Sophia

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11841-021-00860-6

Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/

Three Characters Doctrine in Indian Yogācāra Literature
and Contemporary Scholarship

John Powers1 

Accepted: 17 May 2021

© The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022

Abstract
This article focuses on the three natures (trisvabhāva) or three characters (trilakṣaṇa)
doctrine as described in Indian Yogācāra treatises. This concept is fundamental to
Yogācāra epistemology and soteriology, but terminology employed by contem-
porary buddhologists misconstrues and misrepresents some of its most important
features, particularly with regard to the ‘ultimately real nature’ (pariniṣpanna-
svabhāva), which is equated with terms that connote ultimate reality like ultimate
truth (paramārtha), emptiness (śūnyatā), and reality limit (bhūta-koṭi), and which
is described as a ‘purifying object of observation’ (viśuddhālambana) that facili-
tates insight when properly understood by meditators. The article discusses how it
is described in a range of Yogācāra treatises and compares this with how it has been
conceived in academic studies of Indic Yogācāra literature.

Keywords  Yogācāra · Epistemology · Soteriology · Three natures · Three characters

Introduction

The three natures (trisvabhāva) or three characters (trilakṣaṇa) doctrine figures

prominently in Indian Yogācāra texts such as the Discourse Explaining the Thought
(Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra) (Anon, n.d.), Commentary on Differentiation of the Mid-
dle and Extremes (Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya) (Vasubandhu, n.d.a), Ornament for
Great Vehicle Discourses (Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra) (Bagchi, 1970), Compendium
of the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna-saṃgraha)  (Asaṅga,  n.d.), and Exposition of the

* John Powers
[email protected]
1
Deakin University, Geelong, VIC, Australia

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 J. Powers

Three Natures (Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa) (Vasubandhu, n.d.b). To date, the most influ-

ential interpretation of this doctrine is that of Gadjin Nagao, who contends that it
is based on a ‘principle of convertibility.’1 Nagao’s conclusions have been widely
accepted by academics working in the field, and the terminology he employed has
largely been adopted, often uncritically, in discussions of this topic.
Nagao’s two publications on the three natures in the 1990s followed Alan Spon-
berg’s, 1982 article, ‘The Trisvabhāva Doctrine in India and China: A Study of
Three Exegetical Models,’ which has been cited by a number of scholars as the
source for understandings and translation equivalents that have become entrenched
in secondary literature.2
In this article, I will argue that Nagao’s and Sponberg’s analyses of the doc-
trine are at odds with how it is presented in Indian Yogācāra texts and that more
precise translation equivalents are needed in order to accurately convey how the
three natures/characters are presented in these sources. The discussion of the three
natures/characters will begin with an overview of how it is described in several
representative texts and will then consider Nagao’s and Sponberg’s interpretations
in light of this. The central focus will be how Yogācāra works conceive the ‘ulti-
mately real nature’ (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva), the ultimate reality and a core aspect
of Yogācāra soteriology.
As Åke Boquist (1993: 27–50) notes, the Saṃdhinirmocana presents an early
version of the three characters/natures doctrine, the general outlines of which are
followed in the works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu. As the schema developed, it was
linked with a wide range of Buddhist ideas, including doctrines generally associated
primarily with Yogācāra, but there is a high level of consistency within Yogācāra
literature concerning the relations between the three characters/natures and their
respective properties.
In chapter six of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, the bodhisattva Guṇākara opens the
discussion by asking why some bodhisattvas are recognized by the Buddha as ‘wise
with respect to the character of phenomena,’ to which Buddha replies that those
bodhisattvas who thoroughly understand the three characters are designated as ‘wise
with respect to the character of phenomena.’ (sDe dge, bKa’’gyur, vol. ca: 27.1).
The three characters are then enumerated: (1) the ‘imputational’ or ‘thoroughly
constructed’ (kun brtags pa; Skt. parikalpita); (2) the ‘other-dependent’ (gzhan gyi
dbang; Skt. paratantra); and the ‘ultimately real’ or ‘true’ (yongs su grub pa; Skt.
pariniṣpanna; sDe dge: 27.5). The imputational character is described as
that which is imputed as a name or symbol in terms of the inherent nature of
the attributes of phenomena in order to subsequently designate any convention
whatsoever (sDe dge: 27.6).
The sūtra expands on this description by likening the imputational character to
the perceptions of hairs, dots, etc. of a person with impaired vision. It is merely a
creation of thought and absolutely false in the sense that it does not conform to the
actual state of affairs. The thrust of the sūtra’s presentation is that this character

1
  See Nagao (1991: 131) and (1993: 1–18).
2
  See, for example, Tzohar (2018: 91) and Brennan (2018: 622).

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Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/Three Characters…

consists of unreal and imaginary perceptions, which are falsely superimposed onto
the phenomena of experience. These are the result of mistaken ideas about reality,
and both the imaginations and the ideas are impediments to liberation.
Next the sūtra describes the other-dependent character as ‘the dependent arising
of phenomena’ (sDe dge: 27.7). It is compared to the act of appearance of the mani-
festations of impaired vision. The ultimately real character is declared to be
the suchness of phenomena. Through diligence and through proper mental
application, bodhisattvas establish realization and cultivate realization of it.
Thus it is what establishes [all the stages] up to unsurpassed, complete, perfect
awakening (sDe dge: 28.1).
The ultimately real nature is likened to the ‘nonerroneous objective referent’ of
the eyes when one overcomes defects of vision (sDe dge: 28.4). In other words, it is
compared to the absence of the visual chimera that are superimposed on perceived
phenomena. Further on in the sūtra, it is said to be the absence of the imputations
that are falsely imputed to the other-dependent character. At all times, the other-
dependent is not of the nature of the imputational, and this very absence of the
imputational is the ultimately real character.
Woncheuk comments: ‘Because it does not change into something else, because
it is a purifying object of observation, because it is the supreme of all virtuous phe-
nomena, it is called the “ultimately real nature” in the sense of being supreme.’
Quoting Vasubandhu (p. 500.1), he states:
“Because it does not change into something else,” it is not a false phenom-
enon. It is like a minister who is free from falsity… because it is a purifying
object of observation and because it is the supreme nature, it is “the ultimately
real nature”… it is all-pervasive… [It is] thoroughly differentiated from the
intrinsic character of the obstructibility of forms and so forth. Second: it is
ultimately real. This indicates that it is permanent. It is differentiated from
the impermanence and so forth of generally characterized phenomena. This
is because they are generally characterized phenomena, but they lack perma-
nence. Third: It is the suchness of phenomena. This indicates that it is not
false. It is differentiated from things like space and the “self” of Tīrthikas. This
is because although it is taught that these are permanently pervasive and per-
manent, this is false (1985: 499.7).
Byang chub rdzu’phrul describes how the three characters relate to each other:
The imputational character is a character that is posited in the manner of
names and terminology but is not posited by way of its own character; there-
fore, since it is utterly nonexistent in terms of both truths it is an absence of
nature due to being an absence of nature in terms of character. The other-
dependent character is produced by the power of other conditions but is not
produced by way of its own nature; therefore—since it exists merely like a
magician’s illusions in terms of conventional truths—it is an absence of nature
due to being an absence of nature in terms of production. Moreover—because
it does not have ultimate absence of nature because it is not a purifying object

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 J. Powers

of observation—it is not an ultimate absence of nature because it is not an

ultimate truth. Therefore, it is an absence of nature, and the ultimately real
character is the ultimate. Moreover, the ultimate is distinguished by being the
absence of nature of all phenomena and—because it is both the ultimate truth
and an absence of nature—it is an absence of nature due to being the ultimate
absence of nature [my emphasis] (1985: 213.5).
Returning to Guṇākara’s initial question, the sūtra states that when bodhisattvas
understand the imputational as it really is in relation to the other-dependent, ‘they
understand characterless phenomena as they really are’ (sDe dge: 30.1). Imputations
are characterless because they do not exist, and so have no real character. Bodhisat-
tvas who comprehend the other-dependent as it is understand phenomena of afflicted
character as they really are, which implies that the other-dependent is afflicted in the
sense that the imputations attributed to it are the result of mental defilements. Those
who understand this are ‘wise with respect to the character of phenomena’ (sDe dge:
30.1). The implications of this schema for Buddhist practice are briefly outlined in
the following passage, which declares that
when bodhisattvas know characterless phenomena as they really are with
respect to the other-dependent character, then they completely abandon phe-
nomena of afflicted character. When they have completely abandoned phenom-
ena of afflicted character, then they realize phenomena of purified character
(sDe dge: 30.1).
Thus, correct understanding of the three characters is soteriologically benefi-
cial. As bodhisattvas comprehend the individual characters and their relations, they
understand the illusions of ordinary experience for what they are, and through this
experience they are able to perceive the true nature of phenomena. Woncheuk (1985:
538.1) expands on the importance of correct comprehension of the three natures:
In that way, through entering into [understanding of] the character of objects
that appear in the manner of mental verbalizations, those bodhisattvas enter
into [understanding of] the imputational nature. Through entering into [under-
standing of] cognition-only, they enter into [understanding of] the other-
dependent nature. How do they enter into [understanding of] the ultimately
real nature? They enter after having reversed even conceptions of cognition-
only. At this level, even appearances of cognition-only do not arise.… At that
time, because objects of observation and observers are equalized for those
bodhisattvas, the nonconceptual exalted wisdom of equality arises. Therefore,
those bodhisattvas have entered into [understanding of] the ultimately real
nature.

The Three Natures/Three Characters in the Works of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu

The patterns of explanation of the qualities and relationships of the three characters/
natures detailed thus far are also found, in their essentials, in the works of Asaṅga
and Vasubandhu that discuss this concept. The imputational is a completely false

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Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/Three Characters…

superimposition attributed to the other-dependent; the other-dependent is the act of

production and relations of interdependence; and the ultimately real is the absence
of the false superimpositions.In the Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa, Vasubandhu’s analysis is
closely aligned with that of the Saṃdhinirmocana, but he extends the doctrine of
the three natures by relating it to the apparent duality of subject and object that char-
acterizes ordinary perception. He explains each of the three with reference to this
duality: the imputational nature, he asserts, is the false perception of duality, which
deluded beings uncritically accept. The act of mental creation itself is the other-
dependent, and the nonexistence of the false duality is the ultimately real.
That which appears is the other-dependent; how it appears is the imputational
Because the former develops as a result of conditions and the latter is merely
imaginary.
The eternal nonexistence of the manner in which it appears in that which
appears is known as pariniṣpanna, because it is immutable.3
In verse 4, he equates the other-dependent with ‘unreal imagination’ (abhūta-
parikalpa). He asserts that it appears in the form of duality, but this duality is false.
In verse 5 he equates unreal imagination with mind (citta), and so by extension this
would apply to the other-dependent also. He indicates that unreal imagination does
not exist in the way that it is imagined, nor as the way that it imagines an object
(artha). Thus the other-dependent is explained in two ways in this text: as unreal
imagination and as mind. It is the act of imagining the unreal forms of objectivity
and subjectivity, and so it has no reality apart from those forms. Since the forms are
illusory, they are equated with the imaginary nature.
This presentation is similar to that found in the opening chapter of the
Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya (Nagao,  1964). In the first several verses of the latter
text, Vasubandhu asserts that unreal imagination exists, that the duality perceived
in it does not exist, but the emptiness in it does exist. Thus everything is neither
exclusively empty nor nonempty. Similarly, consciousness exists in the sense that its
contents mirror the bifurcation of subject and object, but because the object does not
really exist, the subject also does not exist.
In the next several verses, he relates this schema to the doctrine of the three
natures, asserting that the imputational nature corresponds to objects, the other-
dependent to imagination of the unreal, and the ultimately real to absence of duality.
Yogis understand that everything is cognition-only (vijñapti-mātra), and for those
who perceive reality in this way objects are no longer apprehended. Therefore, there
is also no subject, because the existence of a subject depends upon an object.
In Vasubandhu’s system, correct understanding of the three natures—and par-
ticularly the ultimately real nature—has important soteriological ramifications.
In meditation, yogis see the mind in an unbifurcated form, free from the duality
of subject and object that is a result of afflicted cognition. This is discussed in the
Triṃśikā-kārikā:

3
  Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa (Vasubandhu n.d.b), verses 2 and 3: Anacker (1984: 464).

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 J. Powers

The transformations of consciousness are imaginary; they do not exist as they

are imagined, and so everything is cognition-only. Consciousness is just all the
seeds [that comprise it]; and its transformations take place in various ways in
accordance with mutual influence, due to which various imaginings arise.4
There is no suggestion in these works that pariniṣpanna is something brought into
being or ‘converted’ through the actions of meditators. On the contrary, it is con-
sistently described as the unchanging ultimate reality, the suchness of phenomena.5
Woncheuk (1985: 499.7) explicitly makes this point when he states that ‘it does not
change into something else.’ This is why it is able to perform its soteriological func-
tion of purifying mental afflictions. It is omnipresent, all-pervasive, and permanent.
Through direct comprehension of this, bodhisattvas, according to Woncheuk (538.1),
give rise to ‘the nonconceptual exalted wisdom of equality.’
Vasubandhu’s correlation of the ultimately real nature with the absence of dual-
ity in subjects and objects is also significant for the interpretation of pariniṣpanna:
it cannot plausibly be conceived as something brought into being by yogic practice
because it is the fundamental truth on which meditators focus in order to bring about
the mental transformations that result in buddhahood.
In the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra’s ‘Verses Differentiating the Characteristics of the Ulti-
mate,’ Asaṅga also emphasizes the notion that the ultimate (paramārtha/pariniṣpanna) is:
Not existent, not nonexistent, neither same nor different;
It neither arises nor ceases; it does not increase or decrease.
It does not become pure, and yet it is still pure.
This is the character of ultimate truth.6
Asaṅga comments:
The nondual truth is the ultimate. This nondual truth is illustrated in five ways:
(1) by way of the imputational and other-dependent characters being nonex-
istent; (2) by way of the ultimately real character not being nonexistent; (3)
by way of the imputational, the other-dependent, and the ultimately real being
neither exactly the same nor different—because they are not separate and are
not exactly the same, they are not identical; (4) because the sphere of real-
ity (dharma-dhātu) is unconditioned, it neither arises nor ceases; and (5) by
way of its being originally unafflicted and also not being purified due to the
elimination of adventitious afflictions. So you should understand that these five
characteristics of nonduality are the characteristics of the ultimate.7

4
 Vasubandhu (n.d.c), Triṃśikā-kārikā 17–19: Anacker (1984: 422–423).
5
  As Woncheuk (500.6) pointed out above, however, although it is the ultimate reality it is fundamentally
different from the ‘self’ (ātman) asserted by non-Buddhist systems: the ultimately real nature is both an
absence (when conceived negatively as emptiness) and the final nature of things (when conceived posi-
tively as suchness).
6
 Asaṅga, Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra 6.1, “paramārtha-lakṣaṇa-vibhāga śloka”; Bagchi (1970: 25).
7
  Bagchi (1970: 25).

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Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/Three Characters…

Asaṅga adds that the process of realization of ultimate reality serves as an antidote
to mental afflictions. Bodhisattvas abide in mind-only that appears as objects; this
leads to nonconceptual realization of the ultimate that is free from subject–object
duality, which corresponds to the path of seeing (darśana-mārga). Through elimi-
nating perceptions of subject-object duality, meditators experience ‘transformation
of the basis’ (āśraya-parivartana) on the path of meditation (bhāvanā-mārga). This
eliminates residual afflictions.
Sthiramati’s commentary on this section expands on how paramārtha/pariniṣpanna
functions as a core aspect of bodhisattvas’ meditative practice. It has six meanings;
it is: (1) a productive object; this means that bodhisattvas arise from this basis; (2)
an expansive object because it causes the purviews of hearers to expand so that
they ‘become bodhisattvas who give rise to the intention to benefit themselves and
thus become bodhisattvas who benefit themselves and others’; (3) a pleasing object
‘because bodhisattvas are happy due to working for the benefit of both themselves and
others’; (4) an object that purifies thought: ‘having purified the afflictive obstructions,
hearers who only obtain the result of their own awakening then realize the attainment
of unsurpassed awakening after eliminating both the afflictive obstructions and the
cognitive obstructions’; (5) an object for mastering the remaining bodhisattva stages:
‘when a bodhisattva dwells in the first stage, she expertly knows the nature and quali-
ties of the second to tenth stages and expertly knows how to progressively attain the
second stage and those that follow’; and (6) an object that is a source because it serves
as the basis for bodhisattva training.8
The three natures schema serves two primary functions in Indic Yogācāra lit-
erature, and interpretational problems in academic studies may have arisen due
to a conflation of these. It is (1) a description of how things exist: they have three
qualities, and individual beings focus on one of these due to their respective levels
of awareness. These three natures are what they are independently of the mental
activities of those who perceive their environments in one of these modes. (2) The
three natures schema also serves a soteriological function: beings who apply it in
a meditative context can better understand the causal factors underlying their per-
ceptions, and by eliminating falsities they can gain intuitive knowledge of the ulti-
mately real nature, and through this they will eliminate afflictions and progress on
the path. Ratnākaraśānti (ca. eleventh century) notes this dual function: ‘It is called
pariniṣpanna because it eliminates obstructions to transcendent wisdom that is both
nonerroneous and correct wisdom. This unchanging suchness is a nature that is ulti-
mately real.’9

Sponberg’s ‘Pivotal Model’ and How Pariniṣpanna Figures in It

According to Sponberg, Yogācāra literature presents two main paradigms of the

three natures doctrine, one of which he terms the ‘pivotal model’ and identifies

8
 Sthiramati (n.d.), Subcommentary on Ornament for Great Vehicle Discourses, sDe dge #4034, vol. mi: 56b.

9
 Ratnākaraśānti (n.d.), Exposition of Ornament for the Middle Way (sDe dge #4085: 226a).

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 J. Powers

as the standard in Indian treatises; the other, the ‘progressive model,’ predomi-
nates in East Asian sources. He asserts that the most detailed presentation of the
first is found in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra, which he characterizes as ‘the most
systematic and comprehensive work of Classical Indian Yogācāra’ (1982: 99). In
his reading of Indian Yogācāra, paratantra (which he terms ‘the Dependent’) has
an ‘axial position’: it ‘can be mistaken to be something Imaginary; or, it can be
understood in its true or Consummate nature’ (1982: 99). He adds: ‘what exists
is the Dependent… the Imaginary and the Consummate are two, mutually exclu-
sive aspects of the Dependent’ (1982: 101). Paratantra plays a ‘pivotal’ role in
the three natures schema because it is what is ultimately real. It can be perceived
through the lens of false conceptions or ‘consummated’ though the efforts of
yogis. In either case, paratantra ‘continues on just as it is… there is no question
of rejecting the Dependent; nor, strictly speaking of even transcending it. Its fun-
damental phenomenal existence is firmly asserted’ (1982: 103).
In Sponberg’s reading, meditators transform their perceptions of paratantra
through meditative practice, but it does not change. Sponberg elaborates on these
themes by referring to the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra’s discussion of the rope-
snake illusion, in which a person in a dark room sees a coiled rope and mistakes
it for a snake. According to Sponberg, paratantra encompasses both the rope and
the illusory perception of a snake. Like the person misperceiving a snake, yogis
who awaken to the true nature of reality discard their previous wrong views and
see paratantra for what it really is, but this ‘pivotal’ nature does not change in
any way. The snake appears ‘as a result of delusion,’ but the rope ‘comes into
being by virtue of its constituent hemp fibers and also is not without conventional
function. The hemp fibers illustrate the universal nature of Thusness, while the
rope illustrates the Dependent’ (1982: 107).
Not only is this interpretation not mentioned in the text, at no point does
Asaṅga intimate that the hemp from which the rope is made should be equated
with the ultimately real nature. In fact, he does not even mention hemp; this is
Sponberg’s own interpolation. Nor is there any indication in this passage or any-
where else in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra that pariniṣpanna is something analo-
gous to the materials from which things like ropes are constructed. Asaṅga uses
this image to indicate that the rope is merely a nominally designated entity that is
a creation of thought, not that the hemp from which it is made is a real substantial
entity that is found when one eliminates the idea of rope. Hemp is just as much
a creation of the mind as the rope and is no more real; and if one were to extend
the analysis suggested by the image, the hemp is composed of fibers, which in
turn are formed from smaller material particles. Both hemp and rope are mentally
generated abstractions, and one’s cognitive projection of this idea is based on a
composite of elements, such as the way it appears, smells, feels, etc.

Nagao’s Interpretation of the Three Characters/Natures

In Indian Yogācāra literature, the three characters/natures are described as aspects of

things that are correlated with alternative epistemic modes, three ways in which one

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Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/Three Characters…

may perceive phenomena. The three natures are interconnected, and each implies
the others. Without the other-dependent to serve as a basis for the superimposition
of imputations, the imputational nature would not be possible, and the other-depend-
ent in turn becomes manifest through the act of projection. The ultimately real can
be apprehended by meditators because there is an imputational nature that is falsely
superimposed on the other-dependent. Thus the three natures are each distinct, but
conceptually intertwined.
The terms ‘character’ (lakṣaṇa) and ‘nature’ (svabhāva) are significant with
respect to this doctrine, because they imply that each of these characterizes phenom-
ena as they are viewed in three different modes. Things may be perceived in one of
these ways at a given time; the characters/natures can be separately apprehended by
thought in the same way that cognition may single out qualities like the color, taste,
or texture of an object.
This presentation differs from the ways in which the three natures have been con-
strued by most contemporary buddhologists, who mainly follow the interpretation of
Sponberg and Nagao, either explicitly (by accepting their conclusions) or implicitly
(by employing terminology that reflects them). Nagao contends that the ultimately
real nature is something that is ‘consummated’ or ‘perfected’ by the contempla-
tive practice of Buddhist meditators. According to Nagao, the three natures model
is based on what he terms a ‘principle of convertibility’: In his reading, paratan-
tra is ‘consummated’ or ‘perfected’ by the meditative training of yogis, and thus
transformed into pariniṣpanna. Meditators eliminate the imputational and the other-
dependent is converted into the ‘consummated’ or ‘perfected’ nature. He writes that
the term
pariniṣpanna or “consummated” means perfect, real, and existent; and con-
notes “reality,” “truth,” “real existence,” or “the absolute.” It does not mean
that this reality exists in an ontological sense or that it is to be perceived epis-
temologically. It is a reality completely perfected or “consummated” by a prac-
titioner through arduous practice (Nagao 1993: 2).
As he develops this idea, Nagao argues that pariniṣpanna is not a quality of
phenomena that is their true nature (as the texts discussed in this study indicate),
but rather that it is something created by the activities of a meditative practitioner.
This corresponds to Sponberg’s ‘pivotal model,’ because in this conception para-
tantra is the basis for the false creations of imputations, and it is transformed by
meditative practice into pariniṣpanna.10 Nagao contends that the external world
remains always the same, but the cognitive world that a particular person inhab-
its depends on whether or not she has ‘converted’ or ‘perfected’ paratantra into
pariniṣpanna. According to Nagao’s interpretation, there is no ontological differ-
ence between saṃsāra and nirvana. The world is always what it is, but it is per-
ceived differently by people whose minds are afflicted with defilements and by
meditators who have eliminated them. Further, he assumes a neutral standpoint,
the other-dependent nature, that does not change. When perceived as it is—that

10
  Sponberg (1982: 97–119).

13
 J. Powers

is, as dependent arising—it is pariniṣpanna; when perceived as mental construc-

tions, it is parikalpita. He assumes that parikalpita and pariniṣpanna are epis-
temic modes—which agrees with how they are presented in the works used in this
study—but these texts indicate that paratantra is also an epistemic mode, a particu-
lar way of perceiving reality, and they give no indication that it is either primary or
more in accordance with reality than the other two natures. In fact, they repeatedly
state that pariniṣpanna is the ‘real’ or ‘true’ nature of reality and that perceiving
phenomena in this way is more correct than the paratantra mode. Paratantra is not
more ontologically primary than the other two; it is simply one of three possible
epistemic perspectives.
It should be noted that Nagao’s translation of pariniṣpanna as ‘consummated’
or ‘perfected’ is a possible one. Franklin Edgerton (1995: 325), for example, states
that pariniṣpatti means ‘perfect development, perfection,’ and that pariniṣpanna
means ‘completely perfected… perfected in the sense of arrived at the supreme
goal… nature (based on knowledge of) absolute (truth).’ Monier-Williams (1995:
596) provides similar translations, but indicates that pariniṣpanna can also mean
‘real’ or ‘existing.’ These latter equivalents are more appropriate in Indian Yogācāra
discussions of the three natures, which present pariniṣpanna as a quality of phenom-
ena that is unchanging and immutable, which always remains their true nature. It is
synonymous with the ultimate (paramārtha), emptiness (śūnyatā), and reality limit
(bhūta-koṭi), and it is also a ‘purifying object of observation’ (viśuddhālambana).
Nagao, however, does not view pariniṣpanna as an immutable quality of phe-
nomena, but instead states that ‘there needs to be a conversion of the imagined
nature of the world into the consummated nature’ (1991: 131). A similar idea is
seen in his statement, ‘the three natures are thus not lateral in their relationship but
are convertible realities’ (1991: 135).

Synonyms of Pariniṣpanna

The ultimate reality transcends words and concepts, and for that reason its defini-
tion is elusive. Moreover, as the discussion so far demonstrates, presentations of the
three natures vary between texts, and even within some treatises. Moreover, sources
that discuss this concept sometimes move back and forth between characterization
of them as aspects and discussions of the practical outcomes of viewing phenomena
from the perspective of falsities, as dependent arisings, or in their true nature.
Yogācāra works put forward a number of synonyms and analogies for
pariniṣpanna, all of which imply that it is ultimate, permanent, and uncreated. The
Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra and the Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāṣya (Nagao, 1964) equate
pariniṣpanna with paramārtha, śūnyatā, and bhūta-koṭi, all of which refer to the
unchanging final nature of phenomena. None of these are created, perfected, or con-
summated by the actions of meditators. In fact, they are able to purify afflictions
and promote the development of wisdom precisely because they are the enduring
ultimate reality. In Indian Yogācāra literature, pariniṣpanna is similarly described
as the true nature of phenomena. Yogis come to understand this through medita-
tive training, but the process enables them to perceive a quality of phenomena that

13
Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/Three Characters…

is already inherent in the phenomena themselves, and not something that is newly
created by contemplative practice. There is no inkling in these sources that the ulti-
mately real nature is something that is a result of the conversion of the other-depend-
ent character. Moreover, Nagao’s contention that pariniṣpanna does not exist in an
ontological sense contradicts the statements of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra that it
is a quality that pervades phenomena at all times and that is their true nature. In
his view, it is a state of awareness that is reached by advanced practitioners, who
transform the ordinary world and consummate it through their meditative practice.
Consider, however, the following statement from the Triṃśikā:
Paratantra, however, is imagination that arises from conditions.
Pariniṣpanna is the perpetual absence of the former [viz., parikalpita] in the
latter [viz., paratantra].….
It is the ultimate reality of all phenomena, and so it is also suchness (tathatā),
because it is just what it is at all times.11
As these verses indicate, ultimate reality is independent of human activity, and it
is not affected or influenced by the actions of yogis or of any other beings. Nagao’s
interpretation merges the realization of yogis with the meditative object by means of
which they achieve it. Moreover, in Nagao’s view, it would appear that if there were
no awakened sages, there would be no pariniṣpanna—since he considers it to be
something that results from the conversion of paratantra—but this notion receives
no support in Indian Yogācāra texts that discuss the three natures schema.
Nagao aligns his interpretation of the three natures with Zen statements that
meditators transform their respective worlds through practice. The world remains
unchanged but is perceived differently by those who are awakened.12
This is not merely an issue of semantics or niceties of translation. The differences
between Nagao’s ideas and how this concept is explained in Indic texts have impor-
tant ramifications for Yogācāra practice. Pariniṣpanna (as well as its equivalent
terms śūnyatā and paramārtha) is described as a ‘purifying object of observation,’ a
meditative object that yogis contemplate in order to eliminate afflictions and develop
wisdom. If it were something that is brought about through individual effort, then it
could not serve this function, since it would be the end result of practice, rather than
the object that facilitates it.
Woncheuk (1985: 406.2) comments that a purifying object of observation has three
aspects: (1) it is permanently changeless; (2) it is a nature of virtue and happiness;
and (3) it manifestly accomplishes everything. It is an immutable, permanent qual-
ity of phenomena that is in no way dependent on human activity for its actualization.
Because of this it can facilitate attainment of advanced levels of realization.
Moreover, because pariniṣpanna is equated with śūnyatā, it is difficult to imagine
how the presentation of the three natures in Indian Yogācāra texts could be recon-
ciled with Nagao’s interpretation, since in Mahāyāna Buddhist philosophy śūnyatā
is presented as a quality that characterizes all phenomena at all times. Emptiness is

11
  Triṃśikā verses 21 and 25 (Anacker 1984: 423).
12
  See Nagao (1993: 4 note 2).

13
 J. Powers

the final nature of phenomena and is unchanging, immutable, and permanent. Con-
templation of this abiding nature of phenomena is a catalyst that leads to advanced
states of realization.

Analogies of the Three Characters/Natures

Several Indian Yogācāra texts that discuss the three characters/natures provide similes
to help readers conceptualize their relations. Some of these are cited by Nagao as cor-
roboration of his interpretation, but a closer examination indicates that they are not.
I will only discuss four of the most influential analogies: the crystal analogy of the
Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, the magical elephant analogy of the Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa,
and the analogies of gold ore and rope-snake of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha. In the first
of these, the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra states that the three natures may be compared
to a transparent crystal that comes into contact with a colored object, and through this
appears to be a colored gem, such as a ruby or emerald.
In the same way as a very clear crystal comes into contact with a color, the
other-dependent character comes into contact with the predispositions for con-
ventional designations that are the imputational character. For example, in the
same way as a very clear crystal is mistaken for a precious substance such as
a sapphire.…the other-dependent character is apprehended as the imputational
character. The other-dependent nature is like that of the very clear crystal. For
example, a transparent crystal is not ultimately real in permanent, permanent
time [i.e., in the past] or in everlasting, everlasting time [i.e., in the future]
as having the character of a precious substance like a sapphire… it lacks the
natures [of such things] (sDe dge: 28.5).
Regarding this analogy, Nagao comments:
The unenlightened ones look at the other-dependent world through colored
glasses, as it were, the original other-dependent world appearing to them not
as it is, but tinged by the colored glass of imagination. Removing the colored
glass… is no easy task; but once it is achieved, then the other-dependent world
recovers its original nature. This recovery of the other-dependent nature is
none other than the realization of the consummated nature… The consum-
mated world thus becomes manifested by the recovery of the other-dependent
nature (1993: 12–13).
In this simile, a false impression is created by the coloring of the crystal, and it
is perceived as a different sort of thing from what it actually is. The impression of a
sapphire or ruby appears to observers, but their perceptions are mistaken. The false
cognition is compared to the imputational nature, since it is utterly erroneous, and
the crystal itself—the basis on which the color is superimposed—is analogous to the
other-dependent nature. When the coloring is removed, the nonperception of the gem
as something other than what it is is likened to the ultimately real character. This anal-
ogy is significant for the argument of this article because there is no suggestion in the
text that the crystal is ‘perfected’ or ‘consummated’—or in fact that any actual change

13
Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/Three Characters…

takes place in it. The three aspects are perspectives in terms of which the crystal may be
viewed. When interpreted in terms of the adventitious color, a perceiver misapprehends
the crystal as a sapphire; but when perceiving it as it is, the same person will see the
crystal on which the false attribution was based. Finally, when the color is removed,
perception of the nonappearance of the color is compared to the perspective of the ulti-
mately real character, in which false imputations no longer appear.
The Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa provides an analogy of a magician who conjures an
imaginary apparition of an elephant to illustrate the three natures. In this example,
the magician chants magical mantras, which causes a piece of wood to appear to an
audience as an elephant.
A magical creation produced by the power of mantras may appear as an ele-
phant, but there is only an appearance, and no elephant whatsoever exists
there.
The imputational nature is the elephant, and the other-dependent is its appear-
ance.
The ultimately real is the nonexistence of an elephant there.
The creation of what is nonexistent appears in the same way from the basic
mind due to the nature of duality, but no duality whatsoever exists there, only
an appearance.
The foundation consciousness is like the mantra; suchness is like the wood.
Perception is like the appearance of the elephant, and duality is the elephant
itself.13
Although Vasubandhu states that the ultimately real nature is the absence of the
apparitional elephant, Nagao contends that the wood that provides a physical basis
for the apparition is actually pariniṣpanna. He provides no explanation as to why he
thinks this, and it is contradicted by the text itself.
The analogy also conflicts with Nagao’s interpretation of the three natures in that
Vasubandhu is implying that there are three different perspectives on the scene and
that these correspond to particular aspects in terms of which phenomena may be
viewed. The apparitional elephant is a creation of magic, and so it is utterly non-
existent, but the appearance itself—since it is perceived and thus has an effect on
the audience—is not utterly nonexistent. Thus it belongs to the other-dependent,
which is equated with the production of appearances and the apparent bifurcation
of consciousness into subjective and an objective modes. Finally, the absence of the
false appearance, which the audience perceives when the power of the mantra ceases
to operate, is the ultimately real, since it is the actual state of affairs. Nothing has
been consummated or perfected in this perspective: the false manifestation no longer
appears, and so the audience perceives the absence of the apparitional elephant.
The third analogy we will consider is found in the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in a sec-
tion in which Asaṅga provides several examples that are intended to facilitate under-
standing of the relation between the three natures. Asaṅga speaks of auriferous clay
from which dross materials are extracted, leaving pure gold.

13
  Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa, vv. 27–30 (Anacker 1984: 423).

13
 J. Powers

In the auriferous clay, one ascertains three things: the earth element, the earth,
and the gold. In the earth element, the earth that is not found there is per-
ceived, while the gold that is found there is not perceived. When one burns the
earth element with fire, the earth does not appear, while the gold does appear.
The earth element, when it appears as earth, has a false appearance; when
it appears as gold it has a true appearance. Consequently, the earth element
enters into two parts at once [participates at once in the earth and the gold]. In
the same way, when one has not burned perception with the fire of nonconcep-
tual wisdom, the false imaginary nature contained in this perception appears,
while the true absolute nature does not appear. When one burns perception
with the fire of nonconceptual wisdom, the true absolute nature contained in
this perception appears, while the false imaginary nature does not appear. Con-
sequently, the dependent nature that is composed of the false imaginations of
perception enters into the two parts at once [participates at once in defilement
and purity] and is similar to the earth element in auriferous clay.14
In this example, the auriferous clay is transformed through the action of purifying
it of dross elements, after which the pure gold ore shines with its innate luster. At
first glance this appears to provide some traction for Nagao’s take on pariniṣpanna
because the act of smelting changes what is perceived, but in the analogy the dross
elements are real and not imagined. The actions of the goldsmith purify the gold of
adventitious substances, but the gold itself is not transformed or altered. This anal-
ogy is mentioned by Nagao, and he concludes that its purport is that just as gold is
purified through smelting, so awakened sages purify paratantra through meditation,
and thus
when burned away by the fire of non-discriminative wisdom, the one world is
transformed into the consummated world of the enlightened ones, and the con-
summated nature is fully manifested (1993: 10).
There is no indication in the analogy that the gold is perfected, altered, or trans-
formed. Rather, adventitious materials that prevented it from being perceived as it is
are removed, after which its true aspect is revealed.
A fourth analogy, found in Mahāyāna-saṃgraha III.8, is the rope-snake illusion
discussed above. Asaṅga compares the rope to the other-dependent nature, since it is
the basis on which the mistaken idea of a snake is imputed. The nonexistence of the
snake that is falsely imagined is the ultimately real nature, while the snake-cognition
is the imputational nature. Asaṅga’s conclusion is significant for our present discus-
sion: he indicates that the rope is not a real thing, but is merely a composite of vari-
ous qualities, such as color, odor, and tangibility.
One enters that [viz., cognition-only] in the same way [that one identifies] a
rope that in the darkness that seems to be a snake. Because it does not exist,
the snake seen in the rope is an illusion. Those who recognize that it does not

14
  Lamotte (1938; 125–126). The passage is my rendering of Lamotte’s French translation. I have elimi-
nated Lamotte’s reconstructions of Sanskrit terms in order to make the passage more readable.

13
Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/Three Characters…

exist reject the notion of a snake and adhere to the notion of a rope. But the
rope itself, if one reduces it to its subtle elements, is an illusion, because its
specific characteristics are color, odor, flavor, and tangibility.15
In this example, a person initially misperceives a coiled rope as a snake and reacts
to the rope as if it were a snake. Upon subsequent examination, the rope is seen
for what it is, after which the snake-cognition disappears. The initial erroneous per-
ception is compared to the imputational nature. The production of the cognition is
analogous to the other-dependent nature, which is conventionally real because it is
perceived and has effects. Finally, the third moment of cognition, in which one looks
at the rope but no longer perceives a snake, is likened to the ultimately real nature.
There is no transformation in this process, only a change in perspective. This is quite
different from Nagao’s contention that
[o]nly when attachment and false imagination are removed is the one unchang-
ing world ultimately purified and consummated as the pure world; that is to
say, the imagined nature has been changed or converted into the consummated
nature (1993: 5).
Although this analogy contradicts Nagao’s model, he cites it in support of his
theories and interprets it as implying that a real thing (the rope) is the basis upon
which one perceives both the illusion of the snake and the reality of the rope, which
is the hemp from which it is made (1993: 9).

Translations and Interpretations of Pariniṣpanna

Nagao’s contention that pariniṣpanna is ‘perfected’ or ‘consummated’ and Sponberg’s

‘pivotal model’ interpretation of the three natures schema are reflected in the major-
ity of secondary studies of this notion, either implicitly in translation equivalents or
explicitly in citations. A survey of academic literature on this topic reveals that ‘per-
fected’ or ‘consummated’ are popular translation choices, while other scholars use ter-
minology that better accords with how pariniṣpanna is presented in Indian Yogācāra
texts, e.g., ‘absolute’ or ‘thoroughly established natures’ (see chart below).
If one moves from close reading of Indic texts that expound the three natures
doctrine to studies by contemporary buddhologists, it is striking how many correctly
present pariniṣpanna but employ terminology that contravenes their characteriza-
tion. In the first book-length discussion of the three natures, Åke Boquist (1993:
34–35) translates pariniṣpanna as ‘consummated nature,’ but comments that it is
‘connected with… the bodhisattva’s quest for knowledge. As a consummated nature
it brings about the supreme (anuttara), complete enlightenment.’ If it is the factor
that facilitates the meditation that culminates in buddhahood, it would be conceptu-
ally contradictory for it to be the result of this process or to be changed by it.
Joy Brennan (2018: 622) rejects Sponberg’s ‘pivotal model’ as an accurate reflec-
tion of the purport of how the three natures are presented in Indian Yogācāra texts,
but she translates pariniṣpanna as ‘perfected nature.’ She comments that:

15
  Lamotte (1938: 163–164).

13
 J. Powers

The commonly embraced name for that standard interpretation is the “pivotal
model”, according to which the dependent nature is understood to be a basic
ontological reality, itself morally neutral, underlying two distinct cognitive ori-
entations towards it, one defiled (the constructed nature) and one purified (the
perfected nature). Ever since Alan Sponberg coined this name for the model
and deemed it the classical Indian presentation of the three natures by distin-
guishing it from the “progressive model”, identified as a later conceptual inno-
vation, the pivotal model has been taken as the standard three natures theory
model from which later models are thought to deviate… But in fact a survey of
the primary source materials shows that the predominant three natures model
as represented in foundational Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda literature is more like the
progressive than the pivotal.
She adds (2018: 623) that the ‘commonly held view that the pivotal model best
represents the predominant three natures theory is therefore both inaccurate and
obfuscatory.’ In Brennan’s reading of the three natures, the schema provides a new
paradigm for the Buddhist path to awakening that ‘repurposes’ the first three noble
truths (ārya-satya). She correctly notes that in Indic sources pariniṣpanna refers to
‘the object of direct realization’ and is the ultimate reality that is ‘inexpressible and
naturally unfabricated… intrinsically pure and the object of purification.’16 But her
translation of pariniṣpanna as ‘perfected nature’ is at odds with how she reports its
presentation in the texts she cites. Something ‘perfected’ must have been less than
perfect prior to its transformation; and if it was something else before its attainment
of perfection, it would also be susceptible to future degeneration.
As the chart below demonstrates, terminology that reflects Sponberg’s ‘pivotal
model’ and Nagao’s ‘principle of convertibility’ abounds in secondary literature on
the three natures, and it is also encoded in reference works published by leading aca-
demic presses. In a detailed study of the three natures in Indian and Tibetan works,
Jeffrey Hopkins argues that pariniṣpanna (which he translates as ‘thoroughly estab-
lished nature(s)’) is ‘the ultimate and…the non-existence of the nature of the object
negated in selflessness’; and he notes ‘the proclivity of some American, European,
and Japanese scholars to interpret the thoroughly established nature as a purified
version of other powered natures.’17
As we have seen, some academic studies reject the notion that the three natures
schema encodes a process of ‘perfection’ or ‘consummation’ of paratantra, and they
correctly interpret pariniṣpanna as enduring, unchanging ultimate reality. Nonethe-
less, translations that imply conversion or transformation persist. In some cases,
what results is a jumble of contradictory notions. Mario D’Amato (2005: 189), for
example, translates pariniṣpanna as ‘perfected nature,’ and he comments that it ‘is to
be purified.’ He then states, however, that it ‘refers to the original purity of reality…
it is existent, originally pure, and without the nature of discursivity’ (2005: 193). He
does not appear to recognize the implicit contradictions in these characterizations. If

16
  Brennan (2018: 629, 631).
17
  Hopkins (2002: 261).

13
Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/Three Characters…

it is the ‘original purity of reality,’ then by implication it cannot be something that is

purified by human activity.
The influence of Sponberg’s ‘pivotal model’ can be seen in the introduction
to D’Amato’s translation of the Madhyānta-vibhāga (Nagao,  1964), where he
describes it as a ‘useful entry into the three-nature theory.’18 D’Amato notes that
in the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra’s three natures schema paratantra is equated with
dependent arising and with the flow of arising and cessation of phenomena, and
pariniṣpanna ‘refers to the true version of reality: reality as it truly is, unmediated
by conceptualizations’; but he adds (2012: 15–17) that in the later Yogācāra tradi-
tion, both the pivotal and progressive models can be found in Indic literature. He
interprets Vasubandhu’s stance in the Madhyānta-vibhāga (Nagao 1964) as accord-
ing with the pivotal model, and he notes that Vasubandhu equates paratantra with
‘unreal imagination’ (abhūta-parikalpa). This compound is composed of two parts,
both of which denote something that is false and imaginary. Monier Williams trans-
lates abhūta as ‘whatever has not been or happened,’ and parikalpa as ‘illusion.’19 In
light of this, it is conceptually incoherent to assert that ‘the dependent nature exists
as the ontological substratum of the other two natures.’20 D’Amato is apparently
aware of the tensions between this and his conclusion that the pivotal model is Vasu-
bandhu’s position, because he notes that the commentary to ch. 3, v. 10a states that
the text construes meditative attainment in this system as abandoning the dependent
nature and thoroughly understanding the ultimately real.21
The persistence of Sponberg’s analysis can be also be seen in Roy Tzohar’s
groundbreaking Yogācāra Buddhist Theory of Metaphor, which cites Sponberg’s
‘pivotal model’ with approval and affirms that it accords with how Sthiramati pre-
sents the three natures in his commentary on verses 20–22 of the Triṃśikā.22 Tzohar
describes a ‘causal process’ of transformation of paratantra into pariniṣpanna, but
the passages from Sthiramati’s text that he cites do not actually say this; rather, they
follow the outlines of Indian Yogācāra literature presented above.23 Tzohar’s analy-
sis conflates what happens to meditators whose focal object is pariniṣpanna (they
progressively attain qualities conducive to attainment of buddhahood) with what
happens to pariniṣpanna itself during this process (nothing).
The chart below surveys secondary literature that discusses the three natures and
demonstrates the persistence of terminology reflective of transformation, perfection,
and consummation.

18
  D’Amato (2012: 15).
19
  Both contain the verbal root kḷp, ‘to be adapted,’ ‘to change,’ ‘to produce,’ ‘to cause,’ ‘to effect’ (Mon-
ier-Williams (1995: 308, col. 2), combined with the intensifying prefix pari, which expresses ‘fullness…
or high degree’ (Monier-Williams 1995: 591, col. 2).
20
  D’Amato (2012: 17).
21
  D’Amato (2012: 18).
22
  Tzohar (2018: 180).
23
  Tzohar (2018: 181–187).

13
 J. Powers

Perfected/perfect Consummated/consum- Absolute Thoroughly established

mate

pariniṣpanna- pariniṣpanna- pariniṣpanna- pariniṣpanna-

svabhāva = ‘perfected svabhāva = ‘the svabhāva = ‘the svabhāva = ‘thoroughly
nature’:Brennan consummated nature’: absolute’: Kapstein established natures’:
(2018: 622)D’Amato Boquist (1993: 34) (2018: 15)Tola and Hopkins (2002:
(2005: 189)Emma- Kaplan (1990: Dragonetti (2004: 261)‘thoroughly estab-
nuel (2013: 143) 69);‘consummate’: 200)‘l’Absolu’: Lam- lished phenomenon’:
Hayes (2007: 845) Garfield (2002: otte (1935: 175) Sparham (1993: 72)
Makransky (1997: 80) 117);‘consummate
Saito (1998: 24)Sal- nature’: Kapstein
vini (2015: 57)Tzohar (2018: 11)Prince-
(2018: 91)Waldron ton Dictionary of
(2018: 290;‘per- Buddhism: Buswell
fected’: Gold (2015: and Lopez (2014:
150)Warder (1980: 228);‘consummate’:
431) ‘the “perfected” Keown (2003:
or “consummate” 310);‘consumma-
nature’: Carpenter tion’: Lusthaus (2004:
(2014: 160);‘perfected 918);‘consummate
aspect of experi- characteristic or
ence’: Griffiths (1986: nature’: Sponberg
84);‘the ultimate or (1982: 100)
the perfected’:Coseru
(2012);‘the form
perfectly attained’:
Encyclopedia Britan-
nica (2021);‘pattern
of full perfection’:
Keenan (2000:
32);‘perfected aspect’:
Williams (1989: 85)

From among these equivalents, ‘the absolute’ and ‘thoroughly established natures’
more accurately convey the sense found in Indian Yogācāra texts that pariniṣpanna is
permanent and unchanging, something that serves as the focal point for advanced med-
itation. ‘Perfect’ and ‘consummate’ are preferable to ‘perfected’ or ‘consummated,’
but these also imply change or alteration, and so are at odds with the core notion that
pariniṣpanna is the ultimate reality, equivalent to śūnyatā and paramārtha. Perfection
is a fleeting state of affairs, one generally achieved through protracted effort, as when
someone perfects a recipe, experiences a perfect moment of joy, or perfectly executes
a planned series of moves in an athletic contest. By its very nature, such perfection
does not endure, whereas the ultimate nature of reality never changes into anything
else and requires no outside actions to make it what it is.24

24
  It could be argued that equivalents like “perfected” or “consummated” have a certain grammatical
symmetry because, like pariniṣpanna, they are past passive participles (bhūte kṛdanta); but the key
imperative for a translation is that it accurately conveys the meaning of a term in the target language.
Reflecting Sanskrit grammar is at best a secondary desideratum.

13
Can Ultimate Reality Change? The Three Natures/Three Characters…

Similarly, ‘consummate’ implies a process that has been brought to its highest
level, following which degeneration of the acquired skill will inevitably occur. A
consummate football quarterback, for example, may remain in top form for decades,
but age, injury, and diminished physical abilities will eventually lead him to retire.
The same is true for anyone who achieves a consummate level of performance in
fields such as music performance or surgery: no one continues to perform at the
highest level in old age. Pariniṣpanna, however, does not age, nor does it either pro-
gress toward a point of perfection or subsequently diminish.

Conclusion

In the Indian Yogācāra texts surveyed in this study, the imputational nature is
described as false mental creations that are motivated by mistaken notions about
reality. The other-dependent is linked with dependent arising and to the act of
mental production, and the ultimately real is the absence of false imagination. It is
explained by Vasubandhu in several texts as the absence of duality, emptiness, and
nonapprehension of mind after subject–object duality has been eliminated. Indian
Yogācāra literature consistently describes it as the true and immutable nature of
phenomena, something that never changes, that remains always the same.
Sponberg and Nagao, however, contend that the thrust of Indian Yogācāra texts is
that there is no ontological difference between saṃsāra and nirvana, and they posit
a neutral standpoint—the other-dependent nature—that abides and that is equivalent
to dependent arising. When its true nature is realized, it is pariniṣpanna, and when
perceived as the imaginations of consciousness, it is parikalpita. There are, of course,
traditions of Buddhism that share this assumed framework, but the Indian Yogācāra
tradition is not one of them. Support for ‘pivotal’ or ‘convertibility’ interpretations is
lacking in the sources considered here, and I have yet to see any Indian Yogācāra text
that supports his reading.25 In light of this, translations of pariniṣpanna as ‘consum-
mated’ or ‘perfected’ (as well as ‘perfect’ or ‘consummate’) are at odds with how this
term is understood in Indian Yogācāra literature, and should be eschewed. Based on
how the texts surveyed in this paper discuss pariniṣpanna, it should be clear that it is
one of three aspects of things that correspond to possible epistemological modes in
terms of which phenomena may be viewed. It is characterized as the ‘real’ or ‘true’
aspect, in which false imputations no longer appear. Since it is not in fact ‘perfected’
or ‘consummated’ by the activities of meditators as Nagao believes—and because it
is not the enduring and unchanging ‘pivot’ between parikalpita and pariniṣpanna, as
Sponberg asserts—translations that imply such notions should be avoided.

25
  An exhaustive survey of East Asian Yogācāra sources lies outside the scope of this study, but one
corroborating text is Xuanzang’s 玄奘 (602–664) Demonstration of Consciousness-Only (Cheng weishi
lun 成唯識論), which follows the pattern we have seen in Indian Yogācāra texts (see la Vallée Poussin
1928). On p. 549, pariniṣpanna is equated with paramārtha, tathatā, and nirvana, because it is ‘immu-
table’ (avikāra) and nonerroneous (aviparīta). On p. 554, Xuanzang writes that it is ‘simply the actual
nonexistence [of imputations], because it does not depend on causes.’.

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 J. Powers

Funding  Funding that supported this project was provided by the Australian Research Council. Versions
of parts of this study have been presented at the American Academy of Religion Annual Meeting in
several Yogācāra Studies Group panels. I wish to thank the colleagues who have provided feedback and
suggested new sources, including the anonymous reviewers whose comments significantly improved the
final product.

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