Techne
Techne
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Robert Meagher
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which has its own purposes, without our intervening in, gazing, something to know and perhaps to wonder at. If,
much less contravening, those purposes. Neither is it as we are gazing at a tree, rain begins to fall, we may be
techne when we make a joke or produce a poem; for jokes inspired to look at the tree and see in its extended arms
and poems are made, as it were, from thin air. Thoughts welcoming shelter from the rain, not as if this were some
are immaterial as, for all practical purposes, are words. intrinsic purpose of the tree's unfolding but merely as a
Finally, any chance, random, or inadvertent activity, de- happy coincidence. Then, instead of gazing any longer at
spite what it may produce, is never a true instance of the tree, we run to it; and in doing so, we begin to see it in
techne, which may be defined as the conscious, willful our terms, as a refuge, as useful. So far, however, we have
working or reworking of matter until it becomes not only not altered the tree. Our presence, complete with human
what it was not but also what it was our intention that it need and desire, is as yet unintrusive. Suppose, however,
should become. Thus it is an instance of techne when we
we begin to have more permanent designs upon the tree
cut down a tree to make lumber for a house, or logs for
and awonder how it might become for us an enduring ref-
fire, or paper for a book. uge from the elements. Not without alterations. Not with-
out the tree's destruction. Not without work, the stages of
From these admittedly commonplace examples we may which we rehearse in our mind. When the rain stops, we
derive all the essential principles of techne: that it is get
con-up and step back from the tree. It and its neighbors
are now lumber to us and for our envisioned shelter. He-
scious, willful, materially violent, and materially produc-
tive. Interestingly, the ancient Greek word most com- gel, Marx, and the early Heidegger, to be sure, would pre-
monly used to mean "matter" or "material" is hule, whose fer more complex formulations for these ideas, but the
first meaning is simply "wood." This word in its ambiguity
story remains essentially the same. Human being essen-
represents a missing link between the natural and the tially realizes itself through negating what is and trans-
artificial. It points simultaneously back towards treesforming
and it in accord with human idea and will.
ahead towards matter, thus revealing the passage from
one to the other. Wood, halfway from tree to raw mate- This, then, is the core of human genius: to look at a forest
rial, is still recognizably natural and yet is, in the multi-
and see not the trees but a village of houses or a fleet of
plicity of its uses, a metaphor for all that is malleable.
ships, or to look at a deer and see not a deer but a shirt, a
Wood is not what the architect sees either firstly or of shoes, and a week's meals; and then, of course,
pair
finally. First there is the tree and finally there is the
materially to realize one's vision. Seeing beyond immedi-
house. In the meantime there is wood. ately given realities is, after all, not enough. Francis Ba-
con spoke with contempt of the impotent transcendence of
This movement from tree to house is and must be a leap ancient and medieval wisdom, which he likened to the im-
of imagination before it becomes a practical undertaking,
potent fantasies of boys. Effectual wisdom, Bacon argued,
which is to say that a house must be imagined beforeisitnecessarily at one with power. It is not enough to know
can be built. To the naked eye a tree represents itself as
the world; one must alter it, bend it to one's purposes, im-
prove it. There is nothing essentially new or modern,
what it is, an other being with its own life and its own pur-
however, in this notion, for this same fusion of idea and
poses. Seen for itself, in itself, it is an object of simple
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anatomy, its coloration, its movements, as fully as the pinnacle of their perfection; and Adam, created to act in
human eye is capable of doing so; but the hunter "takes the image of God, speaks over the cosmos of created
aim at " the bird, a different matter altogether. The first beings, giving to each its name.
stage in the hunter's vision is to free itself from the bird;
and once that freedom is achieved and the bird essentially The idea of a word so powerful that it creates what it ut-
negated, then the bird, negligible in itself, may be shot ters is peculiarly Middle-Eastern and simply foreign to
and cooked, stuffed, or left to lie where it falls, depending ancient Greece. Such a word is absolutely free, since
on the hunter's current needs and desires, which may prior to its utterance there is nothing. It is radically arbi-
stem from such diverse sources as hunger, sadism, bore- trary, answerable to nothing beyond itself. The divine
dom, or vanity. word proceeds from the infinite, impenetrable willfulness
of God and literally constitutes external, finite reality.
In the exercise of techne^, then, imaginative freedom is es- Adam, for all his similarities to God, however, is far more
sential and prior to violence. That the architect possesses constrained and accountable in his exercise of speech.
and practices such freedom is apparent, whether an Adam speaks not over the void but over the created cos-
architect is altering an existing structure or envisioning mos. He calls all things not into existence but to task. He
an as yet non-existent one. That the architect's freedom is bestows names, not existence. Nonetheless, his names are
always constrained and limited by matter is no less appar- powerful; for it is said that whatever he calls each thing,
ent; for every architectural vision must in the end refer, that is what it is.
even defer, to matter. Speaking properly and precisely,
the architect is a maker, not a creator. Architectural The key to the meaning of Adam's power lies in the
works, always only relatively creative, remain instances significance of names in the ancient Middle East, a matter
of techne, things constructed from matter, not created like all others in this essay complex beyond the synoptic
from nothingness. demands of this discussion. Nonetheless, we may say that
names were seen to confer upon anyone or anything their
In fact, no distinction is more decisive for the architect substance, their identity. Names, in short, construe real-
than that between "creating" and "constructing"; and no ity, relative to the name-giver. In entrusting the creation
text is more illuminating of this distinction than the crea- to Adam and in empowering Adam to construe the crea-
tion myth in Genesis, whose authority need be no more tion, God gave to Adam nothing less than effective sover-
than descriptive. In this text, since the respective natures eignty. In case we might skeptically wonder what is, after
of both God and Adam are defined solely by their activi- all, in a name, we should consider several examples of the
ties, the distinction between the act of creating and the forseeable range of Adam's name-giving power. When an
act of constructing proves at the same time definitive of animal, say a cow, is brought before Adam, it is for him to
God and of Adam; God is one who creates and Adam is construe it as something to worship or to harness or to eat
one who constructs. Both activities, however, are essen- or to milk or simply to acknowledge respectfully and let
tially acts of speech. God speaks over the void and sum- be. Similarly, when Adam confronts a river, he must de-
mons from the void a cosmos of beings, with Adam as the cide whether its waters are to be for drinking, or for the
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eyes is the willful work of human beings. What is now dry nothingness; and I fear that the void toward which our
land, supporting massive structures, may once have been technology is unwittingly pushing us is not the one from
water or marsh; and the rivers or canals before our eyes which it will subsequently be able to call forth anything
may have been diverted or even created by human intent which we shall ever look upon, much less see to be good.
and hands. The patches of green below us, trees and Finally, Marx justified the abolition of nature and the
parks, were planned and planted. The all-embracing erection of a cosmic human construct on the Hegelian
patchwork of concrete structures and streets were first grounds that otherness is alienating. There are some of
sketched and then poured into place, effacing whatever us, however, who find an untouched wilderness far less al-
once stood or lay in their place. Now, if we imagine the ienating than a complete, humanly designed and con-
entirety of the world similarly transformed until nothing trolled environment and who see in the vision of a hu-
wild, nothing alien, nothing random confronts us, until manly constructed cosmos not a dream but a nightmare.
all that exists reflects human will and power, then we
grasp the dream from which our age has yet to awaken. Awakening from this vision, it may then be the challenge
and the responsibility of the contemporary architekton to
Having taken this long to sketch with the broadest of pens conserve rather than to abolish otherness and to hold as
the idea and ideology of techne, there can be no question suspect any self-aggrandizing humanism that presumes t
of developing now a critique of the same. Instead, I will eclipse or diminish the non-human. A "wisely conceive
conclude with a series of unadorned comments, which humanism," in the words of Levi-Strauss, is one which
may provoke further thought. As both a beneficiary and a "does not center on man but gives him a reasonable plac
victim of modern techne, I am not uniformly confident within nature, rather than letting him make himself mas-
that its modern practitioners possess the compassion and ter and plunderer." Man, suggests Levi-Strauss, "is wor
goodwill of Prometheus. Prometheus defied the Gods and thy of respect more as a living being than as the lord an
brought transforming power to human beings so that master of creation." Heidegger's word Gelassenheit is a
their sorry plight might be alleviated, not deepened. His apt as any to describe the antidote to human tyranny. Af-
aim was to improve, not to eradicate, the cosmos as a hu- ter years of proposing that the cosmos should be made
man habitat. Neither am I confident that human beings into a human workshop with homo faber at its determin
will ever be capable of uttering the first word, the creative ing center, Heidegger re-considered his position and pro
word. It appears that, in attempting to appropriate crea- posed, instead, Gelassenheit, or "letting all things be."
tive power, modern techne has amassed primarily de- This, of course, is a prescription for contemplation, not
structive power, power perversely suited to uttering the for techne; but a techne experienced in contemplation,
last word, the word which would send the world into the riddled with the scruples of Adam, and inspired by th
void instead of summoning it therefrom. Creation, divine benevolence of Prometheus is at least likely to leave th
or human, by definition requires a formless void, virtual world as inhabitable as it found it.
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