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Module 06 Mitigation Techniques Part1

The document discusses various exploit mitigation techniques used to prevent memory corruption, including stack cookies, address space layout randomization, data execution prevention, and structured exception handling safeguards. It provides examples of the timeline of these mitigations in different Windows versions and how compiler flags like /GS and /SafeSEH can help.

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53 views8 pages

Module 06 Mitigation Techniques Part1

The document discusses various exploit mitigation techniques used to prevent memory corruption, including stack cookies, address space layout randomization, data execution prevention, and structured exception handling safeguards. It provides examples of the timeline of these mitigations in different Windows versions and how compiler flags like /GS and /SafeSEH can help.

Uploaded by

oscar tebar
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Offensive Software

Exploitation
SEC-300-01/CSI-301-02

Ali Hadi
@binaryz0ne
Exploit Mitigation
Preventing memory corruption techniques!!!

Slides are modified from Memory Corruption 101, NYU


Poly, by Dino Dai Zovi
Exploit Mitigation Cited [1]

• Finding and fixing every vulnerability is impossible


• It is possible to make exploitation more difficult through:
– Memory page protection
– Run-time validation
– Obfuscation and Randomization
• Making every vulnerability non-exploitable is impossible

www.ashemery.com 3
Timeline of Mitigation Cited [1]

• Windows 1.0 - Windows XP SP1


– Corruption of stack and heap metadata is possible

• Windows Server 2003 RTM


– Operating System is compiled with stack cookies

• Windows XP SP 2
– Stack/heap cookies, SafeSEH, Software/Hardware DEP

• Windows Vista
– Address Space Layout Randomization

www.ashemery.com 4
Visual Studio /GS Flag Cited [1]

• Place a random “cookie” in the


stack frame before frame pointer
and return address Saved EIP
• Check cookie before using saved
frame pointer and return address
Saved EBP

Canary

Buffer[1024]

www.ashemery.com 5
Structured Exception Handling Cited [1]

• Supports try, except blocks in C and


C++ exceptions
• Nested SEH frames are stored on the SEH Frame
stack
• Contain pointer to next frame and ….
exception filter function pointer

Canary

Buffer[1024]

www.ashemery.com 6
Visual Studio /SafeSEH Cited [1]

• Pre-registers all exception handlers in the DLL or EXE


• When an exception occurs, Windows will examine the pre-
registered table and only call the handler if it exists in the
table
• What if one DLL wasn’t compiled w/ SafeSEH?
– Windows will allow any address in that module as an SEH handler
– This allows an attacker to still gain full control

www.ashemery.com 7
References
• Memory Corruption 101, NYU Poly, Dino Dai Zovi
• SEHOP, http://www.sysdream.com/articles/sehop_en.pdf
• Shellcode Storm, http://shell-storm.org/shellcode/
• Stack /GS, https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/8dbf701c%28VS.80%29.aspx?f=255&MSPPError=-
2147217396

www.ashemery.com 8

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