕ, this does not imply
that it is without a conceptual component (nor indeed that science is without
a Ôknow howÕ component). As I will show, the situation is complex, and
this simple distinction is only part of the story.
The Ôknow howÕ attributed to technology is what cognitive psychologists
call procedural knowledge, which is simply Ôknow how to do itÕ knowledge.
Part of the complexity of it comes in trying to link it to terms such as
ÔprocessÕ, Ôproblem solvingÕ, Ôstrategic thinkingÕ and the like, which in
turn requires distinguishing different levels of procedure. Conceptual knowl-
edge, on the other hand, is concerned with relationships among ÔitemsÕ of
knowledge, such that when students can identify these links we talk of them
having Ôconceptual understandingÕ. Thus in the area of ÔgearingÕ we hope
that students will see the relationship among Ôdirection of rotationÕ, Ôchange
of speedÕ, and ÔtorqueÕ. Cognitive psychologists also use the term Ôdeclar-
ative knowledgeÕ, to contrast it with procedural knowledge, and define it
as Ôknowledge of factsÕ (Anderson, 1990, p. 219). But this has two diffi-
culties; it implies:
¥ that the knowledge may be a collection of unrelated facts, whereas con-
ceptual knowledge puts the focus on relationships (Hiebert & Lefevre,
1986);
¥ a contrast of an inert form of knowledge (declarative) with an active form
(procedural), whereas conceptual knowledge can be part of an active
process.
What is important to emphasise at this point is that conceptual knowledge
is not simply factual knowledge, but consists of ideas that give some power
to thinking about technological activity.
Before going on to explore more fully how learning theorists use the
terms, I want to examine some of the facets of knowledge relevant to
technology, using ideas that are common among technologists and tech-
nology educators.3

TECHNOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE

One of the challenges that technology presents to learning theorists is that

it is able to put students in the kinds of positions they find themselves in
the Ôreal worldÕ i.e. where the demands of tasks may be to some extent
unpredictable, and the knowledge and skills needed are not necessarily
set by some prior instruction on a topic, concept or process. This is the
kind of situation that mathematics educators cry out for as they endeavour
to give children meaningful experiences of mathematics i.e. where students
are learning to make mental representations of the world, not following ritual

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144 ROBERT MCCORMICK

procedures with symbols that have no meaning (Davis, 1986). Technological

activity is by its nature multi-dimensional, requiring understanding from
a variety of points of view, and hence it draws on subjects such as science,
mathematics, economics and social studies. Further, technological activity
is found in all spheres of life and there are in fact many technologies;
examples include food, textiles and civil engineering. Even the way of
classifying the differences varies, and can include being categorised by
the materials that they deal in (e.g. plastics), the devices or artefacts that
are produced (e.g. cars), and the Ôknowledge disciplinesÕ that they are based
upon (e.g. electronics). This makes defining a knowledge base, and the
search for a unique common set of procedures or concepts, particularly
difficult. This difficulty of definition, and the fact that technology draws
on other subjects (or what are often referred to as ÔdomainsÕ), again sets
challenges for learning theorists in terms of the unpredictability of the
knowledge required in some learning tasks and how such knowledge is used.
Technologists often like to mystify what they do, not by escaping into
esoteric and high level abstractions, but by evoking informal and tacit
knowledge. As I have already noted in relation to Ôknow howÕ, this kind
of knowledge is seen as implicit and therefore difficult to build into a cur-
riculum and deal with in the way most Ôschool knowledgeÕ is taught. While
there is no doubt a considerable amount of tacit knowledge in technology,
it is the informal, or what Buccarelli (1994) calls Ôpersonal knowledgeÕ, that
is of most significance. Such knowledge of how objects are made, or how
they work, is not the stuff of science and mathematics textbooks or lessons,
though we make an attempt at many levels of education to pretend it is.
Those who are concerned to advocate an apprenticeship model of learning,
do have something to say to technology educators about how to teach such
personal and tacit knowledge (McCormick, 1994), but it is not altogether
clear how this fits the confines of schools and colleges. However, I am
running ahead of my argument.
Procedural knowledge appears to be easier to define than conceptual, par-
ticularly as seen from the vantage point of school technology. Design,
modelling, problem solving, system approaches, project planning, quality
assurance and optimisation are all candidates for technological procedural
knowledge, and can be found across many technologies whatever their
specific context. What remains unclear is the extent to which, in each
context, they are still the same procedures; learning theorists, and in par-
ticular those who support situated cognition (more of which later), have
some important reflections on this question. Indeed what is important
about recent attempts to consider the nature of technological knowledge
is the fact that such approaches are being considered at all. Although Layton
(1991) in his seminal article on technological knowledge drew mainly on
the work of historians and philosophers of technology (e.g. Staudenmaier,
1985) to represent its nature, he also included the work of psychologists and
anthropologists who are interested in situated cognition. This work has
important implications for the teaching and learning of technology.

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THE LITERATURE ON LEARNING

Although I have already made the point that procedural and conceptual
knowledge are linked, I want to start by considering each separately. Much
of what we know about knowledge issues comes from other domains, such
as science and mathematics, and I will draw upon these along with cogni-
tive psychology and situated cognition. I use this literature, not to develop
a general theory that will illuminate technology education, but to raise issues
to which we must attend. (Johnson, in his article in this issue of the journal,
considers this literature from the point of view of Ôintellectual skillsÕ, but
addresses a similar need to understand the particular needs of technical
and vocational education.)

Procedural knowledge
As I have noted, cognitive psychologists talk of ÔproceduralÕ and Ôdeclar-
ativeÕ knowledge, but they also use the idea of ÔstrategicÕ knowledge
(Gott, 1988). This latter kind of knowledge in effect ÔcontrolsÕ the proce-
dural and declarative knowledge as a Ôhow-to-decide-what-to-do-and-
whenÕ knowledge. This gives the idea of a hierarchy of knowledge, and
in particular of procedural knowledge. Stevenson (1994, pp. 13Ð14),
writing from the vocational education perspective, proposes three levels
of procedures:
¥ First order: these are directed to known goals and are automatic, fluid,
algorithmic, and include specific skills such as hammering in a nail.
¥ Second order: these achieve unfamiliar goals, and operate on specific
procedures and include strategic skills such as problem solving.
¥ Third order: this switches cognition between the other two levels and
hence it has a controlling function.
In some ways, the specifics of the levels (and whether strategic knowl-
edge subsumes or is subsumed by procedural knowledge Ð Anderson, 1987)
are less important than:
¥ the idea that there are such levels;
¥ and that, when it comes to learning procedural knowledge, a balance is
struck between detailed procedures that support learners in specific
contexts and abstract ones that are impossible to use.
The key to the correct level is in fact conceptual knowledge, and it becomes
more important as the complexity of the situation increases, a point to which
I will return.
Problem solving is a particular higher-order procedural knowledge, but
a term that is greatly abused, not just in technology education, but in the
literature more generally. It is abused in terms of what counts as a problem
and a problem solving strategy, but also in terms of what is described as
problem solving. This is one of the areas where, contrary to apparently
popular belief in technology education, ideas about problem solving as a
general-purpose skill are misunderstood, despite the pleas of a number of

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146 ROBERT MCCORMICK

people (e.g. Johnson, 1994b; McCormick, 1993). The crucial finding from
decades of research is that problem-solving skill is dependent upon con-
siderable domain knowledge (Glaser, 1984 & 1992). Thus, rather than it
being a general skill that can be employed with equal success in a variety
of areas, it requires expertise in the context of its application. Even a
casual inspection of proposals for technology education (e.g. Savage &
Sterry, 1990) indicates that it is assumed that problem solving is a general
transferable skill. Research does not support this, nor does it support the
teaching of it as an abstract general-purpose process. This also has impli-
cations for the design process, which I will deal with later.
This does not preclude the use of general procedures when problems
are being solved in unfamiliar territory (i.e. out of domain), but they are
quite unlike the algorithms of:
¥ define the problem
¥ create alternative solutions
¥ implement the best solution
¥ evaluate this solution
Indeed some would argue that, although it is possible to talk about each
of these activities in relation to problem solving, it is not possible to point
to aspects of actual problem solving activity that fit each of these categories
of problem-solving action (Lave, 1988, p. 142). Those who support general
problem-solving skills, but who recognise they are not based upon algo-
rithmic procedures, might nevertheless evoke the idea of heuristics, that
is, rules of thumb that are employed in solving a problem. For example,
if you cannot solve a problem, try Ôbreaking it down into smaller problems
that you can solveÕ. This seductive idea of heuristics, that P˜lya (1957)
advocated in his classic text on problem solving, has been taken up by many
in artificial intelligence who wanted to program computers to solve problems
(most famously Newell & Simon, 1972). But, as Schoenfeld (1985, pp.
71Ð72) argues, such heuristics have Òproven [to be] far more complex and
far less tractable than had been hoped or expected.Ó The crux of the issue
is one of the level of detail that I noted earlier, namely that it may be possible
to label a strategy (e.g. break the problem down into smaller problems),
but quite another to provide instructions that would enable a student to
use such a strategy when faced with a new problem. What Schoenfeld advo-
cates is the detailing of such procedures so that they can be learned (in
fact he uses the word ÔtrainingÕ in this context). Thus we have the idea of
specific procedures, and also the idea of needing a higher-order procedure
to control them. Schoenfeld (1985) in fact advocates a category of knowl-
edge he calls ÔcontrolÕ, which is used to manage the conceptual knowledge
(what he calls ÔresourcesÕ) and heuristics.
Others use the idea of metacognition or self-regulation to describe this
control function, or as I have earlier referred to it, strategic knowledge.
The terms are not always clearly separated because metacognition covers
both procedural and conceptual knowledge, being used to include knowl-
edge about cognitive resources (which would include concepts) and

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self-regulatory mechanisms (Duell, 1986). Self regulation is in many senses

quite straightforward; it involves planning what to do next, checking
outcomes of strategies, and evaluating and revising strategies. To those who
teach design, these ideas look familiar, but, as I will show later, it is not
quite so simple when it comes to teaching and learning these procedures.
What is crucial to the learning of such strategic knowledge is the explicit
treatment of it by the teacher. Only by explicit teaching of how and when
to employ procedures can this strategic knowledge be developed, and,
importantly, be transferred to new situations.
Despite these attempts to spell out the procedural knowledge that under-
pins problem solving, and a general agreement about the importance of
the domain and specific context of the problem situation, there are those
who cast doubt on the whole concept of problem solving. Lave, who,
along with others has studied everyday activity in shopping or work, argues
that the emphasis that cognitive studies gives to problem solving is both
exaggerated and impoverished (Lave, 1988, p. 143). Studies of weight
watchers, milk loaders in a dairy, shoppers in a supermarket, and tailors,
reveal a great deal about the active, flexible, and inventive strategies they
use. Their mental processes are structured by the context, the activity, the
tools and their interactions with others. Thus, in routine everyday activity,
arithmetic is more structured by, than structures, shopping (for best buys).
Significantly, Ôjust plain folksÕ (JPFs are the practitioners in the everyday
activity)4 can solve problems using arithmetic skills with a very high success
rate in the supermarket, compared to a mediocre performance in the equiv-
alent arithmetic skills required in school-like tests (Lave, 1988, pp. 55Ð61).
In contrast to the algorithms for solving arithmetic problems that JPFs
were taught at school, which they could not use effectively in the tests, their
supermarket problem-solving strategies varied across the different settings
(i.e. when choosing the best buy of particular products). Indeed they could
transform or abandon a problem, and the problem and its resolution would
merge. Rather than there being a posed problem (as in school-like tests)
the on-going activity (e.g. shopping) shapes the action and the JPFs are con-
stantly facing dilemmas that they resolve by solving problems, with no
ÔcorrectÕ solution and no solution that is entirely satisfactory (Lave, 1988,
p. 139). It is this dilemma resolution, and the fact that their generation
and resolution can take place simultaneously, that is the centre of practice,
and it is this practice, not problem solving, that should be the focus of
our efforts. The implications of this for schooling are difficult to fathom,
and may take us back to apprenticeship in learning, but my colleagues
and I have evidence that it provides insight into some of the activities we
see children involved in within technology classrooms (Murphy et al., 1995).
The stance that advocates of situated learning take is controversial and, even
if its Ôtheory of practiceÕ is not accepted, it does nevertheless re-empha-
sise the importance of the context and objects of activity. This emphasis
is one shared with much of cognitive psychology.

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Conceptual knowledge

If the development of understanding is seen as the forming of links in

studentsÕ knowledge, then we come to two important ideas that underpin
learning issues in relation to conceptual knowledge, namely that of con-
structivism and schemata. Constructivism focuses upon individuals building
up representations of their knowledge, which is tested against experience.
When concepts are introduced in school, they are not transmitted to students,
but students will attempt to fit them to the models or concepts they cur-
rently have. These models may contrast with those presented in say science
lessons (where they are usually called Ôalternative frameworksÕ), and
students will only ÔlearnÕ science (i.e. incorporate science concepts into their
knowledge structures) if they are able to replace or modify their existing
models. This is not merely an individual process of discovery, but a process
of enculturation into the discourse of science; hence we have the term social-
constructivism to indicate the social element.5 Problem solving is an essential
process in this construction of knowledge, but often problem solving in
this context is seen only as a pedagogic tool (e.g. Watts, 1991; von
Glasersfeld, 1995, pp. 182Ð183), not as procedural knowledge that has to
be taught and learnt. StudentsÕ existing conceptual models are difficult to
change and, although much is known about these models and the pedagogy
that addresses their change, schools are remarkably unsuccessful in enabling
student conceptual development.
The constructivist view, and the associated research on student alterna-
tive frameworks, has important implications for the use and development
of conceptual knowledge in technology education. First, it makes it diffi-
cult to be sure what to assume by way of prior knowledge when facing a
task that uses say science concepts, even in the uncommon situation when
a technology teacher knows what concepts have been dealt with in science
lessons. Second, students will bring to technology from the science lesson
an idea of a concept such as ÔresistanceÕ but it may not be functional in
the context of a technology project. Third, any new concept introduced in
technology will require time for studentsÕ understanding to be developed.
As I will show, this can prove difficult in a situation where conceptual
knowledge is seen as secondary.
Cognitive psychologists describe schemata as the knowledge structures
that exist in memory; they are in effect what the individual constructs
from experience and instruction. It is these schemata that need to be taken
into account by teachers when they want students to learn a new concept
or theory, and it is these schemata that give experts in a domain the ability
to solve problems quickly. While those in specific domains, such as science
and mathematics, use the term Ôconceptual knowledgeÕ, those who deal with
real-world tasks prefer to use the term Ôdeclarative knowledgeÕ, but see it
as the knowledge of devices or systems (Gott, 1988). For technologists
this is important, not just because they deal with devices and systems
(designing, making and repairing them), but because their conceptual knowl-

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 CONCEPTUAL AND PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE 149

edge will be linked to them rather than to abstract concepts, such as is

the case in science. When Buccarelli (1994) discusses the personal knowl-
edge of engineers involved in design, he does so in terms of how it links
to the objects that they are used to dealing with. He describes how one
engineer used a computer program to simulate heat transfer through build-
ings, originally designed by an electrical engineer for electric circuits.
Although the underlying mathematics was the same to model the heat
transfer and electrical circuit behaviour, the physical situations were quite
different and so the time sampling needed to be different to give the correct
ÔfeelÕ of temperature changes Ð the mechanical engineer wanted quicker
results and knew the results would still be accurate enough with a larger
time interval.6 Thus the idea that there are abstract or ÔpureÕ concepts
or device knowledge separate from the world of objects is challenged
(Buccarelli, 1994, pp. 78Ð89). But before I consider this again, let me turn
to the link between conceptual and procedural knowledge. Both the ideas
on schemata and on device knowledge become particularly important in con-
sidering this link.

The inter-relationship of conceptual and procedural knowledge

The debates noted at the beginning of this chapter are in some senses false
ones, in that to be effective in science or mathematics it is necessary to
use both conceptual and procedural knowledge.7 Discussion in these domains
now focuses upon the relationship of the two types of knowledge (e.g.
Hiebert, 1986; Gott & Murphy, 1987; Millar et al., 1994). The literature
on problem solving has most clearly illustrated the importance of this
relationship, because in domains it is evident that it is the possession of con-
ceptual knowledge that makes possible the effective use of the procedural
knowledge of problem solving (Glaser, 1984). In the area of Ôreal-worldÕ
tasks it is the device knowledge that makes fault finding, for example,
successful. The nature of such device knowledge may reflect as much the
context of the device (e.g. its operation) as any abstract knowledge taught
in science. As the complexity of devices increases so does the importance
of the interaction of device knowledge and procedural knowledge (Gott,
1988, p. 120). This calls into question any technology education programme
that tries to focus on procedural knowledge such as problem solving or
design, while assuming that the domain and context within which this
takes place are either irrelevant or at best secondary. It is this inter-rela-
tionship that is at the heart of the arguments against seeing problem solving
as a general skill that can operate independently of the domain, that I
noted earlier. This has important implications for curriculum proposals
where the problem solving and design are seen as unifying features of the
subject of technology education in schools.
Let me return to a theme that has run through the discussion so far on
both procedural and conceptual knowledge, namely the extent to which
the knowledge is of a formal and abstract kind familiar in educational

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150 ROBERT MCCORMICK

contexts. I have already indicated that personal knowledge is important, and

that, for example, device knowledge may be more linked to the object
than to abstract knowledge. Indeed Gott (1988, p. 113) goes as far as saying
that device knowledge built upon formal sciences has failed to produce good
fault finders, and that the kind of models of devices and systems that are
best are often qualitative ones (Gott, 1988, p. 101). The study of qualita-
tive knowledge and reasoning has arisen in part from artificial intelligence
and is important in attempting to recognise a place for this in education
alongside the conventional formal and quantitative approach (Dillon, 1994).
Experts use qualitative knowledge yet much of education ignores this in
favour of formalised textbook knowledge, making the use of science in tech-
nology particularly problematic.
Those who view cognition as situated go further and argue for the link
not just with objects but with action. Some take this from activity theory,
developed from Vygotsky, which sees a reciprocal relationship between
knowledge and action (Scribner, 1985); others see it as the development
of a social anthropology of cognition in practice (Lave, 1988). Either way
it would lead us to unify conceptual and procedural knowledge! Nevertheless
with technology education being primarily rooted in physical action, and
in the physical manifestation of thoughts (be they designs or ideas of
where faults lie), such views of cognition are a challenge to the teaching
and learning we want to encourage. My view is that such approaches are
important reminders of the danger of artificial distinctions, and of the
complexity of everyday activity, but that they present considerable problems
for those of us involved in education in schools.

WHAT DO WE KNOW AND WHAT CAN WE ASSUME ABOUT TECHNOLOGY

EDUCATION?

In this section of the article I want to review some of the implications of

the above ideas on technological knowledge and learning in the context
of what happens in technology education.8 Again I will consider proce-
dural and conceptual knowledge separately, while recognising that their
inter-relationship is more important than their differences. I will draw specif-
ically upon research in technology education, where it exists, but otherwise
I will explore the implications that the literature has for pedagogy.9

Procedural knowledge
The design process and problem solving are of course the main candi-
dates for consideration as procedural knowledge, and they feature in many
school curricula, where technology exists as a separate subject. I have
already indicated that, in as much as each of these is treated as a general-
purpose skill, then this flies in the face of the findings of research. Models
of design or problem solving that indicate steps, even where these are

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seen as iterative or circular, are unlikely to represent what is carried out

in practice either by expert technologists or students. Indeed, there is
evidence in accounts of the practice of design, that parallels the findings
of those who take a situated cognition perspective; namely that objects,
tools, solutions and problems all interact to determine design thinking
(Buccarelli, 1994; McCormick, 1994). When design is taught as a step-
like process, even if done implicitly, then students follow it like a ritual
exhibiting a Ôveneer of accomplishmentÕ while actually following their
own process of design (McCormick et al., 1994);10 or at the very least are
totally unaware that there is a process (procedural knowledge) to be learnt
(McCormick et al., 1994). Research that has mapped the way technology
tasks are presented by teachers across the whole of compulsory schooling
in England indicate that this ritual may be an effect at a particular stage,
corresponding to schooling at ages 11Ð14 (Kimbell, 1994; Stables, 1995;
Kimbell et al., 1996). There is little reason to expect that later in sec-
ondary schooling things are any better (Jeffery, 1990), and in elementary/
primary schools there is likely to be less concern with the specific proce-
dural knowledge of design.
The evidence presented earlier offers a clear challenge to the practice
of technology teachers, but also guidance about how students should be sup-
ported so that they can develop procedural knowledge such as is represented
in designing. The pedagogic strategy, to avoid the ritual noted above, will
depend on just how design is viewed; it may be quite legitimate for a teacher
to recognise the complexity of design but still feel that it is worth teaching
some general process first. If this latter view is held it is still incumbent
upon a teacher to show the diversity of designing in terms of the contexts
within which students experience it (e.g. textiles, food, and electronic
products), and to represent a variety of ways of going through the process
(e.g. starting with existing products to redesign them, as well as with a
ÔproblemÕ that requires a design solution). Designing a new food product,
that has a short making time, can involve more product development than
designing, and to imagine that it is the same as the design of a metal box
product is to stretch credibility.11 It is also necessary for the procedure of
designing to be made explicit at both the specific and strategic levels. At
the specific level it is necessary that elements of design skills such as
Ôgenerating ideasÕ or ÔevaluationÕ are deliberately taught to students as a
range of techniques for each set of skills. For example, most teachers assume
that students can generate ideas but do not instruct them in how to brain-
storm or how to use other procedures such as morphological analysis. At
the strategic knowledge level, teachers often structure design projects so
that each lesson or so represents the steps in the process. Not only does
this encourage ritual, but it takes away from students any of the decisions,
and hence the chance to engage in strategic thinking. Students need to
confront the question of when to give up generating new ideas and move
on to evaluating each or choosing one, or indeed starting again to look at
the design situation or problem, if they are to develop strategic procedural

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152 ROBERT MCCORMICK

knowledge.12 This can only be done by teachers explicitly discussing with

students these questions, and modelling design behaviour for students so
they can see what it means to design. Few students see their teachers ever
design anything, although now the availability of design case studies, which
can illustrate real designersÕ approaches, is increasing as materials are
developed for this new area of the curriculum.
The situation with regard to technological problem solving, as procedural
knowledge, is more complex, not least because some see it as synony-
mous with design. Here, however, the challenge that technology presents
to learning theorists is equal to that presented to technology educators.
Despite the amount of work on problem solving, it is seldom the case that
the nature of the problems is explored or that ordinary classroom-type
problem solving is observed. The situated cognition literature has focused
mainly on workplace and everyday practice such as shopping and, as yet,
has little to say about the problem solving that happens as school children
attempt relatively open-ended tasks in classrooms.13 Such tasks, common
in technology education, may pose problems of a different kind to standard
mathematics ones, where at least what constitutes the ÔproblemÕ is clear,
even if there are multiple solutions (Schoenfeld, 1985).
The challenges to technology educators with regard to problem solving
are threefold. First, to clarify just what they mean by it. Murphy et al. (1995)
have shown that in the literature on technology education, within curricula
proposals, and among teachers there is a confusing array of meanings.14
Some see problem solving as a general-purpose skill, which is challenged
by the literature I have reviewed (the second challenge). Others see a focus
on a global problem, but are not concerned about the process involved in
solving it; they see a problem for an old person with arthritis who cannot
open a jar Ð a problem that has a design solution. Yet others are concerned
only with the problems that emerge as the students go through the design
and make of a product. Such people implicitly take a situated learning
view that problem solving is the facing of dilemmas that emerge as part
of ongoing activity. All of these views are quite different and it is possible
for a student to meet each of them (and others) within their school career,
yet he or she is apparently to make some sense of this variety, especially
as none of the views may ever be made explicit. The third challenge to tech-
nology educators comes from the lack of pedagogic strategies to support
students in developing procedural knowledge in the process of solving
technological problems. As with design, there is little explicit teaching of
the procedures, and little support for the emergent problems. In the latter
situations, the teacherÕs support must enable the student to engage in under-
standing and diagnosing problems. The teacher can involve the student in
solving the problem by, for example:
¥ demonstrating the procedures of formulating, reformulating or solving
the problem, and doing so in such a way that the thinking process is made
explicit to the student;
¥ posing questions to the student to encourage his or her own solutions;

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¥ giving several alternative solutions and allowing the student to choose

or modify them to produce one that is satisfactory.
It is crucial that teachers do not simply supply solutions to students, even
when they know the student does not have the skills or knowledge to
generate them. This simply treats procedural knowledge as declarative
knowledge and will not help problem solving. The pressures of classroom
management of 20 or more students and the need to ensure that they all
make a complete ÔworkingÕ product often lead to this Ôquick fixÕ approach
(McCormick & Davidson, 1995).
Although Ôfault findingÕ as a problem-solving situation is uncommon
in schools (but not in vocational education; see JohnsonÕs account of con-
textual learning elsewhere in this issue of the journal), it nevertheless is
often a part of the more common design and make tasks. Students usually
have to deal with circuits not working or the like and have to fault find.
Again teachers are often forced into giving students procedures to follow;
for example, telling a student to trim all the wires off the connections
without saying that the purpose is to avoid a short circuit; or saying the
student should take out a component and re-solder it, again without indi-
cating that this is because the electrical contact may be poor. Teachers
sometimes even appear to give students a set of specific procedures without
checking whether they fit the particular problem. This is a reasonable
strategy, but they are not given to students as a first heuristic to apply.15
However, central to fault finding procedures, as I have already noted, is
the link with conceptual knowledge, to which I now turn.

Conceptual knowledge
The two kinds of conceptual knowledge relevant to technology, identified
earlier in the chapter, are that drawn from other subjects, such as science,
and that unique to technology. The constructivist view of the development
of concepts provides challenges in terms of:
¥ identifying the possible knowledge requirements of technology tasks;
¥ ascertaining studentsÕ relevant prior knowledge;
¥ providing adequate support for conceptual development within techno-
logical project activity.
The first of these challenges is more difficult when made against a back-
ground of such knowledge being unspecified or of secondary importance.
For example, the National Curriculum in England recognises a role for math-
ematics and science knowledge, but says nothing about what is important
or how it is to be used. Also in England, a major design and technology
project acknowledged the integration of conceptual and procedural knowl-
edge, arguing quite rightly that it is just as important that children are Òaware
of what they need to know as it is for them to actually know itÓ (APU, 1991,
p. 23).16 But the project report said nothing of how the integration was to
take place and, further, carried out assessments that put aside this link
because the focus was the procedural knowledge of design. The challenge

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154 ROBERT MCCORMICK

to technology educators is to clarify conceptual knowledge and to explore

its link with procedural knowledge, as has taken place in science educa-
tion (Millar et al., 1994; Gott & Murphy, 1987).17
Within technology projects the identification of prior conceptual knowl-
edge and support for its development are made complex by the pressure
to design and make products and by a lack of activities specifically focused
on concepts in their context of use. There is evidence to suggest that
technology teachers are not able to cope with these issues, given the con-
straints of the design and make curriculum (McCormick & Murphy, 1994;
McCormick et al., 1995). Although science teachers are more aware of
the alternative frameworks of students, and pay attention to the develop-
ment of their understanding of the scientific models, they fail to deal with
the problem of the context of use. Picking up an earlier example, a student
who meets the concept of resistance in science through investigations of
wires of different lengths and thicknesses, may not be prepared to under-
stand ceramic resistors that all look identical yet have enormously different
resistances. This poses equal challenges to both science and technology
teachers. What I have said about science can equally be said of mathematics,
where, for example, students will struggle with interpreting the colour codes
on resistors because they cannot transfer the concept of powers that they
may have studied in mathematics lessons.18
I have not dealt explicitly with the issue of transfer of knowledge (see
Johnson in this journal issue), though it underlies many of the issues in both
procedural and conceptual knowledge, because I want to focus on the use
of knowledge. From pilot work we have done it seems that, like the evidence
presented earlier about qualitative knowledge and device knowledge, the
knowledge required in technology is bound up with the tasks that students
perform. Thus student views of a circuit in science, based upon wires and
not concerned with faults in circuits, require different forms when they
are faced with a Printed Circuit Board and have to find breaks or shorts
in circuits caused by poor soldering. Again situated cognition prepares us
to consider such a situation of what, in traditional cognitive psychology,
is called a transfer problem. Situated cognition is more concerned with
the context and the way the object and action associated with it are inti-
mately linked with the knowledge.
What then of the conceptual knowledge unique to technology? Putting
aside the definitional problem identified earlier, there is parallel work to
be done to that of constructivist researchers in science education, in trying
to determine studentsÕ ideas of concepts such as come from systems (e.g.
input, output, process, feedback, lag and stability). It may also be that
some technology conceptual knowledge acts as a kind of intermediary
between the abstract knowledge of science (and mathematics) and the
specific knowledge of a device (Martinand, 1992). All use of science and
mathematics concepts in technology is treated as a form of modelling and
as Bissell and Dillon (1993) argue, technologists create their own concep-
tual models that are closer to the systems they deal with than those of

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science and mathematics. Perhaps these are the alternative frameworks of

technologists! This is the final challenge I want to highlight, and here it
is to those in science and mathematics (in particular), but also to those in
learning research. When most researchers probe student conceptual knowl-
edge they do so having consulted an expert for the correct or accepted
model. If it is a physics concept they typically consult a professor of physics.
If, instead, they consulted an engineering professor he or she might be more
concerned to know the context for the model and perhaps give a different
set of explanations, not of physics, but of the relevant knowledge for the
situation. Probing understanding, as the situated cognition theorists say,
cannot be done in the abstract, as knowledge does not exist in the abstract.

WHAT REMAINS TO BE DONE?

This article has tried to explore some of the challenges to technology

educators and to those who carry out research that has a bearing on it,
including those concerned with general learning theory, and with science
and mathematics education. The challenges to technology teachers in
particular are not to be taken as criticisms of their work. As a new area
of the school curriculum, there is still much to be done by way of devel-
oping a new pedagogy. Further, they are often not well supported either
by the curriculum formulations they are subject to, or the training system
and research base. Curriculum proposals need to be clearer about views
of problem solving and design, and how this procedural knowledge is to
relate to different contexts and domains. These proposals also have to
make realistic and specific demands on teachers about the kinds of science
and mathematics knowledge that can be used in technology, and the form
they should take. Trainers and researchers who support technology teachers
need to turn their attentions to the development of strategies for teaching
problem solving and design, given their possible variable interpretations.
More complex still, they must show how conceptual knowledge relates to
these procedures.
For those outside technology education, there is much that should interest
them in the uniqueness of its activities that has a bearing on the under-
standing of learning. In particular the nature of design tasks offers a richness
not found elsewhere. 19 The technological context also makes the use of
conceptual knowledge quite different from the traditional constructivist
work and this may help to link work with those who advocate a situated
cognition perspective, including those such as Clancey (1994) who have
an interest in the knowledge representations discussed in artificial intelli-
gence.
For all these communities the work needed has to be detailed and
painstaking so that we can come to understand the complexity of the use
of both conceptual and procedural knowledge and their interaction.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the work of Patricia Murphy, Sara Hennessy

and Marian Davidson, all of whom have contributed to my understanding
of these issues through their field work and analysis on our Problem solving
in Technology Education research project and through many hours of dis-
cussion of its outcomes. This project is funded by the UK Economic and
Social Research Council (grant number R00023445).

NOTES

01. Murphy (1994) gives a useful account of the debates on process-based science cur-
ricula, drawing out the lessons for technology education. Unless we learn from such
experience, we are likely to simply repeat it.
02. In The Technology Teacher, for example, in the last three years (1993Ð95) there have
been 11 articles proposing a design or problem-solving approach, with just one giving
only a general account of classroom activities and another reviewing the literature on
learning relating to problem solving. A search of ERIC (1985Ð94) revealed that, of 65
items that included problem solving, only 2 involved any empirical work in a class-
room, one involved interviews of 44 teachers, and another was a review of the literature
on cognitive science relevant to teaching technology.
03. It will be obvious that I have neglected one the major area of the ÔaffectiveÕ knowl-
edge. This is partly because it can be subsumed under the two categories of conceptual
and procedural knowledge, but also partly because I want to reduce the complexity of
the issues and literature that I discuss.
04. The idea of everyday activity is that it is routine, not just that it is what everybody
does. Thus the everyday activity of an engineer or a shopper would be included.
05. The Educational Researcher has recently carried a series of articles on these issues in
both the science and mathematics education contexts: Educational Researcher 23(7),
4Ð23; 24(7), 23Ð28.
06. The crux of the difference is that in the electrical circuit a time constant can be
milliseconds, and those of minutes or hours (needed in heat transfer) are rare. It is this
that determines the time step function in each situation and, although the employment
of a short time (relevant to electrical circuits) gives correct results, they are at a level
of resolution quite unnecessary for the mechanical engineer.
07. In fact the debates are not about whether or not learners need the two types of knowl-
edge, but what should be the emphasis in pedagogy at different times, and for different
aims.
08. While I will endeavour to make general statements that are independent of any partic-
ular technology education curriculum, it is inevitable that most of my references will
be to the UK and USA situations.
09. I have already indicated how little research exists in an area such as problem solving
(note 2), and the situation is no better with regard to technology education in general.
10. Lave (1992) reports how in mathematics problem solving students pretend to solve
problems in the way the teacher has taught, but in actual fact have their own ways of
solving them.
11. It is certainly the case that in England, where former home economics and craft, design
and technology teachers now work together to form the subject Ôdesign and technologyÕ,
a department may adopt the same Ôdesign processÕ algorithm for the design of all kinds
of products.
12. My colleagues and I have observed teachers explicitly dealing with steps in the design
process, for example, by discussing the purpose of a model (McCormick & Davidson,

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 CONCEPTUAL AND PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE 157

1995). Even if the process is dealt with in a stepped sequence, this is potentially a
better way of developing procedural knowledge.
13. There are studies of mathematics classrooms, but they are largely on mathematical
puzzles, rather than open-ended problems (e.g. Lave, 1992).
14. There is also a rather limited range of types of problem solving, which usually are
couched in terms of a design situation. Thus the fault finding noted earlier is by and large
missing from curricula, although it is found in the Netherlands.
15. It is pleasing to see that new material such as Nuffield Design and Technology give
such simple procedures.
16. This shows an understanding on the part of the project team of the conceptual knowl-
edge element of metacognition.
17. McCormick, Murphy & Hennessy (1994) give examples of this link in technology
education.
18. My colleagues and I have evidence of mathematical problems in technology (McCormick,
Murphy & Hennessy, 1994), and we are currently doing some pilot work funded by
the Design Council in England prior to carrying out a full-scale study (Design Council,
1996).
19. This richness is beginning to be recognised by this community, for example, in the
Middle-School Mathematics Through Applications Project at the Institute for Research
on Learning and Stanford University, California, USA (e.g. see Greeno et al., 1994).

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