Ian Jackson, Jason Xidias - An Analysis of Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and The Last Man-Macat Library (2017)
Ian Jackson, Jason Xidias - An Analysis of Francis Fukuyama's The End of History and The Last Man-Macat Library (2017)
Francis Fukuyama’s
The End of History
and the Last Man
Ian Jackson
with
Jason Xidias
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SECTION 1: INFLUENCES
Module 1:The Author and the Historical Context 15
Module 2: Academic Context 20
Module 3:The Problem 24
Module 4:The Author’s Contribution 28
SECTION 2: IDEAS
Module 5: Main Ideas 33
Module 6: Secondary Ideas 37
Module 7: Achievement 42
Module 8: Place in the Author’s Work 46
SECTION 3: IMPACT
Module 9:The First Responses 51
Module 10:The Evolving Debate 55
Module 11: Impact and Influence Today 60
Module 12:Where Next? 65
Glossary of Terms 70
People Mentioned in the Text 78
Works Cited 86
Francis Fukuyama’s controversial 1992 book The End of History and the Last
Man demonstrates an important aspect of creative thinking: the ability to
generate hypotheses and create novel explanations for evidence.
In the case of Fukuyama’s work, the central hypothesis and explanation he put
forward were not, in fact, new, but they were novel in the academic and
historical context of the time. Fukuyama’s central argument was that the end of
the Cold War was a symptom of, and a vital waypoint in, a teleological
progression of history.
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influential works ever written across a wide variety of academic disciplines.
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What Does The End of History And The Last Man Say?
Francis Fukuyama’s grand theory for explaining the post-Cold War*
world is that history has a plot, and that its inevitable happy ending is
liberal democracy.* He argues that human history is divided up into
periods, with each one an improvement on the last. The ultimate
destination for everyone is Western-style democracy because that is
the best system for satisfying the human need for recognition and
equality. When all nations become capitalist democracies, he says, it
will mark the end of history.
10
11
Why Does The End of History and the Last Man Matter?
Fukuyama’s controversial argument was made at a time of huge
uncertainty around the world over the future of international relations.
The decades-long Cold War between the United States and the Soviet
Union had ended in 1991.The break-up of the Soviet Union left the
United States as the last superpower standing, and seemingly the most
dominant nation on the planet. Scholars such as Fukuyama and his
contemporaries in American universities were attempting to come to
terms with this immense change in the balance of world power—and
to make difficult predictions about its implications for the future.
From the outset, The End of History met with substantial criticism.
Fukuyama drew reactions from all parts of the political spectrum and
was challenged immediately by equally bold, contrasting viewpoints.
The most notable came in The Clash of Civilizations written by
Fukuyama’s former teacher at Harvard, the American political
philosopher Samuel Huntington.* For Huntington, the deciding
factor in world politics would increasingly boil down to cultural
12
13
15
16
Author’s Life
Francis Fukuyama was born in Chicago in 1952, the only child of
second-generation Japanese immigrants. He grew up in New York
City then studied for his Bachelor of Arts degree in classics at Cornell
University.
At Cornell he studied political philosophy under the noted
American thinker Allan Bloom*—the first of a series of scholars who
would have a profound effect on his later work. It was Bloom who
first introduced him to the ideas of ancient and modern political
philosophers, including Plato,* whose ideas became central to
Fukuyama’s own scholarship.
After Cornell, Fukuyama moved on to graduate studies in
comparative literature at Yale University. He spent six months in
France, studying poststructuralism*—the idea that language and
meaning are shifting and unstable—under influential philosopher
and author Jacques Derrida.* But Fukuyama quickly became
disillusioned with these studies. He later explained, “Perhaps when
you’re young you think that something must be profound just
because it is difficult and you don’t have the self-confidence to say
this is just nonsense.”3
Fukuyama switched to political science, earning a PhD at Harvard
University. He studied under Samuel Huntington,* an eminent
theorist on post-Cold War politics who later presented the direct
counterargument to The End of History.
After his PhD, Fukuyama worked for the American economic and
foreign policy think tank RAND Corporation* (from 1979–80,
1983–9, 1995–6). He also worked for the policy planning staff of the
US Department of State (1981–2, 1989) as well as teaching at the
leading American universities Johns Hopkins, George Mason and
Stanford. These high-profile roles led to his ideas becoming well-
known in politics and the mainstream media.
17
Author’s Background
Fukuyama’s background with the US government and the RAND
Corporation led to him being considered a neoconservative.* This is a
school of thought that promotes the global spread of democracy and
free-market economics through a combination of soft power (such as
international organizations) and military force.
Fukuyama had worked twice in government with neoconservative
politician and academic Paul Wolfowitz;* when Wolfowitz was Dean
of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins, he
brought Fukuyama in as a professor.This relationship added weight to
the suggestion that Fukuyama shared Wolfowitz’s political outlook. In
2003, however, he distanced himself from the neoconservative cause
by criticizing the administration of US President George W. Bush*
and the Iraq War.*
When he wrote The End of History, Fukuyama was still working as
a consultant for RAND. He was preoccupied with the events of the
times: the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union* and
the United States’ rise to a position of dominance in international
relations. These developments followed nearly half a century of
simmering tensions between the capitalist* United States and the
communist* Soviet Union. Fukuyama drew on a long line of ancient
and political philosophy to place the current state of affairs in a
historical context, and then make predictions about the future.
The collapse of the Soviet Union largely discredited communism—a
political ideology that relies on state ownership, collective labor and the
abolition of social class. It led to the view that whatever the merits of
Marxist* ideas, they had spectacularly failed in practice. The
revolutionary socialist philosopher Karl Marx* had stated that the
endpoint of history would arrive when a stateless and classless society
finally overthrew capitalism. This would result in a workers’ utopia*
characterized by absolute freedom.This was never actually achieved by
any of the communist states, including the Soviet Union.
18
NOTES
1 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (New
York: Penguin, 2007), 97.
2 This figure is probably too low. It does not take into account any interest
payable on the money the United States needed to borrow to fund the
war. Various opinions place the true cost at somewhere between $2.4
trillion and $3 trillion. Congressional Budget Office, “Iraq and Afghanistan,”
accessed March 18, 2013, http://www.cbo.gov/topics/national-security/iraq-
and-afghanistan/cost-estimates.
3 Cited in Nicholas Wroe, “History’s Pallbearer,” Guardian, May 11, 2002,
accessed March 19, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/books/2002/
may/11/academicexperts.artsandhumanities.
4 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin,
2012), 39.
19
20
“human
Both Hegel and Marx believed that the evolution of
societies was not open-ended, but would end
when mankind had achieved a form of society that
satisfied its deepest and most fundamental longings.
Both thinkers thus posited an ‘end of history:’ for
Hegel this was the liberal state, while for Marx it was a
communist society.This did not mean that the natural
cycle of birth, life, and death would end, that important
events would no longer happen, or that newspapers
reporting them would cease to be published. It meant,
rather, that there would be no further progress in the
development of underlying principles and institutions,
because all of the really big questions had been settled.
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
”
Fukuyama argues that liberal democracy*—a political system with
an emphasis on human rights, regular and free elections and adherence
to the rule of law— is the final stage in the evolution of human history,
and that it guarantees the triumph of peace over war. Events will still
occur, but there will be no progression from liberal democracy to an
alternative system because all other systems have been exhausted; they
have been tried, and found wanting.As he put it in a 1989 article entitled
“The End of History?”*: “What we may be witnessing is not just the
end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war
history, but the end of history as such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s
ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal
democracy as the final form of government.”1
21
22
Academic Influences
The End of History draws on the ideas of Hegel,* Marx, and Alexandre
Kojève,* the Russian-born politician and philosopher who coined
the phrase “end of history.”These thinkers claimed that human history
is a long process of social improvements, and that it has an endpoint.To
explain constant change, Fukuyama also weaves in Plato’s concept of
the human pursuit of recognition and equality. Political systems have
ranged from aristocratic rule* to fascism* to communism,* says
Fukuyama, but only liberal democracy has been able to satisfy the
powerful human need and desire dubbed thymos.
Once the Cold War had ended, debates over American supremacy
and the future of international relations became a feature in numerous
publications. Perhaps the most prominent were Foreign Affairs—a
journal for academics and others involved in international relations;
International Security—an important outlet for realist* scholars (who
believe that states provide for their own security and share the goal of
survival) published by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) in the United States; and International Organization—a platform
for liberals produced in Cambridge in the United Kingdom.
Fukuyama, however, published the essay that would form the blueprint
for The End of History in The National Interest, a relatively new journal
founded in 1985. The National Interest was specifically devoted to the
question of how America should act on the world stage and promote
its own interests abroad. It was less rarefied and more open to
Fukuyama’s unorthodox ideas than its better-known rivals.
NOTES
1 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” The National Interest 16 (summer
1989): 4.
23
Core Question
In The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama asks why
liberal democracy was so successful in the late twentieth century—and
whether it marked the end of mankind’s ideological evolution by
being the final form of human government.
The spread of democracy across the world was a hot topic in the
study of international relations during the 1990s, for two reasons:
• The number of liberal democracies hit an all-time high of 61 by
1990.1
• The Soviet bloc* collapsed following the end of the Soviet
Union* in 1991, with most former Soviet states and all of its
satellite states switching to a democratic system.
24
“in the
Of the different types of regimes that have emerged
course of human history, from monarchies and
aristocracies, to religious theocracies, to the fascist and
communist dictatorships of this century, the only form
of government that has survived intact to the end of the
twentieth century has been liberal democracy.
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
”
“thaw”) was an attempt to relax tensions between the United States
and the Soviet Union.This was described by Raymond Garthoff* of
American think tank the Brookings Institution as a “phase of the
Cold War, not an alternative.”2 In the US of the 1980s, under
President Ronald Reagan,* détente had been replaced by more
open opposition to the Soviet system, but this too had now gone.
The world had become unipolar*—only one superpower existed
and that was the United States. As America struggled to understand
the world it had inherited, a new theory was needed to make sense
of this unexpected turn of events.
Fukuyama addresses the big question as to why liberal democracy
was winning out in more and more countries by examining it from
two angles. First he discusses the economic success of liberal
democracies. Then, having concluded that economic factors alone
could not explain their rise, he uses a philosophical argument.
Fukuyama says that history has an endpoint, and that progress
towards this point is driven by the human struggle for recognition—
Plato’s notion of thymos.*
The Participants
Fukuyama’s use of philosophy to understand the end of the Cold
War was a radically new approach, and his theory should be
25
26
NOTES
1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin,
2012), 50.
2 Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations
from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994).
3 John Lewis Gaddis, “International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold
War,” International Security 17, no. 3 (1992–3): 5.
4 Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek, eds., Collectivist Economic Planning
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935; reprint, Clifton, N. J.: Augustus M.
Kelley, 1975), 7.
27
Author’s Aims
In The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama provides an
accessible route to understanding political philosophy. He works
through ideas in a logical way, explaining both their philosophical
background and their political reality. Fukuyama does not assume his
readers have any prior understanding and introduces the historical
context of ideas before discussing them. He also gives brief biographies
of philosophical thinkers and summaries of their work.
The core ideas in the book do not in themselves represent original
thought. As French philosopher Jacques Derrida* pointed out in his
book Specters of Marx (1994): “Eschatological* themes of the end of
History, the end of Marxism* … were in the 50s, that is 40 years ago,
our daily bread.”1 On the face of it, Fukuyama’s theories are entirely
borrowed. The concept of an end of history features prominently in
Marx* and has its origins in Hegel, while the term itself is closely
associated with Alexandre Kojève.*
28
“whatWithhadonehitherto
now-famous essay, Frank Fukuyama did
seemed almost impossible: he made
Washington think. His subject was, and in this far more
sweeping book is, the place of America, and the American
idea, in the stream of history. His conclusion is at once
exhilarating and sobering.We have won the struggle for
the heart of humanity. However, that will not necessarily
be good for humanity’s soul.
”
George Will, Pulitzer Prize-winning American journalist and political commen-
tator, quoted on the cover of The End of History and the Last Man
Approach
Fukuyama produces a persuasive argument as to why liberal
democracies seem to be so much more successful than other forms of
government. He also provides a theoretical framework to explain why
the Soviet Union had collapsed—one that goes beyond the economic
reasons, which Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises* had correctly
predicted six decades earlier.2 For this reason Fukuyama’s ideas have
been very useful for both students and academics studying post-Cold
War* politics. The End of History is an up-to-date theory that competes
29
Contribution in Context
The end of history had been discussed at great length by Hegel and Marx,
and revived by scholars such as Alexandre Kojève and American
sociologist Daniel Bell* in the early stages of the Cold War. But by the
time Fukuyama was writing The End of History, Hegel’s ideas had become
quite unfashionable in academic circles. By using them as a foundation
for his grand theory about where the post-Cold War world was heading,
Fukuyama brought them back into the contemporary debate.
The book had its roots in Fukuyama’s 1989 essay “The End of
History?”* In this, he observed that analyses of the end of the Cold War
lacked “any larger conceptual framework for distinguishing between
what is essential and what is contingent or accidental in world history,
and are predictably superficial.”3 The essay triggered heated debate, but
it was the subsequent book—written largely in response to the furore
over the essay—that fleshed out the theory and secured Fukuyama’s
reputation as a leading thinker in international relations.4
The book proved even more divisive than the essay that inspired it.
Martin Griffiths* of Flinders University in Australia noted,“[Cambridge
professor] John Dunn described it as a ‘puerile volume’ and [compared]
it to ‘the worst sort of American undergraduate term-paper.’”5 In stark
contrast, Wayne Cristaudo* of Charles Darwin University judged it to
be “the most important defense of liberal democracy since John
Rawls’s* A Theory of Justice.”6
30
Whatever waves the book caused at the time, the West did seem to
be in the ascendancy in geopolitical terms. Derrida, who was critical of
the book’s generally positive reception by the Western media, argued
that it was “sought out by those who celebrate the triumph of liberal
capitalism* … only in order to hide … the fact that this triumph has
never been so critical, fragile, threatened, even in certain regards
catastrophic.”7
NOTES
1 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of
Mourning, and the New International, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York:
Routledge, 1994), 14.
2 Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek, eds., Collectivist Economic Planning
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1935; reprint, Clifton, N. J.: Augustus
M. Kelley, 1975), 18–22. Mises believed that the mathematics required
to predict the needs of the consumer correctly were far too complex to
allow for a workable command economy (the sort of planned economy that
exists in communist states). Without the law of supply and demand, central
governments would be unable to regulate the economy. His theories were
validated within the Soviet Union, which encountered all the problems that
he had predicted.
3 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest 16 (Summer
1989): 3–18.
4 Jenefer Curtis, review of After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics, ed.
Timothy Burns, Canadian Journal of Political Science 28, no. 3 (1995): 591.
5 Martin Griffiths et al., Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, second ed.
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 81.
6 Griffiths et al., Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, 82–83.
7 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx (New York: Routledge, 1994),15.
31
Key Themes
In The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama focuses on
three main themes within one primary idea—the logic of history,
which he borrows from Hegel.* In his introduction to the book, he
writes that history should be “understood as a single coherent
evolutionary process … taking into account the experience of all
peoples in all times.”1
For Hegel and everyone influenced by him (including Karl Marx,*
Alexandre Kojève,* and Fukuyama himself), history is not simply a
sequence of events. History is a grand story with a plot—it has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It is the process that drives human
societies from where they are to a position that is objectively better.
Hegel and his followers defined “better” in terms of freedom. “The
history of the world,” Hegel wrote in The Philosophy of History, “is
none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom.”2
Fukuyama’s grand theory for understanding world politics after
the Cold War* has three main themes. First, he stresses that human
33
“recognized
Liberal democracy replaces the irrational desire to be
as greater than others with a rational desire
to be recognized as equal. A world made up of liberal
democracies, then, should have much less incentive for
war, since all nations would reciprocally recognize one
another’s legitimacy.
”
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
society evolves over time, with each stage usually attaining greater
freedom than the last. This is based on Plato’s* concept of thymos,*
which sets people apart from animals on the basis of their desire for
recognition and equality.
Second, Fukuyama argues that the driving force behind this
evolution can only be satisfied by a liberal democratic state, because its
emphasis on civil and human rights encourages humans to struggle
for recognition, and eventually to recognize each other’s freedoms and
respect one another’s equality. Fukuyama concludes that all other
systems, including Marxism,* had failed to achieve this.
Third, he argues that liberal democracy marks the end of history
for human society and political ideas, with the “last man” being the
triumphant citizen of this system.
34
Hegel would see the Greeks and Romans as having possessed greater
freedom, and therefore further along the path of history.This is where
thymos comes into play. It is the driving force behind this human desire
to be recognized as free, equal and worthy of consideration.
The notion that history is propelled by thymos feeds Fukuyama’s
second main idea: that liberal democracies represent the final stage of
political development. “As mankind approaches the millennium,”
Fukuyama writes, “the twin crises of authoritarianism* and socialist
central planning have left only one competitor standing in the ring as
an ideology of potentially universal validity: liberal democracy, the
doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty.”4 Liberal
democracy, in other words, is the ideology that most perfectly expresses
thymos, because it is based on the idea that all people—not just one
person or a certain group—are recognized as free and equal.
The end of history does not mean a freezing of time; Fukuyama
acknowledges that events will continue to take place once this
endpoint is reached. But in his view, these will not add up to “history.”
Since no alternative form of government satisfies thymos as well as
liberal democracy, none can hope to replace it.
Fukuyama sees liberal democracy, based on the twin pillars of
liberty and equality, as the final form of government to which all
others will have to adapt. He does not offer a timetable for these final
days of history and even acknowledges that setbacks will occur. He
simply believes that democracy will inevitably be established across
the world.
35
NOTES
1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin,
2012), xii.
2 G. W. F. Hegel, quoted in Peter Singer, Hegel: A Very Short Introduction,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), e-book.
3 Singer, Hegel, e-book.
4 Fukuyama, The End of History, 42.
5 Fukuyama, The End of History, 48.
6 Fukuyama, The End of History, 48.
7 Fukuyama, The End of History, 50.
36
Other Themes
In The End of History and the Last Man, Francis Fukuyama explores
three themes that are subordinate to his main argument.The first is the
power of science and technology to move human history forward.
Technology brings the possibility of limitless economic growth, which
Fukuyama says will be welcomed by every nation. And, since having a
technologically advanced military means having a comparative
advantage in international relations, all nations will seek to improve
their defense capabilities. Regardless of a country’s history or cultural
makeup, science will guarantee that all societies become more alike.
Fukuyama’s second theme is that all nations will openly support
capitalism* and liberal democracy, removing any reason for going to
war.This will result in universal peace.Third, with the defeat of Soviet
communism,* “the last man” will be stripped of purpose and ambition.
These themes are linked to one another, and to the main argument.
Fukuyama insists that history progresses from societies with less
freedom to societies with greater freedom. He explores how free
37
societies assert and maintain their dominance, and ponders what the
future will look like once their dominance is achieved. Fukuyama’s
vision of the future is pessimistic, because he is certain that the absence
of an enemy (Soviet communism) will deprive people of their sense of
moral superiority. This will result in a deep sense of emptiness and
frustration. In the end, the West’s Cold War* victory will prove to be
its moral defeat, because values will have been replaced by material
ambitions for wealth, security, and comfort.
38
societies that can develop, produce and deploy technology the most
efficiently.”2 Fukuyama thought that this would also make sure that
non-democratic societies could not keep pace with liberal ones,
because they would have no market incentives to keep technology at
the cutting edge.
Fukuyama points to the end of the Cold War,* when “one of the
chief reasons [for Soviet surrender] was their realization that an
unreformed Soviet Union was going to have serious problems
remaining competitive, economically and militarily.”3 In other
words, when US president Ronald Reagan used computer
technology to make a generation of Soviet missiles obsolete, he
“shifted the superpower competition into areas like microelectronics
and other innovative technologies where the Soviet Union had
serious disadvantages.”4 Fukuyama calls this “defensive
modernization.” The Soviet Union had no choice but to introduce
more freedoms, because it was outstripped in technological
development by the United States.
For Fukuyama, the post-history world of wall-to-wall liberal
democracies is inevitably still some way off, owing to what is known
as the development continuum gap.* This is the difference in
economic status, and with it levels of industrialization and political
maturity, between the world’s richest and poorest nations. As states
develop and become more democratic, according to Fukuyama, the
chief exchanges will become economic. The old rules of power
politics, with their focus on conflict, will become irrelevant. “The
civil peace,” Fukuyama writes, “brought about by liberalism* should
logically have its counterpoint in relations between states.”5 He goes
on, noting “the fundamentally un-warlike character of liberal
societies is evident in the extraordinarily peaceful relations they
maintain among one another,” in part because they share an ideology
that recognizes one another as legitimate, and in part because they
compete on a more friendly, economic basis.6
39
Overlooked
None of these strands in Fukuyama’s larger theory constitute original
thinking, although he certainly fleshes out some established ideas.The
notion that science influences history’s direction has its origins in the
work of Hegel* and Marx.* The origins of democratic peace theory*
can be traced back to eighteenth-century thinkers Immanuel Kant*
and Thomas Paine.* As for the last man, such ideas had been debated
for quite some time. Hegel, Marx, German philosopher Friedrich
Nietzsche* and others had even argued about whether the last man
was a desirable concept. Nietzsche, in particular, lamented the coming
of the last men as the arrival of “men without chests.”
The ideas in The End of History are useful to scholars because they
explain why Fukuyama believes that liberal dominance is inevitable.
The book provides a snapshot of world politics at the time of writing,
and also describes what the last man might look like.This allows us to
search for evidence of his existence in parts of the world that are
40
NOTES
1 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin,
2012), 73.
2 Fukuyama, The End of History, 73.
3 Fukuyama, The End of History, 75.
4 Fukuyama, The End of History, 76.
5 Fukuyama The End of History, 260.
6 Fukuyama, The End of History, 263.
7 Fukuyama, The End of History, 336.
8 Fukuyama, The End of History, 336.
41
42
“History?’
Francis Fukuyama’s influential essay ‘The End of
announced the triumph of liberal democracy
and the arrival of a post-ideological world. But was it
just a right-wing argument in disguise? And has the
demise of utopianism* ushered in a ‘sad time’?
Eliane Glaser in the Guardian.1
”
replicate themselves through one or more succession crises,”2
authoritarianism* itself is a “fluke.”3 It stands to reason, he argues, that
non-liberal states are an accident of modern history; they are doomed,
because they are at the mercy of any event that proves too much for
their inbuilt inflexibility. Such states either fall or reinvent themselves
as democracies, and existing democracies will endure. A simple
mathematical equation reveals the eventual rise of Western ideology.
Even democratic governments voted out of office during times of
crisis leave behind a constitutional framework.
Achievement in Context
Understanding Fukuyama’s achievement requires an understanding of
the time and place in which The End of History was written. At the
beginning of the 1990s, free market economics, combined with liberal
democracies, had provided stability and growth where other systems
seemed to have failed. Fukuyama was convinced that this trend would
continue. He argued that in order to compete with the West, other
countries would have to become more like it; and in growing more
alike, they would be more peaceful. Fukuyama acknowledged that a
few states would oppose this arrangement, such as North Korea, but
sooner or later they would see no alternative but to join in.
The problem is that actual world events did not turn out that way.
American president George W. Bush* proclaimed a long-term war
43
Limitations
Fukuyama wrote The End of History as a compelling argument as to
why liberal democracies were doing so well compared with other
ways of running economic and political life. It succeeds in this, but
where it failed was in predicting that democracy would continue to
dominate the world stage.
The shortcomings of Fukuyama’s analysis became even more
glaring with the onset of the 2008 global financial crisis,* which
shook the foundations of democracies everywhere and exposed their
weaknesses. Rising Asian countries such as Japan received a good deal
of attention in the book, yet since The End of History was published
they have been overshadowed by the rise of non-liberal states. China,
the biggest, has adopted a blend of state capitalism* and
authoritarianism,* and the Chinese Communist Party* regularly
condemns Western democratic and legal conditions.
It could be argued, then, that China is championing an alternative
model to the West. The introduction of democracy has also failed in
troubled places such as Iraq and Syria. This suggests that democracy
and the market cannot flourish without a stable state apparatus and the
willingness of most people to adopt the “Western system.”
Fukuyama has responded to critiques by arguing that, despite these
important developments, the world has still made great progress
44
towards liberal democracy,* and holds to his belief that it will continue
to be the dominant political structure.4
NOTES
1 Eliane Glaser, “Bring Back Ideology: Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ 25 Years
On,” Guardian, March 21, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015, http://www.
theguardian.com/books/2014/mar/21/bring-back-ideology-fukuyama-end-
history-25-years-on.
2 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin,
2012), 40.
3 Fukuyama, The End of History, 47.
4 Winston Shi, “Francis Fukuyama: End of History Still in Sight Despite China’s
Rise,” Huffington Post, July 9, 2014, accessed March 19, 2015,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/winston-shi/francis-fukuyama-end-of-history-
_b_5569581.html.
45
Positioning
While Francis Fukuyama found fame as the author of The End of
History and the Last Man, his academic career did not begin in
international relations.* His first degree was in classics, and he went
on to study comparative literature before eventually turning to
politics. In each field, Fukuyama was most fascinated by philosophy.
As a graduate student at Yale University he spent six months in
Paris studying poststructuralism under the French philosopher
Jacques Derrida.* Poststructuralism is the name given to ideas
stemming from continental Europe during the 1960s and 1970s.
Structuralism claimed that human beings could be understood by
means of various structures or models. Poststructuralism argued that
people are complex, making these structures unstable and therefore
unreliable.
Fukuyama became disillusioned with complicated postmodern*
criticism and chose to transfer from Yale in order to study political
46
Integration
In his 1989 article, published in the journal The National Interest,2
Fukuyama argues that a fundamental change in world history had
just occurred. He says that while many scholars wanted to understand
why international relations seemed to be heading down a more
peaceful path, studies about the end of the Cold War* lacked “any
47
Significance
The End of History is Fukuyama’s most important publication, and
made him a well-known figure in international relations.* It has been
heavily criticized since it appeared in 1992, and has become more
vulnerable over time as major events have failed to tally with his world
view. Realities such as the rise of non-liberal China and the 2008
global financial crisis* seem at odds with his predictions.
Fukuyama now acknowledges that the reality of current events
and the fact that some states show no indication of being on a liberal,
democratic path has weakened the case of The End of History.
In his later work, especially State-Building: Governance and World
Order in the 21st Century, Fukuyama has not wavered from his
conviction that all states should aspire to a competent, accountable and
democratic government. Such governments should promote a strong
civil society based on equal rights, and aim to maximize prosperity. He
has, however, acknowledged that for weak or failed states, the path
towards this goal is sometimes unclear. Major setbacks have meant that
liberal democracy has not yet become universal, and peace has not yet
triumphed over human conflict.
48
NOTES
1 Martin Griffiths et al., Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations, second
ed. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 81.
2 Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, The National Interest 16
(Summer 1989): 3–18.
3 Fukuyama, “The End of History?”, 3–18.
4 Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of
Mourning, and the New International (New York: Routledge, 1994), 15.
5 Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the
Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven, C. T.: Yale University Press, 2006).
The Iraq War began in 2003 when a coalition led by the United States and
Britain invaded Iraq with the aim of overthrowing the existing regime led by
Saddam Hussein.
49
Criticism
Fellow academics, leading politicians, and media commentators were
quick to respond to Francis Fukuyama’s The End of History and the Last
Man. His theory of liberal democracy* as the end of history drew
criticism from across the ideological spectrum. Fukuyama noted
contributions “from Margaret Thatcher,* William F. Buckley,* and the
Wall Street Journal* on the right and The Nation,* André Fontaine*,
Marion Dönhoff* … on the left.”1
The most important objections to The End of History came from
scholars in the field of international relations.* Harvard professor
Samuel Huntington concluded that the world was not progressing as
his former student had claimed it would. In his rival post-Cold War
theory, The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington argued that Fukuyama
lacked a proper understanding of the workings of world politics.
51
“former
I have been contrasted by many observers to my
teacher Samuel Huntington … I agree with
him in his view that culture remains an irreducible
component of human societies … But there is a
fundamental issue that separates us. It is the question of
whether the values and institutions developed during
the Western Enlightenment are potentially universal, or
bounded within a cultural horizon.
”
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man
Author’s Response
Francis Fukuyama responded to the furore created by the first airing
of his theory in the 1989 essay “The End of History?” with another
article a few months later entitled “A Reply to My Critics,” again in
the journal The National Interest. In this, he observed that his “real
accomplishment [had] been to produce a uniquely universal consensus,
not on the current status of liberalism,* but on the fact that I was
wrong and that history has not in fact ended.”4 He went on in the
same dismissive vein, stating that “none of the objections that have
52
been raised to my thesis strike me as decisive, and the ones that might
have been decisive were never raised.”
At this point it appears that Fukuyama simply did not accept what
his critics were saying. His main objection was that he had been
misunderstood. He also suspected many people of not reading the
entire 16-page article. Rather than retracting his thesis, he expanded it
in 1992 with the publication of The End of History and the Last Man.
In 1999 Fukuyama penned a direct reply to Huntington, his
former teacher and most formidable critic, in the form of an article in
The National Interest entitled “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a
Bottle.” Fukuyama believes that Huntington underestimates the power
of “economic development and technological change” to “blur the
boundaries between civilizations” and to promote a universal
consensus of political values among advanced countries. He also
believes that Huntington is wrong to deny that it is possible “to have
economic development without a certain degree of value change in a
Western”—that is, liberal capitalist—“direction.”5
Fukuyama’s main concern in this article, however, is that the
infinite, forward development of natural science will not lead to the
end of history, but will “abolish” human nature through bioengineering
and pharmacology (genetic modification and drugs).6 The article is
subtitled “The Last Man in a Bottle” because he worries that
antidepressants will allow people to forget their thymos* (the urge to
win recognition and equality) and become “last men” without actually
finding freedom.
53
NOTES
1 Francis Fukuyama, “A Reply to My Critics,” The National Interest 18 (Winter
1989/90): 21–28.
2 Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order (London: Simon and Schuster, 2002), 310.
3 Huntington, Clash, 66.
4 Fukuyama, “A Reply to My Critics,” 21–28.
5 Francis Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts: The Last Man in a Bottle,” The
National Interest 56 (Summer 1999): 5.
6 Fukuyama, “Second Thoughts,” 1.
54
55
“western
Francis Fukuyama’s defence of the universalism of
values and institutions is challenged by modern
global political realities.
”
Professor Talal Asad, “A Single History?” in Open Democracy.1
Schools of Thought
The End of History caused a storm of debate when it was published.
Pierre Hassner* of the French political research institute Fondation
Nationale des Sciences Politiques in Paris agreed that “the current
wave of decline in inter-state conflicts and in revolutionary ideologies,
particularly in the developed world, is more than an illusion or a
temporary fluke.”3
Samuel Huntington argued that a third wave of democratization
had taken place from 1974, sweeping through Latin America and
Eastern Europe and including the end of the Soviet Union. But the
process was not as irreversible as Fukuyama had thought, said
Huntington, because there could also be “reverse waves.”4
Meanwhile, Marc F. Plattner* of the National Endowment for
Democracy saw The End of History as “a carefully structured
56
57
In Current Scholarship
The End of History and the Last Man proposes two credible theses: that
history is an evolutionary process and that the free market represents
the most rational form of economic activity. It can, however, be argued
that it has not been responsible for any fundamental new thinking
outside the field of international relations.
This is because academics in other fields have arrived
independently at ideas that mirror Fukuyama’s. The Nobel Prize-
winning free market economist Milton Friedman* argued that,
“Everyone, everywhere, now understands that the road to success
for underdeveloped countries is freer markets and globalization.”*10
Similarly, democratic peace theorists such as the American
sociologist Dean Babst* shared many of Fukuyama’s views on liberal
peace.11 International relations scholar Michael Doyle went so far as
to state that, “unusually for international relations,” liberalism “can
generate law-like hypotheses … that can in principle be
disconfirmed.”12 Each of these schools also draws inspiration from
thinkers who were around long before Fukuyama. Democratic
peace theory, for example, traces its roots back three centuries to the
philosopher Immanuel Kant.*
58
NOTES
1 Talal Asad, “A Single History?”, Open Democracy, May 5, 2006, accessed
March 19, 2015, https://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-fukuyama/
single_history_3507.jsp
2 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (New
York: Penguin, 2007), 83.
3 Pierre Hassner, “Responses to Fukuyama,” accessed March19, 2015,
http://www.wesjones.com/eoh_response.htm.
4 Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993).
5 Marc Plattner, “Exploring the End of History,” Journal of Democracy 3, no. 2
(1992): 118–21.
6 Hassner, “Responses to Fukuyama.”
7 Dankwart Rustow, “Transition to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic
Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 (1970): 337.
8 Kenneth Waltz, “Globalization and American Power,” The National Interest
59 (Spring 2000): 46–56.
9 Michael W. Doyle, ‘”Michael W. Doyle on Markets and Institutions,” Theory
Talks, April 15, 2008, accessed March 19, 2015, http://www.theory-talks.
org/2008/04/theory-talk-1.html.
10 Nathan Gardels, “Naomi Klein, Read Milton Friedman’s Last Interview,”
Huffington Post, October 1, 2007, accessed March 19, 2015, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/nathan-gardels/naomi-klein-read-milton-f_b_66591.
html?
11 Dean Babst, “Elective Governments – A Force for Peace,” Industrial
Research (April 1972): 55–58.
12 Michael Doyle, “Reflections on the Liberal Peace and Its Critics,” in
Debating the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael E Brown et al. (Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press, 1996), 358–63.
59
Position
The End of History and the Last Man has influenced the political elite of
the West. When philosopher and Fukuyama critic John Gray* noted
that “universal democracy and the ‘War on Terror’* have proved to be
dangerous delusions,”1 he was highlighting an important link between
Francis Fukuyama’s theoretical framework and events in the real world.
Although Fukuyama distanced himself from the 2003 invasion of
Iraq,* two politicians in particular—US President George W. Bush*
and British Prime Minister Tony Blair*—seem to have been heavily
influenced by the book. Unlike Bush (a neoconservative* to the core
who surrounded himself with other neoconservatives), Blair was a
neoliberal* (pro free trade, privatization and deregulation to promote
economic liberation, but less of an advocate of the aggressive
imposition of democracy). Yet he shifted to the neoconservative
agenda after the 9/11 terrorist attack* on the United States.
60
“climax
Francis Fukuyama’s ascription to history of a plot and
is implausible, but the grain of his work is freshly
relevant to the post-9/11 world.*
”
Stephen Holmes, Professor of Political Science and Law, New York Univer-
sity, in “The Logic of a Blocked History,” Open Democracy
Blair held the “belief that only one economic system can deliver
prosperity in a late modern context,” according to Gray.2 He never
doubted that “globalization* … must eventually be complemented by
global democracy.”3 A war to plant democracy in infertile soil can be
seen as the most important political interpretation of Fukuyama’s
seminal text. War was no longer “a last resort against the worst evils,
but an instrument of human progress.”4
The End of History is deeply rooted in philosophical ideas that
many people find unfamiliar. The Cold War left those who lived
through it with only a passing understanding of Karl Marx’s* basic
ideas. Even fewer knew of Hegel* and fewer still had even heard of
Kojève.* While the text itself is well known, its meaning and
significance, it seems, are not well understood.
The main misunderstanding is often highlighted by Fukuyama
himself. The “fall of the Berlin Wall,* the Chinese government’s
crackdown in Tiananmen Square* and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait”*
were seen as “evidence that ‘history was continuing,’ and that [he] was
ipso facto proven wrong.”5 Such an analysis points to a fundamental
misunderstanding of Fukuyama’s concept of history as a single,
coherent evolutionary process that had little to do with actual events.
Interaction
In The End of History, Fukuyama makes bold claims about the nature
of history and its ultimate destination. On a very basic level, his
theory depends on the increasing, or at least sustained, dominance of
liberal democracies.*
61
62
NOTES
1 John Gray, Black Mass: Apocalyptic Religion and the Death of Utopia (New
York: Penguin, 2007), 29.
2 Gray, Black Mass, 94.
3 Gray, Black Mass, 99.
4 Gray, Black Mass, 99.
5 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (London: Penguin,
2012), xii.
6 PwC, “World in 2050: The BRICs and Beyond: Prospects, Challenges and
Opportunities,” accessed March 19, 2015, http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/
world-2050/assets/pwc-world-in-2050-report-january-2013.pdf., last modified
2013, accessed March 10, 2013.
7 Francis Fukuyama, The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to
the French Revolution (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2011), 475.
8 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?”, Foreign Affairs 72
(1993): 26.
9 Olivier Roy, “The End of History and the Long March of Secularisation,”
Open Democracy, May 15, 2006, accessed March 19, 2015,
http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/3546.
63
64
Potential
The End of History and the Last Man is an important text in which
Francis Fukuyama uses the ideas of leading political thinkers from
earlier eras to explain our own turbulent period of history. For that
reason alone the book will continue to be read. However, Fukuyama’s
ideas do not reflect the realities of our times and need updating in
order to tackle what actually happened after the Cold War.*
The end of history may eventually come, but it has certainly not
arrived yet. No universal political and economic system has been
established and different parts of the world are still torn by ethnic,
national, and religious conflict. Instead of seeing the progress of history
through such a wide lens, it may be better to understand each national
context as unique, and to address it as such—after all, the complexities
of nations such as Somalia, Sudan, Iraq, and Syria are very different.
65
“in Asia,
One wonders how this ‘feel good’ thesis is viewed
Africa and Latin America, where liberal
democracies are often fragile at best and where basic
human needs are not being met. Even in Western
terms this provocative tract seems more attuned to the
self-congratulatory 1980s than the problematic years
ahead.
”
Andrew Pierre, review of The End of History and the Last Man, Foreign Affairs
Future Directions
The End of History will remain a reference point in the fields of
international relations* and politics. As an academic argument, it will
continue to be scrutinized as a thesis that does not reflect modern
realities—scholars are bound to point to the rise of non-liberal China,
the ideological challenges of countries such as Iran and North Korea,
the influence of factors such as terrorist groups (which often
undermine state power over territories) and ethnic, religious, and
sectarian struggles in countries such as Iraq and Syria. Such realities
contradict Fukuyama’s idea that humankind will adopt one method of
government; instead, they suggest that conflict will continue to
prevent universal peace.
It seems likely that Western politicians will continue to promote
capitalism* and liberal democracy* abroad. Despite different
approaches, this has been true of US presidents Clinton*, Bush Jr,*
66
and Obama.* It is equally likely that they will be met with resistance,
because not everyone shares their beliefs. Many see their doctrines
simply as an imperialist tool used by the West to expand its interests.
Summary
In 1992 Fukuyama made a very big prediction—that capitalism and
liberal democracy were the eventual destination for all the people of
the world. More than a decade later, the 2003 war in Iraq* saw a
United States government fail to plant democratic roots in unfertile
foreign soil. And yet another decade on from that, bloody conflict is
still a grim reality for many people.
The true test of The End of History, however, is whether the
economic prosperity seen in non-democratic states such as China is
sustainable. If China does not become more liberal, the central premise
of the book will become even less justifiable, though not necessarily to
a fatal degree.
It is possible that Fukuyama’s prediction will only come true over a
much longer period of time and that the world will indeed end up
locked forever in post-history. The problem with extending the time
frame is that it massively dilutes the central argument, since no one can
predict what the world will look like hundreds of years from now.
The End of History is a philosophical text at heart. Specifically it is a
complicated blend of the ideas of Plato* and Hegel.* From Plato,
Fukuyama took the concept of thymos,* the desire to be recognized as
equal to others. From Hegel, he borrowed the idea that history is
divided into periods, and eventually reaches an endpoint. By fusing the
two, Fukuyama argued that as liberal democracy satisfies thymos,
history as an evolutionary process of improvement will grind to a halt.
This complexity makes the work strong enough to be applied to
events other than the annus mirabilis (“year of wonders”) of 1989,
when, contrary to the expectations of almost all students of the Soviet
regime, change came to Eastern Europe by peaceful means. Just as
67
NOTES
1 Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the
Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 54.
2 Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads, 54.
68
Arab Spring: the name given to the series of protests and wars that
began across the Arab world towards the end of 2010.
Berlin Wall: a wall that separated communist East and capitalist West
Berlin, built in 1961 and effectively taken down in 1989.
70
71
72
Iraq War: a conflict that began in 2003 when a coalition led by the
United States and Britain invaded Iraq.The aim was to overthrow the
existing regime led by Saddam Hussein’s Ba’athist party, which was
achieved that same year.
Islam: a religion that bases itself on the word of the Qur’an and the
teachings of the prophet Mohammed.
73
Neorealism: while realism sees all states as responsible for their own
actions, and interested in their own survival, neorealism stresses that
structural constraints limit their actions and motivations.
74
75
themselves; (2) states all share the goal of survival; (3) states provide for
their own security.
Religious wars: the religious wars in Europe took place between the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Several wars were fought during
this period, and by the time they had ended secular political
institutions were firmly in control.
Thymos: for Plato, thymos was the aspect of humanity that separates us
from all other animals. It can best be understood as the part of the
psyche that desires recognition as a human being. Fukuyama argues
76
77
Tony Blair (b. 1953) was the prime minister of the United Kingdom
1997–2007.
George W. Bush (b. 1946) was the president of the United States
2001–9.
78
Bill Clinton (b. 1946) was president of the United States 1993–2001.
79
80
Barack Obama (b. 1961) is the 44th president of the United States.
He assumed office in 2009. His foreign policy has championed the
spread of liberal democracy.
81
82
83
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AFRICANA STUDIES
Chinua Achebe’s An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness
W. E. B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk
Zora Neale Huston’s Characteristics of Negro Expression
Martin Luther King Jr’s Why We Can’t Wait
Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark: Whiteness in the American Literary Imagination
ANTHROPOLOGY
Arjun Appadurai’s Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation
Philippe Ariès’s Centuries of Childhood
Franz Boas’s Race, Language and Culture
Kim Chan & Renée Mauborgne’s Blue Ocean Strategy
Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs & Steel: the Fate of Human Societies
Jared Diamond’s Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Survive
E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic Among the Azande
James Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics Machine
Clifford Geertz’s The Interpretation of Cultures
David Graeber’s Debt: the First 5000 Years
Karen Ho’s Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street
Geert Hofstede’s Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutes and
Organizations across Nations
Claude Lévi-Strauss’s Structural Anthropology
Jay Macleod’s Ain’t No Makin’ It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood
Saba Mahmood’s The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject
Marcel Mauss’s The Gift
BUSINESS
Jean Lave & Etienne Wenger’s Situated Learning
Theodore Levitt’s Marketing Myopia
Burton G. Malkiel’s A Random Walk Down Wall Street
Douglas McGregor’s The Human Side of Enterprise
Michael Porter’s Competitive Strategy: Creating and Sustaining Superior Performance
John Kotter’s Leading Change
C. K. Prahalad & Gary Hamel’s The Core Competence of the Corporation
CRIMINOLOGY
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
Michael R. Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi’s A General Theory of Crime
Richard Herrnstein & Charles A. Murray’s The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in
American Life
Elizabeth Loftus’s Eyewitness Testimony
Jay Macleod’s Ain’t No Makin’ It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low-Income Neighborhood
Philip Zimbardo’s The Lucifer Effect
ECONOMICS
Janet Abu-Lughod’s Before European Hegemony
Ha-Joon Chang’s Kicking Away the Ladder
David Brion Davis’s The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution
Milton Friedman’s The Role of Monetary Policy
Milton Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom
David Graeber’s Debt: the First 5000 Years
Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom
Karen Ho’s Liquidated: An Ethnography of Wall Street
John Maynard Keynes’s The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
Charles P. Kindleberger’s Manias, Panics and Crashes
Robert Lucas’s Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?
Burton G. Malkiel’s A Random Walk Down Wall Street
Thomas Robert Malthus’s An Essay on the Principle of Population
Karl Marx’s Capital
Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century
Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom
Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations
Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable
Amos Tversky’s & Daniel Kahneman’s Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Mahbub Ul Haq’s Reflections on Human Development
Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
GEOGRAPHY
The Brundtland Report’s Our Common Future
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring
Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species
James Ferguson’s The Anti-Politics Machine
Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great American Cities
James Lovelock’s Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth
Amartya Sen’s Development as Freedom
Mathis Wackernagel & William Rees’s Our Ecological Footprint
HISTORY
Janet Abu-Lughod’s Before European Hegemony
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities
Bernard Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
Hanna Batatu’s The Old Social Classes And The Revolutionary Movements Of Iraq
Christopher Browning’s Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Batallion 101 and the Final Solution in
Poland
Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France
William Cronon’s Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago And The Great West
Alfred W. Crosby’s The Columbian Exchange
Hamid Dabashi’s Iran: A People Interrupted
David Brion Davis’s The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution
Nathalie Zemon Davis’s The Return of Martin Guerre
Jared Diamond’s Guns, Germs & Steel: the Fate of Human Societies
Frank Dikotter’s Mao’s Great Famine
John W Dower’s War Without Mercy: Race And Power In The Pacific War
W. E. B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk
Richard J. Evans’s In Defence of History
Lucien Febvre’s The Problem of Unbelief in the 16th Century
Sheila Fitzpatrick’s Everyday Stalinism
LITERATURE
Chinua Achebe’s An Image of Africa: Racism in Conrad’s Heart of Darkness
Roland Barthes’s Mythologies
Homi K. Bhabha’s The Location of Culture
Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble
Simone De Beauvoir’s The Second Sex
Ferdinand De Saussure’s Course in General Linguistics
T. S. Eliot’s The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism
Zora Neale Huston’s Characteristics of Negro Expression
Toni Morrison’s Playing in the Dark: Whiteness in the American Literary Imagination
Edward Said’s Orientalism
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s Can the Subaltern Speak?
Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication of the Rights of Women
Virginia Woolf’s A Room of One’s Own
PHILOSOPHY
Elizabeth Anscombe’s Modern Moral Philosophy
Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition
Aristotle’s Metaphysics
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics
Edmund Gettier’s Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit
David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
David Hume’s The Enquiry for Human Understanding
Immanuel Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason
Søren Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death
Søren Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling
C. S. Lewis’s The Abolition of Man
Alasdair MacIntyre’s After Virtue
Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations
Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality
Friedrich Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil
Plato’s Republic
Plato’s Symposium
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract
Gilbert Ryle’s The Concept of Mind
Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations
POLITICS
Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities
Aristotle’s Politics
Bernard Bailyn’s The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution
Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France
John C. Calhoun’s A Disquisition on Government
Ha-Joon Chang’s Kicking Away the Ladder
Hamid Dabashi’s Iran: A People Interrupted
Hamid Dabashi’s Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution
in Iran
Robert Dahl’s Democracy and its Critics
Robert Dahl’s Who Governs?
David Brion Davis’s The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution
POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES
Roland Barthes’s Mythologies
Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks
Homi K. Bhabha’s The Location of Culture
Gustavo Gutiérrez’s A Theology of Liberation
Edward Said’s Orientalism
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s Can the Subaltern Speak?
PSYCHOLOGY
Gordon Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice
Alan Baddeley & Graham Hitch’s Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis
Albert Bandura’s Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis
Leon Festinger’s A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
Sigmund Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams
Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique
Michael R. Gottfredson & Travis Hirschi’s A General Theory of Crime
Eric Hoffer’s The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements
William James’s Principles of Psychology
Elizabeth Loftus’s Eyewitness Testimony
A. H. Maslow’s A Theory of Human Motivation
Stanley Milgram’s Obedience to Authority
Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature
Oliver Sacks’s The Man Who Mistook His Wife For a Hat
Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein’s Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth and
Happiness
Amos Tversky’s Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases
Philip Zimbardo’s The Lucifer Effect
SCIENCE
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring
William Cronon’s Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago And The Great West
Alfred W. Crosby’s The Columbian Exchange
Charles Darwin’s On the Origin of Species
Richard Dawkin’s The Selfish Gene
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
Geoffrey Parker’s Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth
Century
Mathis Wackernagel & William Rees’s Our Ecological Footprint
SOCIOLOGY
Michelle Alexander’s The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness
Gordon Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice
Albert Bandura’s Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis
Hanna Batatu’s The Old Social Classes And The Revolutionary Movements Of Iraq
Ha-Joon Chang’s Kicking Away the Ladder
W. E. B. Du Bois’s The Souls of Black Folk
Émile Durkheim’s On Suicide
Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks
Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth
Eric Foner’s Reconstruction: America’s Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877
Eugene Genovese’s Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made
Jack Goldstone’s Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World
Antonio Gramsci’s The Prison Notebooks
Richard Herrnstein & Charles A Murray’s The Bell Curve: Intelligence and Class Structure in
American Life
Eric Hoffer’s The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements
Jane Jacobs’s The Death and Life of Great American Cities
Robert Lucas’s Why Doesn’t Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?
Jay Macleod’s Ain’t No Makin’ It: Aspirations and Attainment in a Low Income Neighborhood
Elaine May’s Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era
Douglas McGregor’s The Human Side of Enterprise
C. Wright Mills’s The Sociological Imagination
THEOLOGY
Augustine’s Confessions
Benedict’s Rule of St Benedict
Gustavo Gutiérrez’s A Theology of Liberation
Carole Hillenbrand’s The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives
David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Immanuel Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
Ernst Kantorowicz’s The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Medieval Political Theology
Søren Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death
C. S. Lewis’s The Abolition of Man
Saba Mahmood’s The Politics of Piety: The Islamic Revival and the Feminist Subject
Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics
Keith Thomas’s Religion and the Decline of Magic
COMING SOON
Chris Argyris’s The Individual and the Organisation
Seyla Benhabib’s The Rights of Others
Walter Benjamin’s The Work Of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction
John Berger’s Ways of Seeing
Pierre Bourdieu’s Outline of a Theory of Practice
Mary Douglas’s Purity and Danger
Roland Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously
James G. March’s Exploration and Exploitation in Organisational Learning
Ikujiro Nonaka’s A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation
Griselda Pollock’s Vision and Difference
Amartya Sen’s Inequality Re-Examined
Susan Sontag’s On Photography
Yasser Tabbaa’s The Transformation of Islamic Art
Ludwig von Mises’s Theory of Money and Credit