Case Title: EVERY NATION LANGUAGE INSTITUTE (ENLI) AND RALPH MARTIN LIGON,
v. MARIA MINELLIEDELA CRUZ, G.R. No. 225100, February 19, 2020 (REYES, J. JR., J.)
Instruction learned:
1. Whether NLRC decisions are reviewable by Court of Appeals.
In St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, we held that the decision of the NLRC may be
reviewed by the CA through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. But
because certiorari is not the same as an appeal, it is not a means to review the entire
decision of the NLRC for reversible errors on questions of fact and law. Apparently
limiting itself to the arguments contained in the certiorari petition, the CA resolved only
the issue of whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in admitting Dela
Cruz's appeal.
The limits of the review under Rule 65 affect the Court's review under Rule 45 assailing
the CA's ruling in cases involving alleged grave abuse of discretion by the NLRC. Given
that a review under Rule 45 is limited only to questions of law, the question of law that
must be resolved is whether the CA correctly ruled on the presence or absence of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
2. Is preventive suspension allowed?
Placing an employee under preventive suspension is allowed under Section 8, Rule
XXIII, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, as amended. This
section provides:
Section 8. Preventive suspension. The employer may place the worker concerned under
preventive suspension only if his continued employment poses a serious and imminent
threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-workers.
3. What is the nature of prevention suspension?
Preventive suspension is not a penalty but a disciplinary measure to protect life or
property of the employer or the co-workers pending investigation of any alleged
infraction committed by the employee. Thus, it is justified only when the employee's
continued employment poses a serious and imminent threat to the employer's or co-
workers' life or property. When justified, the preventively suspended employee is not
entitled to the payment of his salaries and benefits for the period of suspension.
4. Is there a limitation in placing an employee under preventive suspension?
Nevertheless, the management's prerogative of placing an employee under preventive
suspension is further temporally limited. Section 9 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code limits the duration of the preventive suspension to a maximum of 30
days:
Section 9. Period of suspension. No preventive suspension shall last longer than thirty
(30) days. The employer shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a
substantially equivalent position or the employer may extend the period of suspension
provided that during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due
to the worker.
Section 9 is clear that the employer had the positive duty of reinstating the preventively
suspended employee upon the lapse of the 30-day period sans extension. When the
period of preventive suspension exceeds the maximum period allowed without
reinstating the employee actually or through payroll, or when the preventive suspension
is for an indefinite period, constructive dismissal sets in.
5. What are the instances considered as amounting or tantamount to constructive
dismissal?
Agcolicol, Jr. v. Casiño cites instances considered as amounting or tantamount to
constructive dismissal such as: (a) where the employee's prolonged suspension was due
to the employer's neglect to conclude the investigation; (b) where the employer's
imposition of preventive suspension pending final investigation was coupled with the
employer's lack of intention to conduct such final investigation; (c) where placing the
employee under preventive suspension in excess of the 30-day limit was a
predetermined effort to dismiss the latter from service in the guise of preventive
suspension; (d) and where the employer failed to recall the employee to work after the
expiration of the suspension taken together with the employer's precondition that the
employee withdraw the complaints against it.
Having been constructively dismissed, Dela Cruz is entitled to the payment of
backwages from the time of her dismissal on July 22, 2012 up to the finality of this
decision. Dela Cruz is likewise entitled to reinstatement but considering that seven years
have lapsed, it is more in consonance with substantive justice to award her with
separation pay computed at one month pay for every year of service.
