WAR AT SEA: U-BOAT COMMANDER TRAINING 1935-1945

Becoming Grey Wolves

The mystique of a stereotyped U-boat commander of the Second World
War is perpetuated in the historiography of the Kriegsmarine’s submarine COVER
arm, and often inaccurately. Dr. Axel Niestlé lays to rest some common STORY
misconceptions as to how it was and the reality of the commanders’ training.
.

■ A U-boat commander peers through the hatch and down into the conning tower of his boat.

W
ith the appearance of submarines as a as swashbuckling fighters in newsreels, books and
new and powerful weapon at the start of newspapers. Statistically, no other military service branch
the 20th century, their advent also saw offered better chances for high awards during the Second
Images Colourised by RJM.

the beginning of new myths surrounding World War, and about 11 % of the German front-line U-boat
their commanding officers. This was especially so for commanders were awarded the prestigious Knight’s Cross.
the achievements of the German U-boats during both Today, their names, biographies, sinking figures and
World Wars, and these myths laid foundations for the personal fates in battle are all well documented on the
commander’s perceived epitome of elite, recklessness, internet and in numerous publications, fiction movies and
decision-making and responsibility. Pushed into the documentaries. It was also the case that the successful film
wider public eye by wartime propaganda, the often production Das Boot of 1981 catapulted the stereotyped
highly decorated U-boat officers were portrayed figure of its commander into wide public awareness.

6 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ The Type II B-U-boat U-16, pre-war, pictured entering the naval base at Kiel.

In strong contrast, however, to the mass of information help of friendly navies in other countries. Six officers were
on the operational achievements of German U-boat seconded to the Finnish navy in 1930, while three others
commanders during the Second World War, almost trained with the Spanish navy. Both countries had purchased
nothing is known about the criteria for naval officer U-boat designs from the secret German U-boat construction
selection for service as U-boat commanders, details company, IvS, based in the Netherlands. The submarines
of their training and the great changes that U-boat were later tested under the supervision of German war-time
commander training underwent during the course of the U-boat engineer and naval construction officers.
war. Quite understandably, the more than 1,400 German In January 1933, four officers of the line joined a three-
U-Boat commanders appointed between 1935 and 1945 month lecture in basic U-Boat training and tactics at the
were not a homogenous group - whether by background, Technical Naval School, Flensburg.
age, training or personal experience. Their distinctive On 1 October 1933, the newly formed U-boat School, acting
differences, however, had a major influence on the under the cover name ‘Anti-U-boat School’, started the first
military situation in battle, and the outcome of the U-boat training course with eight officers including one engineer
War; known by the Allies as the Battle of the Atlantic. officer. U-boat construction was originally planned to start at
the same time, but the plan was delayed for political reasons
and to avoid tensions with France and Britain at that time.
U-BOAT ‘ACES’ In June 1935, an Anglo-German Naval Treaty eventually
Under the Versailles Peace Treaty of 1919, Germany was paved the way for the new German U-boat Arm. The
forbidden to develop or construct any kind of U-boat. commanding officers for the first batch of U-boats,
Likewise, any former U-boat commander who continued to numbered U-1 to U-12 (built from prefabricated
serve in the new German Reichsmarine, which succeeded components until September 1935) were all recruited
the former Imperial German Navy, quickly outranked the from the officers secretly trained in preceding years. On
position for command of a U-boat. However, in summer 1 October 1935, official U-boat officer training started at
of 1930, the German Reichsmarine secretly started a small the U-boat School, including 28 officers of the line and 9
training programme for future U-boat officers with the engineer officers. Among these were many future recipients

■ Left: Kapitänleutnant
Walter Flachsenberg,
commander of U-71, on
return from patrol. Like
several other U-boat
officers, he preferred to
wear an ordinary officer’s
cap instead of the white
cap.
■ Right: Kapitänleutnant
Erich Topp (commander
of U-552) together with
Kapitänleutnant Engelbert
Endrass (commander
of U-567) just before
departure from St. Nazaire
▲

in late 1941.

IRON CROSS ❙ 7
WAR AT SEA: U-BOAT COMMANDER TRAINING 1935-1945

of the Knight’s Cross, including two U-boat ‘aces’: Prien and

Schepke.
Standard pre-war training for future U-boat commanders
included a 12 week course in basic U-Boat operations at
the U-Boat School, 11 weeks torpedo training plus a special
two-week U-boat torpedo training course at the Torpedo
School, followed by a one-week radio training course at the
Communication School. Officers who had graduated from
any of these courses prior to joining the U-boat arm, jumped
the relevant steps. Subsequently, all officers served a two-
year assignment as Officer of the Watch aboard an active
U-boat. The first officers of the newly trained group took
over as U-boat commanders during the regular changes of
command in the autumn of 1937.
Archive records covering pre-war training details and
routines have not been located among German naval records,
but it appears that watch officers on active U-boats, which
were under constant recurrent training of all kinds, were
indoctrinated into the art of being a U-boat commander.
No special course or examination had to be attended, but ■ Commissioning of U-427 on 2 June 1943, at Danziger Werft, by
command certainly depended on biannual evaluations. Oberleutnant zur See Carl von Gudenus.

ELITISM, AGGRESSIVENESS AND SUPERIORITY The quality of pre-war U-boat commander training is
Until the beginning of the Second World War, a total of 81 difficult to quantify, but the group did include 19 officers
officers assumed command of a U-boat, and of these, 57 who would be among the top 35 ship killers during the
were active U-boat commanders on 1 September 1939, the war. In contrast, almost half were killed or became POW
majority of the rest serving in staff positions within the during the war, many during the first year of conflict. It is
U-boat arm or related positions in the Kriegsmarine. Only also a fact that beside sound training, varied unforeseeable
one former U-boat commander was transferred to a surface factors play a role in success or survival during war. This
fleet vessel, while another was killed in a flying accident. includes technological and tactical advances on the enemy
However, after the outbreak of war, all officers outside side, as well as often random fortunes of war.
the U-boat arm were soon The start of the Second World War, however, hit the
redrafted into commanding U-boat arm completely unprepared, both in personnel
officer positions. and materiel aspects. The pre-war mobilisation and
Prior to 1939, the U-boat building programme made a rapid increase of U-boat
arm represented only a figures unlikely. Even from the new naval building
small and unimportant programme of October 1939, which focused mainly on
branch within the German U-boats, substantial numbers of new constructions were
Kriegsmarine. But its not expected before the end of 1940. To make matters
commanding officer, worse, the U-boat arm suffered severe losses in the first
Kommodore Karl Dönitz, twelve months of the conflict. The average monthly loss
instilled his officers and rate figured as 17%, meaning that one out of six boats on
crews with elitism and patrol did not return. This fact is often overlooked, with a
created a strong feeling general impression of great successes by a small number
of aggressiveness and of capable U-boat commanders often presented. In the
superiority. Rigid selection as same period, however, some 39 % of the pre-war U-boat
regards to physical fitness and commanders were killed, taken POW or dropped out of
performance supported this the service arm for other reasons. The loss of their U-boat
esprit de corps, with Dönitz experience was hard to compensate.
■ Kapitänleutnant Robert following the mantra that the
Gysae, commander of U-98, Kriegsmarine should be first
on 18 January 1942 at St. among the armed services in EXPERIENCED VOLUNTEERS
Nazaire in France prior to
departure on his sixth patrol.
the German Wehrmacht, with Following the outbreak of war, several organisational
He was awarded the Knight’s the U-boat arm representing changes were necessary to accelerate U-boat commander
Cross on 31 December 1941. the crème de la crème. training. Because the pre-war training schemes were no

8 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ U-427 with watch officer on the bridge in ■ Lookout on an unknown Type VII C U-boat ■ U-427 leaving port.
Norway,1944. in 1943.

longer feasible, the system of Commander Torpedo Firing The regular training schedule for future U-boat
courses (Kommandanten-Schießlehrgang - KSL), which commanders at the start of the war is shown in table 1.
lasted four weeks and had been invented during the First Officers with previous service in the U-boat arm usually had
World War, was revived. The first course started on 11 already graduated from the U-boat specialist courses and
September 1939, with nine officers. The main goal was to joined a KSL directly. The broad pre-war torpedo training
qualify future U-boat commanders in the art of live day- course (TB-Lehrgang), however, was condensed to eight
and-night torpedo firing under all conditions. Each officer weeks for U-boats and was now designated TU-Lehrgang.
had to fire at least 30 to 40 torpedoes against escorted A total of 51 active naval officers took part in six KSL
dummy convoys in the Baltic Sea. courses during the first year of the war. Of these, 41 (or
To provide the necessary number of training U-boats, 82%) had previously served in U-boats for varying periods
a new training flotilla (U-Ausbildungs-Flottille, eventually (see graphic 1). The rest were hand-picked and experienced
designated 24. U-flotilla) was commissioned the following volunteers from other commands. None of the candidates
month, in addition to the U-boat School flotilla. Initially, failed, although a few had not participated in torpedo firing
only small Type II U-boats with just six torpedoes courses owing to pressing needs for new commanders.
were available, and so the training rhythm was mainly When German U-boat building eventually came into full
dominated by exercises at sea and reloading in port. swing at the end of 1940, new construction figures quickly

GRAPHIC 1 TABLE 1
U-BOAT COMMANDER TRAINING SCHEMES FOR NEWLY TRANSFERRED OFFICERS DURING 1935 - 1945
Period 1935/39 1939/40 1940/41 1943 1944
Pre-qualification seagoing seagoing seagoing seagoing no sea
experience experience experience experience experience
Course
U-boat basic training 12 weeks 8 weeks 8 weeks 8 weeks 8 weeks
Regular torpedo course 11 weeks - - - -
Artwork by Battlefield Design.

U-boat torpedo course 2 weeks 8 weeks 8 weeks 8 weeks 8 weeks

U-boat communication course 1 week 5 weeks 5 weeks 5 weeks 5 weeks
U-boat mining and barrage course - 2 weeks 2 weeks - -
U-boat artillery course - 3 weeks 3 weeks - -
U-boat anti-aircraft gunnery course - - - 4 weeks 4 weeks
Supernumerary OOW in home waters - - - 4 weeks 10 weeks
OOW service on active U-boat 2 years - - - -
Supernumerary commander frontline boat - - 2 - 8 weeks 2 - 8 weeks 2 - 8 weeks
optional optional
Commander harbour navigation course - - - - 12 weeks
Commander conning tower simulator course - - - 2 weeks 2 weeks
Commander torpedo firing course (KSL) - 4 weeks 4 - 6 weeks 6 weeks 6 weeks
▲

TOTAL PERIOD 2 ½ years 30 weeks 32 - 40 weeks 37 - 45 weeks 55 - 63 weeks

IRON CROSS ❙ 9
 WAR AT SEA: U-BOAT COMMANDER TRAINING 1935-1945

■ Right:
Commissioning of
U-405 at Danzig,
17 September
1941, on the quay
of the Danziger
Werft builder’s
yard.

■ Left:
Kapitänleutnant
Herbert Kuppisch,
commander of
U-94, after the
award of his
Knight’s Cross
on 14 May 1943.
He was killed on
27 August 1943,
when his boat
U-847 was sunk in
the mid-Atlantic.

outpaced the available number of candidates for command GRAPHIC 2

within the U-boat arm. Even worse, active frontline U-boat
numbers dropped to an all-time low at the beginning of
1941 due to losses and the growing need for school boats
to cope with the training requirements of new officers and
crews. Consequently, the years 1940 and 1941 saw a first
huge influx of active officers from other naval vessels into
the U-boat arm (see graphic 2).
The bottleneck in commanding officers had been
Artwork by Battlefield Design.

foreseen by the C-in-C. of the Kriegsmarine, who issued a

general order on 8 December 1939 to the effect that all line
and engineer officers belonging to classes between 1921 and
1934, were to be examined immediately for U-boat fitness
and results reported directly to the manning department.

LACK OF U-BOAT EXPERIENCE

The general situation of the Kriegsmarine in 1940/41 also

GRAPHIC 3 favored the recruitment of volunteers from other

branches because many officers on capital ships
down to destroyer size had lost their vessels,
(e.g. during the Norwegian campaign) or were
attracted by the promise of fame and awards after
German propaganda boosted the achievements
of U-boats in combat. Highly decorated U-boat
Artwork by Battlefield Design.

officers were a prominent feature in the German

news, soon becoming well-known heroes. In
addition, a large number of ambitious naval
officers, temporarily detached to the German
Luftwaffe to form the nucleus of a fleet air arm,
were reassigned to the navy after initial plans
to build a carrier force were abandoned, the
Luftwaffe having strongly opposed the idea of an
independent naval air arm.

10 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ The Type II U-boats of the U-Bootflottille Weddigen, pre-war and in
the Baltic port of Sassnitz.

■ The Type II B U-boat U-21 of the U-Bootflottille Weddigen, pre-war,

■ A Type II B U-boat in the pre-war period. at the Tirpitz harbour, Kiel.

Volunteer figures usually exceeded available places on – Appointments to Type XIV supply U-boats (without
the training courses, although the number of participants torpedo armament) whose commanders were often
was raised up to 27 officers within a single course, making reserve officers drafted from the merchant marine;
proper individual training difficult. Although attendance – Commanding officer changes in the Far East, or during
in all special U-boat officer training courses now became the evacuation of France after the Allied invasion, when no
compulsory for commanding officer training, most properly qualified officer was available.
candidates suffered from a complete lack of active U-boat The small number of officers who had graduated from a
experience (see graphic 3). firing course already during the First World War were not
This deficit was partly compensated for by that fact that required to repeat the course before taking over U-boat
most future commanders then were at least seasoned commands during Second World War.
naval officers with often more than 10 years of service.
To provide these officers with at least a minimum of
operational U-boat experience before taking over their TO COMPENSATE FOR LOSSES
own boats, many joined frontline boats as ‘supernumerary At the beginning of 1942, the U-boat arm had grown to 252
commander under training’ for the duration of one patrol. boats in commission with 89 boats in frontline service
From the beginning of the war, the basic principle was and another 104 to join them after completion of work-
that no officer should command a U-boat without prior up training in the Baltic. The larger number of boats now
graduation from a commander firing course. However, offered the chance to recruit all future commanding
operational necessities caused a few exceptions to that officers from the officer pool within the U-boat arm.
rule during the war: In 1942, the required number of new commanding
- School boats in the Baltic were sometimes temporarily officer candidates was calculated as 300 per year, based
lead by frontline experienced U-boat officers until they on a construction figure of 20 new boats per month.
▲

joined the next free place in a commander firing course; This left 60 officers for frontline replacement or as a

IRON CROSS ❙ 11
WAR AT SEA: U-BOAT COMMANDER TRAINING 1935-1945

■ Oberleutnant zur See Harald Gelhaus on the bridge of U-143 with

his First Watch Officer, Leutnant zur See Helmut Herglotz (front left),
and crew in April 1941 at Kiel.

back-up to compensate for other losses, e.g. graduation as replacement commanders to a frontline flotilla.
failure, illness or loss during the period as supernumerary However, only officers with previous frontline experience
commander. The average number of KSL participants was were eligible for frontline replacement. Until 1942, about 20
now 15 officers with two courses each month; that is, except officers were appointed to command in this way with about
during January/February, when icing-up in the Baltic made half having already served previously as First Watch Officer
regular sea training impossible. on their new boats. From April 1943, officers designated to
New commanders were now almost exclusively recruited replace a frontline commander usually attended a refresher
from watch officers serving on frontline U-boats. Their course at the 27th Tactical U-flotilla before taking over their
average frontline experience time had dropped, by then, new command.
to just three patrols. Also, 1942 saw the first reserve officer – Average graduates (or graduates without previous
appointed as a U-boat commander - Leutnant zur See der frontline experience) were generally appointed to
Reserve Botho Bade in U-626. commission newly built boats, which thereafter had to
The youngest commanders during 1942 had entered spend a work-up period of several months in the Baltic.
the Kriegsmarine in 1938, constituting a service time of 57 This allowed the new commanding officers to ‘mature’ in
months, which was only half a year less than their comrades their new positions.
from earlier officer classes. Older officers fit for U-boat – Below average graduates were given school boat
service serving in the U-boat arm staff had already been commands to gain more training and experience in all
totally combed out by 1942. fields or else went away to shore commands.
To balance the lack of experience of new candidates, new These rules remained in force until the end of the war.
tactical simulator equipment (Fahrgerät) was introduced in Failures were sometimes allowed to repeat the KSL once, or
January 1942. This used a dummy conning tower and ship were drafted to other commands outside the U-boat arm.
models in a convoy scenario to simulate battle sequences However, due to rigid selection before being appointed to
and prepare participants for onboard torpedo training at a KSL, until the end of 1942 the percentage of failure was
sea. The simulator course, which allowed training for all below 1%, usually owing to health problems.
kinds of day and night attack modes under changing light The U-boat manning department sometimes showed a
conditions, however, normally lasted two weeks maximum. good sense of humor by appointing officers to individual
command. Thus, Leutnant zur See der Reserve Herbert
Engel (angel) was ordered to command the “devil boat”, U
A ‘CHILDREN’S CRUSADE’ 666. Likewise, in some cases, noble officers were sent to
By 1942, the following basic rules concerning future command ‘namesake’ boats.
appointments of new commanding officers had been In the 1980’s, some authors claimed the German U-boat
established: campaign after 1943 had been a ‘children’s crusade’, with
– Top graduates from each KSL course were often appointed commanding officers often aged just 21 or 22. However,

12 ❙ IRON CROSS
 ■ From left to
right U-1202,
U-2506, U-2511 and
U-3514 alongside
Dokkeskjaerkaien at
Bergen in May 1945
after surrender.

■ Left: Kapitänleutnant
Kurt Freiwald on his
command, U-33, during
operations in the
Atlantic.

these allegations are not reflected in the available records. than four patrols. Apart from two reserve officers and one
As shown, U-boat commander appointment followed promoted from the ranks, all candidates were active line
a strict rule without exceptions or out of line commands. officers from classes between 1935 and 1939. By the end of
Table 2 gives the first ever command, separated to the war, seven had been killed, three became POW, four
positions and officer classes, and based on the evaluation remained in command of a frontline U-boat, one served
of some 7,000 U-boat officer personnel files. It is apparent on a school boat and two had been transferred to shore
that the average service time for individual commands commands.
became shorter during the war. The highpoint was reached In early 1943, the youngest commander of a frontline
in the first half of 1943, when the active officer corps U-boat was 22.5 years (Leutnant zur See Eberhard Dahlhaus,
within the U-boat arm was stretched to the limit, with the born on 24 July 1920) with four previous patrols as Second
transfer of reserve officers or officers from other branches or First watch officer on his record. The age trend in the
within the Kriegsmarine into the U-boat arm having just U-boat arm conforms with wartime affects, including
started. shortened training periods and increased demands. It
The 46th KSL, lasting from mid-April to mid-May 1943, does not differ significantly from other services or units
represents a typical example for the youth-trend at that in the German Wehrmacht. However, the officer manning
time. With the average age of all seventeen officers at 25 problems in the U-boat force was greatly increased by the
years, the youngest candidate was 22 and the oldest already disastrous losses starting in the spring of 1943. Out of 236
33. Like all KSL candidates in the first half of 1943, the frontline boats on 1 May 1943, no less than 120 (51 %) were
officers had previously served as watch officer aboard a lost in the following six months. This also meant the loss
frontline boat with the youngest having completed no less of at least 120 future commander candidates in this same
period.

TABLE 2
Crew IWO Service time Commander Service time
35 Sep-39 54 Months May-40 62 Months PLANNED BUILDING FIGURES
36 Oct-39 43 Months Jul-41 64 Months The increased U-boat building ordered during the summer
IV/37 Oct-40 43 Months May-42 62 Months
X/37 Apr-41 43 Months Jul-42 58 Months
1943, which initially demanded 40 new boats each month,
38 Aug-41 41 Months Dec-42 57 Months eventually called for an average of more than 50 boats
X/39 Jan-42 28 Months Jun-43 45 Months
in 1944. This would have required an annual output of at
XII/39 Apr-42 28 Months Jul-43 44 Months
X/40 Dec-42 28 Months Apr-44 43 Months least 600 new U-boat commanders per year. Although
I/41 May-43 28 Months Dec-44 48 Months the planned building figures were never achieved, 1944
V/41 Jun-43 25 Months Feb-45 46 Months
X/41 Nov-43 25 Months - - nevertheless saw the largest output of new U-boats from
VI/42 Jul-44 25 Months - - the building yards during the entire war despite the British
▲

XII/42 Dec-44 24 Months - -

and American strategic bombing campaign on German

IRON CROSS ❙ 13
 WAR AT SEA: U-BOAT COMMANDER TRAINING 1935-1945

■ U-143 on
departure for
patrol at Kiel on
19 April 1941.

industry targets and numerous terror attacks against the course with 145 eventually assuming command of U-boat
civilian population. The greatly increased demand for new (see graphic 4). Of these, 92 graduates were active officers,
commanding officers could not be provided from the while 61 were reserve officers and six had been promoted
officer pool within the U-boat arm or the existing training from the ranks.
system. In addition to the enlarged group of reserve
Recruiting suitable new candidates for commanding officers, no less than 42 graduates were ex weapons or
officer training from outside the U-boat arm initially administration officers and Luftwaffe pilots without
focused on officers with seagoing experience serving on previous nautical experience. To process the increased
smaller combat ships like torpedo boats, minesweepers number of candidates, the training organisation was
or escort vessels. In a first recruiting period between expanded in September 1943, when a second firing
February and June 1943, 222 new officers were transferred flotilla (23. U-flotilla) for commander torpedo firing was
to the U-boat arm from other branches within the commissioned in addition to the existing 24. U-flotilla.
Kriegsmarine. Of these, 159 later graduated from a KSL From then on, four regular six-week KSL courses took

GRAPHIC 4 GRAPHIC 6
Artwork by Battlefield Design.

14 ❙ IRON CROSS
■ Korvettenkapitän Eberhard Godt (centre) as Chief of the BdU
operational staff, together with his staff officers Korvettenkapitän
Helmut Brümmer-Patzig (right) and Kapitänleutnant Victor Oehrn at ■ Kapitänleutnant Fritz-Julius Lemp (CO of U-30) at the left with his
BdU HQ, Wilhelmshaven, 1940. engineer officer Hans-Joachim Eichelborn.

GRAPHIC 5 OUTDATED BOATS AND WISHFUL THINKING

In an attempt to compensate the lack of seagoing
experience among future commanding officer candidates
in 1944, U-boat commander training was supplemented by
10 weeks of sea training as supernumerary watch officer
on a school boat, and a 12 week navigation and harbour
training course at the newly formed 19. U-flotilla. Despite
these additional steps, the number of repeaters or low-
performance candidates who failed and were drafted
away, grew steadily. The lack of seafaring experience
among a large portion of the new KSL graduates was so
apparent that even the system of supernumerary pupil
commanders embarked for one patrol on frontline boats,
abandoned at the end of 1942 after growing losses, was
revived in early 1944 despite the horrific loss rate of nearly
50% in the months thereafter.
The regular training of new U-boat commanders
stopped on 27 January 1945 owing to the advance of the
Red Army along the Baltic Coast. With a single exception,
no officer drafted into the U-boat arm after January 1944
was able to complete his commanding officer training.
place each month, with between 12-15 candidates each. In all, 114 KSL courses with almost 1,550 officers had
Owing to the steady drain from the officer pool of the been carried out. The growing absence of seagoing
German surface fleet, by mid-1943 active line officers experience, often accompanied by a lack of basic
fit for U-boat service with a minimum experience at sea technical or tactical skills, resulted in a steady process of
had been largely combed out. Consequently, during the de-professionalisation among U-boat commanders from
following recruiting period from July 1943 until January mid-1943. During the last nine months of the Battle in the
1944, when a total of 459 officers newly joined the U-boat Atlantic, more than 50% of commanding officers sailing
arm, almost half were former naval artillery officers on their first patrol had no previous combat experience
without any nautical experience. For these officers, a in U-boats whatsoever (see graphic 5). The rest had often
three-month nautical course at one of the naval schools served no more than a single patrol as U-boat watch
was obligatory. officer. By 1945, the U-boat arm had drifted miles away
Out of the total drafted in the second period, 154 from the pre-war elite, although that elite ethos still lived
officers eventually graduated from a KSL during the war on among its members who stubbornly carried on until
(see graphic 6). Reserve officers now dominated the group the bitter end.
▲

of graduates, representing 59%. New U-boat commanders faced almost insurmountable

IRON CROSS ❙ 15
WAR AT SEA: U-BOAT COMMANDER TRAINING 1935-1945

■ Korvettenkapitän Eberhard Godt, Chief of the BdU operational

staff, on the right together with his First Staff Officer, ■ Kapitänleutnant Günter Kuhnke (commander of U-28) after the award of
Kapitänleutnant Victor Oehrn, at the BdU HQ, Wilhelmshaven, 1940. his Knight’s Cross on 19 September 1940 at Lorient.

problems on patrols under the prevailing conditions in information.

the Atlantic of 1944/45. Unlike their Allied adversaries, With numerical, technical and tactical advantages
the German U-boat arm had no refresher training on the Allied side, the chances of success and survival
schemes to update officers and crews in new offensive or were limited, even for experienced commanders. The
defensive tactics based on information from intelligence German U-boat arm in 1945 still fought with boats
or investigations on Allied tactics and weapons. In fact, technologically designed well before 1939. In 1945, many
German knowledge about Allied anti-submarine warfare of these technologically outdated boats were destroyed
in 1939-1945 was only ever superficial, manifesting in their first serious encounter with enemy forces during
an almost complete failure of the naval intelligence outbound transfer, or within the assigned operational
and advisory departments. U-boat commanders were area.
therefore often helpless against new Allied techniques or In the final months of the war, when the U-boat loss
tactics, and numerous advisory or warning radio signals rate around Britain and in the Atlantic stood at well above
from U-boat Command offered no substitute for proper 50%, the U-boat campaign took on an almost suicidal
character (see graphic 7). No military unit can
sustain such losses for a long period. U-boat
GRAPHIC 7 Command already realised this development at
the end of March 1945, but political fanatacism
among the top command level prevented
it from drawing the proper conclusions.
Hence, only military defeat at land saved the
remaining officers and crews of the U-boat
arm from total extinction and useless killings.
Any wartime or post-war statements,
suggesting that the new U-boat types designed
and built at the end of the war might have
changed the tide again, must all be seen as
wishful and fanciful thinking in the light of the
missing experience and lack of proper training
for commanding officers and crews.

16 ❙ IRON CROSS