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Gender Differences in Virtual Negotiation: Theory and Research

Article  in  Sex Roles · August 2007

DOI: 10.1007/s11199-007-9252-y

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Sex Roles (2007) 57:329–339
DOI 10.1007/s11199-007-9252-y

ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Gender Differences in Virtual Negotiation: Theory

and Research
Alice F. Stuhlmacher & Maryalice Citera & Toni Willis

Published online: 3 July 2007

# Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Abstract Social roles create conflicting behavioral expecta- are not face-to-face but through email, telephone, or video
tions for female negotiators; however, virtual negotiations (or what we call virtual negotiations), may present a
reduce social pressures. This paper reviews theoretical situation where gender differences may be reduced or even
explanations on why men and women might differ in reversed. This paper examines theory and research on
negotiations that occur through email, telephone, or video. gender and virtual negotiation, offers preliminary tests
Forty-three negotiation studies comparing face-to-face and through meta-analyses of the resulting predictions, and
virtual negotiations were examined for gender differences. All suggests avenues for further research. This research is
studies were reported in English but not limited to US particularly timely given the prevalence of virtual commu-
participants. While many reports omitted gender information, nications and the fact that conflict across many diverse
meta-analytic findings supported the prediction that women areas (e.g., employment, pay, status, household chores, and
would be more hostile in virtual compared to face-to-face work–life balance) are most commonly resolved through
negotiations, as well as finding no hostility difference for men formal or informal negotiations.
between virtual and face-to-face negotiations. While negoti- Women in negotiation often reach less favorable agree-
ators overall were more successful face-to-face than virtually, ments than men (e.g., Dalton and Todor 1985; Dalton et al.
results separated by gender did not find this effect. 1987; Gerhart and Rynes 1991; Stevens et al. 1993;
Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999). In a study of MBA
Keywords E-mail . Gender . Negotiation . Social Roles . graduates, Gerhart and Rynes (1991) found that women
Virtual Negotiation negotiated smaller starting salaries than men did. Men and
women received comparable initial offers and attempted
negotiations at about the same rate. The difference was in the
Introduction amount of salary increase men and women secured during
their negotiations. On average, men negotiated adjustments
Research suggests that women, on the average, experience that were $743 more than those negotiated by women.
negotiation differently than men (e.g., Gerhart and Rynes These gender differences in negotiation appear consis-
1991; Stevens et al. 1993; Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999; tent throughout research. Stuhlmacher and Walters (1999)
Walters et al. 1998). On the other hand, negotiations that conducted a meta-analysis examining studies that reported
gender and negotiation profits. They found that, overall,
women negotiated significantly lower outcomes than men.
A. F. Stuhlmacher (*)
Department of Psychology, DePaul University,
Although the overall effect was small, it was consistent
2219 N Kenmore Avenue, across studies. The gender difference for agreement value
Chicago, IL 60614, USA was homogeneous across a variety of tasks and contexts.
e-mail: [email protected] Some have suggested that negotiation outcomes vary by
M. Citera : T. Willis
gender because women approach negotiations differently
SUNY—New Paltz, than men. There is some evidence that women negotiate
New Paltz, NY, USA differently than men. Smeltzer and Watson (1986) found
330 Sex Roles (2007) 57:329–339

that women’s communications patterns in negotiation (expectations about what role members actually do) and
differed from men’s. Less assertive (more submissive) injunctive aspects (what role members ought or ideally should
communications patterns were found with women exchang- do; Eagly and Karau 2002). Looking specifically at the
ing more disclaimers and interruptions than men during impact of gender in negotiation, we suggest that multiple and
collective bargaining sessions. Walters et al. (1998) found, perhaps conflicting social roles are present for women. And,
across 62 research reports, women exhibited more cooper- in the case of virtual negotiation, there are specific character-
ative behaviors than male negotiators. The effect was very istics about virtual communication that influence the expect-
small, but significant and consistent. Moderators influenced ations about negotiators and gender roles. It is relevant to
the extent of these gender differences. One intriguing consider role congruency (Eagly and Karau 2002) in
finding showed that the effect was reversed (i.e., women negotiation, that is, the extent to which negotiators behave
were more competitive than men) in negotiations that similarly to role expectations.
involved prisoner dilemma or matrix games rather than Before discussing the specifics of negotiator roles and
traditional face-to-face negotiations. Prisoner dilemma/ gender roles, we first consider how the virtual context
matrix games involve less communication, less relationship affects roles and role expectations.
building, and less possible face-to-face contact than explicit
negotiations. In many ways, these games have similar (but Virtual Communication and Negotiation
not identical) characteristics to virtual negotiation. Unfor-
tunately, the Walters et al. meta-analysis was unable to Virtual communication uses communication modes other
include virtual negotiations in their analysis; too few virtual than face-to-face (FTF) such as telephone, email, or written
studies were located that reported the necessary gender notes. Several theories can be brought to bear on the roles
information for comparison. (specifically the role expectations of actual and ideal
Likewise, others suggest that negotiation outcomes vary behavior) present across communication modes (Daft and
by gender in part because negotiation partners are influ- Lengel 1984; Latané 1984; Wellens 1986, 1989; Williams
enced by expectations about the opponent (Kray and 1977). Across all of these theories, the critical factor is the
Thompson 2005). In a controlled set of field studies (Ayres number and type of social cues filtered out. Social cues are
1991, 1995, 2001; Ayres and Siegleman 1995), female car the verbal and nonverbal information in the communication
buyers were given higher initial offers and ended with process. Verbal cues range from voice hesitance, tone, and
higher car prices than male car buyers. These experiments immediacy of response while non-verbal cues include eye
carefully controlled for factors such as negotiation strategy, contact, body language, facial expression, and physical
occupation, attire, attractiveness, economic status, and appearance (Tanis and Postmes 2003).
script. Even the addresses of the car buyers were identical. These social cues influence impressions about commu-
It appears that the partner’s gender influenced the negoti- nicators and the meaning of their message (Daft and Lengel
ation opponents (i.e., car salespeople). Given these results, 1984; Latané 1984; Nowak 2003; Sproull and Kiesler 1986;
it is relevant to consider how virtual negotiation contexts Tanis and Postmes 2003; Wellens 1986, 1989). Tanis and
might minimize partner expectations about gender. Postmes (2003) found that social cues are significant factors
Now is an opportune time to examine virtual negotiation in impression formation. Participants were given either a
in light of gender theories. No longer do people talk about descriptive biography, a picture, a biography plus a picture,
the potential for e-negotiation and its rapid growth and or nothing about another person in a computer mediated
popularity; the focus now concerns when e-negotiation is discussion. Individuals with more information about their
appropriate, inappropriate, and what conditions might partners expressed less ambiguity in their impressions of
influence the outcomes. Thus, this paper integrates two the partners. The results also showed that increased social
areas of literature (gender roles and virtual communication) cues promoted the development of more positive impres-
to offer theory and predictions concerning the impact of sions (Tanis and Postmes 2003).
gender in virtual negotiation. We turn first to social role Social cues are part of social roles and communicator
theory (Eagly 1987) as an organizing theoretical framework. status. Traditional status levels, and thus roles, are not as
salient within virtual communication. By removing or
Social Roles changing the types of social cues, virtual communications
equalize social interaction. Virtual communication, in essence,
Social role theory suggests that people develop expectations promotes a sense of equality for users. For example, Sproull
for their own and others’ behavior based on their beliefs about and Kiesler (1986) examined interpersonal communication
what is suitable for members in that role. People may hold through e-mail and found that there was no distinction
multiple social roles simultaneously (i.e., professor, mother, between messages written by subordinates and supervisors.
woman, volunteer). A social role has both descriptive aspects Interestingly, more uninhibited behavior has also been found
Sex Roles (2007) 57:329–339 331

in virtual communication than FTF (Kiesler et al. 1984). deceit and lying behavior was stronger in e-negotiations
When communicating over the computer, individuals dis- (r=.46, p<.01) than FTF negotiations (r=.15, n.s.). Negotia-
played more “flaming” behaviors than when communicating tors were more likely to act in accordance with their
FTF (Kiesler et al. 1984). Flaming behaviors included name- dispositions in e-negotiations, the weaker situation, and less
calling, cursing, and resorting to put downs. This equality as likely to fall back to dispositions in FTF negotiations, the
well as reduced inhibition would be consistent with the idea stronger situation. This is also consistent with social role
that roles are less prescribed in the virtual environment than theory, in that the weaker situation (e-negotiation) had less
FTF interactions. injunctive norms on what negotiators ought to do.
One explanation for cues being less salient is that virtual Thus, we suggest that FTF negotiation is a strong situation
interactions represent what personality researchers call a because there are clear norms and expectations for negoti-
weak situation (Mischel 1977; Weiss and Adler 1984). ation and social interaction. In contrast, virtual negotiation
Weak situations are those in which a person feels more represents a weak situation because its restrictive bandwidth
latitude in acting in accordance with personal beliefs, and reduced social cues provide ambiguity in how to act. The
dispositions, and emotions. Strong situations involve clear weak situation reduces social attention to both descriptive
and direct expectations regarding appropriate behavior. Or and injunctive social norms. In virtual negotiations, then,
in the context of social role theory, weak situations lessen social roles hold less influence on negotiation behaviors for
the influence of social roles. Thus, both the expectations all parties than their FTF counterparts.
about what a virtual negotiator may or may not actually do,
as well as the prescriptive elements of what behaviors Gender Roles and Negotiator Roles
should occur, are weaker than FTF. The gender roles, and
their associated norms, are weaker as well. The process of virtual negotiation becomes more complex
We expect that virtual negotiation has less salient cues and when we consider the place of gender roles. In most
less prescribed roles than FTF interactions. Stuhlmacher and societies, men and women have different social roles, and
Citera (2005) define virtual negotiations as those negotia- then are expected to have the skills to fulfill these roles.
tions that “occur using media other than face-to-face Relevant to negotiation are societal expectations for women
communication (e.g., telephone, e-negotiations, video-con- to communicate in a friendly, warm, supportive, and selfless
ferencing)” (2005, p. 70). Their meta-analytic review of manner (Eagly and Carli 2003). Women are expected to
virtual negotiations found that virtual negotiations were have and exhibit more communal characteristics than men.
more hostile than face-to-face negotiations. Consistent with In contrast, men are expected to adopt more agentic
social role theory, more hostility was present when virtual behaviors. Men would be expected to interact with more
negotiators were anonymous as opposed to when they were assertiveness, confidence, self-promotion, dominance, and
identified. In addition to hostility, anonymity moderated the one-up-manship than women.
effect of virtual negotiation on profit. Profit between FTF It is important to note that in addition to being expected
and virtual negotiators was more similar when virtual to behave in certain ways and perceived as having the skills
negotiators were identified than when they were anony- to fulfill various roles, individuals may accommodate to the
mous. Anonymous virtual negotiators were less profitable roles. For example, Eagly and Wood (1999) discuss that
than identified opponents. women may acquire relationship or domestic skills from
Another example of e-negotiators being more hostile being in a caretaker role, while men may accommodate to
than FTF negotiators is demonstrated in research on employment roles and incorporate qualities like assertive-
credibility. In Citera et al. (2005), e-negotiators reported ness or dominance. Gender-typical roles would then drive
being less credible than FTF negotiators. Lying behaviors expectations and gender norms. Social role theory suggests
were significantly correlated with credibility. As further that certain situations make gender roles more or less salient.
evidence of weaker situational strength in negotiation, In particular, the saliency of gender roles may be influenced
Citera and Beauregard (1997) found that personality and by such things as the negotiation group’s composition,
negotiation behaviors correlated higher for e-negotiators communication form, communication style, and type of task
than for FTF negotiators. In particular, individuals advo- (i.e., leadership vs. nurturing).
cating deceit as a useful negotiation tactic (scoring high on Several researchers (e.g., Kray and Thompson 2005;
the deceit scale of the Machiavellian personality scale) were Putnam and Kolb 2000) suggest that negotiation in general
less credible in e-negotiations than those scoring low. No has been viewed as a masculine role. Stereotypically
differences were found for FTF negotiations. The correla- masculine traits (strong, dominant, assertive, rational) are
tion between deceit and self-reported credibility was con- seen as more important for negotiation success than
siderably different in e-negotiations (r=−.42, p<.01) than FTF stereotypical feminine traits (weak, submissive, intuitive,
negotiations (r=−.24, n.s.). Likewise the correlation between emotional). It is also the case, however, that negotiation
332 Sex Roles (2007) 57:329–339

research has focused almost exclusively on masculine tively. Thus, there is pressure in negotiations for women to
gendered activities. (For an exception in negotiation use an affiliative/communal style of communication. If
research, see Miles and LaSalle 2006 which manipulated women, however, act in accordance with prevailing female
the gender context of the task). Much research has portrayed roles, they may be less successful in negotiations or may be
negotiation as a competition or game, with winners and likely to be perceived as less successful in negotiation than
losers, and limited social interaction. In Walters et al. (1998) men. If women use the more agentic style, they may be
meta-analysis of cooperation in negotiation, all the tasks concerned with being sanctioned for their deviation and
were masculine gendered (e.g., negotiating turbo engine expect to be judged harshly. The agentic/instrumental style
parts) and not a single task involved a feminine gendered may result in their being labeled as domineering or pushy.
context (e.g., caretaking). In some respects, women have to strike an uneasy balance
Putnam and Kolb (2000) discuss that there are many between using a strategy that is perceived as successful and
ways parties may come to an agreement, but experimental the negative labels that might result from using it. Women
negotiation tasks have focused on “trade and transaction” negotiating in a standard face-to-face situation would be
rather than more complex situations. Frequently, the expected to interact with cooperation and low hostility or
experimental situation minimizes relationships and produ- suffer social consequences.
ces very strong situations. Feminine social roles may play The labeling of the task as negotiation influences reactions
an important part in negotiations, building long-term to it, and thus creates expectations of the social role. In their
relationships and problem solving. Kolb (2000) contends recent book, Babcock and Laschever (2003) report substantial
that collaboration is indeed a desirable negotiator behavior differences when the same task is called “asking” vs.
if negotiation is an ongoing part of the relationship, but that “negotiating.” Women were much more comfortable “ask-
negotiation research has been limited to masculine gen- ing” than negotiating. This would be consistent with the
dered contexts. female social role of being submissive and dependent.
While we maintain that effective negotiators (both men Babcock and Laschever suggest the reluctance of women
and women) likely must draw on a wide collection of to negotiate creates inequities in outcomes that are perpet-
behaviors (masculine, feminine, and neutral), depending on uated in society. We suggest that the existing social roles
the situation and context, there is convincing evidence that influence not only how women act, but how they feel
negotiating or being a negotiator, is a masculine social role. obligated to act, and how others interpret their actions.
Role incongruity theory (Eagly and Karau 2002) would Not only is the feminine gender role inconsistent with
then suggest that behavior congruent with a role would be perceptions of negotiation success, related evidence also
most successful, hence masculine behavior would be seen suggests that there are gender differences in conforming to
as most appropriate and successful. the expectations of others. Women are predicted to be more
Gender and knowledge of gender stereotypes has been sensitive to others’ expectations than men. Cross and Madson
found to affect negotiation performance (Kray et al. 2001, (1997) found that men maintain an independent self-
2002). The implicit activation of the stereotype that men are construal while women maintain an interdependent self-
more effective negotiators than women had a detrimental construal. That is, men’s cognitions, emotions, and behaviors
effect on women’s negotiation outcomes and a positive are less influenced by relationships than women’s cognitions,
effect on men’s (Kray et al. 2001). Men’s negotiation emotions, and behavior (Cross and Madson 1997). Thus,
outcomes increased and women’s decreased when the men in negotiation may focus more on their own outcomes
negotiation was labeled diagnostic of ability. and strive to attain the highest amount of profit while being
When stereotypically female characteristics associated minimally influenced by the other party. Women negotiators,
with successful negotiator tactics were activated (e.g., on the other hand, may be more concerned with preserving
verbal expressiveness, good listening skills), female nego- the relationship and exhibit more cooperative behavior than
tiators’ performance was enhanced while male negotiators’ men exhibit. Because women are more interdependent in
performance was hindered (Kray et al. 2002). Interestingly, their self-construals, they are more influenced by strong
when gender-neutral characteristics associated with negoti- norms for how they are expected to interact than men.
ator success were activated, men’s performance increased Some have suggested that interactions of gender and status
and women’s performance decreased. This result suggests confound interpretations of gender differences. Watson
that the default expectation in a negotiation is that men will (1994), for example, holds that gender differences in
do better than women. negotiation result from power differences. Social inequalities
The roles in negotiation create a dilemma for female are often encountered by women; women unconsciously
negotiators. Although a masculine style is seen as more self-categorize themselves into lower status positions when
effective, when female negotiators use this agentic/instru- interacting with others. This would be especially influential
mental communication style they will be perceived nega- in competitive situations such as negotiations. Compared to
Sex Roles (2007) 57:329–339 333

negotiations with less personal information, the social In short, our review suggests these points. First, social
environment in FTF negotiations makes gender a salient roles provide frameworks on how to act and how to
category and increases the connection between women and evaluate the behaviors of other. Negotiation, as it has
low status (Palomares 2004). According to Kray and traditionally been conceptualized, has a masculine social
Thompson (2005), “Women appear to adjust their behavior— role. In most virtual negotiations, the negotiation task
becoming more acquiescing when lacking power and more remains a masculine social role with its focus on compe-
exploitative when possessing power—to a greater extent than tition, winning, and limited personal contact. Virtual
men do” (p. 159). This can also be explained by the competing negotiation, however, makes the gender of the negotiator
social roles present for power and gender. less salient (compared to FTF negotiation) because there are
We suggest that social role theory goes beyond gender fewer status and social cues.
stereotypes to explain how situations or contexts can Gender role salience then has different implications for
influence behaviors, attitudes, and outcomes. According to men than women negotiators. Instead of focusing on the
Eagly and Karau (2002), stereotypes connote a fixed status of the other individual, women in virtual negotiation
attitude toward a social group; these attitudes about a group may be more likely to concentrate on the content of the
are brought to bear on behaviors and attitudes related to an interaction (Nowak 2003; Ridgeway 2001). Recall also that
individual member of that group. Thus, a gender stereotype psychological distance theory predicts that virtual negotia-
explanation about women’s performance in negotiation tions lessen the social influence of the other communicator
would be attributed to attitudes about women. Beyond a (Latane 1984; Wellens 1986, 1989). The reduced social
fixed stereotype of women, however, social role theory cues in virtual negotiation may equalize social interaction,
offers predictions on how and when context may influence making women’s behavior less consistent with a female
the behavior and perceptions of the negotiator and the gender role and more consistent with a negotiation role.
partner. For instance, social role theory would maintain that If this is the case, women may be more hostile virtually
gender roles are more salient in certain situations (see Eagly than FTF, while men’s behavior would not differ. We would
and Karau 2002, particularly pp. 576–578). Gender roles predict that in virtual negotiations, women negotiators will
are more salient in gendered tasks (negotiating for turbo be less guided by female gender roles, and there will be less
engine parts vs. childcare), gendered personal appearance stereotypical affiliative behaviors than in a FTF negotiation.
(e.g., negotiators in feminine dress; pregnant), gender This would result in women being less cooperative and
uniqueness (e.g., face-to-face; one gender as a minority or more hostile in virtual than in FTF negotiations.
token), or under situations with limited cognitive resources Specifically, we predict:
(e.g., time pressure or information overload) that may
Hypothesis 1 Female negotiators will display more hostile
trigger reliance on accessible norms. Likewise, negotiator
behaviors in virtual negotiations compared
roles would be more pronounced in situations where
to FTF negotiations.
negotiation is expected (e.g., car purchases), when formally
labeled as a negotiation (vs. asking or problem solving), or
We also would expect no differences for men based on
are FTF versus virtual.
the mode of communication, in part because being a
Perceived incongruity between negotiator role and
negotiator is congruent with a masculine role.
gender would then depend on the definition of the
negotiator role, traditional beliefs in gender roles, and the
Hypothesis 2 No difference will exist in displays of hostile
importance or salience of gender. Thus, women would be
behavior for male negotiators between
particularly disadvantaged in tasks with a masculine context
virtual and FTF negotiations.
that involves interacting with others who hold traditional
gender views, and where women are in the minority. If being a negotiator is indeed a masculine role, we
Likewise, role incongruity aspects of social role theory should see women’s performance increasing when there is
would predict that men would be disadvantaged in tasks less role incongruity. That is, not only would women
with a feminine context that involves interactions with display role consistent behaviors (less stereotypically
others with traditional gender views, and where men are a feminine behaviors), but this would increase their outcomes
minority. This pattern of results was found in a meta-analysis in terms of profit or objective performance. Given that the
of gender and leader effectiveness. Eagly et al. (1995) found current negotiation paradigms have been almost exclusively
that while women were somewhat less effective than men masculine or at least gender neutral, we predict:
in leader contexts with masculine definitions (e.g., mili-
tary), men had somewhat poorer outcomes than women in Hypothesis 3 Female negotiators will have better objec-
leader roles with feminine definitions (e.g., elementary tive outcomes, or profit, in virtual compared
education, nursing). to FTF negotiations.
334 Sex Roles (2007) 57:329–339

To test these predictions, we meta-analyzed the effects of or not reported/mixed). Most studies included both male
gender and virtual negotiation on two different dependent and female participants and did not break results out by
variables: hostility and profit in the negotiation. In terms of gender. Only two studies reported separate findings for both
virtual media type, studies were considered that had video men and women. The remaining studies used either only
negotiation (with seeing and hearing), audio only (tele- male or only female participants.
phone, barrier), or text only (notes, email, computer/ Two individuals independently coded the majority of
electronic). By combining effect sizes across existing reports. Agreement rate between the two coders was over
studies, we hoped to offer some evidence for these 95% with discrepancies resolved by discussion. Two
predictions concerning gender in virtual negotiation. dependent variables were examined: negotiators’ hostile
behaviors as well as the profit received. Both of these
variables were predicted to be related to gender and whether
Method the negotiation took place face-to-face or virtually.

Computer databases and recent publications were searched Hostile Behavior in Negotiation
to locate studies to include in the meta-analysis. Rather than
search for gender as a keyword, all possible studies The first dependent variable of interest was competitive or
comparing virtual negotiation to FTF negotiation were hostile behavior. These behaviors were operationalized as
collected and screened for gender information. This was either (a) linguistic measures (e.g., lies, threats, putdowns),
done to retrieve gender data even if gender was not a main or (b) offer patterns (e.g., amount of concessions, number
focus of the report. The computer databases of PsycINFO of alternative offers). An example of a hostile offer pattern
(1887 to September, 2006), Educational Resources Informa- would be a negotiator who never concedes any values or
tion Center (ERIC 1966 to September, 2006), Social Science makes counter offers. The difficulty interpreting this
Research Network (October, 2006) and Digital Dissertations behavior is that while it may indicate hostility, a slow
(1861–August 2006), were searched for negotiation terms concession rate may also indicate a competitive strategy.
(bargain-, negotiati-) combined with virtual negotiation However, both language use and offer pattern have been
terms (face to face, audio, visual access, communication, used in previous research as indicators of hostility, or if not
computer mediated, medium). outright hostility, then competitiveness. Given the use in the
The reference list of the studies retrieved and recent literature of various operations, and the difficulty interpret-
books were also searched for relevant research. Several ing motives from behaviors, we felt it appropriate to
attempts were made to find unpublished research to include both types of measures. It is reasonable that some
minimize publication bias. If a presentation was referenced, behaviors might be seen as more hostile than others.
copies of the presentation and other unpublished works Follow-up analyses were conducted to determine if differ-
were requested from the author. ent operationalizations would lead to different conclusions.
If information on both of these types of measures was
Criteria for Inclusion reported in a single study, we used the linguistic measures
rather than offer pattern. In studies that did not report
The sample was limited to studies that manipulated the linguistic communication information, offer pattern was used
communication form of the negotiation along with a compa- as a measure of hostile behavior. Self-reports of one’s own
rable face-to-face negotiation. In terms of virtual media type, behavior, or ratings of the opponent’s behavior, were not
studies were considered that had video negotiation (with included as measures of actual behavior within the negotia-
seeing and hearing), audio only (telephone, barrier), or text tion. Twenty-five effect sizes from 22 different articles
only (notes, email, computer/electronic). A typical study representing 1878 research participants were included.
involved a face-to-face negotiation condition as well as at
least one condition where parties negotiated by email, Negotiator Profit
telephone, or video. Each party typically relied on a payoff
table indicating the profit associated with certain outcomes. The second dependent variable was the objective profit of
Common negotiation tasks involve buying and selling or the negotiations across conditions in the studies. The
negotiating a work contract. negotiation literature uses the term “profit” to represent
the extrinsic value gained from a negotiation. The profit
Coding may be calculated from a payoff table of agreement values
in money units (e.g., dollars), points, or in the amount of an
The studies were coded for characteristics of reports. outcome (e.g., actual starting salary). The value or worth of
Coders recorded the gender of participants (males, females, the agreement is the “profit.” While not familiar terminol-
Sex Roles (2007) 57:329–339 335

ogy outside of negotiation research, we will use the term The gender of the negotiators significantly moderated
profit (rather than other terms like agreement value) to the effect of media on hostility; the between class effect
indicate the objective, rather than subjective, value of the was significantly different between female, male, and
negotiated outcome. mixed gender studies (Q(24)=12.71, p<.01). It is important
Profit was operationalized as the points or “money” to note that significant variation was present within all
earned by the negotiators. Studies may have reported an groups and other factors might be important to explain
individual or joint (all party) profit. In several studies, both additional variation across studies.
an individual and joint profit was reported. In these cases,
individual profit was used. Further, the focus was on
objective profit and did not consider the subjective or self- Profit
reported quality or satisfaction of the outcome. Thirty-eight
effect sizes from 35 different articles representing a total of Results found gender differences in the profit between
3,168 research participants were included. virtual and FTF negotiations (see Table 1). Although not
significant within gender categories, the effects were
significantly different between classes of female, male,
and mixed gender negotiations (Q(37)=26.01, p<.01).
Results While not significant, women did better in virtual negotia-
tions than FTF (d=.25, 95% CI=−.08/.58), as did men
Hostile Behavior (d=.12, 95% CI=.04/−.29). The small number of studies
reporting profit by gender requires caution in interpretation.
Results found gender differences in the effect of virtual Thus, we have only partial support for Hypothesis 3 in that
communication on hostility (See Table 1). As predicted results differed when gender information was available
(Hypothesis 1), women were significantly more hostile in from when gender was not broken out. It is important to
virtual than face-to-face negotiations (d=.64, 95% confidence note, however that separating by gender provides somewhat
interval (CI)=.32/.97). For men, no significant difference was different results than when gender is not specified (c.f.,
found between their FTF behavior and their behavior in Stuhlmacher and Citera 2005). Curiously, across the set of
virtual negotiations (Hypothesis 2; d=.06, 95% CI=−.16/.28). studies that did not report gender or used a mix of male and
Studies combining men and women, or not reporting gender female participants, higher profits were found in FTF
breakdowns, were also significantly more hostile in virtual negotiations than virtual negotiations. Again, it is important
than FTF conditions (d=.47, 95% CI=.35/.57). While the to note that significant variation was present within groups.
effect size when gender composition is unknown is not Further exploration of possible moderators of these effects
directly interpretable in terms of gender differences, it does is clearly warranted to determine if characteristics of the
provide a baseline to compare the known effect sizes for men studies or the context influenced the results. Ideally, we
and women. would want to know if these patterns would hold in larger

Table 1 Comparison of face-to-face and virtual negotiation for hostile behavior and profit across gender.

Variable Number of effect sizes Adjusted effect sizes 95% CI Homogeneity

Within class (Qw) Between class (QB)

HOSTILE BEHAVIOR 25 .41** .31/.50 81.05**

Split by negotiator gender
Female 3 .64** .32/.97 6.06*
Male 8 .06 −.16/.28 30.99**
Mixed/Not reported 14 .47** .36/.57 31.29** 12.71**
PROFIT 38 −.19* −.12/−.26 106.63**
Split by negotiator gender
Female 2 .25 −.08/.58 1.26
Male 11 .12 −.04/.29 20.06*
Mixed/not reported 25 −.29** −.37/−.21 59.30** 26.01**

Positive effect sizes indicate more hostile behavior in virtual negotiation or more profit in virtual negotiation than FTF negotiation. Significant Qw
indicates rejection of homogeneity within class. Significant QB indicates rejection of homogeneity between classes. *p<.05, **p<.01.
336 Sex Roles (2007) 57:329–339

samples. Unfortunately, the sample size limited the mean- Discussion

ingfulness of further breakdowns within gender.
The last decade has seen a re-emergence in the study of
Exploratory Analyses gender differences in negotiation situations (e.g., Babcock
and Laschever 2003; Kolb 2000; Kolb and Williams 2000;
To explore if the type of measure of hostility influenced the Kray et al. 2002, 2001; Stuhlmacher and Walters 1999;
results, three separate additional analyses were run. As Walters et al. 1998). These authors and others suggest that
mentioned previously, several types of measures were there are differences between men and women in respond-
considered hostile based on the language used or the offer ing to conflict and negotiations. How people deal with
pattern. In the first analysis, hostility measures were negotiation contributes to their mental health, employment
separated into language or offer pattern measures. Thus, opportunities, pay, status, and a multitude of other tangible
we compared if linguistic or offer pattern measures had and intangible outcomes. In addition, multiple negotiations
different effects in the comparison of virtual to FTF are transacted throughout a single day and the cumulative
negotiation. While language measures had a bit larger differences between men and women in outcomes may
effect than offer pattern measures (d=.45 vs. d=.27) in become particularly striking. Despite the fact that effect
comparing virtual and FTF, there was not a significant sizes for gender difference may be small, their collective
difference between conditions (Q(25)=2.71, p=.10). impact over time can be substantial. Even small, one-time
In the second exploratory analysis, the hostility measures differences can be of great consequence. A car purchase
were coded as “covert” or “overt”. Covert behaviors are ones scenario offers a concrete example of the meaning of small
that may not be obvious to the opponent; overt behaviors effect sizes. Assume a specific car model sells on the
would be obvious to the opponent. Covertly hostile behaviors average for $25,000 with a standard deviation of $2000. If
included lies and deception as well as offer pattern measures women on average paid $700 more than men, the effect
that were not visible such as large differences between secret size (r=.17) would not be significant and would account for
aspirations and initial offers. Overtly hostile behaviors less than 3% of the variance in the car price. This would be
included language measures like flaming, threats, and considered a small effect. While objectively 3% or $700 is
persuasion tactics as well as offer pattern measures like labeled a “small” difference, many would consider this 3%
small consensus change and restricted bidding strategies. The difference between group outcomes as unfair and hardly
overtness of the behavior was not a significant moderator trivial, particularly if this cost difference was consistently
(covert behavior d=.48 and overt behavior d=.36) in virtual found between groups.
vs. FTF negotiation (Q(25)=1.40, p=.24). Meta-analytic results have found significant, consistent,
Finally, measures were separated into the ones that were but small effects. It remains important to understand the
more clearly hostile and ones that might better reflect circumstances that maximize, minimize or reverse the differ-
competitive strategies, but perhaps not strong hostility. ences. With the expansion of e-business and the increased
Lies, flaming, criticism, putdowns were coded as clearly likelihood that individuals will engage in e-negotiations,
hostile while less hostile and perhaps simply competitive exploration of gender and e-negotiation is particularly timely.
behaviors included low concession rate, amount of persua- As predicted, our findings suggest that the hostility in
sion tactics, change in consensus, or low information virtual negotiation was related to the gender of the
exchange. In this case, there was a significant moderating negotiator. Women were significantly more hostile in virtual
effect between measures in the two categories. While both than face-to-face negotiations. For men, no significant
extreme hostile behaviors and competitiveness were more difference in hostility was found between FTF and virtual
prevalent in virtual conditions compared to FTF, there was negotiations. Women may tend to be less hostile face-to-face
a larger difference in hostile behavior (d=.51) than the due to social roles that prescribe women to be affiliative or
competitive behavior (d=.29; Q(24)=5.77, p<.05) between relationship oriented. With the reduced female social role,
virtual and FTF. It is important to note that this difference women tended to be more hostile; this suggests that an
does not necessarily change our interpretation that negotia- agentic/instrumental communication style is the default style
tors become more difficult in virtual negotiation, but it does on “how to negotiate.” Virtual negotiation allows women to
suggest that more deviant behavior is seen in virtual ignore status cues, reduces pressures to be affiliative, and
situations. Sadly, the results are unable to shed light on allows women to adapt to the expectations of the task of the
gender differences. It would be extremely interesting to run negotiation rather than the relationship.
theses analyses by gender; sample size issues make this In terms of outcomes of the negotiation, the gender of
inappropriate here. It appears that what behaviors are the negotiators significantly moderated the effect of media
measured is another important aspect in understanding the on profit. While our results suggested that virtual negoti-
effects of virtual negotiation. ation led to better negotiation outcomes for women than
Sex Roles (2007) 57:329–339 337

FTF, it is premature to suggest that virtual negotiation will and directive manner. However, these unfavorable reactions
always lead to better outcomes than FTF for women. In may dissipate at least partially when women complement
fact, the majority of the studies (where gender statistics their agentic repertoire with communal behaviors that are
were not reported) found the opposite – better outcomes consistent with the female gender role, as long as these
transpired FTF than virtually. It is very important to explore behaviors do not violate the relevant leadership role”
the other factors of the negotiation that could interact with (p. 590). In the case of negotiation, negotiators could then be
or supersede the influence of gender. It is clear that many trained to work effectively with these perceptions, to
variables may magnify or shrink the gender influence and consider power differences amongst disputants during the
need further exploration. process, as well as on specific techniques for changing the
situation or handling the ways disputants relate to one
Future Directions another.
Virtual negotiation offers unique challenges and oppor-
This paper offers explanations on why we might expect tunities for men and women. Across virtual negotiation
gender to play a role in negotiations and offers avenues for contexts it is possible that gender differences may be
further research. More empirical work is needed to explore substantial under certain circumstances, while minimal in
dyad composition, gender salience, forms of hostility and the others. Our results provide an important step to clarify this
relationship to outcomes. One promising direction for future relationship and open further discussion on the topic. This
research could address how the interface and context of an e- understanding is particularly important given the roles of
negotiation may influence gender effects. For example, men and women and the prevalence of virtual and e-
situations may differ in terms of social cues, status cues, and negotiation in our workplaces and society.
anonymity across different forms and means of e-negotiation.
Different implementations may influence personalization and
relationship building (e.g., “schmoozing,” Morris et al. 2002)
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