Benedict Abellana
Aubrey Hart Cababasada
Allen Kyle Castaneda
Emmanuel Coronel
Troy John Gilbero
Seveso Disaster (July 1976)
In July 1976, a chemical plant explosion near Seveso, Seveso is a small town in Italy,
15 miles from Milan. About 17,000 people inhabit this city. The Icmesa Chemical
Company owned a plant in Seveso and its product was hexachlorophene, a bactericide,
with trichlorophenol produced as an intermediate. During normal operations, a small
amount of TCDD is produced in the reactor as an undesirable side-product. Italy
exposed locals to the highest known levels of 2,3,7,8-tetracholorodibenzo-p-dioxin
(TCDD or dioxin) exposure to a residential population (Mocarelli 2001; Pesatori and
Bertazzi 2012). Dioxin has been classified as a known human carcinogen by the
International Agency for Research on Cancer. It is a potent endocrine disruptor, highly
lipophilic, and extremely stable with a long half-life in humans of 7 to 9 years. Because it
is a combustion byproduct, it is a widespread environmental contaminant in
industrialized areas and background exposures, while declining, are ubiquitous. Much of
what we know and can learn about the risks of dioxin exposure on human health arose
from the tragic circumstances of Seveso.
The chemical 2,4,5-trichlorophenol was being produced there from 1,2,4,5-
tetrachlorobenzene by the nucleophilic aromatic substitution reaction with sodium
hydroxide. The chemical-release accident occurred when a batch process was
interrupted prior to the completion of the final step – removal of ethylene glycol from the
reaction mixture by distillation, due to conformance with an Italian law requiring
shutdown of plant operations over the weekend. Microorganisms (plants and animals of
very small size) can turn any cyanide in water into less dangerous chemicals or form a
complex with metals such as iron. There is little knowledge of the half-life of cyanide in
water. In the bodies of fish, cyanide in the water does not build up. Cyanides in the soil
are fairly mobile.
On
Saturday, 10 July 1976 at around 12:30 A.M., the reactor where trichlorophenol was
produced released a toxic cloud of dioxin and other pollutants because of a sudden
exothermic reaction caused by the breakdown of a safety valve.6 The hazardous gas
produced by the twenty-minute emission settled on a large area of about 1,810 hectares
in the municipalities of Seveso, Meda, Desio, Cesano Maderno, and, although to a less
serious extent, seven other municipalities in the province of Milan. The 2,3,7,8
tetrachloro-dibenzo-para-dioxin (TCDD), simply called dioxin that was released by the
ICMESA reactor7 is an extremely dangerous molecule due to its very high toxicity,
persistence, and stability. Nevertheless, dioxin was little known at the time of the
accident.
Six years after the dioxin leak the “Seveso directive” was created to increase risk
reduction measures, and prevention inside the plant. It also aimed to develop
preparedness and response to offsite in case of emergency. The key aspect of this is
the offsite prevention and response. Educating the residents of Seveso would help with
pressuring the authorities to act quickly. If the population was aware that a cloud over
the factory was not normal and could cause harm, they would not have carried on with
their day-to-day activities for so long. This theory is proven by the actions of the
ICMESA workers. They have at least a basic understanding of the chemicals involved
that they acted when they finally noticed something was wrong. there needs to be
known warning signs in the community or else no action will take place until apparent
human harm is seen. This is exactly what happened in Seveso no-one pressure the
authorities to do anything until workers who were not well trained but still the most
educated in the city about the hazards of dioxin started to feel ill. If these workers didn’t
step up it could have been months until action was taken to clean up the dioxin.
It would have been possible to avoid this accident. First, in the case of an unexpected
release, the construction of the reactor and ensuring a proper containment system are
present. Originally, proper hazard assessment was not done, otherwise the hazards
may have been detected and fixed before the release took place. Before beginning a
process, the dangers should always be carefully assessed before starting. If everyone is
in the area, improving emergency response is crucial for safety. Strict regulations and
standards for facilities which store, produce or handle hazardous materials are now in
place in Europe. These plants shall notify local authorities and communities of the
nature of their facilities and shall construct and disseminate measures to prevent and
respond to any possible future accidents.
