The SIGABA ECM Cipher Machine A Beautiful Idea3
The SIGABA ECM Cipher Machine A Beautiful Idea3
Timothy Mucklow was a senior historian on the staff of the Center for Cryptologic History fol-
lowing a long career in information assurance at NSA and with the Air Force. After a decade in aca-
demia, he served as a military historian at the wing, division, and major command levels and produced
a series of monographs and articles on such topics as information assurance, telecommunications and
computers, and national defense issues, and has offered IA seminars at military facilities around the
world. He received his Ph.D. in 1982. He retired from the CCH in 2013.
Acknowledgments. The Center for Cryptologic History is grateful to Dr. Craig Bauer, professor
of mathematics at York College of Pennsylvania and editor-in-chief of the journal Cryptologia, for his
assistance with this project, and to LeeAnn Tallman for earlier research.
The SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine:
“A Beautiful Idea”
Timothy J. Mucklow
2015
Contents
Introduction ....................................................................................... 1
And Hebern Saw the Wheel .................................................................... 2
Deus ex Machine ................................................................................. 5
Rowlett’s Epiphany .............................................................................. 7
Iacta Alea Est. [The Die Is Cast.] ........................................................... 10
Enter the Navy ..................................................................................12
A Disagreeable but Rewarding Surprise ....................................................14
SIGABA Is Built ...................................................................................16
An Impenetrable Machine .....................................................................22
The Big Machine That Did .....................................................................25
Appendix A: Technical Analysis of SIGABA’s Key Space ..................................29
Appendix B: The Mechanics of SIGABA......................................................32
Notes ..............................................................................................38
Selected Bibliography ..........................................................................42
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
Introduction
1 1
And Hebern Saw the Wheel
2
And Hebern Saw the Wheel
3
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
The crypto rotor wheels William Friedman envisioned for his device
were flattened cylinders with an alphabet around the circumference.
One face of the cylinder had twenty-six spring-loaded copper pins
protruding from it; the other face had twenty-six flush copper contacts.
Inside each cylinder was a wire maze connecting the electrical contacts
on one side to the pins on the other.
Thus, an electrical impulse beginning with, say, the letter A on one
side might connect to H on the other side and so on around the wheel in
random fashion. Several cylinders serially juxtaposed on a spindle side-
by-side could further scramble impulses. (Image courtesy the online
Crypto Museum, www.cryptomuseum.com)
4
Deus ex Machine
5 5
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
6
Rowlett’s Epiphany
7 7
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
I don’t know that I ever was confronted with instead of the tapes. Well, I thought this
a more hopeless task than making these was a pretty powerful thing and I just was so
[Friedman’s] devices work and do what enthusiastic about it because it looked like
was needed and I soon became desperate. I was getting out of this impossible task, I
It didn’t take more than a month for me to went to tell Friedman about it.18
realize that I was fighting a real losing battle
Armed with enthusiastic conviction, Rowlett
here, and as you are apt to do in the case
approached his boss about scrapping the whole key
of where necessity becomes very evident you
tape transmitter concept and moving on to some-
try to figure out some better way of doing
thing more cryptographically sound. After permit-
things and I was dreaming about how rotors
ting Rowlett only briefly to present his discovery,
could be made to do other [things] and
Friedman would hear no more. He categorically
decipher [messages].17
refused to believe it possible to create a machine
As the drudgery of developing key tapes became capable of generating its own random stepping.19
more tedious, the solution came to him. Friedman, who was every bit as hard-headed as his
nemeses over at the Patent Office, remained wed-
I thought it would be a helluva good idea if
ded to using replaceable paper key tape. After all, his
we replaced these key tapes with a second set
salient argument for pursuing a patent for his key
of rotors which in effect would generate five
tape transmitter—which caused the cipher rotors
screens of impulses equivalent to the holes
to advance irregularly—was that any machine that
and no holes in the five levels of the tape and
determined its own stepping would be in violation
use this assembly of five additional rotors
of Kerckhoffs’ second principle and, therefore, vul-
8
Rowlett’s Epiphany
9
Iacta Alea Est.*
10
Iacta Alea Est.
11
Enter the Navy
12
Enter the Navy
Rowlett, after several anxious months, had tated. He knew it was a good idea, a very good idea,
received no feedback from OP-20-G and began to and became all the more convinced not only that it
pester Friedman for word about the Navy’s plans for would work but that it offered secure communica-
SIGABA. Friedman finally tired of these queries tions beyond anything thought possible at the time.
and confessed that Wenger had reported that “there With SIGABA’s future on indefinite hold, Fried-
were certain … operational difficulties and that man and his colleagues returned to solving Japanese
they just weren’t sure the idea would work.” To this, ciphers and producing paper key tapes for those
Rowlett mused, “well, I thought the doggone thing M-134s not fitted with SIGGOOs (since the stan-
would work and maybe they weren’t as smart as they dard M-134s and those with SIGGOOs were not
thought they were.” 31 Rowlett had reason to be irri- compatable, they were used on separate networks).
13
A Disagreeable but
Rewarding Surprise
14
A Disagreeable but Rewarding Surprise
On 3 February 1940 the Army’s primary SIS the stepping magnets of both mazes.” 38 He was
cryptologists—Friedman, Rowlett, Sinkov, and also fascinated by the additional set of rotor wheels
Kullback—trooped over to the Navy Building to see that the Navy had included. When he and Fried-
the prototype of the Electric Cipher Machine Mark man shared the stepping maze concept with the
II (SIGABA). Following an informal demonstration Navy, the design incorporated a plugboard similar
of the device, during which Friedman and Rowlett to that on the German ENIGMA machine. At first
could hardly contain their excitement, they were the Army cryptographers did not perceive “… the
finally given the opportunity to put it through its advantage of the extra set of rotors that the Navy
paces. It was a case of love at first sight. Rowlett later had introduced … We [Friedman and Rowlett]
said, “… it was the most beautiful thing to look at preferred the plugboard. The Navy for some rea-
from where I stood and I couldn’t keep my hands off son didn’t like plugboards but this was not a point
it and of course the Navy was delighted to find some- … to quibble about.” 39 With either the plugboard
body as enthusiastic about it as I appeared to be.” 36 or the index rotors, SIGABA represented the pin-
The Navy had exceeded any expectations Rowlett nacle of cryptography, and both the Army and Navy
had entertained, and he wanted to explore every were confident in its ability to resist all assaults.40
facet of the Navy’s engineering triumph. He and
Those who attended the demonstration at
Friedman were all the more heartened by the Navy’s
the Navy Building had every reason to bask in the
willing acknowledgment of the Army’s visionary role
warmth of self-congratulation. It had been a long
behind SIGABA. (The Army designated the combi-
and unlikely path from Friedman’s and Rowlett’s
nation of machines as the M-134-C, which was also
collaboration to the Navy’s manifestation of their
applied to the later, more mature SIGABAs. For the
concept, and Rowlett couldn’t help but reflect with
purpose of this paper, the M-134-C machine will be
a little nostalgia on the old ways of doing business:
referred to by its more popularly used Army short
“… before, you had to have a different set of code-
title, SIGABA, whenever possible.) 37
books and these became onerous, but with the new
Rowlett, besides being taken with the purely secure cipher machines, all the cipher clerk needed
mechanical aspects of the machine, was also quite was a box of rotors and a little pamphlet that told
interested in SIGABA’s wiring scheme. He later him how to use the rotors, which made the concept
said, “I was very curious about the circuitry that … very practical.” 41 As elated as all of them were,
they’d decided on in terms of the association of the none present could then conceive the extent to which
contacts on the in-plates of the control maze with their accomplishment would alter the future.
15
SIGABA Is Built
16
SIGABA Is Built
A sketch of the wheel control unit, the “control rotor bank,” separate from the cipher unit,
called the “cipher rotor bank.” Note at bottom reads, “Wheel control unit and cipher wheel
unit are identical in design and interchangeable. Wiring to be arranged as indicated.”
It is similar to the diagrams Friedman showed the Navy during 1935.
(Friedman Collection, NSA/CSS accession #47270, box 10, folder 5)
17
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
SIGABA rotor maze. Note the five small ten-pin wheels that replaced the
Army’s original plugboard.
vided 9,667,680 possible wheel orders, mak- 4. The stepping of the alphabet maze was
ing an adversary’s “trial and error” solutions controlled by an independent source—in this
impractical, if not impossible.45 (The CCM case by both the five index rotor set and the
also offered ten reversible cipher wheels per five control rotor set.47
set.) [There is a common misconception
that SIGABA rotors could rotate either 5. The use of a multiplicity of stepping actions
forward or backward. While the direction of (5,855), dependent solely on the key, instead of
travel for SIGABA rotors was forward only, only one in other cipher machines.48
all fifteen rotors could be flipped in either 6. The replication of code wheel sets—both
direction to maximize their cryptographic “effective” and “reserve”—with prompt
potential.] change of code wheels in case of known com-
3. The use of aperiodic stepping of cipher promise, and a periodic change as an added
wheels, instead of regular or modified- security measure. The inclusion of a back-up
regular stepping motion, precluded all known set of fifteen wheels (five index rotors, five
analytical solutions and prevented “short-cut” control rotors, and five cipher rotors) was
solutions with captured cipher wheels.46 taken to dispel any lingering doubts as to the
absolute security of SIGABA.49
18
SIGABA Is Built
With America’s involvement in the war a near ships of the 14th Fleet, with another 100 in stor-
certainty, the Army identified the necessary funds to age awaiting distribution to capital ships and other
assist the Navy in procuring SIGABAs in numbers. units. Twenty-five more were ashore undergoing
The Army’s first lot of 459 machines was fielded in depot-level maintenance. Fortunately, the machines
June 1941. With a due sense of urgency, it distribut- destined for the doomed vessels were still in the
ed these SIGABAs to upper echelon headquarters in warehouse on 7 December 1941 and thus escaped
the CONUS and to selected organizations in Amer- destruction. A hundred of these Pearl Harbor-
ican possessions in the Far East. Naval units in the surplus machines were hastily transferred to the
Atlantic theater were given priority because forces in Army and later used in North Africa. To meet the
the Pacific had already been equipped with the older demand of producing more than fifty devices per
ECM Is.50 Of course some sensitive sites like Cor- month, contracts were let with additional manu-
regidor, Guam, and Pearl Harbor necessitated the facturers. By 1943 5,730 ECM Mark II/SIGABAs
highest degree of security for the signals intelligence were in service and more than 300 per month were
information they processed and thus received the being delivered. The only feature distinguishing the
new cipher machines as well. The Navy was in the Army and the Navy machines was the service-unique
process of outfitting its capital ships of the Pacific designation on the name plates. For the first time
fleet with ECM Mark IIs (SIGABAs) when Pearl in the nation’s history, the Army and Navy enjoyed
Harbor was bombed. Ninety-six had been issued to cryptographic interoperability.51
19
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
20
SIGABA Is Built
As though SIGABA were not already suf- cipher machine rather than humans. Army and Navy
ficiently sound cryptographically, the Army and key generators produced each month’s daily settings
Navy took additional measures to ensure the sys- printed on a single sheet of paper. Thus, the key was
tem’s robustness. Unlike the cipher systems used by easy to transport, easy to use, easy to destroy, and, if
the British and the Axis Powers, SIGABA’s daily necessary, easy to replace.
settings were generated by yet another rotor-based
IBM SIGABA key generator used at headquarters to produce daily key settings 55
21
An Impenetrable Machine
22
An Impenetrable Machine
that the Germans had made any headway against that was an interesting item in itself. They
SIGABA.58 did have some success with the Hagelin.
Deciphered Japanese traffic also indicated that Rowlett continued,
they had not broken into Allied ciphers. An inter-
…we had truckload after truckload of Ger-
cepted JN-A-20 message, dated 24 January 1942,
man cryptographic equipment. … We had
from the naval attaché in Berlin to the Vice Chief
some of the technical reports right up to the
of Naval General Staff Tokyo afforded a comforting
solution of code books and ciphers of other
revelation. In it the naval attaché said he considered
countries, photographic copies of second
“joint Jap[anese]-German cryptanalytical efforts” to
story jobs that they had performed on safes
be “highly satisfactory,” since the “German[s] have
and embassy code rooms …This was gone
exhibited commendable ingenuity and recently
over, carefully evaluated and assessed and a
experienced some success on English Navy systems,”
series of reports produced which you might
but are “encountering difficulty in establishing suc-
find under the term TICOM [Target Intel-
cessful techniques of attack on ‘enemy’ code set-
ligence Committee] Reports.63
up.” 59 In another decrypted JN-A-20 message, the
naval attaché wrote home that he had “…discovered With the return of peace in late 1945, the victo-
that Heine [German] CI [Cryptographic] organi- rious Allies began compiling exhaustive studies on
zation totals 800 persons and is … receiving unsat- Axis technologies and capabilities. One of these, the
isfactory results on American Communications.” Seabourne Report, was a series of technical treatises
He went on to report, “Since last year when Italy drafted by German subject matter experts. Volume
capitulated, English and American countermeasures XIII of this report detailed the Nazis’ successes
have become more vigilant due to interpreting the against Allied cryptographic systems. According
CI situation.” 60 The Japanese in their own internal to interviews with senior officials of the Luftwaffe
communications confessed that they had made no Signal Intelligence Service contained in the report,
real progress against American cipher systems and the Germans revealed they had made no headway
that the Americans were becoming even savvier against the British Typex cipher machine, which
about the security of their cryptographic operations. was greatly inferior to SIGABA. The Luftwaffe
cryptologists interestingly did not address SIGABA
Following V-E Day, Friedman and his asso-
specifically, and their American counterparts were
ciates were anxious to discover just what the Axis
reluctant to press for answers lest they raise unwant-
cryptanalysts had known. According to Rowlett, 61
ed questions from their former enemies. Consider-
We also were very much interested in what ing the immense disparity between SIGABA and
results … have been achieved by the Ger- Typex, it is a certainty that the Nazis made no
mans on the ECM or the SIGABA. And inroads into the “American Big Machine.” 64
we got the answer to that. … they talked to
The official War Diary of the German Signal
the fellow who was in charge of what they
Intelligence Group again seems to validate the find-
called the American Big Machine.62 See,
ings of the other inquiries. Entries made between
they’d identified the Big Machine as the one
February and November 1944 again strongly sug-
jointly used by the Army and Navy, and they
gest that the Axis made no inroads into SIGABA.
couldn’t tell we were using different rotors
While their cryptologists were reading “un-Steck-
or other things because their cryptanalytic
ered” Croatian ENIGMA machines (early com-
understanding was just not at that level; and
mercial model ENIGMA machines without a plug-
23
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
board or Steckerbrett), British transposition ciphers, exploit only a lower-level Hagelin machine on occa-
Yugoslavian ciphers, and a variety of others, they sion, there was no possibility that they could even
undertook efforts against an American five-letter begin to unravel SIGABA. Dr. Huettenhain, when
system. A translated notation in March 1944 reads, pressed about other Allied cipher machines, said, “I
“A study was begun of a group of 5-letter messag- know of no other type of American machine, but
es from U.S.A. links presumably were enciphered the British Typex is known. It was not broken, and
with a machine of unknown type.” 65 These doubt- so far as we know cannot be solved unless the wheel
lessly were SIGABA messages. With each succes- positions are known.” 69 Dr. Huettenhain continued,
sive month the War Diary reflected that no prog-
We have the ENIGMA [sic] which is simi-
ress was made on the five-letter American cipher
lar to the Typex, and as we believe that the
system. Then in September 1944, with the Allied
ENIGMA cannot be solved, no great effort
forces steadily advancing against the Germans, the
was made to solve Typex. Typex has seven
War Diary includes, “U.S. 5-letter traffic: Work dis-
wheels and we therefore believe it to be
continued as unprofitable at this time.” The Third
more secure than our ENIGMA. ENIG-
Reich’s cryptologists ostensibly decided to focus on
MA when used according to instruction is
ciphers they could exploit.66
unbreakable. It might be broken if a vast
During his detention by the Allies, the Ger- Hollerith complex is used but this is only
man cryptographic mathematician and POW Dr. slightly possible.70
Erich Huettenhain was asked what work was done
After months of interviews, none of the cryp-
on British and American ciphers. He answered that
tologic POWs could offer any information about
most of the successes were diplomatic and “Most
SIGABA. They spoke candidly, even proudly, about
of the American strip cipher was read.”67 When
their successes against British and American ciphers,
he was asked what type of cipher machines were
and why not? Had they broken SIGABA, surely they
broken, he responded, “The main machine bro-
would have been all the more delighted to regale
ken was the American Hagelin which was broken
their captors with their cryptanalytic prowess. Little
only when [an] error occurred.” He continued,
did they suspect that their own cherished ENIGMA
“[c]ommon and regular solutions [were] impossible”
machines had been entirely compromised. Exten-
against the Hagelin machine. Only when a soldier
sive evidence gleaned from the Japanese after the
or sailor grew lazy and neglected to change the daily
war indicated that they had made even less progress
key were the Germans able to leverage their way
against SIGABA than the Germans had.71
into a Hagelin-based cipher.68 If the Germans could
24
The Big Machine That Did
25 25
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
The United States for various reasons regarded be guarded twenty-four hours a day by armed mili-
any information about the SIGABA machine as so tary personnel.75 This had been the usual practice
sensitive that it did not share any of its principles during the war in overseas locations, and the services
or details with the British. SIGABAs deployed to did not want a relaxation of security with the return
British military facilities were operated and stored of peace.
in secure enclaves to which host-nation personnel
Army and Navy cryptographers, still concerned
were not permitted. Joint U.S.-UK tactical com-
that SIGABA’s principles might be compromised,
munications in the Pacific Theater were passed
undertook to remove SIGABAs from geographi-
along circuits using the Enigma-like British Typex
cal areas where they might be compromised and
machine; during the latter part of the war the
replaced them with SIGRODs.76 SIGROD was a
Allies used the CCM to coordinate joint activities.
transportable, electromechanical, keyboard-oper-
Throughout World War II high-level communica-
ated cryptographic machine capable of encipher-
tions to and from Roosevelt and Churchill passed
ing and deciphering message traffic at the rate of
through SIGABA-based circuits. Messages from
forty to fifty words per minute. It was nearly identi-
Downing Street were forwarded to the American
cal cryptographically to the joint U.S./UK CCM as
embassy in London where they were encrypted and
well as the British Typex machine. Smaller, lighter,
sent to Washington, DC, where they were rendered
and much cheaper to maintain than SIGABA, the
into plaintext and directed to the White House.
five-rotor SIGRODs were capable of processing top
When peace returned in the summer of 1945, secret information and, importantly, if compromised
more than 16 million Americans were wearing the would not disclose the sensitive cryptographic prin-
uniform of their country; two years later those num- ciples embodied in SIGABA.77 SIGABAs were
bers had dwindled to slightly more than 1.5 mil- phased out incrementally and replaced with the less
lion, and the nation was awash in surplus military powerful machines. Nevertheless, SIGABAs con-
materiel. Cryptographic equipment such as M-209 tinued to be used at higher level headquarters for
cipher machines and M-90 devices could be pur- processing the nation’s most closely held secrets and
chased for a nominal sum. Not for sale, however, were stockpiled in heavily secured facilities against
were the 10,060 SIGABAs which had successfully emergency situations when they might be needed
defied the best efforts of the Axis Powers. Postwar again. When the Korean War broke out, SIGABAs
technical analysis of German and Japanese crypto- were used extensively at higher echelons because of
logic capabilities put SIGABA’s principles in a per- their dependability and high degree of security. For
spective that the Americans themselves were only the remainder of the 1950s, the brainchild of Fried-
just then coming to appreciate. Studies suggested man and Rowlett could be found in military higher
that SIGABA was so much more technologically headquarters and critical message centers around
advanced than had been thought that its principles the world.78 During the course of twenty years,
needed even more protection after the war than dur- SIGABA had processed millions of classified mes-
ing it.74 Army and Navy cryptologists were not so sages, contributed to the saving of countless lives,
much concerned that an adversary might be able shortened the agony of war, and helped to advance
to exploit SIGABA if he were privy to its design; the cause of freedom. That it altered the course of
rather, their chief concern was that an enemy could history goes unquestioned.
use its cryptographic principles to protect his own
In 1956 a grateful Congress awarded $100,000
communications. To this end the sister services pro-
to William Friedman for his contribution to SIGA-
mulgated policies that mandated that all SIGABAs
BA and for other cryptologic achievements. Two
26
The Big Machine That Did
The SIGABA/ECM II
years later a similar sum was granted to Laurance cratic parody of itself, the Patent Office on 16 Janu-
Safford for his World War II cryptographic work; it ary 2001 granted a patent for SIGABA—some six-
would be another eight years before Frank Rowlett ty-six years after its conception and thirty-two years
received his reward. Then, in something of a bureau- after William Friedman’s death.
27
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
28
Appendix A: Technical
Analysis of SIGABA’s Key Space
29
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
each index rotor was provided by the daily key list. An each of the 10 and 10! possibilities for each of the 5.
enemy without knowledge of how it was implemented So the total number of configurations for the system
would have to consider reversals (another factor of 25) would be (26!)10(10!)5 ≈ 2992.8. One need not count
and which value was “on top” (another factor of 105). rotor reversed orientation settings or consider which
Therefore, finding the correct setting for each of the value is “on top,” because such changes are already
fifteen rotors would take (210)(10!)(2610)(5!)(25)(105) ≈ represented by one of the wirings considered. Some
2.0 × 1032 attempts, which is approximately 2107.3 pos- wirings would produce identical encryptions, but the
sible key combinations. Once the index rotors were effect on the already massive key space is minimal.
no longer permuted daily in 1945, this dropped to
Even with this enormous theoretical key space,
(210)(10!)(2610)(25)(105) ≈ 1.7 × 1030, which is 2100.4
the Army and Navy took no chances when they sus-
trial decryptions. This was surprisingly good by the
pected (later proved false) a physical compromise of
modern Advanced Encryption Standard (2128, 2192, or
SIGABA in the last months of the war in Europe. In
2256) and Data Encryption Standard (256) key sizes.
a surge effort, the services produced an entirely new
Of course, as long as the enemy did not recov- set of fifteen rotors for each of the 10,060 machines
er the machine, the wirings in each rotor added to in the inventory. In retrospect, given the state of Axis
the security. For each of the ten cipher and control cryptologic prowess, this was not warranted. All the
rotors there were 26! theoretical ways for them to be same, General Eisenhower, who personally ordered the
wired. A large number of these wirings would have fielding of the new rotors, was not willing to imperil the
been avoided since it does not seem random to have success of military operations or the lives of his troops.
rotors that mapped A B, B C, C D, etc. But Thus, at the war’s end, each SIGABA was equipped
these “nonrandom” wirings should be included in the with two sets of rotors.
theoretical possibilities, since they are valid wiring
The SIGABA’s wiring scheme is provided on
combinations. If an enemy did not know any of the
the next page.
rotors’ wiring, there would be 26! possibilities for
30
Appendix A: Key Space
32
Appendix B: Mechanics
ing from the index rotor bank is live, then the cipher Each letter of the message travels through only the
rotor it is connected to will step forward one letter. five cipher rotors, C1 through C5 in the diagram. The
Otherwise, it will not move. For each keystroke, there control rotors and index rotors exist only to dictate the
can be between one and four live wires coming from stepping of the five cipher rotors. The plaintext letter
the index rotor bank and going into the cipher rotor from the keyboard travels via wire to the left-hand side
bank. In the diagram, there are exactly two wires that of the cipher rotor bank. The signal wire is then scram-
are active: wire number two and wire number five. bled through the five cipher rotors and emerges on the
This means that both the second (C2) and fifth (C5) other side of the cipher rotor bank as an encrypted let-
cipher rotor will step, but the other three will remain ter. The cipher text is then printed on a small tape. The
stationary for this particular keystroke. decryption process simply works in reverse.
Five pages from the SIGABA user’s manual Crypto-Operating Instructions for Converter M-134-C
33
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
(2) Plain-text Position ("P").- All keys of the keyboard and the space bar can be
operated, and the converter will print plain, unenciphered text exactly as typed.
The rotors remain motionless during typing. ·
(3) Reaet Position ("R").-Only the numeral keys 1 to 5, inclusive, and the "Blank"
and "Repeat" keys can be operated. The rotors may be zeroized with the
controller in this position and the zeroize-operate key in the "Zeroize" position.
(See paragraph lOb.) The tape will not feed while the controller is at "R."
When the controller is moved to or through the "R" position, the tape may
advance as many as five spaces. This is caused by the tape feed ratchet re-
setting so that printing will begin on the first letter of a five-letter cipher group.
(4) Encipher Position ("E").- The alphabet, "Blank," and "Repeat" keys and the
space bar can be operated. Numeral and "Dash" keys cannot be operated.
The converter enciphers the letters struck on the keyboard and prints the
resulting cipher text.
(6) Decipher Position ("D").-The alphabet, "Blank," and "Repeat" keys can be
operated. Numeral and "Dash" keys and the space bar cannot be operated.
The converter deciphers the letters struck on the keyboard and prints the
resulting plain text.
e. For a more detailed explanation of component parts of the converter, consult the
maintenance instructions for Converter M- 134-C.
7. Classification of Parts.
a. The converter, exclusive of rotors, is classified CONFIDENTIAL.
b. The cipher unit, exclusive of rotors, is classified CONFIDENTIAL.
c. The index rotors are classified CONFIDENTIAL.
d. The alphabet and stepping control rotors are classified SECRET.
34
Appendix B: Mechanics
SECTION III
KEYI NG INSTRUCTIONS
Paragraph
Keying Elements...................................... . .............. . ... . 8
Rotor Arrangement and Alignment of Index Rotors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Alignment or Stepping Control and Alphabet Rotors. ......... ..... ..... ....... 10
The 26-80 Check.... ....... ..... ... .. ........................... . ......... 11
•If old-style key lists are still effective after the effective date or this document, ignore the columns headed
"INITIAL ALIGNMENT (CONTROL AND CIPHER)."
7
35
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
CONFIDENTIAL RESTRICTED
DAY 26-30 26-30
OF INDEX (FRONT) CHECK INDEX (FRONT) CHECK
MONTH ALIGNMENT GROUP ALIGNMENT GROUP
1 12 28 31 44 63 p w v M T 17 25 36 43 58 M c s D T
2 15 2jl 32 48 56 E H E w B li! 27 84 42 66 R s T H H
c. The Key List.- The key list contains the arrangement of the stepping control and
alphabet rotors for each day of the month and the alignments of the index rotors
for each of the several security classifications for every day of the month. The
arrangement of the stepping control and alphabet rotors remains the same through-
out the cryptographic period for all security classifications. The alignment of the
index rotors differs for each security classification.
(1) Arrangement of Rotors.- Figures in the column marked ROTOR ARRANGE-
MENT (FOR ALL CLASSIFICATIONS) specify which stepping control
and alphabet rotors are to be used on a specific day of the month and the
positions of these rotors in the converter. Numbers in the table refer to the
second digit of the rotor number. A set of rotors bearing the numbers 21 to30
inclusive, for example, will be regarded as being marked 1, 2, 3, ..... 0. "R"
in the table indicates that the rotor so designated is to be inserted in the reversed
position, i. e., the characters on the periphery will appear upside down to the
operator. The rotors will be inserted in their respective positions in order,
from left to right as the operator faces the converter. Example: On the second
day of the month, the sample extract from a key list in paragraph 9b designates
2-3R- 9R- l - 5 for the stepping control rotors and 6-4R- 8- 7- 0 for the alphabet
rotors. Rotors marked 2, 3, 9, 1 and 5 (disregarding the tens digits) will be
inserted in t he control position in that order, from left to right as the operator
faces the converter, with rotors number 3 and 9 reversed. The remaining five
rotors marked 6, 4, 8, 7 and 0, will be inserted in the alphabet position in that
order from left to right with rotor number 4 reversed.
CAUTION: Do not touch rotor contacts when arranging the rotors.
(2) Alignment of Index Rotors.-The sets of numbers under INDEX (FRONT)
ALIGNMENT designate the alignment of the index rotors used for enciphering
and deciphering messages on a specific day of the month. In three separate
colwnns, each headed INDEX (FRONT) ALIGNMENT, the key list gives
the daily alignment of the index rotors for each classification. The alignment
of the index rotors is determined by the classification of the message and the
day of the month. Example: According to the key list above, on the first day
of the month the numbers of the index rotors should be aligned from left to
right on the white reference mark at 10 23 31 49 50 for SECRET messages; at
12 28 31 44 53 for CONFIDENTIAL messages; and at 17 25 36 43 58 for
RESTRICTED messages.
10. Alignment of St epping Control a nd Alpha bet Rotors.-The alignment of the
stepping control and alphabet rotors at the beginning of encipberment or decipherment
of a message constitutes the message keying element. The letters to which the stepping
36
Appendix B: Mechanics
control and alphabet rotors are aligned constitute the message rotor alignment (internal
message indicator). T he message rotor alignment is derived and aligned on the stepping
control and alphabet rotors in the following manner:
a. Select a group of any five letters at random (message indicator). All 26 letters of
the alphabet, including the letters "0" and "Z," may be selected. Letters of the
alphabet in proximity to the letter "O," i. e., P, Q, R, or L, M, N, will not be deliber-
ately or consistently selected in the message indicator merely to reduce the number of
steps required to align the letters of the message indicator on the stepping control
rotors as explained below. Bona-fide words must not be used except as they occur
by chance.
b. Zeroize the converter. This is accomplished by switching the zeroize-operate key
to "zeroize," turning the controller to "R," and then pressing down the "Blank"
and "Repeat" keys simultaneously until the letter "0" on the stepping control and
alphabet rotors comes to rest at the reference mark.
c. Leave the controller at "R" and switch the zeroize-operate key to "Operate."
d. Strike the numeral "1" key the number of times required to align the first stepping
control rotor (next to the left end plate) to the first letter of the message indicator.
The first stepping control rotor will step one letter each time the "1" key is depressed.
e. Align the second stepping control rotor by striking the numeral "2" key, the third
by striking the numeral "3" key, etc., until all five stepping control rotors are aligned
to the five letters of the message indicator. With each step of the stepping control
rotors, the alphabet rotors will step in an irregular manner.
N OTE: If the letter "O" is to be aligned on any of the five stepping control rotors,
it will be necessary to step that rotor 26 times when setting up the message
indicator.
f. If any rotor is stepped past the correct letter or if the rotors are not aligned in proper
sequence, the entire process must be repeated from the zeroize position (subparagraph
lOb). Do not use the "Repeat" key with the numeral keys in aligning the m~ge
indicator and avoid a sharp, quick touch of the numeral keys. It is p<>s.5ible to press
the numeral keys and release them too quickly so that the stepping control rotors
will step but the alphabet rotors will not, thus resulting in an incorrect alignment.
g. After the stepping control rotors have been aligned, check the alignment of the
alphabet rotors to insure that all five are not aligned to the letter "O." The alphabet
rotors should step in an irregular manner while the stepping control rotors are being
aligned. If for any reason all of the alphabet rotors do not step, they will remain
aligned to the letter "O." This is an indication that the converter is not functioning
properly or that the procedure outlined herein has not been followed correctly.
37
Notes
1. David Kahn, The Codebreakers: The Story of Secret 18. Ibid., 39.
Writing. New York: MacMillan, 1967, 235. 19. Ibid., 39j.
2. Kahn, Codebreakers, 415. 20. Ibid., 40.
3. Jack Levine, United States Cryptographic Patents, 21. Ibid., 39-40.
1861-1989 (Terre Haute, IN: Cryptologia, 1991), 22. Ibid., 40; Rowlett, Story of Magic, 97.
85. 23. Rowlett, Oral History Interview 1974, OH-1974-
4. Frank B. Rowlett, The Story of Magic: Memoirs of 01, 40, Ft. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic
an American Cryptologic Pioneer (Laguna Hills, History.
CA: Aegean Park Press, 1998), 69. Also Cap- 24. Ibid.; Rowlett, Story of Magic, 97-98.
tain Laurance Safford, United States Navy OP- 25. Heather Ellie Kwong, thesis: Cryptanalysis of the
20-S-5, History of Invention and Development of SIGABA Cipher, San Jose State University, 2008.
the Mark II ECM, SRH-360, 19-21 (National 26. http://www.sccs.swarthmore.edu/users/08/ajb/tmve/
Archives and Records Administration [NARA]: wiki100k/docs/SIGABA.html.
RG 457, box 1124). 27. Laurance Safford, History of Invention and Devel-
5. Army Security Agency, History of Converter opment of the Mark II ECM, SRH-360, NARA
M-134-C, Vol. 1, or SRH-359 (Washington, DC: RG 457, Box 1124. The ECM Mark I was the
Army Security Agency, n.d.), 18. Navy’s primary cipher machine from May 1936 to
6. Ibid., 51-60. January 1942. It was also the Navy’s first attempt
7. Friedman Collection, NSA/CSS Archives acces- at an “in-house” cipher machine. In spite of ECM
sion #47270, box 14, folder 1. Mark I’s formidable cryptographic strength, the
8. Ibid. Navy remained uneasy about its vulnerability to
9. Levine, United States Cryptographic Patents, 115. exploitation. The Mark I arguably was the most
10. Friedman Collection, 1920-1960, NSA/CSS powerful cryptologic device extant, but at the time
Archives accession #47270, box 14, folders 1-2. the cryptographers at OP-20-G had little appre-
11. Ibid., folder 1. ciation of this fact. The ECM Mark I embodied
12. Ibid. elements of contemporary Hebern machines and
13. Ibid. then was heavily modified by Donald Seiler and
14. Ibid. Laurance Safford. These novel cryptographic
15. Frank B. Rowlett, Oral History Interview 1974, enhancements placed the Mark I in a league of
OH-1974-01, Part B, 45c, Ft. Meade, MD: Cen- its own, well above the Hebern machine. Seiler
ter for Cryptologic History (CCH). also went on to perform much valuable engineer-
16. Ibid., 45c-45d. ing work on the ECM Mark II’s development.
17. Ibid., 38. According to Safford, the Mark I was beset with
38
Notes
numerous mechanical deficiencies that required them because user errors in plugging had directly
almost constant maintenance to keep it opera- led to compromise of the key, not to mention the
tional. This fact alone was probably the largest, effect on the reliability of communications. The
immediate driving factor in the Navy’s quest for Navy’s greatest argument in favor of rotors over
a new machine. When he returned from sea duty plugboards was that rotors offered 49 times more
and was briefed by Wenger on his interview with stepping combinations than the latter (SRH
Friedman and Rowlett, Safford readily embraced 360, 28). German and American cryptographers
the SIGABA principles and pressed for its independently of each other conceived of using
development. plugboards as enhancements to their respective
28. Rowlett, Oral History Interview, 1974, OH-1974- cipher machines.
01, 41, Ft. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic 40. Rowlett, Oral History Interview 1974, OH-1974-
History. 01, 45, Center for Cryptologic History, Ft. Meade,
29. Ibid. MD.
30. Safford, History of Invention and Development of 41. Ibid., 46.
the Mark II ECM, 24-25, 29. 42. Safford, History of Invention and Development
31. Rowlett, Oral History Interview 1974, OH-1974- of the Mark II ECM, 40; The Navy deemed the
01, 45n, Ft. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic thermite emergency destruction devices too dan-
History; Army Security Agency, History of Con- gerous to use aboard ships where fire is the great-
verter M-134-C, vol. 1, SRH-359, Washington, est threat. Navy tests of thermite bombs reduced
DC: Army Security Agency, n.d., 139. the ECM’s critical components to molten metal
32. Rowlett, Story of Magic, 143. in 97 seconds. Safford, History of Invention and
33. Army Security Agency, History of Converter Development of the Mark II ECM, 61. This not-
M-134-C, 138-139; Rowlett, Story of Magic, 143. withstanding, the Army had few qualms about
34. Rowlett, Story of Magic, 143-144. fielding both thermite and TNT charges atop
35. Ibid., 144. SIGABA’s 800 lb. security cabinets aboard tacti-
36. Rowlett, Oral History Interview 1974, OH-1974- cal communications vehicles. There is no record
01, 46, Ft. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic of an unintended mishap associated with these
History. devices; even so, the Navy’s concerns were partly
37. On 1 August 1941 the sister services formally vindicated by more than one Army incident of a
adopted the SIGABA/ECM II as their joint near discharge.
cipher machine. Each agreed not to share any 43. Safford, History of Invention and Development of
information whatever about the machine to any the Mark II ECM, 42; 37-52 passim.
outside person or organization. 44. Ibid., 6; the ECM Mark I, despite the Navy’s
38. Rowlett, Oral History Interview 1974, OH-1974- reservations about it, was still more powerful
01, 46, Ft. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic than any cipher device fielded by either the Brit-
History. ish or the Axis Powers.
39. Ibid., 47. The Navy’s Donald Seiler had given due 45. Ibid., 6-8.
consideration to plugboards and rejected them in 46. Ibid.
favor of the index rotor wheels even before the 47. Ibid.
first ECM Mark II had reached the blueprint 48. Ibid.
stage. Safford, History of Invention and Develop- 49. Ibid.
ment of the Mark II ECM, 39. Safford, Chief OP- 50. Safford, History of Invention and Development of
20-G, relates that besides being inconvenient to the Mark II ECM, 54.
the user, plugboards in the past had not pre- 51. Ibid., 55-56.
vented the initial solutions of six different cipher 52. R. A. Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma,
machines the Navy had tested. He also eschewed Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers (New York:
39
SIGABA / ECM II Cipher Machine
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 81. Also Saf- War II as Revealed by “TICOM” Investigations and
ford, History of Invention and Development of the Other Prisoner of War Interrogations and Captured
Mark II ECM, 52. Material, Principally German, vol. 5, The Ger-
53. Army Security Agency, History of Converter man Air Force Signal Intelligence Service. Army
M-134-C, 7. Security Agency, 10 October 1946.
54. Ibid., 147-158, 247-248. 65. War Diary of the Signal Intelligence Group, Feb-
55. The Navy generated its SIGABA key at the ruary–November 1944 (NSA/CSS Archives,
Nebraska Avenue Naval Station where it oper- accession #5411, box G22-0303-3), 64.
ated its ECM Mark II maintenance facility. 66. Ibid.
Army cryptographers produced SIGABA keys 67. Erich Huttenhain, interview, 10 July 1945
at Arlington Hall. Later in the war, the Army (NARA: RG 457, box 1006).
moved its SIGABA maintenance and training 68. Ibid.
functions to Vint Hill Farms near Warrenton, 69. Ibid.
VA. 70. Ibid.
56. Safford, History of Invention and Development of 71. Ibid. The Japanese Signal Intelligence Service, 17
the Mark II ECM, 31. October 1952 (NARA: RG 457, box 1129).
57. Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence, 105, 164, 168, 72. Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence, 178; Pre-War
177. By the war’s end, more than 8,000 SIG- Radio Intelligence Activities in the Philippines,
ABAs had the capability to interoperate with the 63, CCH Files; Timothy Mucklow, Federal His-
British Typex machine. tory Journal, 2011, 59.
58. J. G. Seabourne, The Signal Intelligence Service 73. Army-Navy Joint Policy Concerning Distribu-
of the German Luftwaffe, vol. 13. November 24, tion and Disclosure of Cryptographic Design of the
1945 (National Archives and Records Admin- ECM-M134C, 26 June 1942; Safford, History of
istration: RG 457, box 976). The Navy’s anxi- Invention and Development of the Mark II ECM,
ety about its own ECM Mark I led Wenger to 57-58.
approach Friedman about the Army’s crypto- 74. Safford, History of Invention and Development of
graphic research—Rowlett, Oral History Inter- the Mark II ECM, 110-111, 115-116; Ratcliff,
view 1974, OH-1974-01, 45m—in the first Delusions of Intelligence, 168.
place. The sister services’ continued development 75. Letter, Col. George A. Bircher, SC, to CG, AAF,
of, and their absolutely rigorous application of, Washington, DC, Attn: Ch, Sec, Air Communi-
COMSEC doctrine demonstrate their concern cations Office, 9 May 46, sub: Policy on Storage
over enemy attempts to break into U.S. crypto of Converter M-134-C:
systems. . . . 2. This Agency does not consider that
59. JN-A-20 messages, 1942 (National Archives the cessation of hostilities justifies any relax-
and Records Administration: RG 457, box 1006, ation in security regulations pertaining to
temporary folder). cryptographic material and has noted with
60. Ibid.; Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence, 201-203. alarm a tendency towards such relaxation
61. Rowlett, Oral History Interview 1974, OH-1974- during recent months as has been evidenced
01, 105. by an increase in the number of physical and
62. Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence, 202. Several dif- cryptographic compromises.
ferent German cryptologic organizations named 3. Since the cryptographic principle and
SIGABA as the “Big Machine.” design of Converter M-134-C is in the
63. Rowlett, Oral History Interview 1974, OH-1974- sole possession of the United States and it
01, 158-159. is considered to be the best cryptographic
64. Seabourne, Signal Intelligence Service. Also see device of its type, it is not advisable to jeop-
report: European Axis Signal Intelligence in World ardize its use or storage under unsatisfac-
40
Notes
tory security conditions. It is considered because it simply could not keep pace with mod-
that eliminating the necessity for a 24-hour ern high-speed telecommunications. Research
armed guard, regardless of geographical based on newly acquired information suggests
location, even if the converter were stored that SIGABA was taken out of the invento-
in a CH-76 in a locked code room, would ry to keep the advanced technology out of the
result in such a condition, and that no justi- hands of the Soviets. Because every SIGABA
fication exists for undergoing such a risk. . . . and rotor had been accounted for and because
Ratcliff, Delusions of Intelligence, 168. Army and Navy cryptologists had much con-
76. History of Converter M-134-C, 5 May 1950, fidence in the integrity of SIGABA principles,
included in the CCH copy of SRH 360, 1-10. they were confident that SIGABA’s secrets
77. Ibid., 7; Extracts: Annual Report, Security Divi- could be retained; History of Converter M-134-C,
sion, CSAS-80, Fiscal Year 1948 (included in 5 May 1950 included in CCH copy of SRH
CCH copy of SRH 360), 1-5; Excerpt: Tab A10, 360, 7-10 (included in CCH copy of SRH 360).
“Staff Study Concerning the Issue of SIGROD SIGABA and its temporary successor SIG-
Machines to all Military Attachés,” Annual ROD were slowly replaced in the 1950s by the
Report, Sec Div, Tech Staff, FY 48 (23 April TSEC/KL-7 (ADONIS/POLLUX). The new
1947) 1948 (included in CCH copy of SRH cipher machine was an electronic-mechanical
360), 1-4; Extract: Tab A7, “Staff Study on the hybrid that employed a programmable cipher
Introduction of the SIGROD,” Annual Report, rotors/bezel assembly (eight rotors/thirty-six
Security Division, Technical Staff, FY 48 (3 Feb- pins), cams, and vacuum tube technology along
ruary 1950), 19 (included in CCH copy of SRH with a novel re-flexing principle. It was phased
360). out of the U.S. military inventory in the early
78. Until recently, cryptologic historians were under 1980s.
the impression that the end for SIGABA came
not because of any cryptographic weakness but
41
Selected Bibliography
42
Selected Bibliography
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44
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