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The document discusses how scientists respond to crises in their field. It notes that scientists do not renounce the paradigm that led to the crisis, and will only reject a theory if an alternative is available to replace it. The process of rejecting a theory is based on more than just comparing it to the natural world, and involves comparing alternatives to both nature and each other.

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29 views1 page

Enlgish Into Arabic

The document discusses how scientists respond to crises in their field. It notes that scientists do not renounce the paradigm that led to the crisis, and will only reject a theory if an alternative is available to replace it. The process of rejecting a theory is based on more than just comparing it to the natural world, and involves comparing alternatives to both nature and each other.

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M
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© © All Rights Reserved
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Let us then assume that crises are a necessary precondition for the emergence of novel

theories and ask next how scientists respond to their existence. Part of the answer, as obvious
as it is important, can be discovered by noting first what scientists never do when confronted
by even severe and prolonged anomalies. Though they may begin to lose faith and then to
consider alternatives, they do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis. They
do not, that is, treat anomalies as counter-instances, though in the vocabulary of philosophy
of science that is what they are. In part this generalization is simply a statement from historic
fact, based upon examples like those given above and, more extensively, below. These hint
what our later examination of paradigm rejection will disclose more fully: once it has
achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate
candidate is available to take its place. No process yet disclosed by the historical study of
scientific development at all resembles the methodological stereotype of falsification by
direct comparison with nature. That remark does not mean that scientists do not reject
scientific theories, or that experience and experiment are not essential to the process in which
they do so. But it does mean—what will ultimately be a central point—that the act of
judgment that leads scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always based upon
more than a comparison of that theory with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is
always simultaneously the decision to accept another, and the judgment leading to that
decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other.

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