Cayetano vs.

Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

I. Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President
Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.On June 5,
1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took
his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC. Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections
be declared null and void.

II. Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates
Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?

III. Held:

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that

there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman
and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall
be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. Atty. Christian Monsod is a
member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of
1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. At this point, it might be helpful to define private
practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services."
(Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.
Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the
members called shareholders.
In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced
attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneys called "associates." Hence, the Commission on the
basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation,implicitlydetermined that he possessed the necessary qu
alifications as required by law.  The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art.
VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment.
In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and
would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly
shown. Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service
Commission, the Court said that, Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it
is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he
does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This
is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
the appointing authority can decide.

Case No. 2
 People vs. Maceda
G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000

I. Facts:

On September 8, 1999, the RTC denied the Peoples motion seeking

reconsideration for its August 13, 1990’s decision. In said resolution,
the RTC held that respondent Judge Maceda committed no grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving
custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of
Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private
respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial
Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private
respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However,
private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but
was to be held as detention prisoner in said residence.

The order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because
private respondent was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del
Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man,
including engaging in the practice of law.

On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Guingoyon filed with the

Supreme Court a motion seeking clarification. After the RTC’s
decision, Atty. Javellana filed a motion to the SC, hence this petition.

II. Issue/s:

Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really
held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not
Atty. Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which
warrant for his arrest should forthwith be issued?

III. Held:

RTC’s Decision:

The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8,

1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-
3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking
the revocation of the trial courts custody order and the imprisonment
of private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.

SC’s Decision:

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing

of criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be
under the custody of the law.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner

private respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his profession
as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is

arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is
placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to
answer for the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail
during the pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized
by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be
stressed that all prisoners whether under preventive detention or
serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in
any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive,
while in detention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and
detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355 must be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.

Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355

has dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to
continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate
dispatch and to avoid further delay.

Wherefore, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby

SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355, including
Javellana and Pacificador are ordered detained at the Provincial Jail
of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be
allowed to go out of the jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior
written permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.
 Office of the Court Administrator vs Atty. Misael M. Ladaga
A.M. No. P-99-1287, January 26, 2001
 
I. Facts:
Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for
“Falsification of Public Documents” before the METC of Quezon City.
It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case
was without the previous permission of the Court. During the
occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel before the
METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover,
his Presiding Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case
he was handling. Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his
cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single
centavo from her. Helpless as she was andrespondent being the only
lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion
and high regard for her.
This is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a
member of his family who is like a bigsister to him. He appeared for
free and for the purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore,
his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his
cousin. On top of this, during all the years that he has been in
government service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence. He failed to obtain a prior permission from the head of
the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent
is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.

II. Issue:
WON Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was engages
into private practice?

III. Held:
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which
prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of
the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys from
engaging in the private practice of their profession. THERE WAS
NO PRIVATE PRACTICE: In People vs. Villanueva: Practice is more
than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864,
42 LRA, N.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been
interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s self out to the
public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State
vs. Bryan, 4 S. E. 522, 98 N. C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel
on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in
the private practiceof law. Based on the foregoing, it is evident that
the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro bono counsel
of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the
“private practice” of the law profession contemplated by law.
 Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999
Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

I. Facts: 

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an

alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union,
under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines. He
completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.

The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he

submit to the Court the following documents as proof of his Philippine
Citizenship:
1. Certification  issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that
Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union
showing that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union

On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath
taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.

Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was

not allowed to take oath.He was required to submit further proof of his
citizenship.The Office of the Solicitor General  was required to file a
comment on Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:

1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and

continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which
the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person
whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.
IV. Issue:

Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a

reasonable time".

III. Rulings:

1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to

elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The
reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3
years from  "upon reaching the age of majority", which is 21 years
old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after
reaching the age of majority which the court considered not within
the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his
election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All
that is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship
and file the same with the nearest civil registry.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A
BAR,ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

B.M. No. 1154.  June 8, 2004

I. Facts:

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez)

filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to
disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary
penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.In the Petition,
Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to
take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending
criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cotabato City, namely:  Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686,
both for Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No.  15687 for
Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which

occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered
defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people.  Meling also purportedly attacked
and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the
latter.Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using
the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of
the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which
shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to
have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato
City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3,

2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.In his Answer, Meling
explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against
him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their
former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez.  Believing in good faith that the case would be settled
 because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being
their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the
three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving
the same parties as “closed and terminated.”  Moreover, Meling
denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not
involve moral turpitude.

II. Issue:
WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling is proper and shall subsequently barred him from taking
his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys
III. Held: 

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of

appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.  Accordingly, the membership of Haron S.
Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling
from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic.

Rationale:

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court,

is not a matter of right but merely a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also
known to possess good moral character.  The requirement of good
moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law.The disclosure requirement is
imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of
whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court
in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer.
 Alawi vs. Alauya
AM No. SDC-97-2-P, Feb. 4, 1997

I. Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa &

Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company.
Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th
Judicial Shari’a District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and
used to be friends.

Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the

purchase on installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of
Villarosa. In connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by
the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President

of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had
resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President
of Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative

complaint against him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s  usurpation
of the title of “attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine
Bar may properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion

that it is “lexically synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to
which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the
title of “attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for
“councilor,” “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a
local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider
himself a lawyer.

II. Issue:

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use

the title of Attorney
 

III. Held:

He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular
Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has

already had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’a
Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may
only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been
admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the
latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who,
having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good
standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
 EMILIO GRANDE VS ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA

I. FACTS

A. Factual Antecedent

Emilio Grande, the complainant in this case, is the private

offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, People of the
Philippines vs Sergio Natividad filed before RTC-Branch 273 Marikina
City for Estafa and Violation of BP Blg 22.
During the proceedings of the cases in the preceding paragraph,
Atty. Evangeline de Silva, respondent in the case at bar, tendered to
Emilio Grande check no. 0023638 in the amount of P144,768.00, drawn
against her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement.
Emilio Grande refused to accept the check. Atty. de Silva assured him
that the same will be paid upon its presentment. She manifested that as
a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded.
Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by Emilio Grande to accept the
check.
Consequently, Emilio Grande desisted from prosecuting the cases
thus, said criminal cases were dismissed. Accused Sergio Natividad was
then released. Upon deposit of the check, the same was returned unpaid
by the drawee bank for the reason that the account is closed. Emilio
Grande then wrote a letter to Atty. de Silva demanding that she pay the
face value of the check. His demand was ignored by Atty. de Silva. This
prompted Emilio Grande to institute a criminal complaint against Atty.
de Silva for Estafa and Violation of BP Blg 22 with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Marikina. The City Prosecutor of Marikina filed the
necessary Information for Violation of BP Blg 22 against Atty. de Silva.
Emilio Grande filed the instant administrative complaint for
disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyer’s Oath.
On February 2, 1998, a Resolution was sent to respondent
requiring her to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from
notice. The same was returned unserved with the notation: “Moved”.
On June 20, 2001, another Resolution requiring respondent to
comment on the administrative complaint filed against her was served.
This was again returned unserved with the notation: “Refused”. Thus,
the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-
CBD) for investigation, report and recommendation.
B. Recommendation of IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent
Atty. de Silva guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the
Lawyer’s Oath in a Report dated December 6, 2001. Thus, he
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years.
C. Recommendation of IBP Board of Governors
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution NO. XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two (2) years.

II. ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. de Silva should be suspended.

III. RULING
The office of an Attorney’s nature requires that a lawyer shall be a
person of good moral character. Gross misconduct which puts the
lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to
continue in the practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. The loss of moral character of a
lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment.

Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the

profession, whether it be professional or non-professional justifies
disciplinary action. For a lawyer’s professional and personal conduct
must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above suspicion.

Her deliberate refusal to accept the notices served on her stains

the nobility of the profession. How else would a lawyer endeavor to serve
justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow simple directives?
Canon 1 expressly states that: “A lawyer shall uphold the constitution,
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for legal processes.”
 RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER’S OATH

I. FACTS
A. Factual Antecedent
This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a
successful bar applicant. Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar
examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-taking
due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide.
Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused the
death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Homicide after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with two
(2) years imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which
was granted by the Court with a two (2) year probation. He took the Bar
Exam and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to
allow him to take the attorney’s oath of office averring that his probation
was already terminated. The Court notes that he spent only ten (10)
months of the probation period before it was terminated.

B. Resolution of the Court

The Court issued a Resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino
to submit to the Court evidence that he may ow be regarded as
complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar.
The Court required Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul to
comment on petitioner’s prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath.
In his comment, Atty. Camaligan states that:
B. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries
which led to the death of his son was deliberate rather than
accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but
murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's
helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of
superior strength and treachery.
C. xxx
D. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused
for the death of his son. However, as a loving father who had
lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law
 practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the
stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
E. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally
fit for admission to the bar. He therefore submits the matter to
the sound discretion of the Court.
F. xxx
II. ISSUE
Whether or not Argosino may take oath of office.

III. RULING
The Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert
Camaligan. The death of one’s child is, for a parent, a most traumatic
experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and profound
in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or
accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. Atty.
Camaligan’s statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven
the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. it is
exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in these cases, to find
room for forgiveness. However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not
in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow
petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, sign the Roll of
Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court
recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently bad moral fiber. On the
contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic
with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to
atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. The Court stresses to Mr.
Argosino that the lawyer’s oath is not a mere ceremony or formality for
practicing law. Every lawyer should at all times weigh his actions
according tot he sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer’s
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the
lawyer’s oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for
everyone concerned.
 REMEDIOS RAMIREZ VS ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR

I. FACTS
A.Facts
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty.
Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct
for cohabiting with a certain Elena Pena under scandalous
circumstances.
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively
charged four (4) times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court. In
AM No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the
Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay, while in AM Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI,
which were consolidated, this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the
separation from service of respondent.

B. Recommendation of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline

Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the
matter was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation. After conducting a thorough investigation, the
Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended
that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of
attorneys. Mainly, this was premised on the ground that,
notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the
Honorable Supreme Court, respondent continued the illicit liaison with
Elena.
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of
contradicting the charges against him, respondent displayed arrogance,
and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months
without pay in 1980 for having a mistress, the same girl Ms. Elena
(Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative
case constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena
Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If thats the law so be it.
C. Recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors
 RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation
therein to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby
DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner
Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the Board of Governors of IBP,
more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution,
herein considered as the recommendation to this Court by said Board
pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court. We are in
agreement that respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.

II. ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility

III. RULING
Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
A lawyer us expected at all times to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to
society, to the bar, to the Courts and to his clients. Exacted from him, as
a member of the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a
shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of
decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously
described as “moral character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs
to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession,
and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.
 Maelotesia Garrido vs Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana
P.Valencia
A.C.No.6593

I. Facts:
Maelotisea Garrido filed a disbarment case against Atty. Angel
Garrido and Atty.Romana Valencia before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Discipline charging them with gross
immorality.
By way of defense Atty. Angel Garrido denied that Maelotesia
Garrido is his legal wife, as he was already married to a certain
Constancia David when he married the complainant. Further, Atty.
Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he was
admitted to the bar.
On her counter-affidavit Atty. Valencia contended that she never
was a mistress of Atty. Garrido since the former’s marriage to the
complainant is void ab initio due to the then existing marriage of Atty.
GArrido to a certain Constancia David. Therefore, the complainant had
no cause of action against her.
In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following
motions before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline:
(1) The respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings in
view of the criminal complaint for concubinage Maelotisea filed
against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity(of
marriage) Atty. Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for lack
of merit.
(2) The respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaints after the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City declared the marriage between
Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea
was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued
that she had no personality to file her complaints against
them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed
any immoral act since they married when Atty. Garrido was
already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed
before his admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline also denied this motion.
 (3)  Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she
filed against the respondents, arguing that she wanted to maintain
friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6)
children. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied
this motion
Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion under Resolution
No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007. Hence, seeking relief
with the Supreme Court through the present petition for review.
II. ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Atty. Garrido and Atty.Valencia’s action constitutes
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and thus a good
enough cause for their disbarment, despite the offense was being
committed when they were not yet lawyers.
III. SUPREME COURT RULING:
Yes. Membership of the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege it can
be withdrawn where circumstances show the lawyer’s lack of essential
qualifications required of lawyers, be it academic or moral.
In this present case, the Supreme Court resolved to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Garrido and Atty. Valencia respectively. The
contention of the respondent that they got married when they were not
yet lawyers will not afford them exemptions from sanctions: good moral
character was already a condition required precedent to the admission to
the bar.
As a lawyer, both the respondents were shouldered with the
expectation to uphold the Constitution and obey the laws of the land and
set as an example to others to do the same. When they violated the law
and distorted it to cater to his own personal needs and selfish motives,
not only did their actions discredit the legal profession. Such actions by
themselves, without even including the fact of Garrido’s abandonment of
paternal responsibility, to the detriment of his children by the petitioner;
or the fact that Valencia married Garrido despite knowing of his other
marriages to two other women including the petitioner, are clear
indications of a lack of moral values not consistent with the proper
conduct of practicing lawyers within the country. As, such their
disbarment is affirmed.
 Ferdinad A. Cruz vs Judge Priscila Mijares
G.R.No. 154464
I. Facts:
Ferdinand A. Cruz was the plaintiff in a civil case for Abatement of
Nuisance pending in the sala of respondent judge. He sought permission
to enter his appearance for and on his behalf. The claim anchored on
Sec. 34, Rule 138: a non- lawyer may appear before any court and
conduct his litigation personally. During the pre-trial, Judge
Mijares required petitioner to secure written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed toappear as counsel for
himself. Counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss. Petitioner
objected, alleging that the motion to dismiss is not allowed after the
Answer has been filed. Respondent judge remarked, “Hay naku, masama
yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? ” On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz
filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, praying for the voluntary
inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality
on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be
inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the
pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark,
reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice
will not be served.
RTC RULING:
On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with
finality. In the same Order, the trial court held that for the failure of
petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence,
and for his failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule
138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.
Hence, the direct petition filed with the Supreme Court.

II. ISSUE/S:
1.) Whether or not the RTC gravely erred and abused its discretion
when it denied the appearance of the petitioner, for and in the
latter’s behalf.
2.) Whether or not the respondent court gravely erred and abused its
discretion when it fails to inhibit voluntarily despite the advent of
jurisprudence that such an inhibition is proper to preserve the
people’s faith and confidence to the courts.
 III. RULING:
It will have to be conceded that the contention of the petitioner has
merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent him in any
case to which he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his
litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his
appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of
the Bar. The individual litigant may personally do everything in the
course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the
litigation. Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified
to practice law, petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of
falling into the snares and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, he
would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party
exercising his right to represent himself. The trial court must have been
misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must,
therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule.
It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioners claim is
Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a
law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the
appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.
Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent
judge committed manifest bias and partiality by ruling that there is no
valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative
demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: Hay naku, masama yung
marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok? Petitioner avers that by denying his motion,
the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of
arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss
of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality. We do not agree.
 In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for
bias and prejudice by clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge
from participating in a particular trial, as voluntary inhibition is
primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion
of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself must be
based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances
prevailing in the case before her. Absent clear and convincing proof of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in
favor of the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
 People of the Philippines vs Leoncio Santocildes Jr. y Siga-an
G.R. No. 109141

I. Facts:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of
rape of a girl less than nine (9) years old, committed on December 28,
1991, in the town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo.

Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial

ensued and the prosecution presented as its witnesses the victim, her
mother, her six (6) year-old playmate, and the medico-legal officer who
examined the victim.

For the defense, appellant presented one German Toriales and

himself. Appellant denied committing the rape and claimed that he
merely tried to stop the two girls, the victim and her playmate, from
quarreling.

RTC RULING:
On October 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision finding
appellant guilty as charged. Hence, the appellant filed a notice of appeal.

II.ISSUE/S:
That the accused-appellant was deprived though o fault on his
own to be defended by a person authorized to practice law amounting to
denial of due process.

III.RULING:

The presence and participation of counsel in criminal proceedings

should never be taken lightly. Even the most intelligent or educated man
may be convicted without a counsel, not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

The right of the accused to counsel is guaranteed to minimize the

imbalance in the adversarial system where the accused is pitted against
the awesome prosecutor machinery of the State. A person has the right
to due process, he must be heard before being condemned – a part of a
person’s basic rights. The right to the counsel of an accused is enshrined
in the Constitution. Wherefore, the assailed judgment is set aside, and
the case is hereby remanded to the trial court for new trial.
 PAFLU vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co.
G.R. No. L-23959, November 29, 1979

I. Facts:

Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a

notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their non-objection
to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages

Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered"

equivalent to 20% of the backwages. However this was opposed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.

The Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as

compensation for professional services rendered in the case,
apportioned as follows:

i. Cipriano 10%

ii. Quintin Muning 10%

iii. Atanacio Pacis 5%

II. Issue:

May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services

rendered?

III. Ruling:

Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since

respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with
PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.

Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties

litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested
qualifications, for the ethics of the profession and for the protection of
courts, clients and the public.
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated:

Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court,

which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,

Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or
an act done in violation of law.

If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in

hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and
also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-
lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures.
 Five J Taxi vs. NLRC
G.R. No. 111474

I. Facts:

Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil
action for certiorari to annul the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay private
respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their
accumulated deposits and car wash payments, plus interest thereon at
the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of
actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.

Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired

by the petitioners as taxi drivers and, as such, they worked for 4 days
weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily "boundary"
of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned
taxi, they were also required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to
further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency in their
"boundary," for every actual working day.

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the
petitioners, he already failed to report for work for unknown reasons.
Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold" Taxi
Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners
on September 6, 1983, he was held up by his armed passenger who took
all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was hospitalized and after
his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.

In January 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi

driver under the same terms and conditions as when he was first
employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis,"
that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he
failed to report for work during his schedule.

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of

P700.00 for the previous day. Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati
without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of petitioners
for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was
revealed that he was driving a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the

reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but herein
petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as
these were not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of
the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the practice adopted by
petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab
units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners
terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his
termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for
the washing of his taxi seat covers.

Guillermo H. Pulia, a non-lawyer, was the private respondents’

authorized representative.

II. Issue

Whether or not the private respondents’ authorized representative is

entitled for attorney’s fees for the services rendered?

III. Ruling

No. Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of

Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-lawyers may appear before
the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2)
if they represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may
be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the authorized representative of
private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the
foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not
entitled to attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have

and recover from his client a reasonable compensation for his services
necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a
condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship
cannot exist unless the client's representative is a lawyer.
 Kanlaon Construction vs NLRC
G.R. No. 126625, September 18, 1997

I. Facts:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction

business nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the
National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant
employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were
hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked under the
supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the
project neared its completion and petitioner started terminating the
services of private respondents and its other employees.

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner

before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-
one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the
minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials and
thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-
respondents.

The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At the
conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio
admitted petitioner’s liability to private respondents and agreed to pay
their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a
result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner’s
right to file its position paper. Private respondents declared that they,
too, were dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their
complaints as their position paper.

Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company
to pay the employees.

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission.

It alleged that it was denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and
Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner.
II. Issue:

Whether or not Engineer Estacio was an agent and authorized

representative of petitioner.

III. Ruling

No. The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the
labor arbiter and respondent Commission in cases before them. The
Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless,
lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:

Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .A non-lawyer may appear before the

Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall
be made to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized
by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
cases referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if:
(a) he represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an
organization or its members, with written authorization from them: or (c)
he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
cases referred to by the latter.

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-
accredited members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the
labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized
under the first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on
behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It was
incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since
both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the
arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and declarations
Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.
 16. - Rey Vargas et al v. Atty. Michael Ignes (2010) 

I. Facts:

Koronadal Water District (KWD) is a government owned and

controlled corporation (GOCC). Atty. Michael Ignes was hired as private
legal counsel for 1 year effective April 17, 2006 with the consent of the
Office of Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and Commission on
Audit (COA).

  Controversy erupted when 2 different groups, the Dela Pea Board

and Yaphockun Board, simultaneously claimed to be the legitimate
Board of Directors of KWD. The Dela Pea Board adopted Resolution 9
appointing respondents Atty. Rodolfo Viajar Jr. and Atty. Leonard Mann
as private collaborating counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board
under the supervision of Atty. Ignes.

On February 16, 2007 the OGCC approved the retainership

contract of Atty. Benjamin Cunanan as new legal counsel of KWD. This
was pursuant to the Local Water Utilities Administration’s confirmation
that the Yaphockun Board was the new board and that the latter
requested for new counsel. In addition, it stated that the contract of Atty.
Ignes expired on January 14, 2007.

Still, the following cases were filed by Attys. Ignes, Viajar and
Mann:

• Feb. 9 2007 Indirect Contempt of Court: KWD represented by its Gen.

Manager Eleanor Gomba v. EfrenCabucay

• Feb. 19, 2007 Civil Case for Injunction and Damages: KWD represented
by its Gen. Manager Eleanor Gombav. Rey Vargas

• Mar. 9, 2007 Supplemental Complaint for the previous caseAs a result,

the complainants filed a disbarment case before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD).

The IBP Board of Governors dismissed the disbarment case. The

Investigating Commissioner recommended that the case against Atty.
Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit holding that he was unaware of the
pre-termination of his contract when he filed pleadings in the
abovementioned cases. As to Attys. Viajar, Mann and Nadua, they were
fined P 5,000 each for failing to secure the conformity of the OGCC and
COA to their employment as collaborating counsels. Hence, this petition
for review.

II. Issues:

W/N the respondents willfully appeared as counsel for KWD without

legal authority and if yes, are administratively liable for doing so.

III. Held/Ratio:

YES. Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9 enjoins GOCCs from

employing private lawyers/firms from handling their cases and legal
matters but under exceptional circumstances may do so provided, a.The
written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the
Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be AND b. The written
concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring of a
private lawyer/firm.

Despite admitting to be aware of the existence of MC 9 requiring

indispensible conditions before a GOCC can hire private counsel and
that non-compliance with them would render said private counsel no
authority to file a case in behalf of a GOCC, they signed pleadings and
voluntarily represented themselves as counsels of KWD. Also, the
respondents” authority as counsel had already been raised in the
previous civil cases by virtue of an urgent motion to disqualify KWD
counsels dated Feb 21, 2007 and even during the hearing 2days later.
Even if they claim that their professional fees were not paid from the
public coffers of KWD, it is clear that they appeared as counsels of KWD
without authority and not merely as counsel of the Dela Pea Board and
KWD personnel in their private suits as claimed as one of their defenses.
For Atty. John Nadua: Only the 4th Whereas Clause of Res. No. 9 partly
stated that he and Atty. Ignes “presently stand as KWD legal counsels.”
No proof that COA and OGCC approved his engagement. For Attys.
Viajar and Mann: Although Resolution 9 granted them authority to act
as collaborating counsels of KWD, it had no approval from the OGCC
and COA. For Atty. Ignes: Although the OGCC and COA approved his
retainership contract for 1 year effective April 17,2006, he appeared as
counsel of KWD without authority when it expired. Even assuming that
he was not notified of the pre-termination of his contract, records prove
that he continued representing KWD even after April 17,2007.
17.
18.
 Daniel Lemoine v. Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr.
A.C. No. 5829 October 28, 2003
I. FACTS
A. Facts
Daniel Lemoine, a French national, filed a car insurance claim
with the Metropolitan Insurance Company (Metropolitan Insurance),
the insurer of his vehicle which was lost. As complainant encountered
problems in pursuing his claim which was initially rejected, his friend
Jesus Jess Garcia arranged for the engagement of the respondent’s,
Atty. Amadeo E. Balon, Jr., legal services. Balon advised Lemoine that
for his legal services he was charging 25% of the actual amount being
recovered payable upon successful recovery. However, Lemoine did
not give his consent as to the proposed attorney’s fee. When Lemoine
left for France, and on the advice of Atty. Balon, he signed an already
prepared undated Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing
respondent and/or Garcia to bring any action against Metropolitan
Insurance for the satisfaction of complainants claim as well as to
negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive payment from it.
When Lemoine had a quick visit to the Philippines and inquired on
the status of his claim, Garcia echoed to him what Balon had written
him, that his claim was still pending with Metropolitan Insurance and
that the latter was offering Php 350,000.00 for settlement of which
Balon suggested the acceptance of the offer of settlement to avoid a
protracted litigation. Atty. Balon acknowledged having in his
possession the proceeds of the encashed check which he retained as
attorney’s lien pending Lemoine’s payment of his attorney’s fee,
equivalent to 50% of entire amount collected. Moreover, Balon also
threatened Lemoine that the former will not hesitate to make proper
representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation,
DOLE and BIR if Lemoine will cause any trouble to Balon and that the
latter has good network with the mentioned agencies.
B. IBP Ruling
The Investigating Commissioner, by Report and
Recommendation of October 26, 2001, found respondent guilty of
misconduct and recommend that he be disbarred and directed to
immediately turn over to Lemoine the sum of Php 475,000.00
representing the amount of the Php 525,000.00 insurance claim less
 respondents professional fees of Php 50,000.00, as proposed by
Lemoine.
C. IBP Board of Governors Ruling
The Board of Governors of IBP, acting on the Investigators
Report, adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner with modification, and considering
respondents dishonesty which amounted to grave misconduct and
grossly unethical behavior which caused dishonor, not merely to
respondent but to the noble profession to which he belongs.
Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months
with the directive to turn over the amount of Php 525,000.00 without
prejudice to his right to claim attorney’s fees which he may collect in
the proper forum.
II. ISSUE/S
A. Whether or not the respondent violated Rule 15.06 of the Code of
Professional Ethics.
B. Whether or not the respondent violated Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Ethics.
C. Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred.
III. HELD / RULING
A. Yes. Rule 15.06 states that a lawyer shall not state or imply that
he is able to influence any public official, tribunal or legislative
body.Respondent’s threat in his letter to expose complainant to
possible sanctions from certain government agencies with which
he bragged to have a good network reflects lack of character, self-
respect, and justness.
B. Yes. Canon 16 provides that a lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties that may come into his possession. This
was breached by the respondent when after he received the
proceeds of Lemoine’s insurance claim, he did not report it to him.
By respondent’s failure to promptly account for the funds he
received and held for the benefit of his client, he committed
professional misconduct. Such misconduct is reprehensible at a
greater degree, for it was obviously done on purpose through the
employment of deceit to the prejudice of complainant who was kept
in the dark about the release of the check, until he himself
 discovered the same, and has to date been deprived of the use of
the proceeds thereof.
C. Yes. In fine, by respondent’s questioned acts, he has shown that
he is no longer fit to remain a member of the noble profession that
is the law. Wherefore, respondent Atty. Balon, is found GUILTY of
malpractice, deceit and gross misconduct in the practice of his
profession as a lawyer and he is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of
the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll
of Attorneys.
 People of the Philippines v. Danny Godoy
Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. v. Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. and
Eva P. Ponce De Leon
G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

I. FACTS
A. Facts
Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr., a judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, filed a
complaint against Mauricio Reynoso, Jr., a columnist, and Eva P.
Ponce de Leon, publisher and chairman of the editorial board,
respectively, of the Palawan Times for indirect contempt. His Honor's
plaint is based on an article written by respondent Reynoso, Jr. in his
column, "On the Beat," and published in the July 20, 1994 issue of
said newspaper which is of general circulation in Puerto Princesa
City.
The article written was based on the resolution of a separate
case People v. Danny Godoy, of which the complainant was the one
who rendered the decision for the conviction of the accused Godoy.
The complaint avers that the article tends to impede, obstruct,
belittle, downgrade and degrade the administration of justice; that the
article contains averments which are disrespectful, discourteous,
insulting, offensive and derogatory; that it does not only cast
aspersions on the integrity and honesty of complainant as a judge
and on his ability to administer justice objectively and impartially, but
is an imputation that he is biased and he prejudges the cases filed
before him; and that the article is sub judice because it is still pending
automatic review. Respondent Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. contends in his
comment that his article does not intend to impede nor obstruct the
administration of justice because the same was published after
complainant had promulgated his decision in the case. Respondent
Eva P. Ponce de Leon, in her comment and Supplemental
Comment, asserts that the article is merely in reaction to the
television interview given by complainant in the show, "Magandang
Gabi Bayan," last June 18, 1994 wherein the latter defended his
decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 11640-41, entitled "People vs.
Godoy”.
II. ISSUE/S
A. Whether or not the specified statements complained of are
contumacious in nature.
B. Whether or not there can be contempt of court in case of post-
litigation statements or publications.
III. HELD / RULING
A. No. The SC have read and reread the article in its entirety and was
fully convinced that what was involved here was a situation
wherein the alleged disparaging statements have been taken out of
context. If the statements claimed to be contumelious had been
read with contextual care, there would have been no reason for
this contempt proceeding.
Snide remarks or sarcastic innuendoes do not necessarily
assume that level of contumely which is actionable under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court. Neither do we believe that the publication in
question was intended to influence this Court for it could not
conceivably be capable of doing so. The article has not transcended
the legal limits for editorial comment and criticism. Besides, it has
not been shown that there exists a substantive evil which is
extremely serious and that the degree of its imminence is so
exceptionally high as to warrant punishment for contempt and
sufficient to disregard the constitutional guaranties of free speech
and press.
It has been insightfully explained and suggested that a judge
will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and
unguarded expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a
reproof. It is so that in every case where a judge decides for one
party, he decides against another; and oftentimes both parties are
beforehand equally confident and sanguine. The disappointment,
therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there should
be other than a bitter feeling, which often reaches to the judge as
the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be
patient, and tolerate everything which appears as but the
momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought will
generally make a party ashamed of such, outbreak, and the dignity
of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence.
B. In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism of
the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However,
there may be a contempt of court, even though the case has been
terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these two
circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect
or, in other words, to scandalize the court; or (2) where there is a
clear and present danger that the administration of justice would
be impeded. And this brings us to the familiar invocation of
freedom of expression usually resorted to as a defense in contempt
proceedings.
Hence, the Supreme Court dismissed the complaint for indirect
contempt against respondents Mauricio Reynoso, Jr. and Eva P.
Ponce de Leon.
 In Matter of the Application for Habeas Corpus of Maximo Gamido;
Maximo B. Gamido v. New Bilibid Prison
G.R. No. 146783 July 29, 2002

I. FACTS
A. Facts
On January 17, 2002, Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, of Suite 416
William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, who styles himself as
counsel for petitioner Maximino B. Gamido, filed his Motion of Relief
before the Supreme Court. The hearing for the said Motion was
attended by Dela Cruz and the counsels for respondent led by the
Assistant Solicitor General Rodolfo Urbiztondo.
It appearing that earlier the petitioner himself filed under date
of February 12, 200, personally his Motion to Withdraw Petition, and
that the Court in its Resolution dated March 12, 2001, granted the
withdrawal of his petition for habeas corpus. The Court then resolved
and denied the instant Motion for Relief for it was filed without
authority of the petitioner and clearly without merit.
II. ISSUE/S
A. Whether or not the act done by Espiridon J. Dela Cruz is
contemptuous.
III. HELD / RULING
A. Yes. Considering representations by the self-styled counsel for
petitioner that he, Espiridon J. Dela Cruz, is a lawyer with a law
office bearing his name at Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal
Avenue, Manila, and for this purpose he used the title of attorney
and indicated in his pleadings filed before this Court an IBP
number, which turned out to be spurious, it having been shown
and admitted by him that he is not a member of the Philippine Bar
as certified by the Office of the Bar Confidant, after he was made to
show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
appearing as counsel in this case without license to practice law,
and although he asked the Court for forgiveness for the wrong he
had done, the Court RESOLVED to declare ESPIRIDION J. DELA
CRUZ GUILTY of indirect contempt of this Court. 
 WHEREFORE, he is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000) within thirty days from notice
hereof, OR suffer IMPRISONMENT for a period of one month and
one day to be served at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
detention center, Taft Avenue, Manila, with the warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more
severely.
 22. G.R. No. L-24864 April 30, l985
FORTUNATO HALILI vs. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and
HALILI BUS DRIVERS and CONDUCTORS UNION
I. FACTS:
PTGWO filed claims for overtime against Halili Transit, eventually settled
by an agreement wherein the administrator of Fortunato Halili’s estate
would transfer a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal to the union. This award
was established by their original counsel, Atty. Espinas, for Espinas &
Associates. Atty. Pineda, while working for the same law firm, later
appeared in court for PTGWO. However, he represented himself with the
firm “B.C. Pineda and Associates” (with the same address as Espinas &
Associates) giving the impression that he was now the principal lawyer in
the cases (and would be entitled to a bigger share of fees). Meanwhile,
Atty. Pineda also entered into an anomalous retainer’s contract with
PTGWO, which was later found to be illegal and unethical. It was
executed only between Atty. Pineda and PTGWO’s officers (only 14% of
its members). The Labor Code requires all members to vote on any
question of major policy. Atty. Pineda required a contingent fee of 30%
for those still working at Halili Transit, and 45% for those already
separated. However, when the contract was executed, Halili had already
stopped operations, meaning the 45% fee now applied to all the members
of PTGWO. The contract was executed while Atty. Espinas was still
representing PTGWO in Halili’s SC appeal. Atty. Pineda didn’t tell his
firm about the contract, nor did he try to substitute as counsel, now that
he was retained by the union. The contract wasn’t even notarized. Manila
Memorial Park, which was supposed to buy the land in the award to
PTGWO, expressed misgivings over the authority of PTGWO because of
PD 1529, which says that a court of competent jurisdiction must
authorize the sale of a property in trust. Atty. Pineda approached the
NLRC, asking for authority to sell the property, which was granted by
Arbiter Valenzuela. He later filed a second motion to distribute the
proceeds of the sale, also granted by Valenzuela. The distribution was to
include the attorney’s fees for him stipulated in his retainer’s contract
with PTGWO. In both motions, neither the two other counsels (Atty.
Espinas and Atty. Lopez) nor the other parties were informed.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Atty. Pineda is guilty of misconduct and indirect
contempt of court.

HELD:
Yes. Atty. Pineda is guilty of misconduct and indirect contempt of court.
The 45% attorney’s lien on the award of the employees was exorbitant
and unconscionable. He must now return the excessive amount of fees
he received. He acted in a fraudulent manner, representing himself as
principal lawyer in the case and from another law firm, albeit at the
same address as Espina & Associates. It was also found that Atty. Pineda
intended to share his attorney’s fees with union leaders, which may be
why the general membership was not informed of the retainer’s contract
with Pineda. This goes against Canon 9.02, which prohibits sharing of
attorney’s fees with non-lawyers. He knowingly approached the NLRC for
authority to sell and dispose of the proceeds of the awarded property,
knowing full well that the NLRC had no jurisdiction to give such
authority. He also did this without the knowledge of his co-counsels and
the other parties in the case.
 23. A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984
VALERIANO F. NUÑEZ vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY

I. FACTS
The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Valeriano F. Nuñez, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint
involved an incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for
which respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because
complainant parked a government vehicle which he was driving at the
parking space reserved for respondent judge. Complainant apologized
and explained that he did not intend to park in respondent Judge's
space, and that he did not know that such space was reserved for
respondent Judge. However, respondent Judge refused to accept
complainant's apology and, instead, found the latter guilty of direct
contempt of court for using the former's parking space, sentencing
complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00). Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring
complainant to the City Jail in Fort Bonifacio, where the latter was
incarcerated for two days. On April 5, 2005, complainant was released
after filing a Motion for Reconsideration and paying the fine of
P1,000.00.
In his Comment, Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time of
incident, he was set to dispose a criminal case, and over the weekend,
had even conceptualized the matter on how to administer the
proceedings to accomplish the requirements of that criminal case.
However, the inconsiderate and improper parking of complainant
disturbed his train of thought as to the intended disposition of his cases.

II. ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.

III. RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges are designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself
becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he
places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and
impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.
By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had
already cited six persons for contempt, including herein complainant.
Worse, respondent Judge immediately detained complainant, thereby
preventing him from resorting to the remedies provided under the law.
Such abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his
integrity, which is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor.

Respondent wrongly argues that complainant delayed the administration

of justice when he improperly parked the van on respondent’s assigned
slot which disrupted his scheduled disposition of cases. Respondent’s
reaction to the complainant’s mistake is exaggerated. The complainant’s
act may have caused inconvenience to the respondent but it could not
delay the administration of justice.
In addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary state that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SEC. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people's
faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done
but must also be seen to be done.
The Court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes
gross misconduct. "Gross" has been defined as flagrant and shameful,
while "misconduct" means a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.

Respondent Judge Francisco B. Ibay was found GUILTY of grave abuse of

authority for citing complainant Valeriano F. Nuñez for contempt without
legal basis, and was ORDERED to PAY a FINE of Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00).
 24. G.R. No. L-36800 October 21, 1974
JORGE MONTECILLO and QUIRICO DEL MAR vs. FRANCISCO M.
GICA, MAGNO S. GATMAITAN, JOSE N. LEUTERIO, and RAMON G.
GAVIOLA, Justices of the Court of Appeals

I. FACTS:
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico
del Mar represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo
in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus
the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral
damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the
latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for
reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of
Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly
rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered through
negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.

The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration and it admonished Atty.

Del Mar from using such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a second
Motion for Reconsideration where he again made threats. The CA then
ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for
contempt.

Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he
sent to the President of the Philippines asking the said justices to
consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del
Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of the CA before a
Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason
of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the
justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.

The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse
his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The
SC denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from
the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges who voted
against him.

The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to

why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead
tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been “convinced
that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless” he would have
continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation,
del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice”.

Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but
the judge who handled the case dismissed the same.

B. RTC Ruling
The Court of First Instance upheld the decision of the City Court which
rendered judgment against Gica for him to pay Montecillo five hundred
pesos for moral damages, two hundred pesos as compensatory damages
and three hundred pesos as attorney’s fees, plus costs.

C. CA Ruling
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu; ruled in favor of Gica on the ground that the preponderance of
evidence favored Gica on the principle that positive must prevail over the
negative evidence, and that “some words must have come from
Montecillo’s lips that were insulting to Gica. The appellate court
concluded that its decision is a vindication of Gica and instead, awarded
him five hundred pesos as damages.
II. ISSUE: 
Whether or not Atty. Del Mar, the counsel of Montecillo should be
suspended.
III. HELD: 
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties
to the courts. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of
the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they
acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.

Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.

 25.Tan vs. Balajadia, GR No. 169517, Mar. 14, 2006

I. FACTS:

This is an original petition for contempt filed by petitioners Rogelio Tan,

Norma Tan and Maliyawao Pagayokan against respondent Benedicto
Balajadia. Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a
criminal case against them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of
Baguio City for usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of
city tax ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by
petitioners from respondent.

In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit, respondent asserted that he is

a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City with office address at RoomB-
207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio City. However,
certifications issued by the Office of the Bar Confidant3 and the
Integrated Barof the Philippines showed that respondent has never been
admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence, petitioners claim that respondent
is liable forindirect contempt for misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.3.

Respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of the complaint-

affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest mistake. He
claimsthat the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the subject
complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquino’s complaint-
affidavit. Itappears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a complaint-
affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter
However, certifications issued bythe OBC and the IBP showed that the
respondent was admitted to the Bar.Respondent asserted that the
allegation that he was a practicing lawyer is an honest mistake. He
claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the
complaint-affidavit patterned after Atty. Aquino’s affidavit. Liza
Laconsay, Atty.Aquino’s secretary, admitted the mistake of copying Atty.
Aquino’s complaint-affidavitand instead of stating that
Respondent Balajadia is a businessman, he was erroneouslyreferred to
as a practicing lawyer.

II. Issue/
Whether respondent is liable for indirect contempt for misrepresenting
himself as a lawyer?

III. Ruling

No. The respondent is not liable for indirect contempt.

SC ruled that records supportrespondent’s claim that he never intended

to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was a clear inadvertenceon
the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino.

 Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a

practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself,
establishintent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases
where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the
party wasguilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf of
his client; appearing before court hearings as an attorney; manifesting
before thecourt that he will practice law despite being previously denied
admission to the bar; or deliberately attempting to practice law and
holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge
that he is not licensed to do so.3.

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent

acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequently,
he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of
intent to illegally practice law.

26.

PCGG vs. SB, et. al., GR No. 151809-12, April 12, 2005

I. FACTS:

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered

financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial
support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the
mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The
Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and
the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of
GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the
CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I
Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth
of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate,
the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by
them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are
represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG
filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza
as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse
to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

II. ISSUE:

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to

Mendoza.
III. HELD:

No. Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he

acted as Solicitor General and later as counsel of respondents et.al.
before the Sandiganbayan. However, there is still the issue of whether
there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to disqualify
respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The key is
unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the
“matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved
in the case at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with
the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation
in CFI of Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent
Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter”
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations
and laws, or briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall
within the scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent
Mendoza had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to
liquidate GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK
to Allied Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue
in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while Solicitor General is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil
case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The
applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics
is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings.
27). People Vs. Simplicio Villanueva, G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965

I. Facts

A. Facts

On September 4, 1959, Simplicio Villanueva was charge of

with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the Justice of the Peace
Court by their own chief of police. The complainant prosecuted the case
employing the aid of the city prosecutor as private prosecutor. The
representation was permitted by the secretary of justice. The counsel for
the accused opposed the said representation as it is against and in
violation of Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules of
Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing. Counsel claims that
City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation.

B. RTC Ruling

The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no

reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil action was
deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action. The offended party
had, therefore, the right to intervene in the case and be represented by a
legal counsel because of her interest in the civil liability of the accused.

Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court
of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or
with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City Attorney Fule appeared in the
Justice of the Peace Court as an agent or friend of the offended party. It
does not appear that he was being paid for his services or that his
appearance was in a professional capacity

C.CA Ruling

CFI Decision Is Affirmed

II. Issue/s

Whether or not the appearance of City Attorney Fule constitutes

private practice?

III. Held/Ruling
 NO.The theory of defense counsel lies in his confused
interpretation of Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised
Rules), which provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the
superior courts or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in
private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice to
clients." He claims that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private
prosecutor in the case was engaging in private practice. We believe that
the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private
practice within the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually
holding one's self out to the public, as customarily and demanding
payment for such services. The appearance as counsel on one occasion is
not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private practice of
law.

The word private practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the legal
profession and that his professional services are available to the public
for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of
his said services.
28. NORIEGA VS SISON, G.R. NO. L-24548, OCT. 27, 1983

I. FACTS:

In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged

that Sison as a hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange
Commission is not allowed to engage in the private practice of law; yet
Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity under the name
“Manuel Sison” in order for him to engage in private practice and
represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila. Sison, in his
defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan Sacquing but the
same is with the permission of the SEC Commissioner; that he never
held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that he provided
legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship and for free;
that he never represented himself deliberately and intentionally as “Atty.
Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in the early stages of his
appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty. Emmanuel R.
Sison”, and in one instance, he even made the necessary correction when
the court staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”; that due to the
“inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”, notices were
sent to “Atty. Manuel Sison.”

II. ISSUE: 

Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.

III. HELD: 
No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by
evidence. The allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of
the Sison. There is no evidence that Sison has committed an act
constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer,
willful disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and
willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney to
do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not constitute private
practice of law, more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for
his appearance because Sison and Sacquing were close family friends.
Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close
family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of
harassment against him.
 29. Lim-Santiago vs. Saguico, AC No. 6705, Mar. 31, 2006

I. FACTS:

Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and

Special Administratrix of his estate. Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the
former President of Taggat Industries, Inc, a domestic corporation
engaged in the operation of timber concessions from the government.
PCGG sequestered it and its operations ceased. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio
("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel
of Taggat Industries, Inc. until his appointment as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan. employees of Taggat ("Taggat
employees") filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al.
v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. No. 97-240 ("criminal
complaint"). Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over
the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father,
withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause.
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct
the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal complaint by
recommending the filing of 651 Informations for violation of Article 288
in relation to Article 116 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for the violations
committed. Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was
filed, respondent had resigned from Taggat for more than five years and
refutes complainant’s allegations and counters that complainant was
merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was
adverse and contrary to her expectation. Respondent points out that
complainant did not file a motion to inhibit respondent from hearing the
criminal complaint and states that complainant’s reason in not filing a
motion to inhibit was her impression that respondent would exonerate
her from the charges filed. While this disbarment case was pending, the
Resolution and Order issued by respondent to file 651 Informations
against complainant was reversed and set aside by Regional State
Prosecutor. Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.
II. ISSUE:

Whether or not Respondent’s act of receiving fees from Taggat for legal
services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful
conduct.

III. RULING:

Yes. A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent

owes to Taggat, a former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the
client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will
injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him." The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (conflicting
interest.) In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when
respondent handled the preliminary investigation of the criminal
complaint filed by Taggat employees in 1997. The issue in the criminal
complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that occurred from 1 April
1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer connected with
Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992. However,
the Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct.
Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)
(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
 30. Catu vs. Relioso, AC No. 5738, Feb. 19, 2008

I. FACTS:

Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio

Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which
was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong 
Tagapamayapa of  Barangay  723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila
where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties,  having  been 
summoned  for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an
amicable settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the
filing of the appropriate action in court.

Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth and

Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila where respondent
entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants. Because of this,
petitioner filed the instant administrative complaint against the
respondent on the ground that he committed an act of impropriety as a
lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the
defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense,
respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task
without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the
case for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after
evaluation, they found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.
According to them, respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and, as an elective official, the prohibition
under Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713. Consequently, for the violation of the
latter prohibition, respondent committed a breach of Canon 1.
Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent was
then recommended suspension from the practice of law for one month
with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will
be dealt with more severely.
II. ISSUE:

Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of

respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of
the respondent were proper.

III. HELD:

No. First, respondent  cannot  be  found liable for violation of Rule 6.03
the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer
who has left government service and in connection to former government
lawyers who  are  prohibited  from  accepting employment in connection
with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In
the case at bar, respondent was an incumbent punong barangay.
Apparently, he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713
which governs the practice of profession of elective local government
officials. While  RA  6713 generally applies to all public officials and
employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA
6713 .Moreover,  while  under RA  7160,certain local elective officials
(like governors, mayors,  provincial  board  members  and councilors) are
expressly subjected to a total or  partial  proscription  to  practice  their
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on
the punong barangay and  the  members  of  the sangguniang barangay.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their
profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his
profession. Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should
have procured a prior permission or authorization from the head of his
Department, as required by civil service regulations. The failure of
respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil
Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the
laws. In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required
written permission, respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law but also violated a civil service rules which is a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For not
living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting
ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply
with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall at
all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession and
support the activities of the integrated bar.

            
 Case #31 Rolly Pemtecostes vs Atty. Hermengildo Marasigan,
A.M. No. P-072337, August 03, 2007

I. Facts

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, Clerk of Court VI of the Office of

the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court North Cotabato, was
administratively charged with gravemisconduct and conduct
unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter
of a criminal case which was placed under his care and custody.

The administrative case against Atty. Hermenegildo stemmed

from a sworn affidavit complaint filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly
Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which was recovered
by members of the Philippine National Police of M’lang, North Cotabato
from suspected carnappers.

The release order for the motorcycle was issued but Pentecostes

refused to receive it because it was already ―cannibalized‖ and
unserviceable.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) referred the case to the Executive
Judge of RTC, Kabacan, North Cotabato, for investigation, report and
recommendation. Judge Rabang recommended that the administrative
complaint against Atty. Hermenegildo be dismissed because there was
no proof of Pentecostes’ claim that the vehicle was ―cannibalized‖ from
the time that it was under Atty. Hermenegildo’s custody until its
transfer to Philippine National Police (PNP) of Kabacan. The Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

II. Issue

Whether or not the Atty. Hermenegildo is guilty of misconduct

III. Held

It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records,

papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge.[12]
Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For Clerks of Court
(now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised
Manual for Clerks of Court) which provides all exhibits used as
evidence and turned over to the court and before the case/s involving
such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under
the custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of

the RTC, Kabacan, Atty. Hermenegildo was charged with
the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and to keep it
until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that would
justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the
trial court.

The Court said ―no explanation was offered by Atty.

Hermenegildo, however, for turning over the motorcycle. But whatever
the reason was, Atty. Hermenegildo was mandated to secure
prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.‖

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment

receipt evidencing the turnover of the motorcycle from the trial court
to the Kabacan police station was lost from the records, with nary a
lead as to who was responsible for it. These circumstance are viewed
with disfavor as it reflects badly on the safekeeping of court records, a
duty entrusted to Atty. Hermenegildo as clerk of court.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are

essential and ranking officers of our judicial system who perform
delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of
justice. Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and
management of court records and, as previously pointed out, the
safekeeping of exhibits and public property committed to their charge.

By transferring Pentecostes’ motorcycle without authority,

respondent failed to give premium to his avowed duty of keeping it
under his care and possession. He must, therefore, suffer the
consequences of his act or omission, which is akin to misconduct.

Clerk of Court Atty. Hermengildo Marasigan is found guilty of

simple misconduct. He is suspended for 15 days without pay with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt
with more severely.
 Case # 32 Father Ranhilio Aquino et al vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua
A.C. No. 5095, November 28, 2007

I. Facts

Father Aquino as the Academic Head of the Philippine Judicial

Academy filed a complaint against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a notary public
for violation of the Notarial Practice Law. Father Aquino alleged that
Atty. Pascua falsified two documents committed wherein both
documents had “Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243. Book III, Series of 1998”
and both are dated on December 10, 1998. It was shown by the Clerk
of Court of RTC Tuguegarao that none of these entries appear in the
Notarial Register of Atty. Pascua.

In his comment on the letter-complaint dated September 4,

1999, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents
on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in
his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal secretary, Lyn
Elsie C. Patli, whose affidavit was attached to his comment.

The affidavit-complaints referred to in the notarized documents

were filed by Atty. Pascua with the Civil Service
Commission. Impleaded as respondents therein
were LinaM. Garan and the other above-named complainants. They
filed with the Supreme Court a  Motion to Join the Complaint and Reply
to Respondents Comment. They maintain that Atty. Pascuas omission
was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of falsification.

II. Issue
Whether or not Atty. Pascua violated the Notarial Practice Rule

III. Held

Yes. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and

credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe the
utmost care to comply with the formalities and the basic requirement
in the performance of their duties (Realino v. Villamor, 87 SCRA 318).
 Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such
register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument
executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing,
swearing to, or acknowledging the instrument, xxx xxx. The notary
shall give to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged
before him a number corresponding to the one in his register, and
shall also state on the instrument the page or pages of his register on
which the same is recorded. No blank line shall be left between entries
(Sec. 246, Article V, Title IV, Chapter II of the Revised Administrative
Code).

Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in

his notarial register touching his notarial acts in the manner required
by law is a ground for revocation of his commission (Sec. 249, Article
VI).

The claim of Atty. Pascua that it was simple inadvertence is far

from true.

The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last entry

which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200 on
Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly
notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214,
respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilio and the
other complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that
Atty. Pascua falsely assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned
affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not only as a
Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any

misconduct in his professional or private capacity. The Court has
invariably imposed a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty
of dishonesty or misconduct in the performance of their duties.

Atty. Pascua is declared guilty of misconduct and is suspended

form the practice of law for 3 months with a stern warning that a
repetitioin of the same act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial
commission is revoked.
 Case # 33 Administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V.
Quitain, JBC No. 013, August 22, 2007

I. Facts

Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of

the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City. Subsequent
thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received
confidential information that administrative and criminal charges were
filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then Assistant Regional
Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM), Regional Office
11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed from the
service.

In the PDS submitted to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC)

Judge Quitain declared that there were five criminal cases filed against
him before the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No
administrative case was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS. To
confirm the veracity of the information OCA requested from
the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order dismissing the
criminal cases. Letters were sent to the NAPOLCOM requesting for
certified true copies of documents relative to the administrative
complaints filed against Judge Quitain dismissing him from the
service. Judge Quitain was also required to explain the alleged
misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.

NAPOLCOM furnished the OCA a copy of the order showing

that respondent Judge was indeed dismissed from the service for
Grave Misconduct for falsifying or altering the amounts reflected in
disbursement vouchers in support of his claim for reimbursement of
expenses. Judge Quitain denied having committed any
misrepresentation before the JBC. He alleged that during his
interview, the members thereof only inquired about the status of the
criminal cases filed by the NAPOLCOM before the Sandiganbayan, and
not about the administrative case simultaneously filed against him. He
also alleged that he never received from the Office of the President an
official copy of A.O. No. 183 dismissing him from the service.
  DCA Lock directed Judge Quitain to explain within ten (10)
days from notice why he did not include in his PDS the administrative
case filed against him, and the fact of his dismissal from the service.
Respondent explained during the investigation of his administrative
case by the NAPOLCOM Ad HocCommittee, one of its members
suggested to him that if he resigns from the government service, he
will no longer be prosecuted. He then tendered his resignation from
NAPOLCOM. He did not disclose the case in his PDS because he was
of the honest belief that he had no more pending administrative case
by reason of his resignation and that his resignation amounted to an
automatic dismissal of his administrative case considering that the
issues raised therein became moot and academic.

The OCA stated that it can not be denied that at the time Judge
Quitain applied as an RTC judge, he had full knowledge of A.O. No.
183 dismissing him from government service. Considering that Judge
Quitains explanations in his Comment are but mere reiterations of his
allegations in the previous letters to the OCA, the OCA maintained its
recommendation that Judge Quitain be dismissed from the service
with prejudice to his reappointment to any position in the government,
including GOCCs and with forfeiture of all retirement benefits except
accrued leave credits.

II. Issue
Whether or not Judge Quitain is guilty of dishonesty due to his
nondisclosure before the Judicial and Bar Council of the
administrative case filed against him

III. Held

Yes. The court fully agrees with the recommendation of the OCA.

Respondents contentions utterly lack merit. No amount of

explanation or justification can erase the fact that Judge Quitain was
dismissed from the service and that he deliberately withheld this
information. His insistence that he had no knowledge of A.O. No. 183
is belied by the newspaper items published relative to his dismissal.
 Cessation from office by his resignation does not warrant the
dismissal of the administrative complaint filed against him while he
was still in the service nor does it render said administrative case
moot and academic. Judge Quitain was removed from office after
investigation and was found guilty of grave misconduct. His dismissal
from the service is a clear proof of his lack of the required
qualifications to be a member of the Bench.

It is clear that Judge Quitain deliberately misled the JBC in his

bid to gain an exalted position in the Judiciary. In Office of the Court
Administrator v. Estacion, Jr, this Court stressed, “the important
consideration is that he had a duty to inform the appointing authority
and this Court of the pending criminal charges against him to enable
them to determine on the basis of his record, eligibility for the position
he was seeking. He did not discharge that duty. His record did not
contain the important information in question because he deliberately
withheld and thus effectively hid it. His lack of candor is as obvious as
his reason for the suppression of such a vital fact, which he knew
would have been taken into account against him if it had been
disclosed.” Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of grave
misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal. However,
the court received a letter from Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief
Justice stating that he is tendering his irrevocable resignation effective
immediately as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
10, Davao City. JUDGE JAIME V. QUITAIN is guilty of
grave misconduct which would have warranted his dismissal from the
service had he not resigned during the pendency of this 
case, he is hereby meted the penalty of a fine of P40,000.00. It
appearing that he has yet to apply for his retirement benefits and
other privileges, if any, the Court likewise ORDERS the FORFEITURE
of all benefits, except earned leave credits which Judge Quitain may be
entitled to, and he is PERPETUALLY DISQUALIFIED from
reinstatement and appointment to any branch, instrumentality or
agency of the government, including government-owned and/or
controlled corporations.
 RODOLFO M. BERNARDO vs. ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA
Adm. Case No. 2984        August 31, 2007

I. FACTS

A. Facts

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained

attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following administrative offenses:

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use part of the

money entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on property
belonging to Bernardo,
2) falsification of certain documents, to wit: (a) a special power of
attorney purportedly executed in his favor by Bernardo; (b) a deed of
sale; and (c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed in
Bernardo’s favor
3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the bank,
in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount
of P50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded.

On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc declared the respondent,
Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty of all the charges against him and imposes
on him the penalty of DISBARMENT.

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to

reengage in the practice of law. However, the Supreme Court En Banc
denied his petition.

II. ISSUE:

WON Mejia’s petition for reinstatement may be granted.

III. RULING: YES

Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to

a great extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will
depend on whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in
the orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be
preserved even with the applicant’s reentry as a counselor at law. The
applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper
person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the
applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between
the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
In this case, fifteen years has passed since Mejia’s disbarment. Although
the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also
cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already 71 years old. While
the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has
endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing
a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the
rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other
transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown remorse.
Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough.

Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring
officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty
imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as
disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.
 GSIS, vs. HON. VICENTE PACQUING & ATTY. MARIO ANACLETO
BAÑEZ, JR.
A.M. No. RTJ-04-1831             February 2, 2007

I. FACTS:

A. FACTS:

Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson)

borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel
mortgages. When Bengson defaulted in the payment of the
amortizations, petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged
properties and sold them at public auction where it emerged as the
highest bidder.

Bengson filed an to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure. The trial court

then declared the foreclosure void and directed petitioner to restore to
Bengson the foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.
Subsequently, Judge Vicente A. Pacquing directed petitioner to pay
Bengson the equivalent value of the foreclosed properties and P31 million
as costs of suit. This order became final on April 24, 1995.

Petitioner filed a petition for relief from judgment with the court a
quo stating that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, went on AWOL and
never informed it of respondent judge’s order. This petition, however, was
dismissed.

When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, respondent

judge issued an alias writ of execution ordering petitioner to pay
Bengson the P31 million costs of suit. Pursuant thereto, respondent Atty.
Mario Anacleto Bañez, acting as sheriff of Branch 26, executed the writ
and levied on petitioner’s shares of stock in San Miguel Corporation
(SMC) worth P6.2 million. The garnished shares were later sold at public
auction with Bengson as the only bidder.

Petitioner moved to quash the writ on the ground that its funds and
properties were exempt from garnishment, levy and execution under
Section 39 of RA 8291. Respondent judge denied the motion stating that
only funds and properties that were necessary to maintain petitioner’s
actuarial solvency, like contributions of GSIS members, were exempt
from garnishment, levy and execution under RA 8291.
Petitioner filed this administrative complaint against Hon. Pacquing for
ignorance of the law, bias and partiality, and for violation of RA 8291. In
its complaint, petitioner alleged that the respondents refused to take
cognizance of Section 39, RA 8291. Respondent judge refused to await
an authoritative and definitive resolution of the issues on the exemption
of GSIS’s funds and properties from execution or the issue of whether
GSIS is entitled to a relief from judgment of his P31 million peso costs of
suit.
The Court referred the complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA), it found nothing in the records to support petitioner’s accusations
against both respondents. According to the OCA, even assuming that
respondent judge erred in interpreting RA 8291, such error did not
constitute gross ignorance of the law. It also failed to prove malice, fraud,
dishonesty or bad faith on the part of respondent judge in issuing the
assailed alias writ of execution. On petitioner’s allegations against
respondent Atty. Bañez, the OCA likewise found no reason to hold him
liable for failing to defer the execution of the writ. The OCA then
recommended the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint against
respondents.

B. RTC RULING:
The trial court, through Judge Antonio Fineza, declared the
foreclosure void and directed petitioner to restore to Bengson the
foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.

C. CA RULING:
The CA affirmed wit modification the trial court’s decision and
remanded the case for reception of evidence on the costs of suit and
determination of the replacement value of the properties should
petitioner fail to return them. The CA;s decision became final and
executory on February 10, 1988.

II. ISSUE:

WON the administrative case filed against the respondents shall prosper.

III. RULING: NO

For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law, the acts
complained of must be gross or patent. To constitute gross ignorance of
the law, such acts must not only be contrary to existing law and
jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or
dishonesty. 

We hold that respondent judge was neither biased nor partial against
petitioner when he issued the alias writ of execution. Petitioner’s
assertion that respondent judge precipitately issued the alias writ is not
supported by the records. On the contrary, the records indicate that the
writ was issued more than three years from the finality of the order
directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. Its
issuance was not all tainted with undue haste. In the exercise of his
judicial discretion, respondent judge believed that the issuance of the
alias writ had become forthwith a matter of right following the finality of
said order. The rule is that once a judgment becomes final, the winning
party is entitled to a writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes
a court’s ministerial duty.

Assuming, that respondent judge erred in issuing the alias writ, his act
would still not merit administrative sanction absent malice or bad faith.
Bad faith does not simply connote poor or flawed judgment; it imports a
dishonest purpose, moral obliquity or conscious doing of a wrong.
Moreover, the party who alleges partiality must prove it with clear and
convincing evidence. Petitioner failed in that aspect.

Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Bañez, the Court

finds no basis to hold him liable for executing the assailed writ at that
time. Atty. Bañez merely carried out a ministerial duty. He had no
discretion to implement the writ or not
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, vs. ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA
A.C. No. 6697             July 25, 2006

I. FACTS

A. FACTS:

An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State
Bar of California. It arose from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled
involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986.
Atty. de Vera was authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was
given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was
then studying in San Diego California) for the release of the funds in
settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the
case which he then deposited to his personal account.

The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that

Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years.
Subsequently, Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which
resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.

Thereafter, Zoilo Antonio Velez filed a complaint for the suspension

and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the
ground of respondent's alleged misrepresentation in concealing the
suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar of California.
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own
benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act
constituting moral turpitude.

II. ISSUE:

WON respondent Atty. De Vera committed malpractice.

III. HOLDING: YES

Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme

Court; grounds therefor. – A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents
or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
Moreover, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates
every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client that
may come into his possession. Accordingly, he shall account for all
money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or

property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption
that he has appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of,
and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. Lawyers who
misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of
professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the
legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be
disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law.

In this case, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainant's allegation in the
latter's memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended
for his client and that he deposited said amount in his personal account
and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the
amount for personal purposes. Atty. de Vera insists that the foregoing
facts do not prove that he misappropriated his client's funds as the
latter's father (the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same. By
insisting that he was authorized by his client's father and attorney-in-
fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the
Willis funds for his own personal use. Absent any proof that he was
authorized by the elder Willlis, his constitutes more than substantial
evidence of malpractice.
 37. CYNTHIA ADVINCULA vs. ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA
A.C. No. 7204, March 7, 2007

I. Facts
A. Facts

             The case is a disbarment case against respondent on the

ground of gross immorality. It was alleged that sometime in December
2004, complainant seek for legal advice from petitioner regarding her
collectibles from Queensway Travel and Tours. Respondent sent Demand
Letter and sometime in February 2005, they met at Zensho Restaurant
to discuss the possibility of filing complaint against the travel company
because the latter failed to settle the accounts. That after that said
meeting, the respondent "held her arm and kissed her on the cheek while
embracing her very tightly."
Again, on March 6, 2005, at about past 10:00 in the morning, she
met respondent at Starbucks coffee shop to finalize the draft of the
complaint to be filed in Court. After the meeting, respondent offered
again a ride, which he usually did every time they met. Along the way,
when she was almost restless respondent stopped his car and forcefully
hold her face and kissed her lips while the other hand was holding her
breast. Complainant even in a state of shocked succeeded in resisting his
criminal attempt and immediately manage to go out of the car.
In the late afternoon, complainant sent a text message to
respondent informing him that she decided to refer the case with another
lawyer and needs (sic) to get back the case folder from him.
               Thus she decided to refer the case to another lawyer.
II. Issue:

  Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly immoral

which would warrant the disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law?

III. Held/Ruling

                The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x xx

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

                The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the tenets of
morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but all throughout their
legal career as lawyers belong to an exclusive and honored fraternity.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession
and should adhere to the unwaveringly to the highest standard of
morality. The respondent admitted to the act of kissing the complainant
on the lips as evidenced as well of his asking for apology from
complainant in his text message. Regardless of the fact that the
respondent admitted that he kissed the complainant but the Court held
that this was not accompanied by malice because the respondent
immediately asked for forgiveness after sensing the annoyance of the
respondent after texting him. Thus the Court held that this is not grossly
immoral nor highly reprehensible which will warrant disbarment or
suspension. But the Court reprimanded respondent to be more prudent
and cautious.
 38. In re: Petition to disqualify Atty. Leonardo De Vera,

I. FACTS:
A. Facts

Petitioner lawyers Oliver L. Garcia, Emmanuel Ravanera and Tony Velez

filed a petition seeking the disqualification of respondent lawyer Leonard
De Vera from being elected Governor of Eastern Mindanao in the 16th
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Regional Governor's Elections.
Petitioners contended that respondent's transfer from Pasay, Parañaque,
Las Piñas and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to Agusan del Sur Chapter is
a brazen abuse and misuse of the rotation rule, a mockery of the
domicile rule and a great insult to the lawyers of Eastern Mindanao for it
implied that there is no lawyer from the region qualified and willing to
serve the IBP. Petitioners also submitted that respondent De Vera lacks
the requisite moral aptitude for the position. According to petitioners,
respondent De Vera was previously sanctioned by the Supreme Court for
irresponsibly attacking the integrity of the SC Justices during the
deliberations of the plunder law. They further alleged that respondent De
Vera could have been disbarred in the United States for misappropriating
his client's funds had he not surrendered his California license to
practice law. Respondent De Vera argued that the Court has no
jurisdiction over the present controversy contending that the election of
the officers of the IBP, including the determination of the qualification of
those who want to serve the organization, is purely an internal matter
governed as it is by the IBP By-Laws and exclusively regulated and
administered by the IBP. Respondent also averred that an IBP member is
entitled to select, change or transfer his chapter or transfer his chapter
membership under Section 19, Article II and Section 29-2, Article IV of
the IBP By-Laws. He also stressed that the right to transfer membership
is also recognized in Section 4, 139-A of the Rules of Court which is
exactly the same as the first of the above-quoted provision of the IBP by-
Laws. On the moral integrity question, respondent De Vera denies that
he exhibited disrespect to the Court or to any of its members during its
deliberations on the constitutionality of the plunder law. As for the
administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he
was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it
cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of
it) to run for the position he is aspiring for.

II. Issues:

1. Whether or not the Court has no jurisdiction over the IBP.

2. Whether or not the respondent is disqualified from being elected

Governor in the IBP.

III. Held/Ruling:

1. On the issue of jurisdiction, the Court affirmed its right to hear

and decide the present controversy. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution conferred on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules affecting the IBP and implicit in the constitutional grant is the
power to supervise all the activities of the IBP, including the election of
its officers. The power of supervision over the IBP has been demonstrated
in the past when it looked into the irregularities which attended the 1989
elections of the IBP National Officers. The Court likewise amended
several provisions of the IBP By-Laws. 2. The Court upheld respondent
De Vera in his contention that a member of the IBP is entitled to select,
change or transfer his chapter membership. Section 19 of the IBP By-
Laws allows a member to change his chapter membership, subject only
to the condition that the transfer must be made not less than three
months prior to the election of officers in the chapter to which the lawyer
wishes to transfer. In the case at bar, respondent De Vera's transfer to
the Agusan Del Sur IBP Chapter is valid as it was done more than three
months ahead of the chapter elections held on February 27, 2003. The
Court also ruled that there is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly
provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP
governorship. The Court emphasized that the disqualification of a
candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by the Court or
conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude. In In Re: Published Alleged Threats Against Members of the
Court in the Plunder Law Case Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera,
Respondent De Vera was found guilty of indirect contempt of court and
was imposed a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos for his
remarks contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer.
The Court held that the statements were aimed at influencing and
threatening the Court to decide in favour of the constitutionality of the
Plunder Law. The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent
De Vera immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect
contempt does not involve moral turpitude. Moral turpitude as "an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals." On the
administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while
he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him
guilty of the charge. Bare allegations and unsubstantiated by evidence
are not equivalent to proof. The Court also ruled that petitioners are not
the proper parties to bring the suit under Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws
which provides that only nominees can file a written protest setting forth
the ground therefor. Petitioner Garcia is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter,
while the other petitioners, Ravanera and Velez, are from the Misamis
Oriental IBP and are not qualified to run for IBP governorship of Eastern
Mindanao pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in Sections 37 and
38 of the IBP By-Laws. The Court also held that the instant petition was
premature as no nomination of candidates has been made by the
members of the House of Delegates from Eastern Mindanao, and
assuming that respondent De Vera gets nominated, he can always opt to
decline the nomination.
 39. Roberto Soriano vs. Atty. Manuel Dizon
A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.
Per Curiam

I. FACTS:

A. Facts:

The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his
way home after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion,
Tarlac with his wife. Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car
driven by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he had
overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a prominent member of
the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.

Incensed, respondent tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to
make a turn. An altercation resulted there from that got to the point that
the respondent fired and shot complainant hitting him on the neck.
The accused went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver was on his
way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of the accused on
the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the accused.

He fell on the thigh of the respondent so the latter pushed him out and
sped off.

II. ISSUE:
WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.

III. RULING/HELD:

Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done

contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through
his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to
satisfy his civil liabilities.

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest

and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought,
with the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with
complainants family. But when this effort failed, respondent concocted a
complete lie by making it appear that it was complainant’s family that
had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a
neurosurgeon.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46. Linsangan vs Atty. Tolentino, AC No. 6672, September 4, 2009

FACTS:

In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint

against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through
his paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, “pirated” a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said
client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s
allegations.

Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling

card which appears as follows:

FRONT

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

BACK

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also

denied authorizing the printing of such calling cards.
 The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its

report and recommendation, found that respondent had encroached on
the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02 10 and other
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he
contravened the rule against soliciting cases for gain, personally or
through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27, Rule 138 12 of the
Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be
reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a
heavier penalty.

ISSUES: 

1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the

professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.

2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of
Labiano.

RULING:

1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result
or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s clients,
Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another’s legal practice.

2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially
denied knowing Labiano, he admitted he actually knew her later in the
proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law
office. Through Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano’s word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more
favorable result.
 Labiano’s calling card is improper. The card made it appear that
the law office will finance legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a
lawyer shall not lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is
handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of

mind so that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely
affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If
the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case,
the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case
or an additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may
lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his
client, or to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in
the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of
undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.

The phrase in the calling card which states “w/ financial

assistance”, was clearly used to entice clients (who already had
representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance
their legal actions.

However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty.

Tolentino had a personal and direct hand in the printing of said calling
cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At any rate, for all the
infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the Supreme
Court for one year.

47. Atty. Vitriolo, et al vs Atty. Dasig, AC No. 4948, April 1, 2003

FACTS:

This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty.

Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation
of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial
spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
 Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking
officers of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this
Court on December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while
she was OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are
grounds for disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

The Supreme Court granted complainants motion to refer the

complaint to the Commission on Bar Discipline, Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In its report and recommendation, the IBP Commission on Bar

Discipline stated as follows:

“From the foregoing evidence on record, it can be concluded that

respondent in violation of her oath as a government official and as a
member of the Bar, indeed made unlawful demands or attempted to
extort money from certain people who had pending
applications/requests before her office in exchange for her promise to
act favorably on said applications/requests. Clearly, respondent
unlawfully used her public office in order to secure financial spoils to
the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the Commission on
Higher Education.

For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that respondent be

suspended from the practice of law for the maximum period
allowable of three (3) years with a further warning that similar action
in the future will be a ground for disbarment of respondent.”

The IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the

recommendation.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-

Charge (OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court
for her malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of
the complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED.
RULING:

Yes. Generally speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office

may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for misconduct in the
discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if said
misconduct as a government official also constitutes a violation of his
oath as a lawyer, then he may be disciplined by this Court as a member
of the Bar.

In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various

occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to
extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje,
and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable
action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The
evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents
misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect
her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to
have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand
sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office.

The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of

every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment,
suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes
upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondents demands for sums of money to
facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her
office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when
admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of
private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in
government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant
scrutiny of the public.

For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and
Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as
gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, the Court finds that
respondent deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from
membership in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended
by the IBP Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall
be stricken off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.

48. Santiago vs Atty. Rafanan, AC No. 6252, October 5, 2004

FACTS:

A verified Complaint was filed by Jonar Santiago, an employee of

the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP), for the disbarment
of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The Complaint was filed with the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on January 16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with
deceit; malpractice or other gross misconduct in office under Section 27
of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02 and
1.03, Canon 5, and Canons 12.07and 12.08 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Atty. Rafanan filed his verified Answer. He admitted having

administered the oath to the affiants whose Affidavits were attached to
the verified Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of
their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-affidavits
was allowed.

He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied only to

documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not mandatory for
affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other government
offices. He pointed out that in the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn
to before government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the residence
certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries public in Nueva
Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners -- indicate the affiants
residence certificates on the documents they notarized, or have entries in
their notarial register for these documents.

As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR, respondent

argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their clients on substantial
matters, in cases where [their] testimony is essential to the ends of
justice. Complainant charged respondents clients with attempted
murder. Respondent averred that since they were in his house when the
alleged crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of
justice.

The IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2003-172

approving and adopting the Investigating Commissioners Report that
respondent had violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the
execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the notarial
register, and the indication of the affiants residence certificate. The IBP
Board of Governors found his excuse for the violations unacceptable. The
other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court;
and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the CPR -- were dismissed
for insufficiency of evidence.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Rafanan violated the Notarial Law.

RULING:

Yes. The Court agrees with the Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors.

The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of

notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to every
document acknowledged before them has presented the proper residence
certificate (or exemption from the residence tax); and to enter its number,
place of issue and date as part of such certification. They are also
required to maintain and keep a notarial register; to enter therein all
instruments notarized by them; and to give to each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number corresponding to the
one in [their] register [and to state therein] the page or pages of [their]
register, on which the same is recorded. Failure to perform these duties
would result in the revocation of their commission as notaries public.

 These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply neglected,

considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight attached to
notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their commissions
are presumed to be aware of these elementary requirements.

It is clear from the pleadings -- and respondent has readily

admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing to enter in the
documents notations of the residence certificate, as well as the entry
number and the pages of the notarial registry.

As correctly pointed out by the investigating commissioner, Section

3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly requires
respondent as notary -- in the absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or
government official authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he
has personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits. Respondent failed
to do so with respect to the subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in
the belief that -- as counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to
comply with the certification requirement.

Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is placed

upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the laws. No custom
or age-old practice provides sufficient excuse or justification for their
failure to adhere to the provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse
given by respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law,
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his office as a
notary public.

  Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of violating the Notarial

Law and Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is
hereby fined P3,000 with a warning that similar infractions in the future
will be dealt with more severely.
49. ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR. vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO  

I. FACTS:

A paid advertisement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer was

published which reads: “Annulment of Marriage Specialist [contact
number]”. Espeleta, a staff of the Supreme Court, called up the number
but it was Mrs. Simbillo who answered. She claims that her husband,
Atty. Simbillo was an expert in handling annulment cases and can
guarantee a court decree within 4-6mos provided the case will not
involve separation of property and custody of children. It appears that
similar advertisements were also published.
An administrative complaint was filed which was referred to the
IBP for investigation and recommendation. The IBP resolved to suspend
Atty. Simbillo for 1year. Note that although the name of Atty. Simbillo
did not appear in the advertisement, he admitted the acts imputed
against him but argued that he should not be charged. He said that it
was time to lift the absolute prohibition against advertisement because
the interest of the public isn’t served in any way by the prohibition.

II. ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rizalino Simbillo is guilty of violating Rule
2.03 and Rule 3.01 of CPR.

III. HELD/RULING:

Yes. The practice of law is not a business --- it is a profession in

which the primary duty is public service and money. Gaining livelihood
is a secondary consideration while duty to public service and
administration of justice should be primary. Lawyers should subordinate
their primary interest.
Worse, advertising himself as an “annulment of marriage
specialist” he erodes and undermines the sanctity of an institution still
considered as sacrosanct --- he in fact encourages people otherwise
disinclined to dissolve their marriage bond.
 Solicitation of business is not altogether proscribed but for it to be
proper it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.
Note that the law list where the lawyer’s name appears must be a
reputable law list only for that purpose --- a lawyer may not properly
publish in a daily paper, magazine…etc., nor may a lawyer permit his
name to be published the contents of which are likely to deceive or injure
the public or the bar.
50. B. R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

I. FACTS:

Petitioner, thru its then counsel of record, Baizas, Alberto and

Associates, received notice to file Appellant’s Brief within 45 days from
receipt thereof. Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief thus
respondent Court issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the
Appellant’s Brief within the reglementary period. As the latter failed to
comply with the above Resolution, respondent Court issued another
Resolution this time dismissing petitioner’s appeal.

Petitioner, this time thru the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion
for reconsideration of the resolution dismissing its appeal alleging that
as a result of the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law
firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES, the affairs of the said firm
are still being settled between Atty. Jose Baizas (son of Crispin Baizas)
and Atty. Ruby Alberto, the latter having established her own law office;
furthermore, Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the lawyer who handled this case in
the trial court and who is believed to have also attended to the
preparation of the Appellant’s Brief but failed to submit it through
oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.

II. ISSUE:
Whether or not the death of a partner extinguish the lawyer-client
relationship with the law firm.

III. HELD/RULING
No. Petitioner’s counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS, ALBERTO &
ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin Baizas. Hence, the death of
the latter did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said
firm and petitioner. With Baizas’ death, the responsibility of Atty.
Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until
withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by
the Rules of Court. This is so because it was the law firm which handled
the case for petitioner before both the trial and appellate courts. That
Atty. Espiritu, an associate who was designated to handle the case, later
left the office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since others
in the firm could have replaced him. Upon receipt of the notice to file
Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the case to another associate
or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by the
Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new
lawyer.
Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed to
make inquiries from counsel regarding its case. As pointed out by
respondents, the president of petitioner corporation claims to be the
intimate friend of Atty. Crispin Baizas; hence, the death of the latter
must have been known to the former. This fact should have made
petitioner more vigilant with respect to the case at bar. Petitioner failed
to act with prudence and diligence, thus, its plea that they were not
accorded the right to procedural due process cannot elicit either approval
or sympathy.
51. DIANA RAMOS VS. ATTY. JOSE R. IMBANG

I. FACTS
In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of
respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions
against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos.  She gave
respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt
for P5,000 only. 
  The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her
cases against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to
enter the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then
come out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been
cancelled and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each
“appearance” in court, respondent charged her P350.
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became
suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the
trial courts of Biñan and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn
that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that
he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

II. ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Imbang should be disbarred.

III. HELD/RULING
Yes. Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and
integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to
be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants
who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
The SC supported this with three explanations: 1. Code of Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees: Section 7(b)(2) of the Code
of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides: o
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to acts and
omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following constitute prohibited acts
and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby
declared unlawful: o (b) Outside employment and other activities related
thereto, public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not: o (1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless authorized
by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict
with their official function. In this instance, Imbang received P5,000 from
the complainant and issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still
connected with the PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes
an attorney-client relationship.

2. Revised Administrative Code: Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III,

Book V of the Revised Administrative Code provides: o The PAO shall be
the principal law office of the Government in extending free legal
assistance to indigent persons in criminal, civil, labor, administrative
and other quasi-judicial cases. As a PAO lawyer, Imbang should not have
accepted attorney's fees from the complainant as this was inconsistent
with the office's mission.

3. Code of Professional Responsibility: Canon 1 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility provides: o CANON 1. — A LAWYER SHALL
UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. Every
lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes the
observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by
Imbang when he accepted the complainant's cases and received
attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
Imbang's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the
private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as Ramos'
counsel.
52.
53.
54.
 RENATO CAYETANO vs. CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS: 

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the

Comelec. The Commission on Appointments confirmed the appointment
despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged lack of the
required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this
certiorari and prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1,
Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years.

ISSUE: 

1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10
years.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave

abuse of discretion in confirming Monsod’s appointment.

HELD:

1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or

litigation in court. It embraces the preparation of pleadings and other
papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works
where the work done involves the determination of the trained legal mind
of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The records of
the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the
term practice of law was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the
Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of law provided that they
use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court
also cited an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star,
that lawyers nowadays have their own specialized fields such as tax
lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their
specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them.
These days, for example, most corporation lawyers are involved in
management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed the bar
in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then
worked for an investment bank till 1986, became member of the
CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide Commission
in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law
as lawyer-economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc. 

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the
Comelec Chairman by the president is mandated by the constitution.
The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion of whom it
is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should
possess the qualification required by law. From the evidence, there is no
occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since there is no such
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.

People v. Hon. Bonifacio Maceda

January 24, 2000

FACTS:

This case stems from denial by the SC of the People’s motion seeking
reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision holding that respondent
Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed no grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private
respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Antique RTC,
Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why Javellana
should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial court’s
order specifically provided for private respondent’s detention at the
residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private respondent was not to be
allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention prisoner
in said residence. It was howevere found that the order was not strictly
complied with because Javellana was not detained in the residence of
Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free
man, including engaging in the practice of law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not under preventive detention or serving final sentence can

not practice their profession nor engage in any business or occupation,
or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.

Held: 

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of

criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the
custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the
custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation “to hold and
detain” him in Atty. del Rosario’s residence in his official capacity as the
clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario
was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused
Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the
custodian under the same undertaking.

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he

is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual
restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the
pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to
be released on bail or on recognizance.  Let it be stressed that all
prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention.

OCA vs. Ladaga OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. ATTY.

MISAEL M. LADAGAA.M. No. P-99-1287 January 26, 2001
Facts:
Atty. Misael Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for
―Falsification of Public Documents before the METC of Quezon City. It is
also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was
without the previous permission of the Court. During the occasions that
the respondent appeared as such counsel before the METC of Quezon
City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge,
Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling.
Respondent appeared as pro bono counsel for his cousin -client Narcisa
Ladaga. Respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless
as she was and respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed
to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her. This is
the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his
family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the
purpose of settling the case amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge
was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of this,
during all the years that he has been in government service, he has
maintained his integrity and independence. He failed to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the
court to which respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department
contemplated by law.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Ladaga, upon such several appearances, was
engages into private practice? NO
Held:
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees which prohibits
civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A
similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules
of Court which disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private
practice of their profession.
Admission a. Legal ProfessionIn re: Cunanan Resolution Cunanan, et. al
18March1954
FACTS OF THE CASE:
In the manner of the petitions for Admission to the Bar of unsuccessful
candidates of 1946 to 1953; Albino Cunanan et. al petitioners. In recent
years few controversial issues have aroused so much public interest and
concern as R.A. 972 popularly known as the ―Bar Flunkers’ Act of
1953.‖ Generally a candidate is deemed passed if he obtains a general
ave of 75% in all subjects w/o falling below 50% in any subject, although
for the past few exams the passing grades were changed depending on
the strictness of the correcting of the bar examinations(1946- 72%,
1947- 69%, 1948- 70% 194974%, 1950-1953 – 75%). Believing
themselves to be fully qualified to practice law as those reconsidered and
passed by the S.C., and feeling that they have been discriminated
against, unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a few
percentages lower than those admitted to the bar went to congress for,
and secured in 1951 Senate Bill no. 12, but was vetoed by the president
after he was given advise adverse to it. Not overriding the veto, the senate
then approved senate bill no. 372 embodying substantially the provisions
of the vetoed bill. The bill then became law on June 21, 1953 Republic
Act 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar
those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials
and inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is contrary to public
interest since it qualifies 1,094 law graduates who had inadequate
preparation for the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their
failure in the exams.
ISSUES OF THE CASE:
Due to the far reaching effects that this law would have on the legal
profession and the administration of justice, the S.C. would seek to know
if it is CONSTITUTIONAL. - An adequate legal preparation is one of the
vital requisites for the practice of the law that should be developed
constantly and maintained firmly. - The Judicial system from which ours
has been derived, the act of admitting, suspending, disbarring, and
reinstating attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is
concededly judicial. - The Constitution, has not conferred on Congress
and the S.C. equal responsibilities concerning the admission to the
practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the
constitution recognizes continue to reside in this court. - Its retroactivity
is invalid in such a way, that what the law seeks to ―cure are not the
rules set in place by the S.C. but the lack of will or the defect in
judgment of the court, and this power is not included in the power
granted by the Const. to Congress, it lies exclusively w/in the judiciary. -
Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a manifest encroachment
on the constitutional responsibility of the Supreme Court.2. It is in effect
a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and only the S.C. may
revise or alter them, in attempting to do so R.A. 972 violated the
Constitution.3. That congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter,
and supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since the rules made
by congress must elevate the profession, and those rules promulgated
are considered the bare minimum.)4. It is a class legislation5. Art. 2 of
R.A. 972 is not embraced in the title of the law, contrary to what the
constitution enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of art. 1,
the entire law is void.
HELD:
Under the authority of the court: 1. That the portion of art. 1 of R.A. 972
referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952 and all of art. 2 of the said
law are unconstitutional and therefore void and w/o force and effect.2.
The part of ART 1 that
refers to the examinations subsequent to the approval of the law (1953-
1955) is valid and shall continue in force. (those petitions by the
candidates who failed the bar from 1946 to 1952are denied, and all the
candidates who in the examination of 1953 obtained a GEN Ave. of
71.5% w/o getting a grade of below 50% in any subject are considered as
having passed whether they have filed petitions for admissions or not.)

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts: 
Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien
Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in Tubao La Union, under
the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed

an application to take the 1998 Bar Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit
to the Court the following documents as proof of his Philippine
Citizenship:
1. Certification  issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a
certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that
Ching is a registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking
ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not
allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General  was required to file a comment on
Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and
continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 265 "an act providing for the manner in which
the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person
whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine
citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already be beyond the
"reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:
Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable
time".
Rulings:
1. No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine
citizenship within a reasonable time. The reasonable time means that the
election should be made within 3 years from  "upon reaching the age of
majority", which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine
citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the court
considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why
he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship, as procedure in electing
Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the
same with the nearest civil registry.
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE
HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR
DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A
BAR, 

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

B.M. No. 1154.  June 8, 2004

Facts:

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with

the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S.
Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose
on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his
Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending
criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cotabato City, namely:  Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for
Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No.  15687 for Less Serious
Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on

May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against
Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. 
Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife
causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title
“Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato
City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to the
Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the
appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed

his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal
cases filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez.  Believing in good faith that the case
would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and
involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.”  Moreover, Meling
denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve
moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word “Attorney” as they were,
according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC

disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against
him in his petition to take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous.  He
should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor.  In fact, the cases
filed against Meling are still pending.  Furthermore, granting arguendo
that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose
the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character.  Petitions
to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and should not be
taken lightly by an applicant.

Issue:
 
Whether or not the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling is proper and shall subsequently barred him from taking his
lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys

Held: 

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of

appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.  Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling
in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders
from the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the
Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the
same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Alawi v Alauya
January 31, 2016Thinker Bell

Facts:

Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of E.B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya
is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a
District in Marawi City, They were classmates, and used to be friends.

Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on

installments by Alauya of one of the housing units of Villarosa. In
connection, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National
Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of

Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the
company. He claimed that his consent was vitiated because Alawi had
resorted to gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse
of confidence. He laso wrote similar letters to the Vice President of
Villarosa and the Vice President of NHMFC.

On learning of Alauya’s letters, Alawi filed an administrative complaint

against him. One of her grounds was Alauya’s  usurpation of the title of
“attorney,” which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may
properly use.

Alauya justified his use of the title, “attorney,” by the assertion that it is
“lexically synonymous” with “Counsellors-at-law.” a title to which Shari’a
lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
“attorney” because “counsellor” is often mistaken for “councilor,”
“konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

Issue:

Whether or not Alauya, a member of the Shari’a bar, can use the title of
Attorney

Held:

He can’t. The title is only reserved to those who pass the regular
Philippine bar.

As regards Alauya’s use of the title of “Attorney,” this Court has already
had occasion to declare that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not
full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law
before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a
Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be
considered “counsellors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in
a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of
“attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree
in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have
been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized
to practice law in this jurisdiction

GRANDE v DA SILVA

FACTS:
 Emilio Grande is the private offended party (of estafa and BP 22)
against a certain Sergio Natividad, the client of Atty. De Silva
De Silva tendered a check to Grande as settlement of the civil
aspect of the case.
The check was returned with the notation that the ACCT CLOSED
 Grande filed a suit against De Silva for violation of BP 22 and
Estafa (sha naman ang nakasuhan tuloy hehe)
De Silva refused to comment on notices of complaints sent to her.
IBP recommended that de Silva be suspended for two years.

ISSUE:
WoN de Silva should be suspended?

HELD: YES

1.        The nature of the office of an atty requires that a lawyer shall be a

person of good moral character. Gross misconduct which puts the
lawyer’s moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to
continue in the practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. The loss of moral character of a
lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment.
2.        Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession,
whether it be professional or non-pro, justifies disciplinary action. For a
lawyer’s professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept
beyond reproach and above suspicion.
Her deliberate refusal to accept the notices served on her stains the
nobility of the profession. How else would a lawyer endeavor to serve
justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple
directives. Also, Canon 1 says that a lawyer shall uphold the consti, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for the legal processes.

In Re: Argosino B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

FACTS:
This is a matter for admission to the bar and oath taking of a successful
bar applicant. Argosino was previously involved with hazing that caused
the death of Raul Camaligan but was sentenced with homicide through
reckless imprudence after he pleaded guilty. He was sentenced with 2
years imprisonment where he applied for a probation thereafter which
was granted by the court with a 2 yr probation. He took the bar exam
and passed but was not allowed to take oath. He filed a petition to allow
him to take the attorney’s oath of office averring that his probation was
already terminated. The court note that he spent only 10 months of the
probation period before it was terminated.

ISSUE:
WON Argosino may take oath of office.

RULING:
The court upheld the principle of maintaining the good morals of all Bar
members, keeping in mind that such is of greater importance so far as
the general public and the proper administration of justice are
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Hence he was asked by
the court to produce evidence that would certify that he has reformed
and have become a responsible member of the community through
sworn statements of individuals who have a good reputation for truth
and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of
time to certify he is morally fit to the admission of the law profession.
The court also ordered that said a copy of the proceeding be furnished to
the family/relatives of Raul Camaligan.

TAPUCAR VS TAPUCAR

EN BANC[ A.C. No. 4148, July 30, 1998 ]

REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. LAURO L.

TAPUCAR, RESPONDENT

Facts:

 In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios

Ramirez Tapucar sought the disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L.
Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for
cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Peña under scandalous
circumstances.

Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged

four times for conduct unbecoming an officer of the court. in
Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent,
at that time the Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six
months suspension without pay, while in Administrative Matter Nos.
1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated, this Court on
January 31, 1981 ordered the separation from service of respondent.

Issue:

 Whether or not respondent violated canon 1 of the code of professional

responsibility

Ruling: 

 Yes.

 The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

 A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of

the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. Exacted from him, as a member of
the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the
defense of what is right, are such positive qualities of decency,
truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described
as “moral character.” To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at
all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession, and thus
improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the
administration of justice.

GARRIDO vs. GARRIDO

 Facts:
The petitioner, the respondent’s legal wife, filed a complaint-affidavit and
a supplemental affidavit for disbarment against the respondents Atty.
Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P. Valencia before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines Committee on Discipline, charging them with gross
immorality, in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The complaint arose after the petitioner
caught wind through her daughter that her husband was having an
affair with a woman other than his wife and already had a child
with her; and the same information was confirmed when one of
her daughters saw that her husband walking in a Robinsons mall
with the other respondent, Atty. Valencia, with their child in
tow. After a much further investigation into the matter, the time and eff
ort given yielded results telling her that Atty. Valencia and her legal
husband had been married in Hong Kong. Moreover, on June 1993, her
husband left their conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia at their residence, and has since failed to render much needed
financial support. In their defense, they postulated that they were not
lawyers as of yet when they committed the supposed immorality, so
as such, they were not guilty of a violation of Canon1, Rule 1.01.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Garrido’s and Valencia’s actions constitute a
violation of Canon 1, Rule1.01 and thus a good enough cause for their
disbarment, despite the offense being supposedly committed when
they were not lawyers.
Held:
Yes. Membership in the Bar is a privilege, and as a privilege
bestowed by law through the Supreme Court, membership in the
Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances show the lawyer’s lack
of the essential qualifications required of lawyers, be they academic or
moral. In the present case, the Court had resolved to withdraw this
privilege from Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for the
reason of their blatant violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which commands that  a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Furthermore, The contention of respondent that they were not yet
lawyers when they got married shall not afford them exemption from
sanctions; good moral character was already required as a
condition precedent to admission to the
Bar. As a lawyer, a person whom the community looked up to, Atty. Gar
rido and Valencia wereshouldered with the expectation that they would
set a good example in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the
laws. When they violated the law and distorted it to cater to his own
personal needs and selfish motives, not only did their actions discredit
the legal profession. Such actions by themselves, without even including
the fact of Garrido’s abandonment of paternal responsibility, to the
detriment of his children by the petitioner; or the fact that Valencia
married Garrido despite knowing of his other marriages to two
other women including the petitioner, are clear indications of a lack of
moral values not consistent with the proper conduct of practicing
lawyers within the country. As such, their disbarment is affirmed.

Cruz v. Mijares

FACTS:
 
Ferdinand A. Cruz was the plaintiff in a civil case for Abatement of
Nuisance pending in the sala of respondent judge.
 
He sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf.
 
Claim anchored on Sec. 34, Rule 138: a non- lawyer may appear before
any court and conduct his litigation personally.
 
During the pre-trial, Judge Mijares required petitioner to secure written
permission from the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to
appear as counsel for himself.
 
Counsel for the defendant filed a motion to dismiss.
 
Petitioner objected, alleging that an MTD is not allowed after the
Answer has been filed.
 
Respondent judge remarked, “Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa
Huwes. Ok?”
 
Petitioner filed a manifestation and motion to inhibit: there was partiality
on the part of respondent judge as can be seen from her contumacious
remarks.
 
Motion denied. MR denied.
 
Cruz’s appearance was also denied as he failed to submit the document
required by Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.
 
MR: basis of his appearance was Rule 138, Sec. 34, not Rule 138-A.
 
138-applicable to any non-lawyer;
 
138-A–specifically for law students.
 
MR denied, still invoking Rule 138-A.
 
Hence, this petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

ISSUES:
Does the SC have jurisdiction to entertain the petition? 

HELD:
YES.
SC has concurrent jurisdiction with RTC and CA to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and injunction.
 
This concurrence does not mean that the petitioner has absolute
freedom to choose where the petition will be filed.
 
Still has to give due regard to the judicial hierarchy.
 
Thus, petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against RTCs
should be filed with the CA.
 
Only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons may the SC take
cognizance of petitions directly filed before it.
 
SC assumes jurisdiction over this petition as it concerns the
interpretation of Sec. 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court.
 
Petitioner is cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly with
the SC.

What rule applies in the case of petitioner, Rule 138 or 138-A? 

 
Rule 138.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs LEONCIO SANTOCILDES,

JR.QUISUMBING,

Facts:
On February 17, 1992, appellant was charged with the crime of rape of a
girl less than nine (9) years old, committed on December 28, 1991, in the
town of Barangay San Luis, San Joaquin, Iloilo. Upon arraignment,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty. Trial ensued and the prosecution
presented as its witnesses the victim, her mother, her six (6) year-old
playmate, and the medico-legal officer who examined the victim. The
Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
together its accessory penalty. Appellant contends that he was
represented during trial by a person named Gualberto C. Ompong, who
for all intents and purposes acted as his counsel and even conducted the
direct examination and cross-examinations of the witnesses. On appeal,
however, appellant secured the services of a new lawyer, Atty. Igmedio S.
Prado, Jr., who discovered that Gualberto C. Ompong is actually not a
member of the bar. Further verification with the Office of the
Bar Confidant confirmed this fact.
Appellant therefore argues that his deprivation of the right to counsel
should necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime charged.

Issue:
Is the petitioner entitled to a new trial?

Held:
“This is so because an accused person is entitled to be represented by
a member of the bar in a criminal case filed against her before the
Regional Trial Court. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is
great danger that any defense presented in her behalf will be inadequate
considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. This would certainly be a denial of due process.”
 Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without
counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. The right of an accused to
counsel is guaranteed to minimize the imbalance in the adversarial
system where the accused is pitted against the awesome prosecutory
machinery of the State. Such a right proceeds from the fundamental
principle of due process which basically means that a person must
be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part
of a person’s basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be
dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.

Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), Enrique Entila and

Victoriano Tenazas vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Company, Court of
Industrial Relations and Quintin Muning

FACTS:
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS ORDERED REINSTATEMENT
WITH BACKWAGES FOR ENTILA AND TENAZAS.
Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of Entila and Tenazas filed a notice of
attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages.
                                      i.     Entila and Tenazas filed manifestation indicating their
non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages
                                     ii.     Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of
Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
Opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a
lawyer.
a.    Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the backwages as
compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned
as follows:
                                                                 i.     Cipriano               10%
                                                                ii.     Quintin Muning      10%
                                                              iii.     Atanacio Pacis       5%

                                   iii.     CANON 34: condemns an agreement providing for the

division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is
allowed to share in said fees with lawyers
Sec 5(b) of RA 875 that —No justification for a ruling, that the person
representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even
if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to attorney's fees
a.    Duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to examine and
cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the
orderly presentation of evidence.
b.   Representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified
members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member does not entitle the representative to
compensation for such representation.
Sec 24, Rule 138 Compensation of attorney's agreement as to fees:
                                      i.     An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from
his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services.

a.    Petition to take the Bar Exam in 1960 after failing in the 1959 Bar
Examination.
b.   His uncle, TAPEL, opposed the petition alleging that his nephew is not a
person of good moral character for having misrepresented, sometime in
1950, when he was 16 years old, that he was eligible for 3 rd year high
 school by utilizing the school records of his cousin and name-sake, Juan
M. Publico.
                                     ii.     PUBLICO has not completed Grade 4
                                   iii.     Tapel instituted an administrative case against his
nephew for falsification of school records or credentials.
PUBLICO PASSED THE BAR, took the lawyer's oath, and signed the Roll
of Attorneys.
Legal Officer-Investigator, Ricardo Paras, Jr., investigated and reported:
September 1961, Dulcisimo Tapel dropped the complaint on the ground
that his witnesses had turned hostile.
                                      i.     Motion denied, his witnesses had already testified.
Recommended PUBLICO’s name to be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
                                      i.     Respondent falsified his school records
                                     ii.     Thereby violating the provisions of Sections 5 and 6,
Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, which require completion by a bar
examinee or candidate of the prescribed courses in elementary, high,
pre-law and law school, prior to his admission to the practice of law.
11 years later, PUBLICO filed a Petition for Reinstatement alleging that
he had never received, for had he been informed, nor did he have any
knowledge of the Resolution of the Court ordering the Bar Division to
strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
He was advised to inquire into the outcome of the disbarment case
against him.
He resigned from all his positions in public and private offices, and
transferred to Manila.
Prayed that Court allow reinstatement taking into consideration his
exemplary conduct from the time he became a lawyer, his services to the
community the numerous awards, resolutions and/'or commendations
he received,
                                      i.     Court denied the Petition.
                                     ii.     Petitioner moved for reconsideration was denied by the
Court for lack of merit.
5th plea avers that his enrollment in Third Year High School in Manila
was through the initiative of his uncle, Dulcisimo B. Tapel who
accompanied him to school and enrolled him in a grade level above his
qualifications in spite of his demonstrations
                                      i.     Misrepresentation committed was precipitated by his
uncle; that being merely 16 year old, he could not be expected to act with
discernment as he was still under the influence of his uncle, who later
on caused his disbarment
                                     ii.     No opposition has been filed to any of the petitions.

ISSUE:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to
the order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.

WON a union may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are

deductible from the backpay of some of its members. YES.
It was PAFLU that moved for an extension of time to file the
present petition for review; union members Entila and Tenazas did not
ask for extension but they were included as petitioners in the present
petition. Their inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.

HELD:
 ORDERS UNDER REVIEW ARE SET ASIDE AS THEY ARE AWARDED
10% OF BACKWAGES AS ATTORNEY’S FEES FOR MUNING. COSTS
AGAINST MUNING.
1. Lawyer-client relationship is only possible if one is a lawyer. Since
respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client
relationship with Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU,
and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees.
2. Public policy demands that legal work in representation of parties litigant
should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications, for
the ethics of the profession and for the protection of courts, clients and
the public.
3. The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated:
1. Acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of court,
which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,
2. Law will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an
act done in violation of law
3. If were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in hopeless
confusion as to whom to consult in case of necessity and also leave the
bar in a chaotic condition, aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not
amenable to disciplinary measures.
4. In response to UNION may appeal an award of attorney's fees which are
deductible from the backpay of some of its members:
1. YES because such union or labor organization is permitted to institute
an action in the industrial court on behalf of its members
2. If an award is disadvantageous to its members, the union may prosecute
an appeal as an aggrieved party, under Sec 6, RA 875:
                                      i.     Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any
person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to the Supreme
Court of the Philippines.
3. Usually, individual unionist is not in a position to bear the financial
burden of litigations.

Five J Taxi and Juan Armamento v. NLRC, DomingoMaldigan and Gilberto

Sabsalon
G.R. No. 111474. August 22, 1994
Facts:
Maldigan and Sabsalon were hired by the Five J Taxi as taxi
driver. Nov. 1987 and June 1979, respectively.
a. They worked for 4 days weekly
o n   a   2 4 h o u r shifting schedule.
b. Aside from the daily “boundary” of P700.00 for
air-co n d i t i o n e d   t a x i   o r   P 4 5 0 . 0 0   f o r  
n o n - a i r - conditioned taxi, they were also
required to pay P 2 0 . 0 0 f o r c a r w a s h i n g , a n d
t o f u r t h e r m a k e a P 1 5 . 0 0 deposit to answer for
any defiency in their “boundary,” for every
actual working day.
Subsequently, in less than 4 months after he was hired,
Maldigan failed to report to work for unknown reasons.
Sabsalon was held up by his armed passenger who took all
his money and stabbed him. He was hospitalized and a f t e r
h i s   d i s c h a r g e ,   h e   w e n t   t o   h i s h o m e   p r o v i n c e t o recuperate.
While Sabsalon was re-admitted to work by Five J Taxi, he was
only required to work every other day. However, on several instances, he
also failed to report for work during his schedule. Despite repeated
requests for him to report to work, he refused.
In 1989, Maldigan requested Five J Taxi f
o r   t h e reimbursement of his daily cash deposits for 2 years, but
they told him that nothing was left of his de posits as these were
not even enough to cover the amount spent f o r t h e r e p a i r s o f   t h e
t a x i h e   w a s   d r i v i n g .   T h i s   w a s allegedly the practice adopted
by Five J Taxi to recou p the expenses incurred in the repair of their
taxicab units. When Maldigan insisted on the refund of his
deposit, petitioners terminated his services.
Sabsalon, on his part, claimed that his termination from
employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his
taxi seat covers.
Maldigan and Sabsalon then filed a complaint
with the NLRC
for illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.
Comlaint was dismissed.
a. The filing of the case was a mere
a f t e r t h o u g h t since it took them two years to file the
same. Such delay is unreasonable.
b. It was also discovered that Maldigan was
working for another taxi company called “Mine
of Gold” and that Sabsalon was driving a taxi for
“Bulaklak Company.” Both of them failed to controvert
the evidence showing this and that
they voluntarily left their jobs.
c. However, ordered Five J Taxi and
Armamento to pay Maldigan
a n d   S a b s a l o n   t h e i r accumulated deposits and car
wash payments.
Is s u e :
Whether or Not Maldigan and Sabsalon’s deposits and car
wash payments should be refunded.

Held:
YES.
1.NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by
respondents to defray any shortage in their “boundary” is covered by
the general prohibition in LC 114 against requiring employees to
make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor
has recognized the same as a “practice” in the taxi industry. Therefore,
t h e   d e p o s i t s   m a d e   w e r e   i l l e g a l   a n d   t h e   r e s p o n d e n t s must be
refunded.
2. It can be deduced that the LC114 provides the rule on
deposits for loss or damage to tools, materials or
equipment supplied by the employer. Clearly the same does not
apply to or permit deposits not to defray any
deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the
remittance of his “boundary.”
3.
Furthermore, when Maldigan and Sabsalon stopped
working for Five J Taxi, the alleged purpose for which the deposits were
required no longer existed. As such, any
balance due to private respondents after proper
accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.
G.R. No. 126625 September 18, 1997

KANLAON CONSTRUCTION ENTERPRISES CO., INC., petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, 5TH DIVISION, and
BENJAMIN RELUYA, JR., EDGARDO GENAYAS, ERNESTO CANETE,
PROTACIO ROSALES, NESTOR BENOYA, RODOLFO GONGOB, DARIO
BINOYA, BENJAMIN BASMAYOR, ABELARDO SACURA, FLORENCIO
SACURA, ISABELO MIRA, NEMESIO LACAR, JOSEPH CABIGKIS,
RODRIGO CILLON, VIRGILIO QUIZON, GUARINO EVANGELISTA,
ALEJANDRO GATA, BENEDICTO CALAGO, NILO GATA, DIONISIO
PERMACIO, JUANITO SALUD, ADOR RIMPO, FELIPE ORAEZ, JULIETO
TEJADA, TEOTIMO LACIO, ONOFRE QUIZON, RUDY ALVAREZ,
CRESENCIO FLORES, ALFREDO PERMACIO, CRESENCIO ALVIAR,
HERNANI SURILLA, DIOSDADO SOLON, CENON ALBURO, ZACARIAS
ORTIZ, EUSEBIO BUSTILLO, GREGORIO BAGO, JERRY VARGAS,
EDUARDO BUENO, PASCUAL HUDAYA, ROGELIO NIETES, and
REYNALDO NIETES, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the construction

business nationwide with principal office at No. 11 Yakan St., La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City. In 1988, petitioner was contracted by the
National Steel Corporation to construct residential houses for its plant
employees in Steeltown, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. Private respondents were
hired by petitioner as laborers in the project and worked under the
supervision of Engineers Paulino Estacio and Mario Dulatre. In 1989, the
project neared its completion and petitioner started terminating the
services of private respondents and its other employees.

In 1990, private respondents filed separate complaints against petitioner

before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch XII, Iligan City. Numbering forty-
one (41) in all, they claimed that petitioner paid them wages below the
minimum and sought payment of their salary differentials and
thirteenth-month pay. Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were named co-
respondents.

The preliminary conferences before the labor arbiters were attended by

Engineers Estacio and Dulatre and private respondents. At the
conference of June 11, 1990 before Arbiter Siao, Engineer Estacio
admitted petitioner’s liability to private respondents and agreed to pay
their wage differentials and thirteenth-month pay on June 19, 1990. As a
result of this agreement, Engineer Estacio allegedly waived petitioner’s
right to file its position paper. 1 Private respondents declared that they,
too, were dispensing with their position papers and were adopting their
complaints as their position paper.

Extension was denied by the LA Siao and ordered the employer company
to pay the employees.

Petitioner appealed to respondent National Labor Relations Commission.

It alleged that it was denied due process and that Engineers Estacio and
Dulatre had no authority to represent and bind petitioner.
NLRC affirmed the decisions of the Labor Arbiters.

RULING:

It has been established that petitioner is a private domestic corporation

with principal address in Quezon City. The complaints against petitioner
were filed in Iligan City and summons served on Engineer Estacio in
Iligan City. The question now is whether Engineer Estacio was an agent
and authorized representative of petitioner.

Under the Revised Rules of Court, 7 service upon a private domestic

corporation or partnership must be made upon its officers, such as the
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors.
These persons are deemed so integrated with the corporation that they
know their responsibilities and immediately discern what to do with any
legal papers served on them.

In the case at bar, Engineer Estacio, assisted by Engineer Dulatre,

managed and supervised the construction project. 9 According to the
Solicitor General and private respondents, Engineer Estacio attended to
the project in Iligan City and supervised the work of the employees
thereat. As manager, he had sufficient responsibility and discretion to
realize the importance of the legal papers served on him and to relay the
same to the president or other responsible officer of petitioner. Summons
for petitioner was therefore validly served on him.

Engineer Estacio’s appearance before the labor arbiters and his promise
to settle the claims of private respondents is another matter.

The general rule is that only lawyers are allowed to appear before the
labor arbiter and respondent Commission in cases before them. The
Labor Code and the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, nonetheless,
lists three (3) exceptions to the rule, viz:

Sec. 6. Appearances. — . . . .

A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter

only if:
(a) he represents himself as party to the case;
(b) he represents the organization or its members, provided that he shall
be made to present written proof that he is properly authorized; or
(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized
by the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
cases referred thereto by the latter. . . . 10

A non-lawyer may appear before the labor arbiters and the NLRC only if:
(a) he represents himself as a party to the case; (b) he represents an
organization or its members, with written authorization from them: or (c)
he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by
the Department of Justice or the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in
cases referred to by the latter. 11
Engineers Estacio and Dulatre were not lawyers. Neither were they duly-
accredited members of a legal aid office. Their appearance before the
labor arbiters in their capacity as parties to the cases was authorized
under the first exception to the rule. However, their appearance on
behalf of petitioner required written proof of authorization. It was
incumbent upon the arbiters to ascertain this authority especially since
both engineers were named co-respondents in the cases before the
arbiters. Absent this authority, whatever statements and declarations
Engineer Estacio made before the arbiters could not bind petitioner.

Nevertheless, even assuming that Engineer Estacio and Atty. Abundiente

were authorized to appear as representatives of petitioner, they could
bind the latter only in procedural matters before the arbiters and
respondent Commission. Petitioner’s liability arose from Engineer
Estacio’s alleged promise to pay. A promise to pay amounts to an offer to
compromise and requires a special power of attorney or the express
consent of petitioner. The authority to compromise cannot be lightly
presumed and should be duly established by evidence.

Sec. 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of

parties shall have authority to bind their clients in all matters of
procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or
express consent, enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing
party in full or partial discharge of a client’s claim.

After petitioner’s alleged representative failed to pay the workers’ claims

as promised, Labor Arbiters Siao and Palangan did not order the parties
to file their respective position papers. The arbiters forthwith rendered a
decision on the merits without at least requiring private respondents to
substantiate their complaints. The parties may have earlier waived their
right to file position papers but petitioner’s waiver was made by Engineer
Estacio on the premise that petitioner shall have paid and settled the
claims of private respondents at the scheduled conference. Since
petitioner reneged on its “promise,” there was a failure to settle the case
amicably. This should have prompted the arbiters to order the parties to
file their position papers.

Sec. 3. Submission of Position Papers/Memorandum. — Should the

parties fail to agree upon an amicable settlement, in whole or in part,
during the conferences, the Labor Arbiter shall issue an order stating
therein the matters taken up and agreed upon during the conferences
and directing the parties to simultaneously file their respective verified
position papers.

VARGAS vs. IGNES

FACTS:
Apr 16, 2007-
Atty. Michael Ignes was hired by Koronadal Water District (KWD) as private legal
counsel for one year; the Office of Gov’t. Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and
Commission on Audit (COA) consented
Dec. 28, 2006
- Dela Pena (DP) Board filed a case to annul the appointment of two
directors who will allegedly connive with Director Allan Yapchockun who
is against the present Board of Directors (the Dela Pena Board)
 Jan. 18, 2007
- DP Board appointed respondents Atty. Rodolfo U. Viajar, Jr. And Atty.
Buentipo Mann as private counsels for all cases of KWD and its Board of
Directors, under Atty. Ignes’s supervision
Feb. 9 and 19-
they filed cases “KWD represented by Gen. Manager Eleanor Pimentel-
Gomba vs Efren V Cabucay” and “KWD vs. Rey J. Vargas”
Feb. 16, 2007
- OGCC approved retainership contract of Atty. Benjamin Cunanan as
new legal counsel of KWD and stated that the retainership contract of
Ignes had expired on Jan.14, 2007
March 2, 2007
- OGCC addressed Eleanor P. Gomba’s insistence that the retainership
contract of Atty. Ignes will expire on April 17, 2007. The OGCC stated
that as stipulated, the KWD or OGCC may terminate the contract
anytime without need of judicial action; that OGCC’s grant of authority
to private counsels is a privilege withdrawable under justifiable
circumstances; and that the termination of Atty. Ignes’s contract was
justified by the fact that the Local Water Utilities Administration had
confirmed the Yaphockun board as the new Board of Directors of KWD
and that said board had terminated Atty. Ignes’s services and requested
to hire another counsel. Alleging that respondents acted as counsel
for KWD without legal authority, complainants filed a disbarment
complaint against the respondents before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline-Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge
against Atty. Ignes be dismissed for lack of merit. The Investigating
Commissioner held that Atty. Ignes had valid authority as counsel of
KWD for one (1) year, from April 2006 to April 2007, and he was
unaware of the pre-termination of his contract when he filed pleadings-
IBP Board of Governors reversed the recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner and dismissed the case for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
did the IBP Board of Governors err in dismissing the case? Are the
respondents liable for appearing as attorneys for a party to a case
without authority to do so?
HELD/RATIONALE:
 Yes, the IBP Board of Governors erred in dismissing the case; and YES,
the respondents are administratively liable. Section 10, Chapter 3, Title
III, Book IV of the Admin Code of 1987 says that the OGCC shall act as
the principal law office of all Government Owned and Controlled
Corporations(GOCCs); Sec. 3 of Memo Circular No. 9: in exceptional
cases, the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General
or the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be, and the
written concurrence of the COA shall first be secured before the hiring or
employment of a private lawyer or law firm.-Attys. Nadua, Viajar, Jr. and
Mann had no valid authority to appear as collaborating counsels of KWD
in SCA Case No. 50-24 and Civil Case No. 1799. Nothing in the records
shows that Atty. Nadua was engaged by KWD as collaborating counsel.-
In the case of Attys. Viajar, Jr. and Mann, their appointment as
collaborating counsels of KWD under Resolution No. 009 has no
approval from the OGCC and COA.-In the case of Atty. Ignes, he also
appeared as counsel of KWD without authority, after his authority as its
counsel had expired. True, the OGCC and COA approved his retainership
contract for one (1) year effective April 17, 2006. But even if we assume
as true that he was not notified of the pre-termination of his contract,
the records still disprove his claim that he stopped representing KWD
after April 17, 2007

Sps.Agbulos vs. Gutierrez, GR No. 176530, June 16, 2009

FACTS:
On October 16, 1997, respondents, Dr. Nicasio G. Gutierrez, Josefa
Gutierrez de Mendoza and Elena G. Garcia, through their counsel, Atty.
Adriano B. Magbitang, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan,
Nueva Ecija, a complaint against petitioners, spouses Constante Agbulos
and Zenaida Padilla Agbulos, for declaration of nullity of contract,
cancellation of title, reconveyance and damages. The complaint alleged
that respondents inherited from their father, Maximo Gutierrez, an eight-
hectare parcel of land located in Callos, Penaranda, Nueva Ecija, covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. NT-123790 in the name of
Maximo Gutierrez. Through fraud and deceit, petitioners succeeded in
making it appear that Maximo Gutierrez executed a Deed of Sale on July
21, 1978 when, in truth, he died on April 25, 1977. As a result, TCT No.
NT-123790 was cancelled and a new one, TCT No. NT-188664, was
issued in the name of petitioners. Based on the notation at the back of
the certificate of title, portions of the property were brought under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and awarded to Lorna
Padilla, Elenita Nuega and Suzette Nuega who were issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award (CLOAs).

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in not dismissing the
appeal despite the undisputed fact that Atty. Magbitang filed
the notice of appeal without respondents knowledge and
consent;
 
2. Whether or not the CA erred in giving due course to
the appeal despite the fact that Atty. Magbitangs appellants
brief failed to comply with the mandatory requirements of
Section 13, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court regarding the
contents of an appellants brief; and
 
3. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the RTC
(Regional Trial Court), not the DARAB (Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board) or the PARAD/RARAD
(Provincial/Regional Agrarian Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator), has jurisdiction over respondents complaint.

HELD:
 The CA did not err in giving due course to the appeal, on both
procedural and substantive grounds.
 
A lawyer who represents a client before the trial court is presumed
to represent such client before the appellate court. Section 22 of Rule
138 creates this presumption, thus:
 
SEC. 22. Attorney who appears in lower court
presumed to represent client on appeal. An attorney who
appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be
presumed to continue representing his client on appeal,
unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance
in the appellate court.
 
 
A reading of respondent Elena Garcias letter to the RTC would
show that she did not actually withdraw Atty. Magbitangs authority to
represent respondents in the case. The letter merely stated that there
was, as yet, no agreement that they would pursue an appeal.
 
In any case, an unauthorized appearance of an attorney may be
ratified by the client either expressly or impliedly. Ratification retroacts
to the date of the lawyers first appearance and validates the action taken
by him. Implied ratification may take various forms, such as by
silence or acquiescence, or by acceptance and retention of benefits
flowing therefrom.  Respondents silence or lack of remonstration when
the case was finally elevated to the CA means that they have acquiesced
to the filing of the appeal.
 
Moreover, a lawyer is mandated to serve his client with
competence and diligence. Consequently, a lawyer is entreated not to
neglect a legal matter entrusted to him; otherwise, his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable. In light of such mandate,
Atty. Magbitangs act of filing the notice of appeal without waiting for her
clients to direct him to do so was understandable, if not commendable.
 
The CA was likewise correct in holding that the case is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC, not the DARAB.
 
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must be a
tenancy relationship between the parties.  It is, therefore, essential to
establish all the indispensable elements of a tenancy relationship, to wit:
(1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural
land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship; (4)
that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant
or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
 
Basic is the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations
in the complaint. Respondents complaint did not contain any allegation
that would, even in the slightest, imply that there was a tenancy relation
between them and the petitioners. We are in full agreement with the
following findings of the CA on this point:
 
x x x A reading of the material averments of the complaint
reveals that the principal relief sought by plaintiffs-
appellants is for the nullification of the supposedly forged
deed of sale which resulted in the issuance of TCT No. NT-
188664 covering their 8-hectare property as well as its
reconveyance, and not for the cancellation of CLOAs as
claimed by defendants-appellees. Moreover, the parties
herein have no tenurial, leasehold, or any other agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this
controversy under the ambit of the agrarian reform laws.
Neither were the CLOA awardees impleaded as parties in this
case nor the latters entitlement thereto questioned. Hence,
contrary to the findings of the RTC, the herein dispute is
purely civil and not agrarian in nature falling within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the trial courts.
 
 
On the alleged deficiency of the appellants brief filed before the CA
by the respondents, suffice it to state that the requirements in Section
13, Rule 44 are intended to aid the appellate court in arriving at a just
and proper resolution of the case. Obviously, the CA found the
appellants brief sufficient in form and substance as the appellate court
was able to arrive at a just decision. We have repeatedly held that
technical and procedural rules are intended to help secure, not to
suppress, substantial justice. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the
rules may, thus, be allowed in order to attain this prime objective for,
after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of
courts.

Manangan vs. CFI, GR No. 82760, Aug. 30, 1990; Lapena 2009

FACTS: On 7 November 1977, petitioner, representing himself as a

lawyer, was appointed Legal Officer I of the Bureau of Lands in Region II
(p. 98, Rollo).

On 30 June 1978, Criminal Case No. 639 entitled "People v. Filemon

Manangan alias Andres Culanag" (Annex D, Petition, Rollo, UDK 3906, p.
20) was filed before the then Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya,
First Judicial District, Bayombong, charging petitioner with "Execution
of Deeds by Intimidation" under Article 298 of the Revised Penal Code
(the Criminal Case, for short). Apparently, the Director of Lands had
given his imprimatur to the charge.

On the same date, an Order of Arrest was issued by then Judge Gabriel
Dunuan of respondent Court (Rollo, UDK 3906, p. 21).

On 18 April 1979, petitioner filed before this Court a Petition

for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus with Writ of Preliminary
Injunction entitled "Filemon de Asis Manangan v. Court of First Instance,
et al.," in UDK No. 3906, assailing the jurisdiction of respondent Court
to try the criminal case and seeking to stay the Order of Arrest of 30
June 1978. The petition was dismissed on 7 May 1979 for non-payment
of legal fees (p. 99, Rollo).

On 10 and 18 July 1978, the dates set for preliminary investigation,

petitioner did not show up and, in fact, disappeared for about a year.

On 31 July 1978, a Second Amended Information was filed (Comment,

Solicitor General, p. 61, Rollo), this time Identifying the accused as
"Andres Culanag (alias Andres M. Culanag, Filemon Manangan Atty.
Filemon A. Manangan and Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan)."

On 8 July 1979, petitioner surfaced and, through counsel, posted a

bailbond with the Municipal Circuit Court of San Miguel, Zamboanga del
Sur (Resolution of the RTC, Nueva Vizcaya, 25 March 1983, Annex B,
Petition, p. 2).

On 19 July 1979, an Alias Warrant of Arrest was by Judge Gabriel

Dunuan. It is this Alias Warrant that is challenged herein.

On 12 September 1979, petitioner filed an ex-parte Motion to Dismiss

the Criminal Case, which was denied by respondent Court (see CA-G.R.
No. 11588-SP, p. 2).

Petitioner then resorted to a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus before

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 11588-SP entitled "Filemon
Manangan v. Director of Lands and CFI of Nueva Vizcaya." The Petition
sought to (1) nullify the decision of the Director of Lands, dated 27
March 1980, finding petitioner guilty of extortion, impersonation and
abandonment of office and ordering his dismissal from the service; and
(2) "require respondent CFI of Nueva Ecija to dismiss Criminal Case No.
639 pending in its Court." In a Decision, promulgated on 27 February
1981, the Appellate Court dismissed the Petition for "absolute lack of
legal and factual basis" and holding, among others, that "the non-
withdrawal of the Information for execution of deeds by intimidation . . .
is not covered by mandamus" (hereinafter, the German Decision).

On 30 October 1981, before respondent Court, a Motion for

Reconsideration was filed by petitioner, ostensibly through counsel, Atty.
Benjamin Facun, asking that the Criminal Case be dismissed on the
ground that the accused had already died on 29 September 1971 such
that respondent Court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person. The
Motion was denied.
On 22 February 1982, erroneously construing the German Decision as a
final judgment of conviction, respondent Court reset the promulgation to
19 April 1982 and ordered the bondsmen to produce the body of the
accused on said date (Annex A, Petition). Realizing the mistake, on 9
July 1982, respondent Court vacated said order and ruled that "the
warrant of arrest issued by this Court through Judge Gabriel Dunuan on
19 July 1979, shall remain in full force and effect" (Annex F, Petition).

On 25 June 1982, petitioner again resorted to the Court of Appeals in

another Petition for Certiorari (CA-G.R. No. SP-14428) filed by one Atty.
Benjamin Facun as counsel for petitioner, this time praying for the
annulment of the proceedings in the Criminal Case "on the ground that
the accused was already dead when the decision finding him guilty of the
crime . . . was rendered." The pleading alleged "that petitioner is of age,
Filipino, deceased, but has come to this Honorable Court through
counsel. . . ." In a Decision promulgated on 29 November 1982, Certiorari
was denied for being devoid of merit inasmuch as "there is nothing on
record to show that such dismissal had been sought before the decision
was rendered" (briefly, the Kapunan Decision). (Actually, no judgment
has been rendered by respondent Court).

Unfazed by the adverse Kapunan Decision, the supposed heirs of the

accused, on 10 February 1983, filed a Manifestation before respondent
Court asking for the dismissal and termination of the Criminal Case on
the same ground that the accused had allegedly died.

On 25 March 1983, Judge Quirino A. Catral of respondent Court refused

to declare the case closed and terminated inasmuch as the accused was
alive on 8 July 1979 when he posted his bailbond (citing the Kapunan
Decision) and reiterated that the "alias warrant issued by the Court on
July 19, 1979 which up to the present has not yet been served upon the
accused as in full force and effect."

For the third time, the case was elevated to the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. SP-00707, entitled "Heirs of the Deceased
Filemon Manangan v. Hon. Quirino A. Catral, etc." The Petition sought to
annul the Order of Judge Catral of 25 March 1983 denying the closure
and termination of the Criminal Case.

On 28 May 1983, the then IAC, after quoting at length from the Kapunan
Decision and the Catral Order, dismissed the Petition (hereinafter, the
Aquino Decision) holding, inter alia, that "whether or not its denial of the
motion to dismiss that case constitutes a grave abuse of discretion, was
already passed upon by this Court in CA-G.R. No. SP-14428 (Kapunan
Decision), hence, it is res adjudicata. It may not be litigated anew, no
matter what form the action for that purpose may take."

On 28 June 1984, before the respondent Court, petitioner-accused filed

an Omnibus Motion with Motion for New Trial, which was denied for lack
of merit in the Order of 19 November 1984. In the same Order,
respondent Court ordered the case archived until such time that the
accused is brought to the Court.

On 19 June 1986, counsel for petitioner-accused filed a Motion to Quash

on the grounds that: "(1) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged or the person of the accused; and (2) the
accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted
of the offense charged."

ISSUES:
Whether or not He is guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation
and highly improper conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct,
degrade, and make a mockery of the administration of justice.
HELD:

In the German Decision, it was additionally pointed out that petitioner

had also committed imprisonation when, representing himself as Atty.
Ross V. Pangilinan, he filed a petition with this Court praying that his
right to practice law be affirmed (Misc. Bar-I and Misc. Bar-2). In those
cases, we ruled that petitioner Filemon Manangan is "really Andres
Culanag, an impostor;" dismissed the petitions; and directed Andres
Culanag to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt for
filing the two false petitions (In re: Andres Culanag, September 30, 1971,
41 SCRA 26). He explained that "he thought this Court would not
discover that he is a poseur, for which reason he apologizes to the Court
promising that he would not commit the same act if he is excused and
given another chance." On 12 November 1971, after finding his
explanation unsatisfactory, we adjudged him guilty of indirect contempt
of Court under Rule 71, Section 3(e) of the Rules of Court and sentenced
him to suffer imprisonment for six (6) months.

Parenthetically, we also take judicial notice of Bar Matter No. 190,

entitled "In Re Andres Culanag alias Atty. Ross V. Pangilinan" and Bar
Matter No. 206, entitled "Eriberto H. Decena vs. Andres Culanag"
wherein, on 9 October 1984, this Court Resolved "to direct that petitioner
be subjected to mental examination by a doctor from the National Mental
Hospital" after noting that petitioner was suffering from some kind of
mental alienation. This mitigates somewhat petitioner's present liability
for contempt.

It is the height of chicanery, indeed, that despite the foregoing

antecedents, petitioner still has the gall to claim that he is, in truth and
in fact, Filemon Manangan. The evidence on hand, without need for
more, and with petitioner having been sufficiently heard, amply
establishes that petitioner Filemon Manangan, is an impostor. He is
guilty of continued fraudulent misrepresentation and highly improper
conduct tending directly to impede, obstruct, degrade, and make a
mockery of the administration of justice (Rule 71, Sec. 3 [d]).

While it may be that some pronouncements in the pertinent decisions

allude to Filemon Manangan and that Andres Culanag is just an alias of
Filemon Manangan, those statements actually refer to the person of
Andres Culanag and not to the real Filemon Manangan, long since dead.

The action for contempt has not prescribed since it is apparent that the
contumacious acts continue to this day.

Lemoine vs. Atty. Balon Jr., AC No. 5829, Oct 28, 2003
FACTS:
Lemoine, the petitioner, is a French national who
f i l e d   a n   i n s u r a n c e c l a i m   w i t h Metropolitan Insurance.
His friend, Jesus Garcia, arranged for the engagement of Atty. Balon’s
services as his counsel
Balon advised Lemoine that he was charging 25% of
the actual amount to being recovered payable upon successful
recovery. Lemoine never gave his consent as to the fee.
Since he was leaving the country, Lemoine signed an undated Special
Power of Attorney authorizing Balon to bring any action against
Metropolitan Insurance for the satisfaction of Lemoine’s claim as well
as to negotiate, sign, compromise, encash and receive  payments.
Metropolitan Insurance offered to settle Lemoine’s claim
and Balon confirmed his acceptance of the offer.
December 1998, Metropolitan Insurance issued a China Bank check
payable to Lemoine in the amount of P525,000 which was received by
Balon.
When Lemoine asked Balon as to the status of the case,
B a l o n a n s w e r e d t h a t Metropolitan Insurance was offering P350,000
for settlement which Lemoine suggested that Balon accept to avoid
litigation.
December 1999, Lemoine visited the office of Metropolitan Insurance to
ask on the status of the case and it answered that the case was
long settled via a check given to Balon.
Balon acknowledge that he is in possession of the check and that he is
keeping the check as attorney’s lien pending Lemoine’s payment of his
attorney’s fee equivalent to 50% of the entire amount collected. He also
threatened Lemoine that he will not hesitate to make proper
representation with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, DOLE
and BIR if L e m o i n e   w i l l   m a k e   a n y t r o u b l e   t o   B a l o n   a n d t h a t
h e   h a s g o o d n e t w o r k   w i t h   t h e mentioned agencies.

Balon later claimed that he gave P233,000 to Garcia on the

representation of Lemoine, however, he gave no evidence to such
turnover .
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility?

hELD:
There is a conflict of interest if there is an inconsistenc y in the
interests of two or more opposing parties. The test is whether or not
in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty to fight for an issue or
claim but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client. In short,
if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other  client.
the reasons proffered by respondent are hardly persuasive 
t o   e x c u s e   h i s   c l e a r   representation of conflicting interests.
first, the investigating commissioner observed that the name “Gamaliel
Abaqueta” is not a common name. once heard, it will surely ring a bell in
one’s mind if he came across the name again.
Second, assuming arguendo that respondents memory
was indeed faulty, still it is incredible that he could not recall
that complainant was his client, considering that Mrs. Charito
Baclig, who was complainants attorney-in-fact and the go-between of
complainant and respondent in Special Proceedings, was the same
person who brought Milagros Yap Abaqueta to him.
Lastly, the fact that the subject matter of Civil Case and Special
Proceedings are the same properties could not have escaped the
attention of respondent.

PEOPLE VS. GODOY

G.R. Nos. 115908-09 (December 6, 1995)

FACTS:
Godoy was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of rape
and kidnapping with serious illegal detention, and sentencing him to the
maximum penalty of death in both cases by the Regional Trial Court.
The private complainant Mia Taha allegedly said that her teacher Danny
Codoy(Appellant) by means of force, threat and intimidation, by using a
knife and by means of deceit, have carnal Knowledge with her and
kidnap or detained her, for a period of five (5).
The defense presented a different version of what actually transpired.
His defense was that they were lovers, as evidenced by the letters wrote
by the complainant (Mia Taha) to the accused and the same was
corroborated by the testimonies of the defense witnesses.

ISSUES:
Can Godoy be convicted of rape and kidnapping with illegal detention?

RULING:
No. They were in fact lovers.
This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains that in all criminal
prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the
accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the
prosecution to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the
accused raises a sufficient doubt as to any material element, and the
prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence, the prosecution
has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in
reviewing the evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape.
These are: (1)while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be
severely and impartially punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an
accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved, but harder to be
defended by the party accused, though innocent;(2) that in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with
extreme caution; and (3) that the evidence for the prosecution must
stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength
from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.
In the case at bar, several circumstances exist which amply demonstrate
and ineluctably convince this Court that there was no rape committed on
the alleged date and place, and that the charge of rape was the
contrivance of an afterthought, rather than a truthful plaint for redress
of an actual wrong.
The challenged decision definitely leaves much to be desired. The court
below made no serious effort to dispassionately or impartially consider
the totality of the evidence for the prosecution in spite of the teaching in
various rulings that in rape cases, the testimony of the offended party
must not be accepted with precipitate credulity. In finding that the crime
of rape was committed, the lower court took into account only that
portion of the testimony of complainant regarding the incident and
conveniently deleted the rest. Taken singly, there would be reason to
believe that she was indeed raped. But if we are to consider the other
portions of her testimony concerning the events which transpired
thereafter, which unfortunately the court a quo wittingly or unwittingly
failed or declined to appreciate, the actual truth could have been readily
exposed.
It is basic that for kidnapping to exist, there must be indubitable proof
that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the offended party
of her liberty. In the present charge for that crime, such intent has not at
all been established by the prosecution. Prescinding from the fact that
the Taha spouses desisted from pursuing this charge which they
themselves instituted, several grave and irreconcilable inconsistencies
bedevil the prosecution's evidence thereon and cast serious doubts on
the guilt of appellant.
The Court takes judicial cognizance of the fact that in rural areas in the
Philippines, young ladies are strictly required to act with circumspection
and prudence. Great caution is observed so that their reputations shall
remain untainted. Any breath of scandal which brings dishonor to their
character humiliates their entire families.80 It could precisely be that
complainant's mother wanted to save face in the community where
everybody knows everybody else, and in an effort to conceal her
daughter's indiscretion and escape the wagging tongues of their small
rural community, she had to weave the scenario of this rape drama.

In the matter of the application for Habeas Corpus of Maximino Gamido

vs. New Bilibid Prison, GR No. 146783, July 29, 2002

FACTS:
Before us is the Motion for Relief filed on January 17, 2002 by Espiridion
J. Dela Cruz, of Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila, who
styles himself as counsel for petitioner Maximino B. Gamido.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there has been a violation of the rule against
forum-shopping; and
2. Whether or not Espiridion J. Dela Cruz may appear as counsel
for petitioner in this case, considering allegations that he is not
a member of the Philippine Bar.
HELD:
It appearing that earlier the petitioner himself filed under date of
February 12, 2001, personally his Motion to Withdraw Petition, and that
the Court in its Resolution dated March 12, 2001, granted the
withdrawal of his petition for habeas corpus, the Court
hereby RESOLVES that the instant Motion for Relief, which was filed
without authority of the petitioner and clearly without merit, should be
and is hereby DENIED.
Further, considering representations by the self-styled counsel for
petitioner that he, Espiridion J. Dela Cruz, is a lawyer with a law office
bearing his name at Suite 416 William Liyao Bldg., Rizal Avenue, Manila,
and for this purpose he used the title of attorney and indicated in his
pleadings filed before this Court an IBP number, which turned out to be
spurious, it having been shown and admitted by him that he is not a
member of the Philippine Bar as certified by the Office of the Bar
Confidant, after he was made to show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for appearing as counsel in this case without
license to practice law, and although he asked the Court for forgiveness
for the wrong he had done, the Court RESOLVED to declare ESPIRIDION
J. DELA CRUZ GUILTY of indirect contempt of this Court. WHEREFORE,
he is hereby sentenced to pay a FINE of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000) within thirty days from notice hereof, OR suffer
IMPRISONMENT for a period of one month and one day to be served at
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) detention center, Taft Avenue,
Manila, with the warning that a repetition of the same or similar act
would be dealt with more severely.

Halili v CIR (136 SCRA 112)

Facts:
The cases involve disputes regarding claims for overtime of more than
five hundred bus drivers and conductors of Halili Transit. Litigation
initially commenced with the filing of a complaint for overtime with the
CIR. The disputes were eventually settled when the contending parties
reached an Agreement where the Administratrix would transfer to the
employees the title to a tract of land in Caloocan, Rizal. The parcel of
land was eventually registered in the name of the Union.
The Union, through Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, filed an urgent motion
with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) requesting for
authority to sell and dispose of the property. Union President Amado
Lopez, in a letter, informed J.C. Espinas and Associates that the general
membership of the said Union had authorized a 20% contingent fee for
the law firm based on whatever amount would be awarded the Union.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas, (the original counsel) established the award of 897
workers' claim. When Atty. Pineda appeared for the Union in these cases,
still an associate of the law firm, his appearance carried the firm name
B.C. Pineda and Associates," giving the impression that he was the
principal lawyer in these cases.
Atty. Pineda joined the law firm of Atty. Espinas in 1965 when these
cases were pending resolution. He always held office in the firm's place at
Puyat Building, except in 1966 to 1967 when he transferred to the Lakas
ng Manggagawa Offices. During this one-year stint at the latter office,
Atty. Pineda continued handling the case with the arrangement that he
would report the developments to the Espinas firm. When he rejoined the
law firm in 1968, he continued working on these cases and using the
Puyat Building office as his address in the pleadings.
When Atty. Pineda rejoined the Espinas firm in 1968, he did not reveal to
his partners (he was made the most senior partner) that he had a
retainer's contract. He stayed with the law firm until 1974 and still did
not divulge the 1967 retainer's contract. Only the officers of the Union
knew of the contract.
The alleged retainer's contract between Atty. Pineda and the Union
appears anomalous and even illegal as well as unethical considering
that-
1. The contract was executed only between Atty. Pineda and the officers
of the Union chosen by about 125 members only. It was not a contract
with the general membership.
2. The contingent fee of 30% for those who were still working with Halili
Transit and the 45% fee for those who were no longer working worked to
the prejudice of the latter group who should and were entitled to more
benefits. Thus, too, when the alleged retainer's contract was executed in
1967, the Halili Transit had already stopped operations in Metro Manila.
By then, Atty. Pineda knew that all the workers would be out of work
which would mean that the 45% contingent fee would apply to all.
3. The contract which retroactively took effect on January 1, 1966, was
executed when Atty. Espinas was still handling the appeal of Halili
Transit in the main case before the Supreme Court.
4. When Atty. Pineda filed his motion for approval of his attorney's lien
with Arbiter Valenzuela on February 8, 1983, he did not attach the
retainer's contract.
5. The retainer's contract was not even notarized.
A prospective buyer, the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. objected
in view of PD 1529 which requires no less than an order from a court of
competent jurisdiction as authority to sell property in trust.
Atty. Pineda, without authority from the Supreme Court but relying on
the earlier authority given him by the Ministry of Labor, filed another
urgent motion, praying that the Union be authorized to sell the lot. The
sale was finally consummated, resulting in the execution of an escrow
agreement.
When Atty. Jose C. Espinas (herein movant and alleged original counsel
for the Union) learned of the sale and apportionment of the proceeds
from past Union president Amado Lopez, he requested Labor Arbiter
Raymundo Valenzuela to allow him to look into the records of the case.
The latter, however, told him that the records of the case were missing.
Thereupon, Atty. Espinas requested Director Pascual Reyes of the NLRC
to locate the records.

Issue:
a. Whether or not Atty. Pineda and Arbiter Valenzuela should be held
in contempt.
b. Whether or not Atty. Pineda should be disbarred.

Held:
a. YES. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the authority and
administration of the law into disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice
parties litigant or their witnesses during litigation.
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the
enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice.
In the Slade Perkins case, "the exercise of the power to punish contempt
has a twofold aspect, namely (1) the proper punishment of the guilty
party for his disrespect to the court or its order; and (2) to compel his
performance of some act or duty required of him by the court which he
refuses to perform. Due to this twofold aspect of the exercise of the power
to punish them, contempts are classified as civil or criminal.
A civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered to be done by a
court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein.
A criminal contempt, is conduct directed against the authority and
dignity of a court or of a judge, as in unlawfully assailing or discrediting
the authority or dignity of the court or judge, or in doing a duly forbidden
act.
b. YES. Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court
which provides:
Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
grounds.—A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any
violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corrupt or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any conduct on his part
showing his unfitness for the confidence and trust which characterize
the attorney and client relations, and the practice of law before the
courts, or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good moral
character as to render him unworthy of public confidence.
In the case, the expeditious manner by which Arbiter Valenzuela granted
Atty. Pineda's motion for such authority to sell the property make the
entire transaction dubious and irregular.
Significantly Atty. Pineda's act of filing a motion praying for authority to
sell was by itself an admission on his part that he did not possess the
authority to sell the property. He could not and did not even wait for
valid authority but instead previously obtained the same from the labor
arbiter whom he knew was not empowered to so authorize.
The 45% attorney's lien on the award of those union members who were
no longer working and the 30% lien on the benefits of those who were
still working as provided for in the alleged retainer's contract are also
very exorbitant and unconscionable.
*Atty. Pineda is found guilty of indirect contempt of court for which he is
sentenced to imprisonment and directed to show cause why he should
not be disbarred.

Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234

FACTS:
Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico
del Mar represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo
in the lower court. Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus
the lower court ordered Gica to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral
damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the
latter court reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for
reconsideration where he made a veiled threat against the Court of
Appeals judges intimating that he thinks the CA justices “knowingly
rendered an unjust decision” and “judgment has been rendered through
negligence” and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using
such tone with the court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he
again made threats. The CA then ordered del Mar to show cause as to
why he should not be punished for contempt.
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he
sent to the President of the Philippines asking the said justices to
consider the CA judgment. But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del
Mar then filed a civil case against the three justices of the CA before a
Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually dismissed by reason
of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay damages to the
justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse
his suspension as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The
SC denied both and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from
the Clerk of the Supreme Court as to who were the judges who voted
against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to
why he should not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead
tried to justify his actions even stating that had he not been “convinced
that human efforts in [pursuing the case] will be fruitless” he would have
continued with the civil case against the CA justices. In his explanation,
del Mar also intimated that even the Supreme Court is part among “the
corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice”.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but
the judge who handled the case dismissed the same.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD: 
Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties
to the courts. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard
towards the court so essential to the proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of
the land when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he
proceeded to challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they
knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they
acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in
disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.

Nuñez vs. Ibay, AM No. RTJ-06-1984, June 30, 2009

FACTS:
The administrative case stemmed from the Sinumpaang Salaysay of
Valeriano F. Nuňez, filed with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
135, Makati City with gross abuse of authority. The complaint involved an
incident in the Makati City Hall basement parking lot for which
respondent judge cited complainant in contempt of court because
complainant parked a government vehicle which he was driving at the
parking space reserved for respondent judge.
Complainant apologized and explained that he did not intend to park in
respondent Judge’s space, and that he did not that such space was
reserved for respondent Judge. However, respondent judge refused to
accept complainant’s apology and, instead, found the latter guilty of
direct contempt of court for using the former’s parking space, sentencing
complainant to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of one thousand
pesos (P1,000.00). Respondent then ordered the jail guard to bring
complainant to the City Jail in Fort Bonifacio, where the father was
incarcerated for two days. On April 5, 2005, complainant was released
after filing a Motion for Reconsideration and paying the fine of
P1,000.00.
In his Comment. Respondent Judge claimed that on the date and time of
incident, he was set to dispose a criminal case, and over the weekend,
had even conceptualized the matter on how to administer the
proceedings to accomplish the requirements of that criminal case.
However, the inconsiderate and improper parking of complainant
disturbed his train of thought as to the intended disposition of his cases.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of grave abuse of authority.

HELD:
Yes, The Supreme Court held that the exacting standards of conduct
demanded from judges and designed to promote public confidence in the
integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. When the judge himself
becomes the transgressor of the law which he is sworn to apply, he
places his office in disrepute, encourages disrespect for the law and
impairs public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary itself.
By the time the instant complaint was filed, respondent Judge had
already cited six persons in contempt, including herein complainant.
Worse, respondent Judge immediately detained complainant, thereby
preventing him from resorting to the remedies provided under the law.
Such abusive behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his
integrity, which is essential not only to the proper discharge of the
judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor.
In addition, Sections 1 and 2, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary state that:
SECTION 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above
reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer.
SECTION 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be
done but must also be seen to be done.
The court believes that the frequency of his offenses already constitutes
gross misconduct. “Gross” has been defined as flagrant and shameful,
while “misconduct” means a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior.

Tan vs. Balajadia

Facts:
Respondent Balajadia was charged for contempt by the petititioners,
Tan, et al.
Before that, the respondent filed a criminal case against the petitioners
with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Baguio City. In his complaint-affidavit, the
respondent asserted
that he is a “practicing lawyer” based in Baguio City. However,
certifications issued by
the OBC and the IBP showed that the respondent was admitted to the
Bar.
Respondent asserted that the allegation that he was a practicing lawyer
is an
honest mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino
prepared the
complaint-affidavit patterned after Atty. Aquino’s affidavit. Liza
Laconsay, Atty.
Aquino’s secretary, admitted the mistake of copying Atty. Aquino’s
complaint-affidavit
and instead of stating that Respondent Balajadia is a businessman, he
was erroneously
referred to as a practicing lawyer.

Issue:
Whether not the respondent is liable for direct contempt.

Ruling:
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the mistake in drafting the
complaint-
affidavit conforms to the documentary evidence on record and the
allegation was indeed
a result of inadvertence and doesn’t establish intent to make him liable
for indirect
contempt.

PCGG V SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS

In 1976 the General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered

financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial
support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily
overdrawings on its current account with Central Bank. Despite the
mega loans GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. The
Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and
the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public bidding of
GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the
winning bid. Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza filed a petition with the
CFI praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by RA 265. After EDSA Revolution I
Pres Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth
of former Pres Marcos, his family and cronies. Pursuant to this mandate,
the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against respondents Lucio Tan, at.al. PCGG
issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by
them by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
former Pres. Marcos. The abovementioned respondents Tan, et. al are
represented as their counsel, former Solicitor General Mendoza. PCGG
filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza
as then Sol Gen and counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the
liquidation of GENBANK which was subsequently acquired by
respondents Tan et. al., which subsequently became Allied Banking
Corporation. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which prohibits former government lawyers
from accepting “engagement” or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the said service. The
Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denyting PCGG’s motion to disqualify
respondent Mendoza. It failed to prove the existence of an inconsistency
between respondent Mendoza’s former function as SolGen and his
present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. PCGGs recourse
to this court assailing the Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE

Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to

respondent Mendoza. The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after
leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said
service.”

HELD
The case at bar does not involve the “adverse interest” aspect of Rule
6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is conceded, has no adverse interest
problem when he acted as SOlGen and later as counsel of respondents
et.al. before the Sandiganbayan. However there is still the issue of
whether there exists a “congruent-interest conflict” sufficient to
disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents et. al. The
key is unlocking the meaning of “matter” and the metes and bounds of
“intervention” that he made on the matter. Beyond doubt that the
“matter” or the act of respondent Mendoza as SolGen involved in the case
at bar is “advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said
bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation in CFI of
Manila. The Court held that the advice given by respondent Mendoza on
the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is not the “matter” contemplated by
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion
No. 342 is clear in stressing that “drafting, enforcing or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations and laws, or
briefing abstract principles of law are acts which do not fall within the
scope of the term “matter” and cannot disqualify. Respondent Mendoza
had nothing to do with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate
GENBANK. He also did not participate in the sale of GENBANK to Allied
Bank. The legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the
sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not
include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. Thus, the Code 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent
Mendoza because his alleged intervention while SolGen is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil
case of sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The
applicable meaning as the term is used in the Code of Professional Ethics
is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist
where the government lawyer does not act which can be considered as
innocuous such as “ drafting, enforcing, or interpreting government or
agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of
law.” The court rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant
and substantial. He merely petitions that the court gives assistance in
the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of
justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the
claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role of the SolGen is not
that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.
Petition assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is denied.
Relevant Dissenting Opinion of Justice Callejo:
Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional
Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the
public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in
connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon
while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public
position as a vehicle to promote or advance his private interests extends
beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public
official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers
who once held public office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction
1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the government and 2. relates
to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in the service.

People vs. Villanueva, GR No. L-19450, May 27, 1965

FACTS:
In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the
municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case, the private offended
party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case.
Apparently, Fule was the fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the
opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as he
said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been
appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and
therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
practice.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.

HELD: 
No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself
to be in the active and continued practice of the legal profession and that
his professional services are available to the public for a compensation,
as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In
the case at bar, Fule is not being compensated but rather he’s doing it
for free for his friend who happened to be the offended party. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or
customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words,
it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of
Justice approved Fule’s appearance for his friend should be given
credence.

Noriega vs. Sison, GR No. L-24548, Oct. 27, 1983

FACTS:
In 1981, Noriega filed a disbarment case against Sison. Noriega alleged
that Sison as a hearing officer of the Securities and Exchange
Commission is not allowed to engage in the private practice of law; yet
Noriega alleged that Sison has created another identity under the name
“Manuel Sison” in order for him to engage in private practice and
represent one Juan Sacquing before a trial court in Manila.
Sison, in his defense, argued that he is in fact representing Juan
Sacquing but the same is with the permission of the SEC Commissioner;
that he never held himself out to the public as a practicing lawyer; that
he provided legal services to Sacquing in view of close family friendship
and for free; that he never represented himself deliberately and
intentionally as “Atty. Manuel Sison” in the Manila JDRC where, in the
early stages of his appearance, he always signed the minutes as “Atty.
Emmanuel R. Sison”, and in one instance, he even made the necessary
correction when the court staff wrote his name as Atty. Manuel Sison”;
that due to the “inept and careless work of the clerical staff of the JDRC”,
notices were sent to “Atty. Manuel Sison”.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not the disbarment case should prosper.
HELD: 
No. The arguments of presented by Sison is well merited and backed by
evidence. The allegations in the complaint do not warrant disbarment of
the Sison. There is no evidence that Sison has committed an act
constituting deceit, immoral conduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer,
willful disobedience of any lawful order of the court, or corruptly and
willfully appearing as an attorney to a part to a case without attorney to
do so. His isolated appearance for Sacquing does not constitute private
practice of law, more so since Sison did not derive any pecuniary gain for
his appearance because Sison and Sacquing were close family friends.
Such act of Sison in going out of his way to aid as counsel to a close
family friend should not be allowed to be used as an instrument of
harassment against him.

LIM SANTIAGO VS SAGUCIO

EN BANC[ A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006 ]

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, RESPONDENT

Facts:

 Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

 Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing

conflicting interests. Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager
and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of Taggat very well.
Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating
and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore,
complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and
even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an
affidavit to support the complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government

prosecutor

 Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the

private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor.
Complainant presented evidence to prove that respondent received
P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995,
another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for
the month of April 1996.

Issue:
whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with
respondent’s role as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor 

Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling: 

 1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule
15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (“Code”). However, the
Court finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct.
Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)
(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 (“RA 6713”).

 Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government

service in the discharge of their official duties.” A government lawyer is
thus bound by the prohibition “not [to] represent conflicting interests.”
However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to
represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest
exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full
disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship exists.
Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is
necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.

 Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage

in “unlawful x x x conduct.” Unlawful conduct includes violation of the
statutory prohibition on a government employee to “engage in the private
practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions.”

 2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the

same nature habitually or customarily holding one’s self to the public as
a lawyer.

 Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat

intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to
1996 as alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does
not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer agreement.
For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by
lawyers with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the
ambit of the term “practice of law.”

Catu vs. Rellosa [A.C. No. 5738. February 19, 2008]

16AUG
Ponente: CORONA, J.
FACTS:
Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building
erected thereon located in Manila. His mother and brother contested the
possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the
units in the building. The latter ignored demands for them to vacate the
premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against them in the Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Barangay. Respondent, as punong barangay,
summoned the parties to conciliation meetings. When the parties failed
to arrive at an amicable settlement, respondent issued a certification for
the filing of the appropriate action in court.Respondent entered his
appearance as counsel for the defendants in the (subsequent ejectment)
case. Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming
that respondent committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a
public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the
fact that he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the
litigants as punong barangay.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Rellosa violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for six (6) months.
RATIO:
[R]espondent was found guilty of professional misconduct for violating
his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require
his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the
private practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the
department concerned in accordance with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the
Revised Civil Service Rules.
Respondent was strongly advised to look up and take to heart the
meaning of the word delicadeza.

PENTECOSTES VS MARASIGAN

SECOND DIVISION[ A.M. No. P-07-2337 (Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No.
04-2060-P), August 03, 2007 ]
ROLLY PENTECOSTES, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. HERMENEGILDO MARASIGAN, CLERK OF COURT VI, OFFICE
OF THE CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, KABACAN,
NORTH COTABATO, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

 The administrative case against respondent stemmed from a sworn

affidavit-complaint filed by Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki
motorcycle, which was recovered by members of the PNP of M’lang, North
Cotabato from suspected carnappers against whom a criminal case for
carnapping, was lodged at RTC.

 On the order of the trial court, the chief of police of M’lang, North
Cotabato turned over the motorcycle to respondent who acknowledged
receipt thereof.
 After the conduct of hearings to determine the true owner of the
motorcycle, the trial court issued an Order for its release to Pentecostes.

 Pentecostes immediately asked respondent to release the motorcycle to

him. Respondent, however, told him to wait and come back repeatedly
from 2001 up to the filing of the complaint.

Issue:

 On the topic of good moral character

Ruling:

 ,Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. – The clerk shall safely keep all record,
papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to his charge,
including the library of the court, and the seals and furniture belonging
to his office.

 From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC,
Kabacan, respondent was charged with the custody and safekeeping of
Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and to keep it until the termination of the case,
barring circumstances that would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and
upon the prior authority of the trial court.

 No explanation was offered by respondent, however, for turning over the
motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, respondent was mandated to
secure prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.

 This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential
and ranking officers of our judicial system who perform delicate
functions vital to the prompt and proper administration of justice. Their
duties include the efficient recording, filing and management of court
records and, as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and
public property committed to their charge.

 Misconduct is a transgression of some established or definite rule of

action; more particularly, it is an unlawful behavior by the public officer.
The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of
corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established
rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the
misconduct is only simple, as in this case.

Father Ranhilio C. Aquino et al vs. Atty. Edwin Pascua A.C. No.5095,

November 28, 2007
FACTS:
Father Aquino as the Academic head of Philippine Judicial Academy,
filed a complaint against Atty. Edwin Pascua, a Notary Public for
violation of the Notarial Practice Law. He alleged that Atty. Pascua
falsified two documents wherein both documents had “Doc. No. 1213,
Page No. 243. Book III, Series of 1998” and both are dated on December
10, 1998. It was shown by the Clerk of Court of RTC – Tuguegarao that
none of these entries appear in the National Register of Atty. Pascua. In
his comment, Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents
on December 10, 1998, but they were not entered in his Notarial Register
due to the oversight of his legal secretary. Complainant maintains that
Atty. Pascua’s omission was not due to inadvertence but a clear case of
falsification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Pascua violated the Notarial Practice Rule
HELD:
Yes, under the notarial law, “the notary public shall enter in such
register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to,
or acknowledging the instrument. Failure of the notary to make the
proper entry or entries in his notarial register touching his notarial acts
in the manner requested by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission.”
Atty. Pascua claims that the omission was not intentional but due to
oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua cannot escape
liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that
he admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary
public and he is bound by the acts of his staff.
Furthermore, the claim of Atty. Pascua of simple inadvertence is
untenable. The photocopy of his notarial register shows that the last
entry which he notarized on December 28, 1998 is Document No. 1200
on Page 240. On the other hand, the two affidavit-complaints allegedly
notarized on December 10, 1998 are Document Nos. 1213 and 1214,
respectively, under Page No. 243, Book III. Thus, Fr. Ranhilo and the
other complainants are correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely
assigned fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a
clear dishonesty on his part not only as a Notary Public, but also as a
member of the Bar.
A member of the Bar may be disciplined or disbarred for any misconduct
in his professional or private capacity. The Court has invariably imposed
a penalty for notaries public who were found guilty of dishonesty or
misconduct in the performance of their duties.
Atty. Pascua is declared guilty of misconduct and is suspended from the
practice of law for 3 months with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial commission is
revoked.

Administrative case filed against Judge Jaime V. Quitain, JBC No.013,

August 22, 2007
FACTS: Judge Jaime Vega Quitain was appointed Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Davao City on May 17,
2003. Subsequent thereto, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
received confidential information that administrative and criminal
charges were filed against Judge Quitain in his capacity as then
Assistant Regional Director, National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM),
Regional Office 11, Davao City, as a result of which he was dismissed
from the service per Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 183 dated April 10,
1995.

In the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) submitted to the Judicial and

Bar Council (JBC) on November 26, 2001, Judge Quitain declared that
there were five criminal cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 18438, 18439,
22812, 22813, and 22814) filed against him before
the Sandiganbayan, which were all dismissed. No administrative case
was disclosed by Judge Qutain in his PDS.

To confirm the veracity of the information, then Deputy Court

Administrator (DCA) Christopher O. Lock (now Court Administrator)
requested from the Sandiganbayan certified copies of the Order(s)
dismissing the criminal cases. On even date, letters were sent to the
NAPOLCOM requesting for certified true copies of documents relative to
the administrative complaints filed against Judge Quitain,
particularly A.O. No. 183 dated April 10, 1995 dismissing him from the
service. Likewise, DCA Lock required Judge Quitain to explain the
alleged misrepresentation and deception he committed before the JBC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge is guilty of grave misconduct.
HELD:

We cannot overemphasize the need for honesty and integrity on

the part of all those who are in the service of the Judiciary. We have
often stressed that the conduct required of court personnel, from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk of court, must always be beyond
reproach and circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility as to
let them be free from any suspicion that may taint the Judiciary. We
condemn, and will never countenance any conduct, act or omission on
the part of all those involved in the administration of justice, which
would violate the norm of public accountability and diminish or even just
tend to diminish the faith of the people in the Judiciary.

Considering the foregoing, Judge Quitain is hereby found guilty of

grave misconduct. He deserves the supreme penalty of dismissal.

However, on August 9, 2007, the Court received a letter from

Judge Quitain addressed to the Chief Justice stating that he is tendering
his irrevocable resignation effective immediately as Presiding Judge of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Davao City. Acting on said letter,
the Court Resolved to accept the irrevocable resignation of Judge Jaime
V. Quitain effective August 15, 2007, without prejudice to the decision of
the administrative case.

Verily, the resignation of Judge Quitain which was accepted by the

Court without prejudice does not render moot and academic the instant
administrative case. The jurisdiction that the Court had at the time of
the filing of the administrative complaint is not lost by the mere fact that
the respondent judge by his resignation and its consequent acceptance
without prejudice by this Court, has ceased to be in office during the
pendency of this case. The Court retains its authority to pronounce the
respondent official innocent or guilty of the charges against him. A
contrary rule would be fraught with injustice and pregnant with dreadful
and dangerous implications. Indeed, if innocent, the respondent official
merits vindication of his name and integrity as he leaves the government
which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive
the corresponding censure and a penalty proper and imposable under
the situation.

Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty Ismael F. Mejia, Adm Case No.2984, August
31, 2007
FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for review of Administrative Case No. 2984
with plea for reinstatement in the practice of law filed by Ismael F. Mejia
(Mejia) who is already seventy-one years old and barred from the practice
of law for fifteen years.

On June 1, 1999, Mejia filed a Petition praying that he be allowed to

reengage in the practice of law. On July 6, 1999, the Supreme Court En
Banc issued a Resolution denying the petition for reinstatement.
 
On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for review of
Administrative Case No. 2984 with a plea for reinstatement in the
practice of law. No comment or opposition was filed against the petition.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound discretion of the
Court.
2. whether or not the Court decides that the public interest in the
orderly and impartial administration of justice will continue to be
preserved even with the applicants reentry as a counselor at law.

HELD:
The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the
Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and proper
person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the
applicants character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed between
the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.
 
In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his indiscretions in the law
profession. Fifteen years had already elapsed since Mejias name was
dropped from the Roll of Attorneys. At the age of seventy-one, he is
begging for forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him,
he has long repented and he has suffered enough. Through his
reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his children and redeem the
indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.
 
After his disbarment, he put up the Mejia Law Journal, a publication
containing his religious and social writings. He also organized a religious
organization and named it El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle
of Heart and Mind.
 
The Court is inclined to grant the present petition. Fifteen years has
passed since Mejia was punished with the severe penalty of disbarment.
Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejias
disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already
of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time
during which he has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the
sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes
cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992,
no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has shown
remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and
his punishment has lasted long enough. Thus, while the Court is ever
mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to
show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its
purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to
punish but to correct offenders.
 
We reiterate, however, and remind petitioner that the practice of law is a
privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing
requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice law.

GSIS vs. Hon. Vicente A. Pacquing, AM No. RTJ-04-1831,February 2,

2007
FACTS:

In 1971, Bengson Commercial Building, Inc. (Bengson)

borrowed P4,250,000 from petitioner Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), secured by real estate and chattel mortgages. When
Bengson defaulted in the payment of the amortizations, petitioner
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgaged properties and sold them at
public auction where it emerged as the highest bidder.
 
In 1977, Bengson filed an action in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of San Fernando, La Union, Branch 26 to annul the extrajudicial
foreclosure. The trial court, through Judge Antonio Fineza, declared the
foreclosure void and directed petitioner to restore to Bengson the
foreclosed properties, pay damages and costs of suit.
 
Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). The
CA affirmed with modification the trial courts decision and remanded the
case for reception of evidence on the costs of suit and determination of
the replacement value of the properties should petitioner fail to return
them. The CA decision became final and executory on February 10,
1988.
 
When petitioner failed to return the foreclosed properties, the new
presiding judge of Branch 26, respondent Judge Vicente A. Pacquing,
ordered it to pay Bengson the equivalent value of the foreclosed
properties. Thereafter, Bengson moved that it be permitted to present
evidence on the costs of suit. On April 6, 1995, the trial court directed
petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million as costs of suit. This order became
final on April 24, 1995.
 
Petitioner filed an urgent omnibus motion with the court a
quo stating that its counsel, Atty. Rogelio Terrado, went on AWOL and
never informed it of respondent judges order. This motion, treated as
petition for relief from judgment by respondent judge, was dismissed on
January 16, 1997.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Judge acted administratively liable for ignorance of
the law.
HELD:

For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law,

the acts complained of must be gross or patent. To constitute gross
ignorance of the law, such acts must not only be contrary to existing law
and jurisprudence but also motivated by bad faith, fraud, malice or
dishonesty. That certainly does not appear to be the case here as
petitioners complaint was spawned merely by the honest divergence of
opinion between petitioner and respondent judge as to the legal issues
and applicable laws involved. Petitioner also proffered no evidence that
respondent judges acts were imbued with malice or bad faith.
 
In the same vein, we hold that respondent judge was neither
biased nor partial against petitioner when he issued the alias writ of
execution. Petitioners assertion that respondent judge precipitately
issued the alias writ is not supported by the records. On the contrary,
the records indicate that the writ was issued more than three years from
the finality of the order directing petitioner to pay Bengson P31 million
as costs of suit. Its issuance was not all tainted with undue haste. In the
exercise of his judicial discretion, respondent judge believed that the
issuance of the alias writ had become forthwith a matter of right
following the finality of said order. The rule is that once a judgment
becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a writ of execution and the
issuance thereof becomes a courts ministerial duty.
 
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that respondent judge erred in
issuing the alias writ, his act would still not merit administrative
sanction absent malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote
poor or flawed judgment; it imports a dishonest purpose, moral obliquity
or conscious doing of a wrong.
 
Furthermore, for allegations of bias and partiality to stand,
petitioner should have demonstrated that respondent judges decisions
and orders came from extrajudicial sources or from some bases other
than what he had learned from his study of the case. Decisions formed
in the course of judicial proceedings, although they appear erroneous,
are not necessarily partial as long as they are culled from the arguments
and evidence of the parties. The party who alleges partiality must prove it
with clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner failed in that aspect

The filing of an administrative complaint is not the proper remedy

for correcting the actions of a judge perceived to have gone beyond the
norms of propriety, where a sufficient remedy exists. The actions against
judges should not be considered as complementary or suppletory to, or
substitute for, the judicial remedies which can be availed of by a party in
a case.
 
Regarding the accusations against respondent Atty. Baez, the
Court finds no basis to hold him liable for executing the assailed writ at
that time. Undeniably, the most difficult phase of any proceeding is the
execution of judgment. Charged with this task, he must act with
considerable dispatch to administer justice. Otherwise, a judgment, if
not executed at once, would just be an empty victory on the part of the
prevailing party. In executing the writ, Atty. Baez merely carried out a
ministerial duty. He had no discretion to implement the writ or not.

Velez vs De Vera 
496 SCRA 345 [ÀC No. 6697 July 25, 2006]

Facts: 
An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State
Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose
from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III
who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was
authorized by the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority
by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in
San Diego California) for the release of the funds in settlement of the
case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he
then deposited to his personal account; The Hearing referee in the said
administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from
the practice of law for three years; Atty. de Vera resigned from the
California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of
California. Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do
not prove that he misappropriated his client’s funds as the latter’s father
(the elder Willis) gave him authority to use the same and that,
unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation
notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis testified under oath that he
“expected de Vera might use the money for a few days. Petitioner claims
that such information was concealed by the respondent. Such and other
circumstances which the IBP board deems that respondent is not fit to
be a member of the board, hence his removal was sought.

Issue: 

Whether or not a member of the Philippine Bar, who is concomitantly an

attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the
practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member
of the Philippine Bar for the same infraction committed in the foreign
jurisdiction.

Held: 

No. We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of
Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign
jurisdiction (State Bar of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges
were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However,
unlike the case of Atty. Maquera, no final judgment for suspension or
disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation
of suspension of three years as he surrendered his license to practice law
before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a

Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in
his suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to
his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this
jurisdiction. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may
transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only
if the basis of the foreign court’s action includes any of the grounds for
disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the
judgment of the foreign court merely constitutes prima facie evidence of
unethical acts as lawyer.

A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country

from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a
presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in
the foreign forum.
In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment
to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior
by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the
facts upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based.
If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are
likewise unethical under Philippine law.

A.C. No. 7204             March 7, 2007

CYNTHIA ADVINCULA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ERNESTO M. MACABATA, Respondent

Facts:

                The case is a disbarment case against respondent on the

ground of gross immorality. It was alleged that sometime in December
2004, complainant seek for legal advice from petitioner regarding her
collectibles from a travel company. Respondent sent Demand Letter and
sometime in February 2005, they met at Zensho Restaurant to discuss
the possibility of filing complaint against the travel company because the
latter failed to settle the accounts. That after that said meeting, the
respondent "held her arm and kissed her on the cheek while embracing
her very tightly."

                The two met again to finalize the draft for the complaint and
while on their way home after the said meeting, the respondent suddenly
stopped the car and things went out of hand. Thus she decided to refer
the case to another lawyer.

Issue:

                Whether or not the respondent committed acts are grossly

immoral which would warrant the disbarment or suspension from the
practice of law.

Held:

                The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON I – x x x

Rule 1.01-- A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

CANON 7-- A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

xxxx

Rule 7.03-- A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private
life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
                The SC held that lawyers are expected to abide the tenets of
morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but all throught out their
legal career as lawyers belong to an exclusive and honored fraternity.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the legal profession
and should adhere to the unwaveringly to the highest standard of
morality. The respondent admitted to the act of kissing the complainant
on the lips as evidenced as well of his asking for apology from
complainant in his text message. Regardless of the fact that the
respondent admitted that he kissed the complainant but the Court held
that this was not accompanied by malice because the respondent
immediately asked for forgiveness after sensing the annoyance of the
respondent after texting him. Thus the Court held that this is not grossly
immoral nor highly reprehensible which will warrant disbarment or
suspension. But the Court reprimanded respondent to be more prudent
and cautious.

In re: Petition to disqualify Atty. Leonardo De Vera, AC No.6052,

December 11, 2003
FACTS:
The election for the 16th IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) was set
on April 26, 2003, a month prior to the IBP National Convention
scheduled on May 22-24, 2003. The election was so set in compliance
with Section 39, Article VI of the IBP By Laws, which reads:

SECTION 39. Nomination and election of the Governors. At least one

month before the national convention, the delegates from each region
shall elect the governor of their region, the choice of which shall as much
as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

Later on, the outgoing IBP Board, in its Resolution No. XV-2003-

99 dated April 16, 2003, reset the elections to May 31, 2003, or after the
IBP National Convention.
Respondent De Vera, a member of the Board of Directors of the
Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter in Eastern Mindanao, along with Atty. P.
Angelica Y. Santiago, President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, sent a
letter dated 28 March 2003, requesting the IBP Board to reconsider its
Resolution of April 6, 2003. Their Motion was anchored on two
grounds viz. (1) adhering to the mandate of Section 39 of the IBP By
Laws to hold the election of Regional Governors at least one month prior
to the national convention of the IBP will prevent it from being politicized
since post-convention elections may otherwise lure the candidates into
engaging in unacceptable political practices, and; (2) holding the election
on May 31, 2003 will render it impossible for the outgoing IBP Board
from resolving protests in the election for governors not later than May
31, 2003, as expressed in Section 40 of the IBP By Laws, to wit:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an

election shall, within two days after the announcement of the results of
the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written
protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition,
the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board
of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the
contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not
later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

On April 26, 2003, the IBP Board denied the request for
reconsideration in its Resolution No. XV-2003-162.
On May 26, 2003, after the IBP national convention had been
adjourned in the afternoon of May 24, 2003, the petitioners filed
a Petition dated 23 May 2003 before the IBP Board seeking (1) the
postponement of the election for Regional Governors to the second or
third week of June 2003; and (2) the disqualification of respondent De
Vera from being elected Regional Governor for Eastern Mindanao Region.
ISSUE:
(1) whether this Court has jurisdiction over the present
controversy;
(2) whether petitioners have a cause of action against respondent
De Vera, the determination of which in turn requires the
resolution of two sub-issues, namely:
(a) whether the petition to disqualify respondent De Vera is
the proper remedy under the IBP By-Laws; and
(b) whether the petitioners are the proper parties to bring
this suit;
(3) whether the present Petition is premature;
(4) assuming that petitioners have a cause of action and that the
present petition is not premature, whether respondent
De Vera is qualified to run for Governor of the IBP
Eastern Mindanao Region;
HELD:
Anent the first issue, in his Respectful Comment respondent De Vera
contends that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction on the present
controversy. As noted earlier, respondent De Vera submits that the
election of the Officers of the IBP, including the determination of the
qualification of those who want to serve the IBP, is purely an internal
matter and exclusively within the jurisdiction of the IBP.
The contention is untenable. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution confers on the Supreme Court the power to promulgate
rules affecting the IBP, thus:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

....

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement

of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated
Bar, and the legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules
shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the
speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and
 quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by
the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Implicit in this constitutional grant is the power to supervise all the

activities of the IBP, including the election of its officers.
The authority of the Supreme Court over the IBP has its origins in
the 1935 Constitution. Section 13, Art. VIII thereof granted the Supreme
Court the power to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law. It reads:

SECTION 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the
admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all
courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice, and
procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of
Courts, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify
the same. The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or
supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.

The above-quoted sections in both the 1987 and 1935 Constitution

and the similarly worded provision in the intervening 1973
Constitution through all the years have been the sources of this Courts
authority to supervise individual members of the Bar. The term Bar
refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. Pursuant to this power of supervision, the Court initiated the
integration of the Philippine Bar by creating on October 5, 1970 the
Commission on Bar Integration, which was tasked to ascertain the
advisability of unifying the Philippine Bar. Not long after, Republic Act
No. 6397 was enacted and it confirmed the power of the Supreme Court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Finally, on January 1,
1973, in the per curiam Resolution of this Court captioned In the Matter
of the Integration of the Bar to the Philippines, we ordained the
Integration of the Philippine Bar in accordance with Rule 139-A, of the
Rules of Court, which we promulgated pursuant to our rule-making
power under the 1935 Constitution.
The IBP By-Laws, the document invoked by respondent De Vera in
asserting IBP independence from the Supreme Court, ironically
recognizes the full range of the power of supervision of the Supreme
Court over the IBP. For one, Section 77 of the IBP By-Laws vests on the
Court the power to amend, modify or repeal the IBP By-Laws, either motu
propio or upon recommendation of the Board of Governors of the IBP.
Also in Section 15, the Court is authorized to send observers in IBP
elections, whether local or national. Section 44 empowers the Court to
have the final decision on the removal of the members of the Board of
Governors.
On the basis of its power of supervision over the IBP, the Supreme
Court looked into the irregularities which attended the 1989 elections of
the IBP National Officers. In Bar Matter No. 491 entitled In the Matter of
the Inquiry into the 1989 Elections of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines the Court formed a committee to make an inquiry into the
1989 elections. The results of the investigation showed that the elections
were marred by irregularities, with the principal candidates for election
committing acts in violation of Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws. The Court
invalidated the elections and directed the conduct of special elections, as
well as explicitly disqualified from running threat the IBP members who
were found involved in the irregularities in the elections, in order to
impress upon the participants, in that electoral exercise the seriousness
of the misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with
which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the non-political
character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive
electioneering.
The Court likewise amended several provisions of the IBP By-Laws.
First, it removed direct election by the House of Delegates of the (a)
officers of the House of Delegates; (b) IBP President; and (c) Executive
Vice-President (EVP). Second, it restored the former system of the IBP
Board choosing the IBP President and the Executive Vice President (EVP)
from among themselves on a rotation basis (Section 47 of the By-Laws,
as amended) and the automatic succession by the EVP to the position of
the President upon the expiration of their common two-year term. Third,
it amended Sections 37 and 39 by providing that the Regional Governors
shall be elected by the members of their respective House of Delegates
and that the position of Regional Governor shall be rotated among the
different chapters in the region.
The foregoing considerations demonstrate the power of the Supreme
Court over the IBP and establish without doubt its jurisdiction to hear
and decide the present controversy.
In support of its stance on the second issue that the petitioners have
no cause of action against him, respondent De Vera argues that the IBP
By-Laws does not allow petitions to disqualify candidates for Regional
Governors since what it authorizes are election protests or post-election
cases under Section 40 thereof which reads:

SECTION 40. Election contests. - Any nominee desiring to contest an

election shall, within two days after the announcement of the results of
the elections, file with the President of the Integrated Bar a written
protest setting forth the grounds therefor. Upon receipt of such petition,
the President shall forthwith call a special meeting of the outgoing Board
of Governors to consider and hear the protest, with due notice to the
contending parties. The decision of the Board shall be announced not
later than the following May 31, and shall be final and conclusive.

Indeed, there is nothing in the present IBP By-Laws which sanctions

the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. The remedy it
provides for questioning the elections is the election protest. But this
remedy, as will be shown later, is not available to just anybody.
Before its amendment in 1989, the IBP By-Laws allowed the
disqualification of nominees for the position of regional governor. This
was carefully detailed in the former Section 39(4) of the IBP By-Laws, to
wit:

SECTION 39 (4) Disqualification proceedings. - Any question relating to

the eligibility of a candidate must be raised prior to the casting of ballots,
and shall be immediately decided by the Chairman. An appeal from such
decision may be taken to the Delegates in attendance who shall forthwith
resolve the appeal by plurality vote. Voting shall be by raising of hands.
The decision of the Delegates shall be final, and the elections shall
thereafter proceed. Recourse to the Board of Governors may be had in
accordance with Section 40.

The above-quoted sub-section was part of the provisions on

nomination and election of the Board of Governors. Before, members of
the Board were directly elected by the members of the House of Delegates
at its annual convention held every other year. The election was a two-
tiered process. First, the Delegates from each region chose by secret
plurality vote, not less than two nor more than five nominees for the
position of Governor for their Region. The names of all the nominees,
arranged by region and in alphabetical order, were written on the board
within the full view of the House, unless complete mimeographed copies
of the lists were distributed to all the Delegates. Thereafter, each
Delegate, or, in his absence, his alternate voted for only one nominee for
Governor for each Region. The nominee from every Region receiving the
highest number of votes was declared and certified elected by the
Chairman.
In the aftermath of the controversy which arose during the 1989 IBP
elections, this Court deemed it best to amend the nomination and
election processes for Regional Governors. The Court localized the
elections, i.e, each Regional Governor is nominated and elected by the
delegates of the concerned region, and adopted the rotation process
through the following provisions, to wit:

SECTION 37: Composition of the Board. - The Integrated Bar of the

Philippines shall be governed by a Board of Governors consisting of nine
(9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated in Section 3 of the
Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one Governor for each
region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that
region only. The position of Governor should be rotated among the
different chapters in the region.

SECTION 39: Nomination and election of the Governors. - At least one (1)

month before the national convention the delegates from each region
shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of which shall as
much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

The changes adopted by the Court simplified the election process and
thus made it less controversial. The grounds for disqualification were
reduced, if not totally eradicated, for the pool from which the Delegates
may choose their nominees is diminished as the rotation process
operates.
The simplification of the process was in line with this Courts vision of
an Integrated Bar which is non-political and effective in the discharge of
its role in elevating the standards of the legal profession, improving the
administration of justice and contributing to the growth and progress of
the Philippine society.
The effect of the new election process convinced this Court to remove
the provision on disqualification proceedings. Consequently, under the
present IBP By-Laws, the instant petition has no firm ground to stand
on.
Respondent De Vera likewise asseverates that under the aforequoted
Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws, petitioners are not the proper persons to
bring the suit for they are not qualified to be nominated in the elections
of regional governor for Eastern Mindanao. He argues that following the
rotation rule under Section 39 of the IBP By-Laws as amended, only IBP
members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to be
nominated.
Truly, with the applicability of Section 40 of the IBP By-Laws to the
present petition, petitioners are not the proper parties to bring the suit.
As provided in the aforesaid section, only nominees can file with the
President of the IBP a written protest setting forth the grounds therefor.
As claimed by respondent De Vera, and not disputed by petitioners, only
IBP members from Agusan del Sur and Surigao del Norte are qualified to
be nominated and elected at the election for the 16th Regional Governor
of Eastern Mindanao. This is pursuant to the rotation rule enunciated in
the aforequoted Sections 37 and 38 of the IBP By-Laws. Petitioner Garcia
is from Bukidnon IBP Chapter while the other petitioners, Ravanera and
Velez, are from the Misamis Oriental IBP Chapter. Consequently, the
petitioners are not even qualified to be nominated at the forthcoming
election.
On the third issue relating to the ripeness or prematurity of the
present petition.
This Court is one with the IBP Board in its position that it is
premature for the petitioners to seek the disqualification of respondent
De Vera from being elected IBP Governor for the Eastern Mindanao
Region. Before a member is elected governor, he has to be nominated
first for the post. In this case, respondent De Vera has not been
nominated for the post. In fact, no nomination of candidates has been
made yet by the members of the House of Delegates from Eastern
Mindanao. Conceivably too, assuming that respondent De Vera gets
nominated, he can always opt to decline the nomination.
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the
post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of
residence is in Paranaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM
IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the
way for his ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the
national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP
membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19
Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court
can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice,
thus:

Section 19. Registration. -

....

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular

Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member of the Chapter of
the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office or,
in the absence thereof, his residence is located. In no case shall
any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.
(Underscoring supplied)

It is clearly stated in the afore-quoted section of the By-Laws that it is

not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where
his place of residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose
the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when
he does not register his preference that he will become a member of the
Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains his office. The only
proscription in registering ones preference is that a lawyer cannot be a
member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact,
under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the
lawyer complies with the conditions set forth therein, thus:

SECTION 29-2. Membership - The Chapter comprises all members

registered in its membership roll. Each member shall maintain his
membership until the same is terminated on any of the grounds set forth
in the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or he transfers his membership to
another Chapter as certified by the Secretary of the latter, provided that
the transfer is made not less than three months immediately preceding
any Chapter election.

The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the
transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of
officers in the chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his
IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month
thereafter, IBP National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a
letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM
Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero, Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur
Chapter, informing them of respondent De Veras transfer and advising
them to make the necessary notation in their respective records. This
letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in
Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that De Veras transfer was made
effective sometime between August 1, 2001 and September 3, 2001. On
February 27, 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29-
12.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers
and Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every
other year. Between September 3, 2001 and February 27, 2003,
seventeen months had elapsed. This makes respondent De Veras
transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the
chapter elections held on February 27, 2003.
Petitioners likewise claim that respondent De Vera is disqualified
because he is not morally fit to occupy the position of governor of
Eastern Mindanao.
We are not convinced. As long as an aspiring member meets the
basic requirements provided in the IBP By-Laws, he cannot be barred.
The basic qualifications for one who wishes to be elected governor for a
particular region are: (1) he is a member in good standing of the IBP; 2)
he is included in the voters list of his chapter or he is not disqualified by
the Integration Rule, by the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar, or by the By-
Laws of the Chapter to which he belongs; (3) he does not belong to a
chapter from which a regional governor has already been elected, unless
the election is the start of a new season or cycle; and (4) he is not in the
government service.
 There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one
must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this
is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidates lies in
the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates.
Indeed, based on each members standard of morality, he is free to
nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic
requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of
a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his
disbarment or suspension from the practice of law by this Court, or
conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral
turpitude.
Petitioners, in assailing the morality of respondent De Vera on the
basis of the alleged sanction imposed by the Supreme Court during the
deliberation on the constitutionality of the plunder law, is apparently
referring to this Courts Decision dated 29 July 2002 in In Re: Published
Alleged Threats Against Members of the Court in the Plunder Law Case
Hurled by Atty. Leonard De Vera. In this case, respondent De Vera was
found guilty of indirect contempt of court and was imposed a fine in the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) for his remarks
contained in two newspaper articles published in the Inquirer. Quoted
hereunder are the pertinent portions of the report, with De Veras
statements written in italics.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Tuesday, November 6, 2001

Erap camp blamed for oust-Badoy maneuvers

Plunder Law

De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in
favor of a petition filed by Estradas lawyers to declare the plunder law
unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.

De Vera said he and his group were greatly disturbed by the rumors from
Supreme Court insiders.

Reports said that Supreme Court justices were tied 6-6 over the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law, with two other justices still
undecided and uttered most likely to inhibit, said Plunder Watch, a
coalition formed by civil society and militant groups to monitor the
prosecution of Estrada.

We are afraid that the Estrada camps effort to coerce, bribe, or influence
the justices- considering that it has a P500 million slush fund from the
aborted power grab that May-will most likely result in a pro-Estrada
decision declaring the Plunder Law either unconstitutional or vague, the
group said.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

SC under pressure from Erap pals, foes

Xxx
People are getting dangerously, passionate.. .emotionally charged. said
lawyer Leonard De Vera of the Equal Justice for All Movement and a
leading member of the Estrada Resign movement.

He voiced his concern that a decision by the high tribunal rendering the
plunder law unconstitutional would trigger mass actions, probably more
massive than those that led to People Power II.

Xxx

De Vera warned of a crisis far worse than the jueteng scandal that led to
People Power II if the rumor turned out to be true.

People wouldnt just swallow any Supreme Court decision that is basically

wrong. Sovereignty must prevail. 

In his Explanation submitted to the Court, respondent De Vera

admitted to have made said statements but denied to have uttered the
same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring
it into disrepute. He explained that he was merely exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right to freedom of speech.
The Court found the explanation unsatisfactory and held that the
statements were aimed at influencing and threatening the Court to
decide in favor of the constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
The ruling cannot serve as a basis to consider respondent De Vera
immoral. The act for which he was found guilty of indirect contempt does
not involve moral turpitude.
In Tak Ng v. Republic of the Philippines cited in Villaber v.
Commission on Elections, the Court defines moral turpitude as an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a
man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man, or
conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. The
determination of whether an act involves moral turpitude is a factual
issue and frequently depends on the circumstances attending the
violation of the statute.
In this case, it cannot be said that the act of expressing ones opinion
on a public interest issue can be considered as an act of baseness,
vileness or depravity. Respondent De Vera did not bring suffering nor
cause undue injury or harm to the public when he voiced his views on
the Plunder Law. Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner to invoke
the administrative case as evidence of respondent De Veras alleged
immorality.
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De
Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no
final judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding
him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the
discrimination he suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found
it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations
satisfactory in the absence of contrary proof. It is a basic rule on
evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In
this case, the petitioners have not shown how the administrative
complaint affects respondent De Veras moral fitness to run for governor.
 Finally, on the allegation that respondent de Vera or his handlers
had housed the delegates from Eastern Mindanao in the Century Park
Hotel to get their support for his candidacy, again petitioners did not
present any proof to substantiate the same. It must be emphasized that
bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
proof under our Rules of Court.

Soriano v. Dizon

A.C. No. 6792. January 25, 2006.

Per Curiam

FACTS:

While driving on his way home, a taxi driver (herein complainant)

overtook the car driven by herein respondent. Incensed, respondent
tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn. An
altercation resulted therefrom that got to the point that the respondent
fired and shot complainant hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh
of the respondent so the latter pushed him out and sped off.

ISSUE:

WON respondent’s guilt warrants disbarment.

RULING:

Yes. Moral turpitude has been defined as “everything which is done

contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness
or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty,
or good morals.” It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously
transgressed Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through
his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his unjust refusal to
satisfy his civil liabilities.

AGUIRRE VS RANA

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

 Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before
the scheduled mass oath-taking, complainant Aguirre filed against
respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
 The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the
lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of
Attorneys up to now.

 Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared

as counsel for a candidate in an election.

 On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is

a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law
to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant

accuses respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate
George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services.
Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to
prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

Issue:

 Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law

and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

 the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of
court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform
acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires
the use of legal knowledge or skill.

 The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a

privilege. It is limited to persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational
attainment, and even public trust since a lawyer is an officer of the
court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply
by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that
can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if
the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

 True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the
lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that
finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed
the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should know
that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court
and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
CRUZ VS MINA

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA
LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

 Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance,

as private prosecutor, where his father, Mariano Cruz, is the complaining
witness.

 The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies

his appearance as private prosecutor on the bases of Section 34 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in
Cantimbuhan v. Judge Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before
the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The petitioner
furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of
the public prosecutor and a written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing
him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

 However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied

permission for petitioner to appear as private prosecutor on the ground
that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in
conjunction with Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice
Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:

 whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior

court as an agent or friend of a party litigant

Ruling:

 The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an

inferior court, where the issues and procedure are relatively simple. In
inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity
without the supervision of a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of

the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an
agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation
personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.
Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party without the supervision of a member of the bar.

In re: Atty. MarcialEdillion, AM 1928, August 3, 1978

FACTS:
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on

the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment
on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees
due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976,
they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification
of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings

would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred
to as the Court Rule) — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws 

ISSUE:
1. whether or not a lawyer can compel to be a member of the
Integrated Bar.
2. Whether or not a lawyer is mandated to pay the monthly fees.
3. Whether or not the practice of law is a property right.

HELD:

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is

without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional
for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and
not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of
the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to
associate.

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is

not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and in
cohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer

to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State.

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar
(Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged
class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of
integration.

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty

provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due
process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether
the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation
and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure
is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which
penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as
unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.

Letter of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo Jr. BM 1370, May 9, 2005

FACTS:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) dues filed by petitioner Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr.
In his letter, dated 22 September 2004, petitioner sought exemption
from payment of IBP dues in the amount of P12,035.00 as alleged
unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He alleged that after
being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and
worked in, the USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year
2003. He maintained that he cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years
that he was working in the Philippine Civil Service since the Civil Service
law prohibits the practice of ones profession while in government service,
and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was working in the
USA.
On 05 October 2004, the letter was referred to the IBP for comment.
On 16 November 2004, the IBP submitted its comment stating inter
alia: that membership in the IBP is not based on the actual practice of
law; that a lawyer continues to be included in the Roll of Attorneys as
long as he continues to be a member of the IBP; that one of the
obligations of a member is the payment of annual dues as determined by
the IBP Board of Governors and duly approved by the Supreme Court as
provided for in Sections 9 and 10, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court; that
the validity of imposing dues on the IBP members has been upheld as
necessary to defray the cost of an Integrated Bar Program; and that the
policy of the IBP Board of Governors of no exemption from payment of
dues is but an implementation of the Courts directives for all members of
the IBP to help in defraying the cost of integration of the bar. It
maintained that there is no rule allowing the exemption of payment of
annual dues as requested by respondent, that what is allowed is
voluntary termination and reinstatement of membership. It asserted that
what petitioner could have done was to inform the secretary of the IBP of
his intention to stay abroad, so that his membership in the IBP could
have been terminated, thus, his obligation to pay dues could have been
stopped. It also alleged that the IBP Board of Governors is in the process
of discussing proposals for the creation of an inactive status for its
members, which if approved by the Board of Governors and by this
Court, will exempt inactive IBP members from payment of the annual
dues.
ISSUE:
whether or nor petitioner is entitled to exemption from payment of his
dues during the time that he was inactive in the practice of law that is,
when he was in the Civil Service from 1962-1986 and he was working
abroad from 1986-2003
HELD:
We rule in the negative.
An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer
must belong, as distinguished from bar association organized by
individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of
the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his shares in carrying out the
objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an
Integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are
required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of
payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the
purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
professional responsibility, breach of which constitutes sufficient reason
for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a
recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
The integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of
the entire lawyer population. This requires membership and financial
support of every attorney as condition sine qua non to the practice of law
and the retention of his name in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme
Court.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone.
He is free to attend or not to attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar
Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of his annual dues.
The Supreme Court, in order to foster the States legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the
Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules
concerning the admission to the practice of law and in the integration of
the Philippine Bar - which power required members of a privileged class,
such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the
expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite
apparent that the fee is, indeed, imposed as a regulatory measure,
designed to raise funds for carrying out the noble objectives and
purposes of integration.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, thus:

For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not
mean that the Court is attempting to levy a tax.

A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation,

while tax purpose of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent
power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to regulation, it
may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible
to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the
power to impose such exaction.

The only limitation upon the States power to regulate the privilege of law
is that the regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The
public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far outweighs the
slight inconvenience to a member resulting from his required payment of
the annual dues.

Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in

the IBP, of which no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory
nature of payment of dues subsists for as long as ones membership in
the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of, or the type of
practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from
payment of membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP,
he could have informed the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his
intention to stay abroad before he left. In such case, his membership in
the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay dues could
have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board
of Governors is in the process of discussing the situation of members
under inactive status and the nonpayment of their dues during such
inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty bound to comply with his
obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of
removal would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial
Edillon, in this wise:

. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its

being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we
do not here pause to consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the
Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondents right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a
regulatory measure is recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not
void as unreasonable or arbitrary.

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyers
public responsibilities.

As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar

is a privilege burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of
membership dues. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of
such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants such drastic move.
Santos, Jr. vs. Atty. Llamas, AC 4749

23JUL
FACTS:
Atty. Francisco Llamas was complained of not paying his IBP dues.
He was also cited in the complaint as not paying his professional tax or
PTR as it was intermittently indicated in his pleadings filed in court. It
was also an alleged falsity when he included his “IBP-Rizal 259060”
where in fact he was not in good standing. Petitioner cited that Atty.
Llamas was dismissed as Pasay City Judge. But later revealed that the
decision was reversed and he was subsequently promoted as RTC Judge
of Makati. He also had criminal case involving estafa but was appealed
pending in the Court of Appeals. In the numerous violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, he expressed willingness to settle the IBP
dues and plea for a more temperate application of the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
HELD:
YES. Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
year, or until he has paid his IBP dues.

Donton vs. Dr. Tansingco, AC No. 6057, June 27, 2006

FACTS:

In his Complaint dated 20 May 2003, Peter T. Donton ("complainant")

stated that he filed a criminal complaint for estafa thru falsification of a
public document against Duane O. Stier ("Stier"), Emelyn A. Maggay
("Maggay") and respondent, as the notary public who notarized the
Occupancy Agreement.

The disbarment complaint arose when respondent filed a counter-charge

for perjury against complainant. Respondent, in his affidavit-complaint,
stated that:

5. The OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT dated September 11, 1995 was

prepared and notarized by me under the following circumstances:

A. Mr. Duane O. Stier is the owner and long-time resident of a real

property located at No. 33 Don Jose Street, Bgy. San Roque,
Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.

B. Sometime in September 1995, Mr. Stier – a U.S. citizen and

thereby disqualified to own real property in his name – agreed
that the property be transferred in the name of Mr. Donton, a
Filipino.

C. Mr. Stier, in the presence of Mr. Donton, requested me to

prepare several documents that would guarantee recognition of
him being the actual owner of the property despite the transfer of
title in the name of Mr. Donton.

D. For this purpose, I prepared, among others, the OCCUPANCY

AGREEMENT, recognizing Mr. Stier’s free and undisturbed use of
the property for his residence and business operations. The
OCCUPANCY AGREEMENT was tied up with a loan which Mr.
Stier had extended to Mr. Donton.

Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy

Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is
disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant
prayed that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something
in violation of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.

In his Comment dated 19 August 2003, respondent claimed that

complainant filed the disbarment case against him upon the instigation
of complainant’s counsel, Atty. Bonifacio A. Alentajan, because
respondent refused to act as complainant’s witness in the criminal case
against Stier and Maggay. Respondent admitted that he "prepared and
notarized" the Occupancy Agreement and asserted its genuineness and
due execution.
In a Resolution dated 1 October 2003, the Court referred the matter to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violates the canon 1 and rule 1.02 of the
code.
HELD:

The Court finds respondent liable for violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02
of the Code.

A lawyer should not render any service or give advice to any client which
will involve defiance of the laws which he is bound to uphold and obey. A
lawyer who assists a client in a dishonest scheme or who connives in
violating the law commits an act which justifies disciplinary action
against the lawyer.

By his own admission, respondent admitted that Stier, a U.S. citizen,

was disqualified from owning real property. Yet, in his motion for
reconsideration, respondent admitted that he caused the transfer of
ownership to the parcel of land to Stier. Respondent, however, aware of
the prohibition, quickly rectified his act and transferred the title in
complainant’s name. But respondent provided "some safeguards" by
preparing several documents, including the Occupancy Agreement, that
would guarantee Stier’s recognition as the actual owner of the property
despite its transfer in complainant’s name. In effect, respondent advised
and aided Stier in circumventing the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership of lands by preparing said documents.

Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his

oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.
Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.

In 2005, Atty. Pedro Linsangan filed an administrative complaint against

Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino alleging that Atty. Tolentino, through his
paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, “pirated” a client of Atty. Linsangan. Said
client later executed an affidavit in support of Atty. Linsangan’s
allegations.
Atty. Linsangan also questioned the propriety of Labiano’s calling card
which appears as follows:
FRONT

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal

BACK
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.

In his defense, Atty. Tolentino denied knowing Labiano. He also denied

authorizing the printing of such calling cards.

ISSUES: 
1. Whether or not Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino encroached upon the
professional services of Atty. Pedro Linsangan.
2. Whether or not Atty. Tolentino is liable for the improper calling card of
Labiano.

HELD:
1. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rule 8.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. A lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor
induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good result
or reduced fees for his services. By recruiting Atty. Linsangan’s clients,
Atty. Tolentino committed an unethical, predatory overstep into
another’s legal practice.
2. Yes. Atty. Tolentino violated Rules 1.03, 2.03, and 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Although Atty. Tolentino initially denied
knowing Labiano, he admitted he actually knew her later in the
proceedings. It is thus clear that Labiano was connected to his law
office. Through Labiano’s actions, Atty. Tolentino’s law practice was
benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the
strength of Labiano’s word that Atty. Tolentino could produce a more
favorable result.
Labiano’s calling card is improper. The card made it appear that the law
office will finance legal actions for the clients. The rule is, a lawyer shall
not lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has
to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so
that the free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It
seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is handling as well
as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends
money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in
effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead
the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or
to accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict
to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity
to the client’s cause.
The phrase in the calling card which states “w/ financial assistance“,
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to
change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions.
However, since there is no substantial evidence to prove that Atty.
Tolentino had a personal and direct hand in the printing of said calling
cards, he cannot be punished with severity. At any rate, for all the
infractions Atty. Tolentino committed, he was suspended by the Supreme
Court for one year.

Atty. Vitriolo et al vsAttyDasig, AC No. 4984, April 01, 2003

FACTS:
This is an administrative case for disbarment filed against Atty.
Felina S. Dasig, an official of the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED). The charge involves gross misconduct of respondent in violation
of the Attorneys Oath for having used her public office to secure financial
spoils to the detriment of the dignity and reputation of the CHED.
Almost all complainants in the instant case are high-ranking officers
of the CHED. In their sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with this Court on
December 4, 1998, complainants allege that respondent, while she was
OIC of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, committed acts that are grounds for
disbarment under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
a) Sometime in August 1998 and during the effectivity of
Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of Legal Affairs
Service, CHED, she demanded from Betty C. Mangohon, a
teacher of Our Lady of Mariazel Educational Center in
Novaliches, Quezon City, the amount of P20,000.00 and later
reduced to P5,000.00 for the facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED...
b) Likewise, sometime in July to August 1998 and during the
effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rosalie B.
Dela Torre, a student, the amount of P18,000.00 to P20,000.00
for facilitation of her application for correction of name then
pending before the Legal Affairs Service, CHED
c) Likewise, sometime in September 1998 and during the
effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge of
Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Rocella G.
Eje, a student, the amount of P5,000.00 for facilitation of her
application for correction of name then pending before the
Legal Affairs Service, CHED. . . In addition, Respondent even
suggested to Ms. Eje to register her birth anew with full
knowledge of the existence of a prior registration
d) Likewise, sometime in August to September 1998 and during
the effectivity of Respondents designation as Officer-in-Charge
of Legal Affairs Service, CHED, she demanded from Jacqueline
N. Ng, a student, a considerable amount which was
subsequently confirmed to be P15,000.00 and initial fee of
P5,000.00 more or less for facilitation of her application for
correction of name then pending before the Legal Affairs
Service, CHED... In addition, the Respondent even suggested to
Ms. Ng to hire a lawyer who shall be chosen by Respondent
Dasig to facilitate the application for correction of name.
 Complainants likewise aver that respondent violated her oath as
attorney-at-law by filing eleven (11) baseless, groundless, and unfounded
suits before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, which were
subsequently dismissed.
ISSUE:
whether or not the respondent attorney-at-law, as Officer-in-Charge
(OIC) of Legal Services, CHED, may be disciplined by this Court for her
malfeasance, considering that her position, at the time of filing of the
complaint, was Chief Education Program Specialist, Standards
Development Division, Office of Programs and Standards, CHED
HELD:
In this case, the record shows that the respondent, on various
occasions, during her tenure as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, attempted to
extort from Betty C. Mangohon, Rosalie B. Dela Torre, Rocella G. Eje,
and Jacqueline N. Ng sums of money as consideration for her favorable
action on their pending applications or requests before her office. The
evidence remains unrefuted, given the respondents failure, despite the
opportunities afforded her by this Court and the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline to comment on the charges. We find that respondents
misconduct as a lawyer of the CHED is of such a character as to affect
her qualification as a member of the Bar, for as a lawyer, she ought to
have known that it was patently unethical and illegal for her to demand
sums of money as consideration for the approval of applications and
requests awaiting action by her office.
The Attorneys Oath is the source of the obligations and duties of
every lawyer and any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment,
suspension, or other disciplinary action. The Attorneys Oath imposes
upon every member of the bar the duty to delay no man for money or
malice. Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Respondents demands for sums of money to
facilitate the processing of pending applications or requests before her
office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the oath she took when
admitted to the Bar. Such actions likewise run contrary to Rule 1.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
A member of the Bar who assumes public office does not shed his
professional obligations. Hence, the Code of Professional Responsibility,
promulgated on June 21, 1988, was not meant to govern the conduct of
private practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in
government service. This is clear from Canon 6 of said Code. Lawyers in
government are public servants who owe the utmost fidelity to the public
service. Thus, they should be more sensitive in the performance of their
professional obligations, as their conduct is subject to the ever-constant
scrutiny of the public.
Respondents attempts to extort money from persons with
applications or requests pending before her office are violative of Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibits members
of the Bar from engaging or participating in any unlawful, dishonest, or
deceitful acts. Moreover, said acts constitute a breach of Rule 6.02 of the
Code which bars lawyers in government service from promoting their
private interests. Promotion of private interests includes soliciting gifts or
anything of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of
his office or which may be affected by the functions of his office.
Respondents conduct in office falls short of the integrity and good moral
character required from all lawyers, specially from one occupying a high
public office. For a lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain
from any act or omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government, she must also uphold the
dignity of the legal profession at all times and observe a high standard of
honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service
is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.
For her violation of the Attorneys Oath as well as of Rule 1.01 and
Rule 1.03 of Canon 1 and Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly for acts of dishonesty as well as
gross misconduct as OIC, Legal Services, CHED, we find that respondent
deserves not just the penalty of three years suspension from membership
in the Bar as well as the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors, but outright disbarment. Her name shall be stricken
off the list of attorneys upon finality of this decision.

Jonar Santiago vs. Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, A.C. No. 6252, October
5, 2004

Facts:

               Atty. Edison V. Rafanan, was allegedly notarized several

documents on different dates and failed to: a) make the proper notation
regarding the Community Tax Certificate (CTC) of the complainant; b)
enter the details of the notarized documents in the notarial register; and
c) make and execute the certification and enter his PTR and IBP
numbers in the documents he had notarized.  

               On the other hand, Atty. Rafanan admitted having

administered the oath but believed that non-notation of the Resident
Certificates as well as not entering the details of the notarized documents
in the notarial register was allowed.  Notation of Resident Certificates are
applied only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was not
mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before courts and other
government offices.  He further asserted that this was a popular practice
among notaries public in Nueva Ecija, some of whom were older
practitioners. 

Issues:

               What is the rule on registry of notarial documents?

Held:

               The court ruled in the negative.  The Notarial Law is explicit on
the obligations and duties of notaries public. They are required to certify
that the party to every document acknowledged before them has
presented the proper residence certificate (or exemption from the
residence tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of
 such certification. They are also required to maintain and keep a notarial
register; to enter therein all instruments notarized by them; and to give
to each instrument executed, sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a
number corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state therein]
the page or pages of [their] register, on which the same is recorded.
Failure to perform these duties would result in the revocation of their
commission as notaries public. 

               These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply

neglected, considering the degree of importance and evidentiary weight
attached to notarized documents. Notaries public entering into their
commissions are presumed to be aware of these elementary
requirements.

               It is intolerable that he did away with the basics of notarial

procedure allegedly because others were doing so. Being swayed by the
bad example of others is not an acceptable justification for breaking the
law. 

               Disbarment, however, cannot be granted considering the

nature of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of Atty.
Rafanan. A fine of P3, 000 is imposed with a warning that similar
infractions in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Atty. Khan Jr. vs Atty. Simbillo AC No. 5299, August 19, 2003

FACTS:
An advertisement in Philippine Daily Inquirer came out which reads:
“ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SPECIALIST 532-4333/521-2667.”
SC ordered its staff to call the number and ask some information.
Espeleta called the number and the wife of Atty. Rizalino Simbillo answered
who said that his husband was an expert in handling annulment cases
and guarantees a court decree within 4-6 month.  The services of Atty.
Simbillo is for P48,000. half of which is payable at the filing of the case
and the balance after the decision has been rendered.
Similar advertisement also appeared in The Philippine Star and Manila
Bulletin.
Khan, Assist. Court Administrator, filed a case against Simbillo for violating
the Code of Professional Responsibility, Rule 2.03 and 3.01.
Simbillo admitted that he caused the advertisement but he argued that
solicitation and advertisement is not prohibited per se and that it is
about time to change our views about the prohibition on advertising and
solicitation.  He also said that the interest of the public is not served by
the prohibition and suggested that the ban be lifted.
IBP recommended that Simbillo be suspended for 1 year and that repetition
of similar act will be dealt with more severely.
While the case was being investigated upon by the court, Simbillo again
advertised his legal services, for 2 times, in the Buy & Sell Free Ads
Magazine.

ISSUE:
W/N Simbillo violated the Code of Professional Responsibility
 HELD:
YES!
Rule 2.03 provides a lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business while Rule 3.01 states that a
lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or
claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.
It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.  It
is a profession in which the duty to public service, not money, is the
primary consideration.  The gaining of livelihood should be a secondary
consideration.
Aside from advertising himself as an “Annulment of Marriage Specialist,” his
assurance of his clients that an annulment may be obtained in 4-6
months from the filing of the case encourages people, who might other
have 2nd thought, to dissolve their marriage.
Solicitation of legal business is not proscribed.  However, solicitation must
be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession.  The use of simple
signs stating the name/s of the lawyers, the office and residence address
and the fields of expertise, as well as advertisement in legal periodicals
bearing the same brief data, are permissible.
The use of calling cards is now acceptable.

BR Sebastian Enterprises, Inc. vs CA GR No. L-41862, February7, 1992

FACTS:
Eulogio B. Reyes, now deceased, filed an action for damages against the
Director of Public Works and BR Sebastian Enterprises. Trial court found
B.R. Sebastian liable for damages but absolved other defendants. B.R.
Sebastian, thru its counsel, the law firm of Baizas, Alberto and
Associates, timely appealed the adverse decision to the respondent Court
of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal, Eulogio B. Reyes died
and was substituted by his heirs. On February 1974, B.R Sebastian,
thru its counsel of record, received notice to file Appellant’s Brief within
45 days from receipt thereof; however, it failed to comply. Court of
Appeals issued a Resolution requiring said counsel to show cause why
the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief
within the reglementary period. On September 1974, Court of Appeals
dismissed the appeal. On September 1974, petitioner, this time thru the
BAIZAS LAW OFFICE, filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution
dismissing its appeal alleging that as a result of the death of Atty.
Crispin Baizas, senior partner in the law firm. Atty. Rodolfo Espiritu, the
lawyer who handled this case in the trial court and who is believed to
have also attended to the preparation of the Appellant’s Brief but failed
to submit it through oversight and inadvertence, had also left the firm.
Court denied the motion for reconsideration. No action was taken by
petitioner from within the period to file a petition for review, the same
became final and executory, and the records of the case were remanded.
Trial court issued a writ of execution. But on November 1975, petitioner
filed with Court of Appeals a Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction but was subsequently
denied. Petitioner filed prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for
preliminary injunction with the Supreme Court to Court of Appeals
denial of petitioner’s motion. SC required them to comment and soon
after, some amendments were made. Ultimately, the petition was denied.
But on May 1976, petitioner filed a motion for its reconsideration
claiming that since it was deprived of the right to appeal without fault on
its part, the petition should be given due course. Supreme Court
reconsidered and required both parties to submit simultaneously their
respective Memoranda.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion to reinstate its appeal,
previously dismissed for failure to file the Appellant’s Brief

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court held that no fraud is involved in the present
case. What was present was simple negligence on the part of petitioner’s
counsel, which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner thus
failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant a favorable action on its
plea. Granting that the power or discretion to reinstate an appeal that
had been dismissed is included in or implied from the power or
discretion to dismiss an appeal, still such power or discretion must be
exercised upon a showing of good and sufficient cause, in like manner as
the power or discretion vested in the appellate court to allow extensions
of time for the filing of briefs. There must be such a showing which
would call for, prompt and justify its exercise. Otherwise, it cannot and
must not be upheld. The “confusion” in the office of the law firm
following the death of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for
its failure to file the Brief. With Baizas’ death, the responsibility of Atty.
Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel remained until
withdrawal by the former of their appearance in the manner provided by
the Rules of Court. The law firm should have re-assigned the case to
another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner
provided by the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the
services of a new lawyer. The rule is settled that negligence of counsel
binds the client. Moreover, petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when
it failed to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case.

Petition DISMISSED.

Diana Ramos vs. Atty. Jose R. Imbang, AC No. 6788, August23, 2007
FACTS:

In 1992, the complainant Diana Ramos sought the assistance of

respondent Atty. Jose R. Imbang in filing civil and criminal actions
against the spouses Roque and Elenita Jovellanos. She gave
respondent P8,500 as attorney's fees but the latter issued a receipt
for P5,000 only.
 
The complainant tried to attend the scheduled hearings of her cases
against the Jovellanoses. Oddly, respondent never allowed her to enter
the courtroom and always told her to wait outside. He would then come
out after several hours to inform her that the hearing had been cancelled
and rescheduled. This happened six times and for each appearance in
court, respondent charged her P350.
 
After six consecutive postponements, the complainant became
suspicious. She personally inquired about the status of her cases in the
trial courts of Bian and San Pedro, Laguna. She was shocked to learn
that respondent never filed any case against the Jovellanoses and that
he was in fact employed in the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).

ISSUE:
Whether or not Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with
honesty and integrity.
HELD:

Lawyers are expected to conduct themselves with honesty and

integrity. More specifically, lawyers in government service are expected to
be more conscientious of their actuations as they are subject to public
scrutiny. They are not only members of the bar but also public servants
who owe utmost fidelity to public service.
 
Government employees are expected to devote themselves completely to
public service. For this reason, the private practice of profession is
prohibited. Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees provides:
 
Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. -- In addition to
acts and omissions of public officials and employees now
prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any
public official and employee and are hereby declared
unlawful:
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto,
public officials and employees during their incumbency shall
not:
 
xxx xxx xxx
 
(1) Engage in the private practice of profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict with their official function.
 
Thus, lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they
are expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective
offices.
 
In this instance, respondent received P5,000 from the complainant and
issued a receipt on July 15, 1992 while he was still connected with the
PAO. Acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client
relationship. Respondent's admission that he accepted money from the
complainant and the receipt confirmed the presence of an attorney-client
relationship between him and the complainant. Moreover, the receipt
showed that he accepted the complainant's case while he was still a
government lawyer. Respondent clearly violated the prohibition on
private practice of profession.
 
Aggravating respondent's wrongdoing was his receipt of attorney's fees.
The PAO was created for the purpose of providing free legal assistance to
indigent litigants. Section 14(3), Chapter 5, Title III, Book V of the
Revised Administrative Code provides:
 
Sec. 14. xxx
 
The PAO shall be the principal law office of the Government
in extending free legal assistance to indigent persons in
criminal, civil, labor, administrative and other quasi-judicial
cases.
 
As a PAO lawyer, respondent should not have accepted attorney's fees
from the complainant as this was inconsistent with the office's
mission. Respondent violated the prohibition against accepting legal fees
other than his salary.
 
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
 
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION,
OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT
FOR THE LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
 
Every lawyer is obligated to uphold the law. This undertaking includes
the observance of the above-mentioned prohibitions blatantly violated by
respondent when he accepted the complainant's cases and received
attorney's fees in consideration of his legal services. Consequently,
respondent's acceptance of the cases was also a breach of Rule 18.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility because the prohibition on the
private practice of profession disqualified him from acting as the
complainant's counsel.
 
Aside from disregarding the prohibitions against handling private cases
and accepting attorney's fees, respondent also surreptitiously deceived
the complainant. Not only did he fail to file a complaint against the
Jovellanoses (which in the first place he should not have done),
respondent also led the complainant to believe that he really filed an
action against the Jovellanoses. He even made it appear that the cases
were being tried and asked the complainant to pay his appearance fees
for hearings that never took place. These acts constituted dishonesty, a
violation of the lawyer's oath not to do any falsehood.
 
Respondent's conduct in office fell short of the integrity and good moral
character required of all lawyers, specially one occupying a public office.
Lawyers in public office are expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the citizenry in
government but also uphold the dignity of the legal profession at all
times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. A
government lawyer is a keeper of public faith and is burdened with a
high degree of social responsibility, higher than his brethren in private
practice.
 
There is, however, insufficient basis to find respondent guilty of violating
Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent did
not hold the money for the benefit of the complainant but accepted it as
his attorney's fees. He neither held the amount in trust for the
complainant (such as an amount delivered by the sheriff in satisfaction
of a judgment obligation in favor of the client) nor was it given to him for
a specific purpose (such as amounts given for filing fees and bail
bond). Nevertheless, respondent should return the P5,000 as he, a
government lawyer, was not entitled to attorney's fees and not allowed to
accept them.

Huyssen vs. Gutierrez

A.C. No. 6707, March 24, 2006

(Legal Ethics)

FACTS

Respondent Atty. Gutierrez, a Bureau of Immigration and Deportation

officer, received US$20,000 from complainant Huyssen. Accused of
falsely representing that it was needed in complainant’s application for
visa and failing to return the same, respondent denied misappropriating
the said amount, claiming that he gave it to a certain Atty. Mendoza who
assisted complainant and children in their application for visa. He failed
however to substantiate such denial.

Atty. Gutierrez had many alibis on why the money could not immediately
be returned to the complainant, and promised her several times that he
would repay her out of his personal funds. He even issued personal post-
dated checks on this, but which later bounced.
ISSUE

Whether or not respondent’s conduct violated the Code of Professional

Responsibility and merits the penalty of disbarment?

RULING

Yes, the respondent should be disbarred.

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. It is

settled that denial, which is inherently a weak defense, to be believed
must be buttressed by a strong evidence of non-culpability. The
evidence, respondent’s letters to the complainant, shows that he made it
appear that the US$20,000 was officially deposited with the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation. If this is true, how come only Petty Cash
Vouchers were issued by respondent to complainant to prove his receipt
of the said sum and official receipts therefore were never issued by the
said Bureau? Also, why would respondent issue his personal checks to
cover the return of the money to complainant if said amount was really
officially deposited with the Bureau of Immigration? All these actions of
respondent point to the inescapable conclusion that respondent received
the money from complainant and appropriated the same for his personal
use.

Lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official task have

more restrictions than lawyers in private practice. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer who holds a
responsible public office.

Considering that respondent was able to perpetrate the fraud by taking

advantage of his position with the Board of Special Inquiry of the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation, makes it more reprehensible as it has
caused damage to the reputation and integrity of said office. It is
submitted that respondent has violated Rule 6.02 of Canon 6 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which reads:

"A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere
with his public duties."

Also, the act of issuing a bouncing check shows moral turpitude.

Respondent's acts are more despicable, for not only did he
misappropriate the money of complainant; worse, he had the gall to
prepare receipts with the letterhead of the BID and issued checks to
cover up his misdeeds.

Time and again, we have declared that the practice of law is a noble
profession. It is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are
competent intellectually, academically and morally.

A lawyer must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings

with his clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a
manner beyond reproach. More importantly, possession of good moral
character must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the
privilege of law practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the
revocation of such privilege.

As a lawyer, who was also a public officer, respondent miserably failed to

cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal profession.
Section 27 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for, among other acts, gross
misconduct in office.

Ali vs Atty. Bubong, AC No. 4018, March 8, 2005

FACTS:
On 26 February 1993, former President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 41 adopting in toto the conclusion reached by
Secretary Drilon and ordering respondents dismissal from government
service. Respondent subsequently questioned said administrative order
before this Court through a petition for certiorari, mandamus, and
prohibition claiming that the Office of the President did not have the
authority and jurisdiction to remove him from office. He also insisted
that respondents in that petition violated the laws on security of tenure
and that respondent Reynaldo V. Maulit, then the administrator of the
LRA committed a breach of Civil Service Rules when he abdicated his
authority to resolve the administrative complaint against him (herein
respondent).
In a Resolution dated 15 September 1994, we dismissed the petition
for failure on the part of petitioner to sufficiently show that public
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
questioned order. Respondent thereafter filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied with finality in our Resolution of 15
November 1994.
On the basis of the outcome of the administrative case, complainant
is now before us, seeking the disbarment of respondent. Complainant
claims that it has become obvious that respondent had proven himself
unfit to be further entrusted with the duties of an attorney and that he
poses a serious threat to the integrity of the legal profession.
In his Comment, respondent maintains that there was nothing
irregular with his issuance of TCT No. T-2821 in the name of the Bauduli
Datus. According to him, both law and jurisprudence support his stance
that it was his ministerial duty, as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City,
to act on applications for land registration on the basis only of the
documents presented by the applicants. In the case of the Bauduli
Datus, nothing in the documents they presented to his office warranted
suspicion, hence, he was duty-bound to issue TCT No. T-2821 in their
favor.
Respondent also insists that he had nothing to do with the dismissal
of criminal complaint for violation of the Anti-Squatting Law allegedly
committed by Hadji Serad Abdullah and the latters co-defendants.
Respondent explains that his participation in said case was a result of
the two subpoenas duces tecum issued by the investigating prosecutor
who required him to produce the various land titles involved in said
dispute. He further claims that the dismissal of said criminal case by the
Secretary of Justice was based solely on the evidence presented by the
parties. Complainants allegation, therefore, that he influenced the
outcome of the case is totally unjustified.
ISSUE:
whether or not respondent may be disbarred for grave misconduct
committed while he was in the employ of the government. We resolve this
question in the affirmative
HELD:
The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a
lawyer simply because he has joined the government service. In fact, by
the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules governing the conduct
of lawyers shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official tasks. Thus, where a lawyers misconduct as a government
official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to
show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds. Although the general rule is that a lawyer who
holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the bar
for infractions he committed as a government official, he may, however,
be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his
oath a member of the legal profession.
Indeed, in the case of Collantes v. Atty. Vicente C. Renomeron, we
ordered the disbarment of respondent on the ground of his dismissal
from government service because of grave misconduct. Quoting the late
Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, we declared

[A] person takes an oath when he is admitted to the bar which is

designed to impress upon him his responsibilities. He thereby becomes
an officer of the court on whose shoulders rests the grave responsibility
of assisting the courts in the proper, fair, speedy and efficient
administration of justice. As an officer of the court he is subject to a rigid
discipline that demands that in his every exertion the only criterion be
that truth and justice triumph. This discipline is what has given the law
profession its nobility, its prestige, its exalted place. From a lawyer, to
paraphrase Justice Felix Frankfurter, are expected those qualities of
truth-speaking, a high sense of honor, full candor, intellectual honesty,
and the strictest observance of fiduciary responsibility all of which,
throughout the centuries, have been compendiously described as moral
character.

Similarly, in Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, et al. v. Atty. Felina Dasig, this

Court found sufficient basis to disbar respondent therein for gross
misconduct perpetrated while she was the Officer-in-Charge of Legal
Services of the Commission on Higher Education. As we had explained in
that case

[A] lawyer in public office is expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and confidence of the
citizenry in government, she must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high standard of honesty and fair
dealing. Otherwise said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of the
public faith and is burdened with high degree of social responsibility,
perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

In the case at bar, respondents grave misconduct, as established by

the Office of the President and subsequently affirmed by this Court,
deals with his qualification as a lawyer. By taking advantage of his office
as the Register of Deeds of Marawi City and employing his knowledge of
the rules governing land registration for the benefit of his relatives,
respondent had clearly demonstrated his unfitness not only to perform
the functions of a civil servant but also to retain his membership in the
bar. Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is explicit on
this matter. It reads:

Rule 6.02 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public
position to promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter
to interfere with his public duties.

Respondents conduct manifestly undermined the peoples confidence in

the public office he used to occupy and cast doubt on the integrity of the
legal profession. The ill-conceived use of his knowledge of the intricacies
of the law calls for nothing less than the withdrawal of his privilege to
practice law.
As for the letter sent by Bainar Ali, the deceased complainants
daughter, requesting for the withdrawal of this case, we cannot possibly
favorably act on the same as proceedings of this nature cannot be
interrupted or terminated by reason of desistance, settlement,
compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the charges or failure of the
complainant to prosecute the same. As we have previously explained in
the case of Irene Rayos-Ombac v. Atty. Orlando A. Rayos:

A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or

lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether, on the
basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and
grossly immoral conduct has been duly proven. This rule is premised on
the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or
disbarment is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private
grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of
justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them.
The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer
of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of
the court to the attorneys alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and
has generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may
have in the proper administrative of justice.

Olazo vs. Justice Tinga, AM No. 10-5-7-SC, December 07, 2010

FACTS:
In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a
parcel of land situated in Barangay Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of
Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres
Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition
pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, issued on January 7, 1986, and
Proclamation No. 172, issued on October 16, 1987.
 
To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was
issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, creating a
Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared
open for disposition. The Committee on Awards was headed by the
Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the Committee
members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and
Pateros (from 1987 to 1998); the respondents district includes the areas
covered by the proclamations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the
private practice of their profession during their incumbency.

HELD:
As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the
private practice of their profession during their incumbency. By way of
exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his or her
profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is
authorized by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice
will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her official functions. The
last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In
case of lawyers separated from the government service who are covered
under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year
prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with.
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this
restriction and prohibits lawyers, after leaving the government service, to
accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is the term intervene
which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who has
the power to influence the proceedings. Otherwise stated, to fall within
the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter
which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power
to influence the outcome of the proceedings.
 
As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the
respondent previously interfered with the sales application covering
Manuels land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the
respondent was engaged in the practice of law. At face value, the legal
service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the preparation of
a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc., we specifically described
private practice of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of
the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public
as a lawyer.
 
In any event, even granting that respondents act fell within the
definition of practice of law, the available pieces of evidence are
insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the
Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be
presented before it. These are matters for the complainant to prove and
we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the
respondents favor.
 
Violation of Rule 1.01
 
Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral
or deceitful conduct. From the above discussion, we already struck down
the complainants allegation that respondent engaged in an unauthorized
practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.
 
We find that a similar treatment should be given to the
complainants claim that the respondent violated paragraph 4(1) of
Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not
a qualified applicant. The matter of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguezs
qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the
proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of
the DENR in the decision dated April 3, 2004, when the DENR gave due
course to his sales application over the subject land. We are, at this
point, bound by this finding.
 
As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed
by the Office of the President, the Court of Appeals and, finally, the
Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R. No.
173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review
on certiorari filed by the complainant after finding, among others, that
no reversible error was committed by the Court of Appeals in its decision.
 
All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of
disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, the burden rests on
the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers. The respondent generally is
under no obligation to prove his/her defense, until the burden shifts to
him/her because of what the complainant has proven. Where no case
has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.
With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case
against the respondent for the complainants failure to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the former committed unethical infractions
warranting the exercise of the Courts disciplinary power.

Que vs. Atty. Revilla Jr. AC No. 7054,December 4, 2009

FACTS:

In a complaint for disbarment, Conrado Que (complainant) accused Atty.

Anastacio Revilla, Jr. (respondent) before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court:
 
(1) The respondents abuse of court remedies and processes
by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA), two petitions for annulment of title before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of
judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for
declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively, subject
cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) and RTC in the unlawful
detainer case rendered against the respondents
clients. The respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised
the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and RTC
knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over
the unlawful detainer case. The respondent also
repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings
titles over the property subject of the unlawful detainer
case;
 
(2) The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing
the subject cases in order to impede, obstruct, and
frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own
personal gain and to defeat the right of the complainant
and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments
in the unlawful detainer case;
 
(3) The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his
adversary and the courts by resorting to falsehood and
 deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due
administration of justice. The respondent asserted
falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of the petition for annulment of judgment by
fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding
judge in open court which allegedly denied the motion to
dismiss filed by the respondents in the said case. The
complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover
up his lack of preparation; the respondent also deceived
his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the
above falsehood.
 
(4) The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that
unjustly maligned and defamed the good name and
reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico),
the previous counsel of the respondents clients.
 
(5) The respondents deliberate, fraudulent and unauthorized
appearances in court in the petition for annulment of
judgment for 15 litigants, three of whom are already
deceased;
 
(6) The respondents willful and fraudulent appearance in the
second petition for annulment of title as counsel for the
Republic of the Philippines without being authorized to do
so.
 
 
Additionally, the complaint accused the respondent of representing
fifty-two (52) litigants in Civil Case No. Q-03-48762 when no such
authority was ever given to him.

ISSUE:
whether or not the respondent can be held liable for the imputed
unethical infractions and professional misconduct, and the penalty these
transgressions should carry.
HELD:

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the respondent

committed various acts of professional misconduct and thereby failed to
live up to the exacting ethical standards imposed on members of the Bar.
We cannot agree, however, that only a penalty of one-year suspension
from the practice of law should be imposed. Neither should we limit
ourselves to the originally recommended penalty of suspension for two
(2) years.
 
Given the respondents multiple violations, his past record as
previously discussed, and the nature of these violations which shows the
readiness to disregard court rules and to gloss over concerns for the
orderly administration of justice, we believe and so hold that the
appropriate action of this Court is to disbar the respondent to keep him
away from the law profession and from any significant role in the
administration of justice which he has disgraced. He is a continuing risk,
too, to the public that the legal profession serves. Not even his ardor and
overzealousness in defending the interests of his client can save
him. Such traits at the expense of everything else, particularly the
integrity of the profession and the orderly administration of justice, this
Court cannot accept nor tolerate.
 
Additionally, disbarment is merited because this is not the
respondents first ethical infraction of the same nature. We penalized him
in Plus Builders, Inc. and Edgardo Garcia versus Atty. Anastacio E.
Revilla for his willful and intentional falsehood before the court; for
misuse of court procedures and processes to delay the execution of a
judgment; and for collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of
law. We showed leniency then by reducing his penalty to suspension for
six (6) months. We cannot similarly treat the respondent this time; it is
clear that he did not learn any lesson from his past experience and since
then has exhibited traits of incorrigibility. It is time to put a finis to the
respondents professional legal career for the sake of the public, the
profession and the interest of justice.

People vs. Hon Maceda, GR No. 89591-96, January 24, 2000

FACTS:

On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking

reconsideration of our August 13, 1990 decision in these cases. In said
resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda
committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8,
1989 giving custody over private respondent Avelino T. Javellana to the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique,
Atty. Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos.
3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason was shown why private
respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial
Jail. The trial courts order specifically provided for private respondents
detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario. However, private
respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be
held as detention prisoner in said residence.

This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because
private respondent was not detained in the residence of Atty. Del
Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man,
including engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July
30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear as counsel in Criminal
Case No. 4262, the latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.

ISSUE:
(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990,
prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to
Criminal Case No. 4262?
(2) Is Atty. now (Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty.
Javellana? and
(3) Since it appears that Atty. (now Judge) del Rosario never really held
and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty.
Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant
for his arrest should forthwith be issued?
HELD:

In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.

After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999,

the trial court resumed hearing Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier,
on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the
trial courts custody order and the imprisonment of private respondent
Javellana in the provincial jail.

On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the

Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking to clarify whether the June 18,
1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for clarification
filed by the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.

Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of

criminal cases against him. By such arrest, he is deemed to be under the
custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the
custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and
detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios residence in his official capacity as the
clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario
was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused
Javellana and the succeeding clerk of court must be deemed the
custodian under the same undertaking.

In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life

no longer exist. Thus, the trial courts order dated August 8, 1989 giving
custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be
detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.

Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private

respondent Javellana is not allowed to practice his profession as a
necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial
courts order was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed
liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention prisoner." The
prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262,
but to all other cases as well, except in cases where private respondent
would appear in court to defend himself. Spped

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he

is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed in actual
restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the
pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to
be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all
prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence
can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or
occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This
is a necessary consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must be confined in the
Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has
dragged on for more than ten (10) years, the presiding judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to
continue with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch
and to avoid further delay.

Zeta vs. Malinao, AM No. P-220, December 20, 1978

FACTS:

Administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao court interpreter of

the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan, Samar charging as follows:

l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has

been appearing in the municipal court of this town for
parties like attorney when he is not an attorney. Reliable
information also says he has been appearing in the
municipal courts of Daram, Zumarraga, Talalora and even
Sta. Rita. He is not authorized to do so we believe. He makes
it his means of livelihood as he collects fees from his clients.
He competes with attorneys but does not pay anything. We
believe that his doing so should be stopped for a good
government. These facts can be checked with records of
those municipal courts.

2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in

the Court of First Instance he would instigate persons,
especially in his barrio to grab land rob or coerce. In fact he
has cases in the municipal court in this town involving
himself and his men. He incite them telling them not to be
afraid as he is a court employee and has influence over the
judges. Those persons being ignorant would believe him and
so would commit crimes. This act of Mr. Malinao is contrary
to good order and peace as he is using his supposed
influences to urge persons to commit crimes.

3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that

he is unfaithfully filing his time record in the CFI. Even he
has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes
he would fill his time record as present. He receives salary
for those absent days. This can be checked with time record
he has submitted and if he has any application for leave. He
may try to cure it by submitting application for leave but this
should not be allowed as he has already committed crime.

4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL

SERVICE LAW.-WE have reliable information it is prohibited
for a civil service employee to engage in private practice any
profession or business without permission from the
Department Head. Mr. Malinao we are sure has not secured
that permission because he should not be allowed to
practice as he is not an attorney. If that were so, he violated
that Executive Order and Civil Service Law and we are
urgently and earnestly requesting the Commissioner of Civil
Service to investigate him on this. If warranted he should be
 given the corresponding penalty as dismissal because we
believe he deserve it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Department of Justice had jurisdiction over the
matter.
HELD:

We have carefully reviewed the record, and We find the conclusions of

fact of the Investigator to be amply supported by the evidence,
particularly the documents consisting of public records and the
declarations of the judges before whom respondent had appeared. It is
clear to Us that respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various
municipal courts without prior permission of his superiors in violation of
civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by
making it appear therein that he was present in his office on occasions
when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as counsel,
without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes
illegal practice of law. We, therefore, adopt the above findings of fact of
the Investigator.

The defense of respondent that "his participation (sic) for defendants'

cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by
reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if
true, carry the day for him, considering that in appearing as counsel in
court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse, he
falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence from his office
on the dates in question. Indeed, the number of times that respondent
acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he
was doing it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than
pure love of justice.

In the premises, it is quite obvious that the offense committed by

respondent is grave, hence it warrants a more drastic sanction than that
of reprimand recommended by Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than
to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of
the bar are allowed to practice.

Tan and Pagayokan vs. Balajadia, GR No. 169517, March 14,2006

FACTS:

Petitioners allege that on May 8, 2005, respondent filed a criminal case

against them with the Office of the City of Prosecutor of Baguio City for
usurpation of authority, grave coercion and violation of city tax
ordinance due to the alleged illegal collection of parking fees by
petitioners from respondent. In paragraph 5 of the complaint-affidavit,
respondent asserted that he is a "practicing lawyer based in Baguio City
with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road,
Baguio City." However, certifications issued by the Office of the Bar
Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines showed that
respondent has never been admitted to the Philippine Bar. Hence,
petitioners claim that respondent is liable for indirect contempt for
misrepresenting himself as a lawyer.
In his Comment, respondent avers that the allegation in paragraph 5 of
the complaint-affidavit that he is a practicing lawyer was an honest
mistake. He claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared
the subject complaint-affidavit which was patterned after Atty. Aquino’s
complaint-affidavit. It appears that Atty. Aquino had previously filed a
complaint-affidavit against petitioners involving the same subject matter.

Respondent claims that two complaint-affidavits were drafted by the

same secretary; one for the May 5, 2005 parking incident at 10:00
o’clock in the morning and another for the parking incident on the same
date but which occurred at 1:00 o’clock in the afternoon. Respondent
insists that the complaint-affidavit regarding the 1:00 o’clock parking
incident correctly alleged that he is "a businessman with office address
at Room B-204, 2/F Lopez Building, Session Road, Baguio
City." However, the complaint-affidavit regarding the 10:00 o’clock
parking incident, which is the subject of the instant petition, erroneously
referred to him as a practicing lawyer because Atty. Aquino’s secretary
copied verbatim paragraph 5 of Atty. Aquino’s complaint-affidavit. Hence,
it was inadvertently alleged that respondent is a "practicing lawyer based
in Baguio City with office address at Room B-207, 2/F Lopez Building,
Session Road, Baguio City," which statement referred to the person of
Atty. Aquino and his law office address.

Liza Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, executed an affidavit admitting

the mistake in the preparation of the complaint-affidavit. Respondent
alleged that he did not read the complaint-affidavit because he assumed
that the two complaint-affidavits contained the same allegations with
respect to his occupation and office address. Respondent claims that he
had no intention of misrepresenting himself as a practicing lawyer.

In their Reply, petitioners reiterate that respondent should be made

liable for indirect contempt for having made untruthful statements in the
complaint-affidavit and that he cannot shift the blame to Atty. Aquino’s
secretary.

ISSUE:
 Whether OR not respondent is liable for indirect contempt
HELD:

we have ruled that the unauthorized practice of law by assuming to be

an attorney and acting as such without authority constitutes indirect
contempt which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both. The
liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section 3(e), Rule 71
of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt and the acts
are punished because they are an affront to the dignity and authority of
the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice. In
determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the rule that
intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished unless the
evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s claim

that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public. It was
a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino. The
affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave rise to
the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to the
documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these circumstances
show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s complaint-
affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is a

practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself,
establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases
where we found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law, the
party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on behalf
of his client; appearing before court hearings as an attorney; manifesting
before the court that he will practice law despite being previously denied
admission to the bar; or deliberately attempting to practice law and
holding out himself as an attorney through circulars with full knowledge
that he is not licensed to do so.

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that respondent

acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law. Consequently,
he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt considering his lack of
intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s

deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as such
without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and
circumspect in his future actions.

Lijauco vs. Atty. Terrado AC No. 6317, August 31, 2006

FACTS:

On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint was filed by

complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against respondent Atty. Rogelio P.
Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of
an officer of the court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him
despite receipt of payment representing attorney’s fees.

According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent

sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to assist in recovering her
deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the
amount of P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot
located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as Lot No. 408-C-2
and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the
subject of a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession then pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed as
LRC Case No. B-2610.

Complainant alleged that respondent failed to appear before the trial

court in the hearing for the issuance of the Writ of Possession and did
not protect her interests in the Compromise Agreement which she
subsequently entered into to end LRC Case No. B-2610.

Respondent denied the accusations against him. He averred that the

P70,000.00 he received from complainant was payment for legal services
for the recovery of the deposit with Planters Development Bank and did
not include LRC Case No. B-2610 pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation. On September 21, 2005,
the Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding respondent
guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provide:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or

deceitful conduct.

Rule 9.02 – A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal
services with persons not licensed to practice law, except:

a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate

that, upon the latter’s death, money shall be paid over a reasonable
period of time to his estate or to the persons specified in the agreement;
or

b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a

deceased lawyer; or

c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a

retirement plan, even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit-
sharing arrangement.

In finding the respondent guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 9.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, the Investigating Commissioner
opined that:

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the

complainant. To be made the suspension or disbarment of a lawyer, the
charge against him must be established by convincing proof. The record
must disclose as free from doubt a case which compels the exercise by
the Supreme Court of its disciplinary powers. The dubious character of
the act done as well as of the motivation thereof must be clearly
demonstrated. x x x.

In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent

that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and solely for the recovery of
the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts and
events say otherwise, to wit:

1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00

savings deposit is too high;

2.) Respondent actively acted as complainant’s lawyer to effectuate the

compromise agreement.

By openly admitting he divided the Php70,000.00 to other individuals as

commission/referral fees respondent violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall
not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law. Worst, by luring complainant to participate in a
compromise agreement with a false and misleading assurance that
complainant can still recover after Three (3) years her foreclosed property
respondent violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which says a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

ISSUE:
Whether or not A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for
legal services with persons not licensed to practice law
HELD:

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar
may be disbarred or suspended on the following grounds: 1) deceit; 2)
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in office; 3) grossly immoral
conduct; 4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; 5) violation of
the lawyer’s oath; 6) willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior
court; and 7) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority.

In Santos v. Lazaro and Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., we held that Rule 18.03

of the Code of Professional Responsibility is a basic postulate in legal
ethics. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will
exercise due diligence in protecting his rights. The failure to exercise that
degree of vigilance and attention makes such lawyer unworthy of the
trust reposed in him by his client and makes him answerable not just to
his client but also to the legal profession, the courts and society.

A lawyer should give adequate attention, care and time to his client’s
case. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task
with dedication and care. If he fails in this duty, he is not true to his
oath as a lawyer. Thus, a lawyer should accept only as much cases as he
can efficiently handle in order to sufficiently protect his clients’ interests.
It is not enough that a lawyer possesses the qualification to handle the
legal matter; he must also give adequate attention to his legal work.
Utmost fidelity is demanded once counsel agrees to take the cudgels for
his client’s cause.

In view of the foregoing, we find that suspension from the practice of law
for six months is warranted. In addition, he is directed to return to
complainant the amount he received by way of legal fees pursuant to
existing jurisprudence.

Plus Builders Inc. vs. Revilla, Jr. 578 SCRA 431

Facts:
The Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) rendered a decision in favor
of Plus Builders, Inc.and against the tenants/farmers Leopoldo de
Guzman, et.al, who were the clients of respondent, Atty. Revilla, Jr. The
PARAD found that respondent’s clients were mere tenants and not
rightful possessors/owners of the subject land. The case was elevated all
the way up to the Supreme Court, with this Court sustaining Plus
Builders Inc.’s rights over the land.
 Respondent was found to have committed intentional falsehood; and
misused court processes with the intention to delay the execution of the
decision through the filing of several motions, petitions for temporary
restraining orders, and the last, an action to quiet title despite the
finality of the decision. Furthermore, he allowed non-lawyers to engage in
the unauthorized practice of law – holding themselves out as his
partners/associates in the law firm. Respondent maintains that he did
not commit the acts complained of and that the courses of action he took
were not meant to unduly delay the execution of the DARAB Decision.

Issue:
WON respondent is guilty of gross misconduct.

Held:
It is the rule that when a lawyer accepts a case, he is expected to give his
full attention, diligence, skill and competence to the case, regardless of
its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
 
A lawyer’s devotion to his client’s cause not only requires but also entitles
him to deploy every honorable means to secure for the client what is
justly due him or to present every defense provided by law to enable the
latter’s cause to succeed.
 
In this case, respondent may not be wanting in this regard. On the
contrary, it is apparent that the respondent’s acts complained of were
committed out of his over-zealousness and misguided desire to protect
the interests of his clients who were poor and uneducated. Taking the
cudgels from the former lawyer in this case is rather commendable, but
respondent should not forget his first and foremost responsibility as an
officer of the court. In support of the cause of their clients, lawyers have
the duty to present every remedy or defense within the authority of the
law. This obligation, however, is not to be performed at the expense of
truth and justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer
has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of
justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying a case by impeding
execution of a judgment or by misusing court processes. However, the
Court also knows how to show compassion and will not hesitate to
refrain from imposing the appropriate penalties in the presence of
mitigating factors, such as the respondent’s length of service,
acknowledgment of his or her infractions and feeling of remorse, family
circumstances, humanitarian and equitable considerations,
and respondent’s advanced age, among other things, which have varying
significance in the Court’s determination of the imposable penalty.
Therefore, a suspension of six (6) months from the practice of law is
sufficient in this case.
 58. Tan vs. Balajadia
G.R. No. 169517, March 14, 2016

I. Facts:

Respondent Balajadia was charged for contempt by the

petititioners, Tan, et al. Before that, the respondent filed a criminal case
against the petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City. In his complaint-affidavit, the respondent asserted that he is a
“practicing lawyer” based in Baguio City.

However, certifications issued by the OBC and the IBP showed that
the respondent was admitted to the Bar. Respondent asserted that the
allegation that he was a practicing lawyer is an honest mistake. He
claims that the secretary of Atty. Paterno Aquino prepared the
complaint-affidavit patterned after Atty. Aquino’s affidavit. Liza
Laconsay, Atty. Aquino’s secretary, admitted the mistake of copying Atty.
Aquino’s complaint-affidavit and instead of stating that
Respondent Balajadia is a businessman, he was erroneously referred to
as a practicing lawyer.

II. Issue:

Whether not the respondent is liable for direct contempt.

III. Ruling:

In several cases, the Supreme Court ruled that the unauthorized

practice of law by assuming to be an attorney and acting as such without
authority constitutes indirect contempt which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both.

The liability for the unauthorized practice of law under Section

3(e), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is in the nature of criminal contempt
and the acts are punished because they are an affront to the dignity and
authority of the court, and obstruct the orderly administration of justice.

In determining liability for criminal contempt, well-settled is the

rule that intent is a necessary element, and no one can be punished
unless the evidence makes it clear that he intended to commit it.

In the case at bar, a review of the records supports respondent’s

claim that he never intended to project himself as a lawyer to the public.
It was a clear inadvertence on the part of the secretary of Atty Aquino.
The affidavit of Liza Laconsay attesting to the circumstances that gave
rise to the mistake in the drafting of the complaint-affidavit conforms to
the documentary evidence on record. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the allegation in paragraph 5 of respondent’s
complaint-affidavit was, indeed, the result of inadvertence.

Respondent has satisfactorily shown that the allegation that he is

a practicing lawyer was the result of inadvertence and cannot, by itself,
establish intent as to make him liable for indirect contempt. In the cases
where the Court found a party liable for the unauthorized practice of law,
the party was guilty of some overt act like signing court pleadings on
behalf of his client; appearing before court hearings as an
attorney; manifesting before the court that he will practice law despite
being previously denied admission to the bar; or deliberately attempting
to practice law and holding out himself as an attorney through circulars
with full knowledge that he is not licensed to do so.

In the case at bar, no evidence was presented to show that

respondent acted as an attorney or that he intended to practice law.
Consequently, he cannot be made liable for indirect contempt
considering his lack of intent to illegally practice law.

However, while the evidence on record failed to prove respondent’s

deliberate intent to misrepresent himself as an attorney and act as such
without authority, he is hereby warned to be more careful and
circumspect in his future actions.
 59. LUZVIMINDA C. LIJAUCO vs. ATTY. ROGELIO P. TERRADO
A.C. No. 6317, August 31, 2006

I. FACTS:

Sometime in January 2001, Luzviminda C. Lijauco engaged the

services of Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for P 70,000 to assist in recovering
her deposit with Planters Development Bank in the amount of P180,000
and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba,
Laguna. The said foreclosed house and lot is the subject of a petition for
the issuance of writ of possession then pending before the RTC of Binan
Laguna docketed as LRC Case No. B-2610.
Ms. Lijauco alleged that Atty. Terrado failed to appear in the
hearing for the issuance of Writ of Possession and did not protect her
interest in allowing her to participate in a Compromise Agreement in
order to end the LRC Case No. B-2610. She filed an administrative
complaint against Atty. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and
conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.
In his defense, Atty. Terrado claims that the P 70,000 legal fees he
received is purely and solely for the recovery of the P 180,000 savings
account. The complaint was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The Investigating Commissioner submitted his report finding Atty.
Terrado guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and 9.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR) and recommended that he be suspended from the
practice of law for six (6) months. The IBP Board of Governors adopted
the recommendation of the investigating commissioner.
 
II. ISSUE:

Whether or not the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors is proper?

III. HELD:

Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the IBP. The
practice of law is a privilege bestowed on those who show that they
possessed and continue to possess the legal qualifications for it. Indeed,
lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal
proficiency and morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal profession,
the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of
the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 
Lawyers are prohibited from engaging in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct and are mandated to serve their clients
with competence and diligence. They shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to them, and this negligence in connection therewith shall
render them liable.
 The records show that Atty. Terrado acted as complainant’s
counsel in the drafting of the compromise agreement between Ms.
Lijauco and the bank regarding LRC Case No. B-2610. He lured Ms.
Lijauco to participate in a compromise agreement with a false and
misleading assurance that the latter can still recoverher foreclosed
property even after three years from foreclosure.

In this instance, Atty. Terrado violated Rule1.01 Canon 1 of the

CPR which says that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.

Furthermore, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee

of P70,000 for legal assistance in the recovery of the deposit amounting
to P180,000 is unreasonable and is violative of Canon 20 of the CPR.
Atty. Terrada was also found guilty of violating Rule 9.02 of the CPR by
openly admitting that he divided the legal fees with two other people as a
referral fee.
 60). Plus Builders vs. ATTY. Revilla, A.C. No. 7056 September 13,
2006

I. Facts

A. Facts

On April 7, 1999, a landlord (Plus Builders) vs. tenant ensued

before the Provincial Adjudicator of Cavite (PARAD) of DAR, DARAB
CASE NOS. R-402-027-99 up to R-402-031-99, inclusive, against
Leopoldo De Guzman, Heirs of Bienvenido De Guzman, Apolonio Ilas and
Gloria Martirez Siongco, Heirs of Faustino Siongco; Serafin Santarin,
Benigno Alvarez and Maria Esguerra, et al; hereinafter called
tenants/farmers. The PARAD rendered decision in favor of Plus Builders.
The tenants/farmers was then represented by several lawyers but was
able only to secure a disturbance compensation. During the pendency of
the case ATTY. Revilla intervened, he filed a motion for correction and, a
Petition for Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order and to Quash Alias Writ of Execution with Demolition
plus Damages despite the knowledge that it was appealed by another
lawyer. "Enraged by his defeat, Respondent filed a verified "Action to
Quiet Title" before the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite praying for a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), among others, to deliberately and
maliciously stop the enforcement of the Decisions of the higher courts to
implement the PARAD Decision dated November 15, 1999.

B. CA Ruling

The assailed orders issued by the DARAB are hereby declared

NULL AND VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction.
Consequently, this Court sees no impediment for the IMPLEMENTATION
of the 15 November 1999 Decision of the provincial adjudicator (PARAD).

C. Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD

In his April 30, 2005 Report,6 Investigating Commissioner Espina

found respondent guilty of violating the attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.7 Allegedly, respondent had "maliciously
concealed the defeat of his clients in the case before the PARAD of Cavite
and the higher courts,"8 in order to secure a temporary restraining order
from the RTC of Imus, Cavite. As a result, he was able to delay the
execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision dated November 15,
1999.

Moreover, Commissioner Espina opined that the charge that

respondent had been engaged in the unlawful practice of law was neither
satisfactorily explained nor specifically denied by the latter. The failure of
respondent to do so led to the presumption that the allegation was true.

II. Issue/s

Whether or not ATTY. Revilla is guilty of violating the attorney's

oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

III. Held/Ruling

YES. Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system,
protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are expected to
act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the courts.

In the case at bar, petitioner ATTY. Revilla in pursuing the cause of

his clients, his course of legal action was obviously a stratagem meant to
delay unduly the execution of the provincial adjudicator's Decision. His
claim of ownership of the land, he cannot feign ignorance of his previous
admission of a tenancy relationship existing between his clients and
complainants.

Lawyers have the duty to present every remedy or defense within

the authority of the law. This obligation, however, must never be at the
expense of truth and justice, as explained in Choa v. Chiongson. In this
case, ATTY. Revilla file unsolicited motions and TRO’s to unduly delay
the legal process. He allowed non-lawyers to engage in the unauthorized
practice of law and who held himself out as a law partner of the "KDC
Legal Services, Law Offices and Associates," was rendering legal services
together with persons not licensed to practice law. Thus violating Canon 9
and Rule 9.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: Canon
9 – A lawyer shall not directly or indirectly assist in the unauthorized
practice of law. ‘Rule 9.01 – A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which by law may only
be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.