CD No.

2b CASES:

Case # 30
Doctrine:
The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals was the first case that
attempted to lay down the standards for determining psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Santos declared that
“psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.” Furthermore, the incapacity “should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.”
Case Title: Celerina J. Santos vs. Ricardo T. Santos, GR. No. 187061;
October 8, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La Fuente, Jr.
(Rodolfo) first met when they were students at the University of Sto.
Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became sweethearts. While they were still
sweethearts, Maria Teresa already noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert
and was prone to jealousy. She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to
have no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who excelled in
their studies and careers. Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married and had
two children.
Rodolfo’s attitude worsened as they went on with their marital life. He
was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria Teresa, and would even skip
work at his family’s printing press to stalk her. Rodolfo’s jealousy was so
severe that he once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was
staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of being Maria
Teresa’s lover. In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave.
They would have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day. One day, the couple
quarreled because Rodolfo suspected that Maria Teresa was having an
affair. In the heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa’s
head. Maria Teresa, with their two (2) daughters in tow, left Rodolfo and
their conjugal home after the gun poking incident. Maria Teresa never saw
Rodolfo again after that, and she supported their children by herself. Maria
Teresa filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Issues:
Whether or not the marriage between Teresa and Rodolfo should be
nullified based on psychological incapacity.
Held:
Yes. The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals was the first case
that attempted to lay down the standards for determining psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Santos declared that
“psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability.” Furthermore, the incapacity “should refer
to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be
truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.” Dr. Lopez’s
testimony, as corroborated by petitioner, sufficiently proved that respondent
suffered from psychological incapacity. Respondent’s paranoid personality
disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy and acts of
depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend and assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
 The juridical antecedence of respondent’s psychological incapacity
was also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner attested that she noticed
respondent’s jealousy even before their marriage, and that he would often
follow her to make sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him.
She believed that he would change after they got married; however, this did
not happen. Respondent’s jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and
severe that these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner’s head.
The incurability and severity of respondent’s psychological incapacity
were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He vouched that a person with
paranoid personality disorder would refuse to admit that there was
something wrong and that there was a need for treatment. This was
corroborated by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly
refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest, and a doctor, and
suggested couples counselling to respondent; however, respondent
refused all of her attempts at seeking professional help. Respondent also
refused to be examined by Dr. Lopez.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife “to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help
and support.” In this case, petitioner and respondent may have lived
together, but the facts narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to,
or could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a husband. He
was even apathetic that petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
their marriage.

Case # 31
Doctrine:
 Psychological incapacity is not a medical but a legal concept. It is a
personal condition that prevents a spouse to perform marital obligations in
relation to a specific person that may exits at the time of marriage but may
have revealed through behavior subsequent to ceremonies. It need not be
a mental or personality disorder. It need not be permanent and incurable.
The testimony of a psychologist or psychiatrist is not mandatory in all
cases.
Case Title: Eliscupidez vs. Eliscupidez, GR. No. 226907, July 22, 2019
Facts:
Gerardo and Glenda were husband and wife whose marriage was
plagued with fights and numerous and unreasonable demands from
Glenda. According to Gerardo’s testimony, Glenda would often throw things
at him when they argued. She also asked their household help to buy
abortifacient medicines and to accompany her to a manghihilot and such
acts led to her miscarriage. Gerardo also said that she would demand that
he not wear nice clothes to work, and to quit his job so that he could not flirt
with his co-workers. He also said that Glenda became a negligent mother
and carried an illicit affair while he was away in Milan for work. Gerardo
also claimed that Glenda bore 2 children from the said affair. Gerardo then
decided to file a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code. He presented himself, his sister Viernes, and their
household help Irene Oro, as witnesses. He also presented a medical
report prepared by Dr. Tayag. The said report found that Glenda was
suffering from HISTRIONIC PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-Social
Personality Traits. The report said that the psychological incapacity of
Glenda was characterized with juridical antecedence and that her issues
started early on in her life. Her incapacity is attributed to her lack of
sufficient guidance and discipline from her upbringing and bad family role
models who maintained a faulty lifestyle. The RTC ruled in favor of Gerardo
and held that the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio on
the ground of respondent's psychological incapacity. The CA reversed the
RTC and found that the data gathered by Dr. Tayag was was not
comprehensive enough to establish the conclusion that Glenda is
pyschologically incapacitated. This is because the report was grounded on
information supplied by the witnesses, which the CA felt was not competent
enough to establish factors in Glenda’s early life that would show or lead to
her incapacity.
Issues:
1. W/N the totality of the evidence presented by the husband was able
to prove that the wife was suffering from psychological incapacity.
2. W/N the report of Dr. Tayag was properly refused for being based on
self-serving testimonies made by the husband and his witnesses.
Held:
1. No, In this case, this Court agrees with the OSG that the totality of
the evidence presented by the petitioner failed to prove psychological
incapacity of the respondent to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. The root cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity
was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable…What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition. For
indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person
concerned need not be resorted to.
 In the present case, however, the totality of the evidence presented
by the petitioner fails to convince this Court that respondent suffered from a
psychological incapacity that is permanent or incurable, and that has
existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage. Although respondent
was said to have exhibited "dramatic, extroverted behavior" who was
"prone to insecurities and aggressive outbursts of emotions," these
characterizations fell short of proving that she was psychologically
incapacitated to assume her marital responsibilities. Thus, while this Court
commiserates with petitioner's predicament, the evidence on record does
not square with the existence of psychological incapacity as contemplated
by law and jurisprudence. Petitioner and respondent's marriage cannot
therefore be declared null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
2. Yes, We agree with the refusal of the CA to give credence and
weight to the Report of Dr. Tayag. As found by the CA, Dr. Tayag declared
in her Report that her professional services were engaged by petitioner in
connection with the petition for nullity of his marriage with respondent, and
that the persons who provided her with information as regards her data
gathering with respect to the behavioral, social, and emotional
characteristics of the respondent were the petitioner himself, their former
househelp Oro, and respondent's sister Viernes. This leads to the
conclusion that findings in the same were solely based on the self-serving
testimonial descriptions and characterizations of respondent rendered by
petitioner and his witnesses.
Moreover, the conclusion of Dr. Tayag that respondent's
psychological incapacity existed early in her life were merely based on the
information provided by Viernes that she and respondent were their father's
second family, and that respondent was very manipulative. Dr. Tayag
merely generalized her explanations as to the reason behind and the extent
of respondent's alleged personality disorder. The CA correctly pointed out
that Dr. Tayag's Report failed to explain in detail how respondent's
condition could be characterized as grave, deeply-rooted, and incurable
within the doctrinal context of "psychological incapacity."

Case # 32
Doctrine:
According to case law, psychological incapacity should be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly manifest utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It
should refer to no less than a mental —not merely physical — incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage, which, as provided under Article 6837 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. In this accord,
psychological incapacity must therefore be characterized by three (3) traits:
(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b)
juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. Applying the foregoing guidelines, the Court finds that - contrary
to the rulings of the courts a quo - the totality of evidence presented failed
to sufficiently establish respondent's psychological incapacity based on his
DPD.
Case Title: Cahapisan-Santiago vs. Santiago, GR. No. 241144, June
26, 2019
Facts:
Sometime in 1999, respondent met petitioner at a car service center
along Marcos Highway, Antipolo City. At that time, petitioner was forty (40)
years old and respondent was twenty-two (22) years old. Petitioner
became respondent's girlfriend, and three (3) months into the relationship,
she became pregnant. Eventually, or on March 31, 2000, petitioner and
respondent got married before the Mayor of Pangil, Laguna. During their
marriage, however, instead of experiencing marital bliss, their relationship
was fraught with quarrels. Respondent averred that petitioner was
domineering, considering that she was the one earning and he was a high
school drop-out. Sometime in 2005, petitioner and respondent separated
because they could no longer stand each other. After eleven (11) years of
living apart, respondent filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
before the RTC. In support of his petition, respondent presented the report
of an expert clinical psychologist, Ms. Shiela Marie O. Montefalcon (Ms.
Montefalcon), who assessed him to be suffering from Dependent
Personality Disorder (DPD), and petitioner from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder (NPD). According to the report, respondent's DPD is a long term
chronic condition that manifested itself through his overdependence on
petitioner and his own mother to meet his emotional and physical needs.
The clinical features of respondent's DPD were likewise exhibited through
his: (a) difficulty in making everyday decisions without an excessive amount
of advice and reassurance from petitioner and his own mother; (b) problem
in expressing disagreement with others because of fear or loss of support
or approval; (c) struggle in initiating projects on his own because of lack of
self-confidence in judgment or abilities; (d) excessive dependence on
petitioner and his own mother to obtain nurturance and support; and (e)
inclination to substance use and abuse.12 On the other hand, petitioner's
NPD was found to be grave, severe, and already ingrained deeply within
her adaptive system, as evidenced by her pervasive pattern of grandiosity,
need for admiration, and lack of empathy.
As both parties were found to be psychologically incapacitated to
perform their essential marital obligations, Ms. Montefalcon, therefore,
recommended that their marriage be declared null and void. For her part,
petitioner contended that respondent was not psychologically
incapacitated, but was merely immature and lacked a sense of
responsibility.
She also pointed out that respondent's past addictive behavior is not
permanent, considering that the latter was able to cope with his drug
dependency and was able to change for the better.
She added that respondent's alleged DPD is even contrary to his
personality, since the report stated that respondent "can present a proposal
or lead a group discussion with ease and tact. He is assertive but
sometimes impatient. He is best in situations that need sound common
sense and practical ability with things. He relies on his ability to improvise
instead of preparing in advance." Furthermore, respondent's "common
capacities and strengths" are "being friendly, energetic, resourceful, and
having negotiating skills." Finally, she claimed that it was after the affair
judgement order James Rodriguez marriage contract online respondent
annulment process civil law marital family civil court cases respondent
survey dated August 1, 2018; hence, this petition. The RTC granted the
petition and declared the marriage of the parties null and void on the
ground of respondent's psychological incapacity. Aggrieved, petitioner filed
an appeal before the CA which affirmed the RTC decision.
Issues:
Whether or not the parties' marriage should be nullified on the ground
of respondent's psychological incapacity.
Held:
The petition is meritorious. At the outset, it bears stressing that the
RTC, as affirmed by the CA, already ruled that there was insufficient
evidence to prove the root cause or juridical antecedence of petitioner's
alleged NPD. Finding no cogent reason to disturb the same, the resolution
of this case shall, thus, revolve on whether or not, on the other hand,
respondent's psychological incapacity, i.e., DPD, was proven.
Jurisprudence states that the validity of marriage and the unity of the
family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory laws; hence, any
doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of the continuance
and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the
same rests at all times upon the petitioner. The policy of the Constitution is
to protect and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the Constitution decrees
marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Under Article 3633 of the Family Code, as amended,
psychological incapacity is a valid ground to nullify a marriage. However, in
deference to the State's policy on marriage, psychological incapacity does
not merely pertain to any psychological condition; otherwise, it would be
fairly easy to circumvent our laws on marriage so much so that we would
be practically condoning a legal subterfuge for divorce. Respondent's
womanizing, and not his purported dependency, that caused their frequent
fights.
According to case law, psychological incapacity should be confined to
the most serious cases of personality disorders that clearly manifest utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It
should refer to no less than a mental —not merely physical — incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the
marriage, which, as provided under Article 6837 of the Family Code,
among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe
love, respect and fidelity, and render help and support. In this accord,
psychological incapacity must therefore be characterized by three (3) traits:
(a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b)
juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge
only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or
even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved. Applying the foregoing guidelines, the Court finds that - contrary
to the rulings of the courts a quo - the totality of evidence presented failed
to sufficiently establish respondent's psychological incapacity based on his
DPD.
In this case, respondent relied heavily on the testimony of and
psychological examination by the clinical psychologist, Ms. Montefalcon, to
establish his psychological incapacity. In her report, she enumerated
several clinical features indicative of respondent's DPD, to wit: (a) difficulty
in making everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice and
reassurance from petitioner and his own mother; (b) problem in expressing
disagreement with others because of fear or loss of support or approval; (c)
struggle in initiating projects on his own because of lack of self-confidence
in judgment or abilities; (d) excessive dependence on petitioner and his
own mother to obtain nurturance and support; and (e) inclination to
substance use and abuse. However, the report leaves much to be desired
as it did not even identify specific actions or incidents that could amply
demonstrate his alleged psychological incapacity. As the petitioner aptly
points out, "[i]n the [p]sychological [r]eport, there is nothing in
[respondent's] acts that is indicative of his 'chronic condition in which he
depends too much on others to meet his emotional and physical needs.' In
fact, the report failed to show 'who' are those other that [respondent]
depended [on] too much x x x." Also, as petitioner emphasizes,
respondent's alleged DPD appears to be even contrary to his personality
since the report actually states, among others, that respondent's "common
capacities and strengths" are "being friendly, energetic, resourceful, and
having negotiating skills." Moreover, the report states that respondent "is
best in situations that need sound common sense and practical ability with
things [as] he relies on his ability to improvise instead of preparing in
advance." More importantly, the link between respondent's acts to his
alleged psychological incapacity was not established.
Even if it is assumed that respondent truly had difficulties in making
everyday decisions without excessive advice or reassurance coming from
other people, such as petitioner and his own mother, the report fails to
prove that the said difficulties were tantamount to serious psychological
disorder that would render him incapable of performing the essential marital
obligations. As case law holds, "[i]n determining the existence of
psychological incapacity, a clear and understandable causation between
the party's condition and the party's inability to perform the essential marital
covenants must be shown. A psychological report that is essentially
comprised of mere platitudes, however speckled with technical jargon,
would not cut the marriage tie." Similarly, Ms. Montefalcon's report merely
provided general characterizations of the parties' illnesses as deeply-
rooted, grave, and incurable. In her report, she stated that the root cause of
the parties' flawed personality patterns was attributable to genetic factors
and/or dysfunctional factors involved in their childhood milieu. She also
declared that their illnesses were grave, since the parties were not able to
carry out the normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family, and
incurable, as they have no psychological insight that they have character
problems.46 However, no evidence was presented to substantiate these
conclusions. In fact, as petitioner demonstrates, the report seems to
contradict the foregoing characterizations since it was observed that
respondent "was awaken and decided x x x to fix his life" and that "[h]e
admitted that he is weak but he was able to resist drugs and [is now]
helping his mother run their business." As such, it cannot be concluded
that respondent's DPD is imbued with therequired quality of permanence or
incurability.
If anything, Ms. Montefalcon's evaluation only supports the
allegations regarding respondent's infidelity, immaturity, and dependence
on his mother and wife, which traits do not, however, rise to the level of the
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of the parties'
marriage. Indeed, while respondent's purported womanizing caused the
couple's frequent fights, such was not established to be caused by a
psychological illness. In fact, records reveal that when petitioner discovered
respondent's affair for the first time, the latter immediately severed it. They
would also eventually reconcile and live together after their fights. Thus,
respondent's infidelity does not appear to be a symptom of a grave and
permanent psychological disorder that renders him incapable of performing
his spousal obligations. In a long line of cases, the Court has held that
sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering
from psychological incapacity.
It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are manifestations of
a disordered personality which make the spouse completely unable to
discharge the essential obligations of marriage. In fine, for failing to
sufficiently prove the existence of respondent's psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of Article 36 of the Family Code, the petition is
granted. The contrary rulings of the courts a quo are hence, reversed and
set aside.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed under Article 36 of the
Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. Carpio (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and
LazaroJavier, JJ., concur.

Case # 33
Doctrine:
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage.
Case Title: Go-Yu vs. Yu, GR. No. 230443, April 3, 2019
Facts:
 Christine C. Go-Yu (Petitioner) filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage and Dissolution of the Absolute Community of Property
against Romeo A. Yu (Respondent). She claimed that she and her
husband stayed at the latter’s home after the marriage where she had to
contend with the constant meddling of her mother-in-law and the mother-in-
law’s constant intrusion into their privacy; the decrease in their spouses’
sexual activity after their wedding; her inability to conceive and her
husband’s refusal to allow her to undergo in-vitro fertilization; the
adjustments that she had to make which entailed a lot of sacrifice on her
part such as but not limited to giving up of some of the luxuries she was
used to when her husband’s financial resources dwindled; and their
growing apart as husband and wife which led them to live a separate lives
even though they stay together under the same roof. Because of all these
circumstances, Petitioner claimed that she was diagnosed with “Narcissistic
Personality Disorder”. According to her, the disorder existed before their
marriage. And the fact that Petitioner is comfortable with her behavior, sees
nothing wrong with it or that she needed to change makes treatment
improbable.
Issues:
Whether or not Article 36 applies.
Held:
After evaluation of the evidence presented by the petition, the
petitioner unquestionably recognizes both spouses' obligations to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, render mutual help and
support, provide for the support of the family, and manage their household.
The fact that she gradually became overwhelmed by feelings of
disappointment or disillusionment toward her husband and their marriage is
not a sufficient ground to have such marriage declared null and void.
Petitioner claims to be afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder,
which is defined as a mental condition in which people have an inflated
sense of their own importance, a deep need for excessive attention and
admiration, troubled relationships, and a lack of empathy for others. The
psychiatrist who examined petitioner confirmed this definition by stating that
in layman's terms, a person who is suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder is one "who is self-centered and [who] has prioritized [his/]her
needs over the other or significant person." Based on the above definitions
alone, how can petitioner claim that she is suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder when, as previously discussed, through her own
statements and admissions in her petition and in her testimony in court, she
has displayed full knowledge and understanding of her and her husband's
obligations and has, in fact, committed positive acts towards building and
sustaining a family.
An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. This Court
has repeatedly stressed that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be
confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
Resultantly, it has always been held that mere irreconcilable differences
and conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.
PETITION IS DENIED.
Case # 34
Doctrine:
A psychologically incapacitated person need not be shamed and
pathologized for what could have een a simple mistake in one’s choice of
intimate partner, a mistake too easy to make as when one sees through
rose-colored glasses. A person’s psychological incapacity to fulfill hisor her
marital obligations should not be at the expense of one’s dignity, because it
could very well be that he or she did not know that the incapacity existed in
the first place.

Case Title: Republic vs. Deang, GR. No. 236279, March 25, 2019
Facts:
Cheryl and Emilio were married on August 28, 1993 at Sangley Point,
Cavite. They have one child named Bryan Joseph R. Deang, who was born
on January 12, 1994.
As a backgrounder, the couple first met sometime in March 1992 and
soon after became romantically involved. Two (2) months after living
together, Emilio quit his job and engaged in gambling.[9] In April 1993, at
the age of 21, Cheryl became pregnant. Emilio offered to have an abortion
outside the country, which however, did not push through. Confused and
stressed with her situation, she turned to Emilio's friend for comfort, whom
she became intimate with at one time. When Emilio learned about this, he
became jealous and began physically abusing her. At one point, he boxed
her on the stomach during her second month of pregnancy forcing her to
resign from work. Eventually, they got married after Cheryl's parents made
the arrangements. Thereafter, they stayed in an apartment in Quezon City
which was rented by Cheryl's family.[10] Despite their marriage, however,
Emilio kept bringing up Cheryl's affair with his friend.
In January 1994, the couple went back to Butuan City in order for
Cheryl's parents to assist her in giving birth. Barely more than a week after
their return, however, Emilio decided to go to Manila for work.
Subsequently, in August of the same year, Cheryl went to visit Emilio in
Manila; Emilio, however, opted for them to live separately. One morning,
Cheryl went to Emilio's rented room to surprise him. When Emilio opened
the door, however, she saw him covered merely with a towel, while his
mistress locked herself in the bathroom. She cried but Emilio merely sent
her off to leave. Thus, she went back to Butuan City in December 1994 and
never saw Emilio again.
On February 11, 2013, Cheryl filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage[14] before the RTC alleging that Emilio was psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. She claimed that
Emilio did not give any support to her and their son, and that to her
knowledge, he is living with another woman with whom he has two (2)
children.
For his part, Emilio failed to file his answer and appear during trial
despite service of summons.
During trial, Cheryl testified that she and Emilio lived together as
husband and wife for only a year and a month, during which she
discovered that the latter was "emotionally immature, irresponsible, a
gambler and does not give financial support to the family." Cheryl also
presented Dr. Yolanda Y. Lara (Dr. Lara), a clinical psychologist, who
submitted a Psychological Evaluation Report[18] dated October 28, 2013
and testified that after interviewing Cheryl, Cheryl's sister, and Emilio's
cousin, she concluded that Cheryl manifested signs of Dependent
Personality Disorder (DPD), while Emilio showed symptoms of Anti-Social
Personality Disorder (APD), both of which caused the dysfunction of their
relationship leading to their separation.[20] She, however, admitted that: (a)
she merely talked to Emilio's cousin over the phone; and (b) the information
she obtained from the latter was not significant; thus, she based her
findings mostly on Cheryl's story.
The RTC declared the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of
the Family Code. Giving full weight and credit to Dr. Lara's findings, the
RTC ruled that Emilio was psychologically incapacitated given his inability
to understand his obligations as a married man. Additionally, it
commiserated with Cheryl's situation, and thus, found no reason to
unreasonably deny her the relief she prayed for.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), through the Office
of the Solicitor General, moved for reconsideration which was, however,
denied. Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC’s
ruling. Unsatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied in
a Resolution dated December 12, 2017; hence, this petition.
Issues:
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA
erred in upholding the RTC ruling declaring the marriage between Cheryl
and Emilio void pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Held:
The petition is meritorious. The policy of the Constitution is to protect
and strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.[36] Because of this, the Constitution decrees
marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of
the parties. Thus, the Court has consistently ruled that psychological
incapacity, as a ground to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, should refer to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.[38] It should refer to no less than
a mental — not merely physical — incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as provided
under Article 68[39] of the Family Code, among others,[40] include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity, and
render help and support.[41] In other words, it must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[42]
For the above reasons, the Court has declared, in Santos v. CA,[43]
that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a
marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and (c) incurability, i.e., it must be
incurable, or otherwise the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
Guided by the foregoing considerations, the Court, in several cases,
[45] did not consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity the
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity, and other
behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning spouses, for the reason that
these behaviors "do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity, as these may be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or neglect
to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not rooted in some
psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code addresses."[46]
Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and thus grants the
petition. As aptly pointed out by petitioner, the actuations of the spouses
that allegedly indicated their incapacity to perform marital obligations were
not proven to have existed prior to, or at least, at the time of the celebration
of the marriage, as required by jurisprudence.[47]Emilio may have engaged
in an extra-marital affair, gambled, failed to support Cheryl and their son, is
irritable and aggressive, and abandoned his family, while Cheryl may have
married Emilio simply in obedience to her parents' decision and had the
constant need for her parents' care and support. However, these acts, by
themselves, do not prove that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated as these may have been simply due to jealousy, emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, or dire financial constraints.
In Toring v. Toring, the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity, as [these] may only be due to a person's difficulty,
refusal[,] or neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not
rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the Family Code
addresses."[49] Accordingly, it cannot be said that either party is suffering
from a grave and serious psychological condition which rendered either of
them incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage.
Furthermore, an examination of Dr. Lara's psychological report, which the
courts a quo significantly relied upon, actually fails to show that the APD
and DPD which Emilio and Cheryl allegedly respectively suffer were
impressed with the qualities of juridical antecedence and incurability.
For one, apart from enumerating and characterizing Emilio and
Cheryl's respective behavior during the marriage based only on the
symptoms specified in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders 5th Edition, no specific behavior or habits during their childhood
or adolescent years were shown that would explain such behavior during
the marriage. It must be emphasized that there must be proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage
- which must be linked with the manifestations of the psychological
incapacity.
Also, while it is not required that the expert witness personally
examine the party alleged to be suffering from psychological incapacity,
nevertheless, corroborating evidence must be presented to sufficiently
establish the required legal parameters. Here, Dr. Lara's findings as
regards Emilio were solely founded on the narrations of Cheryl and her
sister. From these, Dr. Lara proceeded to diagnose Emilio with APD and
concluded that Emilio "grew up in a dysfunctional family" resulting "to the
development of his antisocial behaviors" which is a "chronic condition x x x
embedded in his personality make up." Perusing the report, the Court is
hard-pressed to accept this conclusion based solely on accounts coming
from Cheryl's side whose bias cannot be doubted.
And finally, aside from the fact that no discernible explanation was made
anent the purported disorders' incurable nature, the Court notes that Dr.
Lara's report ultimately fails to demonstrate the relation of these disorders
to the ability of the parties to perform their essential marital obligations. In
Republic v. Tecag,[55] the Court held that "[i]n determining the existence of
psychological incapacity, a clear and understandable causation between
the party's condition and the party's inability to perform the essential marital
covenants must be shown. A psychological report that is essentially
comprised of mere platitudes, however speckled with technical jargon,
would not cut the marriage tie."
Truly, the Court can only commiserate with the parties' plight as their
marriage may have failed. It must be reiterated, however, that the remedy
is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. It must be stressed that Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the grounds for divorce manifest themselves[57] for a marriage, no
matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent
sufficient evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the context
of Article 36, the Court is compelled to grant the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated May
30, 2017 and the Resolution dated December 12, 2017 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 04183-MIN are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed under
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. Carpio (Chairperson), Caguioa, J. Reyes, Jr., and
Lazaro-Javier, JJ., concur.
Case # 35
Doctrine:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. x x x Further,
psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them
x x x.
Case Title: Republic vs. Mola Cruz, GR. No. 236629, July 23, 2018
Facts:
Respondent Liberato and Liezl were married. In the course of their
relationship, Liezl left for Japan to work as an entertainer for six (6) months.
The couple then got married after Liezl returned home. They lived for some
time in Manila where respondent worked, but later moved to Japan where
Liezl again worked as an entertainer and respondent found work as a
construction worker. It was while living in Japan when respondent noticed
changes in Liezl. She began going out of the house without respondent’s
permission and started giving respondent the cold treatment. Liezl also
started getting angry at respondent for no reason. The couple later returned
to the Philippines after Liezl was released from detention due to
overstaying in Japan. It was then that Liezl confessed to respondent her
romantic affair with a Japanese man. Despite the confession, respondent
expressed his willingness to forgive Liezl, but the latter chose to walk away
from their marriage.
 The couple reconciled after respondent made efforts to woo Liezl
back. One day, however, respondent found Liezl’s Japanese lover in their
house. To respondent’s surprise, Liezl introduced him to her lover as her
elder brother. Respondent went along with the charade and allowed Liezl to
share her bed with her lover as she threatened to leave their home. Liezl
went on with her partying ways and continued working in a Manila nightclub
despite respondent’s offer for her to start a business.
However, Liezl left respondent a second time. Respondent tried to
move on and left for Singapore to work. Though abroad, he continued to
woo his wife back, but found out that Liezl already cohabited with her lover.
Respondent decided to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The RTC granted respondent’s petition and declared respondent and
Liezl’s marriage void ab initioand their property regime dissolved. The RTC
relied on the psychological report and testimony of expert witness, Dr.
Pacita Tudla (Dr. Tudla) a clinical psychologist. Dr. Tudla found that Liezl
was afflicted by histrionic personality disorder, a pervasive pattern of
behavior characterized by excessive emotionality and attention seeking.
Dr. Tudla presented the following indicators of Liezl’s disorder: going
out without her husband’s knowledge or permission; coldly treating her
husband, verbally and sexually; quick anger at the slightest provocation or
for no reason; arrest in Japan due to overstaying; admission to an affair;
insensitivity towards her husband’s feelings, as shown by introducing her
husband as her brother to her Japanese lover; threats of leaving if her
ideas are not agreed to; unabashed declaration of having no feelings for
her husband; maintaining a night life with friends; and choosing to work in a
nightclub instead of engaging in a decent job.
Dr. Tudla found that Liezl’s psychological incapacity existed prior to
the marriage because she grew up irritable, hard-headed, and fond of
friends than family. She despised advice or suggestion from her elders, and
would rebel when her demands were not met. This personality aberration
was determined by Dr. Tudla as rooted on Liezl’s poor upbringing – Liezl’s
father resorted to corporal punishment to instill discipline, while her mother
tolerated her whims. According to Dr. Tudla, the irregular treatment she
received from her parents led to Liezl acquiring unsuitable behavioral
patterns.
Aside from the existence of Liezl’s psychological incapacity prior to
the marriage, Dr. Tudla found her incapacity too grave that it seriously
impaired her relationship with her husband. It was also the cause of Liezl’s
failure to discharge the basic obligations of marriage which resulted in its
breakdown. Her incapacity was also found incurable because it was deeply
ingrained in her personality. Further, Dr. Tudla found that Liezl was
unconscious of her personality disorder and, when confronted, she would
deny it to avoid criticism. The disorder was also permanent as it started
during her adolescence and continued until adulthood.
On appeal, petitioner claimed that respondent was not able to prove
Liezl’s psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations, and that
witness Dr. Tudla only made a sweeping statement that Liezl’s condition
was grave and permanent. Petitioner questioned Dr. Tudla’s report as it
lacked details regarding Liezl’s condition and how Liezl was unable to
comply with her marital obligations. Petitioner contended that the change in
Liezl’s behavior was only caused by her illicit relationship and not because
of psychological incapacity. Petitioner asserted that sexual infidelity,
indulgence and abandonment can only be grounds for legal separation as
they do not constitute psychological incapacity.
The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. It reasoned that what matters in
cases of declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code is whether the totality of evidence presented is adequate to sustain a
finding of psychological incapacity. In the task of ascertaining the presence
of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the
courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of
psychology, must rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an
intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the malady of
being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis of
experts.
Issues:
Whether Liezl’s psychological incapacity to comply with her marital
obligations was sufficiently established by the totality of evidence presented
by respondent.
Held:
Yes. In Santos v. Court of Appeals, the Court explained psychological
incapacity as follows:
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love,
respect and fidelity and render help and support. x x x Further,
psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the
obligations of marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them
x x x.
Jurisprudence consistently adhered to the guidelines in appreciating
psychological incapacity cases set in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina (Molina).
In sum, a person’s psychological incapacity to comply with his or her
essential obligations, as the case may be, in marriage must be rooted on a
medically or clinically identifiable grave illness that is incurable and shown
to have existed at the time of marriage, although the manifestations thereof
may only be evident after marriage.
In addition, the Court is mindful that the Molina guidelines should no
longer be viewed as a stringent code which all nullity cases on the ground
of psychological incapacity should meet with exactitude, in consonance
with the Family Code’s ideal to appreciate allegations of psychological
incapacity on a case-to-case basis and “to allow some resiliency in its
application” as legally designed.
In the case at hand, the Court is so bound, owing to the great weight
accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the
CA to dispute the veracity of these facts.
A sharper pronouncement on the respect accorded to the trial court’s
factual findings in the realm of psychological incapacity was made in Kalaw
v. Fernandez (Kalaw):
The findings of the RTC on the existence or non-existence of a
party’s psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as
such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other
evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. In every
situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by
the facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should
restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. It is not enough reason to
ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own
as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code
regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. x x x
The CA decision itself recognized, and Our own review of Dr. Tudla’s
psychological report confirms, contrary to petitioner’s allegation, that Dr.
Tudla personally interviewed both spouses regarding their personal and
familial circumstances before and after the celebration of their marriage.
Information gathered from the spouses was then verified by Dr. Tudla with
Ma. Luisa Conag, Liez’s youngest sister, a close relation privy to Liezl’s
personal history before and after she got married. Dr. Tudla then based her
psychological evaluation and conclusions on all the information she
gathered. Her findings were, thus, properly anchored on a holistic
psychological evaluation of the parties as individuals and as a married
couple under a factual milieu verified with an independent informant. The
courts a quo properly accorded credence to the report and utilized it as an
aid in determining whether Liezl is indeed psychologically incapacitated to
meet essential marital functions. Clearly, petitioner has no basis to assail
Dr. Tudla’s psychological findings as wanting evidentiary support.
Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential premise, the Court holds that
both the CA and the RTC did not err in finding that the totality of evidence
presented by respondent in support of his petition, sufficiently established
the link between Liezl’s actions showing her psychological incapacity to
understand and perform her marital obligations, and her histrionic
personality disorder. In addition, Dr. Tudla was able to collect and verify
largely the same facts in the course of her psychological evaluation of both
spouses and her interview of Liezl’s sister. Dr. Tudla’s report gave a
description of histrionic personality disorder and correlated the
characteristics of this disorder with Liezl’s behavior from her formative
years through the course of her marriage to the respondent. Indubitably,
Dr. Tudla’s report and testimony enjoy such probative force emanating from
the assistance her opinion gave to the courts to show the facts upon which
her psychological conclusion was based.

Case # 36
Doctrine:
Case Title: Tadeo-Matias vs. Republic, GR. No. 230751, April 25, 2018
Facts:
On April 10, 2012, petitioner Estrellita Tadco-Matias filed before the
Regional Trail Court (RTC)of Tarlac City a petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of her husband, Wilfredo N.Matias.Summary of the facts
contained in the petition were as follows:• She was married (January 7,
1968) to the missing member of the Philippine Constabulary.And
established their conjugal home in Imbo, Anda, Pangasinan.• That her
missing husband was assigned in Arayat Pampanga. And her
husband sinceSeptember 15, 1979 was nowhere to be found and his
whereabouts was also cannot bedetermined by his Office. And neither did
they know why he went into AWOL.• Weeks became years and years
became decades, but the petitioner never gave up hope,and after more
than three (3) decades of awaiting, the petitioner is still hopeful, but the
timeshad been tough on her, specially with a meager source of income
coupled with her age, it isnow necessary for her to request for the
benefits that rightfully belong to her in order tosurvive;• That one of the
requirements to attain the claim of benefits is for a proof of death or at
leastdeclaration of presumptive death by the Honorable Court;• That this
petition is being filed not for any other purpose but solely to claim for the
benefitunder P.D. No. 1638 as amended.• On January 15, 2012, the
RTC issued a Decision. in Spec. Proc. No. 4850 granting
thepetition.• The Republic questioned the decision of the RTC via a petition
for certiotrari.• On November 28, 2012, the CA rendered a decision
granting the certiorari petition of theRepublic and setting aside the
decision of the RTC.• The CA premised its decision that RTC erred in its
decision using Article 41 as the basis ofclaim which the provides otherwise.
In which case, the article is plainly dealt with purposes ofremarriage. It may
have been proper to invoke Article 390 and 391 as to the purpose of such
claim.
Issues:
Whether or not presumptive death referred to in Article 41 would be
the ground in application ofclaims? No
Held:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated
November 28, 2016 and Resolution dated March 20, 2017 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129467 are A FFIRMED. The
Court declares that a judicial decision of a court of law that a
person is presumptively dead is not requirement before the Philippine
Veterans' Affairs Office and the Armed Forces of the Philippines for their
consideration. Given that her petition for the declaration of presumptive
death was not filed for the purpose of remarriage, petitioner was clearly
relying on the presumption of death under either Article390 or Article 391 of
the Civil Code11 as the basis of her petition. Articles 390 and 391 of the
Civil Code express the general rule regarding presumption s of death for
any civil purpose, to wit: Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absence still lives, he shall be presumed dead
for all purposes except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an
absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession may be
opened. Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes,
including the division of the estate among the heirs:(1) A person on board a
vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has
not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four years; (3) a person who has been in danger of death
under other circumstances and his existence has not been known for four
years. The Court also added:1. It must be stressed that the presumption of
death under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code arises by operation of
law, without need of a court declaration, once the factual conditions
mentioned in the said articles are established.2. In order to avail of the
presumption, therefore, the claimant need only present before the PVAO or
the appropriate office of the AFP, as the case may be, any “evidence"
which shows that the concerned soldier had been missing for such number
of years and or under the circumstances prescribed under Articles 390 and
391 of the Civil Code. Obviously, the "evidence" referred to here excludes a
court declaration of presumptive death.3. If the PVAO or the AFP
determines that the evidence submitted by the claimant is sufficient, they
should not hesitate to apply the presumption of death and pay the latter's
claim.4. 4. If the PVAO or the AFP determines that the evidence submitted
by the claimant is not sufficient to invoke the presumption of death under
the Civil Code and denies the latter's claim by reason thereof, the claimant
may file an appeal with the Office of the President (OP) pursuant to the
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies

Case # 37
Doctrine:
Article 36 of the Family Code states: A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
Case Title: Meneses vs. Lee-Meneses, GR. No. 200182, March 13,
2019
Facts:
The facts, as narrated by the CA, are as follows: [Anacleto] and
[respondent Jung Soon Linda Lee-Meneses (Linda)] met during their
college years in the United States of America (USA). They became
involved romantically after fifteen (15) months of courtship. A year after,
they decided to get married.
On August 9, 1981, [Anacleto] and [Linda] were married at Sanctuario
de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On June 3, 1983, Linda
Monique L. Meneses, their only child[,] was born.
During the first few years of married life, they lived with [Anacleto's]
family in Houston[,] Texas, USA. [Linda] [would] always complain of not
having enough money as she wanted to live on their own, away from her
parents-in-law. She would always nag [Anacleto] to look for a higher paying
job so that she could get ahead in life. [Linda] wanted a luxurious life and
she only appreciate [d] her husband when he [bought] her expensive gifts
and [took] her out to fancy expensive restaurants.
After ten (10) years of living in Houston[,] Texas, USA, they decided
to relocate their business to Korea. For a couple of years, they lived with
[Linda's] parents. When their business failed, they decided to return to the
Philippines.
During their marriage, they always fought about not having enough
money.
The constant fighting and nagging caused [Anacleto] humiliation[;]
[h]e lost self-esteem and suffered an erectile disorder. [Linda] even
ridiculed [Anacleto's] inability to have an erection. She even accused him of
having an extra-marital relationship.
In May 2005, after living together for almost [21] years, [Linda] left
[Anacleto] to live in Korea. Later on, she lived in the USA with their
daughter x x x. [Linda] informed [Anacleto] that she [would] x x x come
back [only] if he [could] give her a better life financially.
On September 8, 2006, Anacleto filed a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage (RTC Petition) before the RTC.
Linda failed to file her responsive pleading Respite service of
summons through publication. Thus, the RTC referred the case to the
Office of the City Prosecutor to determine whether there was collusion
between the parties. Finding that no such collusion exists, the Assistant
City Prosecutor issued a Report recommending that the case proceed to
trial.
Trial on the merits ensued. Anacleto presented the testimony of Dr.
Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychiatrist. Based on interviews
conducted with Anacleto, his office secretary Marife Davi (Marife) and the
parties' family driver Ronilo Reol (Ronilo), Dr. Lopez concluded that Linda
suffers from narcissistic personality disorder with borderline personality
disorder features that render her incapable of fulfilling the essential marital
obligations.
The RTC summarized Dr. Lopez's findings as follows: Dr. Lopez
testified that the root cause of [Linda's] personality disorder can be traced
back to her dysfunctional familial pattern and psychological development.
She was years old when her parents separated and she was raised by her
mother who was controlling, strict and disciplined. When [Linda]
misbehaved, her mother abused her verbally and spanked her using her
hand, a belt, or a golf iron rod. In fact, because of her meddling in the
private lives of her daughters, [Linda's] sister also separated from her
husband. Dr. Lopez alleges that [Linda's] stepfather also [abused] her
physically. There were instances [when] [Linda's] stepfather dank her head
in the water because she was naughty. Because of the way [Linda] was
treated by her parents, she became a rebel teenager and developed hatred
towards her stepfather. In order to succeed in life, [Linda's] parents
sacrifice[d] a lot[;] they [saw] money as the key to have a successful life.
With this mindset, [Linda] grew up whose (sic) main concern.
The CA denied Anacleto's appeal through the Assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DENIED.
Issues:
 The Petition calls on the Court to determine whether the lower courts
erred in dismissing Anacleto's petition for declaration of nullity on the
ground of insufficient evidence.
Held:
The Petition lacks merit. Article 36 of the Family Code states: A
marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
In a long line of cases, the Court has ruled that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. To warrant a declaration of nullity on the
basis of Article 36, the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in
marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the
marriage; and it must be incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved."
Anacleto insists that Linda's psychological incapacity warrants the
nullification of their marriage. His assertions remain hinged on the findings
of Dr. Lopez who found Linda to be afflicted with "Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with Borderline Personality Disorder Features," characterized by a
"pervasive pattern of grandiosity and lack of empathy[,] x x x instability of
interpersonal relationship[s] x x x and marked impulsivity." He also
stresses that according to Dr. Lopez, Linda's disorder can be traced back to
her "psychologically unhealthy childhood."
 Hence, contrary to the lower courts' findings, Anacleto argues that Dr.
Lopez's findings sufficiently show that Linda's incapacity is grave,
permanent, incurable and has juridical antecedence.
The Court disagrees. As stated, Anacleto's arguments stem from the
findings of Dr. Lopez which, in turn, are based on interviews he conducted
with Anacleto, his secretary Marife and the parties' family driver, Ronilo. In
turn, Dr. Lopez based his findings on the factors which purportedly
confronted Linda during her childhood. As narrated in Dr. Lopez's Judicial
Affidavit: 20. [Question]: You said that [Linda] is suffering from personality
disorders.
What were the root causes of these? [Answer]: The root cause of
such could be traced back to her psychologically unhealthy childhood due
to her pathogenic family.
[Question]: What made you say that [Linda] has an unhealthy
childhood due to her pathogenic family? [Answer]: At the age of seven [7]
years old, her parents separated. Her mother raised her and her sibling. It
is known that her mother was loving, however, strict and had disciplined
her inappropriately. For instance, when Linda has misbehaved or has
committed a sin, her mother subjected her to verbal abuse [and] spanked
her using her hand, a belt or a golf iron rod.
Linda also suffered the same from her stepfather when he punished
her. As a matter of fact, many times, her stepfather dunked her head in the
water when she would misbehave. This has made Linda rebel against her
parents when she became a teenager. She also developed hatred towards
her stepfather because she felt that he was only a second father to her and
did not have the right to punish her in that manner.
 Moreover, Linda's parents struggled through life and made a lot of
sacrifices to [attain] financial success. They saw money as the key to
success in life and the answer to satisfy one's needs. This has made Linda
prioritize the satisfaction she would derive from material things and would
do anything to get what [she] wants. On the other hand, Linda's resentment
and lack of love and attention from her father has resulted to her
demanding and domineering ways towards the opposite sex x x x. All these
has (sic) made her display narcissistic and borderline behaviors. x x x x
24. [Question]: Based on your expert opinion, when did [Linda's]
psychological disorders start to develop? [Answer]: It x x x started to
develop during her growing up years x x x and before her marriage.
While Dr. Lopez attributes the gravity of Linda's disorder to her
alleged unhealthy childhood, none of the informants whom he interviewed
claims to have known Linda since childhood. Moreover, neither Marife nor
Ronilo appear to have known Linda prior to the marriage in question. This
significantly impairs the weight of Dr. Lopez's findings, insofar as they are
based on the informants' narration of Linda's childhood events and
circumstances which they appear to have no personal knowledge of in any
case, the Court.

Case # 38
Doctrine:
A well-founded belief that the absence is already dead is required
before a petition for declaration of presemptive death can be granted.
Case Title: Republic vs. Quinonez, GR. No. 237412, Jan. 6, 2020
Facts:
 [Petitioner Remar A. Quinonez (Remar)] and his wife Lovelyn met in
[Gamaon6], Mangagoy, Bislig City when Remar was in college [and]
staying at his aunt's house. After eight months [of being] in a relationship,
they got married on August 16, 1997 at the Saint Vincent de Paul Parish in
Mangagoy, Bislig City[. The wedding was] officiated by Rev. Fr. Ivan Novo,
as shown in their Marriage Certificate.
After their wedding, the couple stayed at the house of Lovelyn's
parents and they begot two (2) children [namely], Emar A. Quiñonez born
on January 20, 1998 and Diana Love Quiñonez born on December 15,
1999.
To support his family, Remar started working as a security guard at
the National Food Authority Warehouse in October 1997, although later on,
he transferred to Cebu City for an opportunity to earn a bigger salary.
Sometime in 2001, when Lovelyn's father received his retirement pay,
Lovelyn asked her husband's permission to go on a three-month vacation
in Manila to visit some relatives. Despite Remar's reluctance, he agreed to
his wife's request.
During the first three months[,] Lovelyn constantly communicated with
Remar through cell phone. It was also at this time that Remar resigned
from his work in Cebu City and transferred to Surigao City, where he
worked as a security guard at the Surigao City Hall of Justice.
Remar informed Lovelyn that as soon as she arrive[d] from Manila,
they would x x x be living together in Surigao City [with] their two children.
Thereafter, the calls and text messages tapered off until the communication
between the spouses ceased altogether.
At first, Remar thought that his wife just lost her cellphone, so he
inquired about her from their relatives in Bislig City. Someone informed him
that his wife was then already cohabiting with another man and would no
longer be coming back out of shame.
On November 2003, Remar's uncle informed him that Lovelyn was in
Bislig City to visit their children. Remar filed for an emergency leave of
absence from his work and left for Bislig City only to be told that his wife
had already left for Lingig, Surigao del Sur. He went after her in Lingig, yet
upon arrival, he was told that Lovelyn stayed only for a day and returned to
Bislig. He was then constrained to go back to Surigao City, without seeing
his wife.
In the summer of 2004, Remar filed for a leave from work to look for
his wife in Manila. [Remar also] went to Batangas along with his aunt,
Evelyn Pachico[,] as well as to Cavite with Lovelyn's aunt, Leonora Aguilar,
yet they were not able to find her.
On February 27, 2013, after almost ten (10) years of trying to know
about the whereabouts of his wife from their relatives proved futile, x x x
[Remar filed a] Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death before the
RTC.
RTC granted the petition and was affirmed by CA. Republic filed this
petition. The Republic insists that Remar's efforts in locating his wife
Lovelyn were insufficient to give rise to a "well-founded belief' that she is
dead. On this basis, the Republic maintains that Remar's petition to declare
Lovelyn presumptively dead should have been dismissed.
Citing Cantor, the Republic asserts that the standard of "well-founded
belief' is exacting; it presupposes that the present spouse had exerted
diligent and reasonable efforts to locate the absent spouse.35 According to
the Republic, Remar's efforts fall short of this requirement
Issues:
 Whether or not Remar has proven a well-founded belief that his wife
should be declared presumptively dead in order to capacitate him to
remarry.
Held:
The law did not define what is meant by '"well-founded belief." It
depends upon the circumstances of each particular case. Its determination,
so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to comply with
this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the
result of diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent
spouse and that based on these efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that
under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
To recall, Remar's efforts to locate Lovelyn are marked by the
following acts:
1. Remar travelled to several places where his wife had been reportedly
seen particularly, Bislig City and the Municipality of Lingig in the province of
Surigao del Sur, Metro Manila, Batangas and Cavite; and
2. Remar constantly communicated with Lovelyn's relatives for a period of
ten (10) years in order to ascertain Lovelyn's whereabouts.
Unfortunately, Remar failed to allege, much less prove, the extent of
the search he had conducted in the places where he claims to have gone.
This leaves the Court with no way to ascertain the extent of Remar's
search.
Remar also failed to identify which of Lovelyn's relatives he had
communicated with, and disclose what he learned from these
communications. Again, this leaves the Court with no basis to determine
whether the information Remar learned is sufficient to engender a well-
founded belief that Lovelyn is dead.
Moreover, much like the respondent in Cantor, Remar never sought
the help of the authorities to locate Lovelyn in the course of her ten
(10)¬year disappearance. Remar was given ample opportunity to explain
his failure to report Lovelyn 's disappearance, considering that the Republic
first noted such failure when it filed its Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
Curiously, however, Remar chose not to address the matter.
Finally, the allegations in Remar's Petition for Declaration of
Presumptive Death37 suggest that he is aware of the true cause of Lovelyn
's disappearance, thus:
In the first three (3) months that his wife was in Manila[,] [there] was x
x x constant communication through cellphone calls and [texts]. [Remar]
relayed to [Lovelyn] that he is x x x working in Surigao City as a security
guard in the Hall of Justice. x x x
Then the calls and [texts] got fewer and fewer until [they] stopped. He
thought that the cell phone of his wife was just lost so he started inquiries
from his and her relatives in [Bislig] City. One confess[ed] that his wife is
now [cohabiting] with another man and will not be going home because of
shame. He could not believe and refuse[d) to believe the devastating news.
The Court commiserates with Remar's plight. Nevertheless, the Court
cannot uphold the issuance of a declaration of presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage where there appears to be no well-founded belief of
the absentee spouse's death, but only the likelihood that the absentee
spouse does not want to be found.