U.S.

-CHINA
TECHNOLOGICAL
“DECOUPLING”
A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

JON BATEMAN
With Foreword by Eric Schmidt
© 2022 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

About the Author v

Abbreviations vii

Foreword ix

Executive Summary 1

The Evolution of U.S. Thinking and Policy 9

Choosing a Strategy 35

Translating Strategy Into Policy and Process 53

Maintaining a Military Edge Over China 57

Limiting Chinese National Security Espionage 65

Preventing Chinese Sabotage in a Crisis 73

Limiting Chinese Influence Operations 81

Denying Support for Chinese and China-Enabled

Authoritarianism and Repression 87

Countering Unfair Chinese Economic Practices and

Intellectual Property Theft 97

Competing and Leading in Strategic Industries 105

Obtaining General Leverage Over China 113

Shaping U.S. Domestic Narratives 117

Conclusion 121

Notes 123

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 163

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Jon Bateman is a fellow in the Technology and International Affairs Program at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He previously worked as a senior intelligence
analyst, policy adviser, and speechwriter in the U.S. Department of Defense, most recently
serving as special assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author is deeply grateful to George Perkovich for his patient guidance and penetrat-
ing reviews of this report throughout its development. Special thanks also go to Marjory
Blumenthal, Tom Carothers, Mark Chandler, Chris Chivvis, Tino Cuéllar, Doug Farrar,
Steve Feldstein, Sarah Gordon, Yukon Huang, Jim Miller, Mike Nelson, Matt Sheehan,
Stephen Wertheim, and Tong Zhao for their valuable written feedback on drafts.
Conversations with many others—in government, the private sector, academia, and civil
society—helped to test and sharpen the report’s underlying ideas. Thanks are also owed to
Evan Burke, Emeizmi Mandagi, Nikhil Manglik, and Arthur Nelson for research assistance,
and to Isabella Furth, Natalie Brase, Jocelyn Soly, and Amy Mellon for editing and design.
This report is the author’s sole responsibility and does not represent the views of any other
person or institution.

The research for and writing of this report were supported by the William and Flora
Hewlett Foundation. Editorial production and dissemination were supported by a grant
from Schmidt Futures.

v
ABBREVIATIONS

AI Artificial intelligence

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CCL Commerce Control List

CFIUS Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOD Department of Defense

EAR Export Administration Regulations

ECRA Export Control Reform Act

FCC Federal Communications Commission

FIRRMA Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act

IC Intelligence Community

ICTS Information and communications technology or services

IEEPA International Emergency Economic Powers Act

vii
INA Immigration and Nationality Act

ITAR International Traffic in Arms Regulations

MEU Military End User

NSC National Security Council

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PRC People’s Republic of China

R&D Research and development

SDN Specially Designated Nationals

SEC Securities and Exchange Commission

STEM Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics

USITC U.S. International Trade Commission

USML U.S. Munitions List

USTR U.S. Trade Representative

WTO World Trade Organization

viii U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

FOREWORD

Technology is the engine that powers superpowers. As the chair of the National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI), I led the effort that ultimately delivered a
harsh message to the U.S. Congress and to the administration: America is not prepared to
defend or compete in the AI era. The fact is that America has been technologically domi-
nant for so long that some U.S. leaders came to take it for granted. They were wrong. A
second technological superpower, China, has emerged. It happened with such astonishing
speed that we’re all still straining to understand the implications.

Washington has awakened to find the United States deeply technologically enmeshed with
its chief long-term rival. America built those technology ties over many years and for lots
of good reasons. China’s tech sector continues to benefit American businesses, universities,
and citizens in myriad ways—providing critical skilled labor and revenue to sustain U.S.
R&D, for example. But that same Chinese tech sector also powers Beijing’s military build-
up, unfair trade practices, and repressive social control.

What should we do about this? In Washington, many people I talk to give a similar answer.
They say that some degree of technological separation from China is necessary, but we
shouldn’t go so far as to harm U.S. interests in the process. That’s exactly right, of course,
but it’s also pretty vague. How partial should this partial separation be—would 15 percent
of U.S.-China technological ties be severed, or 85 percent? Which technologies would fall
on either side of the cut line? And what, really, is the strategy for America’s long-term tech-
nology relationship with China? The further I probe, the less clarity and consensus I find.

ix
In fairness, these are serious dilemmas. They’re also unfamiliar. “Decoupling” entered the
Washington lexicon just a few years ago, and it represents a dramatic break from earlier
assumptions. In 2018, for example, I remarked that the global internet would probably
bifurcate into a Chinese-led internet and a U.S.-led internet. Back then, this idea was still
novel enough that the comment made headlines around the world. Now, the prediction has
already come halfway true. Meanwhile, policymakers—who usually aren’t technologists—
have scrambled to educate themselves about the intricate global supply chains that still link
the United States, China, and many other countries.

In 2019, I was appointed to be the chair of the NSCAI, a congressionally mandated bipar-
tisan commission that was charged with “consider[ing] the methods and means necessary
to advance the development of artificial intelligence, machine learning, and associated tech-
nologies to comprehensively address the national security and defense needs of the United
States.”1 I worked with leaders in industry, academia, and government to formulate recom-
mendations that would be adopted by Congress, the administration, and departments and
agencies.

We were successful, but this effort did not go far enough. That is why I continue to advocate
for major legislation (such as the United States Innovation and Competition Act and the
America COMPETES Act), to develop the next phase of implementable policy options
(through the recently launched Special Competitive Studies Project), to support bold and
ambitious research on the hardest AI problems (via my new AI2050 initiative), and to el-
evate public discussion (in my latest book, The Age of AI, with Henry Kissinger and Daniel
Huttenlocher).

Still, there is so much more work to do to secure America’s technological future in the
context of a rising China. Given the high stakes and dizzying complexity of the challenges,
many U.S. leaders are still searching for a mental framework—a set of analytical tools
to help them answer the most fundamental questions of strategy and policy. The China
Strategy Group, a bipartisan group of thinkers and doers I convened with Jared Cohen in
2020, sought to develop those kinds of frameworks. One of our key findings was that such
profound national dilemmas call for deeper analysis by a broader range of independent
voices.

That’s why I was so pleased to read Jon Bateman’s major new report, “U.S.-China
Technological ‘Decoupling’: A Strategy and Policy Framework.” Jon is a brilliant thinker
who has written an exceptional guidebook and blueprint for U.S. action. His report builds
on recommendations outlined by the NSCAI and the China Strategy Group. It’s a major
achievement, and I strongly hope that policymakers pay attention to it.

There is no shortage of analysis today on U.S.-China tech policy, but Jon’s report stands
out for its ambition, clarity, and rigor. To start with, he avoids two of the biggest and most
common pitfalls: offering hazy strategic ideas without explaining how to implement them,

x U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

or cataloging a laundry list of policies without any discernible strategy. Instead, Jon draws
a straight line from the heights of American grand strategy to the trenches of agency deci-
sionmaking. With this methodical approach he outlines a smart, achievable agenda for a
remarkable range of U.S. national security and economic goals. I particularly appreciated
Jon’s prolific use of case studies to ground his proposals in technological reality.

Jon is not afraid to stake a position, and some of my favorite parts of his report were those
that I disagreed with. He argues, for example, that the military importance of AI may be
overestimated—or, at least, that the era of what China calls “intelligentized warfare” is
probably still a long way away. I’ll take the other side of that bet, but I still found Jon’s anal-
ysis to be evenhanded and thought-provoking. And at this perilous moment in U.S. history,
we simply can’t afford groupthink. With calls for a hard “decoupling” getting louder, fewer
people are willing to say (or even ask) where it all ends. Jon is one of those people, and I
applaud him for it.

The paradoxes of the U.S.-China tech relationship are not going away. The United States
will need to continually reassess whether and how to remain interdependent with our major
international rival. The decisions will be difficult, the debates heated. Jon’s report is among
the best guides I have seen and will remain a touchstone for years to come.

Eric Schmidt
Co-founder, Schmidt Futures
Chair, Special Competitive Studies Project
Former CEO & Chairman, Google

JON BATEMAN xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A partial “decoupling”2 of U.S. and Chinese technology ecosystems is well underway. Beijing
plays an active role in this process, as do other governments and private actors around the
world. But the U.S. government has been a primary driver in recent years with its increased
use of technology restrictions: export controls, divestment orders, licensing denials, visa
bans, sanctions, tariffs, and the like. There is bipartisan support for at least some bolster-
ing of U.S. tech controls, particularly for so-called strategic technologies, where Chinese
advancement or influence could most threaten America’s national security and economic
interests. But what exactly are these strategic technologies, and how hard should the U.S.
government push to control them? Where
is the responsible stopping point—the
The United States cannot
line beyond which technology restrictions
aimed at China do more harm than good afford simply to muddle through
to America? technological “decoupling,” one of
These are vexing questions with few, if any,
the most consequential global trends
clear answers. Yet the United States cannot of the early twenty-first century.
afford simply to muddle through techno-
logical decoupling, one of the most consequential global trends of the early twenty-first cen-
tury. The U.S. technology base—foundational to national well-being and power—is thor-
oughly enmeshed with China in a larger, globe-spanning technological web. Cutting many
strands of this web to reweave them into new patterns will be daunting and dangerous.
Without a clear strategy, the U.S. government risks doing too little or—more likely—too
much to curb technological interdependence with China. In particular, Washington may
accidentally set in motion a chaotic, runaway decoupling that it cannot predict or control.

1
Sharper thinking and more informed debates are needed to develop a coherent, durable
strategy. Today, disparate U.S. objectives are frequently lumped together into amorphous
constructs like “technology competition.” Familiar terms like “supply chain security” often
fail to clarify such basic matters as which U.S. interests must be secured and why. Important
decisions are siloed within opaque forums (like the Committee on Foreign Investment
in the United States [CFIUS]), narrow specialties (like export control law), or individual
industries (like semiconductors), concealing the bigger picture. The traditional concerns
of “tech policy” and “China policy” receive outsized attention, while second-order implica-
tions in other areas (such as climate policy) get short shrift. And as China discourse in the
United States becomes more politically charged, arguments for preserving technology ties
are increasingly muted or not voiced at all.

This report aims to address these gaps and show how American leaders can navigate the
vast, perilous, largely unmapped terrain of technological decoupling. First, it gives an over-
view of U.S. thinking and policy—describing how U.S. views on Chinese technology have
evolved in recent years and explaining the many tools that Washington uses to curb U.S.-
China technological interdependence. Second, it frames the major strategic choices fac-
ing U.S. leaders—summarizing three proposed strategies for technological decoupling and
advocating a middle path that preserves and expands America’s options. Third, it translates
this strategy into implementable policies and processes—proposing specific objectives for
U.S. federal agencies and identifying the technology areas where government controls are
(or are not) warranted. The report also highlights many domestic investments and other
self-improvement measures that must go hand in hand with restrictive action.

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. THINKING AND POLICY

The U.S. government’s interest in technological decoupling has risen dramatically since the
mid-2010s. During this period, Beijing’s growing strength and more troubling behavior
at home and abroad led U.S. leaders to revise their views of China, deeming it America’s
primary state threat. At the same time, techno-nationalist ideas—depicting technology as
an arena for interstate struggle rather than a neutral global marketplace—became ascendant
around the world and eventually prevailed in Washington. Together, these two trends pro-
duced a new American techno-nationalism focused principally on China. It first took shape
during former president Barack Obama’s second term, was elevated and implemented un-
der former president Donald Trump, and has been largely embraced by President Joe Biden.

Early U.S. actions were mainly “defensive”: restrictive measures aimed at thwarting or contain-
ing Chinese technology threats. Export and import controls, inbound and outbound invest-
ment restrictions, telecommunications and electronics licensing regimes, visa bans, financial
sanctions, technology transaction rules, federal spending limits, and law enforcement actions
have more frequently and intensively targeted China. Lately, Washington has increased its

2 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

focus on “offensive” measures—positive actions to nurture America’s own technological
strength, such as investments in research and development (R&D) and education. Yet despite
this offensive pivot, defensive measures continue to multiply and raise some of the most acute
policy dilemmas. For example, cracking down on illicit Chinese technology transfer at U.S.
universities can chill valuable scientific collaboration, and banning Chinese technologies on
national security grounds may prompt Beijing (or others) to broaden their own trade barriers.

U.S. policymakers must have a firm grasp of the many different tools used to curb bilat-
eral technology interdependence. Defensive tools are often described generically as “sanc-
tions” or “blacklists,” but this conflates distinct legal authorities with a range of effects and
implementing agencies. For example, SenseTime and Hytera are among the Chinese tech
firms most targeted by U.S. controls, yet the restrictions imposed on each company do not
overlap at all. Huawei, meanwhile, suffers from nearly all of the controls placed on both
SenseTime and Hytera, plus others that are completely unique. To clarify the picture, this
report offers a primer on key U.S. defensive authorities and how they have targeted the
Chinese tech sector.

Under U.S. law, officials have vast discretion to impose technological decoupling. They
need only invoke pliable concepts like “national security” or “the public interest” to restrict
how technology products, services, and inputs move between America and China. Most
restrictive powers have been used to a small fraction of their full decoupling potential. At
the same time, restrictive authorities are fragmented across multiple agencies and policy
domains. This combination of great power and great complexity increases the risk that U.S.
technology controls will be poorly conceived or work at cross-purposes. It is therefore essen-
tial to develop a government-wide strategy that can prevent overreach and align disparate
elements into a coherent whole.

CHOOSING A STRATEGY
A U.S. strategy for decoupling should envision the kind of technology relationship that
America hopes to have with China, provide a rationale for this vision, and explain how it
can be made into reality. A sound strategy would start with a multidimensional assessment
of U.S.-China tech ties and their wide-ranging effects on diverse American interests. In
fact, a strategy for technological decoupling should consider more than just tech-specific or
China-specific concerns. It should be rooted in a larger U.S. grand strategy that reconciles
decoupling with other national priorities, from international trade to domestic political stabil-
ity to global climate change, that might be impacted directly or indirectly. Washington still
lacks such a decoupling strategy, even as it continually imposes new tech controls on China.

Leading proposals can be grouped into three general camps. First, a “restrictionist” camp
believes that the U.S.-China technology relationship is zero-sum and that it tends to favor

JON BATEMAN 3
Beijing, necessitating dramatic curtailment of bilateral tech ties. This group—including
China hawks, some human rights defenders, and many national security officials—fears
U.S. complacency during what it sees as a closing window to prevent China’s technological
dominance. Second, a “cooperationist” camp perceives U.S.-China tech ties as non-zero-
sum and largely beneficial to America, casting doubt on key elements of Washington’s de-
coupling agenda. This group—including many business interests, techno-globalist activists,
and some progressives—fears U.S. overreaction, inflated threat perceptions, and excessive
confidence in restrictive tools.

Third, a “centrist” camp identifies the U.S.-China tech relationship as complex and un-
certain, with both zero-sum and non-zero-sum elements and mixed costs and benefits for
both countries. Centrists want focused, finely tuned defensive measures plus large offensive
investments. This group—including many mainstream think tank analysts, moderate po-
litical figures, and some state and local leaders—fears U.S. incapacity to balance interdepen-
dence and decoupling. Key capacity challenges include securing public-private coordina-
tion, mapping complex supply chains, and overcoming Washington gridlock, polarization,
and bureaucratic clumsiness.

The United States should adopt a centrist strategy. The very existence of a heated debate
among these three camps is itself an argument for the careful incrementalism that centrists
espouse. We are still in the early years of a radically new phase in U.S.-China relations and
only on the cusp of far-reaching global transformations promised by artificial intelligence
(AI) and other emerging technologies. These coming changes, although unquestionably
significant, remain difficult for present-day observers to assess. Policymakers should play
for more time—preserving and expanding American options while the future comes into
sharper focus.

The primary effort should be “offensive”: new investments and incentives to bolster and
diversify innovation pathways, supply chains, talent pipelines, and revenue models in stra-
tegic technology areas. The United States has far more influence over its own technological
strength than it has over China’s, and such investments act as a hedge against multiple sce-
narios. They can prepare America for full-scope technological decoupling with fewer costs
and risks, should that become necessary, or they can position U.S. firms to compete better
in a still-globalized technology marketplace.

Because offensive investments are challenging to implement and take a long time to pay off,
fast-acting “defensive” restrictions should be used to buy time. Washington should insti-
tute controls in technology areas where China seems close to securing unique, strategically
significant, and long-lasting advantages. Defensive measures can help to forestall Chinese
breakthroughs long enough for U.S. offensive efforts to bear fruit.

However, restrictive tools should be confined to a secondary, supporting role and only
used in compelling circumstances. Technology restrictions can be costly (harming U.S.

4 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

industries and innovators), imprecise (chilling more activity than intended), and even futile
(failing to remedy the relevant Chinese tech threats). Restrictive tools by themselves can-
not ensure U.S. technological preeminence over the long haul, but they can and should
frustrate Chinese dominance in the short run, preserving competitive opportunities while
America regroups and regains momentum in key technology areas.

A centrist strategy of this kind will

also help the U.S. government Restrictive tools by themselves
maintain its control over the de- cannot ensure U.S. technological
coupling process—keeping its pace preeminence over the long haul, but
and scope aligned with American
needs. U.S. policymakers have en- they can and should frustrate Chinese
joyed the luxury of control during dominance in the short run.
recent years, as Washington took
the initiative while Beijing, other governments, and private entities around the world were
comparably cautious and reactive in technological decoupling. But as decoupling acceler-
ates, these outside actors increasingly seek to seize initiative for themselves—for example,
preempting future U.S. restrictions by acting first to reduce technology interdependence on
their own terms. Meanwhile, decoupling has slowly begun to shift power within the United
States toward political figures, commercial actors, and national security voices who advocate
even stronger restrictive measures.

These dynamics create risks of unanticipated escalatory spirals. Washington might aim for
a modest level of decoupling but end up with something broader, faster, and messier. In
a worst-case scenario, the United States could accidentally set in motion a frenzied, ever-
intensifying cycle of decoupling that races well ahead of what the nation can afford. A
centrist strategy can minimize this risk by ensuring that technology restrictions are targeted
and precise. The United States must then communicate this strategic intention, and share
more details of specific policies, to help stabilize expectations in China and elsewhere. Such
clarity cuts against the grain for U.S. leaders, who like to preserve their own discretion and
struggle to make credible commitments across presidential administrations. But in a com-
plex and interdependent global technology landscape, silence or ambiguity may actually
cede control to others.

TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO POLICY AND PROCESS

Any U.S. strategy—whether restrictionist, cooperationist, or centrist—must be translated
into policies and processes to guide agency-level decisions. This is no simple task. It requires
evaluating a host of technology areas, weighing numerous costs and benefits through the lens
of multiple expert disciplines. Meaningful guidance must move past generalities and express
clear policy choices, even in the face of uncertainty and a fraught domestic atmosphere. Thus,

JON BATEMAN 5
although many observers say that technological decoupling should be bounded and partial,
there are few comprehensive, detailed proposals for how and where to draw such boundaries.

To develop such guidance, this report unpacks the many U.S. interests at stake and pro-
poses nine policy objectives for technological decoupling. National security objectives in-
clude maintaining a military edge over China, limiting Chinese national security espionage,
preventing Chinese sabotage in a crisis, limiting Chinese influence operations, and denying
support for Chinese or China-enabled authoritarianism and repression. Economic objec-
tives include countering unfair Chinese practices and intellectual property (IP) theft, and
competing and leading in strategic industries. Then there are ancillary objectives—non-
technology goals that also influence American decoupling policy: obtaining general leverage
over China, and shaping U.S. domestic narratives. These nine objectives, although linked,
raise many distinct issues and dilemmas. They cannot be treated as interchangeable re-
sponses to an undifferentiated mass of “Chinese tech threats”—an all-too-typical approach.

The next step, and the heart of this report, is a careful review of the role U.S. technology
controls should play in achieving these policy objectives (see Table 1). Taking each objective
in turn, the report weighs the risks and benefits of U.S.-China technological interdepen-
dence against the risks and benefits of U.S. government technology controls. This analy-
sis leads to a series of proposed dividing lines—implementable standards for determining
which technologies warrant restrictions and which do not. Specific examples help illustrate
how these dividing lines would work in practice. Offensive measures essential to each objec-
tive are also highlighted. By considering the full gamut of U.S. interests across many differ-
ent technology areas, the report shows what a centrist decoupling might look like and how
agencies could implement it.

This step-by-step process demonstrates several points that bolster the case for a cen-
trist approach. First, the most strategically significant technologies (like 5G telecom-
munications equipment and semiconductors) are few in number and already subject
to strong U.S. government controls. A handful of other technology areas may need
tighter China-oriented restrictions—for example, drone swarms, the U.S. bulk pow-
er system, and technologies sold to Xinjiang. Yet certain China-focused controls
seem counterproductive in a number of other high-profile areas, such as geolocation
data, social media platforms, and consumer devices like smartphones. Second, offi-
cial U.S. policy goals remain dangerously vague and open-ended. To avoid costly and
quixotic technology wars, Washington must publicly clarify its vision for the global
tech trade and set more achievable ambitions for countering techno-authoritarianism,
maintaining a military edge over China, and preventing Chinese espionage, sabotage, and
influence operations. Third, offensive policies have the greatest long-term potential for
strengthening U.S. technology leadership, competitiveness, and resilience—and thereby
achieving security and prosperity. Although technology restrictions are the primary subject
of this report, they cannot be the primary focus of policymakers.

6 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Table 1: Overview of Recommended U.S. Policies

Proposed policy Proposed standard for Illustrative policies Key offensive measures
objective government tech controls
NATIONAL SECURITY

Slow China’s acquisition of Consider controls for drone Speed up U.S. force trans-
Maintain a
technologies that could thwart swarm hardware, but review formation. Improve defense
military edge
U.S. defense planning sanctions on Chinese super- industrial base information and
over China
objectives. computing organizations. cybersecurity.

Deny China insider access to Continue blocking sale of Pass national cybersecurity
Limit Chinese
U.S. personal data it cannot American genetics firms to and data privacy laws. Improve
national security
otherwise readily obtain, whose Chinese entities, but allow sale defensive counterintelligence for
espionage
loss would be hard to remedy. of firms with geolocation data. U.S. government officials.

Deny China a presence in sys-

Reinstate ban on Chinese large Invest in adversary-agnostic
Prevent Chinese tems that could disrupt major
power transformers, but narrow cybersecurity and all-hazards
sabotage in U.S. military contingencies or
and clarify the sweeping ICTS resilience of critical military and
a crisis cause mass casualties
supply chain security rule. civilian systems.
or evacuations.

Permit Chinese ownership and

Prevent China from swinging a Repair U.S. information ecosys-
operation of TikTok pending
Limit Chinese federal election or significantly tem by regulating platforms,
further analysis. Do not force
influence reducing public confidence in reforming election law, funding
Chinese divestment from U.S.
operations elections or pandemic education and journalism, and
video game developers based on
measures. facilitating basic research.
influence threats.

Avoid U.S. complicity in Sanction Chinese tech com-

Deny support for Press Americans, U.S. allies,
Beijing’s repression of panies that support Xinjiang
China-enabled and others on the use or sale of
minorities. Dissuade China security operations, but clarify
authoritarianism repressive tech. Model liberal
from selling, and others the “surveillance technology
and repression democratic tech policies at home.
from buying, repressive tech. sector” authority.

Reconcile U.S. open trade

ECONOMIC

Counter unfair
Link U.S. technology controls to aspirations with America’s tech- Cultivate a united front among
Chinese eco-
a comprehensive strategy for related trade barriers and claims U.S. allies about the WTO’s
nomic practices
the international trade system. of a WTO “national security future and China’s role within it.
and IP theft
exception.”

Prevent long-term Chinese Maintain controls on 5G tele- Increase federal spending on

Compete and dominance of tech industries coms equipment, but generally R&D, STEM education and
lead in strategic expected to have the largest avoid restricting AI software, training, and innovation
industries economic impact (and some smartphones, and Internet of infrastructure. Step up
national security nexus). Things on economic grounds. antitrust scrutiny and reforms.
ANCILLARY

Consider leveraging Huawei

Use technology restrictions as
Obtain general sanctions to secure Chinese Build and sustain international
bargaining chips with Beijing in
leverage over emissions reductions, but not coalitions to press China on key
rare cases when they could
China to expand U.S. market access in U.S. concerns.
advance supreme U.S. interests.
non-technology sectors.

Raise domestic awareness

Shape U.S. Use regularized processes Carry out responsible, factual
about technology threats
domestic instead of executive orders. domestic messaging campaigns.
from China while minimizing
narratives Empower oversight elements. Listen to domestic stakeholders.
politicization.

JON BATEMAN 7
THE EVOLUTION OF
U.S. THINKING AND POLICY

In the last few years, the U.S. government has come to see technological interdependence
with China as a major threat to American security, prosperity, and values. Washington fears
that Beijing can leverage technological linkages to steal secrets, spread disinformation, sur-
veil dissidents, hold U.S. infrastructure hostage, and leap ahead in economic competition,
among other threats. As a result, U.S. officials of both parties have sought to substantially—
though not completely—reduce the flow of technology products, services, and inputs to
and from China. This process is sometimes called “technological decoupling.”3 Decoupling
is not just a bilateral phenomenon, nor is it entirely the product of governmental policy.
Many public and private sector actors around the world are contributing—in different
ways, and with varying motivations and levels of enthusiasm—to the trend.

Although the overall trend toward technological decoupling is clear, its exact course and
ultimate extent remain unknown. There are many possibilities. In an extreme scenario, de-
coupling widens and accelerates until distinct geo-technological spheres emerge—one cen-
tered on the United States, one centered on China, and perhaps others. Because technology
is so intertwined with all commercial activity, such a technological split would drastically
reduce every kind of economic interaction between China and the U.S.-aligned world. In
the opposite scenario, U.S.-China technology ties gradually begin to stabilize, finding a
new equilibrium that preserves the vast bulk of the global technology supply chain. Various
other scenarios lie in between these two poles, and many international actors are vying to
shape the future.

9
 The most important decisionmaker, for
The U.S. government has now, is the U.S. government. Washington
been a principal driver of recent has been a principal driver of recent techno-
technological decoupling with China logical decoupling with China and remains
uniquely able to adjust this global trend
and remains uniquely able to adjust up or down. By comparison, other ma-
this global trend up or down. jor actors have been more reactive. While
Beijing has long maintained its own limits
on American and other foreign technology, it has been more hesitant than Washington to
add significant new technology restrictions in recent years. China still appears interested
in retaining many of the technological links it has built over decades, at least until it can
position itself for greater self-sufficiency. Beijing has therefore responded in a cautious,
reciprocal manner to many U.S. tech restrictions (though it is gradually becoming more
assertive). Other governments and private sector players have diverse views on technologi-
cal decoupling, yet very few are as forward-leaning as the U.S. government, and none has
pushed the trend as forcefully and effectively.

A NEW CONVENTIONAL WISDOM

Two broad trends have driven the U.S. government’s recent interest in technological decou-
pling. First, beginning in the mid-2010s, U.S. policymakers and political leaders developed
much darker views of China. Previously, most in Washington had believed that China’s rise
was largely compatible with and even beneficial to American interests. Although Beijing’s
human rights abuses, market distortions, and other behavior were always points of fric-
tion, U.S. officials in the 1990s and 2000s thought the best solutions were further integra-
tion of China into global institutions and deepening of bilateral political and economic
engagement.4

This official consensus, never without dissenters, eroded and eventually collapsed during
the Obama administration. Major catalysts included China’s militarization of disputed is-
lands and broader military buildup; its unrelenting intellectual property theft and exploi-
tation of international trade rules to move up the economic value chain; its deepening
authoritarianism and abhorrent repression of Uyghurs and other minority groups; and its
bolder encroachments on Hong Kong and Taiwan.5 Across the board, China seemed in-
creasingly intent on and capable of challenging U.S. interests, values, and visions of global
order. These developments caused a sea change in U.S. thinking on China. Within a few
short years, cautious optimism or ambivalence turned into distress and fear, and most U.S.
policymakers came to identify Beijing as America’s primary long-term state threat (see Table
2). As a result, U.S. leaders belatedly started to scrutinize the many ways their country had
become dependent on or supportive of China in prior decades—with technology rightly
emerging as a central concern.

10 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Table 2: U.S. Rhetoric on China Has Shifted Dramatically Over a Decade

2010
“We will continue to pursue a positive, constructive, and comprehensive
relationship with China.”
Obama National Security Strategy
2015
“The scope of our cooperation with China is unprecedented even as we remain alert.”
Obama National Security Strategy
2015
“A return to great power competition,” though “nothing is preordained about
Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, this relationship.”
Obama White House
2017
“China . . . want[s] to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests.”
Trump National Security Strategy
2020
“The Chinese Communist Party[’s] actions are the primary challenge today in
the free world.”
Secretary of State Mike Pompeo
2021
“Our relationship with China will be competitive when it should be, collaborative
when it can be, and adversarial when it must be.”
Secretary of State Antony Blinken

Sources: “National Security Strategy,” White House, May 2010, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/

files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf; White House, “National Security Strategy,” February 2015, https://
obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf; David B. Larter,
“White House Tells the Pentagon to Quit Talking About ‘Competition’ With China,” Navy Times, September 26, 2016,
https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2016/09/26/white-house-tells-the-pentagon-to-quit-talking-about-
competition-with-china/; Michael R. Pompeo, “Communist China and the Free World’s Future,” State Department,
July 23, 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/communist-china-and-the-free-worlds-future-2/index.html; Antony J.
Blinken, “A Foreign Policy for the American People,” State Department, March 3, 2021, https://www.state.gov/a-
foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/.

Second, during roughly the same period, techno-nationalist ideas became ascendant around
the world and eventually took hold in the United States. By the 2010s, digital technologies
such as online platforms, mobile devices and apps, streaming media, and targeted advertis-
ing had matured into powerful new global industries, unsettling previous economic struc-
tures. Some tech firms, like social media companies, even subsumed state-like functions—
setting terms for public discourse and determining when and how governments could access
their own citizens’ private information. Digital technologies also came to have great value in
espionage and warfare. Because the most globally successful tech companies were American,
China and many other countries bristled at the entrenchment and extension of U.S. influ-
ence. They sought ways to claw back some measure of digital sovereignty—especially after
Edward Snowden’s disclosures about U.S. surveillance.

Washington was more sanguine at first. It had long extolled the digital globalization led by
U.S.-based multinational tech companies, which enriched Silicon Valley and empowered
America on the world stage. But an onslaught of major cyber and influence operations by

JON BATEMAN 11
foreign actors, including China, gradually convinced U.S. leaders that America’s digital
openness was also a vulnerability.6 Meanwhile, there was growing apprehension about the
next wave of emerging tech, especially machine learning and 5G. These innovations were
said to be even more transformative than previous digital technologies—but this time,
China would rival or even surpass Western capabilities, in part due to Beijing’s organized
exploitation of its technological links with the West. Washington finally realized what other
governments already understood: technology had become a key arena of interstate compe-
tition that could not simply be left to the marketplace. U.S. technology would need to be
better protected from adversaries and more closely aligned with national strategy.

These two trends gave birth to a new American techno-nationalism focused principally on
China. The basic ideas began to take shape during former president Barack Obama’s second
term and drove a few early regulatory actions.7 The Trump administration then went much
further, elevating techno-nationalist thought within U.S. strategy and rhetoric and greatly
expanding the number and scope of measures targeting Chinese tech threats. President Joe
Biden, while making some tactical adjustments, has largely followed suit so far. There is
now bipartisan consensus that the U.S. government must take a lead role in organizing the
American technology ecosystem to reduce its interdependence with China.

PAST PRECEDENTS
Today’s American techno-nationalism is not wholly unprecedented. In fact, much of the
institutional architecture that Washington now uses to nurture and protect U.S. technol-
ogy strength originated during two prior techno-nationalist periods. Early in the Cold War,
U.S. leaders recognized that science and engineering would be key factors in America’s
military and geopolitical struggle with the Soviet Union. Thus they created the National
Science Foundation, spent extraordinary sums on the Space Race, used defense contracts
to seed what would become Silicon Valley, expanded the federal role in higher education,
and worked with allies to establish the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export
Controls (COCOM).8 By the time the Cold War was receding in the late 1980s and early
1990s, Japan had emerged as a fierce economic and technological competitor to the United
States. This spurred another wave of U.S. techno-nationalist policies, including the cre-
ation of SEMATECH, a public-private partnership with the domestic semiconductor in-
dustry, and the Exon-Florio Amendment, which transformed the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States from a sleepy study group into a powerful regulator of
cross-border deals.9

These earlier periods of techno-nationalism, which are still being debated, offer many po-
tential lessons for today’s U.S. policymakers.10 Yet historical analogies should be treated
with caution, as they fail to capture unique features of the current China challenge. The
United States has successfully contested a geopolitical adversary (the Soviet Union) and a

12 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

modern technological competitor (Japan), but it must now face a single rival that plays both
these roles at once and has more latent capacity than either of its predecessors.

China’s economy could become the

world’s largest in a decade, and it is already The United States has successfully
about 70 percent as big as America’s in contested a geopolitical adversary
nominal terms—roughly equal to Japan’s
peak proportion (in 1995) and perhaps
(the Soviet Union) and a modern
twice the share (or more) ever achieved by technological competitor (Japan).
the Soviet Union.11 China’s population is But China now plays both these roles
more than four times that of the United and has more latent capacity than
States, whereas the Soviet Union was only
slightly larger than America, and Japan either predecessor.
much smaller.12 Of course, China lacks
the Soviet Union’s world-class nuclear arsenal and large network of allies, client states, and
ideological bedfellows. And Beijing has fought no proxy wars in recent decades. Yet its deep
economic and technological integration with the U.S.-aligned world grants it opportuni-
ties that the Kremlin never had, creating novel dilemmas for Washington. And while the
Chinese economy faces serious demographic, financial, and political risks in the years to
come, Beijing’s signature brand of state-guided capitalism appears more dynamic and resil-
ient than the creaky machinery of Soviet central planning.

The technological landscape has also changed a great deal since the mid-to-late twentieth
century. Then, the U.S. government was a leading innovator in its own right and “spun off”
many breakthroughs to the private sector. Now, private companies develop the most excit-
ing new technologies while the public sector scrambles to understand and absorb them.
Then, Washington had relatively cozy relationships with large American companies—as
expressed in the famous (though hyperbolic) claim that “what was good for our country
was good for General Motors, and vice versa.”13 Today, major U.S.-based tech firms are
vast, multinational, digital-physical enterprises with complex loyalties and their own for-
eign policies.14

The American nation has also changed, as has the world and the U.S. role within it.
Domestic social cohesion, governance capacity, and political stability have plummeted.15
U.S. leaders now struggle to do anything big at home, or even to rally the country in the
face of foreign threats. Looking outward, Washington confronts a more multipolar system
and a somewhat strained set of alliances. America still leads, but with diminished influence,
credibility, and prestige. Today’s world is also much more interconnected, thanks in large
part to decades of U.S.-driven globalization. Collaborative scientific research and interna-
tional technology supply chains span the globe, creating efficiencies never before possible.
But this interconnectedness also comes with looming, systemic risks: global climate change,
global financial crises, global pandemics, global supply chain disruptions, and global cyber

JON BATEMAN 13
 incidents, among others.16 Global challeng-
Techno-nationalism must es demand global cooperation, yet interna-
be reconsidered for a radically tional institutions have struggled to meet
changed world. This means looking the moment.

with fresh eyes at familiar In short, U.S. leaders find themselves in

strategies and policies. uncharted territory. Although America
has a rich heritage of techno-nationalist
thought and policy to draw upon and learn
from, today’s circumstances are quite different from those faced by previous generations.
Techno-nationalism must be reconsidered for a radically changed world. This means look-
ing with fresh eyes at familiar strategies and policies.

“OFFENSIVE” AND “DEFENSIVE” MEASURES

U.S. techno-nationalist policies are often divided into two groups. “Defensive” measures
aim to thwart and contain technology threats from China, while “offensive” measures seek
to nurture America’s own technological strength. During the Trump era, policymakers in
the administration and Congress overwhelmingly focused on defensive measures, such as
export controls, investment restrictions, and the denial of visas and regulatory licenses for
Chinese workers, students, and businesses. While defensive measures are still being actively
developed and deployed, there is now some consensus—among Biden administration of-
ficials, members of Congress, and outside policy experts—that offensive measures deserve
far more attention. This shift can be seen in bills like the U.S. Innovation and Competition
Act and the America COMPETES Act, two mammoth pieces of draft legislation. Although
the bills contain multiple defensive measures, they focus primarily on offensive goals like
funding and facilitating R&D.

That said, defensive measures continue to raise some of the most acute policy dilemmas.
On the one hand, these tools provide uniquely powerful means for Washington to reshape
the bilateral technology relationship. Regulations and other coercive federal powers can be
used to quickly sever technology links deemed unduly risky. This obviates the need for U.S.
leaders to cajole American businesses or universities with patriotic appeals, to place faith in
blind market forces that may not align with national policy, or to negotiate directly with
the Chinese government or (sometimes) with other governments. Moreover, the executive
branch can often impose defensive measures on its own initiative, without the need for new
statutes or spending bills from Congress.

However, defensive measures can come with significant costs and risks. They may cut off—
perhaps abruptly—key sources of labor, supplies, and funds that U.S. businesses and uni-

14 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

versities depend on to develop and deploy important technologies.17 Defensive actions may
provoke China’s ire, triggering various forms of retaliation and further damaging a sensitive
bilateral relationship. Allies and trading partners may also object to or resist U.S. actions
that disrupt global technology supply chains. Moreover, each new defensive measure raises
the possibility of still more restrictions in the future, causing outside actors to try to get
ahead of U.S. policy and thereby increasing the risk of a decoupling spiral that exceeds U.S.
tolerances.

Thus, while U.S. leaders rightly refocus their attention on offensive actions to promote
American technological strength from within, they must also make difficult decisions about
the role of defensive measures. Washington must find a delicate balance that addresses
legitimate concerns about Chinese technology while avoiding overreach and self-sabotage.

There are many kinds of defensive tools, and U.S. policymakers must have a firm grasp
of their differences (see Table 3). Defensive tools are often described generically as “sanc-
tions” or “blacklists,” but this conflates distinct legal authorities with a range of effects and
implementing agencies. For example, SenseTime and Hytera are among the Chinese tech
firms most targeted by U.S. controls, yet the restrictions imposed on each company do not
overlap at all. Huawei, meanwhile, suffers from nearly all of the controls placed on both
SenseTime and Hytera, plus others that are completely unique (see Table 4 at the end of
the chapter).

What follows is a primer on key U.S. government authorities that have been, or could be, used
to curb the flow of technology to and from China. It seeks to outline, in a slightly simplified
form, the most important legal authorities. It describes which agencies are involved, what
discretion they have, and how the Chinese tech sector has been targeted in recent years.18

Table 3: Washington’s Large and Growing Tool Kit of Technology Restrictions

Pre-2017 Authorities Major China-Related Developments Since 2017

Export • International Traffic in Arms Regula- • Export Control Reform Act mandated emerging and founda-
Controls tions (including U.S. Munitions List) tional technology controls
• Export Administration Regulations • Military end user (MEU)/end use restrictions tightened and
(including Commerce Control List, MEU List created
Entity List, deemed export restrictions,
• Entity List greatly expanded
foreign direct product and de minimis
rules) • Foreign direct product rule tightened for Huawei
• Civilian exception rescinded
• Hong Kong’s preferential treatment ended

JON BATEMAN 15
 Pre-2017 Authorities Major China-Related Developments Since 2017
Investment • Committee on Foreign Investment in • CFIUS activity increased
Restrictions the United States (CFIUS)
• Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act passed
• Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List
created
• Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act passed
Telecoms • Carrier public interest certificate • Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act created the
Licensing and FCC’s Covered List
• Submarine cable landing licensing
Equipment
• Team Telecom formalized
Authorizations • Radio frequency equipment
authorization (technically based) • Chinese carrier and cable landing licenses denied or revoked
• Secure Equipment Act barred radio frequency equipment on
national security grounds
Visa • Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the • Visa ban instituted for graduate students and researchers tied
Restrictions Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to military-civil fusion
• Section 212(f) of the INA • Certain Huawei employees barred
• Chinese Communist Party members restricted
Import • Antidumping duties • Broad-based tariffs imposed under a revived Section 301 of
Restrictions the Trade Act of 1974
• Countervailing duties
• Steel and aluminum tariffs imposed under a revived Section
• Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act
• DJI drones and Hytera radios excluded (the former later
rescinded)
• Xinjiang-made goods presumptively banned
Financial • International Emergency Economic • Chinese actors placed on SDN list for human rights abuses,
Sanctions Powers Act and National Emergen- corruption, and Hong Kong repression
cies Act
• U.S. Innovation and Competition Act passed Senate (would
• Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) mandate further sanctions on Chinese actors)
List
• Global Magnitsky Act
Technology • International Emergency Economic • “App bans” attempted on TikTok, WeChat, and others (later
Transaction Powers Act and National Emergen- rescinded)
Rules cies Act
• Bulk power system order instituted (later rescinded)
• Information and communications technology or services
(ICTS) supply chain security rule enacted
Federal Use • Various • Drone use and purchase restricted
and Spending
• Section 889 of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act
Restrictions
restricted government and contractor use of Chinese tech
• “Remove and replace” rule enacted
Law • Federal investigation and prosecution • China Initiative announced (later ended)
Enforcement
• Nontraditional collector cases prosecuted

16 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

EXPORT CONTROLS
U.S. export controls restrict the transfer of sensitive goods, services, and data to foreign coun-
tries. There are multiple, overlaying export control regimes administered by different federal
agencies with distinct legal authorities. In general, controls can target the item being exported
(as in “list-based” controls), the country an item is being sent to (as in economic embargoes),
an item’s ultimate recipient (as in end-user or end-use controls), or some combination. Export
controls vary in their restrictiveness, from
total bans to permissive licensing processes.
The government’s criteria for granting or de-
U.S. law requires that export
nying licenses is a key determinant of an ex- controls be justified on national
port control’s practical impact, though such security grounds. However, “national
criteria are often opaque to the public.19 security” might conceivably include
U.S. law requires that export controls be an economic component.
justified on national security and foreign
policy grounds.20 Common rationales for export controls include maintenance of U.S. mil-
itary superiority, nonproliferation of WMDs, and promotion of human rights. However,
the concept of “national security” is subject to interpretation and might conceivably include
an economic component. For example, the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) of 2018
proclaims that U.S. national security “requires that the United States maintain its leadership
in the science, technology, engineering, and manufacturing sectors, including foundational
technology that is essential to innovation,” and that “such leadership requires that United
States persons are competitive in global markets.”21 Congress passed ECRA in large part due
to concerns about Chinese technological advancement.22

For military items, the primary export control regime is the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR), administered by the Department of State. ITAR includes a list-based
control called the U.S. Munitions List (USML). Despite its name, the USML encom-
passes a great deal beyond munitions, including military electronics, military cryptographic
systems, electronic intelligence systems such as offensive cyber capabilities, and a variety of
technical data.23 The current list reflects a ten-year effort by the State Department to de-list
“less sensitive items” and transfer them to more permissive regulatory regimes.24 The USML
is now meant to cover only “those items that provide the United States with a critical mili-
tary or intelligence advantage or, in the case of weapons, perform an inherently military
function.”25 Nothing on the USML may be exported to China.26 And in 2020, then presi-
dent Donald Trump ordered that Hong Kong be treated as part of China under U.S. export
control (and other) laws—effectively barring the transshipment of USML items through
this global trading hub and port city.27

Civilian, dual-use, and less sensitive military items are governed by the Export
Administration Regulations (EAR), which the Department of Commerce administers.28

JON BATEMAN 17
The EAR has multiple components, including a list-based regime called the Commerce
Control List (CCL). Each item on the CCL has one or more “reasons for control” that
explain the listing’s justification and determine which countries it affects. Relatively few
reasons for control apply to Canada, for example—only those based on chemical and bio-
logical weapons nonproliferation or the Inter-American Firearms Convention. China, by
contrast, is subject to a variety of control categories, including those tied to regional stabil-
ity, missile proliferation, policing abuses, and broad national security concerns.29 The CCL
contains—among many other items—certain software, technology, and manufacturing
equipment used to design and produce semiconductors, some of which requires a license to
be exported to China.30

The Commerce Department says that “generally, the licensing policy for China is to approve
items for civil end use to civil end users.”31 However, differentiating civil from military (or
dual-use) applications in China is no simple matter. Consider the EAR rule, adopted in
2020, that restricts certain exports—including “low-level electronics” and “mass market en-
cryption hardware and software (such as laptops and smartphones)”—destined for Chinese
“military end uses” and “military end users.”32 The latter category includes “any person
or entity whose actions or functions are intended to support ‘military end uses.’”33 The na-
ture and extent of such support, and its relationship to the exported item, are not explicitly
defined. Thus, under a strict reading of this language, U.S. companies might need to obtain
a license before “supplying non-sensitive, broadly available items to Chinese companies for
civilian applications” if those Chinese companies also happen to do business, however little,
with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) or its affiliates.34 The Commerce Department
publishes a Military End User (MEU) List to aid in due diligence, but it is nonexhaustive,
meaning that a recipient’s absence from the list provides no guarantee that an export would
be legal.35 As of yet, the MEU List does not include any well-known Chinese commercial
technology firms.

The Export Control Reform Act also calls for an effort to identify and control “emerg-
ing and foundational technologies” that “are essential to the national security of the
United States.”36 Congress drafted this provision in large part to prevent China from gain-
ing early access to potentially important U.S. technology. However, the executive branch
has struggled to define a set of “emerging and foundational technologies” that warrant
export controls yet are not already subject to them. The Trump administration initially
considered controls on a wide swath of “emerging” tech areas prioritized by Beijing’s Made
in China 2025 plan, including genetic engineering, AI, additive manufacturing, robotics,
and advanced materials.37 But U.S. businesses and universities pushed back hard against
the notion of controlling such broad and commercially important categories. As a result,
the Commerce Department opted to impose only a few narrow controls related to chemi-
cal and biological weapons development, high-end semiconductor manufacturing, and ad-
vanced digital forensics and lawful intercept.38

18 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Commerce Department also administers the Entity List, an end-user-based control
that targets foreign companies and other entities involved in “activities contrary to the na-
tional security or foreign policy interests of the United States.”39 Designated entities can be
barred from importing any items “subject to the EAR” (including almost any U.S.-origin
product); the exporter must first obtain a license, which may be subject to presumptive
denial.40 China has been a growing focus of the Entity List (see Figure 1). The number
of unique China-based entries has quadrupled since 2018, from 130 to 532.41 Four years
ago, China comprised only 14 percent of the Entity List; today, it accounts for 29 percent.
Nearly half of the Entity List’s overall growth during that period came from new Chinese
entries. The list now includes many of China’s leaders in areas such as telecommunica-
tions (Huawei), AI (SenseTime, Megvii, iFLYTEK), semiconductors (SMIC, HiSilicon,
Phytium), digital cameras (Hikvision, Dahua), drones (DJI), cybersecurity (Qihoo 360),
and supercomputers (China’s National Supercomputing Centers). These tech leaders were
generally cited for supporting China’s human rights violations—particularly in Xinjiang—
or its military advancement.

FI G UR E 1
The Entity List Is Increasingly Focused on China
Figure 1: The Entity List Is Increasingly Focused on China
Non-China-based entries

China-based entries

1,800
1,305
1,600

1,400

1,200
UN IQUE ENTRIES

1,000

800 790
600

400 532
200
130
0
As of January 2018 As of March 2022

Source:
SOURCE:Author’s analysis
Author’s analysisofofthe CommerceDepartment’s
the Commerce Department’s Entity
Entity List spreadsheet
List spreadsheet available
available at at https://www.bis.doc
.gov/index.php/documents/consolidated-entity-list/1072-el-2.
https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/consolidated-entity-list/1072-el-2.

Note: China figures include Hong Kong. Entries with exact duplicate names were excluded, but entries for close varia-
tions of names, aliases, subsidiaries, and affiliates were included. Undated entries were assumed to predate 2018.

JON BATEMAN 19
The EAR mainly governs U.S.-origin items—whether exported from the United States, re-
exported from one foreign country to another, or transferred within a foreign country.42 But
the regulations also cover some foreign-origin goods that have a nexus with controlled U.S.
material. Two kinds of foreign products are deemed “subject to the EAR,” which means
they cannot be re-exported to companies on the Entity List without a license. The first kind
is foreign items that incorporate, or are comingled with, a threshold amount of controlled
U.S.-origin content.43 For re-exports to China and most other countries, the usual “de
minimis” threshold is 25 percent of an item’s fair market value. In other words, a Japanese
computer costing $1,000 could not be re-exported to SenseTime if it contained more than
$250 worth of controlled U.S. components.

The second category is so-called foreign-produced direct products—items that may not
actually contain any controlled U.S. tech but were nonetheless designed or manufactured
with the assistance of such tech.44 Traditionally, this rule covered only those foreign prod-
ucts deriving from a particular subset of controlled U.S. technologies: those placed on the
CCL for “national security” reasons (as opposed to “anti-terrorism,” “regional stability,” and
other rationales).45 But in 2020, the Trump
The Trump administration administration created a harsher version of
the rule for select companies on the Entity
created a harsher version of the List—namely, Huawei and more than 150
foreign-produced direct product of its affiliates.46 These companies, desig-
rule for Huawei and more than nated with “footnote 1,” need permission
150 of its affiliates. from the Commerce Department to import
foreign semiconductor designs and finished
chips (among other items) based partly on
U.S. technology.47 Because the United States “maintains a significant leadership position in
[semiconductor design] software and in some segments of semiconductor manufacturing
tools,” this amounts to a broad-based ban.48 Licenses are available: the Trump and Biden
administrations have both allowed Huawei to continue receiving billions of dollars of less-
sensitive U.S.- and foreign-origin semiconductors and other goods.49 However, any chips
destined for use in Huawei’s 5G systems are presumptively denied.50

U.S. controls are not only concerned with exports to foreign countries; they also restrict
so-called deemed exports to foreign citizens, even those lawfully living and working in the
United States. This rule means that some U.S. firms—including many in the semiconduc-
tor and telecommunications sectors—must apply for a license to employ foreign workers
in certain technical roles, depending on their nationality and the controlled technology at
issue.51 Prior to 2020, foreigners without military affiliations were exempt from this require-
ment; however, the Trump administration eliminated this exemption.52 China has been by
far the biggest supplier of foreign workers subject to deemed export rules: it accounted for
44 percent of approved deemed exports between 2015 and 2019.53

20 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

INVESTMENT RESTRICTIONS
U.S. national security agencies can impose restrictions on inbound investments (foreign-
ers investing in U.S. companies) as well as outbound investments (Americans investing in
foreign companies).54 For inbound investments, the primary regulatory mechanism is the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), an interagency body
chaired by the treasury secretary. CFIUS—or in rare cases, the president—can block trans-
actions that “[threaten] to impair the national security of the United States.”55 In general,
CFIUS can review only those transactions where a foreigner would acquire dominant con-
trol over a business with U.S. operations. However, the Foreign Investment Risk Review
Modernization Act (FIRRMA) of 2018 broadened CFIUS’s jurisdiction over transactions
involving “critical technology,” “critical infrastructure,” or “sensitive personal data.”56
For these, CFIUS can block even noncontrolling stakes that would nevertheless entitle for-
eign investors to access key information or influence corporate decisionmaking.57 FIRRMA,
like ECRA, was principally intended to limit China’s access to U.S. technology.58

CFIUS has become more active in recent years as Washington has grown increasingly con-
cerned with the national security risks of foreign investment and Congress has provided the
body with new resources and authorities. Since 2017, more companies have had to notify
CFIUS of covered transactions and to submit to CFIUS investigations; many have ulti-
mately backed out of business deals amid CFIUS scrutiny.59 CFIUS has blocked Chinese
acquirers from buying several U.S. tech companies, including Grindr (a dating app) and
PatientsLikeMe (a healthcare social network) in 2019 and Stayntouch (a hotel management
platform) in 2020.60 A CFIUS investigation also preceded Trump’s 2020 executive order re-
quiring ByteDance to sell TikTok.61 CFIUS also stopped Ant Financial, a fintech affiliate of
Alibaba, from buying MoneyGram in 2018.62 Meanwhile, Chinese investors have become
less interested in transactions that involve notifying CFIUS (see Figure 2). They submitted
just seventeen notices (9 percent of the global total) in 2020, down from sixty (25 percent)
in 2017.63 Heightened CFIUS scrutiny is probably one of multiple factors at play; Chinese
foreign direct investment in the United States fell across the board during this period.64

There is no body like CFIUS that systemically reviews Americans’ outbound investments
for national security risks—though Congress and the Biden administration are actively
exploring the idea.65 For now, outbound investments are subject to a few, narrowly defined
restrictions. A 2021 executive order by Biden prohibits Americans from trading securi-
ties of any company designated by the Department of the Treasury as operating in “the
defense and related materiel sector or the surveillance technology sector of the economy
of the PRC [People’s Republic of China].”66 This Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial
Complex Companies List—so named to differentiate it from the Treasury Department’s
Specially Designated Nationals list, described later—currently cites sixty-eight Chinese
companies, including tech firms like Huawei, Hikvision, SenseTime, DJI, Megvii, SMIC,

JON BATEMAN 21
 FI G UR E 2
Chinese Acquirers Are Submitting Fewer CFIUS Notices
Figure 2: Chinese Acquirers Are Submitting Fewer CFIUS Notices

Non-Chinese acquirers

Chinese acquirers

250

177
CFIUS TRAN SACTION N OTIC E S

174 206
200

170
150

100

50 60 55

25 17
0
2018 2019 2020 2021

Sources:
SOURCE:“Annual
“AnnualReport
Report to Congress
Congressfor
forCY
CY2020,”
2020,” CFIUS,
CFIUS, JulyJuly 2021,
2021, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/
CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2020.pdf; andand
CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2020.pdf; “Annual Report
“Annual to Congress
Report for CYfor
to Congress 2019,” CFIUS, CFIUS,
CY 2019,” July 2020,
July 2020, https://
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2019.pdf.
home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2019.pdf.

China Telecom, China Unicom, and China Mobile.67 It replaced a very similar list, created
by the Trump administration, that was maintained by the Department of Defense (DOD)
and did not cover surveillance technology.68

While outbound investment limits are currently narrow, pending regulations of U.S. stock
exchanges may further diminish Americans’ practical opportunities to invest in Chinese
tech firms (and other Chinese companies). The Holding Foreign Companies Accountable
Act, passed in December 2020, takes aim at publicly traded companies whose financial
statements cannot be adequately inspected or investigated by U.S. authorities due to for-
eign government obstruction.69 China has long hindered U.S. accounting oversight; in fact,
it is the only country currently classified as doing so by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board, a congressionally chartered nonprofit.70 The new law essentially gives
China three years to come into compliance with U.S. accounting transparency standards. If
it fails to do so, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) must order the de-listing
of Chinese companies from U.S. stock exchanges and bar other ways of trading their secu-
rities, like over-the-counter sales. There are currently about 225 U.S.-listed Chinese com-
panies, including tech giants such as Alibaba, JD.com, Baidu, and Weibo, plus a smaller

22 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

number of firms traded over-the-counter, like Tencent and Kingsoft.71 SEC Chairman Gary
Gensler recently warned that “the clock is ticking.”72 In fact, bills to accelerate the de-
listing timeline by one year have already passed the Senate and been endorsed by House
leadership.73

TELECOMMUNICATIONS LICENSING AND

EQUIPMENT AUTHORIZATIONS
Federal law gives the U.S. government several tools to restrict foreign involvement in do-
mestic telecommunications. Any international carrier wishing to operate in the United
States must first receive a “public interest” certificate from the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC).74 In weighing the public interest, the FCC considers factors such as
“national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, or trade policy concerns related to the
applicant’s or authorization holder’s reportable foreign ownership.”75 Submarine cable land-
ings likewise require an FCC license, which can be denied in order to “promote the security
of the United States.”76

Although the FCC is an independent agency overseen by Congress, it “has sought the
expertise of the relevant Executive Branch agencies for over 20 years, and has accord-
ed deference to their expertise when they have identified . . . a concern in a particular
application.”77 National security agencies convey their views on FCC licensing decisions
through a forum known as Team Telecom, now formally called the Committee for the
Assessment of Foreign Participation in
the United States Telecommunications Team Telecom’s formalization
Services Sector, chaired by the attorney
general.78 Team Telecom’s roles, responsi- reflects how national security has
bilities, and procedures were formalized in become increasingly central to FCC
2020, reflecting how national security has licensing decisions, particularly
become increasingly central to FCC licens-
those involving China.
ing decisions.

Since 2019, Team Telecom has successfully spurred the FCC to crack down on Chinese enti-
ties seen as “vulnerable to exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese government.”79
The FCC has cited these concerns to deny China Mobile’s application for a carrier license
and to revoke the licenses of China Telecom, China Unicom, and the Chinese firms Pacific
Networks and ComNet.80 Team Telecom also recommended that the FCC deny permission
for Pacific Light Cable Network System, a Chinese company, to lay an undersea cable be-
tween Hong Kong and the United States in partnership with Google and Facebook.81 The
application was then withdrawn, as was another application for a U.S.–Hong Kong cable
to be built by Facebook, Amazon, and China Mobile.82

JON BATEMAN 23
Beyond telecommunications, the FCC also regulates radio frequency devices—an enor-
mous category that includes “almost all electronic-electrical products” sold to businesses
and consumers.83 Radio frequency devices must receive an equipment authorization, or
qualify for an exemption, to be imported or marketed in the United States, and such deci-
sions have long been based on technical criteria alone.84 In June 2021, however, the FCC
unanimously voted to invite public comment on a proposal to incorporate national security
considerations.85 It cited statutory and regulatory provisions allowing the commission to
consider “the public interest” in making authorization decisions.86

The FCC proposed to deny authorizations

Pending national security rules and exemptions—and potentially revoke
will lead to a virtual U.S. ban on existing approvals—for equipment made
new electronics made by certain by companies on its Covered List. This
companies—almost all Chinese. list, created by the Secure and Trusted
Communications Networks Act of 2019,
initially contained just five companies (all
Chinese): Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua.87 Congress mandated the inclu-
sion of these companies, plus any other entity that the executive branch later determines
“poses unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and
safety of United States persons.”88 The FCC’s pending equipment authorization rules will
lead to a virtual ban on new electronics made by Covered List companies. Although formal
rulemaking is still underway, Biden in November signed the Secure Equipment Act, which
compels the FCC to adopt the core of its proposed rule and thus renders public comments
somewhat irrelevant.89

In March 2022, the FCC expanded the Covered List beyond the original five companies
mandated by Congress. It added China Mobile, China Telecom, and Kaspersky Lab (a
Russian cybersecurity firm).90 Kaspersky, the only non-Chinese company on the list, was
most likely targeted due to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is also the first software company
to be listed, indicating the Covered List has broadened in scope and could come to include
Chinese software companies as well. The FCC has promised that it will continue to list
more companies as needed. One FCC commissioner has already proposed adding DJI, call-
ing it “Huawei on wings.”91 Such a move could force DJI—by far the dominant drone-seller
in the United States and globally—to exit the U.S. market.

VISA RESTRICTIONS
The U.S. government has the discretion to bar noncitizens from entering the country if
they are deemed to be national security threats. It can do so for specific individuals or
entire classes of people. One mechanism is Section 212(a)(3)(C) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA), which allows the secretary of state to exclude any noncitizen whose

24 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

presence “would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United
States.”92 The State Department cited this provision in 2020 to deny entry for “certain
employees of Chinese technology companies,” including Huawei, “that provide material
support to regimes engaging in human rights abuses globally.”93

Another powerful tool is the INA’s Section 212(f ), which can be used to ban broad cat-
egories of foreigners. It allows presidents to exclude “all aliens or any class of aliens” whose
entry “would be detrimental to the interests of the United States.”94 Every president since
Ronald Reagan has used this authority at least once; Donald Trump used it particularly of-
ten.95 In May 2020, Trump suspended entry of all foreign graduate students and researchers
with past or present ties to “an entity in the PRC that implements or supports the PRC’s
‘military-civil fusion strategy.’”96 This policy, which Biden retained, has so far led to the re-
vocation of more than 1,000 visas and the denial of at least 700 to 1,300 visa applications.97
Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology estimated that 3,000 to 5,000
Chinese students and researchers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
(STEM) could be excluded annually.98

Other policy tools can be used to limit foreigners’ opportunities to visit, study, and work in
the United States without banning their entry outright.99 For example, the Trump admin-
istration proposed new regulations to shorten the length of F-1 (student) visas100 and to
increase the minimum wages that employers would need to pay H1-B (specialty occupa-
tion) visa holders.101 Trump also signed an executive order temporarily suspending issu-
ance of new H1-B visas to applicants outside of the United States during the COVID-19
pandemic.102 While none of these moves specifically targeted China, Chinese students and
workers were among the largest groups affected.103 (Biden later suspended or rescinded
these policies.104) Trump also restricted Chinese Communist Party members and their fami-
lies to single-entry visas valid for one month, whereas other Chinese people can obtain
multiple-entry visas lasting up to ten years; Biden has kept this policy.105

IMPORT RESTRICTIONS
U.S. domestic law authorizes tariffs, duties, taxes, quotas, exclusions, and other import
restrictions under certain circumstances. The lead agency is the Commerce Department,
which investigates unfair foreign practices alleged by U.S. industry (or more rarely, launches
self-initiated probes) and can impose import restrictions as a remedy.106 If Commerce finds
that imported goods are being sold “at less than [their] fair value,” then it can impose an-
tidumping duties to negate the predatory price cuts.107 If the imported goods have been
subsidized by a foreign government, then the department can levy countervailing duties
equal to the value of the subsidies.108 China has long been a top target of both antidumping
and countervailing duties, though typically on raw materials and other commodities (not
finished technology products).109

JON BATEMAN 25
 Antidumping and countervailing duties require the consent of the U.S. International Trade
Commission (USITC)—an independent, nonpartisan, quasi-judicial body.110 The USITC
must find that “an [existing] industry in the United States is materially injured, or is threat-
ened with material injury” by the wrongful dumping or subsidy, or that “the [future] es-
tablishment of an industry in the United States is materially retarded.”111 The USITC also
has its own separate authority, under Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, to investigate
“unfair methods of competition and unfair acts” by foreign entities.112 Section 337 inves-
tigations tend to focus on intellectual property violations, the main problems singled out
in the statutory text. If a foreign product is shown to violate a U.S. patent, copyright,
trademark, or other intellectual property protection, then the USITC can ban its importa-
tion or sale. Since 2018, the USITC has blocked the importation of some two-way radios
made by Hytera because they violated Motorola’s patents.113 Hytera had apparently poached
employees from Motorola and directed them to steal large amounts of design data before
leaving their former company. (The Justice Department later indicted Hytera for conspiracy
to commit trade secret theft.114) In 2020, the USITC ordered the exclusion of several popu-
lar DJI drone models that it found had infringed a U.S. patent held by Autel Robotics
USA, the American subsidiary of a Chinese company.115 However, the order was paused
and eventually rescinded after DJI and Autel reached a settlement in related litigation.116

Antidumping duties and countervailing

USTR imposed tariffs on most duties have a long, bipartisan pedigree and
imports from China in response are specifically sanctioned by the World
to Beijing’s forced tech transfer, Trade Organization (WTO).117 (Section
discriminatory licensing, strategic 337 is less commonly employed and has
garnered occasional complaints from U.S.
foreign investments, and trading partners.118) But the Trump admin-
cyber-enabled IP theft. istration sought even more powerful trade
weapons.119 It therefore dusted off several
controversial statutes that had fallen into disuse during the WTO era.120 One of these was
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which enables the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)
to investigate trade agreement violations or any other foreign “act, policy, or practice” that
“burdens or restricts United States commerce” and is “unjustifiable,” “unreasonable,” or
“discriminatory.”121 If it finds fault, USTR has broad discretion to institute retaliatory mea-
sures against the offending country. These measures—unlike antidumping and counter-
vailing duties or Section 337 exclusions—can target “any goods or economic sector . . .
without regard to whether or not [they] were involved in the act, policy, or practice” being
investigated.122

In 2017, Trump ordered USTR to launch a Section 301 investigation into Chinese prac-
tices “that may be harming American intellectual property rights, innovation, or technology
development.”123 USTR found China responsible for numerous unfair practices, includ-
ing forced technology transfer, discriminatory licensing, strategic foreign investments, and

26 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

cyber-enabled intellectual property theft.124 Based on these findings, USTR eventually im-
posed tariffs of 10 percent to 25 percent on the majority of U.S. imports from China.125
Affected goods include some finished tech products (such as certain monitors and touch
screens, industrial robots, and specialized cameras) and technology components (like inte-
grated circuits, batteries, cooling fans, and disk drives), but not other major categories like
cell phones, laptops, or video game consoles.126 This was only the second time since 2001
that a new Section 301 investigation had led to unilateral U.S. trade restrictions.127 The tar-
iffs remain largely intact today, though the Biden administration is now considering narrow
carve-outs for products only available from China.128

Trump also resurrected another moribund authority, Section 232(b) of the Trade Expansion
Act of 1962, which had not been used since 2001.129 This provision enables the Commerce
Department to investigate whether “an article is being imported into the United States in
such quantities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”130
If a national security threat exists, Commerce can remedy the threat by “tak[ing] action to
adjust imports.” (There need not be any finding of unfair foreign practices.) Notably, the
statute “recognize[s] the close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our national
security,” opening the door for economically motivated import restrictions.131 In 2017,
Trump ordered the department to self-initiate Section 232(b) investigations of steel and
aluminum.132 The investigations led to new steel and aluminum tariffs on China and several
other countries.133 So far, Section 232(b) has not been used to target Chinese technology.

In addition to these economic- and national security–oriented statutes, U.S. law has long
prohibited the import of goods made with forced labor.134 Since 2018, Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) has steadily ramped up enforcement against Chinese-origin items made
by Uyghur detainees.135 CBP has issued several Withhold Release Orders to ban com-
puter parts, silica-based products used in solar panels and electronics, and various non-tech
goods from specified companies operating in Xinjiang.136 Dissatisfied with this piecemeal
approach, Congress passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which Biden signed
in December 2021. It creates a rebuttable presumption that all Xinjiang-made goods are
products of forced labor and therefore cannot be imported.137

FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
Dozens of U.S. government programs authorize financial sanctions on foreign individu-
als and entities.138 Congress created some of these programs, but most were fashioned by
presidents using the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).139 IEEPA
allows the president to declare a “national emergency” regarding “any unusual and extraor-
dinary [foreign] threat . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United
States.”140 The president may then “deal with” the threat by blocking some or all financial
activities of designated actors—for example, freezing their assets and barring them from

JON BATEMAN 27
receiving any money or property.141 Presidents have declared seventy-four national emer-
gencies since 1979, with forty still in effect.142 (Emergencies must be renewed annually and
comply with other procedural requirements in the National Emergencies Act.143)

After a sanctions program has been established, the power to designate specific actors is
typically delegated to the Treasury Department. Those subject to the harshest sanctions
are placed on Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List.144 A review of this
list shows that China has been sparingly targeted by U.S. financial sanctions to date (see
Figure 3). The SDN List includes 332 China-based actors, about 3 percent of the glob-
al total (9,792).145 Moreover, these China-based actors were generally not sanctioned for
China-specific reasons, such as involvement with Beijing’s domestic human rights abuses.146
Rather, most were punished for their dealings with North Korea, Iran, and other sanc-
tioned nations. For example, the Chinese state-owned enterprise CEIEC (China National
Electronics Import & Export Corporation) was designated in 2020 for helping undermine
democracy in Venezuela by “supporting the Maduro regime’s malicious cyber efforts” and
providing “a commercialized version of China’s ‘Great Firewall.’”147

FI G UR E 3
Figure 3: The SDN List Rarely Targets China or Cites
The SDN List Rarely Targets China or Cites China-Specific Relations
China-Specific Rationales

9.460 332 273

Non-China-based China-based Sanctioned for ties
actors actors to third countries

59
Sanctioned for
China-specific reasons

Source: Author’s analysis of the Treasury Department’s Sanctions List Search and SDN spreadsheet, available at
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of the Treasury Department’s Sanctions List Search and SDN spreadsheet, available at
https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-
https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-
designated-nationals-list-data-formats-data-schemas (primary names), as of March 27, 2022.
designated-nationals-list-data-formats-data-schemas (primary names), as of January 30, 2022.

Note: Entries with exact duplicate names were excluded, but entries with close variations of names, aliases, sub-
sidiaries, and affiliates were included. “China” here refers to mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau. China-based
actors include some third-country entities that maintain a presence in China. China-specific reasons mean human
rights abuses and corruption (Executive Order 13818) and Hong Kong repression (Executive Order 13936).

28 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Two relatively new sanctions programs have been used to target Chinese government of-
ficials and entities for their domestic abuses, suggesting that China could become a more
explicit focus of U.S. financial sanctions over time. In 2017, Trump declared that “serious
human rights abuse and corruption around the world” constituted a national emergency,
invoking IEEPA and the Global Magnitsky Act.148 Seventeen Chinese individuals and
organizations have been designated under this authority (mostly for activities in Xinjiang),
and many more could be targeted in the future—including people or companies that pro-
vide “technological support” to Chinese human rights abuses.149 (The Uyghur Human
Rights Policy Act of 2020 and the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021 call
for additional Xinjiang-related sanctions to be imposed.150) Trump created another new
authority in 2020 to punish the suppression of Hong Kong’s autonomy, democracy, and
human rights, including online censorship; forty-two local and national Chinese officials
have since been designated on that basis.151

The draft U.S. Innovation and Competition Act, recently passed by the Senate, further
suggests the likelihood of additional financial sanctions targeting China and its technology
ecosystem. Identifying “sanctions and other restrictions” as “[central] to strategic competi-
tion with China,” the bill criticizes the executive branch for not sufficiently utilizing the
“broad range of tough authorities” provided by Congress.152 It demands SDN List desig-
nation and/or other harsh sanctions for foreign actors found to be supporting trade se-
cret theft or Chinese government efforts to “undermin[e] cybersecurity.”153 The equivalent
House bill, the America COMPETES Act, contains no similar provisions.154

TECHNOLOGY TRANSACTION RULES

The breadth and flexibility of executive powers can permit U.S. administrations to apply
existing authorities in novel ways, sometimes spinning up whole new regulatory regimes
without the need for further legislation. The Trump administration did this on several oc-
casions. Leveraging IEEPA’s power to restrict “transactions,” Trump debuted new kinds of
restrictions that operated differently from the SDN List—including what is now called
the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List. This tool, described
earlier, allows the U.S. government to ban outbound investments in certain Chinese firms
while stopping short of a full asset freeze.

One of Trump’s most high-profile inno- The breadth and flexibility of

vations was his attempted “app bans” of executive powers can permit U.S.
TikTok and WeChat.155 To impose these
administrations to spin up whole
bans, Trump declared that “the unrestrict-
ed acquisition or use in the United States new regulatory regimes without the
of information and communications tech- need for further legislation.
nology or services” (ICTS) associated with

JON BATEMAN 29
 “foreign adversaries” constituted a national
The ICTS supply chain security emergency.156 His Commerce Department
rule establishes a CFIUS-like then issued rules to block app stores, host-
mechanism for federal government ing services, content delivery networks,
and peering services from supporting these
review of almost any large-scale use two apps—effectively banning them in the
of Chinese ICTS in the United States. United States.157 Trump later sought to ban
AliPay, Tencent QQ, and six other Chinese
apps as well. But no app ban was ever enforced. Federal courts enjoined the TikTok and
158

WeChat bans; Trump left office before detailed rules on the others could be published; and
Biden wiped the slate clean.159

Mobile apps were not the only targets of Trump’s novel technology restrictions. Relying on
the same ICTS national emergency, he ordered U.S. bulk power systems, which are key el-
ements of the electrical grid, to curb the use of equipment sourced from “foreign adversary”
countries such as China.160 Specifically, the Department of Energy barred Chinese equip-
ment from being used in bulk power systems that serve military facilities “critical to the
defense of the United States.”161 Biden paused implementation of this rule pending a
review.162

More recently, the U.S. government has sought to replace such ad hoc restrictions with
formalized regulatory structures. In March 2021, Biden allowed a major new regulation de-
veloped by the Trump administration to come into force. The ICTS supply chain security
rule cites, once again, the national emergency regarding foreign adversary ICTS.163 It es-
tablishes a CFIUS-like mechanism for federal government review of almost any large-scale
use of Chinese ICTS in the United States. The Department of Commerce can block such
transactions if they pose “undue or unacceptable risks.”

Biden later issued an executive order outlining “a criteria-based decision framework and
rigorous, evidence-based analysis” to help guide the rule’s application to internet-con-
nected software.164 He told the Commerce Department to examine any links to adver-
sarial military, intelligence, proliferation, or cyber activities, and to consider the quality
of third-party auditing, the scope and sensitivity of data collected, the number and sen-
sitivity of users, and any verifiable risk remediation measures, among other factors. The
department has not yet taken any public enforcement action under the new authority,
but multiple investigations are apparently under way. Commerce has issued subpoenas
to unnamed Chinese companies, is reportedly investigating Alibaba’s cloud business and
DiDi, and is probably also reviewing at least some of the mobile apps that Trump sought
to ban by executive order.165

30 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

FEDERAL USE AND SPENDING RESTRICTIONS
The federal government has increasingly acted to limit its own use of and financial support
for certain Chinese technologies, although these actions are not a primary focus of this
report. These efforts can have wider impacts due to the U.S. government’s large purchas-
ing power. Drones, for example, have been the target of several recent federal restrictions.
The Defense Department suspended its purchase of all commercial drones in 2018 due to
concerns about the security of Chinese products, and the next year, Congress permanently
barred DOD from using any drones with Chinese components.166 After the Department
of the Interior grounded its entire drone fleet for similar reasons, Trump sought to institute
government-wide restrictions on foreign drones.167 Days before leaving office, he signed an
executive order telling agencies not to buy drones whose key hardware, software, or data
services come from “adversary countries” like China.168

Telecommunications and video surveillance equipment have also been subjects of recent
China-related procurement restrictions. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019 included a provision—Section 889—prohibiting agencies from spending any
federal funds on such equipment made by Huawei, ZTE, Hytera, Hikvision, and Dahua.169
This government-wide blacklist may expand in the future; the law allows DOD to add
other firms “connected to” the Chinese government. (Any additions would automatically
be placed on the FCC’s Covered List as well.170)

As the U.S. government curbs its own direct purchase or use of Chinese technology, it has
also imposed parallel restrictions on federal contractors and grantees, a much bigger uni-
verse. Section 889, which blacklists certain Chinese equipment within the federal govern-
ment, separately bars agencies from contracting with entities that “use” such equipment—
even if their “use” has no connection to the federal contract and involves an unrelated unit
of the contractor’s business.171 More than 16,000 companies had federal prime contracts as
of 2018, suggesting the wide reach of Section 889.172 Similarly, the FCC has leveraged fed-
eral subsidies to discourage the private use of Chinese telecommunications equipment. It
will subsidize carriers’ efforts to “remove and replace” Huawei and ZTE equipment, while
denying future subsidies for carriers who retain such equipment.173 Although technically
voluntary, this program operates as a de facto ban on Huawei and ZTE usage in the tele-
coms sector. Small and rural carriers cannot afford to lose federal funds, while large carriers
already generally avoid Huawei and ZTE.174

LAW ENFORCEMENT
Outside the regulatory domain, federal law enforcement activities can also have the effect
of restricting China’s illicit (and licit) access to U.S. technology. From November 2018 to
February 2022, the China Initiative was the Department of Justice’s strategic campaign

JON BATEMAN 31
to investigate and prosecute theft of trade secrets, espionage, foreign influence activities,
supply chain subversion, and other threats from China. The Justice Department publicly
categorized at least seventy-seven criminal cases against more than 150 defendants as part
of the China Initiative, according to a database compiled by the MIT Technology Review.175
However, the Justice Department had no official definition of a China Initiative case, and
many of these cases would presumably still have been filed even without such an initiative.
The most high-profile indictments charged Huawei and its chief financial officer, Meng
Wanzhou, with theft of trade secrets and fraud.176 Cases against other Chinese, American,
and third-country nationals and companies alleged export control violations, hacking, eco-
nomic and national security espionage, and failure to register as a foreign agent.177 Many
cases did not have an explicit connection to the Chinese government.178

The most controversial and arguably significant element of the China Initiative was the
Justice Department’s crackdown on what it called “nontraditional collectors” at U.S. uni-
versities. Fearing illicit transfer of technology and intellectual property, federal prosecutors
charged about twenty U.S.-based Chinese and American researchers with hiding their ties
to the Chinese government.179 For example, multiple cases alleged that researchers applied
for federal grants without disclosing their participation in Beijing’s Thousand Talents Plan.

The crackdown led many Chinese researchers to leave the United States and made American
academics more reluctant to collaborate with Chinese counterparts.180 Critics called this a
harmful chilling effect, but Justice Department officials (even well into the Biden admin-
istration) characterized it as successful deterrence.181 Over time, some of the cases proved
weak. Since 2021, the department has dropped charges against five Chinese researchers,
dismissed its case against a China-born American academic, and failed to convict a Chinese
Canadian professor.182 It also secured some victories, such as the conviction of a high-profile
American chemistry professor for hiding his ties to China.183

After a monthslong review, the Biden administration announced an end to the China
Initiative in February 2022.184 The change was partly cosmetic: the Justice Department’s
China-related work largely continues under different branding. Matt Olsen, assistant at-
torney general for national security, explained that the China Initiative label “helped give
rise to a harmful perception that the department applies a lower standard to investigate and
prosecute criminal conduct related to that country or that we in some way view people with
racial, ethnic or familial ties to China differently.” Although Olsen disputed this perception,
he nevertheless announced one key policy change. “Cases involving academic integrity and
research security” (formerly described by the more charged term “nontraditional collec-
tion”) are now mainly handled as administrative matters by the federal agencies that fund
research. Prosecutions of such cases will be rarer and require closer scrutiny from senior
department officials.185

32 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

 Table 4: Select Chinese Tech Companies Subject to Multiple U.S. Restrictions
China China China Fujian
Huawei ZTE Hikvision Hytera Alibaba Tencent Dahua DJI ByteDance Kingsoft SenseTime Megvii SMIC
Telecom Mobile Unicom Jinhua
Non-SDN CMIC List X X X X X X X X X
Entity List X X X X X X X X
*
Covered List X X X X X X X
Section 889 blacklist X X X X X
Federal indictment X X X X
App ban
ICTS supply chain
* * *
X ? ? ?
security review
FCC license denial/
X X X
revocation
CFIUS action X † X
Stock exchange
de-listing/over-the- † † †
counter ban
Remove and
X X
replace rule
Section 337 X
Foreign-produced
*
direct product X
footnote 1
Employee visa ban X

LEGEND

JON BATEMAN
X = active ? = probable † = pending Sources: U.S. government documents and press reports cited throughout this chapter.
* = rescinded

33
Note: This table covers actions taken between January 1, 2017, and March 27, 2022. Alibaba here includes Ant Group, a closely related company.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. STRATEGY
This overview of U.S. policy tools holds at least two important lessons for American strate-
gists weighing the larger issues at stake in technological decoupling. First, Washington’s
restrictive powers are dizzyingly complex to administer, with authority fragmented across
multiple agencies, statutes, and policy areas. It is therefore essential to articulate a govern-
ment-wide strategy that can align these disparate elements into a coherent whole. Without
such a strategy, different policy levers may operate out of sync, or even work at cross-pur-
poses, based on agencies’ divergent views of key goals and trade-offs.

Second, U.S. law gives the executive branch vast discretion to pursue a technological de-
coupling of its choosing. By interpreting pliable concepts like “national security” or “the
public interest,” U.S. officials can unlock an extraordinary range of powers to restrict the
technology products, services, and inputs flowing between America and China. Most of
these powers have only been used to a tiny fraction of their full potential. And Congress has
been an eager partner—providing several new authorities and prodding administrations to
act. Legally speaking, U.S. officials have a blank canvas on which to paint new restrictive
measures and effect technological decoupling.186 This is both an opportunity and a danger,
as overreach becomes more likely in such circumstances.

All of the policy tools defined and explained above will be collectively referred to as “tech-
nology restrictions,” “technology controls,” or “defensive measures.” The remainder of this
report explores which technologies Washington should target with this general tool kit to
reduce U.S.-China technological interdependence. Identifying the best tool or tools to use
with each technology area is a topic for another paper.

34 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

CHOOSING A STRATEGY

The dozens of new U.S. government technology controls aimed at China in recent years did
not all have a single, unified objective. Some sought to counter national security threats,
some were more economically motivated, and some had ancillary purposes (like domestic
or diplomatic gamesmanship) unrelated to technology itself. Yet in public discourse, and
even in policy circles, distinct objectives are often left undifferentiated or undefined. Too
frequently, U.S. leaders and analysts speak of “countering” or “reining in” Chinese technol-
ogy threats and risks—highly general formulations that elide key goals and trade-offs.

Untangling this jumble of U.S. objectives is an important first step in developing a coherent
strategy. Table 5 describes nine apparent rationales for recent U.S. technology restrictions
aimed at China.

The existence of so many distinct policy rationales is not surprising. The United States has
many different concerns with China, and technology plays a significant part in nearly all
of them. Technology is rightly at the heart of America’s China policies. (The corollary idea,
that China should be at the heart of U.S. tech policy, is more debatable.) In many cases,
these policy rationales overlap and reinforce each other. For example, potential Chinese
influence over U.S. telecommunications networks raises multiple fears simultaneously:
theft of commercial secrets, tracking of U.S. government officials, injection of disinforma-
tion, or subversion of critical infrastructure in a crisis, among other possibilities. Hence
the U.S. telecommunications sector was an early target for American restrictive measures,
and the global telecoms marketplace remains a central preoccupation of Washington’s tech
diplomacy.

35
Table 5: Untangling the Many U.S. Rationales for China-Related
Tech Restrictions

U.S. Rationale Illustrative policy

interest area
Maintaining a military Since 2020, Chinese graduate students and researchers with institutional ties to
edge over China Beijing’s “military-civil fusion” efforts have been denied visas.

Limiting Chinese
In 2019, a Chinese company was forced to sell the dating app Grindr because the
national security
app’s sensitive personal data could be used for intelligence targeting.
espionage
Preventing Chinese Since 2019, U.S. telecommunications providers have been unable to receive federal
National sabotage in a crisis subsidies to buy Huawei or ZTE equipment, partly due to sabotage fears.
security
Limiting Chinese influ- In 2020, Trump ordered a ban on TikTok in part because the app could “be used for
ence operations disinformation campaigns that benefit the Chinese Communist Party.”

Denying support for

In 2019, Chinese tech companies, including Hikvision, Megvii, and SenseTime,
Chinese and China-en-
were placed on the Entity List due to their involvement in Beijing’s repression
abled authoritarianism
in Xinjiang.
and repression

The Trump administration’s broad-based tariffs on China—aimed at countering

Countering unfair
unfair economic practices such as intellectual property theft—applied to many
Chinese economic
technology goods, including smart devices, flash memory devices, and electronic
practices and IP theft
components.
Economic
U.S. controls on the export of American technologies to Huawei are especially
Competing and leading
strict for semiconductors and for any tech that would be used “with or in any 5G
in strategic industries
devices”—two areas considered strategic by Washington.

Trump described U.S. and allied actions against ZTE and Huawei as leverage in
Obtaining general
broader trade talks. In the Phase One deal, he used this leverage to gain
leverage over China
concessions in non-tech areas like agriculture and financial services.
Ancillary
Shaping U.S. domestic Shortly before the 2020 election, the Trump administration released new H1-B
narratives visa restrictions that would have significantly affected Chinese high-tech workers.

THE NEED FOR BETTER STRATEGY

However, a long list of policy aims is not the same as a strategy. In fact, it can be anathema
to one. Many of these goals are vague and have no clear limiting principle. They can also
come into conflict with each other, or with other U.S. national priorities. A good strategy
would clarify key objectives and prioritize them. It would also proffer a theory of success—a
realistic basis for determining which forms of technological decoupling will actually achieve
U.S. aims. So far, Washington has struggled to articulate such a strategy.

36 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Without more strategic clarity, decou-
pling can become overaggressive or inco- A long list of policy aims is not
herent and contrary to U.S. interests. For a strategy. Washington has
example, the U.S. military does not need
struggled to clarify key objectives,
(and cannot achieve) unlimited advan-
tages over China’s military in every place, prioritize them, and proffer a
time, and domain. The United States theory of success.
must define its desired “military edge”
over China in more specific terms. Likewise, if Washington seeks to rebalance the terms
of bilateral economic competition, it should have a desired model of the global economy
in mind. Are U.S. policymakers aiming for two largely separate international economic
systems, or would China remain integrated within a modified global economy? And is
the point to maximize U.S. prosperity and technology leadership, or to minimize China’s
(which are not the same thing)?

Without a sense of strategic priorities, decoupling can cause havoc as one objective smash-
es into another. Barring Chinese graduate students helps to reduce illicit technology
transfer, but it also hampers U.S. technological competitiveness by spurning a key source
of skilled labor.187 Which goal takes precedence? Technological decoupling is fraught with
these kinds of costs and risks—and unfortunately, their ripples can spread far beyond
the technological realm, affecting seemingly unrelated U.S. goals. For example, harsh
U.S. measures against Huawei and TikTok have helped convince many in Beijing that
Washington seeks wholesale economic containment. In climate change talks, China may
now be even more liable to view proposed emissions reduction targets as a stealth means
of stifling its economic growth.

Finally, without a strategic theory of success, decoupling may fail to accomplish much of
anything good. U.S. efforts to prevent the flow of sensitive technology into China—for
example, equipment for manufacturing 5- and 7-nanometer node microchips—require co-
operation from many other countries that participate in the supply chain or have access to
the same sensitive technology. Without this cooperation, technology controls can be futile
and ultimately self-defeating. Which countries, or multilateral institutions, would belong
to the U.S. “side” of trusted partners in a given technology area? What mixture of induce-
ment, pressure, and persuasion could succeed in bringing those countries on board and/or
reshaping multilateral institutions for this purpose? And when are these diplomatic efforts
really worth the payoff?

THE CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY DEBATE

After the chaos and inconsistency of the Trump years, Biden will need a more rational
approach—clearly defining U.S. objectives for decoupling and articulating a strategy to

JON BATEMAN 37
 achieve them. This is a high stakes challenge. Technology is a key determinant of American
national well-being and power, and a central arena of U.S.-China strategic competition.
It is also fraught with risk and uncertainty. Too much interdependence with China could
leave the U.S. economy, society, and national security apparatus vulnerable to espionage or
subversion, and make America complicit in Chinese technological abuses. Yet too much
decoupling could impair the U.S. tech ecosystem, further destabilize the bilateral relation-
ship, and alienate U.S. allies and trading partners caught in the crossfire.

There is heated debate about how the United States should thread this needle. To grossly
oversimplify, one can define three general camps (see Table 6).188

Restrictionists. First, what might be called a “restrictionist” camp calls for dramatically
curtailing U.S.-China technology ties. The harshest proposals come from China hawks
like Matt Pottinger (who has advocated expanding U.S. outbound investment restrictions
“by at least an order of magnitude”), Derek Scissors (who has recommended far tougher
export controls and an “outbound version of CFIUS”), and Senator Tom Cotton (who has
proposed a “research blockade” on China, sweeping export controls on high-end semicon-
ductors, secondary sanctions amounting to a “death sentence” for China’s “national cham-
pions,” and revocation of Permanent Normal Trade Relations).189

Some human rights advocates also have restrictionist leanings: twenty-four NGOs includ-
ing Human Rights Watch, Freedom House, and PEN America have called for “a series of
escalating actions against technology companies found to be contributing to China’s mass
surveillance, including by imposing Global Magnitsky sanctions,” while New York Times
columnist Farhad Manjoo suggested that technological and economic integration with
China “isn’t worth the moral cost.”190 And restrictionist sensibilities seem fairly common
within U.S. national security officialdom, particularly in the military and the Intelligence
Community (IC). In 2019, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Joseph Dunford
expressed “great concern” that U.S. tech firms provide “indirect benefit” to the PLA when
they operate and conduct research in China.191

As these examples indicate, restriction-

Restrictionists tend to define ists have varied diagnoses of the problems
bilateral tech ties as zero-sum: they seek to solve and the appropriate U.S.
China gains long-term strategic policy response. One common view holds
that Beijing is successfully executing a long-
advantages while America reaps term plan to sap American global strength
only marginal and transitory gains. and attain regional or even global hege-
mony.192 Technology is seen as central to
China’s plans, allowing Beijing to steal U.S. secrets, leapfrog U.S. military capabilities, bol-
ster its own and other countries’ repressive capabilities, and more. Restrictionists therefore
tend to define bilateral tech ties as zero-sum: China gains long-term strategic advantages

38 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

by exploiting U.S. tech industries and systems, while America reaps only marginal and
transitory gains, like paying lower prices for China-derived tech goods. Accordingly, restric-
tionists favor broad-based technological decoupling aimed at denying China meaningful
opportunities to draw support from, or establish influence within, the U.S. tech ecosystem.
Hal Brands, for example, has proposed that Washington “work with allies to slow Chinese
innovation through technological denial policies.”193 Some restrictionists go beyond mere
decoupling and argue that U.S. tech controls should be designed to harm and ideally de-
stroy major Chinese tech companies, such as Huawei.

Cooperationists. At the other end of the spectrum, a range of what might called “coop-
erationist” voices have opposed major elements of Washington’s technological decoupling
agenda. U.S. business interests often tout the economic and technological importance of
maintaining global supply chains and market access to China. For example, Google warned
that Huawei’s Entity List designation could create cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and the
Semiconductor Industry Association has argued that “America’s longstanding leadership
in semiconductors is put at risk by broad restrictions on U.S. exports of commercial chip
technologies to China.”194 Meanwhile, some independent technologists and tech activists—
including key pioneers of the early internet—remain vocally committed to techno-globalist
ideals and view decoupling as anathema. The World Wide Web Foundation (joined by
Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and others) has warned against “internet fragmen-
tation” and “techno-protectionist initiatives,” while the Internet Society believes that “hav-
ing a government dictate how networks interconnect according to political considerations
rather than technical considerations, runs contrary to the very idea of the Internet.”195

Cooperationists often posit that a twenty-

first-century system of open technology Cooperationists often posit that
collaboration would reproduce the waves of the United States would be well
innovation and widely shared global prog- positioned to lead and benefit from a
ress said to characterize the late twentieth
century. And the United States—with its
twenty-first-century system of open
historically dynamic innovation system— technology collaboration.
would be well positioned to lead within
and benefit from such an environment. They also argue that many technology controls are
simply unworkable, given the practical difficulties of predicting technological change and
regulating cross-border flows in an already globalized, digitized world.

Another strain of cooperationism exists among progressives, who caution against overinflat-
ing Chinese (and other foreign) threats. Senator Bernie Sanders, for example, has argued
that “the growing bipartisan push for a confrontation with China” fuels wasteful spending,
militarism, bigotry, and authoritarian populism at home while reducing the likelihood of
cooperation on key global issues.196 Applying this critique to U.S. tech policy, Sanders has
described proposed federal investments in semiconductors as a form of corporate welfare.197

JON BATEMAN 39
Others have blamed the China Initiative for fomenting xenophobia and racism toward
U.S.-based academics of Chinese nationality or ethnicity.198 In addition, some progres-
sives cite climate change as an area where U.S.-China technology cooperation must greatly
increase, not decrease. More than forty activist groups—including MoveOn, the Sunrise
Movement, and the Union of Concerned Scientists—have urged the Biden administration
to “speed the [global] transition away from dirty energy economies” by marrying U.S. clean
tech with Chinese industrial capacity.199 (On the other hand, progressive concerns about
Chinese human right abuses and untrammeled free trade lead some on the left to favor
more tech restrictions.200)

Centrists. Between the poles of restrictionism and cooperationism lies what might be called
a “centrist” camp, which seeks to incorporate the best insights of each side while making
more room for complexity and uncertainty. Centrists agree with restrictionists that Beijing
poses unique long-term challenges to the United States and that technology is a central risk
factor. But, echoing cooperationists, they think that some Chinese tech threats are exagger-
ated, offset by the benefits of cooperation, and only partially addressable via China-focused
governmental restrictions. Centrists generally endorse the overall U.S. shift toward partial
technological decoupling and accept that decoupling must progress further to protect U.S.
national security and economic security. However, they want new technology controls to be
carefully scrutinized; they doubt the viability or wisdom of dividing the world into sealed
geo-technological blocs. Centrists view Chinese military aggression as a major possibility
and question Beijing’s willingness to partner on global issues like climate change and pan-
demics. Yet they insist that co-existence and collaboration on urgent challenges must still be
tried, and so they hope to avoid a technological confrontation that would take bilateral rela-
tions to a breaking point. Some centrists emphasize how much we still do not know about
China’s long-term path and the ultimate impacts of emerging technologies, and therefore
recommend hedging strategies to account for multiple possible futures.

A leading centrist statement is the China Strategy Group report co-led by Eric Schmidt and
Jared Cohen. It argues that “some degree of disentangling is both inevitable and preferable,”
yet “we [should] seek to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive levels of separation.”201
Many other centrists can be found in technocratic bastions such as mainstream Washington
think tanks and academic policy centers. Stephanie Segal of the Center for Strategic and
International Studies developed a cost-benefit framework to assess U.S.-China interlink-
ages; she found that “existing [U.S. government restrictions] go a long way in protecting
national security” and that further decoupling should be “targeted” and rigorously evaluat-
ed.202 Richard Danzig and Lorand Laskai, summarizing a body of research on technological
decoupling commissioned by the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory,
advocated “an incremental approach rooted in the indeterminacy of the current moment
and recognition of the fact that interdependence is likely to continue.”203 Samm Sacks of
New America and others have promoted the “small yard, high fence” concept.204 This popu-
lar metaphor, attributed to former U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates, conveys that

40 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

technology controls should be the excep- Centrists have promoted the
tion instead of the rule, applying only to
“small yard, high fence” metaphor
the most sensitive and strategic areas.205
to convey that technology controls
The centrist approach to technological de- should apply only to the most
coupling has been embraced by some mod-
erate political figures as well. Senator Chris
sensitive and strategic areas.
Coons has also endorsed the “small yard,
high fence” metaphor and has proposed “safeguard[ing the] crown jewels of technology”
while “strik[ing] the right balance to avoid [full-scale] decoupling of global tech industries
between the United States and China.”206 A quiet centrism may also exist at the state and
local level. The Carnegie report “Making U.S. Foreign Policy Work Better for the Middle
Class,” published in 2020, drew on interviews of state and local government, business, la-
bor, and community leaders and middle-income workers in Colorado, Nebraska, and Ohio.
Most interviewees “want[ed] the United States to push back more effectively against unfair
Chinese trading practices and make investments at home to compete more successfully
with China. But otherwise they tend[ed] to see China pragmatically and [were] not inclined
to view the geopolitical rivalry as an organizing principle of U.S. foreign policy.”207 (More
recent surveys by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that the general American
public has become “dramatically” more hostile to U.S.-China trade since 2019.208)

Like the other camps, centrists have diverse policy ideas but tend to unite around a few
general principles. First, centrists say that U.S.-China technological decoupling should
be selective and targeted. Second, they want decoupling to be coordinated multilaterally.
Centrists observe that the United States is a leading, but not exclusive or indispensable,
player for many technologies. This means that unilateral U.S. controls are often ineffective,
resulting only in self-imposed competitive disadvantages and friction with international
partners. Therefore, Washington should work with so-called like-minded countries (in par-
ticular, technologically advanced liberal democracies) to create shared policy frameworks.209

Third, centrists insist that “defensive” efforts to curb or thwart Chinese technology threats
cannot distract from a core “offensive” program to strengthen U.S. and allied technology
ecosystems. Washington has only so much influence over the course of Chinese techno-
logical advancement, centrists argue, but there is far more the United States can do to im-
prove its own technological strength. Moreover, many of the problems commonly framed
as Chinese technology threats are partially, or even mostly, the result of domestic American
challenges. For example, supply chain insecurity (a central focus of China-oriented tech-
nology controls) stems in part from industrial consolidation and workforce shortages in
the United States; disinformation targeting Americans (a growing concern of China tech
watchers) is a largely homegrown problem. According to the centrist view, U.S. policy
should primarily focus on supporting America’s own technology leadership, competitive-
ness, and resilience. Countering China would be a secondary priority.

JON BATEMAN 41
Table 6: Three U.S. Camps Offer Competing Strategies for
Technological Decoupling

Camp Beliefs Adherents

Restrictionists • U.S.-China tech relationship is zero-sum and tends to • China hawks
advantage China
• Some human rights defenders
• U.S. has a short window in which to prevent Chinese
• Many national security
technological dominance
officials
• U.S. should greatly expand tech restrictions aimed at China

Cooperationists • U.S.-China tech relationship is non-zero-sum and tends to • Many business interests
benefit the U.S.
• Techno-globalist activists
• Americans often inflate China-tech threats
• Some progressives
• Major U.S. tech restrictions are domestically harmful and
internationally destabilizing

Centrists • U.S.-China tech relationship has both zero-sum and • Many mainstream think tank
non-zero-sum elements with mixed costs and benefits for analysts
both countries
• Some moderate politicians
• More U.S. tech controls are needed but these should be
• Some state and local leaders
selective, carefully designed, and multilateral
• U.S. should focus on nurturing its own technological
strength and tech policymaking capacity

Implications. This three-camps taxonomy is admittedly crude. Individual people and in-
stitutions do not self-identify with these labels and may not agree with them. Each camp is
internally diverse and their boundaries overlap and shift. Still, the taxonomy helps to reveal
some of the major questions and choices facing U.S. policymakers.

It is clarifying, for example, to compare what each camp sees as the greatest risks for U.S.
policy. Restrictionists most fear U.S. complacency during a brief window when China’s tech-
driven dominance can still be prevented. Cooperationists most fear U.S. overreaction result-
ing from inflated perceptions of Chinese tech threats and excessive confidence in restrictive
measures. Centrists, hoping to avoid both these perils, most fear U.S. incapacity to achieve
a successful balance. Key capacity challenges include securing public-private coordination,
mapping complex supply chains, and overcoming Washington gridlock, polarization, and
bureaucratic clumsiness. Ultimately, U.S. leaders must choose which fears (and hopes) they
most identify with.

42 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

This taxonomy also gives a rough guide to
the changing direction of U.S. thought and
Restrictionists fear U.S.
policy. Cooperationism was the dominant complacency toward Chinese tech
view when Obama took office, and it still threats, while cooperationists fear
had some currency by the time he stepped U.S. overreaction. Meanwhile,
down. The Trump administration’s poli-
cies and rhetoric became increasingly re- centrists fear U.S. incapacity to
strictionist over four years—though it sent navigate between both perils.
contradictory signals, and Trump departed
before a fully restrictionist vision could be realized. The Biden administration has so far re-
tained much of the Trump policy architecture, while speaking a language that sounds more
centrist. For now, the center of gravity in Washington seems to lie somewhere between the
centrist and restrictionist positions.

A CASE FOR A CENTRIST STRATEGY

The debate among restrictionists, cooperationists, and centrists cannot be resolved by a
policy paper. Part of what separates these camps are divergent worldviews and values—
deep-seated disagreements about American priorities and purposes. The three camps also
disagree about more tangible questions, such as how to understand China’s capabilities and
intentions, what kind of political economy will produce the most innovation in the com-
ing decades, and how much influence the United States will have in shaping global tech-
nological choices. The answers to these questions will not be known for decades. For now,
strategists and policy experts can only venture their best assessments based on incomplete
data and personal beliefs—and, for some, perceived political advantage. Indeed, the biggest
drivers of real-world U.S. strategy will probably be political: partisan dichotomies, public
sentiment, business interests, media attention, and civil society advocacy.

Despite these limitations, expert analysis can still help to inform and guide political and
public dialogues about U.S.-China technological decoupling. Analysts can present the
strongest, clearest versions of each strategic position, and continually sharpen and dissemi-
nate their ideas in the face of critiques and evolving evidence. In that spirit, below are
two brief arguments in support of the centrist position. First, narrow and targeted China-
focused technology restrictions can buy time for more positive U.S. investments to bear
fruit, while reducing the costs and risks of decoupling. And second, a clearly articulated
centrist strategy can help Washington maintain control of the pace and course of techno-
logical decoupling, thereby helping to prevent a runaway cycle that moves faster and further
than U.S. leaders want.

JON BATEMAN 43
BUYING TIME
The very existence of a heated debate among restrictionists, cooperationists, and centrists
is itself an argument for the careful incrementalism that centrists espouse.210 We are still
in the early years of a radically new phase in U.S.-China relations, and we are only at the
cusp of far-reaching global transformations promised by AI and other emerging technolo-
gies. These coming changes, while undoubtedly significant, remain difficult for present-
day observers to assess. How will China’s strategic intentions and technological capabilities
change as the country further develops? How will cross-border data flows, new energy tech,
or quantum computing reshape the global economy and security environment? How will
countries of the world (and multinational companies) align themselves in a more fractured
geo-technological landscape? How will the familiar costs and benefits of U.S.-China tech-
nological interdependence shift in the coming decades? There is simply no reliable way to
answer these questions today. Policymakers should therefore play for time—preserving and
expanding American options while the future comes into sharper focus.

Offense and defense. The primary effort should be a positive program to strengthen U.S.
and allied technology ecosystems from within (the so-called “offensive” agenda). An offensive
program would include new investments and incentives to bolster and diversify innovation
pathways, supply chains, talent pipelines, and revenue models in strategic technology areas.

Such investments make sense regardless of how U.S.-China technology relations develop
over time. If the United States ultimately concludes that full-scope technological decou-
pling has become necessary, then offensive investments will have prepared America to sepa-
rate with fewer costs and risks. But if American leaders eventually decide to maintain sub-
stantial tech ties with China, then the offensive measures will have positioned U.S. firms to
compete more effectively in a globalized technology marketplace. Moreover, many offensive
investments are worth making for their own sake, irrespective of the China challenge. Even
if China did not exist, concerted efforts to strengthen the U.S. technology base would still
help boost American productivity and economic dynamism.

Offensive investments like education and R&D take a long time to pay off. Conversely,
“defensive” measures—government restrictions aimed at thwarting Chinese technological
advancement or influence—are fast-acting and readily implemented. They should therefore
be used to buy time for the offensive agenda to bear fruit. Specifically, Washington should
impose new controls in technology areas where China seems close to securing unique, stra-
tegically significant, and long-lasting advantages. In such circumstances, defensive measures
can help to forestall Chinese breakthroughs long enough for the United States to regroup
and regain technological momentum.

Defense is not risk-free, however. U.S. tech controls can be costly (harming U.S. industries
and innovators), imprecise (chilling more activity than intended or desired), and even fu-

44 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

tile (failing to substantially remedy the rel-
evant Chinese tech threats). And these side Fast-acting and readily
effects can be hard to predict, measure, and implemented “defensive”
control. That is why restrictive tools should restrictions can buy time for
be confined to a secondary, supporting
role and only used in compelling circum-
“offensive” investments, like
stances. Restrictive tools by themselves are education and R&D, to bear fruit.
incapable of ensuring U.S. technological
preeminence over the long haul, but they can and should be used to frustrate Chinese dom-
inance in the short run. The right U.S. technology controls can help to preserve competitive
opportunities while American offensive efforts better position the country to succeed and
lead in key technologies.

Comparing technology areas. Consider 5G telecommunications equipment. The United

States and many other countries have been in the process of purchasing large-scale 5G in-
frastructure that will likely operate for many years, providing the supplier country with a
long-lasting technological beachhead as well as durable economic and political influence.
Until 2019, Huawei and ZTE appeared set to secure Chinese dominance of the global 5G
telecoms marketplace—occupying, for the foreseeable future, some of the most strategic
terrain in cyberspace.211 Although no U.S. company competed on a one-for-one basis with
Huawei or ZTE, multiple U.S. national security and economic interests were nevertheless
at risk: protecting secrets, preventing sabotage, blunting the global influence of an adver-
sary, and more. This was a closing window of opportunity if there ever was one, and a clear
impetus for defensive measures.

In response, the United States imposed a barrage of restrictions on ZTE and even more
on Huawei: the Entity List, the Covered List, the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial
Complex Companies List, the Section 889 blacklist, the special foreign direct product re-
strictions, the “remove and replace” rule, federal indictments of Huawei and its CFO, and
visa bans for certain employees, among other actions.212 Washington also waged a unique
diplomatic campaign (branded for a time as “The Clean Network”) to dissuade third coun-
tries from buying Huawei and ZTE 5G equipment.

These moves were reasonably successful: several major countries opted not to purchase
Chinese 5G gear, improving the market position of European competitors.213 Most impor-
tant, an open 5G architecture called O-RAN was given precious time to develop as a serious
alternative, reducing the prospects of Chinese vendor lock-in and creating new openings for
U.S. firms.214 Meanwhile, Washington took active steps to manage the costs of its telecoms
decoupling efforts. It has paid for small U.S. carriers to replace Huawei and ZTE equip-
ment, helped finance certain third-country purchases of Western-made 5G gear, allowed
U.S. chipmakers to retain some Huawei business, and drafted legislation to infuse the U.S.
semiconductor sector with new federal funds.215

JON BATEMAN 45
 5G telecommunications equipment provided an especially compelling case for U.S. restric-
tions, because the United States faced a closing window of opportunity to prevent Chinese
dominance of a strategic technology. But each technology area has a different strategic
profile, and few of them will present as clear-cut a case for so many restrictive measures. AI
software, social media platforms, smartphones, drones, Internet of Things devices, routers,
advanced batteries, semiconductors, cloud services: they all have distinct national security
implications, economic impacts, marketplace dynamics, supply chains, and innovation tra-
jectories. In many cases, strong new U.S. government technology controls could do more
harm than good.

Balancing global challenges. One reason for caution is the existence of other urgent
crises, beyond Chinese tech threats, that compete for Washington’s resources and atten-
tion and can sometimes clash with technological decoupling. Even as the United States
engages in bilateral power struggles with China (and other state adversaries), it faces global
and domestic challenges that are arguably still more daunting and have their own closing
windows of opportunity. At a global level, COVID-19 exemplifies the perils of today’s
interconnected world. Contagions—in the form of infectious diseases, financial crises, or
cyber catastrophes—loom on many fronts, requiring new forms of collective action across
geopolitical divides.216 The most obvious of these enormous threats is climate change.

While decoupling might seem like a solution to excess interconnectedness, global chal-
lenges cannot be solved without deep global cooperation. If Washington and Beijing cannot
come together with others to address shared risks, then any U.S. national accomplishments
may be washed out by a rising tide of global calamity. It is imperative that U.S. government
policies toward China—including tech policy—address these larger problems and avoid
making them worse.

For example, Washington should think

Even as the United States engages twice before walling itself off from Chinese
in bilateral power struggles with clean energy technology such as solar cells,
China, it faces global and domestic wind turbines, and advanced batteries.
Granted, some Chinese clean tech compa-
challenges that are arguably still nies have benefited from unfair practices
more daunting and urgent. like intellectual property theft, and the
United States has powerful motivations to
protect and nurture its own industries in these emerging strategic sectors.217 Yet the world
has years, not decades, to avoid catastrophic and irreversible climate damage; any delays
in the deployment of low-carbon-intensive infrastructure would require powerful justifi-
cations.218 By the same token, U.S. sanctions on Beijing’s national tech champions should
avoid inflicting so much Chinese economic pain that bilateral climate cooperation breaks
down. In September 2021, China’s climate envoy made the not-unreasonable case that
climate “cannot possibly be divorced” from other friction points: “The U.S. side hopes

46 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

that climate cooperation can be an ‘oasis’ in China-U.S. relations, but if that ‘oasis’ is sur-
rounded by desert, it will also become desertified sooner or later.”219

Balancing domestic challenges. Domestically, the U.S. political system is floundering,

its social cohesion fraying, and its economic promise hollowing for too many people. These
trends have complex, multi-decadal causes but have dangerously accelerated in recent years.
It was only a year ago that the United States suffered an abortive insurrection, and most ex-
perts believe that American democracy remains unstable. U.S. policymakers must therefore
focus much of their attention on the home front, even at some risk to traditional national
security priorities such as addressing Chinese tech threats.220 For example, the U.S. govern-
ment’s ongoing crackdown on Chinese graduate students and researchers cannot be allowed
to trigger a mass exodus of Chinese undergraduates, who pose little security risk yet pay bil-
lions of tuition dollars, in effect subsidizing educational opportunity for many Americans.

In sum, an overaggressive technological decoupling can set back other national priorities
that may matter more or come to a head sooner. This does not negate the risks of U.S.-
China technological interdependence, which are real and will likely grow in years ahead.
But the United States must balance the troubling possibilities of tomorrow against the
lethal dangers of today. This means buying additional time for U.S. leaders to assess geo-
technological developments, juggle domestic and global crises, and implement long-term
investments in American technological strength. Select defensive measures can extend these
timelines—helping to lay the groundwork for greater technological independence in the
future, should it become needed, even as most U.S.-China tech ties are allowed to endure
for now. Balancing in this way can help hedge against multiple scenarios, from full-scope
decoupling to relative technological integration.

MAINTAINING CONTROL
Time is one of two decisional resources that Washington must conserve as it manages tech-
nological decoupling. The other key resource is control over the decoupling process—the
ability to set its pace and scope so that decoupling aligns with American needs. Granted,
the U.S. government has never had total control. Beijing maintains its own long-standing
limits on foreign technology; other governments have significant influence on global sup-
ply chains and markets; and companies around the world make private calculations about
cross-border investments and deals. Nevertheless, the distinct wave of technological de-
coupling that began in the mid-2010s was initially of Washington’s design—set in motion
by the U.S. government’s purposeful, albeit ill-coordinated campaign of China-oriented
restrictions. Other actors have been comparably reactive (maneuvering in response to U.S.
policy) and cautious (often seeking to conserve the status quo ante). This kept the U.S.
government in the driver’s seat, letting American officials advance decoupling as they saw
fit while stopping short wherever they perceived risks to U.S. interests.

JON BATEMAN 47
That privileged position could not last for long. As decoupling progresses, various foreign
and domestic actors have increasingly sought to seize initiative for themselves—seeking to
shape the decoupling process rather than remain at the mercy of U.S. government policy.
These dynamics, explored below, create a risk of feedback loops: each new U.S. technology
control strengthens the incentives for others to retaliate in kind, or to get ahead of the next
Washington restriction, which accelerates decoupling beyond what U.S. officials intend. If
Washington fails to monitor and manage these escalatory dynamics, it could accidentally
set in motion a frenzied, ever-intensifying cycle of decoupling that races well past what
America can afford.

Figure
FI G UR4:
E 4The U.S. Government Is Just One of Many Actors Shaping
Technological Decoupling
The U.S. Government Is Just One of Many Actors Shaping Technological Decoupling

GO V E R N M E N T PR IVAT E
I N F L UE N CE IN FLUEN CE
United States United States
China China
Other Other

U.S. Government U.S. Private Actors

Chinese Government Chinese Private Actors

Other Governments Other Private Actors

Source:Author's
Source: Author’selaboration.
elaboration.

Preemptive action by outside actors. The first kind of feedback loop involves outside ac-
tors seeking to anticipate and preempt future rounds of U.S. technology restrictions. Now that
U.S.-China technology decoupling is well underway, companies, universities, investors, and
other actors around the world want to avoid being caught in the maelstrom. This means not
making significant long-term commitments that could be vulnerable to collapse if the U.S.

48 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

government decided to impose new technology controls. In essence, these actors could “self-
decouple” now, on their own terms, rather than risk a more abrupt and forceful U.S. govern-
ment mandate later. The more restrictive measures that Washington imposes, the more outside
actors will look to stay ahead of the curve. The consequences could potentially snowball, caus-
ing much more extensive technological decoupling than the U.S. government intends.

A vivid example came in July 2020, when

the Justice Department announced the Companies and foreign govern-
indictment of six Chinese researchers for ments could “self-decouple” now,
hiding their affiliations with the PLA. on their own terms, rather than risk
Following these six indictments, more than
a more abrupt and forceful U.S.
one thousand other Chinese researchers re-
portedly left the United States. “The breadth government mandate later.
and depth of the exodus was not expected,”
an anonymous U.S. official told the Washington Post.221 James Mulvenon, who has written
extensively on China tech threats, told the newspaper that “he does not believe there were
1,000 active PLA-linked researchers in the United States but said it is possible many research-
ers affiliated with state institutes and universities left over the last year because they feared they
might lose their fellowships.” In other words, the U.S. government failed to anticipate that
its small action would trigger a huge counterreaction, disrupting vast amounts of legitimate
research activity. In the end, the Justice Department dropped charges against five of the six
defendants. Still, it claimed to have “advanced our deterrence objectives,” citing the mass exo-
dus of Chinese researchers as a positive development.222 The whole episode casts significant
doubt on Washington’s ability to predict and adequately weigh the collateral consequences of
its China-tech actions.

Chilling effects from vague restrictions. The episode also illustrates a more general
problem: vague or opaque U.S. government restrictions can chill far more technological
activity than policymakers intend. There are many impediments to designing precise U.S.
controls. Major “technologies” that Washington seeks to protect (such as AI, 5G, micro-
electronics, and drones) are really high-level constructs and systems-of-systems built from
multiple interlinked technology families. Their smaller subelements (for example, advanced
batteries that might power drones or electric cars) have complex global supply chains and
innumerable uses and users. Agencies struggle to divvy up this mass of technological inter-
connections into clean administrative categories. And their criteria for doing so—premised
on such notions as “national security” and, increasingly, “economic security”—are poorly
conceptualized and highly contested. Early-stage technologies pose particular regulatory
challenges because their future impact can only be guessed.

In the face of these uncertainties and administrative dilemmas, U.S. government agen-
cies often take what they view as a cautious approach. They announce broad, open-ended
authorities that would permit—but not require—a sweeping range of new government

JON BATEMAN 49
 technology restrictions. The government can then apply these authorities on a case-by-case
basis, deliberating in secret and weighing a host of variables. This approach maximizes flex-
ibility: enforcement can be dialed up or down based on new data, circumstances, and po-
litical imperatives. Its ambiguity also makes it harder for adversaries to identify and exploit
loopholes in Washington’s decisionmaking framework. Examples of this approach include
CFIUS reviews, enforcement of the Commerce Department’s new ICTS supply chain se-
curity rule, the licensing process for many export-controlled items, and designations under
many sanctions authorities.
U.S. agencies often announce broad, However, too much discretion can ulti-
open-ended restrictive authorities mately be self-defeating. A major risk is
they can then apply on a case-by- that outside stakeholders see these opaque
case basis, deliberating in secret and technology control regimes as risky and
unpredictable, thereby chilling activity that
weighing a host of variables. could otherwise benefit the United States.
Consider the Trump administration’s visa
ban for Chinese graduate students and researchers affiliated with Beijing’s “military-civil fu-
sion” programs; the ban left many key terms undefined, including what affiliations would
be disqualifying. The policy’s ambiguity generated widespread confusion about its scope and
impact. A rigorous analysis by Georgetown’s Center for Security and Emerging Technology
tentatively “suggest[ed] 3,000 to 5,000 as a reasonable range for the annual number of stu-
dents affected,” calling this “a low-confidence estimate” and warning that the real number
“would be much larger” if “military-civil fusion” was interpreted more broadly than the report
assumed.223 (The study was “unable to assess” the impact on Chinese nonstudent researchers
due to a lack of publicly available data.) Today, more than eighteen months after the policy
was announced, there is still no official public account of its key parameters.

Confronting this uncertainty, many Chinese graduate students and researchers can be expect-
ed simply to avoid applying to U.S. universities. Many U.S. universities will likewise avoid
admitting or hiring certain Chinese applicants—even in cases where there was no national
security risk and a visa might actually have been granted. (U.S. officials have offered rough
estimates of visa revocations and denials, but have not yet publicly addressed potential chilling
effects.)224 Moreover, such dynamics can become self-reinforcing. Chinese graduate students
and researchers diverted from the United States will go somewhere else instead, and eventually
these alternate academic paths could become popular or even default options. The net result
could be large, long-term reductions in American access to top academic talent.

Chinese government retaliation. Another feedback loop stems from Beijing’s retaliation
against U.S. technology controls aimed at China, which creates a risk of lengthy tit-for-tat
reactions or escalatory spirals. So far, Beijing’s responses have generally been reciprocal.225
For example, it established an “unreliable entities list” following increased U.S. use of the
Entity List, and Beijing imposed new technology export controls after related moves by

50 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Washington.226 But future responses could be more damaging. Many in Beijing believe that
the United States is intent on destroying the Chinese technology ecosystem, and Chinese
domestic narratives about tech competition have become increasingly nationalistic.227 A
particularly harsh U.S. restriction, or the overall accumulation of controls, may cause China
to step up its responses or broaden them into new areas. Alternatively, Beijing might over-
react due to misperceived U.S. intentions.

Retaliation by China could put pressure on Washington to respond in kind, risking a repeti-
tive cycle that takes decoupling further or faster than the United States initially envisioned.
For example, the U.S. order for ByteDance to divest from TikTok was followed, less than a
year later, by China’s pressure on ride-hailing company DiDi to de-list from the New York
Stock Exchange.228 Although Beijing probably had multiple motivations for reining in DiDi,
it publicly cited data security concerns, mirroring Washington’s main justification for the
TikTok order. Beijing’s abrupt exercise of power over DiDi aggravated U.S. leaders’ worries
that Chinese companies fail to disclose regulatory (and other) risks and are in Beijing’s thrall.
Several senators seized upon the episode to promote an accelerated timeline for de-listing
all Chinese companies from American exchanges under the Holding Foreign Companies
Accountable Act.229 These moves and countermoves illustrate how easily escalatory spirals
could be set in motion.

China has many cards to play if it chooses to step up its retaliation for U.S. tech restrictions.
For example, it could dissuade or bar Chinese undergraduates from attending U.S. univer-
sities, depriving the United States of billions of dollars in tuition revenue at a time when
many American institutions of higher learning are struggling financially.230 It could impose
controls on the rare earth metals required for many important technologies, which China
nearly monopolizes.231 It could further limit the activities of U.S. tech companies operating
in China, bar or unwind U.S. investments and joint ventures, or ban the purchase of certain
U.S. tech products. And if Beijing seeks to respond outside of the technology domain, the
possibilities are open-ended.

These Chinese retaliation options illuminate vulnerabilities that U.S. leaders should try to
address over time. For now, however, they are realities of interdependence. They highlight
the damage America could suffer if decoupling gets out of hand and is no longer being
controlled by Washington. Granted, China would also suffer in the process, so a measure of
deterrence almost certainly exists. Nevertheless, history is replete with examples of destruc-
tive, seemingly irrational cycles of international escalation. A responsible U.S. strategy for
technological decoupling must account for and mitigate this risk.

Domestic political dynamics. Finally, U.S. technology controls can shape domestic poli-
tics in ways that encourage ever-stronger restrictions in the future. Politically speaking,
China-related controls—like other kinds of U.S. sanctions and restrictions targeting ad-
versaries—are easy to impose and hard to reverse. Congress has also repeatedly stepped in

JON BATEMAN 51
to turn discretionary executive measures into permanent statutory requirements. The result
is a one-way ratchet, gradually limiting the policy space of each successive administration.

Biden, for example, has so far opted to retain many Trump policies that were highly contro-
versial when first instituted—including the China tariffs and the unique foreign direct prod-
uct rule applied to Huawei. Biden also allowed Trump’s sweeping ICTS regulation to come
into effect, surprising multiple business groups that had called the rule unworkable. Although
Biden may actively support some of these measures, politics are probably a factor in others.
The Wall Street Journal reported that “administration officials [were] concerned that blocking
or diluting the [ICTS] rule would send the wrong message about the new administration’s
approach to China, potentially fueling criticism that it [was] taking a weaker approach.”232

The economic impact of U.S. government technology restrictions can also ripple into the
political arena. For example, a U.S. import ban on certain Chinese tech products could
economically weaken the American resellers of those products. If those resellers ultimately
exit the marketplace, that would mean fewer voices advocating for bilateral tech coopera-
tion. Conversely, hawkish voices tend to thrive in a restrictive and securitized environment.
Palantir, whose data products are used by the U.S. national security establishment, has
emerged as a strong advocate of technological decoupling.233 Washington’s drive to counter
China tech threats creates business and political opportunities for companies like Palantir,
potentially fueling the rise of a well-connected decoupling lobby. There is already a long
American tradition of defense and national security contractors exerting influence over
public policy—for example, by supporting political candidates and thinkers who warn of
foreign threats and advocate muscular U.S. responses. Technology controls aimed at China
could unleash similar dynamics, as a subset of U.S. tech companies will benefit from such
restrictions and work to entrench or expand them.

In sum, Washington might aim for a moderate level of technological decoupling but end
up with something broader, faster, and messier. The risks are serious and demand a strategic
response. The United States must preserve the ability to adjust the decoupling process up-
ward or downward—keeping its pace and scope aligned with American needs. That means
U.S. technology restrictions should be kept as targeted and precise as possible to minimize
the risk of unwanted escalation. Moreover, Washington must communicate its intentions
clearly and convincingly to multiple audiences. It should openly clarify its strategic objec-
tives, and even some specific policy criteria, to reassure companies, universities, and foreign
governments—including China—of its intentions. This degree of clarity cuts against the
American grain: U.S. political and national security leaders like to preserve their own dis-
cretion, and they struggle to make credible commitments across presidential administra-
tions. But in a complex and interdependent global technology landscape, too much silence
or ambiguity may actually cede control to others.

52 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO
POLICY AND PROCESS

The previous chapter argued for a centrist technological decoupling strategy in which U.S.
government restrictions play a small but important role. Government tech restrictions by
themselves cannot ensure U.S. technological preeminence over the long haul, but they
can sometimes frustrate Chinese dominance in the short run. The United States should
therefore focus its restrictions on a select set of technology areas where China verges on
securing unique, strategically significant, and long-lasting advantages. This would buy time
for longer-term investments in American technological leadership, competitiveness, and
resilience to succeed—helping the United States address the full range of its tech challenges,
including those that only partially relate to China. Carefully tailoring and communicating
these restrictive policies would also help Washington preserve its influence over the pace
and scope of technological decoupling, reducing the likelihood of a damaging runaway
process. A balanced approach to the U.S.-China technology relationship would provide
American leaders with maximum options during an era of strategic uncertainty and flux.
It would also improve the odds of bilateral cooperation on urgent global challenges, like
climate change, and preserve space to address pressing domestic crises.

Not everyone will agree with this strategy. Restrictionists may find it naïve, and coopera-
tionists may consider it dangerous. So much the better; American policymakers need to hear
robust debate, especially in this early phase of technological decoupling. Responsible voices
from all three camps should continue weighing in on the most fundamental questions: In
what ways does today’s U.S.-China technology relationship help or hurt America—in the
technology arena, and beyond? How will this cost-benefit calculus change over time, and

53
 how should the United States balance its present and future needs amid inherent uncer-
tainty? Meanwhile, how can Washington maintain control of the technological decoupling
process and prevent triggering a more severe, violent break than it intends? Strategies should
be judged by the clarity, factual grounding, and analytical rigor of their answers to these
questions.

THE NEED FOR PRACTICAL GUIDANCE

Once a strategy is established, it must then be translated into policies and processes to guide
U.S. government decisions. Without a practical set of standards, even the best strategy can
result in inconsistent and ad hoc decisionmaking. In particular, the U.S. government must
devise ways to determine which technology areas require China-related restrictions and
which do not. While restrictionists, centrists, and cooperationists have varying appetites for
technological decoupling and China-oriented controls, they must all face a version of this
line-drawing problem when turning their high-level visions into tangible policy.

Meaningful guidance must move past generalities and express clear choices. That means de-
scribing what different federal agencies should do with specific authorities that they have. It
is no simple task. Analytically, it requires evaluating a host of technology areas and weighing
numerous costs and benefits through the lens of multiple expert disciplines. Politically, the
charged tenor of China discourse in the United States makes American leaders and analysts
reluctant to publicly cheerlead any form of bilateral technology cooperation, even where the
benefits outweigh the costs. Thus, while many observers say that technological decoupling
should be bounded and partial, there are
Any strategy for technological few comprehensive, detailed proposals for
decoupling must face a line-drawing how and where to draw such boundaries.
problem when turning its high-level The easy part is identifying the highest-
vision into tangible policy. risk, most strategically sensitive technology
areas where U.S. government controls are
clearly desirable. 5G telecommunications equipment and semiconductors are two well-
known examples. The United States has already imposed substantial restrictions in both
areas, and experts broadly support them even while debating key details. The hard part,
often, is naming lower-risk areas—technologies where continued U.S.-China interdepen-
dence would be permissible and actually beneficial to American interests. But Washington
needs real limits to bound the decoupling process and prevent a costly, self-destructive over-
reach. The more clearly such limits can be articulated in practical policymaking standards,
the more effectively the U.S. government can make decisions and manage the expectations
of other governments and private actors worldwide.

54 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

BREAKING DOWN THE POLICY PROBLEMS
This report takes a step-by-step approach to develop useful policy guidance. It begins by
breaking down the many U.S. interests at stake into nine distinct policy objectives for tech-
nological decoupling. National security objectives include maintaining a military edge over
China, limiting Chinese national security espionage, preventing Chinese sabotage in a crisis,
limiting Chinese influence operations, and denying support for Chinese or China-enabled
authoritarianism and repression. Economic objectives include countering unfair Chinese
practices and intellectual property theft, and competing and leading in strategic industries.
Then there are ancillary objectives—non-technology goals that also influence American
decoupling policy: obtaining general leverage over China, and shaping U.S. domestic nar-
ratives. These nine objectives, although linked, raise many distinct issues and dilemmas.
They cannot be treated as interchangeable
responses to an undifferentiated mass of Technological decoupling can
“China tech threats”—an all-too-typical
serve many distinct U.S. policy
approach. Of course, real-world decision-
making often involves weighing multiple objectives. These cannot be treated
policy objectives simultaneously. as interchangeable responses to
The next step, and the heart of this report,
an undifferentiated mass of
is a careful review of the role U.S. technol- “China tech threats.”
ogy controls should play in achieving these
policy objectives. Taking each objective in turn, the report weighs the risks and benefits of
U.S.-China technological interdependence against the risks and benefits of U.S. govern-
ment technology controls, in line with the overall (centrist) strategy described above.234
This analysis leads to a series of proposed dividing lines—implementable standards for de-
termining which technology areas warrant U.S. government restrictions and which do not.
Specific examples help to illustrate how these dividing lines would work in practice. Finally,
there are brief discussions of “offensive” (domestic self-improvement) measures critical for
achieving each policy objective. While technology controls are the primary subject of this
report, they must not become the primary focus of policymakers.

Because U.S. policymakers face complex dilemmas, these recommendations would require
further vetting and debate by implementing agencies. They would also need refinement to
a higher level of detail. While this report’s proposals aim to be specific and actionable, agen-
cies need to draw still finer distinctions in real-world policymaking. For this reason, many
of the recommendations lay out analytic processes that agencies should follow—questions
to ask, objectives to prioritize, and standards to apply—rather than firm outcomes. Case
studies illustrate how these processes might play out in specific technology areas, though
agencies would need to arrive at their own conclusions based on internal expertise (includ-
ing classified information) and outside perspectives.

JON BATEMAN 55
Reasoned deliberation does not always determine actual U.S. policy, of course. Political
imperatives, unexpected crises, and bureaucratic quirks all play a role. But it is essential
for Washington to develop strong decisionmaking processes to inform the use of China-
oriented technology controls. Good processes push high-level U.S. officials to consider key
issues earlier, more frequently, and in a more focused, structured way than would oth-
erwise happen. They frame policy dilemmas for principals and help to clarify questions
that require resolution by the president. Over time, high-quality government deliberations
also teach the permanent national security apparatus—the many thousands of staffers and
outside analysts who shape conventional thinking in Washington—to ask better questions
about technological decoupling.

56 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

MAINTAINING A MILITARY
EDGE OVER CHINA

RISKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
America’s most senior military officers and civilian defense leaders in both parties have
grown increasingly alarmed by China’s advancing military capabilities. Unclassified U.S.
intelligence assessments describe the PLA as slowly but steadily transforming itself “from
a defensive, inflexible ground-based force charged with domestic and peripheral security
responsibilities to a joint, highly agile, expeditionary, and power-projecting arm of Chinese
foreign policy that engages in military diplomacy and operations across the globe.”235 U.S.
forces, by comparison, have deferred some of their own modernization programs and
declined in readiness across many areas since 2001, partly due to a preoccupation with
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency. Even after the Afghanistan withdrawal, America’s
enormous and highly capable military remains spread thin across a number of global mis-
sions—whereas the PLA has been optimizing for a few key objectives in its local theater.
Together, these trends have led the Pentagon to warn of a diminished “competitive edge”
over China.236

Technology plays a key part in China’s military catch-up. Beijing has made major strides in
modernizing its conventional hardware and nuclear weapons systems—aided, at times, by
cyber and traditional espionage. Looking ahead, many U.S. analysts are especially worried
about the PLA’s incorporation of emerging digital technologies such as AI and quantum
computing. China believes that AI, in particular, will eventually enable “intelligentized
warfare”—a more rapid, precise, and dispersed form of combat intended to paralyze enemy
forces and decisionmakers.237

57
Because AI and so many other militarily relevant technologies are dual-use, the PLA seeks
technical support from Chinese companies and universities under the banner of “mili-
tary-civil fusion.” Seamless fusion remains more aspiration than reality; however, Beijing
is working to break down bureaucratic barriers and enhance incentives for private support
to the military.238 It also has many legal and extra-legal tools to compel such cooperation
for high-priority military programs. This makes the U.S. defense establishment leery of
technological cooperation between American and Chinese businesses or universities. The
Pentagon fears that Beijing will leverage such links to acquire military-relevant technology,
whether through licit means (such as joint ventures) or illicit means (like hacking).239

RISKS AND LIMITATIONS OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES

The need to maintain a military edge over China offers powerful justification for U.S.
technology controls. But what sort of controls can achieve American military needs at ac-
ceptable overall cost to the U.S. national interest? A narrowly tailored set of restrictions
makes the most sense for several reasons. First, although AI and other emerging, dual-use
technologies may someday become key factors in the U.S.-China military balance, that day
is probably a long way off. The coming wave of military-technological advances will likely
produce a marathon competition that lasts many years or even decades. This means the
United States should prioritize the long-term sustainment of American innovative capacity
rather than the short-term curtailment of Chinese military advances. Technology controls
that durably set back PLA modernization would be worthwhile, but restrictions that de-
grade America’s own technology base while
It will likely take many years or only briefly disrupting Chinese progress
would be counterproductive.
even decades before AI and other
emerging, dual-use technologies To gauge the near-term role of AI in U.S.-
become key factors in the China military competition, consider a po-
tential confrontation in the Taiwan Strait
U.S.-China military balance. occurring in the next few years—the cen-
tral worry of today’s U.S. defense leaders.
According to most analysts, the outcome of a Chinese incursion would likely hinge on
such traditional factors as the PLA’s competence in amphibious assaults, the readiness of
Taiwan’s defensive forces and the willpower of its civilian population and leaders, and the
U.S. military’s regional force posture and rules of engagement.240 AI would certainly not be
decisive. A recent analysis of Chinese military contracts found that, “like the United States,
China’s most promising AI applications so far seem to be for back-office tasks like intel-
ligence analysis and predictive maintenance.”241

At what point will military AI become important enough to swing a battle between
U.S. and Chinese forces? The National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence—

58 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

the leading mainstream assessment—placed this risk “in the coming decades.”242 And how
likely is it that Chinese AI would one day be sufficient to offset U.S. military advantages in
other areas? The commission was appropriately cautious, simply noting that Beijing “be-
lieves” this could happen. DOD’s most recent public report on the Chinese military also
hedged on whether, how, and when emerging technologies like AI or quantum computing
might affect real-world combat. The report rightly gave more weight to less exotic develop-
ments, such as China’s ballistic and cruise missile advancements, its anti-satellite capabili-
ties, its increasingly realistic joint exercises, and other modernization efforts.243 Of course,
the era of AI warfare will come eventually and the U.S. military must work hard to prepare
for it. But the longer this technology competition lasts, the less likely it is that U.S. restric-
tions will hold Chinese advances at bay.244

Second, the Pentagon’s “competitive edge” concept is notably vague and open-ended, mak-
ing it a poor guide for determining which technologies merit U.S. government restric-
tions.245 Nearly all technology has some military application, and the U.S. military sees
itself “competing” with China in innumerable ways and places—from combat contingen-
cies in the Indo-Pacific to steady-state information operations and defense diplomacy in
Africa and Latin America. Controlling all the technologies relevant to such competition
would mean a total amputation of U.S.-China tech ties—choking the American economy
that funds defense spending, and degrading the U.S. innovation base that supports military
capability development.

DOD has never actually called for full-scope decoupling; in fact, the DOD-aligned JASON
group of scientific advisers has argued that international technical cooperation is vital to
American interests.246 Yet U.S. military leaders have sometimes flirted with more restric-
tionist ideas—for example, generically opposing Americans’ involvement in the Chinese
AI sector.247 Such ideas, if pursued to their logical conclusion, could lead to broad-based
technological decoupling.

Finally, the U.S.-China rivalry is not just military in nature, and Washington will likely
rely more on economic and diplomatic tools in the years to come. That is because the cur-
rent U.S. military “competitive edge” over China, diminished as it is, probably cannot be
sustained. China has natural geographic advantages in its home theater, whereas U.S. forces
must operate costly and vulnerable expeditionary bases and logistics lines. China’s defense
budget will probably keep growing faster than American spending, which is projected to
stay flat or rise slowly in real terms.248 The technologically inferior PLA can close many
existing gaps at a faster pace than the U.S. military can create new ones. And for many
military scenarios, such as a Taiwan Strait confrontation, Beijing will be more invested in
the outcome and more politically capable of absorbing losses than Washington.

Of course, the United States should take all reasonable measures to mitigate these mili-
tary disadvantages. But a detailed study by the RAND Corporation found that “as long as

JON BATEMAN 59
 the Chinese economy continues to grow faster than that of the United States and Beijing
continues to make military modernization a priority, the challenges facing U.S. military
planners in Asia will grow more severe over time.”249 This means that other tools of U.S.
national power will be crucial for managing China’s rise—something Beijing itself appears
to recognize.250 Thus, Washington should avoid technology restrictions that yield immedi-
ate yet modest military gains but inflict larger, longer-term economic and diplomatic costs
on the United States.

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PROCESSES

The Defense Department must focus and prioritize its concerns about Chinese tech.
Specifically, DOD should identify future PLA technology milestones that would tangi-
bly change military outcomes over a concrete time horizon. This rigor would help federal
regulators design more targeted technological controls that achieve military needs while
minimizing harm to other national interests.

A good starting point would be DOD’s China-related defense planning scenarios—a clas-
sified set of priority missions that might include, for example, helping to defend and/or
resupply Taiwan.251 For each planning scenario, DOD could seek to identify what poten-
tial new PLA technological capabilities would most significantly increase the likelihood of
U.S. mission failure. The time horizon being considered would shape the nature of DOD’s
analysis. DOD could make fairly concrete
predictions about what technologies will
DOD should use its defense planning matter most during the next five or ten
scenarios to identify future PLA years, because U.S. and Chinese opera-
technology milestones that would tional concepts will not drastically change
tangibly change military outcomes during that time and most key technologies
either already exist or have been theorized.
over a concrete time horizon. To assess military-critical technologies on a
longer timeline, DOD would need to make
more speculative predictions, such as how early-stage technologies may mature over de-
cades, and what the American and Chinese militaries of the future will look and fight like.
Proposed controls on early-stage technologies should therefore meet a higher threshold of
criticality and undergo more rigorous vetting.

Although DOD has formidable internal expertise in offices such as the Strategic Intelligence
and Analysis Cell, its assessments should draw generously from the insights of indepen-
dent technologists, military analysts, and China experts to avoid myopia and groupthink.
Existing channels for engaging outside experts, like the JASON group, may need to be
expanded or supplemented to account for the difficulty of making long-term technology
predictions and the need to consider implications for a wide range of U.S. interests beyond

60 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

defense. The Intelligence Community should also provide an independent check on DOD’s
assessments. Once military-critical technologies have been identified, intelligence analysts
should assess the likelihood of the PLA actually acquiring these technologies and effectively
fielding them over different time horizons. Analysts would also evaluate China’s relative
dependence on foreign tech transfer, as opposed to its indigenous ability to develop the
same technologies.

Regulators would then consider the efficacy of potential technology controls, and an in-
teragency review led by the National Security Council (NSC) would evaluate second- and
third-order impacts, such as economic and diplomatic implications. Interagency review
has long been the norm for many kinds of technology controls. But given the growing
importance of dual-use technology, private sector–led “spin-on” innovation, and globalized
supply chains, the NSC should assess whether current deliberative processes are sufficiently
comprehensive and inclusive.

CASE STUDIES
Drone swarms. Drone swarms are a potential example of militarily significant technol-
ogy that might merit new U.S. technology restrictions. Many military analysts worry that
large swarms of cheap, autonomous, self-coordinating drones could neutralize U.S. military
advantages over China.252 They fear that China could deploy these drone swarms to over-
whelm and destroy large, expensive, relatively immobile American assets like aircraft carri-
ers. If that fear is well-grounded, then China’s development and successful fielding of this
technology could swing the balance of a strategically consequential battle.

Still, U.S. technology controls would only make sense if they could be effective in protect-
ing America’s military edge. China’s world-class commercial drone industry is mostly indig-
enous, reducing the U.S. government’s influence over Chinese advancements. In late 2020,
the Trump administration added DJI, the global market leader in drones, to the Entity List
based on human rights violations. David Benowitz, an industry analyst and former DJI
official, identified several U.S.-origin parts that DJI would need to replace following this
designation. Still, he predicted the move would not “severely impact” the company.253

Swarming, an aspect of drone technology that remains in development, could have distinct
chokepoints for U.S. controls to target. Key hardware components of drone swarms, like
high-fidelity short-range communication equipment, might perhaps be controllable (as-
suming China does not already lead in these areas). Some software components, however—
like computer vision algorithms—would be harder to control because they are intangible,
under development by many international companies, and often based on openly published
academic research.

JON BATEMAN 61
 Xiaomi. The final days of Trump’s presidency offered a vivid example of poorly designed
technology controls, when DOD designated the consumer electronics giant Xiaomi as a
“Communist Chinese Military Company.” This status, a forerunner of Biden’s Non-SDN
Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List, would have prohibited Americans
from investing in the company. DOD’s justification was shockingly thin. It highlighted
Xiaomi’s plans to invest in 5G and AI—two broad, loosely defined technology areas that
most global companies are pursuing—and the fact that Xiaomi was once publicly rec-
ognized by a Chinese ministry. Xiaomi later won a court injunction after a federal judge
found the company did not meet the legal criteria for designation and DOD “could not
identify any transfers of technology from Xiaomi to the PRC.”254 Biden has since reversed
this designation and overhauled the underlying regulatory process, placing the Treasury
Department in charge.255

Broad technology categories like “AI,” “Big Data,” or “the Internet of Things” are not ap-
propriate targets for military-related technology restrictions. They are too ubiquitous to
control, and too generic to meaningfully assess for military impact. Unfortunately, the U.S.
government does not always recognize this. The Commerce Department’s new ICTS sup-
ply chain rule requires special scrutiny for any China-related technology “integral to: (A)
Artificial intelligence and machine learning; (B) Quantum key distribution; (C) Quantum
computing; (D) Drones; (E) Autonomous systems; or (F) Advanced Robotics.”256 These are
diverse and capacious categories. They can be a starting point for further analysis, but U.S.
government decisionmaking must be far more granular.

Supercomputers. Supercomputers pro-

Broad technology categories like vide another case study that illustrates the
“AI,” “Big Data,” or “the Internet of complexity of U.S. efforts to control mil-
Things” are too ubiquitous to control itary-relevant technology. The U.S. gov-
ernment has long sought to prevent the
and too generic to meaningfully
Chinese military from acquiring powerful
assess for military impact. supercomputers due to their important
role in advanced cryptography and in the
design and development of nuclear weapons, missiles, and other military systems.257 For
decades, Washington relied on export controls of finished supercomputers, permitting their
sale to China only if they would not be used for military purposes.258 But U.S. restrictions
have recently broadened. The United States now uses its Entity List to target entire Chinese
organizations involved in supercomputing—restricting them from obtaining a wide range
of U.S. components and other goods, not just supercomputers themselves.259

Although these initial designations focused on organizations owned or controlled by the

PLA, they have sprawled since 2015.260 Today the Entity List covers nearly all major players
in the Chinese supercomputing ecosystem, including high-performance chip designers, su-
percomputer manufacturers, and supercomputer operators.261 According to the Commerce

62 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Department, these organizations have varying ties to the PLA. Secretary of Commerce
Gina Raimondo explained that “supercomputing capabilities are vital for the development
of many—perhaps almost all—modern weapons and national security systems, such as
nuclear weapons and hypersonic weapons.”262 But that is hardly all, or even most, of what
some of these entities do. Like supercomputing organizations around the world, they also
support biomedical research, weather forecasting, electric grid management, oil and gas
exploration, and countless other benign activities.263

On one level, this increasing use of the Entity List makes sense. China has transitioned from
purchasing foreign supercomputers to building its own, so U.S. technology controls will
be more effective if they target the latter process instead of the former.264 Yet the change in
U.S. regulatory tools has also implied a subtle but important de facto shift in U.S. policy to-
ward China’s technological development. Before, Washington specifically opposed Beijing’s
military use of supercomputers. Now, it effectively opposes Chinese supercomputing as a
whole—a general-purpose technology with innumerable civilian uses. The U.S. government
has yet to publicly comment on this shift, which could have second- and third-order im-
plications. It might stymie scientific cooperation on climate modeling, for example, or help
motivate Beijing to restrict American access to some general purpose technology that China
dominates. The Biden administration should carefully review its semiconductor restrictions
to ensure that it has fully considered their implications beyond the military sphere.

KEY OFFENSIVE POLICIES

While senior defense leaders should continue to inform civilian regulators of the criti-
cal technologies they believe warrant government controls, other ways of maintaining the
American military edge over China deserve more time and attention. First, DOD should
accelerate its efforts to modernize and transform U.S. forces to counter the PLA. This
work—which includes developing more survivable and cost-effective systems, becoming
more adept at incorporating private sector innovations, designing new warfighting con-
cepts for near-peer battle, and moving forces into and within the Indo-Pacific—has been
underway since late in the Obama administration. However, it remains far from complete
and faces enormous bureaucratic and congressional obstacles.265 The U.S. military edge over
China will depend more on this task than
on any other governmental effort, includ- The U.S. military edge over
ing technology restrictions. the PLA will depend more on the
Second, the Department of Defense and modernization and transformation
the Department of Homeland Security of American forces than on
(DHS) should redouble their efforts to technology restrictions
shore up cybersecurity and information se-
curity in the military and among defense
targeting China.

JON BATEMAN 63
contractors specifically. The immediate priority would be to counter the most proven and
most damaging Chinese intelligence collection techniques—namely, remote hacking, hu-
man agent recruitment, and open-source research. Although the Pentagon in recent years
has significantly tightened the cybersecurity requirements in its procurement rules, the de-
fense industrial base remains vulnerable.266

64 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

LIMITING CHINESE NATIONAL
SECURITY ESPIONAGE

RISKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
The Federal Bureau of Investigation currently describes China’s intelligence activities as “the
greatest long-term threat to our nation’s information.”267 The bureau has thousands of active
counterintelligence cases relating to China and opens multiple new cases daily.268 Although
Beijing’s theft of intellectual property and other economically valuable data remains the
primary concern, Chinese national security espionage is also harmful. China’s intelligence
agencies have stolen a significant volume of U.S. military secrets in recent years, includ-
ing aircraft designs.269 They have penetrated U.S. political campaigns to gain insight into
future American policymaking.270 And they have compromised America’s own espionage
networks, reportedly helping to expose and disrupt U.S. intelligence activities in China—a
top American collection priority—and elsewhere.271

Classified U.S. national security secrets are shielded by a robust system of technological,
physical, and personnel controls. As a result, China often first seeks out sensitive unclassified
data that it can later exploit to acquire classified information. In particular, U.S. officials as-
sess that China assembles and analyzes large quantities of Americans’ personal information
to identify potential targets for intelligence collection or other subterfuge. Some U.S. intel-
ligence officials believe such techniques have enabled Beijing to quickly identify undercover
personnel from the Central Intelligence Agency around the world and monitor or disrupt
their activities.272 U.S. agencies also cite the risk that China could use sensitive medical,
financial, or other personal information to blackmail or co-opt American officials.273

65
 China’s intelligence targeting of American officials has become a major justification for U.S.
tech restrictions. After all, U.S.-China technological ties provide the Chinese government
with additional opportunities to harvest Americans’ personal data (just as these ties may
give Washington ways to collect on Chinese targets). Beijing could, for example, pressure a
Chinese tech company to share its private data on American users. Chinese companies are
legally required to comply with such requests, and according to U.S. intelligence officials,
these companies already help to process bulk data in the possession of Chinese intelligence
agencies.274 For example, U.S. officials have publicly alleged that Huawei “has the capabil-
ity secretly to access sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains and sells,”
and that “information from Huawei routers has ultimately ended up in hands that would
appear to be the state.”275

RISKS AND LIMITATIONS OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES

These risks provide some basis for limiting Chinese companies’ presence in U.S. informa-
tion systems. However, restrictive measures may always not be very effective in thwarting
Chinese theft of Americans’ personal data, for the simple reason that Beijing seems to prefer
other ways of acquiring that data. When American officials describe China’s most successful
and damaging bulk collection efforts to date, they usually point to the devastating hack of
the U.S. Office of Personnel Management and the compromises of Marriott, Equifax, and
Anthem. But these were all remote cyber operations; none apparently required any Chinese
insider access to U.S. systems, companies, or supply chains.276

In fact, sensitive personal information about Americans can be bought outright from U.S.
or foreign data brokers. U.S. journalists have vividly demonstrated how easy it is to ob-
tain geolocation and other data to identify and track prominent Americans.277 The U.S.
military and Intelligence Community reportedly use similar techniques to track foreign
targets, so there is every reason to believe that Beijing does the same.278 Then there is sim-
ple data scraping from the open internet,
China’s most successful known bulk which is apparently one of Beijing’s most
effective espionage techniques. According
collection efforts were all remote to U.S. prosecutors, China has success-
cyber operations. They required fully recruited multiple Americans to spy
no insider access to U.S. systems, for Beijing based on information in these
companies, or supply chains. targets’ public LinkedIn profiles. William
Evanina, then director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center,
said in 2019 that LinkedIn was China’s “ultimate playground for collection.”279 (Although
LinkedIn announced last year that it would leave the Chinese market, that won’t stop
Beijing from scouring Americans’ own LinkedIn pages.280) The major digital espionage

66 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

risks, then, stem from pervasive gaps in U.S. cybersecurity and data privacy law, policy, and
implementation. Chinese tech companies’ presence in American markets and supply chains
seems like a secondary threat at most.

Before instituting sweeping measures to deny China any access to Americans’ personal data
on national security grounds, it is also worth considering targeted actions to protect the
relatively few U.S. citizens with access to classified information. The government has signifi-
cant influence over its own employees and contractors, enabling Washington to discourage
or even bar them from using Chinese technologies deemed to be high-risk. For example, the
U.S. military already bans TikTok from government-owned devices. The military has even
“urged troops and their dependents to erase the app from personal phones”; if necessary,
this could become a condition for maintaining a security clearance.281 Protecting undercov-
er agents is a more complicated task. But U.S. spy agencies have already implemented new
tradecraft and operational security innovations to offset China’s digital counterintelligence
techniques—the kind of cat-and-mouse game that has occurred throughout the history of
espionage.282

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PROCESSES

“Personal data” is not a useful or controllable category. Instead, the U.S. Intelligence
Community should work to identify those categories of personal data that would provide
the greatest marginal benefits to Chinese spy agencies. Regulatory agencies would then
consider technology restrictions aimed specifically at this data, while accepting higher levels
of risk for other types of data.

The Intelligence Community analysis

Regulators should protect the
would need to consider China’s preexist-
ing intelligence capabilities and its access personal data with greatest marginal
to functionally equivalent personal data on benefits to Chinese spy agencies,
Americans. It would also examine the U.S. while accepting higher levels of risk
government’s ability to detect and mitigate
different kinds of personal data theft. If
for other types of data.
Washington can learn of certain Chinese
data theft quickly and implement effective response plans (for example, by readjusting of-
ficial travel patterns or refreshing the cover identities used by intelligence officers), that
category of data may need less protection. Finally, the IC should consider the overall sig-
nificance of the U.S. personnel described by the data, and the likely harm to U.S. national
security from China’s improved ability to track, recruit, or disrupt these people. While
all Americans’ personal data deserves fundamental protections, extra-stringent restrictions
should have special justification—just as the IC generates costly cover identities for some
intelligence officers and not others. For example, data on enlisted U.S. military members in

JON BATEMAN 67
non-sensitive positions would certainly have some intelligence value to China, but it may
not be critical enough to justify broad-based restrictions on China’s involvement in the U.S.
tech sector.283

Because U.S. government data is already controlled to varying degrees, the Intelligence
Community would primarily look to identify sensitive but unclassified personal data held
by companies and other private parties. For a useful benchmark of the sensitivity of private-
ly held data, the IC could ask whether the data would be considered classified if owned by
the U.S. government. For example, U.S. national security agencies maintain large caches of
employee data in unclassified, internet-connected systems (like the Defense Travel System)
that are inherently more vulnerable to Chinese hacking than classified systems.284 The ex-
istence of such systems suggests that Washington believes the practical benefits of internet
connectivity can often outweigh the risks of Chinese espionage. This is a reasonable calcu-
lation. Regulators should not require private companies to take more onerous precautions
than U.S. agencies themselves take for equivalent categories of government-held data.

CASE STUDIES
Genetic data. Genetic information is an example of personal data that could warrant re-
strictive measures to prevent Chinese government access. In 2020, the Treasury Department
issued new regulations empowering CFIUS to review covered transactions that involve
“sensitive personal data” of more than 1 million individuals.285 The definition of sensitive
personal data includes genetic data. Compared to other types of personal information, ge-
netic data is less widely distributed and harder for Beijing to obtain. China could conceiv-
ably use genetic information to identify and physically track U.S. government officials—in-
cluding undercover officers—as they move around the world.286 Because someone’s genetic
information cannot be changed, a breach would have lifelong consequences and be difficult
to remediate.287

Geolocation data. In other cases, the “sensitive personal data” regulation seems overly
broad. Geolocation data is also considered sensitive under the Treasury rule. Yet because
Americans’ geolocation data can be easily purchased from online data brokers, CFIUS
screening probably cannot prevent China from acquiring such data. Meanwhile, the pos-
sibility of CFIUS review could cause substantial economic harm to U.S. businesses. There
are entire industries, including the mobile app ecosystem, where relatively small American
companies might have geolocation data on 1 million or more individuals. The potential
need to file voluntary CFIUS notices, and the opaque and time-consuming nature of
CFIUS review, could chill a great deal of investment activity while doing little to protect
Americans from Chinese espionage.

68 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Grindr episode illustrates both the possibilities and limitations of U.S. efforts to stop
Chinese companies from acquiring different kinds of personal data on Americans. In 2019,
CFIUS forced a Chinese company to unwind its purchase of the dating app Grindr.288
Grindr has a large American user base, likely including many U.S. officials, who privately
share information about their HIV status and sexual activities with the app. Such infor-
mation has great value for Chinese intelligence targeters, will remain relevant to them for
decades, and cannot be found in many other places online. The CFIUS action therefore
made sense, because it blocked one of China’s clearest paths to acquiring a unique cache
of personal data with clear national security value. On the other hand, the forced divest-
ment probably did little to secure other types of personal data, such as geolocation. A 2021
Norwegian government report revealed that Grindr’s new American owners routinely share
users’ “IP address, GPS location, age, and gender,” though not sexual or health informa-
tion, “with a very large number of third parties.”289 It would be a trivial task for the Chinese
government to get similar information from data brokers.

Stayntouch. Trump’s 2020 executive order on Stayntouch provides another cautionary

case study. Circumventing the normal CFIUS process, Trump required a Chinese company
to divest from Stayntouch, a cloud-based service that helps hotels manage their proper-
ties.290 Stayntouch has access to data on hotel guests, and its software can even be used to
access guest rooms. This likely raised the specter of China using Stayntouch software to
gain historical or real-time knowledge of U.S. government officials’ travels, a clear counter-
intelligence threat. That said, Stayntouch is used by only 500 hotels worldwide; American
officials might be able simply to avoid these hotels.291 By comparison, Marriott alone has
7,642 properties.292 Without aid of any insider access, Chinese hackers had persistent access
to Marriott’s Starwood network for four years and stole data on 500 million guests, includ-
ing reservation and travel information as well as personal data such as passport numbers.293

The contrast between Stayntouch and Marriott shows the limits of CFIUS as a tool for pro-
tecting Americans’ personal data. While a small number of high-value data sources can be
protected through China-focused restrictions like investment screening, most other kinds
of personal data cannot feasibly be secured this way. Unfortunately, U.S. officials have not
always made such distinctions. The Trump administration, in particular, often lumped all
types of personal data together regardless of sensitivity, uniqueness, or controllability. Then
secretary of state Mike Pompeo in 2020 described a “project of real scale” in which “we are
now evaluating each instance where we believe that U.S. citizens’ data . . . crosses Chinese
technology.”294

App bans. In Trump’s last days as president, he signed an executive order banning Alipay,
WeChat Pay, and six other Chinese apps. Rather than point to specific kinds of data these
apps collected from Americans, Trump described a generalized threat of “Chinese connect-
ed software applications” that can “[access] personal electronic devices such as smartphones,
tablets, and computers”—in other words, nearly all Chinese software. And he cited, as a

JON BATEMAN 69
favorable precedent, India’s recent ban of “more than 200 Chinese connected software ap-
plications throughout the country”— a blunderbuss barrage from New Delhi that seemed
motivated more by a desire to retaliate for recent border skirmishes than by any careful,
app-specific security review.295

Pompeo and Trump are no longer in office, and Biden has rescinded the app bans. But the
fact that such bans were even attempted, and the limitless logic used to justify them, has
already sent a chilling message to the global software industry. Meanwhile, loose talk about
“Americans’ data” can still be heard across the political spectrum. Evanina, a former career
professional, testified last year that approximately “80 percent of American adults have had
all of their personal data stolen by the [Chinese Communist Party], and the other 20 percent
most of their personal data”—a head-scratchingly vague and implausible claim that has
nevertheless become widely quoted.296

Video games. Under Biden, CFIUS has reportedly continued its investigation of Tencent’s
ownership stakes in Riot Games and Epic, two video game developers.297 A former civil ser-
vant in charge of CFIUS reviews under Obama and Trump explained these investigations
to Bloomberg: “When you’re talking about massive amounts of data, there’s probably some-
thing for the committee to look at.” He went on to add that: “The question then becomes[:]
is the risk high enough that it actually warrants forcing deals apart.”298 In other words, a
large universe of activities must be reviewed, with fine policy distinctions being made after
the fact, behind the scenes, on a case-by-case basis. This strategy, typical of the American
national security establishment, risks casting a chill over huge swaths of commercial trans-
actions. A more targeted and rigorous approach is needed.

In June 2021, Biden signed an executive order on “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data
from Foreign Adversaries.”299 This order singles out the threat from China and tasks agen-
cies with making “recommendations to protect against harm from the unrestricted sale of,
transfer of, or access to United States persons’ sensitive data, including personally identifi-
able information, personal health information, and genetic information, and harm from
access to large data repositories by persons owned or controlled by, or subject to the juris-
diction or direction of, a foreign adversary.” A formal process for grappling with these prob-
lems is a welcome improvement on the previous, ad hoc approach. But the ultimate value
of this process will depend on whether key terms from Biden’s order can be given more
specific, tightly focused definitions. “Sensitive data,” “personally identifiable information,”
and “large data repositories” are vague concepts that could easily lead to overreaching gov-
ernmental controls. These concepts should be refined to include only the highest-priority
data, as outlined above.

70 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

KEY OFFENSIVE POLICIES
The U.S. government has many opportunities to protect Americans’ personal data from
Chinese intelligence, beyond imposing restrictive measures aimed specifically at China.
Above all, Congress should establish national data privacy and cybersecurity standards.
Many experts have called for federal legislation to replace the weak smattering of sector-
specific and state-level rules.300 With new mega-breaches and data abuses routinely coming
to light, it is clear that many U.S. companies lack adequate incentives to protect Americans’
private information. National cybersecurity and data privacy standards would be adversary-
agnostic, aiming to stop any malicious actor from wrongfully purchasing or stealing sensitive
personal data. By addressing the underly-
ing problem—that Americans’ personal
data is very easy to obtain—such standards National cybersecurity and data
would do more to thwart Beijing’s intelli- privacy standards, although
gence collection than most China-centric adversary-agnostic, would do more
measures.
to thwart Beijing’s intelligence
The U.S. government can also take spe- collection than most China-
cific precautions to protect its own offi- centric measures.
cials. While all Americans have an interest
in preventing Beijing from accessing their
personal data, the most acute national security threat is Chinese intelligence targeting those
with classified information—a much narrower category. In response to this growing threat,
U.S. agencies have significantly increased their China-related counterintelligence activities.
Still, the scope of the problem described by U.S. officials calls for even more resources.
The government should step up its monitoring and disruption of Chinese intelligence op-
erations, provide more frequent and detailed defensive counterintelligence briefings, and
hand down new guidance or restrictions for officials’ use of higher-risk online spaces like
LinkedIn, among other possibilities. Targeted counterintelligence programs, while often
not sufficient on their own, can help advance U.S. policy objectives without many of the
costs and risks that come with broad-based technology restrictions.

JON BATEMAN 71
PREVENTING CHINESE SABOTAGE
IN A CRISIS

RISKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
The Biden and Trump administrations both have warned that China could sabotage criti-
cal U.S. systems during a bilateral crisis and that technological interdependence heightens
this risk.301 Beijing has the legal and political tools to compel private Chinese companies
to offer up any privileged access they may have to software or hardware systems used in the
United States. Such access could facilitate actual attacks, as well as threats (either explicit
or implicit), against U.S. infrastructure. During peacetime, China’s interest in stable com-
mercial and diplomatic relations generally outweighs any benefits of digital sabotage or
saber-rattling. But in extreme circumstances, like the cusp of war, China would have strong
reason to consider all its options. There are two broad scenarios.

First, China could attempt a counter-

force operation to paralyze the U.S. mili- In extreme circumstances, Beijing
tary and prevent American units from would consider digital sabotage
responding to a bilateral crisis. For exam- to paralyze the U.S. military or
ple, Beijing might want to stop key U.S.
military assets from promptly reinforcing
dissuade American leaders from
or resupplying American or allied forces confronting China forcefully.
abroad. The scenario has parallels with
Japan’s 1941 surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, which sought to buy time for Tokyo to act
freely in the Pacific.302 In a modern digital version of such an attack, China could try to sub-
vert unclassified and/or commercially operated infrastructure that the U.S. military relies

73
on—such as core telecommunications systems, private logistics companies, off-base electric
power sources, undersea cables, commercial satellites, and cloud services.

Second, Beijing could carry out a countervalue operation that harms U.S. civilians, hoping
to demoralize them and thereby dissuade American political leaders from confronting China
forcefully. This might involve disruptions of the U.S. power grid, financial sector, health-
care systems, emergency services, telecommunications, or transportation networks. Britain
briefly tried (and soon abandoned) a countervalue strategy at the outset of World War I,
seeking to exploit its centrality in international communications and financial networks to
isolate the German economy and force Berlin to quickly sue for peace.303 A Chinese version
of this gambit could cause significant blowback—harming the Chinese economy and turn-
ing Chinese tech companies into international pariahs, among other consequences. But in
a major crisis, Beijing might discount or accept this risk, seeing digital subversion as less
dangerous and provocative than more overt forms of disruption.

The danger posed by these scenarios is difficult to assess. On the one hand, they are pre-
mised on a hypothetical, high-stakes crisis that may never come to pass. China’s calculus for
when and how to exploit its companies’ access to adversary systems is unknown; Beijing’s
concern for Chinese firms’ commercial reputations may create a state of deterrence. And
the ultimate impact of any Chinese sabotage is uncertain, in part because U.S. critical infra-
structure systems are so complicated and decentralized. On the other hand, the long-term
risk of such a crisis seems to be trending upward as bilateral relations deteriorate. And all
governments, including the United States, are willing to exploit domestic companies for
national security purposes under various circumstances. Finally, a crisis is no time to test the
consequences of critical U.S. system outages.

RISKS AND LIMITATIONS OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES

U.S. restrictive measures can help to reduce the risks of actual or threatened Chinese tech-
nological sabotage. But such measures also have practical limits. Understanding these limits
can help to focus U.S. action on the most important areas while preventing futile and costly
overreach elsewhere.

To begin with, Beijing’s counterforce and countervalue options in a crisis do not all require
insider access to U.S. systems. According to the U.S. Intelligence Community, “China can
launch cyber attacks that, at a minimum, can cause localized, temporary disruptions to crit-
ical infrastructure within the United States.”304 Such cyber attacks most frequently involve
remote hacking; built-in backdoors are rare. In extremis, China could also do things like
physically cutting undersea cables (including those that are not operated by or connected
to China), disrupting U.S. satellites (through physical or cyber means that do not require

74 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

supply chain access), or ordering intelligence agents or co-optees inside the United States to
carry out physical sabotage of critical infrastructure (whether Chinese-made or otherwise).
Some of these actions are potentially deniable. In other words, U.S. tech restrictions can
curb a few of China’s sabotage options, but it isn’t clear that PLA military planners need or
prefer those particular options.

Technology controls also cannot eliminate China’s low-tech or no-tech sources of leverage
over the United States. During peacetime, Beijing’s demonstrated coercive tool kit includes
halting key exports, imports, and people-to-people exchanges in an effort to inflict eco-
nomic damage.305 Such actions do not necessarily target technology industries or rely on
technological links. Instead, China has previously targeted sectors (including agriculture,
tourism, and education) where it can impose asymmetric economic costs and maximize
political pressure on a rival country’s government. Again, more extreme options also exist.
At the threshold of war, Beijing could choose to seize U.S.-owned assets in China or carry
out mass arrests of American citizens. Such leverage points are inherent to a U.S.-China
relationship; they cannot be eliminated so long as the two countries do business.

The fact is that any bilateral relationship provides both countries with some access to
and influence over the other. Unless the United States seeks a Cold War–style separa-
tion from China, Beijing will retain significant avenues for coercion and disruption. Of
course, Washington wants to design a relationship that maximizes U.S. leverage over China
while minimizing Chinese leverage over
America. This is a fine aspiration in the-
ory, but often unattainable in practice, Any bilateral relationship provides
especially in the long run. One-sided both countries with some influence
dynamics will become harder to sustain over the other. Barring a Cold War–
over time as China continues to grow in
style separation, Beijing will retain
economic heft and international influ-
ence relative to the United States.306 significant avenues for coercion
and disruption.
Finally, potential Chinese sabotage
should be placed in the context of other
threats to U.S. infrastructure.307 While American policymakers worry about what Beijing
might do in future crises, a diverse array of non-Chinese actors have already caused actual
disruptions to U.S. infrastructure during peacetime, or demonstrated the capability to do
so. In 2021, a criminal ransomware attack led to the lengthy shutdown of America’s largest
petroleum pipeline, helping trigger fuel shortages throughout the East Coast.308 The year
prior, a domestic suicide bombing near an AT&T facility in Nashville caused prolonged
telecommunications outages across multiple states.309 Russia has twice caused power out-
ages in Ukraine, and in 2014 it emerged that unknown cyber actors had severely damaged
a German steel mill.310

JON BATEMAN 75
The biggest threat to critical infrastructure, arguably, comes from non-intentional disrup-
tions. Episodes like the Texas freeze (2021), Hurricane Maria (2017), and the Northeast
blackout (2003) illustrate a basic problem: First, inadequate investments in infrastructure
capacity, maintenance, and resilience create systemic fragility. Then, semi-random shocks—
such as weather events, demand surges, equipment malfunctions, or counterfeit parts—de-
stabilize the system and lead to large-scale outages.311 Non-intentional infrastructure fail-
ures have been far more frequent and damaging than intentional wrongdoing by any actor.
Non-intentional disruptions might even happen to coincide with an international crisis and
thereby hamper U.S. military forces, although such a convergence is unlikely.

Unfortunately, China-focused restrictions can sometimes divert resources from broader ef-
forts to shore up U.S. critical infrastructure against all hazards. Consider a hypothetical
federal mandate to remove all Chinese equipment from the electrical grid. To pay for this
expensive initiative, utilities would need to defer other planned investments in security and
resilience, raise rates on consumers and businesses, or secure large government subsidies.
Congress recently bumbled through a very similar situation. In March 2020, it passed a law
requiring U.S. telecoms to “remove and replace” Huawei and ZTE equipment due to na-
tional security concerns.312 Small rural carriers warned that this unfunded mandate would
“devastate” them financially. Congress eventually provided subsidies to offset carriers’ costs,
but it took nine months and a fortuitous legislative vehicle—the $900 billion COVID-19
relief package—to do so.313 Meanwhile the industry was forced to endure what one top
lobbyist described as a lengthy “cliffhanger,” during which two small carriers shut down.314

To be sure, U.S. policymakers cannot ignore the risk of China sabotaging American systems
in a crisis. The risk is real, and technological interdependence provides Beijing with addi-
tional means (though perhaps lower motivation) to subvert U.S. infrastructure. Washington
should take targeted, cost-effective actions to address the problem. But restrictive measures
should focus on the highest-risk areas, where Chinese technological influence within the
United States could grant Beijing a particularly effective capability to paralyze key U.S.
forces or coerce U.S. political leadership at a critical moment. Even then, technology con-
trols should be aligned with a comprehensive national plan to protect U.S. critical infra-
structure from all digital and physical hazards.

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PROCESSES

The U.S. government should identify the most consequential Chinese sabotage scenarios,
map the specific technological dependencies that would enable them, and design targeted
controls to curb such risks.

The Department of Defense should take the lead on counterforce analysis. Approved de-
fense planning scenarios can serve as the starting point. For each planning scenario, DOD

76 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

could list the individual U.S. military assets or networks essential to achieving mission ob-
jectives, perhaps based on Time-Phased Force Deployment Data.315 It could then determine
where these military assets have critical dependencies on unclassified and/or commercial
U.S. networks. Finally, DOD could evaluate such networks for the presence of Chinese-
origin software or hardware that Beijing could exploit to alter military outcomes. The acid
test would be whether Chinese technological sabotage could significantly increase the likeli-
hood of U.S. mission failure.

While DOD is leading the counterforce analysis, DHS should assess countervalue sabo-
tage. To build a set of scenarios, DHS might start with existing frameworks such as the
National Critical Functions—a list of fifty-five government and private sector activities “so
vital to the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a
debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety,
or any combination thereof.”316 These functions include such elemental tasks as “Manage
Hazardous Materials,” “Generate Electricity,” and “Provide Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing Services.” DHS could survey major stakeholders for each function to identify
Chinese commercial presence in the supply chain that could be exploited for disruptive
purposes. This could leverage and complement the department’s ongoing Systemic Cyber
Risk Reduction Venture, which has a similar purpose but is not China-specific.317

DHS should set a high threshold of criticality before it recommends that regulators impose
new China-related technology controls. It might, for example, consider only those sabotage
scenarios that could plausibly exert a coercive effect on U.S. political leadership during
a crisis. This would likely involve mass casualties and/or mass evacuations. As a point of
comparison, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s National Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessment provides a list of seven scenarios with that level of sever-
ity, including earthquakes, hurricanes, space weather events, and concurrent natural disas-
ters.318 To justify new government technology controls, a Chinese countervalue sabotage
scenario might need to threaten damage on the same order of magnitude.

Any Chinese sabotage scenario should be vetted for plausibility. The Intelligence Community
could provide an independent assessment that considers China’s technology subversion capa-
bilities, military doctrines, and national leadership intentions during the expected lifecycle of
the U.S. systems at issue. In assessing China’s plans and intentions, intelligence analysts should
consider what other counterforce or countervalue options Beijing may have in a crisis, and
whether Chinese leaders may be deterred by the risks of economic blowback or U.S. reprisals.

CASE STUDIES
Bulk power. The Trump administration’s regulation of bulk power systems was a good
example of tailored tech restrictions designed to thwart Chinese sabotage. In May 2020,

JON BATEMAN 77
 Trump signed an executive order restricting usage of bulk power equipment sourced from
“foreign adversary” countries such as China.319 Bulk power systems are ideal targets for
sabotage because their failure can cause massive electricity outages that cannot easily be
remediated. Large power transformers, for example, can take more than twenty months
to replace.320 These transformers are increasingly—though not exclusively—sourced from
China and contain smart components potentially susceptible to manipulation.321

Trump’s action focused specifically on counterforce scenarios. The administration assessed

that the PLA “is equipped and actively planning to undermine” the bulk power system and
that “such attacks are most likely during crises abroad where Chinese military planning en-
visions early cyber attacks against the electric power grids . . . in the U.S. to prevent the de-
ployment of military forces and to incur domestic turmoil.” Accordingly, the Department
of Energy applied the ban on Chinese bulk power equipment only to “Defense Critical
Electric Infrastructure”—that is, civilian-
The Department of Energy was owned or -operated power infrastructure
serving certain military facilities designated
right to bar China from supplying by DOD as “critical to the defense of the
highly critical, difficult-to-replace United States.”322
bulk power equipment that directly
The Department of Energy was right to
supports military operations. impose this restriction on a select subset of
highly critical, difficult-to-replace equip-
ment that directly supports military operations. However, Biden has rescinded the new
rule and asked the Energy Department to consider what, if anything, should replace it.323
The department invited public comment on potential approaches, including whether it
should issue a new, even broader ban to cover countervalue scenarios and other types of
power infrastructure. Any such expansion should remain focused on a very high threshold
of sabotage impact and be rooted in rigorous cost-benefit analysis.

ICTS supply chain security rule. Not every U.S. action aimed at preventing Chinese
technological sabotage has been so targeted. A particularly troubling case is the Commerce
Department’s new rule on ICTS supply chain security, which was first developed by the
Trump administration, then allowed by Biden to come into effect in March 2021. Like the
bulk power regulation, this rule warns that China and other foreign adversaries could sabo-
tage the U.S. supply chain—“fully or partially shutting down critical networks or functions
at key times,” among many other cited dangers.324 But the ICTS supply chain rule is far
more sweeping in its scope and implications.

The ICTS rule allows the Commerce Department to review and ban virtually any China-
sourced technology that is widely used in the United States. The potential scope of review
includes—but is not limited to—all software (including mobile apps and web apps), internet
hosting services, home networking devices, and Internet of Things devices used by or process-

78 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

ing data on more than 1 million Americans.325 Considering the U.S. population and the scale
of many digital markets, this is a low threshold. A transaction need not have any connection
to critical infrastructure sectors or critical national functions to trigger review. The law firm
Morrison & Foerster observed that “almost any ICTS-related activity in the United States
connected to China is now subject to regulatory review by the U.S. government.”326

Covered transactions are not automatically banned. Instead, the rule establishes a review
system analogous to CFIUS. The Department of Commerce, in consultation with other
agencies, will judge each transaction using a wide range of factors, including the likelihood
and severity of potential harms and the efficacy of mitigation options, to determine whether
“undue or unacceptable risks” exist. The publicly stated decisionmaking criteria are quite
vague. Biden and the Commerce Department have taken laudable initial steps to clarify and
refine these criteria, but it remains to be seen what implementation will actually look like.
If Commerce follows the standard model of U.S. national security regulation (exemplified
by CFIUS), it will either develop a more detailed list of internal criteria, or else make deci-
sions on an ad hoc basis.327 Both options would leave outside stakeholders—such as U.S.
businesses—in the dark.

U.S. national security officials and political leaders traditionally prefer opaque regulatory
processes for several reasons. By declining to commit publicly (or sometimes even privately)
to a detailed and predictable decision framework, they seek to maximize the U.S. govern-
ment’s enforcement discretion. The all-encompassing ICTS supply chain rule means that
Washington can adjust its interpretation from day to day based on its evolving needs and
beliefs. Trump’s Commerce Department also explained that clearer public criteria “would
[have] allow[ed] foreign adversaries to pinpoint certain types of ICTS Transactions that
would more easily escape Departmental
oversight and, therefore, threaten U.S. na-
tional security.”
Biden should substantially narrow
the ICTS rule, instituting a clear
But too much discretion comes with costs and high threshold for technology
of its own, especially when a large portion of
the U.S. digital economy and global tech- bans and declaring specific safe
nology supply chain is at stake. Without harbors for noncritical tech areas.
more clarity and predictability, some U.S.
businesses will simply choose to avoid China-related technology transactions, including
many that pose little national security risk and are economically beneficial. Likewise, global
investors will pull back support from some projects—many of them benign—whose viabil-
ity depends on a long-term U.S.-China technology supply chain.328 The Biden administra-
tion should substantially narrow the ICTS supply chain rule, instituting a clear and high
threshold for technology bans and declaring specific safe harbors for noncritical technology
areas. It should also continue working to develop and publicize a more detailed and explicit
set of enforcement criteria, along the lines suggested throughout this report.

JON BATEMAN 79
In its current form, the ICTS supply chain rule is an invitation for overuse—if not by this
administration, then by a future one. For example, restrictionist politicians and national
security analysts have long campaigned for broad-based bans on computers, printers, and
other devices sold by the Chinese companies Lenovo and Lexmark. The proposed bans
would apply even in lower-risk settings, like noncritical state and local government offic-
es.329 Banning these cheap IT commodities would make it harder for cash-strapped public
entities to address more pressing cybersecurity concerns, such as ransomware. Yet the ICTS
supply chain rule provides a clear regulatory basis for such a ban, setting the stage for a
concerted lobbying push in the future.

KEY OFFENSIVE POLICIES

The U.S. government has numerous options for directly bolstering the cybersecurity and
resilience of critical military and civilian systems, which would mitigate not only the risk of
Chinese sabotage but also other serious threats, like weather-related outages. With the elec-
trical grid, for example, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission could apply stronger
mandatory cybersecurity standards to a larger number of entities and enforce them more
vigorously.330 The Department of Energy could establish a strategic reserve of large power
transformers.331 Congress could allocate federal money to shore up grid vulnerabilities.332
Investments in disaster recovery capabilities at the federal, state, and local levels would also
help mitigate the economic and societal damage caused by infrastructure outages once they
occur. Any of these efforts might be expensive, so the federal government could focus first
on a small subset of assets, like Defense Critical Electric Infrastructure, that face greatest
risk from Chinese sabotage.

80 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

LIMITING CHINESE INFLUENCE
OPERATIONS

RISKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
U.S. officials have become increasingly vocal in warning of Chinese government efforts
to influence American politics and society.333 Several trends underlie this concern. First,
Russia’s interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election brought much greater attention
to the overall threat of foreign influence. Subsequent events, particularly the COVID-19
“infodemic” and the U.S. Capitol insurrection, further highlighted the fragility of America’s
political-informational ecosystem and its susceptibility to damaging manipulation.

At the same time, a more assertive China has increasingly sought to shape political narra-
tives beyond its borders, especially on China-related issues. Much of this activity is overt—
including Beijing’s “wolf warrior diplomacy,” its nationalistic state-sponsored media, and
its punishment of foreign companies whose speech offends the Chinese Communist Party.
But some efforts are covert—ranging from traditional influence (for example, cultivating
agents within foreign political circles) to modern digital techniques (for example, fabricat-
ing armies of fake social media accounts that harass and vilify dissidents).334

China’s foreign influence efforts have often focused closer to home, on targets such as
Taiwan and Australia.335 Nevertheless, in 2021 the U.S. Intelligence Community assessed
that “Beijing has been intensifying efforts to shape the political environment in the United
States to promote its policy preferences, mold public discourse, pressure political figures
whom Beijing believes oppose its interests, and muffle criticism of China on such issues
as religious freedom and the suppression of democracy in Hong Kong.”336 According to

81
 the IC, China “considered but did not deploy influence efforts intended to change the
outcome of the [2020] US presidential election.”337 Beijing apparently judged that the risks
outweighed the benefits. This calculus may well change in the future, particularly if U.S.-
China relations continue to deteriorate.

U.S. policymakers worry that Beijing could

U.S. policymakers worry that pressure the makers of popular Chinese
Beijing could pressure the makers of apps like TikTok or WeChat to support
popular Chinese apps like TikTok or covert influence campaigns that target
Americans. Such a campaign might involve
WeChat to support covert influence artificially promoting and/or suppressing
campaigns that target Americans. certain content, perhaps leveraging the
apps’ capability to microtarget specific au-
diences. WeChat—which is popular among the global Chinese diaspora—already censors
topics such as the Tiananmen Square massacre and the Falun Gong religious movement.338
TikTok has acknowledged doing the same, but claims that it stopped in 2019.339

RISKS AND LIMITATIONS OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES

In theory, these concerns could justify major U.S. government restrictive measures such as app
bans. In practice, however, there are good reasons for U.S. policymakers to think twice. To
begin with, social media–based influence operations by China and other foreign governments
may not actually be very effective. Researchers have struggled to find strong evidence that such
operations can measurably alter their targets’ beliefs and actions over time. A meta-analysis
by Princeton University found only one high-quality empirical study on the question.340 That
study examined efforts by Russia’s Internet Research Agency during the 2016 U.S. presiden-
tial election and found no effect on American Twitter users’ political beliefs.

Although future research may identify stronger causal effects, it is worth keeping in mind
the difficulties of large-scale public persuasion. To swing a U.S. presidential election, for ex-
ample, Chinese influence actors would need to sway the small number of persuadable vot-
ers, or alter the turnout of voters, in battleground states. But Beijing would face stiff compe-
tition along the way. A Chinese influence campaign would be operating amid a cacophony
of other voices—including political candidates and parties, community leaders, activists,
traditional media commentary, and authentic citizen views—that dominate online as well
as TV, radio, print, and word-of-mouth discourse. Domestic voices tend to have far more
resources (billions of dollars are spent during a presidential election cycle), greater political
sophistication, and thicker networks than even the most well-crafted foreign personas.

Just as domestic actors are the predominant voices in American politics, domestic players
are also the main sources and amplifiers of political disinformation. Before TikTok entered

82 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

the American market, U.S.-based platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube already
provided fertile ground for false, polarizing, and destructive political discourse. While these
platforms have taken many actions to address influence operations, the problem seems to
be growing even faster.341 Fundamentally, user-generated content is produced on a scale
that overwhelms existing content moderation tools, and platforms lack the financial and
political incentives to undertake wholesale product redesigns to reduce the spread of harm-
ful content. Market power is one part of the problem. The size of some major platforms
helps to insulate them from pressure by users, advertisers, political leaders, activists, and
employees to take stronger action against influence operations and other damaging content.

In this context, competitive pressure from Chinese apps like TikTok may have beneficial
effects. TikTok is the most significant competitive threat to emerge in the American social
media landscape in years. As such, its presence might help spur U.S.-based platforms to take
stronger action against disinformation and other influence operations to burnish their repu-
tations among advertisers, users, and outside stakeholders. Indeed, American activists and
NGOs concerned about harmful online content have begun to explicitly compare TikTok’s
efforts against those of U.S.-based platforms.342 This suggests that TikTok’s presence has
helped to intensify a reputational contest
among platforms that could, if combined Slow-rolling efforts to shape
with regulatory and other pressure, raise
the bar for responsible policies and prac- Americans’ general views of China
tices by all players. and China-related policy are more
readily detected and countered
A sound U.S. policy on Chinese influ-
ence operations would place companies without resort to government
like TikTok in the context of the larger tech controls.
American political-informational ecosys-
tem. Seen in that light, Chinese tech companies play a limited and, perhaps, not entirely
harmful role. Restrictive measures to counter Chinese influence operations should therefore
be carefully vetted and focus on the highest-impact, most plausible threats.

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PROCESSES

Washington has a variety of tools to combat Chinese influence operations, but it should re-
serve technology restrictions such as app bans for the most serious risks. These would include
the risk that China successfully alters a national election outcome or greatly reduces public
confidence in an election. Potential influence operations with life-and-death consequences,
such as those that markedly increase vaccine hesitancy during a pandemic, would also justify
strong controls. However, long-term influence operations on less sensitive topics can often
be managed in other ways. The bulk of Chinese influence activity in the United States seems
aimed at shaping Americans’ general views of China and China-related policy.343 These slow-

JON BATEMAN 83
rolling persuasion campaigns, while troubling, are no emergency. They are more readily
detected and countered without resort to government controls.

It is unclear whether China currently has the ability to achieve any of the most dangerous
influence outcomes, such as swinging an election. The U.S. government should conduct
a careful, fact-based assessment to guide its use of technology controls. The Intelligence
Community can help by estimating the Chinese government’s capability and willingness to
subvert Chinese commercial technology to influence Americans. But a China-focused intel-
ligence assessment is only part of what policymakers would need. U.S. policymakers must
also understand the American political and societal factors that would determine whether
Chinese influence operations ultimately succeed or fail. This analysis would be crucial to
properly size up the threat and weigh policy responses, yet the Intelligence Community and
other government agencies lack the authority and expertise to conduct such an assessment.

To supplement the IC’s analysis, the president could convene an outside advisory group
of political scientists, communications experts, influence operations researchers, and tech-
nologists, perhaps under the aegis of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and
Medicine. This panel would examine the U.S. domestic environment’s susceptibility to
Chinese digital influence operations. For example, it might consider whether and how such
operations could effectively persuade key voting constituencies or influence their turnout,
considering factors like the partisan balance in swing states and the responsiveness of vari-
ous constituencies to targeted digital campaigns. A government-sponsored analysis of this
kind would need to be carefully designed to prevent real and perceived impingements on
Americans’ civil liberties.344

CASE STUDIES
TikTok. The most significant U.S. restrictions aimed at thwarting Chinese influence opera-
tions were Trump’s executive orders attempting to ban TikTok and force its sale. These or-
ders—which have never been implemented—were not justified based on publicly available
evidence about influence threats. While Trump vaguely claimed that TikTok could “be used
for disinformation campaigns that benefit the Chinese Communist Party,” his administra-
tion offered no analysis of how effective these campaigns might be.345

Biden rescinded the TikTok ban. He replaced it with a new mechanism, the Commerce
Department’s ICTS supply chain security rule, to evaluate any Chinese software and hard-
ware popularly used in the United States. Later, he published “a criteria-based decision
framework” to help guide the Commerce Department’s review of so-called “connected
software applications” such as TikTok.346 However, officials have not publicly confirmed
whether TikTok is currently being investigated under the ICTS process.347

84 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

The Department of Commerce should carry out such a review, if it has not already started
one. Biden’s criteria offer a helpful starting point but should be refined to more specifically
assess TikTok’s threat as a medium for Chinese influence operations. Outside experts should
draw on the best data and science to answer key questions including: whether TikTok’s user
base contains a large number of swing state voters; whether political content on TikTok
content appears highly influential with a critical mass of those voters; whether corporate
firewalls cannot reliably prevent Beijing from hijacking the platform in an undetected way
during the course of an election; and whether the threat of Chinese influence operations via
TikTok outweighs any benefits that TikTok may have on U.S. political discourse, including
from competitive pressures on American tech platforms.

Long-term influence. Beyond TikTok, many proposals to limit Chinese influence ca-
pabilities in the United States do not focus on high-consequence, time-critical processes
like elections. Instead, there is often worry that Beijing may gradually sway Americans’
views about China-related policies. Confucius Institutes (Chinese public diplomacy initia-
tives embedded in U.S. universities) are frequent bogeymen, as is Chinese influence over
U.S. entertainment sectors, like filmmaking and sports. CFIUS is reportedly in talks with
Chinese tech giant Tencent about its ownership stakes in major U.S. video game develop-
ers.348 At some point, relationships between Chinese tech companies and U.S. streaming
platforms—like Netflix-Baidu and HBO-Tencent—will likely come under scrutiny. But
none of these arrangements seem to represent the kind of urgent influence threat that justi-
fies forceful U.S. government controls.

KEY OFFENSIVE POLICIES

While the U.S. government should continue to monitor and disrupt Chinese influence
activities, its top priority must be restoring health to America’s domestic information eco-
system. Washington must recognize that disinformation flourishes due to deep-seated and
largely homegrown trends—in American politics, society, economy, and law—that have
co-evolved over decades and become mutually reinforcing. Key factors include the TV
and online media landscape (segmenting
Americans into ideological echo cham- The top priority must be restoring
bers), social media business models (maxi-
mizing user engagement and enabling mi-
health to America’s domestic
crotargeting), and political party dynamics information ecosystem. This would
(such as geographic sorting, gerrymander- disincentivize the production,
ing, and primary election rules). Large- amplification, and consumption of
scale progress in combating disinformation
would require profound national reforms disinformation from all sources—
in these and other arenas. The goal would not just China.

JON BATEMAN 85
be to disincentivize the production, amplification, and consumption of disinformation
from all sources—not just China.

True reform would be an extremely daunting task. The federal government’s role in combat-
ing disinformation is poorly defined and heavily constrained by laws, norms, and political
obstacles. Its tools are often tactical in nature (like sanctions) and oriented toward for-
eign threats (as with the Foreign Agents Registration Act). Federal overreach could actually
worsen political distrust or create harmful precedents that future administrations could
abuse. In fact, some of the most dangerous disinformers have been federal officeholders and
candidates.

That said, experts have proposed a raft of policy ideas that the U.S. government could
either implement or help to coordinate. These include strengthening regulation of online
platforms; reforming campaign finance, election advertising, and redistricting laws; fund-
ing media literacy education; creating new public-private grant programs for journalists;
and funding and facilitating basic research on influence operations.349 Such policies have
not been rigorously tested. In fact, there is very little empirical evidence about the impacts
of influence operations or the effectiveness of countermeasures.350 Still, improving the U.S.
domestic information environment would be much more effective in curbing Beijing’s in-
fluence operations than any China-specific measures. Moreover, these policies would help
to address domestic disinformation, a far more serious problem.

86 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

DENYING SUPPORT FOR CHINESE AND
CHINA-ENABLED AUTHORITARIANISM
AND REPRESSION

RISKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
Technology has enabled disturbing escalations and expansions of China’s authoritarian and
repressive policies, prompting American policymakers to step up U.S. tech restrictions in
response. Washington’s main concerns are twofold.

First, Beijing has spent years pioneering

wholly new kinds of mass digital surveil- China’s techno-authoritarian
lance and censorship within China—in- systems, while more fragmented
cluding the Great Firewall, social credit and spottier than sometimes
systems, and ubiquitous AI-powered digi-
portrayed, have nevertheless
tal camera networks, to name just a few
well-known examples. These systems are expanded the modern frontiers
more fragmented and spottier than some- of social control.
times portrayed. Nevertheless, China’s
techno-authoritarian innovations have managed to expand the modern frontiers of social
control, alarming Americans concerned with Chinese human rights and civic freedoms.351
In particular, tech has helped to power Beijing’s worst recent abuses, such as the ongoing
campaign to marginalize Uyghurs and eliminate their culture, which Washington rightly
calls genocide and crimes against humanity.352 Mass facial recognition and biometric col-
lection have become tools of ethnic profiling against Uyghurs, while Chinese drones have
helped Xinjiang security forces to manage mass detention operations.

87
Second, many U.S. policymakers believe that Beijing is proactively exporting this techno-
authoritarian model to other countries.353 For example, Chinese digital surveillance and
censorship systems have been sold to repressive regimes like Zimbabwe and Venezuela, with
the latter receiving “a commercialized version of China’s ‘Great Firewall.’”354 Washington
fears that a “China model” of techno-authoritarianism will not only spread among authori-
tarian countries, but may also influence hybrid regimes and illiberal democracies, exacerbat-
ing and entrenching the global democratic recession.

Such an outcome would threaten U.S. interests (as well as American values), because
Washington derives much of its geopolitical influence from the assumption of like-mind-
edness among governments and publics in democratic countries. More fundamentally,
Biden argues that the fate of America’s own democracy is bound up with that of democracy
abroad, and he has rhetorically staked his national security strategy on that premise.355 This
linkage may motivate a broadening of U.S. efforts to combat global techno-authoritarian-
ism, particularly in countries that purchase systems from America’s chief rival, China.

A number of experts dispute the narrative that China purposefully exports techno-author-
itarianism. They argue that Chinese foreign tech sales are driven more by the “pull” from
governments who demand repressive tools than by any “push” from Beijing.356 However,
the strength of Beijing’s “push” may grow over time, if China (like the United States and
other historical great powers) comes to see a network of like-minded regimes as vital to its
global interests. Moreover, even a mere “pull” from third countries, when eagerly satisfied
by China, can pose challenges to U.S. agendas of human rights and democracy promotion
around the world.

Initiatives like the Digital Silk Road help to spread Chinese hardware, software, and servic-
es, whose architectures embody Beijing’s preference for a more controllable, government-
led internet.357 Western democracies, in contrast, promote international tech standards and
governance models more compatible with free expression and civil society. To be sure, the
United States and its allies have also provided substantial technology to friendly authori-
tarian regimes, from general cloud services to boutique hacking software.358 Yet multiple
democracies are taking tentative steps to reduce this complicity—for example, by cracking
down on the reckless proliferation of advanced hacking tools.359

The development of Chinese techno-authoritarianism, and Beijing’s more general authori-

tarian turn under President Xi Jinping, has prompted Washington to revisit its traditionally
laissez-faire approach to China’s human rights problems. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square
massacre, the United States initially sought to condition the overall bilateral trade relation-
ship on improvements to China’s human rights record. But the Bill Clinton administration
“ultimately abandoned this direct linkage” in favor of permanent most-favored-nation sta-
tus, hoping that economic engagement would open up China politically (while benefiting

88 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

America economically).360 Afterward, for nearly twenty years, the United States dealt with
Chinese human rights abuses by levying very targeted punishments that did not jeopardize
economic ties. For example, it imposed visa restrictions and sanctions on a handful of
Chinese officials involved in the repression of Tibet and Falun Gong. It has also funded civil
society and human rights activities in China, including software designed to circumvent
internet censorship.

But recent U.S. technology restrictions reflect a tougher policy on Chinese human rights,
with more economic bite. The Trump administration punished some of China’s most
prominent and successful tech firms, including SenseTime, Megvii, Hikvision, iFLYTEK,
and Dahua, for their activities in Xinjiang—the first time that human rights violations had
ever been cited in Entity List designations.361 Likewise, Biden and Congress have cracked
down on Chinese imports from Xinjiang, including tech products such as cell phones and
solar cells, due to forced labor concerns.362 The solar cell restrictions, in particular, will
have widespread impact across the solar industry.363 In addition, the U.S. government has
announced sanctions and visa restrictions for certain Chinese tech companies and their em-
ployees involved in support to the Nicolás Maduro regime in Venezuela and other “regimes
engaging in human rights abuses globally.”364

RISKS AND LIMITATIONS OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES

Unlike past U.S. efforts to punish Chinese human rights abuses, these latest technology
controls have had tangible economic consequences, resulting in canceled deals and rerouted
supply chains.365 Still, the recent restrictions represent just a small fraction of the broad-
based China tech restrictions that some are advocating in the name of human rights and
democracy. U.S. policymakers should understand this slippery slope before they slide much
further.

Although recent U.S. government restrictions have focused primarily on Xinjiang, and
Washington officially disavows any intent to impose sweeping reforms on China’s larger po-
litical order, an emerging and politically diverse strain of thought argues for more expansive
and assertive U.S. efforts to liberalize Chinese politics.366 From the right, leading former
Trump administration officials argue that
the problem with China is its Marxist- An emerging and politically diverse
Leninist ideology, and that Washington
strain of thought argues for stronger
must therefore wage a Manichean struggle
against Beijing’s official thought system.367 U.S. efforts to liberalize Chinese
From the left, some human rights promot- politics. Policymakers should
ers believe that America’s economic rela- understand this slippery slope
tionship with China “isn’t worth the moral
cost” and that U.S. leaders should mount
before sliding much further.

JON BATEMAN 89
a “sustained effort” to “[counter] China’s dictatorial apparatus.”368 From the center, national
security voices such as the Atlantic Council’s “The Longer Telegram” have called for the United
States to aggravate “internal fault lines of domestic Chinese politics in general and concerning
Xi’s leadership in particular”—that is, to help effectuate Xi’s removal from power.369

These ideas have growing influence, and they could well push U.S. tech policy down a
perilous path. Human Rights Watch, for example, has asserted that “human rights abuses
in China exist, and persist, in part because the US and others haven’t insisted on holistic
progress, and haven’t imposed a price in response to them.”370 It therefore signed a letter
with twenty-three other NGOs, including Freedom House and PEN America, advocating
“a series of escalating actions against technology companies found to be contributing to
China’s mass surveillance, including by imposing Global Magnitsky sanctions.”371 But the
premise is likely mistaken: the United States probably can’t impose a price severe enough to
deter the vast bulk of Chinese human rights violations. As a result, these “escalating actions”
would have no clear stopping point.

Much of Beijing’s techno-authoritarianism is a logical outgrowth of the Chinese political

system itself—a system the United States cannot change and can barely seem to influence.
The Chinese government seeks to preserve the Communist Party’s power at all costs, and
the Party stands for a rigid, domineering vision of the Chinese social order. So long as these
facts remain true, Beijing will continue developing and employing technologies to achieve
its authoritarian ends. Moreover, the indigenous Chinese technology base provides Beijing
with ample capability to do so. This means that no amount of U.S. pressure is likely to com-
pel China to relax the basic components of its domestic technological repression. At most,
U.S. technology controls can impose modest costs and delays in specific cases where China
currently relies on foreign components, such as advanced semiconductors.372

Meanwhile, a zealous U.S. campaign against the basic apparatus of Chinese techno-author-
itarianism could inflict serious costs on the United States. It would likely devastate bilateral
diplomatic ties, making cooperation on global issues more difficult and military conflict
more likely. It would also be difficult to contain. Consider that virtually all Chinese tech
companies contribute in some way to mass surveillance via the operation of draconian stat-
utes such as China’s Cybersecurity Law and National Security Law. In fact, Beijing’s system
of mass surveillance and control is suffused throughout the entire Chinese economic and
societal structure. Chinese tech and non-tech companies alike send sensitive data to the
state, participate in censorship activities, implement various social credit systems, and gen-
erally seek to anticipate and demonstrate allegiance to Xi’s sociopolitical edicts.373 Aggressive
attempts to thwart Chinese mass surveillance, censorship, or techno-authoritarianism may
well lead toward technological and economic divorce.

The United States probably has more room to address China’s sales of repressive technolo-
gies to foreign governments. Some of these governments are less deeply authoritarian than

90 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

China and/or easier for Washington to influence due to specific bilateral relationships.
Direct engagement should be tailored to the individual circumstances and motivations of
third-country governments. Even then, the U.S. government should expect to encounter
strong resistance in any global campaign to roll back techno-authoritarianism. U.S. democ-
racy promotion efforts have historically struggled during periods when they were comingled
and conflated with larger geopolitical campaigns, such as the Cold War and the War on
Terror.374 American strategic competition with China presents a similar problem for today’s
U.S. democracy promoters.

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PROCESSES

The United States is right to respond to the novel and serious twenty-first-century challenge
of techno-authoritarianism, but it must also avoid embarking on an overambitious cru-
sade with high risks and few rewards. U.S. policy on Chinese domestic techno-nationalism
should focus on the most egregious abuses. Rather than waging a quixotic battle against
entrenched Chinese policies like mass surveillance and internet censorship, Washington
should keep working to punish and stigmatize Beijing’s targeted repression of Uyghurs and
other minority groups. Such groups do not benefit from what the Chinese Communist
Party considers to be its authoritarian social compact, and they often seek to remain out-
side of it. In partnership with other countries, U.S. pressure might make some difference
on Chinese repression of minorities. But if it does not, America can at least limit its moral
complicity.

To implement this policy, the State Department and the Intelligence Community should
collaborate with outside groups to identify Chinese technology systems that support
Beijing’s targeted efforts to repress minority groups. The Departments of Commerce and
Treasury, and other agencies, could then
compile the major ways that these Chinese
systems rely on direct or indirect American U.S. responses to Chinese “export”
support, including U.S. exports (of fin- of techno-authoritarianism should
ished technology, raw inputs, or non-tech- depend on the “importing” country,
nology goods and services) and financing.
the nature of the technology
Regulators would then consider which of
these support flows can be feasibly con- transaction, and the mixture of
trolled, based on the U.S. government’s “push” and “pull” motivations
ability to trace their movement into and at play.
inside of China.

U.S. responses to Chinese “export” of techno-authoritarianism should look different de-

pending on the “importing” country, the nature of the technology transaction, and the
mixture of “push” and “pull” motivations at play. When third countries are specifically seek-

JON BATEMAN 91
ing out repressive tools and deem Chinese technology to be the best available, Washington
can consider using sanctions and other restrictive measures as part of a broader dissuasion
campaign aimed at both sides of the transaction—recognizing that the prospects of success
will often be low.

When third countries are instead seeking general purpose technologies and the United
States is concerned that Chinese products have authoritarian governance models embed-
ded within them, Washington should focus on fostering the development of compelling
Western alternatives. The U.S. government could, for example, help its companies better
compete with China on costs, or double down on traditional American advantages such
as reliability, security, technical assistance, and noncorruption. Restrictive measures could
then buy time for these positive efforts to produce competitive alternatives to Chinese tech.
Finally, there will likely be countries that pursue hedging strategies—intentionally divid-
ing purchases between Chinese and Western technologies—to maximize their political and
economic leverage and autonomy. Hedging countries are difficult to sway; U.S. tech policy
might draw insights from other domains, such as arms and civilian aircraft sales, where
hedging occurs.375

CASE STUDIES
The majority of Trump- and Biden-era technology controls related to Chinese human rights
have wisely focused on ethnic repression in Xinjiang. This includes almost all of the Entity
List designations of tech companies, for example.

DJI. In a few cases, however, the justifications were vague. In December 2020, the
Department of Commerce designated four Chinese entities that “have enabled wide-scale
human rights abuses within China through abusive genetic collection and analysis or high-
technology surveillance, and/or facilitated the export of items by China that aid repressive
regimes around the world, contrary to U.S. foreign policy interests.”376 “Abusive genetic
collection” may refer to Xinjiang, but the Commerce Department did not say this. Notably,
one of the four companies was the drone manufacturer DJI, which was presumably desig-
nated for its “high-technology surveillance” in China or its sales to repressive regimes.

DJI supported Xinjiang security operations as of 2017–2019, though publicly available

information is scant and somewhat dated.377 By declining to specify what exactly DJI had
done (and when) and failing to reference Xinjiang, the Trump administration undermined
the strength of its stand and allowed for speculation that human rights may have been a
pretext. The U.S. government has many other concerns about DJI, including the potential
military and intelligence applications of its products and the company’s dominant market
share in a growing industry where American companies have struggled to break through.378

92 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Fortunately, the Biden administration has begun to stake a clearer position on DJI’s human
rights record. Its December placement of DJI on the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial
Complex Companies List indicated that DJI “has provided drones to the Xinjiang Public
Security Bureau, which are used to surveil Uyghurs in Xinjiang.”379 This specificity helps
to give businesses and governments around the world more stable expectations about the
intention behind U.S. human rights policy and the planned use of restrictive tools. Ideally,
the U.S. government would take the further step of outlining when DJI’s problematic con-
duct occurred and how the firm could demonstrate reform over time to earn removal from
these lists. It may be that DJI and other Chinese companies have no intention of undertak-
ing such reforms or of publicly disavowing human rights abuses that Beijing downplays
or denies. However, establishing the general terms of an off-ramp for sanctioned Chinese
companies could help Washington clarify its redlines and demonstrate that its human rights
concerns are sincere.

Xinjiang. The Biden administration should continue looking for and restricting other
traceable forms of American support for China’s technological repression in Xinjiang. The
newly signed Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act is a good first step: it requires im-
porters of goods from Xinjiang to prove those goods were not derived from forced labor,
thereby making forced labor less profitable for Chinese companies and the Chinese gov-
ernment.380 To complement these import restrictions, Washington should further curb the
flow of American technologies or tech inputs into Xinjiang. Good candidates for control
may include technologies that require significant customization or technical support (in-
cluding patches and updates), because ongoing vendor-customer relationships can provide
a platform to verify Chinese end users and end uses. Other possibilities include enterprise
software or heavy “smart” equipment sold to Xinjiang-based entities.381

Surveillance sector. A handful of U.S. human rights–oriented tech restrictions have

not focused on Xinjiang or other particularly egregious Chinese abuses. Biden’s version
of the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex Companies List allows designa-
tion of companies operating in China’s “surveillance technology sector.”382 This undefined
term could conceivably cover an enormous range of Chinese companies. The Treasury
Department did try to clarify that it “expects to use its discretion to target” three kinds of
Chinese companies: those supporting surveillance “that occurs outside of the PRC,” those
enabling “surveillance of religious or ethnic minorities,” and those “otherwise facilitat[ing]
repression or serious human rights abuse.”383 While the first two categories make sense, the
final catch-all requires narrowing and clarification. For example, the Treasury Department’s
initial designations—of Hikvision and Huawei—failed to cite any specific human rights
abuses or even explain which enforcement category they fell under.384 (Subsequent designa-
tions of SenseTime, DJI, Megvii, and several other Chinese tech companies did provide
relevant details on the firms’ involvement in targeted surveillance of Uyghurs.385)

JON BATEMAN 93
 Without more clarity on the intent behind this authority, the U.S. government may find
itself adding an ever-larger and more diverse set of Chinese companies to its restrictive lists.
Consider that in 2019, the House of Representatives voted 407 to 1 to require sweeping
export controls of virtually all technologies “critical” to Chinese social control, surveil-
lance, and censorship.386 The Senate version of the bill that eventually became law omitted
this provision.387 Still, the initial House vote indicates broad support in Washington for
an expansive and potentially costly campaign against China’s entire techno-authoritarian
model—not just the worst abuses.

Summit for Democracy. During the Summit for Democracy in December 2021, the
Biden administration announced several new initiatives related to technology and human
rights. While the initiatives were generally sound, they nevertheless demonstrated a contin-
ued reluctance to clarify U.S. policy objectives in this area. First, the United States joined
with Australia, Denmark, and Norway to launch the Export Controls and Human Rights
Initiative, aimed at “prevent[ing] the proliferation of software and other technologies used
to enable serious human rights abuses.”388 The meaning of this initiative depends entirely
on how “serious human rights abuses” is
Is Washington content to “affirm” interpreted—a term that Washington has
so far not defined.
existing and emerging democracies
with their partnership and consent? Second, the White House announced a
series of “grand challenges” to spur in-
Or does it seek actively to subvert
novation in what it called “democracy-
and weaken authoritarian regimes? affirming technologies.”389 These technol-
ogies include censorship circumvention
software, which the United States has long supported. Still, it is odd to brand such
software as “democracy-affirming” rather than, say, “counter-authoritarian”: its primary
users are seeking to elude their own authoritarian governments, not “affirm” democrat-
ic ones. The new language has the effect of masking a major U.S. policy dilemma: is
Washington content simply to “affirm” existing and emerging democracies, with these
governments’ partnership and consent? Or does the United States seek actively to subvert
and weaken authoritarian regimes? The latter goal, while instinctually appealing to many
in Washington, could be disastrous if applied to China and should not be used to justify
significant bilateral tech restrictions.

KEY OFFENSIVE POLICIES

Washington retains a variety of traditional tools for addressing China’s authoritarianism and
repression, to include démarches, advocacy in international forums, and moral and material
support for Chinese dissidents (especially those living abroad), in addition to targeted sanc-
tions against companies and officials involved in the worst abuses. While these are unlikely

94 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

to deter Beijing’s domestic techno-authoritarianism to any large degree, they are sometimes
the best options available.

There is more the United States can do to combat techno-authoritarianism at a global level,
including in places where China supplies repressive technologies. First, the U.S. govern-
ment could further crack down on America’s own witting and unwitting transfer of po-
tentially harmful technology products, services, and know-how to human rights abusers.
For example, Washington could be more parsimonious in licensing the export of advanced
hacking services; better monitor the conduct of U.S. companies granted such licenses; and
place postemployment restrictions on former U.S. government officials and contractors
who have had access to classified American cyber operations techniques.390 Second, the
United States could more intensively press its allies on their sale (as with Israel, Italy, and
Germany) or use (as with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) of authoritarian
technologies, whether sourced from China or elsewhere. The recent Entity List designation
of Israel’s NSO Group was a long-overdue step in this regard and has already had some
positive effects.391

And third, America can better model pro-democracy, pro–human rights technology poli-
cies at home, thus earning the credibility to serve as a global leader on these topics. For
example, U.S. federal agencies could hold transparent and inclusive discussions with civil
society groups and other affected communities on difficult emerging issues such as law
enforcement use of facial recognition. The White House Office of Science and Technology
Policy recently announced a broad initiative along these lines, aimed at developing a “Bill
of Rights for an Automated Society.”392 The practical impact of this “Bill of Rights” will
depend on its successful implementation in federal rulemaking and legislation.

JON BATEMAN 95
COUNTERING UNFAIR CHINESE
ECONOMIC PRACTICES AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT

RISKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
Technology is increasingly at the heart of America’s many complaints about unfair and
illegal Chinese economic practices.393 For example, Washington argues that Beijing’s exten-
sive and opaque subsidy regime—which includes preferential government financing and
procurement contracts—has helped Chinese tech giants like Huawei reach their dominant
market positions. Another long-standing sore point is Chinese government discrimination
against foreign firms in such areas as regulatory enforcement, licensing, and market access;
American tech companies are the most likely of all U.S. firms in China to perceive such
discrimination.394 Likewise, China’s practice of pressuring foreign companies into sharing
trade secrets and intellectual property with Chinese corporate partners has disproportionate
impact on U.S. companies built around specific technology rights, know-how, and data.
And the list goes on.

As these examples illustrate, the technology sector is a major target of unfair Chinese
economic practices. Technology can also enable China to obtain unfair advantages in all
sectors. For example, the Chinese government carries out large-scale cyber espionage for
the benefit of domestic firms, and it shields Chinese companies from accountability when
they conduct their own cyber espionage. The U.S. government classifies these policies as
unfair trade practices, and it worries that American technological links to China—for
example, through the digital supply chain—provide additional access points for Chinese
cyber thefts.

97
Although “unfairness” may be in the eye of the beholder, Washington sees China as violating
specific bilateral and multilateral commitments, including WTO rules—that is, Beijing’s
own promises.395 Unfortunately, the United States has had only limited success in resolving
these issues via formal trade dispute mechanisms and direct diplomacy. Beijing remains
strongly committed to its economic strategies, and international trade obligations are dif-
ficult to apply and enforce in these kinds of cases. With frustration mounting, Washington
has begun to take more unilateral measures, including curbs on the flow of technology to
and from China.

U.S. officials have pointed to several ways that technology controls help combat unfair
Chinese practices. First, they can serve as a punishment meant to induce changes in Chinese
behavior. When Trump implemented tariffs on large categories of Chinese goods—includ-
ing tech products like smart devices, flash memory devices, and electronic components—he
said he was imposing costs for China’s intellectual property theft and seeking concessions at
the bargaining table.396 Second, technology restrictions can aim to counteract the benefits
China receives from unfair practices and thus equalize the economic competition, in much
the same way that countervailing duties offset foreign subsidies. Commerce Secretary Gina
Raimondo once told Congress that the Entity List—which prevents designated Chinese
companies from obtaining U.S. technologies, ostensibly for national security reasons—can
“level the playing field for the American worker.”397 Finally, technology controls can reduce
China’s opportunities to act unfairly. For example, the U.S. government has strongly dis-
couraged American telecoms from using Chinese equipment, in part so that Beijing cannot
leverage this equipment to steal U.S. intellectual property.

RISKS AND LIMITATIONS OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES

However, U.S. government tech restrictions can also create risks for Washington’s trade
agendas with China and other countries. In particular, U.S. efforts to counter unfair
Chinese practices might themselves be deemed unfair or violate international trade rules.
Trump’s tariffs offer a recent example. Though he imposed them in the name of counter-
ing illegal Chinese intellectual property theft, a WTO panel ruled in 2020 that one large
tranche of Trump’s tariffs was itself illegal.398 The United States thus faces a dilemma. If it
sticks to formal trade dispute mechanisms and nonconfrontational direct diplomacy, then
Beijing’s systemic trade abuses will likely continue. But if Washington reaches instead for
more powerful unilateral tools, like tariffs and government tech controls, then it could end
up destabilizing the very global trade order that it professes to be enforcing and protecting.
And the WTO’s further erosion or collapse might well leave U.S. leaders with less ability
than before to curb unfair Chinese practices. Washington has an excellent record of win-
ning WTO cases against China—although the most serious and systemic trade issues, like
subsidies and intellectual property theft, have proven hardest to address in that forum.399

98 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Washington’s China trade dilemma involves more than just technology, and Trump has not
been the only president to face it. The Obama administration took issue with several WTO
appellate rulings, including those seen as overly accommodating to China. In response,
Obama blocked the appointment of multiple WTO appellate judges—an unprecedented
and controversial series of interventions.400 Trump escalated this practice, eventually block-
ing all WTO appellate appointments and thus denying the body a quorum.401 Biden has
affirmed the Trump policy—in effect, halting the appeals process for all countries until
the WTO resolves U.S. concerns with the process and substance of dispute settlement.402
Washington’s goal is to force reforms of what it sees as a broken system that tolerates unfair
Chinese practices (among other problems), but its tactics risk weakening the system further.

While the United States plays hardball

with the WTO dispute system, its barrage Nonconfrontational diplomacy
of new China-oriented tech controls may probably cannot stop Beijing’s
also test the limits of WTO substantive systemic trade abuses. But more
principles. At their core, these principles
powerful unilateral tools could
bar trade barriers that discriminate by na-
tional origin.403 Many recent U.S. tech re- destabilize the global trade order.
strictions would seem to clash—in spirit, if
not in letter—with that idea. Consider executive orders or regulatory actions whose terms
apply exclusively to China, such as the Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial Complex
Companies List, the Section 889 blacklist, and Trump’s attempted bans on TikTok, WeChat,
Alipay, and other Chinese apps. Other U.S. tech controls, like the FCC’s Covered List, are
technically not focused on any specific country but have so far been used almost exclusively
against Chinese firms. The Commerce Department’s ICTS supply chain security rule and
the Trump Energy Department’s bulk power system regulation applied just to China and a
handful of other designated “foreign adversaries.” Meanwhile, CFIUS and the Entity List
are not explicitly tailored to China, yet China has become a primary focus of enforcement.
All these tools function as trade barriers by placing substantial limits on Chinese companies’
ability to buy technology from, sell technology to, or otherwise transact with Americans.

To U.S. leaders, such policy tools are familiar, accepted, and fully compatible with the
international trade system. The United States continues to cite its long-standing position
that national security–related restrictions fall outside of WTO scrutiny.404 Although most
other countries (including U.S. allies) do not accept the existence of such a broad exception,
they have traditionally declined to press the point, because the U.S. government histori-
cally did not impose many such barriers.405 Yet Washington’s self-restraint is now loosening,
in large part due to concerns about China and its technology. In the tech domain alone,
Washington has greatly increased the number and scope of trade, investment, and other
economic restrictions in just the last few years. Meanwhile, U.S. officials in both parties
flirt openly with an expanded definition of “national security” that encompasses “economic

JON BATEMAN 99
security.” If the American “national security exception” becomes an “economic security
exception,” it would virtually negate the WTO framework.

Already, foreign governments have seized on the precedents created by U.S. actions to as-
sert their own national interests. Since 2016, Japan, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, and
Saudi Arabia have all for the first time cited an American-style national security exception
in WTO disputes.406 Beijing could take the same path, using the United States’ own posi-
tion to justify Chinese policies (like market access restrictions) that Washington fervently
protests.

The United States must think hard about its endgame for bilateral and global trade, in the
technology sector and beyond. In a best-case scenario for Washington, its tough tactics
somehow push Beijing (and other countries) to accept strong, enforceable new trade rules
that rein in unfair Chinese practices. This would be a monumental achievement: negotia-
tions on new WTO trade rules have stalled for the last two decades, and the United States
would now be negotiating from a position of reduced global influence, amid heightened
tensions with a strategic competitor. In a worst-case scenario, the WTO system collapses
under the weight of U.S.-China economic conflict. Although Washington would still have
other bilateral and multilateral trade agreements to fall back on, China and other nations
would likely institute new economic and national security–related trade barriers that harm
the United States.

Some amount of risk-taking by Washington makes sense. The status quo should not be
idealized: open trading principles are far from fully implemented and sometimes more
honored in the breach, particularly by China. The United States therefore has strong reason
to implement measures it thinks will protect American economic interests and add to pres-
sure for structural reforms. It also has reason to believe that the WTO system will merely
bend, not break, under this pressure. The system has survived for decades despite numerous
international disputes and changing geo-economic and geopolitical dynamics. U.S. tech
controls have so far not sent bilateral trade ties with China (let alone the larger WTO sys-
tem) into a death spiral.

Still, the United States must tread carefully. If present trends continue, American technol-
ogy restrictions aimed at China will significantly broaden and intensify in the coming years,
further raising the stakes. Some of the rhetoric heard in Washington—including limitless
notions of “economic security,” or the brute goal of “destroying” China’s most prominent
companies—directly contravenes international trading principles and implies a dangerous
reckoning in the future. Worse, these risks often go unacknowledged: U.S. officials and
analysts are rarely willing to describe America’s China-oriented tech restrictions as trade
barriers that skirt the line of national discrimination. By avoiding this issue, they sidestep
fundamental questions: Are U.S. actions compatible with today’s international rules? If
not, what new rule set would Washington propose? Would other nations agree to these new

100 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

rules? And if China and others began to leverage any new rules for their own advantage,
would Americans still benefit in the end?

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PROCESSES

The use of technology controls to address unfair Chinese economic practices should be
nested within a comprehensive U.S. strategy for shaping the international trading system
as a whole. China would be a major but not exclusive focus of this strategy. The overall
goal would be to describe a desired U.S. end-state for international trade. Fundamental
questions include whether Washington should seek to reinforce WTO open trading prin-
ciples or partially roll them back, and what new kind of rules the United States might
prefer instead. For example, what would be the desired parameters of an internationally
approved “national security exception”? At its heart, a U.S. strategy should deal with
practical questions such as which other major nations could be feasibly brought on board,
and what enforcement mechanisms could realistically achieve and sustain the American
vision over time.

Due to the complexity of international trade and its sweeping implications for all U.S.
interests, the process for developing a comprehensive trade strategy should be inclusive.
For example, the NSC might share leadership of this process with the National Economic
Council and the Domestic Policy Council to ensure that its outcome serves the domes-
tic needs of the American people. USTR and the State Department would be important
but not dominant voices. The Intelligence Community could vet the likelihood of various
scenarios, including a successful effort to reform the international trade system, as well as
alternative futures such as the unintended degradation or collapse of the system. The final
strategy, once ratified by the president, would guide how regulatory bodies such as the
Commerce Department, Treasury Department, and CFIUS evaluate the purpose, benefits,
and risks of technology controls aimed at combating unfair Chinese economic practices.

CASE STUDIES
The Biden administration has taken some positive steps toward an international trade
strategy, but it has not yet publicly addressed the core policy dilemmas. In May 2021,
U.S. Trade Representative Katherine Tai delivered a report to Congress articulating Biden’s
official trade policy agenda.407 It promised a major focus on combating unfair Chinese
economic practices, especially those that “threaten our technological edge [and] weaken
our supply chain resiliency.” Although Trump’s government had said the same thing, the
Biden report rightly called for “a comprehensive strategy and more systematic approach
than the piecemeal approach of the recent past.” To that end, it announced that “the Biden

JON BATEMAN 101

 Administration is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. trade policy toward China as
part of its development of its overall China strategy.”

This review culminated in October with a major speech by Tai on China. Tai criticized
China for “pour[ing] billions of dollars into targeted industries and continu[ing] to shape
its economy to the will of the state”—citing solar cells and semiconductors, among other
examples.408 She vowed to “directly engage with China on its industrial policies.” Tai ad-
dressed the WTO that same month, reaffirming America’s commitment to the body while
calling for unspecified institutional reforms in several key areas.409

Tai’s statements contained laudable objec-

Tai’s report affirmed that “opening tives and welcome messages. Nevertheless,
markets and reducing trade barriers they still elided basic tensions in the U.S.
are fundamental” goals. Yet it approach. The report to Congress, for ex-
made no mention of Chinese tech ample, affirmed that “opening markets and
reducing trade barriers are fundamental to
companies recently cut off from U.S. any trade agenda.” Yet it made no men-
markets, suppliers, or investors. tion of the many ways that Washington
has sought to curb technology trade with
China. It said nothing about Huawei, ZTE, DJI, Hikvision, or other Chinese tech compa-
nies recently cut off from U.S. markets, suppliers, or investors. It was silent on the growing
use and expanding scope of restrictive tools like the Entity List, CFIUS, export controls,
and IEEPA. It omitted any discussion of America’s position on the WTO national security
exception and the rise of copycat claims by other countries.

Such omissions aren’t unusual in public (or even private) U.S. government strategy docu-
ments. The Biden administration probably wants to reserve discretion at the negotiating
table and to avoid taking controversial stands before they prove necessary. The important
thing for now is that senior U.S. officials deliberate on these basic dilemmas in a structured
way. While some technology restrictions are appropriate and sustainable responses to unfair
Chinese practices, there must be an anticipated stopping point. The Biden administration
should fully understand the risks involved, think about its endgame, and eventually signal
its intentions to China and other trading partners. Simplistic invocations of “unfairness” or
“U.S. national security interests” will no longer suffice to navigate these choppy, uncharted
waters.

102 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

KEY OFFENSIVE POLICIES
Tech controls or no tech controls, Washington lacks any easy path to stop unfair Chinese
economic practices. Such practices are highly beneficial to Beijing and hard for outsiders to
monitor, let alone deter. Successive U.S. administrations have protested and pushed back
with little success. To change these dynamics, Washington needs to amass significant lever-
age over China, then use some combination of bilateral and multilateral talks—including
at international forums like the WTO—to secure and enforce an agreement with Beijing.

Trump made one attempt to accomplish this, using unilateral tariffs for leverage, but he
botched the negotiations by settling for market access concessions rather than seeking ma-
jor structural reforms. Biden is taking the smarter, albeit slower approach of trying to culti-
vate a united front among U.S. allies and trade partners (while holding onto Trump’s tariffs
as a bargaining chip). For example, the recently established U.S.-EU Trade and Technology
Council has developed an ambitious multilateral agenda to coordinate policy on a number
of key issues relevant to Chinese technology and decoupling.410 And Washington has been
using multilateral fora like the G7, the G20, and the WTO to discuss “market distortions
and other unfair trade practices” by China.411

Time will tell whether Biden’s approach yields concrete results. America’s European and
Asian allies have so far proven less inclined than the United States to squarely confront
Beijing over its unfair practices. In the end, Washington may need to make concessions of
its own to China (and others) as part of the negotiating process. If China remains obstinate,
then Washington will face difficult choices about the future of international trade.

JON BATEMAN 103

COMPETING AND LEADING IN
STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES

RISKS OF INTERDEPENDENCE
As China’s technological prowess grows, U.S. officials worry that China could come to lead
and possibly dominate the most economically significant tech industries of the future. This
concern is not about China’s unfair practices per se; it is about unfavorable outcomes for U.S.
competitiveness. The distinction is often glossed over, yet it is crucial. Even on a level play-
ing field, China could potentially outcompete the United States in some tech industries.
This troubles American policymakers, most of whom have only known an era of peerless
technological leadership by U.S. companies. They now see China catching up (or even
moving ahead) in the technology areas expected to matter most for twenty-first-century
economies.

China has already become the global leader in 5G telecommunications equipment (a crux
of the future digital backbone), as well as commercial drones, Internet of Things devices,
mobile payments, solar cells, and smart cities, among other technology areas. And where
China does not lead, it is often a world-class competitor—for example, in AI (the most-
hyped of all emerging technologies), smartphones, electric vehicles, and much more. While
unfair economic practices have contributed to China’s success, they do not tell the whole
story. China ranks first globally in STEM graduates and second in R&D spending.412 Its
geographically concentrated tech hubs have revolutionized supply chain and manufacturing
integration. And government tech policies like Made in China 2025 and the Digital Silk
Road, although often misunderstood and overestimated in the West, nevertheless demon-

105
 strate Beijing’s national focus on technology strategy—a relative weak point for the United
States in recent decades.413

If China halted all unfair practices tomorrow, its tech industry would still likely represent
the most significant challenge to U.S. technology leadership and global competitiveness
since the rise of Japan in the 1980s.414 Of course, China’s challenge might fade over time,
just as Japan’s did. China could experience a
If China halted all unfair practices bursting debt bubble, or a “middle income
tomorrow, it would still likely trap,” among other potential causes of tech-
nological stagnation. But Washington has
represent the most significant little ability to predict, let alone influence,
challenge to U.S. technology such developments. If the current trajec-
leadership since Japan in the 1980s. tory continues, the United States will have
several problems on its hands.

At the most basic level, losing America’s technological edge in major industries would mean
fewer U.S. jobs, lower GDP, reduced tax revenue, and other macroeconomic setbacks. It
would also diminish the global influence that America derives from its technology leader-
ship. For example, U.S. dominance of digital platforms has provided unparalleled intelli-
gence collection opportunities and helped to project certain American political and cultural
values into foreign societies. It also provided the Biden administration with concrete lever-
age to shape and secure a recent global tax agreement.415 Loss of American technological
dominance would lessen those forms of power and influence. Moreover, it would weaken
the so-called “national security innovation base,” a Washington term for the American tech
industry’s special role in generating new U.S. military and intelligence capabilities.416 No
country wants to fall behind in these ways, and the United States is particularly reliant on
its technological leadership as a source of economic and national security advantages.

Still, the United States could survive and even thrive despite a loss of dominance in some
important tech areas—so long as it remains relatively competitive overall. The more serious
threat is that China itself becomes so technologically dominant that American companies
are largely frozen out of many important markets. U.S. leaders worry that China’s technol-
ogy gains could become strongly self-reinforcing, paving the way toward just this kind
of dominance.417 Certain tech markets—5G telecommunications equipment is a prime
example—have high barriers to entry, significant first-mover advantages, and deep linkages
to many other sectors. In such cases, China’s early leadership could enable its companies
to lock in global market share and seek to dominate related or adjacent industries. Once
Chinese firms secured strong enough positions, they and the Chinese government could
use unfair practices, like predatory pricing and exclusionary deals, to further entrench their
advantages.

106 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

These worries have driven U.S. policymakers to try to curb bilateral tech ties that Washington
sees as helping China catch up with or overtake the United States—especially in the most
economically important technology areas, where long-term leadership is at stake. Two laws
passed in 2018 illustrate this trend.

The Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) calls for CFIUS to
scrutinize transactions involving “a country of special concern that has a demonstrated or
declared strategic goal of acquiring a type of critical technology or critical infrastructure
that would affect United States leadership in areas related to national security.”418 This is
a clear mandate to thwart Made in China 2025, Beijing’s strategic technology develop-
ment plan. Likewise, the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) instructs the Commerce
Department to limit exports of “emerging and foundational technologies.” Although these
categories remain undefined, Made in China 2025 has served as a starting point for U.S.
government analysis.419 Technically, both FIRRMA and ECRA describe national security as
their sole focus. But economic considerations helped spur Congress to act and will certainly
influence future regulatory actions.

RISKS AND LIMITATIONS OF DEFENSIVE MEASURES

Preventing China from seizing control of key tech industries is a worthy policy goal. The
United States should not underwrite its own economic dislocation if it can avoid doing
so. Nevertheless, there is risk of overreach—particularly if Washington views technology
controls as the primary means of maintaining its own preeminence, rather than as stopgap
measures to thwart Chinese dominance so that other American investments have time to
take root. U.S. policymakers should keep several points in mind.

First, the “cure” of government technology controls can sometimes be as harmful as the
“disease” of aggressive Chinese competition. Export controls, Entity List designations, and
similar restrictions reduce American companies’ sales to China, cutting the revenue avail-
able to plow back into R&D. Visa bans, deemed export curbs, and supply chain security
requirements restrict U.S. access to Chinese talent and subcomponents, imposing higher
costs and greater delays on American innovators. Inbound investment restrictions limit
U.S. firms’ opportunities to raise capital from and achieve corporate synergies with Chinese
entities. If U.S. controls are unilateral, then European and Asian rivals can gain competitive
advantages over American firms. Moreover, China can and will retaliate against significant
restrictive measures.

For these reasons, trade groups like the Semiconductor Industry Association, the Business
Roundtable, the National Association of Manufacturers, and the Information Technology
Industry Council have sought to limit the use of ECRA and similar new authorities.420
Although trade associations have narrow vested interests that can diverge considerably from

JON BATEMAN 107

the national interest, the coalitions raising these concerns have been notably broad-based
and diverse. They include a set of groups that represent “all major research universities and
medical schools in the United States,” which collectively warned that “overly broad or vague
controls will result in unnecessary restrictions that will stifle scientific progress and impede
research.”421

Second, technology controls can conflict with Washington’s stated objective of fair, rules-
based economic competition, as described earlier. WTO rules do not allow a country to
curb trade in certain industries just because they are seen as economically important. In
fact, this runs directly counter to WTO principles. If the United States publicly embraces
an economic strategy of restricting trade in important tech industries, then China and
other countries will step up protections of their own “strategic” industries (whether tech or
non-tech). Although the WTO system urgently needs reforms, U.S. leaders have not yet
articulated a credible vision for reform or a plan for gaining agreement from China and
other major trading partners.

Third, it is not easy to identify economically strategic technologies that merit governmental
controls. The U.S. government has historically struggled to make accurate, useful predic-
tions about what innovations will be important in the future and to draw administrable
lines around fuzzy technology areas.

In the 1990s, economic competition from Japan spurred the U.S. government and outside
groups to produce a number of so-called critical technology lists to help inform policymak-
ing.422 Defining “criticality” proved to be a major challenge, given the many different U.S.
interests impacted by technology. In part for this reason, the lists were usually too broad
(naming whole fields of practice, such as “programming languages”) and/or too long (some
had over 100 items) to be useful in policymaking. In hindsight, it is also apparent that
many items designated as critical turned out not to be, while some technologies excluded
from the lists wound up having vast economic impact. For example, the 1995 White House
list cited “virtual reality software” (still a marginal industry today) as critical, but omit-
ted personal mobile devices (a then-extant technology that has since revolutionized global
communications).423 Critical technology lists ultimately failed to have much policy impact,
and the effort was abandoned in the 2000s.

The Trump administration sought to revive this moribund tradition by publishing a “criti-
cal and emerging technologies list” in October 2020.424 Unfortunately, this list reflected
many old pitfalls. It was vague and equivocal in defining the criteria for inclusion—at one
point saying the listed technologies were critical to overall U.S. national security and/or
economic advantages, then later calling them critical merely for U.S. government agencies.
Although the list was manageable in size (just twenty items), the individual entries had
sweeping scope: “Energy Technologies,” “Communication and Networking Technologies,”
“Data Science and Storage,” “Medical and Public Health Technologies,” “Biotechnologies,”

108 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

and so on. And its publication so late in
a presidential administration meant that The U.S. government should
Trump’s list, like others before it, lacked develop more detailed and robust
clear policymaking relevance. internal processes for evaluating
The Biden administration refreshed this list the economic consequences of
in February 2022.425 The new categories of emerging technologies.
critical and emerging technologies do not
differ much from Trump’s, though Biden’s version helpfully elaborates on each category by
defining multiple subcategories. Still, the list’s selection criteria and policymaking purpose
remain unclear. Does it name technologies that “may be critical to U.S. national security,”
or merely those with “the potential to further” it? Both formulations are given. National
security, meanwhile, is defined as including “economic prosperity and opportunity”—a
defensible framing that nevertheless clouds the specific rationale behind each entry’s inclu-
sion, making it harder to use the list as policy guidance. In fact, the White House empha-
sized that “this list should not be interpreted as a priority list for either policy development or
funding.”426 Yet it also recommended that agencies consult the list when designing “mea-
sures that respond to threats against U.S. security” and “initiatives to research and develop
technologies”—that is, policy development and funding.

Washington does not necessarily need (and probably shouldn’t try to create) a singular
list of all technologies critical for every U.S. national interest. But it does need something
beyond what it has now. Routine policy actions like export control listings and CFIUS
investigations already require some predictions of future technological importance, despite
the inherent difficulties. Yet formally, these policy tools have an exclusive focus on national
security concerns, with economic interests left as a potential but largely undefined (and
sometimes unspoken) consideration. The U.S. government should develop more detailed
and robust internal processes for evaluating the economic consequences of emerging tech-
nologies, so that agencies can tailor controls to critical areas where China threatens to secure
dominance.

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PROCESSES

Government technology controls should play a specific, limited role in the U.S. quest to
maintain economic leadership and competitiveness. The president should instruct regula-
tory agencies to institute restrictive measures only when necessary to hold off looming
Chinese dominance in defined strategic industries, thus buying time for other positive
American investments to bear fruit. Implementing this guidance would involve creating
a formal governmental process to conduct (or oversee) geo-economic analysis of technolo-
gies. A new process would need to avoid replicating 1990s-era mistakes while also adapting
to today’s geostrategic, technological, and governance realities. Fortunately, scholars and

JON BATEMAN 109

independent analysts have offered a number of useful recommendations and lessons for
policymakers.427

One approach would be for geo-economic assessments to identify technologies that rate
highly across three dimensions: economic value, defensibility, and urgency of control. Each
of these dimensions can be defined and measured in various ways. For example, highly
economically valuable technologies might include those set to become top exports (as semi-
conductors are now), to produce the largest companies of the future (as with today’s digital
advertising sector), or to have powerful second- or third-order effects on many other indus-
tries (like clean energy or advanced batteries).

Highly defensible technologies would have strong winner-take-all qualities, meaning that
a market leader could capture disproportionate gains and then defend its position for long
periods, perhaps due to network effects (as in today’s social media market) or high barriers
to entry (as in telecommunications equipment). Frameworks for evaluating technological
defensibility can be found in antitrust economics and venture capital investing, among
other domains. Finally, technologies in urgent need of control are those where a window of
competitive opportunity could soon close. Washington might assess whether technological
and market developments during the next five to ten years could enable China to achieve
and lock in long-term dominance.

If the United States publicly announces an official process for identifying and controlling
economically strategic technologies, China and other countries would likely accuse the
United States of a flagrant assault on WTO principles. Therefore, the U.S. government
should seek to maintain its tradition of requiring that new technology controls have a
national security justification, even if, internally, the initial impetus for considering a con-
trol is economic competition. Ideally, new controls should be framed as continuations of
historic U.S. policy, to include American claims of a WTO national security exception;
new precedents should be created only when necessary. The U.S. framework for identifying
economically strategic technologies should probably remain confidential or classified.

CASE STUDIES
5G. The Trump administration was right to identify 5G telecommunications equipment as
a major target for technology restrictions. Countries all over the world are making or plan-
ning massive investments in such equipment, and deployment is expected to drive many
ancillary innovations in areas such as autonomous vehicles, the Internet of Things, and
mobile apps. Because these are generational investments, market leaders like Huawei have
an opportunity to establish firm footholds in the purchasing countries. And the purchases
are all happening within a short time frame as countries race to deploy 5G, meaning the
window of opportunity will close within the next few years.428

110 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Semiconductors. Semiconductors are also a strategic industry: they rank among the most
important technologies by overall sales and are essential to almost all modern activity, while
the most advanced semiconductors will drive next-generation technological applications
like machine learning. Yet U.S. semiconductor firms also rely on China for much of their
revenue, and most experts believe China still remains about a decade behind the United
States and its allies in key aspects of semiconductor design and manufacturing.429 U.S. gov-
ernment controls on this sector should therefore be carefully targeted.

The United States should restrict China from accessing only the most advanced semiconductor
technology, while allowing sales of commodity chips to help maintain U.S. market share and
fund R&D. The Trump administration was right to press the Netherlands to prevent export
of extreme ultraviolet lithography systems to China.430 These would facilitate manufacture of
5- and 7-nanometer node chips and thus help China to leap well ahead of its current capabili-
ties. At the same time, the Biden administration was also right to grant U.S. firms licenses to
sell automotive chips—considered commodity items—to Huawei.431 A more difficult case was
Trump’s tightening of rules for so-called deemed exports, in effect requiring more scrutiny for
Chinese nationals working in the U.S. semiconductor industry.432 Although the costs and ben-
efits are difficult to independently assess, it makes sense in principle to prioritize protection of
critical, cutting-edge intellectual property and trade secrets in the semiconductor sector.

Consumer devices. However, very few technologies sold in large quantities to individual
consumers should be subject to government control on the grounds of economic criticality.
Smartphones, laptops and desktop computers, Internet of Things devices, consumer-grade
drones, home network hardware, gaming systems, and most mobile apps should be rela-
tively unrestricted on economic grounds. These industries are generally commoditized or
will likely become so in the near future. They typically feature gradual, incremental shifts
in technology, pricing, and market share over time—not defensible moats or closing win-
dows of opportunity for one country to gain enduring dominance. For example, the Biden
administration should not add Honor, a smartphone maker spun off from Huawei, to the
Entity List, as it is reportedly considering.433 Republican members of Congress have urged
the designation, but their vague argument seems premised on the spurious notion that
Honor operates “in a strategic sector.”434

AI. Artificial intelligence is frequently described as economically strategic—perhaps more

often than any other technology area. Evangelists claim that AI will transform all other in-
dustries and become a primary determinant of competitive success. Even if this is true, com-
petitive advantages in many aspects of AI do not appear to be very defensible. Foundational
know-how proliferates widely (due to open, international academic ecosystems) and would
be difficult to control (due to the relative ease of stealing or copying algorithms and training
data), compared to more physically embodied trade secrets like semiconductor manufactur-
ing equipment.435 Thus, U.S. government efforts to control AI research or software would
often be ineffectual.

JON BATEMAN 111

While China is quickly progressing in AI capabilities, there is also no clear sign that it verges
on somehow dominating the industry. China does have certain advantages, including its
ability to pool large stores of data with less concern for privacy and its access to massive,
cheap sources of labor for data cleaning and preparation. Yet the United States still pro-
duces higher-quality AI research and has better access to data from key Western markets. At
best, China seems capable of developing a modest lead in certain subdisciplines, like facial
recognition, where Chinese advantages seem most relevant.436 But any such lead would be
neither comprehensive (across all AI applications) nor permanent (foreclosing future U.S.
competition).437

AI does appear to have some strategic terrain—bottlenecks in the AI value-chain where one
nation might gain outsized advantages and seek to exclude its competitors. Semiconductors,
discussed earlier, are one example. Another is the pool of high-end scientific and engineer-
ing talent. While the overall AI field is large, many of the most promising breakthroughs
have come from a few individuals and companies, such as Alphabet’s DeepMind.438
Concentrating this talent together in one ecosystem seems to create disproportionate in-
novative benefits—although the effect is likely temporary, as AI innovations often prolifer-
ate widely within a few years. Thus, the United States should focus first and foremost on
attracting the best AI talent and avoid decoupling the labor pool. This means ensuring that
U.S. visa restrictions do not drive away top Chinese AI researchers from American universi-
ties and companies, unless a clear national security threat exists.

KEY OFFENSIVE POLICIES

America’s ability to compete against China will depend much more on the health of the
U.S. innovation ecosystem (so-called “offense”) than on any attempt to thwart or impede
Chinese technological progress (“defense”). There are at least three major categories of of-
fensive opportunities.439

First, Congress should greatly increase the amount of federal R&D spending. Such spend-
ing was historically pivotal in creating what we now know as Silicon Valley, but has atro-
phied in recent decades.440 The draft U.S. Innovation and Competition Act and America
COMPETES Act, although not without problematic elements, mark important steps to-
ward committing greater federal resources to R&D. Second, Congress should invest more
in the social and physical infrastructure that supports technological innovation and access.
Examples include STEM education (at all levels), STEM workforce training, a national re-
search cloud, and rural broadband.441 Third, the Justice Department and the Federal Trade
Commission should continue stepping up their antitrust scrutiny of the tech sector, and
Congress should move forward with intelligent statutory reforms to promote competition.
These would help ensure that the U.S. tech sector remains dynamic and innovative.

112 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

OBTAINING GENERAL LEVERAGE
OVER CHINA

Technology itself is not always the sole concern animating U.S. tech policy. In the China
context, U.S. leaders have sometimes used the technology relationship as a pawn in wider
bilateral negotiations. For example, the Trump administration used its Entity List designa-
tions of ZTE and Huawei to help advance broader trade talks with China. During the talks,
Trump rescinded the ZTE designation as a personal gesture to Xi, and held out the prospect
of sparing Huawei during subsequent negotiations.442 Yet Trump did not use these chits to
secure major concessions on tech-related issues like intellectual property protection. He
accepted relatively weak commitments on those issues and instead bargained for China to
buy more U.S. agricultural products and grant market access to American financial services
firms. In a roundabout way, Trump used the leverage of technological controls to move
China on unrelated matters.

The Entity List designations of ZTE and Huawei, and the attempted ban and forced sale
of TikTok, suggested a template. These episodes taught U.S. policymakers that they held
the power of life and death over certain Chinese tech companies, and that Beijing prizes
these companies enough to bargain over
their fate. Given how much Washington It is hard enough to design a U.S.
wants from China in numerous domains, tech policy that succeeds on its own
and how few reliable tools the United
terms. This can become virtually
States has for bringing Beijing to the table,
there is strong temptation to use technol- impossible if tech issues become
ogy controls as a bargaining chip in non- entangled with unrelated objectives.
technology-oriented negotiations.

113
 This kind of maneuver should be rare, however. Because U.S.-China technology ties are so
important and sensitive in their own right, there are few other issues salient enough to jus-
tify their use as a bargaining chip. Doing so risks adding even more pressure to an increas-
ingly fragile technology relationship. It is hard enough to design an American tech policy
that succeeds in addressing the complex set of challenges and opportunities that China
represents. This can become virtually impossible if tech issues become entangled with, and
subordinated to, unrelated policy objectives.

RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PROCESSES

The president should instruct regulatory agencies, diplomats, and trade negotiators not to
use China-related technology restrictions as leverage for unrelated matters, barring excep-
tional circumstances. Biden should consider exceptions only when they are likely to ad-
vance a handful of supreme priorities, such as combating climate change. Before making an
exception, the president should ask the Intelligence Community and his negotiating team
about the odds that doing so would help win valuable concessions from Beijing.

CASE STUDIES
Phase One trade talks. Trump’s maneuvers in trade talks with China illustrate both the
promise and the peril of using technology controls as general bilateral leverage. ZTE was
originally placed on the Entity List in 2016 for violating U.S. sanctions against Iran and
North Korea. So when Trump later granted the company a reprieve to advance his trade
talks with China, domestic critics argued that he had compromised U.S. national security.443
The gambit did make sense in theory. The Phase One trade talks provided a rare opportu-
nity to address structural issues in the U.S.-
China economic relationship—a prospect
Trump’s maneuvers in trade talks
of surpassing value to the American people.
with China illustrate both the promise By comparison, unyielding enforcement
and the peril of using technology of sanctions on Iran and North Korea was
controls as general bilateral leverage. relatively unimportant.
In the end, though, Trump squandered
whatever leverage these tactics gave him. He chose to focus his Phase One deal on minor
matters like the trade deficit, while neglecting more central grievances such as Chinese
subsidies and forced technology transfer. The Entity List maneuver therefore accomplished
little—except that it caused China and many other observers to see the list itself as a tool of
realpolitik, not a legitimate national security instrument.

114 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Climate change. The Biden administration may face its own decision points in climate
change negotiations with China. China has already made some recent climate commit-
ments, but much more work remains. Given the paramount importance of addressing cli-
mate change, Biden should consider whether defensive technology measures could serve as
bargaining chips—tightening restrictions to increase U.S. leverage, or loosening them to
facilitate a deal. The Justice Department, for example, agreed in September 2021 to resolve
charges against Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou, allowing her to leave Canadian custody and
return to China. Two Chinese scholars told the South China Morning Post that the move
would make Beijing more willing to cooperate on climate and other issues.444 Weeks later,
the United States and China signed a new bilateral climate agreement.445

KEY OFFENSIVE POLICIES

Washington is right to seek leverage over Beijing, though the best and most appropriate
sources of leverage will vary depending on the issue at hand. In general, the United States
will have the strongest leverage when it can rally multiple major countries to its side. The
Biden administration has therefore tried to build coalitions of allies and partners on such
issues as China’s human rights record, its cyber operations, and more. Granted, building
and sustaining these international coalitions is a challenging task. Compared to the United
States, most other countries—even close U.S. partners such as the Five Eyes, the European
Union, Japan, and South Korea—tend to be more accommodative toward China. Biden
can help set America’s China-related global diplomacy on the right course, but these diplo-
matic challenges will likely outlast his administration.

JON BATEMAN 115

SHAPING U.S. DOMESTIC NARRATIVES

China-related technology controls can be used to shape American public discourse and
political narratives. There are both legitimate and dubious reasons for doing so.

First, U.S. leaders sometimes use announcements of new technology restrictions to raise do-
mestic awareness about tech threats from China and thereby shock complacent private ac-
tors into more careful behavior. For context, the government does not directly control most
of the U.S.-China technology relationship. On a day-to-day basis, American businesses
and academic institutions choose when and where to cooperate with Chinese counterparts,
weighing risks and benefits according to their own tolerances. When private stakeholders
do not seem to fully appreciate the risks of technological cooperation with China, U.S. gov-
ernment restrictions can be a powerful messaging tool. Of course, the government should
first try to communicate directly with these stakeholders and share appropriate evidence
about specific threats.

Second, and more questionably, U.S. leaders sometimes institute China-related technology
controls as part of domestic political gamesmanship. Anti-China measures are often popu-
lar. U.S. politicians may see them as opportunities to burnish national security and populist
credentials, especially during election season. Even the most enlightened U.S. leaders will
sometimes have mixed motives. From a policy perspective, this is worrisome. Parochial
political concerns should never motivate something as serious as technological decoupling.
The government should institute guardrails to minimize this behavior.

117
 RECOMMENDED POLICIES AND PROCESSES
Executive branch agencies should adhere to regularized procedures for evaluating technol-
ogy controls wherever possible. In many cases, regulatory agencies have long-standing inter-
nal processes and statutory constraints, such as the Administrative Procedure Act, overseen
by the courts. In other cases, broad presidential powers (like IEEPA) can be wielded quite
freely, including as a way to circumvent normal decisionmaking by agencies. These short-
cuts should be reserved for exceptional situations, such as when the government must act
immediately. And when the government creates new decisionmaking processes, such as
the new ICTS supply chain security review
The development of China-related regime, it should anticipate and account for
potential abuse.
technology controls should adhere
to regularized procedures and At the same time, oversight elements
across the federal government should give
get special attention from federal special attention to China-related technol-
oversight elements. ogy controls, given the high policy stakes
and the substantial risk of politicization or
mismanagement. Congressional committees of jurisdiction and inspectors general at key
agencies—particularly the Departments of Commerce, Defense, Treasury, and State and
the Intelligence Community—should identify technology controls as a top oversight pri-
ority. To rally the oversight community, the Government Accountability Office should
add technology controls to its High Risk List of federal activities “with vulnerabilities
to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement, or in need of transformation.”446 The list
already includes entries for “Ensuring the Effective Protection of Technologies Critical
to U.S. National Security Interests” and “Ensuring the Cybersecurity of the Nation,” but
those categories do not capture the full scope of government activities and policy objec-
tives at issue.

CASE STUDIES
Huawei and ZTE. The Trump administration’s early actions against Huawei and ZTE
helped to correct what had been relatively lax attitudes toward Chinese technology threats
at leading U.S. universities. During Trump’s first two years in office, U.S. officials strug-
gled to persuade American universities to impose heightened scrutiny on technology col-
laboration with China. This changed in 2019, when Huawei was indicted on multiple
federal charges and ZTE remained under several high-profile investigations. In response
to these developments, prominent universities—including the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), Stanford, and the University of California, Berkeley—froze new col-
laboration with both Chinese companies.447 MIT went further, instituting a “new review
process for ‘elevated-risk’ international proposals” involving China (as well as Russia and

118 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

Saudi Arabia). These university actions were responsible, well-tailored, and long overdue.
They might not have happened without government pressure.

TikTok. In contrast, Trump’s actions against TikTok were badly tainted by the appearance
of improper motives and methods. Trump sought to ban the app during a hard-fought
presidential election campaign in which he sought to frame Joe Biden as weak on China.
There is reasonable speculation that Trump’s ban was prompted in part by personal con-
versations with Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, whose platform not only competes with
TikTok but also served as a critical component of Trump’s electioneering infrastructure.448
Trump then ordered TikTok’s owners to sell the company to an American firm based on the
recommendation of CFIUS.449 Rejecting the bids seen by outside observers as most viable,
he instead chose Oracle, whose leaders were political supporters.450

These red flags might have been dismissible if Trump’s TikTok actions were otherwise well-
grounded in a legitimate policymaking process. But the executive orders lacked meaningful
detail, and their implementation had to be repeatedly delayed. A federal court later found
the ban to be legally questionable and prevented it from coming into effect, before Biden
eventually reversed it.451

KEY OFFENSIVE POLICIES

If U.S. leaders want to look strong on China, they should support some of the many nonre-
strictive policies highlighted throughout this report, each of which would help protect U.S.
national security, economic prosperity, and values in the face of serious challenges from
Beijing. Meanwhile, U.S. officials should focus on sharing factual, responsible assessments
of Chinese technology threats with American businesses, universities, and the public. Many
private stakeholders are clear-eyed about these threats and want detailed, actionable infor-
mation from the government.

At the same time, Washington must be careful not to exaggerate China tech threats. The
overheated rhetoric of the Trump administration did much to damage the U.S. govern-
ment’s credibility on this issue and inflame public opinion. To reverse these trends, the
Biden administration must be prepared to listen as much as talk—to hear directly from
private stakeholders about what they see as the costs and benefits of U.S.-China technologi-
cal decoupling and governmental technology controls.

JON BATEMAN 119

CONCLUSION

U.S.-China technological decoupling is extraordinarily complex, yet American strategy and

policy debates are too often simplistic and vague. This report has sought to clarify how
decoupling in a host of different technology areas could affect the gamut of American in-
terests. Even so, reality is orders of magnitude more intricate and dynamic than what can
be presented here. Washington must account for the decisions of dozens of other countries
involved in the global tech trade, and it must make sound policy choices while the U.S. po-
litical system continues to deteriorate—to name just two enormous challenges that deserve
far more analysis.

Complexity and uncertainty are key reasons to pursue a centrist strategy that can hedge
against multiple futures. By imposing focused, carefully designed technology restrictions,
U.S. decisionmakers can conserve their most critical resources: time to assess the situation,
and control over the decoupling process. This report has offered a concrete picture of what
centrist decoupling might look like and how implementation could work at the agency
level. It has also demonstrated several points
that further bolster the case for a centrist ap- Focused, carefully designed
proach to decoupling.
technology restrictions can help
First, the most strategically significant tech- U.S. decisionmakers conserve their
nologies (like 5G telecommunications equip- most critical resources: time to
ment and semiconductors) are few in number
and already subject to strong U.S. govern-
assess the situation, and control
ment controls. A handful of technology areas over the decoupling process.

121
may need tighter China-oriented restrictions—for example, drone swarms, the U.S. bulk
power system, and technologies sold to Xinjiang. Yet certain China-focused controls seem
counterproductive in a number of other high-profile areas, such as geolocation data, social
media platforms, and consumer devices like smartphones. While future circumstances may
justify increased decoupling, U.S. technology controls should not be greatly expanded at
this time.

Second, official U.S. policy goals remain dangerously vague and open-ended across the
board. Washington must publicly clarify its vision for the global tech trade and set more
achievable ambitions for countering techno-authoritarianism, maintaining a military edge
over China, and preventing Chinese espionage, sabotage, and influence operations. These
are all important U.S. interests, but none would currently justify broad-based technology
controls. Even so, U.S. rhetoric and policy actions continue to suggest the possibility of a
costly and quixotic expansion of China-oriented controls. Clearer, narrower public messag-
ing by U.S. leaders would help to focus agencies on those problems they can realistically
address with restrictive tools and reduce the motivation of China and others to seize control
of the decoupling process.

Third, “offensive” (self-improvement) policies have the greatest long-term potential for
strengthening American technology leadership, competitiveness, and resilience. Granted,
many offensive policies face substantial hurdles to implementation. The United States has
so far lacked the political will to accelerate transformation of its military forces, create na-
tional cybersecurity and data privacy standards, or begin to repair the domestic information
ecosystem—just as the centrists fear. But failure to enact these and other needed reforms
would mean wasting the extra time that “defensive” measures can provide, placing U.S.
security and prosperity at risk. Perhaps the rise of a formidable state rival such as China can
finally persuade American leaders to take on fundamental challenges at home.

Not everyone will endorse a centrist strategy for technological decoupling or the specific
policies recommended here. Some may doubt whether a comprehensive strategy is possible
or even useful. But all should agree that the United States needs sharper public debates on
this critical set of challenges. If nothing else, U.S. officials and analysts should confront the
hardest questions head-on. What kind of technological future does America hope to create?
And how can the tools of government policy help to bring about such a world? U.S. nation-
al strength and well-being will depend, in large part, on how American leaders answer these
questions in the years to come. They must act carefully. But first, they must think clearly.

122 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

NOTES

FOREWORD
1 From the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence homepage at https://www.nscai.gov/.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
2 “Technological decoupling” is a contested and sometimes politically charged phrase. In its strongest
form, it can mean a total technological divorce between the United States and China—a very grave
prospect currently favored only by a few radical voices. In its weaker form, it can refer more generally
to the kind of marginal reduction of technological interdependence seen for the last several years. This
report uses the latter meaning. Although “decoupling” can carry conflicting and at times misleading
meanings, no other single term has yet managed to displace it in common usage.

This report is about the decoupling of “technology.” It does not focus on the range of other sectors (such
as medical supplies, finance, entertainment, agriculture, and real estate) where U.S. analysts or officials
have also proposed some partial decoupling from China. That said, “technology” is an elusive concept.
While policymakers often speak of a distinct “tech sector” (which they sometimes equate with “Silicon
Valley”), the truth is that every commercial sector employs, adapts, and develops technologies. Hence,
loose talk of “technological decoupling” can often be confusing or misleading. Policymakers need more
precise analysis of specific technology-related U.S. interests and objectives, as this report seeks to provide.

Within the broad category of technology, this report focuses mainly on digitally oriented technologies,
whose major value stems from software, data, communications, and networks. Examples include machine
learning systems, social media platforms, and large data caches. These raise particularly acute policy
dilemmas, such as how to distinguish between dual-use applications and how to manage globalized
supply chains and information flows. The report also addresses mixed digital-physical technologies,
where hardware innovation is a crucial source of value; these include semiconductors, drones, and
telecommunications equipment. However, highly physically oriented technologies—like nuclear reactors,
advanced materials, and hypersonics—are not an explicit focus.

Finally, this report is concerned both with finished technology (end products and services) and with
technology inputs. The latter includes elements of what is called “the supply chain,” such as technology
components, raw materials, data, know-how, and human capital that flow between the United States and
China. It also includes financial support. U.S. and Chinese actors have each made significant investments
in the other country’s tech companies, and U.S. and Chinese tech companies receive significant revenue
from sales to the other country’s home markets. These financial flows can be as important as the supply
chain itself, or even more so, and have become a major policy battleground.

123
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. THINKING AND POLICY

3 See endnote 2 for a discussion of this term and how it relates to this report’s scope.
4 A 2005 speech by then deputy secretary of state Robert Zoellick crystallized this viewpoint, which
was already widely held and would continue to hold sway into the Obama administration. Robert B.
Zoellick, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?,” State Department, September 21,
2005, https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm.
5 Zoellick himself recognized these concerns in a 2019 speech, though he opposed the “logic of constant
confrontation” that had come to characterize Washington’s China policy. Robert B. Zoellick, “Can
America and China Be Stakeholders?,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, December 4, 2019,
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/12/04/can-america-and-china-be-stakeholders-pub-80510.
6 Jack Goldsmith and Stuart Russell, “Strengths Become Vulnerabilities: How a Digital World
Disadvantages the United States in Its International Relations,” June 5, 2018, Hoover Institution, Aegis
Series Paper no. 1806, June 5, 2018, https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/381100534-
strengths-become-vulnerabilities.pdf.
7 For a notable executive branch action, see “President Obama Blocks Chinese Acquisition of Aixtron
SE,” Covington & Burling, December 5, 2016, https://www.cov.com/-/media/files/corporate/
publications/2016/12/president_obama_blocks_chinese_acquisition_of_aixtron_se.pdf. In Congress,
a 2012 committee report on Huawei and ZTE became a touchstone for future scrutiny of these
companies and Chinese technology more generally. House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
Investigative Report on the U.S. National Security Issues Posed by Chinese Telecommunications Companies
Huawei and ZTE, October 8, 2021, https://republicans-intelligence.house.gov/sites/intelligence.house.
gov/files/documents/huawei-zte%20investigative%20report%20(final).pdf.
8 Seth Center and Emma Bates, “Tech-Politik: Historical Perspectives on Innovation, Technology, and
Strategic Competition,” CSIS, December 19, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/tech-politik-historical-
perspectives-innovation-technology-and-strategic-competition.
9 James L. Schoff, “U.S.-Japan Technology Policy Coordination: Balancing Technonationalism
With a Globalized World,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 29, 2020, https://
carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/29/u.s.-japan-technology-policy-coordination-balancing-
technonationalism-with-globalized-world-pub-82176.
10 Adam Kline and Tim Hwang, “From Cold War Sanctions to Weaponized Interdependence: An
Annotated Bibliography on Competition and Control Over Emerging Technologies,” Center for Security
and Emerging Technology, September 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/from-cold-war-
sanctions-to-weaponized-interdependence/.
11 Eric Zhu and Tom Orlik, “When Will China Rule the World? Maybe Never,” Bloomberg, July 5,
2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-07-05/when-will-china-s-economy-beat-the-
u-s-to-become-no-1-why-it-may-never-happen; World Bank, “GDP (Current US$) - United States,
China, Japan,” https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=US-CN-JP; and
Marc Trachtenberg, “Assessing Soviet Economic Performance During the Cold War: A Failure of
Intelligence?,” Texas National Security Review 1, no. 2 (2018), https://tnsr.org/2018/02/assessing-soviet-
economic-performance-cold-war/.
12 “Population Total - China, Japan, United States,” World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.POP.TOTL?locations=CN-JP-US; and Murray Feshbach, “The Soviet Union: Population Trends and
Dilemmas,” Population Bulletin 37, no. 3 (1982), https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/12264357/.
13 Ellen Terrell, “When a Quote Is Not (Exactly) a Quote: General Motors,” Inside Adams (blog), Library
of Congress, April 22, 2016, https://blogs.loc.gov/inside_adams/2016/04/when-a-quote-is-not-exactly-a-
quote-general-motors/.
14 John Chipman, “Why Your Company Needs a Foreign Policy,” Harvard Business Review, September
2016, https://hbr.org/2016/09/why-your-company-needs-a-foreign-policy.
15 Jon Bateman, “National Security in an Age of Insurrection,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, January 14, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/14/national-security-in-age-of-
insurrection-pub-83635.

124 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

16 David Forscey, Jon Bateman, Nick Beecroft, and Beau Woods, “Systemic Cyber Risk: A Primer,”
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Aspen Institute, March 7, 2022, https://
carnegieendowment.org/2022/03/07/systemic-cyber-risk-primer-pub-86531.
17 Raj Varadarajan et al., “What’s at Stake If the US and China Really Decouple,” Boston Consulting
Group, October 20, 2020, https://www.bcg.com/fr-ca/publications/2020/high-stakes-of-decoupling-us-
and-china.
18 This primer is necessarily a snapshot in time, accurate as of March 27, 2022, unless stated otherwise. The
U.S. government debuts new policy actions targeting Chinese technology on an almost weekly basis.
19 Federal regulations reveal some basic outlines of licensing policy, such as 15 C.F.R. § 742 for the CCL.
However, they leave substantial room for interpretation.
20 50 U.S.C. § 4811.
21 50 U.S.C. § 4811(3).
22 Ian F. Fergusson and Karen M. Sutter, “U.S. Export Control Reforms and China: Issues for Congress,”
Congressional Research Service, January 15, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF11627.pdf.
23 22 C.F.R. § 121.1.
24 “International Traffic in Arms Regulations: U.S. Munitions List Categories I, II, and III,”
State Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 3819, (March 9, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/01/23/2020-00574/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-us-munitions-list-
categories-i-ii-and-iii.
25 “International Traffic in Arms Regulations: U.S. Munitions List Categories I, II, and III,”
State Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 3819, (March 9, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/01/23/2020-00574/international-traffic-in-arms-regulations-us-munitions-list-
categories-i-ii-and-iii.
26 22 C.F.R. § 126.1(d)(1).
27 “2021 Hong Kong Policy Act Report,” State Department, March 31, 2021, https://www.state.gov/2021-
hong-kong-policy-act-report/.
28 15 C.F.R. § 730.3.
29 15 C.F.R. Supplement No. 1 to Part 738.
30 “Export Administration Regulations: Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced
Direct Product Rule) and the Entity List,” Commerce Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 29,849 (March 19,
2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/05/19/2020-10856/export-administration-
regulations-amendments-to-general-prohibition-three-foreign-produced-direct.
31 “China - Country Commercial Guide - U.S. Export Controls,” U.S. International Trade Commission
(USITC), September 14, 2021, https://www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/china-us-export-controls.
32 15 C.F.R. § 744.21; and John R. Shane and Lori E. Scheetz, “Commerce Department Further Restricts
U.S. Exports to China, Russia, and Venezuela; Aims to Combat China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy,”
Wiley, April 28, 2020, https://www.wiley.law/alert-Commerce-Department-Further-Restricts-U-S-
Exports-to-China-Russia-and-Venezuela-Aims-to-Combat-China-s-Military-Civil-Fusion-Strategy.
33 Emphasis added. 15 C.F.R. § 744.21(g).
34 Sylwia A. Lis, Lise S. Test, and Maria Sergeyeva, “Commerce Tightens Restrictions on Technology
Exports to Countries of Concern, in Particular China, Russia, and Venezuela,” Sanctions & Export
Controls Update (blog), Baker McKenzie, April 30, 2020, https://sanctionsnews.bakermckenzie.com/
commerce-tightens-restrictions-on-technology-exports-to-countries-of-concern-in-particular-china-
russia-and-venezuela/.
35 “Military End User (MEU) List,” Commerce Department, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-
guidance/lists-of-parties-of-concern/1770.
36 50 U.S.C. § 4817.
37 “Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies,” Commerce Department, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,201
(November 19, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/11/19/2018-25221/review-of-
controls-for-certain-emerging-technologies; and Emma Rafaelof, “Unfinished Business: Export Control
and Foreign Investment Reforms,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 1,

JON BATEMAN 125

 2021, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/Unfinished_Business-Export_Control_and_
Foreign_Investment_Reforms.pdf.
38 “New Controls on Emerging Technologies Released, While U.S. Commerce Department Comes Under
Fire for Delay,” Gibson Dunn, October 27, 2020, https://www.gibsondunn.com/new-controls-on-
emerging-technologies-released-while-us-commerce-department-comes-under-fire-for-delay/.
39 15 C.F.R. § 744.16.
40 15 C.F.R. § 734.3.
41 As of March 27, 2022, based on author’s analysis of the Commerce Department’s Entity List spreadsheet
available at https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/documents/consolidated-entity-list/1072-el-2. These
figures include both China and Hong Kong. They exclude all entries with exact duplicate names;
however, they include entries for close variations of names, aliases, subsidiaries, and affiliates. Undated
entries were assumed to predate 2018.
42 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(a).
43 15 C.F.R. § 734.4.
44 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(b)(3).
45 Charles L. Capito, Panagiotis C. Bayz, and Joseph A. Benkert, “The Commerce Department Modifies
‘Direct Product Rule’ to Restrict Transfers of More Foreign-Made Items to Huawei,” Morrison Foerster,
May 28, 2020, https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/200529-commerce-department-modifies.html.
46 “Addition of Huawei Non-U.S. Affiliates to the Entity List, the Removal of Temporary General
License, and Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule),”
Commerce Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 51,596 (August 20, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/08/20/2020-18213/addition-of-huawei-non-us-affiliates-to-the-entity-list-the-
removal-of-temporary-general-license-and; and “Export Administration Regulations: Amendments
to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule) and the Entity List,”
Commerce Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 29,849 (May 15, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/05/19/2020-10856/export-administration-regulations-amendments-to-general-
prohibition-three-foreign-produced-direct.
47 15 C.F.R. § 736.2(e); 15 C.F.R. Supplement No. 4 to Part 744, footnote 1; and “Commerce Addresses
Huawei’s Efforts to Undermine Entity List, Restricts Products Designed and Produced With U.S.
Technologies,” press release, Commerce Department, May 15, 2020, https://2017-2021.commerce.gov/
news/press-releases/2020/05/commerce-addresses-huaweis-efforts-undermine-entity-list-restricts.html;
Kay C. Georgi, Marwa M. Hassoun, Sylvia G. Costelloe, and Aman Kakar, “BIS Expands the Huawei
Foreign Direct Product Rule to Capture a Wide Swath of COTS Products,” Arent Fox, August 19, 2020,
https://www.arentfox.com/perspectives/alerts/bis-expands-the-huawei-foreign-direct-product-rule-
capture-wide-swath-cots.
48 “Comments of the Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) on Amendments to General Prohibition
Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule) and the Entity List,” Semiconductor Industry
Association, July 14, 2020, https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/SIA-
Comments-on-Foreign-Direct-Product-July-14-2020.pdf.
49 “Export Control Licensing Decisions for Huawei (November 9, 2020-April 20, 2021),” Commerce
Department, https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Huawei-Licensing-
Information.pdf.
50 “Addition of Huawei Non-U.S. Affiliates to the Entity List, the Removal of Temporary General
License, and Amendments to General Prohibition Three (Foreign-Produced Direct Product Rule),”
Commerce Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 51,596 (August 20, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/08/20/2020-18213/addition-of-huawei-non-us-affiliates-to-the-entity-list-the-removal-
of-temporary-general-license-and.
51 Evan Burke, “Trump-Era Policies Toward Chinese STEM Talent: A Need for Better Balance,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/25/
trump-era-policies-toward-chinese-stem-talent-need-for-better-balance-pub-84137.
52 Evan Burke, “Trump-Era Policies Toward Chinese STEM Talent: A Need for Better Balance,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/25/
trump-era-policies-toward-chinese-stem-talent-need-for-better-balance-pub-84137.

126 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

53 “2019 Statistical Analysis of BIS Licensing Deemed Export 2015-2019,” Commerce Department, April
25, 2020, https://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/country-papers/2648-2019-statistical-aalysis-of-bis-
licensing-deemed-export-2015-2019/file.
54 What counts as an “American” or “foreign” investor or business is a complicated and increasingly
contested legal question. For example, see Brandon L. Van Grack and James Brower, “CFIUS’s
Expanding Jurisdiction in the Magnachip Acquisition,” Lawfare, October 11, 2021, https://www.
lawfareblog.com/cfiuss-expanding-jurisdiction-magnachip-acquisition.
55 31 C.F.R. § 800.101, 800.601.
56 Farhad Jalinous, Karalyn Mildorf, Keith Schomig, and Ata Akiner, “CFIUS Finalizes New FIRRMA
Regulations,” White & Case, https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/cfius-finalizes-new-firrma-
regulations.
57 David Mortlock, Noman Goheer, and Ahmad El-Gamal, “Expanded CFIUS Jurisdiction Under
FIRRMA Regulations: An Overview,” Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, May 19, 2020, https://www.willkie.
com/-/media/files/publications/2020/05/expandedcfiusjurisdictionunderfirrmaregulations.pdf.
58 James K. Jackson and Cathleen D. Cimino-Isaacs, “CFIUS Reform Under FIRRMA,” Congressional
Research Service, February 21, 2020, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/IF10952.pdf.
59 “Annual Report to Congress for CY 2020,” Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS), July 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2020.
pdf.
60 Harry Clark, Gregory Hume, and Jeanine McGuinness, “President Trump Orders Divestment of U.S.
Company; CFIUS Clears Semiconductor Transaction,” JD Supra, March 16, 2020, https://www.jdsupra.
com/legalnews/president-trump-orders-divestment-of-u-12562/.
61 “Statement by Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin on the President’s Decision Regarding the Acquisition by
ByteDance Ltd. of the U.S. Business of musical.ly,” Treasury Department, August 14, 2020, https://
home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1094.
62 Greg Roumeliotis, “U.S. Blocks MoneyGram Sale to China’s Ant Financial on National Security
Concerns, Reuters, January 2, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-moneygram-intl-m-a-
ant-financial/u-s-blocks-moneygram-sale-to-chinas-ant-financial-on-national-security-concerns-
idUSKBN1ER1R7.
63 “Annual Report to Congress for CY 2020,” CFIUS, July 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/system/
files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2020.pdf; and “Annual Report to Congress for CY 2019,”
CFIUS, July 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/CFIUS-Public-Annual-Report-CY-2019.
pdf.
64 Thilo Hanemann, Daniel H. Rosen, Mark Witzke, Steve Bennion, and Emma Smith, “Two-Way Street:
2021 Update US-China Investment Trends,” Rhodium Group, May 2021, https://rhg.com/wp-content/
uploads/2021/05/RHG_TWS-2021_Full-Report_Final.pdf; and Andres B. Schwarzenberg and Karen
M. Sutter, “U.S.-China Investment Ties: Overview,” Congressional Research Service, January 15, 2021,
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11283.pdf.
65 Jake Sullivan, “Remarks by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan at the National Security
Commission on Artificial Intelligence Global Emerging Technology Summit,” White House, July 13,
2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/briefing-room/2021/07/13/remarks-by-national-security-advisor-
jake-sullivan-at-the-national-security-commission-on-artificial-intelligence-global-emerging-technology-
summit/; Thilo Hanemann et al., “An Outbound Investment Screening Regime for the United States?,”
Rhodium Group, January 2022, https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/RHG_TWS_2022_US-
Outbound-Investment.pdf; and Sarah Bauerle-Danzman, “Is the US Going to Screen Outbound
Investment?,” Atlantic Council, January 10, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/
is-the-us-going-to-screen-outbound-investment/.
66 Executive Order 14032, “Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Certain
Companies of the People’s Republic of China,” June 3, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/06/07/2021-12019/addressing-the-threat-from-securities-investments-that-finance-
certain-companies-of-the-peoples.
67 As of March 27, 2022, based on author’s analysis of the Treasury Department’s Sanctions List Search
and Consolidated Sanctions List (Non-SDN Lists) spreadsheet (primary names) available at https://

JON BATEMAN 127

 sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ and https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/
consolidated-sanctions-list-non-sdn-lists. This figure includes some duplication for companies listed two
or more times under aliases or closely related entities.
68 “President Biden Revamps Communist Chinese Military Companies (CCMC) Sanctions Program,”
Paul, Weiss, June 7, 2021, https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/economic-sanctions-aml/
publications/president-biden-revamps-communist-chinese-military-companies-ccmc-sanctions-
program?id=40293.
69 Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act, Public Law No. 116-222 (2020), https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/PLAW-116publ222/pdf/PLAW-116publ222.pdf.
70 “Rule Governing Board Determinations Under the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act,”
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), September 22, 2021, https://pcaob-assets.
azureedge.net/pcaob-dev/docs/default-source/rulemaking/docket048/2021-004-hfcaa-adopting-release.
pdf?sfvrsn=f6dfb7f8_4.
71 As of March 27, 2022, 225 China- and Hong Kong-based companies had filed audit reports in the
last year, according to PCAOB: “Audit Reports Issued by PCAOB-Registered Firms Located Where
Authorities Deny Access to Conduct Inspections,” PCAOB, https://pcaobus.org/oversight/international/
denied-access-to-inspections. See also “Chinese Companies Listed on Major U.S. Stock Exchanges,”
U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, May 5, 2021, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/
default/files/2021-05/Chinese_Companies_on_US_Stock_Exchanges_5-2021.pdf. The SEC estimated
that about 10 percent of companies affected by the new law would have over-the-counter or unlisted
securities. “Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act Disclosure,” SEC, 86 Fed. Reg. 70,027
(December 9, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/12/09/2021-26528/holding-
foreign-companies-accountable-act-disclosure.
72 Robert Schmidt and Benjamin Bain, “SEC Chief Warns ‘Clock Is Ticking’ on Delisting Chinese
Stocks,” Bloomberg, August 25, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-25/sec-chief-
warns-clock-is-ticking-on-delisting-chinese-stocks?sref=QmOxnLFz.
73 Senator John Kennedy, “Senate Passes Kennedy Bill to Strengthen America’s Protection Against
Fraudulent Foreign Companies,” press release, June 22, 2021, https://www.kennedy.senate.gov/
public/2021/6/senate-passes-kennedy-bill-to-strengthen-america-s-protection-against-fraudulent-foreign-
companies; and H.R. 4521, The America COMPETES Act of 2022, § 60301, https://rules.house.gov/
sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/BILLS-117HR4521RH-RCP117-31.pdf.
74 47 U.S.C. § 214; and 47 C.F.R. § 63.18.
75 “Order on Revocation of China Unicom Americas’ Sec. 214 Authority,” Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), March 17, 2021, https://www.fcc.gov/document/order-revocation-china-unicom-
americas-sec-214-authority.
76 47 U.S.C. §§ 34-35; and Executive Order 10530, “Providing for the Performance of Certain Functions
Vested in or Subject to the Approval of the President,” 19 Fed. Reg. 2,709 (May 10, 1954), https://www.
archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/10530.html.
77 “Order on Revocation of China Unicom Americas’ Sec. 214 Authority,” FCC, March 17, 2021, https://
www.fcc.gov/document/order-revocation-china-unicom-americas-sec-214-authority; and “Order on
Revocation/Termination: Pacific Networks/ComNet 214 Authority,” FCC, March 17, 2021, https://docs.
fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-21-38A1.pdf.
78 Executive Order 13913, “Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in
the United States Telecommunications Services Sector,” April 4, 2020, https://www.federalregister.
gov/documents/2020/04/08/2020-07530/establishing-the-committee-for-the-assessment-of-foreign-
participation-in-the-united-states; and “The Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation
in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector – Frequently Asked Questions,” Justice
Department, December 7, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/nsd/committee-assessment-foreign-
participation-united-states-telecommunications-services-sector.
79 “FCC Denies China Mobile Telecom Services Application,” FCC, May 9, 2019, https://www.fcc.gov/
document/fcc-denies-china-mobile-telecom-services-application-0. For an overview, see Adam Chan,
“CFIUS, Team Telecom and China,” Lawfare, September 28, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/cfius-
team-telecom-and-china.

128 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

80 “FCC Denies China Mobile Telecom Services Application,” FCC, May 9, 2019, https://www.fcc.gov/
document/fcc-denies-china-mobile-telecom-services-application-0; “China Telecom Americas Order
on Revocation and Termination,” FCC, October 26, 2021, https://www.fcc.gov/document/china-
telecom-americas-order-revocation-and-termination; “FCC Revokes China Unicom Americas’ Telecom
Services Authority,” press release, FCC, January 27, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-revokes-
china-unicom-americas-telecom-services-authority; and “FCC Revokes Pacific Networks’ & ComNet’s
Telecom Service Authority,” press release, FCC, March 16, 2022, https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-
revokes-pacific-networks-comnets-telecom-service-authority.
81 “Team Telecom Recommends That the FCC Deny Pacific Light Cable Network System’s Hong Kong
Undersea Cable Connection to the United States,” press release, Justice Department, June 17, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/team-telecom-recommends-fcc-deny-pacific-light-cable-network-system-
s-hong-kong-undersea.
82 Daphne Leprince-Ringuet, “Facebook and Google Drop Plans for Underwater Cable to Hong Kong
After Security Warnings,” ZDNet, September 1, 2020, https://www.zdnet.com/article/facebook-and-
google-drop-plans-for-underwater-cable-to-hong-kong-after-security-warnings/; and Adam Chan,
“CFIUS, Team Telecom and China,” Lawfare, September 28, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/cfius-
team-telecom-and-china.
83 “Equipment Authorization – RF Device,” FCC, https://www.fcc.gov/oet/ea/rfdevice.
84 Joel Griffin, “FCC Moves One Step Closer to Banning Hikvision, Dahua Products,” SecurityInfoWatch.
com, June 17, 2021, https://www.securityinfowatch.com/video-surveillance/article/21227289/fcc-moves-
one-step-closer-to-banning-hikvision-dahua-products.
85 Joel Griffin, “FCC Moves One Step Closer to Banning Hikvision, Dahua Products,” SecurityInfoWatch.
com, June 17, 2021, https://www.securityinfowatch.com/video-surveillance/article/21227289/fcc-
moves-one-step-closer-to-banning-hikvision-dahua-products; and “Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Notice of Inquiry, Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications Supply Chain
Through the Equipment Authorization Program; Protecting Against National Security Threats to the
Communications Supply Chain through the Competitive Bidding Program,” FCC, ET Docket Nos. 21-
232 and 21-233, https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-372818A1.pdf.
86 47 U.S.C. § 302a; and 47 C.F.R. § 2.915.
87 “List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act,” FCC, https://www.
fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist.
88 47 U.S.C. § 1601(c); and John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019,
Public Law No. 115-232, § 889(f)(3)(A-B).
89 Secure Equipment Act of 2021, Public Law No. 117-55.
90 “List of Equipment and Services Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act,” FCC, https://www.
fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist.
91 “Citing National Security Risks, Carr Calls for Starting Process of Adding DJI—a Chinese Drone
Company—to FCC’s Covered List,” press release, FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr, October 19, 2021,
https://www.fcc.gov/document/carr-calls-review-dji-citing-national-security-risks.
92 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(C).
93 “U.S. Imposes Visa Restrictions on Certain Employees of Chinese Technology Companies That Abuse
Human Rights,” State Department, July 15, 2020, https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-imposes-visa-
restrictions-on-certain-employees-of-chinese-technology-companies-that-abuse-human-rights/index.
html.
94 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f).
95 Ben Harrington and Theresa A. Reiss, “Presidential Actions to Exclude Aliens Under INA § 212(f),”
Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/
LSB10458.
96 Proclamation 10043, “Suspension of Entry as Nonimmigrants of Certain Students and
Researchers From the People’s Republic of China,” May 29, 2020, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/06/04/2020-12217/suspension-of-entry-as-nonimmigrants-of-certain-students-and-
researchers-from-the-peoples-republic.

JON BATEMAN 129

97 Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. Revokes More Than 1,000 Visas of Chinese Nationals, Citing Military Links,”
Reuters, September 9, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-visas-students/u-s-revokes-
more-than-1000-visas-of-chinese-nationals-citing-military-links-idUSKBN26039D; and Stuart
Anderson, “Biden Keeps Costly Trump Visa Policy Denying Chinese Grad Students,” Forbes, August 10,
2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2021/08/10/biden-keeps-costly-trump-visa-policy-
denying-chinese-grad-students/.
98 Remco Zwetsloot, Emily Weinstein, and Ryan Fedasiuk, “Assessing the Scope of U.S. Visa Restrictions
on Chinese Students,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, February 2021, https://cset.
georgetown.edu/publication/assessing-the-scope-of-u-s-visa-restrictions-on-chinese-students/.
99 For an overview, see Evan Burke, “Trump-Era Policies Toward Chinese STEM Talent: A Need for Better
Balance,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.
org/2021/03/25/trump-era-policies-toward-chinese-stem-talent-need-for-better-balance-pub-84137; and
Evan Burke, “The Right Way to Bring Chinese STEM Talent Back to the U.S.,” ChinaFile, April 27,
2021, https://www.chinafile.com/reporting-opinion/viewpoint/right-way-bring-chinese-stem-talent-back-
us.
100 “Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure for Nonimmigrant
Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media,” Department
of Homeland Security, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,526 (September 25, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/09/25/2020-20845/establishing-a-fixed-time-period-of-admission-and-an-extension-of-
stay-procedure-for-nonimmigrant.
101 “Strengthening Wage Protections for the Temporary and Permanent Employment of Certain Aliens
in the United States,” Department of Labor, 86 Fed. Reg. 3,608 (January 14, 2021), https://www.
federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/14/2021-00218/strengthening-wage-protections-for-the-
temporary-and-permanent-employment-of-certain-aliens-in-the.
102 Proclamation 10052, “Suspension of Entry of Immigrants and Nonimmigrants Who Present a
Risk to the United States Labor Market During the Economic Recovery Following the 2019 Novel
Coronavirus Outbreak,” 85 Fed. Reg. 38,263 (June 22, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/06/25/2020-13888/suspension-of-entry-of-immigrants-and-nonimmigrants-who-
present-a-risk-to-the-united-states-labor.
103 Evan Burke, “Trump-Era Policies Toward Chinese STEM Talent: A Need for Better Balance,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/25/
trump-era-policies-toward-chinese-stem-talent-need-for-better-balance-pub-84137.
104 “Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure for Nonimmigrant
Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media,”
Department of Homeland Security, 86 Fed. Reg. 35,410 (July 6, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/07/06/2021-13929/establishing-a-fixed-time-period-of-admission-and-an-extension-of-
stay-procedure-for-nonimmigrant; “Biden Admin Proposes 18-Month Delay in Calculating Prevailing
Wages of H-1B, Other Visas,” Economic Times, March 24, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.
com/nri/work/biden-admin-proposes-18-month-delay-in-calculating-prevailing-wages-of-h-1b-and-
other-visas/articleshow/81646252.cms; and “Biden Lets Trump Era H-1B Visa Bans Expire; Indian IT
Professionals to Benefit,” Economic Times, April 1, 2021, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/nri/
work/biden-lets-trump-era-h-1b-visa-bans-expire-indian-it-professionals-to-benefit/articleshow/81813752.
cms.
105 Abby Lemert and Eleanor Runde, “New U.S. Visa Rules Prompt Scrutiny of CCP Members,” Lawfare,
December 11, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/new-us-visa-rules-prompt-scrutiny-ccp-members.
106 Chad P. Bown and Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, “Will Trump Invoke National Security to Start a Trade
War?,” Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE), July 5, 2017, https://www.piie.com/blogs/
trade-investment-policy-watch/will-trump-invoke-national-security-start-trade-war.
107 19 U.S.C. § 1673.
108 19 U.S.C. § 1671.
109 Chad P. Bown, “Steel, Aluminum, Lumber, Solar: Trump’s Stealth Trade Protection,” PIIE, June 2017,
https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/pb17-21.pdf.
110 “Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations,” USITC, https://www.usitc.gov/
press_room/usad.htm.

130 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

111 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671, 1673.
112 19 U.S.C. § 1337. For a discussion of how Section 337 relates to China, see Yiqing Yin, “Section 337 of
the Tariff Act of 1930 and Its Impacts on China,” Catholic University Journal of Law and Technology 25,
no. 2 (2017), https://scholarship.law.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1038&context=jlt.
113 “Certain Two-Way Radio Equipment and Systems, Related Software and Components Thereof;
Commission Decision to Affirm-in-Part, Modify-in-Part, Reverse-in-Part, and Strike Certain Portions
of a Final Initial Determination Finding a Violation of Section 337; Issuance of Limited Exclusion
Order and Cease and Desist Orders; and Termination of the Investigation,” USITC, 83 Fed. Reg. 59,415
(November 23, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/11/23/2018-25463/certain-two-
way-radio-equipment-and-systems-related-software-and-components-thereof-commission.
114 “Federal Indictment Charges PRC-Based Telecommunications Company With Conspiring With Former
Motorola Solutions Employees to Steal Technology,” press release, Justice Department, February 7, 2022,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/federal-indictment-charges-prc-based-telecommunications-company-
conspiring-former-motorola.
115 “Certain Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Components Thereof; Final Determination Finding a
Violation of Section 337 and Issuance of Remedial Orders; Suspension of Enforcement of the Remedial
Orders Pending Final Resolution of a Final Written Decision by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board;
and Termination of the Investigation,” USITC, 85 Fed. Reg. 52,640 (August 26, 2020), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/26/2020-18695/certain-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-and-
components-thereof-final-determination-finding-a-violation-of.
116 Qingyu Yin et al., “Latest Development in the DJI-Autel Disputes,” Finnegan, August 24, 2020,
https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/ip-updates/latest-development-in-the-dji-autel-disputes.html;
“Certain Unmanned Aerial Vehicles and Components Thereof; Commission Determination to Institute
a Rescission Proceeding and Rescind Permanently a Limited Exclusion Order and Cease and Desist
Orders; Termination of Rescission Proceeding,” USITC, 86 Fed. Reg. 51,676 (August 16, 2021),
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/09/16/2021-19977/certain-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-
and-components-thereof-commission-determination-to-institute-a; and Ishveena Singh, “DJI, Autel
Settle Years-Long Patent Dispute Days Before Jury Trial,” DroneDJ, August 19, 2021, https://dronedj.
com/2021/08/19/dji-autel-settle-years-long-patent-dispute-days-before-jury-trial/.
117 “Anti-dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, Etc.,” World Trade Organization (WTO), https://
www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm; and Chad P. Bown, “Steel, Aluminum,
Lumber, Solar: Trump’s Stealth Trade Protection,” PIIE, June 2017, https://www.piie.com/system/files/
documents/pb17-21.pdf.
118 “DS186: United States — Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 and Amendments Thereto,” WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds186_e.htm; and Joel W. Rogers and Joseph P.
Whitlock, “Is Section 337 Consistent With the GATT and the TRIPs Agreement?,” American University
International Law Review 17, no. 3 (2002), https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1220&context=auilr.
119 For a general overview, see Brock R. Williams et al., “Trump Administration Tariff Actions: Frequently
Asked Questions,” Congressional Research Service, December 15, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/
product/pdf/R/R45529; and Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb, “Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-
Date Guide,” PIIE, October 31, 2021, https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-
war-timeline.pdf.
120 Another example is Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974, which authorizes the ITC to investigate surges
of foreign imports in “such increased quantities” that are or threaten to become “a substantial cause of
serious injury” to U.S. industry. (The import surge need not be unfair in any way.) A USITC finding then
allows the President to impose temporary “global safeguards,” such as tariffs or other import restrictions,
on the imported item from all countries. Trump instituted safeguards for solar panels and washing
machines, following the first new investigations under this authority since 2001. 19 U.S.C. § 2251;
“Understanding Safeguard Investigations,” USITC, https://www.usitc.gov/press_room/us_safeguard.
htm; “President Trump Approves Relief for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar Cell Manufacturers,” press
release, U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), January 22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/
press-office/press-releases/2018/january/president-trump-approves-relief-us; and Chad P. Bown and Junie
Joseph, “Solar and Washing Machine Safeguards in Context: The History of US Section 201 Use,” PIIE,

JON BATEMAN 131

 October 31, 2017, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/solar-and-washing-
machine-safeguards-context-history-us.
121 19 U.S.C. § 2411.
122 19 U.S.C. § 2411(c)(3)(B).
123 “Addressing China’s Laws, Policies, Practices, and Actions Related to Intellectual Property, Innovation,
and Technology,” Presidential Memorandum for the USTR, 82 Fed. Reg. 39,007 (August 14, 2017),
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-memorandum-united-states-
trade-representative/.
124 “Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,” USTR, March 22,
2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF.
125 Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb, “Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide,” PIIE, October
31, 2021, https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf; Chad P.
Bown, “US-China Trade War Tariffs: An Up-to-Date Chart,” PIIE, March 16, 2021, https://www.piie.
com/research/piie-charts/us-china-trade-war-tariffs-date-chart; and Andres B. Schwarzenberg, “Section
301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use,” Congressional Research Service, December
14, 2020, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R46604.pdf.
126 “USTR Issues Tariffs on Chinese Products in Response to Unfair Trade Practices,” press release,
USTR, June 15, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/june/ustr-
issues-tariffs-chinese-products; USTR, “USTR Finalizes Tariffs on $200 Billion of Chinese Imports
in Response to China’s Unfair Trade Practices,” September 18, 2018, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-
offices/press-office/press-releases/2018/september/ustr-finalizes-tariffs-200; and Brock R. Williams et al.,
“Trump Administration Tariff Actions: Frequently Asked Questions,” Congressional Research Service,
December 15, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45529.
127 Andres B. Schwarzenberg, “Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974: Origin, Evolution, and Use,”
Congressional Research Service, December 14, 2020, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R46604.pdf; and Brock
R. Williams et al., “Trump Administration Tariff Actions: Frequently Asked Questions,” Congressional
Research Service, December 15, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R45529.
128 Joseph L. Barloon et al., “USTR Relaunches Exclusion Process for China Section 301 Tariffs,”
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, October 12, 2021 https://www.skadden.com/insights/
publications/2021/10/ustr-relaunches-exclusion-process.
129 Chad P. Bown and Cathleen Cimino-Isaacs, “Will Trump Invoke National Security to Start a Trade
War?,” PIIE, July 5, 2017, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/will-trump-invoke-
national-security-start-trade-war.
130 19 U.S.C. § 1862.
131 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d).
132 Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb, “Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date Guide,” PIIE, October
31, 2021, https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf.
133 Chad P. Bown, “Trump’s Long-awaited Steel and Aluminum Tariffs Are Just the Beginning,” PIIE,
March 26, 2018, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/trumps-long-awaited-
steel-and-aluminum-tariffs-are-just; and Chad P. Bown and Melina Kolb, “Trump’s Trade War Timeline:
An Up-to-Date Guide,” PIIE, October 31, 2021, https://www.piie.com/sites/default/files/documents/
trump-trade-war-timeline.pdf.
134 19 U.S.C. § 1307.
135 “Withhold Release Orders and Findings List,” Customs and Border Protection (CBP), https://www.cbp.
gov/trade/forced-labor/withhold-release-orders-and-findings.
136 “DHS Cracks Down on Goods Produced by China’s State-Sponsored Forced Labor,” press release, CBP,
September 14, 2020, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/dhs-cracks-down-goods-
produced-china-s-state-sponsored-forced-labor; and “The Department of Homeland Security Issues
Withhold Release Order on Silica-Based Products Made by Forced Labor in Xinjiang,” press release,
CBP, June 24, 2021, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/national-media-release/department-homeland-
security-issues-withhold-release-order-silica.

132 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

137 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021, Public Law No. 117-78, § 3, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/PLAW-117publ78/pdf/PLAW-117publ78.pdf.
138 “Sanctions Programs and Country Information,” Treasury Department, https://home.treasury.gov/
policy-issues/financial-sanctions/sanctions-programs-and-country-information.
139 “Reference Sheet on Economic Sanctions,” Brookings Institution, December 2020, https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ReferenceSheet_EconomicSanctions.pdf.
140 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
141 50 U.S.C. § 1701, 1702.
142 As of March 11, 2022. “Declared National Emergencies Under the National Emergencies Act,” Brennan
Center, December 15, 2021, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/declared-
national-emergencies-under-national-emergencies-act.
143 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651.
144 “Reference Sheet on Economic Sanctions,” Brookings Institution, December 2020, https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/12/ReferenceSheet_EconomicSanctions.pdf.
145 As of March 27, 2022, based on author’s analysis of the Treasury Department’s Sanctions List Search
and SDN spreadsheet, available at https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/ and https://home.treasury.gov/
policy-issues/financial-sanctions/specially-designated-nationals-list-data-formats-data-schemas (primary
names). Figures exclude all entries with exact duplicate names; however, they may include entries for
close variations of names, aliases, subsidiaries, and affiliates. “China” here refers to mainland China plus
Hong Kong and Macau. China-based actors include some third-country entities that maintain a presence
in China.
146 For the purpose of these figures, China-specific reasons refer to human rights abuses and corruption
(Executive Order 13818) and Hong Kong repression (Executive Order 13936).
147 “Treasury Sanctions CEIEC for Supporting the Illegitimate Maduro Regime’s Efforts to Undermine
Venezuelan Democracy,” Treasury Department, November 30, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/
press-releases/sm1194.
148 Executive Order 13818, “Blocking the Property of Persons Involved in Serious Human Rights
Abuse or Corruption,” 82 Fed. Reg. 60,839 (December 20, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2017/12/26/2017-27925/blocking-the-property-of-persons-involved-in-serious-human-rights-
abuse-or-corruption.
149 As of March 27, 2022, based on author’s analysis of the Treasury Department’s Sanctions List Search,
available at https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/. Figures include China, Hong Kong, and Macau-based
actors, excluding duplicate entries associated with more than one of these jurisdictions. Rob Berschinski,
“Trump Administration Notches a Serious Human Rights Win. No, really.” Just Security, January 10,
2018, https://www.justsecurity.org/50846/trump-administration-notches-human-rights-win-no-really/.
150 Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, Public Law No. 116-145, § 6, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/PLAW-116publ145/pdf/PLAW-116publ145.pdf; and Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of
2021, Public Law No. 117-78, § 5, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-117publ78/pdf/PLAW-
117publ78.pdf.
151 As of March 27, 2022, based on author’s analysis of the Treasury Department’s Sanctions List Search,
available at https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov/. Executive Order 13936, “The President’s Executive
Order on Hong Kong Normalization,” 85 Fed. Reg. 43,413 (July 14, 2020), https://www.federalregister.
gov/documents/2020/07/17/2020-15646/the-presidents-executive-order-on-hong-kong-normalization.
152 S.1260, “United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,” §§ 3211, 5202, https://www.congress.
gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1260/text.
153 S.1260, “United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,” §§ 5203-5204, https://www.congress.
gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/1260/text.
154 H.R. 4521, The America COMPETES Act of 2022, https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.
gov/files/BILLS-117HR4521RH-RCP117-31.pdf.
155 Executive Order 13942, “Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps to
Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology

JON BATEMAN 133

 and Services Supply Chain,” 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (August 6, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-tiktok-and-taking-additional-
steps-to-address-the-national-emergency; and Executive Order 13943, “Addressing the Threat Posed
by WeChat, and Taking Additional Steps to Address the National Emergency With Respect to the
Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,” 85 Fed. Reg. 48,641
(August 6, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/08/11/2020-17700/addressing-the-
threat-posed-by-wechat-and-taking-additional-steps-to-address-the-national-emergency.
156 Executive Order 13873, “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and
Services Supply Chain,” 84 Fed. Reg. 22689 (May 15, 2019) https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2019/05/17/2019-10538/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-
services-supply-chain.
157 “Identification of Prohibited Transactions to Implement Executive Order 13942 and Address the Threat
Posed by TikTok and the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications
Technology and Services Supply Chain,” Commerce Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 60,061 (September 24,
2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/09/24/2020-21193/identification-of-prohibited-
transactions-to-implement-executive-order-13942-and-address-the-threat.
158 Executive Order 13971, “Addressing the Threat Posed by Applications and Other Software Developed or
Controlled by Chinese Companies,” 86 Fed. Reg. 1249 (January 5, 2021), https://www.federalregister.
gov/documents/2021/01/08/2021-00305/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-applications-and-other-
software-developed-or-controlled-by-chinese.
159 Robert Chesney, “TikTok, WeChat, and Biden’s New Executive Order: What You Need to Know,”
Lawfare, June 9, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/tiktok-wechat-and-bidens-new-executive-order-
what-you-need-know.
160 Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” 85 Fed. Reg. 26595 (May 1,
2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/05/04/2020-09695/securing-the-united-states-
bulk-power-system.
161 Department of Energy, “Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” 86 Fed. Reg. 533
(January 6, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/06/2020-28773/prohibition-
order-securing-critical-defense-facilities.
162 “Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Ensuring the Continued Security of the United States
Critical Electric Infrastructure,” Department of Energy, 86 Fed. Reg. 21,309 (April 22, 2021), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/04/22/2021-08482/notice-of-request-for-information-rfi-on-
ensuring-the-continued-security-of-the-united-states.
163 “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,”
Commerce Department, 86 Fed. Reg. 4909 (January 19, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/01/19/2021-01234/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-
services-supply-chain.
164 “Fact Sheet: Executive Order Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,”
press release, White House, June 9, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-
releases/2021/06/09/fact-sheet-executive-order-protecting-americans-sensitive-data-from-
foreign-adversaries/; and Executive Order 14034, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From
Foreign Adversaries,” 86 Fed. Reg. 31,423 (June 9, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/06/11/2021-12506/protecting-americans-sensitive-data-from-foreign-adversaries.
165 “U.S. Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo Statement on Actions Taken Under ICTS Supply Chain
Executive Order,” press release, Commerce Department, March 17, 2021, https://www.commerce.gov/
news/press-releases/2021/03/us-secretary-commerce-gina-raimondo-statement-actions-taken-under-icts;
Alexandra Alper, “Exclusive: U.S. Examining Alibaba’s Cloud Unit for National Security Risks –
Sources,” Reuters, January 19, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-us-examining-
alibabas-cloud-unit-national-security-risks-sources-2022-01-18/; and Ben Brody, “A Secretive US Security
Program Has Its Sights on DiDi,” Protocol, March 23, 2022, https://www.protocol.com/policy/didi-
commerce-icts.
166 Haye Kesteloo, “Department of Defense Bans the Purchase of Commercial-Over-the-Shelf UAS,
Including DJI Drones Effective Immediately,” DroneDJ, June 7, 2018, https://dronedj.com/2018/06/07/
department-of-defense-bans-the-purchase-of-commercial-over-the-shelf-uas-including-dji-drones/; and

134 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Public Law No. 116-92, § 848, https://www.
govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-116publ92/pdf/PLAW-116publ92.pdf.
167 “Secretary Bernhardt Signs Order Grounding Interior’s Drone Fleet for Non-Emergency Operations,”
press release, Department of Interior, January 29, 2020, https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/secretary-
bernhardt-signs-order-grounding-interiors-drone-fleet-non-emergency.
168 Executive Order 13981, “Protecting the United States From Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems,” 86
Fed. Reg. 6,821 (January 18, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/22/2021-01646/
protecting-the-united-states-from-certain-unmanned-aircraft-systems.
169 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law No. 115-232, §
889(f)(3)(A-B).
170 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law No. 115-232, §
889(f)(3)(D).
171 Angela B. Styles, Scott M. Heimberg, Robert K. Huffman, and Chris Chamberlain, “Section 889(a)(1)
(B): Five Things to Know About the Interim Rule and a Roadmap for Compliance,” Akin Gump, August
5, 2020, https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/section-889a1b-five-things-to-know-about-the-
interim-rule-and-a-roadmap-for-compliance.html.
172 Author’s analysis of the Treasury Department’s Federal Contract Explorer spreadsheet, available at
https://datalab.usaspending.gov/unstructured-data/contract-explorer/awards_contracts_FY18_v2.csv.
This figure excludes all entries with exact duplicate names; however, they include entries for close
variations of names, aliases, subsidiaries, and affiliates.
173 47 C.F.R. §§ 54.9–54.11; and “Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications
Supply Chain Through FCC Programs,” FCC, 86 Fed. Reg. 46,995 (August 23, 2021), https://www.
federalregister.gov/documents/2021/08/23/2021-17279/protecting-against-national-security-threats-to-
the-communications-supply-chain-through-fcc-programs.
174 Matt Kapko, “Rural US Carriers Secure $1.9B to Rip Out Chinese Equipment,” SDxCentral, December
23, 2020, https://www.sdxcentral.com/articles/news/rural-us-carriers-secure-1-9b-to-rip-out-chinese-
equipment/2020/12/; and Mike Dano, “Verizon, CenturyLink, Windstream Still Using Huawei,
ZTE Equipment,” September 4, 2020, https://www.lightreading.com/security/verizon-centurylink-
windstream-still-using-huawei-zte-equipment/d/d-id/763705.
175 As of December 1, 2021. Eileen Guo, Jess Aloe, and Karen Hao, “We Built a Database to Understand the
China Initiative. Then the Government Changed Its Records.” MIT Technology Review, December 2,
2021, https://www.technologyreview.com/2021/12/02/1039397/china-initiative-database-doj/.
176 “Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering
Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets,” press release, Justice Department, February 13, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-subsidiaries-
charged-racketeering.
177 “Information About the Department of Justice’s China Initiative and a Compilation of China-Related
Prosecutions Since 2018,” Justice Department, November 19, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/nsd/
information-about-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-related.
178 “Chinese Telecommunications Conglomerate Huawei and Subsidiaries Charged in Racketeering
Conspiracy and Conspiracy to Steal Trade Secrets,” press release, Justice Department, February 13, 2020,
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-telecommunications-conglomerate-huawei-and-subsidiaries-
charged-racketeering.
179 As of September 15, 2021. Ellen Nakashima and David Nakamura, “China Initiative Aims to Stop
Economic Espionage. Is Targeting Academics Over Grant Fraud ‘Overkill’?,” Washington Post,
September 15, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-initiative-questions-
dismissals/2021/09/15/530ef936-f482-11eb-9738-8395ec2a44e7_story.html.
180 Ellen Nakashima and David Nakamura, “U.S. Drops Cases Against Five Researchers Accused of
Hiding Ties to Chinese Military,” Washington Post, July 23, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national-security/us-drops-cases-against-five-researchers-accused-of-hiding-ties-to-chinese-
military/2021/07/23/54a8b268-ec04-11eb-8950-d73b3e93ff7f_story.html; and Elizabeth Redden, “A
Retreat From China Collaborations in the Face of U.S. Scrutiny,” Inside Higher Ed, October 29, 2021,
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2021/10/29/survey-finds-chilling-effect-china-initiative.

JON BATEMAN 135

181 George P. Varghese, Benjamin Conery, Hyun-Soo Lim, and Christina Luo, “DOJ’s ‘China Initiative’
Falters,” Wilmer Hale, August 5, 2021, https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20210805-
dojs-china-initiative-falters.
182 Ellen Nakashima and David Nakamura, “U.S. Drops Cases Against Five Researchers Accused of
Hiding Ties to Chinese Military,” Washington Post, July 23, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national-security/us-drops-cases-against-five-researchers-accused-of-hiding-ties-to-chinese-
military/2021/07/23/54a8b268-ec04-11eb-8950-d73b3e93ff7f_story.html; Associated Press, “Tennessee
Professor With Ties to China Acquitted by District Judge,” Washington Post, September 10, 2021,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/tennessee-professor-with-ties-to-china-acquitted-by-district-
judge/2021/09/10/30d32e74-0c64-11ec-aea1-42a8138f132a_story.html; and Ellen Barry and Katie
Benner, “U.S. Drops Its Case Against M.I.T. Scientist Accused of Hiding China Links,” New York Times,
January 20, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/20/science/gang-chen-mit-china-initiative.html.
183 “Harvard University Professor Convicted of Making False Statements and Tax Offenses,” press release,
Justice Department, December 21, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/harvard-university-
professor-convicted-making-false-statements-and-tax-offenses.
184 Matthew Olsen, “Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen Delivers Remarks on Countering Nation-
State Threats,” Justice Department, February 23, 2022, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorney-general-matthew-olsen-delivers-remarks-countering-nation-state-threats.
185 Matthew Olsen, “Assistant Attorney General Matthew Olsen Delivers Remarks on Countering Nation-
State Threats,” Justice Department, February 23, 2022, https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-
attorney-general-matthew-olsen-delivers-remarks-countering-nation-state-threats.
186 The canvas is not entirely blank, as Congress has made it difficult for the executive branch to rescind
certain China-tech restrictions. In this way, Congress is contributing to the risk (discussed later) of
feedback loops that entrench and accelerate technological decoupling.

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CHOOSING A STRATEGY
187 Evan Burke, “Trump-Era Policies Toward Chinese STEM Talent: A Need for Better Balance,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/25/
trump-era-policies-toward-chinese-stem-talent-need-for-better-balance-pub-84137.
188 For a more sophisticated taxonomy that is not tech-specific, see Ganesh Sitaraman, “Mapping the
China Debate,” Lawfare, May 26, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/mapping-china-debate. For a
robust synthesis of decades of expert debates on geo-technological competition and controls, see Adam
Kline and Tim Hwang, “From Cold War Sanctions to Weaponized Interdependence: An Annotated
Bibliography on Competition and Control Over Emerging Technologies,” Center for Security and
Emerging Technology, September 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/from-cold-war-
sanctions-to-weaponized-interdependence/.
189 Matt Pottinger, “Beijing’s American Hustle,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2021, https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-08-23/beijings-american-hustle; Derek Scissors, “Partial Decoupling
From China: A Brief Guide,” American Enterprise Institute, July 2020, https://www.aei.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/07/Partial-decoupling-from-China.pdf; and Tom Cotton, “Beat China: Targeted
Decoupling and the Economic Long War,” February 2021, https://www.cotton.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/210216_1700_China%20Report_FINAL.pdf.
190 Farhad Manjoo, “Dealing With China Isn’t Worth the Moral Cost,” New York Times, October 9, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/china-houston-rockets.html; and “A Human Rights
Approach to US-China Policy,” Human Rights Watch, February 17, 2021, https://www.hrw.org/
news/2021/02/17/human-rights-approach-us-china-policy.
191 Ryan Browne, “Top US General Says Google ‘Is Indirectly Benefiting the Chinese Military,’” CNN,
March 14, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/14/politics/dunford-china-google/index.html.
192 A magisterial version of this argument can be found in Rush Doshi, The Long Game (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2021). That said, Doshi’s discussion of technology does not necessarily fit
within restrictionist canon. He ultimately calls for a fairly targeted set of U.S. government tech controls
combined with robust offensive investment and international coordination. Meanwhile, Hal Brands and
Michael Beckley have provided a contrasting set of predictions, arguing that China is a “peaking power”
whose growing boldness on the world stage stems from a sense of impending decline. Hal Brands and
Michael Beckley, “China Is a Declining Power—and That’s the Problem,” Foreign Policy, September 24,
2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/24/china-great-power-united-states/.
193 Hal Brands, “Containment Can Work Against China, Too,” Wall Street Journal, December 3, 2021,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/containment-can-work-against-china-too-11638547169. Elsewhere, Brands
and Michael Beckley have argued that Washington should “check China’s technological expansion”
by “restrict[ing] the export of technologies made in the United States and other democracies on which
Chinese technology still depends” (including “semiconductors”), yet they cautioned against a “full
technological embargo.” Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, “Competition With China Could Be
Short and Sharp,” Foreign Affairs, December 17, 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-
states/2020-12-17/competition-china-could-be-short-and-sharp.
194 Kiran Stacey and James Politi, “Google Warns of US National Security Risks From Huawei Ban,”
Financial Times, June 6 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/3bbb6fec-88c5-11e9-a028-86cea8523dc2;
and John Neuffer, “Report Shows Risks of Excessive Restrictions on Trade With China,” Semiconductor
Industry Association, March 9, 2020, https://www.semiconductors.org/report-shows-risks-of-excessive-
restrictions-on-trade-with-china/.
195 “Internet Society Statement on U.S. Clean Network Program,” press release, Internet Society, August
7, 2020, https://www.internetsociety.org/news/statements/2020/internet-society-statement-on-u-s-
clean-network-program/; and “An Open, Interconnected and Interoperable Internet (Joint Letter),”
World Wide Web Foundation, September 14, 2021, https://webfoundation.org/2021/09/an-open-
interconnected-and-interoperable-internet-joint-letter/.
196 Bernie Sanders, “Washington’s Dangerous New Consensus on China,” Foreign Affairs, June 17, 2021,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-06-17/washingtons-dangerous-new-consensus-china.

JON BATEMAN 137

197 Daniel Flatley, “Bernie Sanders Proposes Forcing Chipmakers to Give U.S. Equity for Aid,” Bloomberg,
May 24, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-05-24/sanders-proposes-forcing-
chipmakers-to-give-u-s-equity-for-aid?sref=QmOxnLFz.
198 “CAPAC Members and Attorney General Garland Discuss China Initiative, COVID-19 Hate Crimes
Act, and Language Access,” press release, Congressional Asian Pacific American Caucus, October 29,
2021, https://capac-chu.house.gov/press-release/capac-members-and-attorney-general-garland-discuss-
china-initiative-covid-19-hate.
199 “Cooperation, Not Cold War, to Confront the Climate Crisis,” open letter, Friends of the Earth, July
7, 2021, http://foe.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/Cooperation-Not-Cold-War-To-Confront-the-
Climate-Crisis-129.pdf.
200 “Turnaround: New Multilateral Trade Rules for People-Centered Shared Prosperity and Sustainable
Development,” press release, Our World Is Not for Sale network, September 2021, https://
ourworldisnotforsale.net/2021_WTO-Turnaround; and David Klion, “What Should the Left Do About
China?,” The Nation, January 11, 2022, https://www.thenation.com/article/world/china-left-foreign-
policy/.
201 “Asymmetric Competition: A Strategy for China & Technology,” China Strategy Group, Fall 2020,
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20463382-final-memo-china-strategy-group-axios-1.
202 Stephanie Segal, “Degrees of Separation: A Targeted Approach to U.S.-China Decoupling – Final
Report,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2021, https://csis-website-prod.
s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211021_Segal_DegreesSeparation_Final.pdf.
203 Richard Danzig and Lorand Laskai, “Symbiosis and Strive: Where Is the Sino-American Relationship
Bound?,” Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory (JHU APL), 2020, https://www.jhuapl.
edu/assessing-us-china-technology-connections/dist/00f3f3c246ab508f9fe11452bb18200c.pdf.
204 Smart Competition: Adapting U.S. Strategy Toward China at 40 Years: A Hearing Before the House Foreign
Affairs Committee, 116th Cong. (2019) (testimony of Samm Sacks, May 8, 2019), https://www.congress.
gov/116/meeting/house/109457/witnesses/HHRG-116-FA00-Wstate-SacksS-20190508.pdf.
205 Susan Shirk, “How to Shield Silicon Valley,” Bloomberg, July 3, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/
opinion/articles/2018-07-03/how-the-u-s-should-defend-its-high-tech-from-china?sref=QmOxnLFz.
206 Chris Coons, “Senator Coons Outlines Bipartisan Strategy for U.S.-China Relations at the Wilson
Center,” press release, October 18, 2019, https://www.coons.senate.gov/news/press-releases/senator-
coons-outlines-bipartisan-strategy-for-us-china-relations-at-the-wilson-center.
207 Salman Ahmed et al., “Making U.S. Foreign Policy Work Better for the Middle Class,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, September, 23, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/USFP_
FinalReport_final1.pdf.
208 Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Emily Sullivan, “A Foreign Policy for the
Middle Class—What Americans Think,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, October 2021, https://
www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/2021-10/ccs2021_fpmc_0.pdf.
209 Andrew Imbrie, Ryan Fedasiuk, Catherine Aiken, Tarun Chhabra, and Husanjot Chahal, “Agile
Alliances: How the United States and Its Allies Can Deliver a Democratic Way of AI,” Center for
Security and Emerging Technology, February 2020, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/agile-
alliances/.
210 For more on the relationship between uncertainty and incrementalism, see Daniel W. Drezner, Ronald
R. Krebs, and Randall Schweller, “The End of Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2020, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/world/2020-04-13/end-grand-strategy. Drezner, Krebs, and Schweller
advocate decentralized, bottom-up decisionmaking, whereas this report proposes top-down strategic
guidance.
211 Dan Strumpf, “U.S. Set Out to Hobble China’s Huawei, and So It Has,” Wall Street Journal, October 7,
2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-set-out-to-hobble-chinas-huawei-and-so-it-has-11633617478.
212 Huawei’s current placement on the Treasury Department’s Non-SDN Chinese Military-Industrial
Complex Companies List is an outgrowth of its earlier (now-lapsed) designation as a “Communist
Chinese Military Company” by DOD. Huawei still remains on another, similar DOD list—the so-called
Section 1260H List—but this does not yet have any clear legal consequences. “Biden Administration
Revises and Expands Restrictions on U.S. Person Investment in Chinese Companies and Releases New

138 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

 List of ‘Chinese Military Companies’ Under 2021 NDAA Section 1260H,” Dorsey, June 10, 2021,
https://www.dorsey.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2021/06/new-list-of-chinese-military-
companies.
213 “The Backlash to Huawei’s Global 5G Expansion,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July
22, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/interactive/huawei-timeline.
214 Stu Woo, “The U.S. Is Back in the 5G Game,” Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/us-5g-companies-11621870061.
215 Stu Woo and Drew Hinshaw, “U.S. Fight Against Chinese 5G Efforts Shifts From Threats to Incentives,”
Wall Street Journal, June 14, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-fight-against-chinese-5g-efforts-
shifts-from-threats-to-incentives-11623663252.
216 Ariel E. Levite and Lyu Jinghua, “Travails of an Interconnected World: From Pandemics to the Digital
Economy,” Lawfare, April 30, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/travails-interconnected-world-
pandemics-digital-economy.
217 “Court Imposes Maximum Fine on Sinovel Wind Group for Theft of Trade Secrets,” press release, Justice
Department, July 6, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/court-imposes-maximum-fine-sinovel-wind-
group-theft-trade-secrets; and Diane Cardwell, “Solar Company Seeks Stiff U.S. Tariffs to Deter Chinese
Spying,” New York Times, September 1, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/02/business/trade-
duties-urged-as-new-deterrent-against-cybertheft.html.
218 Jonathan Watts, “We Have 12 Years to Limit Climate Change Catastrophe, Warns UN,” Guardian,
October 8, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/08/global-warming-must-not-
exceed-15c-warns-landmark-un-report.
219 Chris Buckley and Lisa Friedman, “Climate Change Is ‘Not a Geostrategic Weapon,’ Kerry Tells Chinese
Leaders,” September 1, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/02/world/asia/climate-china-us-kerry.
html.
220 Jon Bateman, “National Security in an Age of Insurrection,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, January 14, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/14/national-security-in-age-of-
insurrection-pub-83635.
221 Ellen Nakashima, “More Than 1,000 Visiting Researchers Affiliated With the Chinese Military Fled the
United States This Summer, Justice Department Says,” Washington Post, December 2, 2020, https://www.
washingtonpost.com/national-security/more-than-1000-visiting-researchers-affiliated-with-the-chinese-
military-fled-the-united-states-this-summer-justice-department-says/2020/12/02/9c564dee-34e1-11eb-
b59c-adb7153d10c2_story.html.
222 Ellen Nakashima and David Nakamura, “U.S. Drops Cases Against Five Researchers Accused of
Hiding Ties to Chinese Military,” Washington Post, July 23, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.
com/national-security/us-drops-cases-against-five-researchers-accused-of-hiding-ties-to-chinese-
military/2021/07/23/54a8b268-ec04-11eb-8950-d73b3e93ff7f_story.html.
223 Remco Zwetsloot, Emily Weinstein, and Ryan Fedasiuk, “Assessing the Scope of U.S. Visa Restrictions
on Chinese Students,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, February 2021, https://cset.
georgetown.edu/publication/assessing-the-scope-of-u-s-visa-restrictions-on-chinese-students/.
224 Humeyra Pamuk, “U.S. Revokes More Than 1,000 Visas of Chinese Nationals, Citing Military Links,”
Reuters, September 9, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-visas-students/u-s-revokes-
more-than-1000-visas-of-chinese-nationals-citing-military-links-idUSKBN26039D; and Stuart
Anderson, “Biden Keeps Costly Trump Visa Policy Denying Chinese Grad Students,” Forbes, August 10,
2021, https://www.forbes.com/sites/stuartanderson/2021/08/10/biden-keeps-costly-trump-visa-policy-
denying-chinese-grad-students/?sh=4f73456c3641.
225 For a side-by-side comparison of U.S. and Chinese government actions, see Yan Luo, Samm Sacks,
Naomi Wilson, and Abigail Coplin, “Mapping U.S.–China Technology Decoupling,” DigiChina,
August 27, 2020, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/digichina-mapping-decoupling-
final1.pdf.
226 B. Chen Zhu, Paul D. McKenzie, and Cheryl Zhu, “China’s ‘Unreliable Entity List’ Creates New
Countervailing Risks for Companies Navigating U.S. Sanctions and Long-Arm Enforcement,” Morrison
Foerster, October 7, 2020, https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/201007-china-mofcom-unreliable-
entity-list.html.

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227 Jane Li, “The Return of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou Has Become a Nationalist Moment for China,”
Quartz, September 27, 2021, https://qz.com/2065090/the-return-of-huawei-cfo-becomes-a-nationalist-
moment-for-china/.
228 “China Investigates Didi Over Cybersecurity Days After Its Huge IPO,” Reuters, July 2, 2021, https://
www.reuters.com/technology/china-cyberspace-administration-launches-security-investigation-into-
didi-2021-07-02/.
229 Senator John Kennedy, “Kennedy, Sullivan Call on SEC to Enforce Transparency Laws for Chinese
Companies Following Didi IPO Debacle,” July 29, 2021, https://www.kennedy.senate.gov/
public/2021/7/kennedy-sullivan-call-on-sec-to-enforce-transparency-laws-for-chinese-companies-
following-didi-ipo-debacle.
230 “Trade War: How Reliant Are US Colleges on Chinese Students?,” BBC, June 12, 2019, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-48542913.
231 Mary Hui, “Japan’s Global Rare Earths Quest Holds Lessons for the US and Europe,” Quartz, December
28, 2021, https://qz.com/1998773/japans-rare-earths-strategy-has-lessons-for-us-europe/.
232 John D. McKinnon, “U.S. to Impose Sweeping Rule Aimed at China Technology Threats,” Wall Street
Journal, February 26, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-to-impose-sweeping-rule-aimed-at-china-
technology-threats-11614362435.
233 Samantha Subin, “Palantir CEO Says Companies Working With U.S. Adversaries Should Justify Their
Position,” CNBC, November 23 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/11/23/palantir-ceo-companies-
working-with-us-adversaries-should-justify-their-position-.html.

TRANSLATING STRATEGY INTO POLICY AND PROCESS

234 Although the analysis and recommendations in this section are grounded in the centrist strategy outlined
earlier, the analytical structure and methodology used can be readily adopted by restrictionists or
cooperationists to frame their own arguments.

140 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

MAINTAINING A MILITARY EDGE OVER CHINA
235 “China Military Power: Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win,” Defense Intelligence Agency, 2019,
https://www.dia.mil/Portals/110/Images/News/Military_Powers_Publications/China_Military_Power_
FINAL_5MB_20190103.pdf.
236 Department of Defense Budget Posture: A Hearing Before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 115th Cong.
(2017) (testimony of General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 13,
2017), https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dunford_06-13-17.pdf.
237 Michael Dahm, “Chinese Debates on the Military Utility of Artificial Intelligence,” War on the Rocks,
June 4, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/chinese-debates-on-the-military-utility-of-artificial-
intelligence/.
238 Elsa B. Kania and Lorand Laskai, “Myths and Realities of China’s Military-Civil Fusion Strategy,”
Center for a New American Security, January 28, 2021, https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/
myths-and-realities-of-chinas-military-civil-fusion-strategy.
239 In a 2021 report to Congress, DOD stated, “The PRC Uses Imports, Foreign Investments, Commercial
Joint Ventures, Mergers and Acquisitions, and Industrial and Technical Espionage to Help Achieve
Its Military Modernization Goals.” “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China: 2021,” Department of Defense, November 3, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/
Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF.
240 Robert D. Blackwill and Philip Zelikow, “The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to Prevent
War,” Council on Foreign Relations, Special report no. 90, February 2021, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/
default/files/report_pdf/csr90_1.pdf; Elbridge Colby and Walter Slocombe, “The State of (Deterrence
by) Denial,” War on the Rocks, March 22, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/03/the-state-of-
deterrence-by-denial/; and Tanner Greer, “Why I Fear for Taiwan,” Scholar’s Stage, September 11, 2020,
https://scholars-stage.org/why-i-fear-for-taiwan/.
241 The research also found that “U.S. companies are inadvertently powering Chinese military advances in
AI” due to “loopholes and shortfalls in the export control system.” However, this problem is challenging
to address and not cost-free, as discussed elsewhere. Ryan Fedasiuk, “We Spent a Year Investigating What
the Chinese Army Is Buying. Here’s What We Learned,” Politico, November 10, 2021, https://www.
politico.com/news/magazine/2021/11/10/chinese-army-ai-defense-contracts-520445.
242 “Final Report,” National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, March 2021, https://www.
nscai.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf.
243 “Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China: 2021,” Department of
Defense, November 3, 2021, https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-
FINAL.PDF.
244 Alex Stone and Peter W. Singer, “How China Is Planning for a Tech Decoupling,” Defense One, October
12, 2021, https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/10/how-china-planning-tech-decoupling/186029/.
245 Daniel H. Nexon, “Against Great Power Competition,” Foreign Affairs, February 15, 2021, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-15/against-great-power-competition; and Cornell
Overfield, “Biden’s ‘Strategic Competition’ Is a Step Back,” Foreign Policy, October 13, 2021, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/13/biden-strategic-competition-national-defense-strategy/.
246 Gordon Long, “Fundamental Research Security,” JASON, December 6, 2019, https://www.nsf.gov/news/
special_reports/jasonsecurity/JSR-19-2IFundamentalResearchSecurity_12062019FINAL.pdf.
247 Ryan Browne, “Top US General Says Google ‘Is Indirectly Benefiting the Chinese Military,’” CNN,
March 14, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/14/politics/dunford-china-google/index.html; and B.
Chen Zhu, Brandon L. Van Grack, Timothy W. Blakely, and Charles L. Capito, “U.S. Court Blocks
Trump-Era Designation of Xiaomi as a Chinese Military Company and Permits Continued Trading in
Its Securities,” Morrison Foerster, March 19, 2021, https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/210319-us-
court-blocks-trump-era-designation.html.

JON BATEMAN 141

248 Fenella McGerty and Meia Nouwens, “China’s New Five-Year Plan and 2021 Budget: What Do They
Mean For Defence?,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 8, 2021, https://www.iiss.org/
blogs/analysis/2021/03/chinas-new-five-year-plan-and-2021-budget; and David Arthur and F. Matthew
Woodward, “Long-Term Implications of the 2021 Future Years Defense Program,” Congressional Budget
Office, September 2020, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/56554.
249 This particular study was published in 2015, but in the intervening years, the key factors undergirding
its conclusion have not reversed. Eric Heginbotham et al., “The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces,
Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017,” RAND Corporation, 2015, https://www.
rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR392.html.
250 For example, the Lowy Institute’s most recent Asia Power Index found that China is investing and
gaining more in its international economic ties than in its defense capabilities and relationships. Hervé
Lemahieu and Alyssa Leng, “Asia Power Index: Key Findings 2021,” Lowy Institute, 2021, https://power.
lowyinstitute.org/downloads/lowy-institute-2021-asia-power-index-key-findings-report.pdf.
251 This example is hypothetical.
252 Christian Brose, “The New Revolution in Military Affairs: War’s Sci-Fi Future,” Foreign Affairs, May/
June 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2019-04-16/new-revolution-military-affairs.
253 David Benowitz, “DJI Added to the US Entity List – What’s the Impact?,” DroneAnalyst, December 21,
2020, https://droneanalyst.com/2020/12/21/dji-added-to-the-us-entity-list-whats-the-impact.
254 B. Chen Zhu, Brandon L. Van Grack, Timothy W. Blakely, and Charles L. Capito, “U.S. Court Blocks
Trump-Era Designation of Xiaomi as a Chinese Military Company and Permits Continued Trading in
Its Securities,” Morrison Foerster, March 19, 2021, https://www.mofo.com/resources/insights/210319-us-
court-blocks-trump-era-designation.html.
255 “President Biden Revamps Communist Chinese Military Companies (CCMC) Sanctions Program,”
Paul, Weiss, June 7, 2021, https://www.paulweiss.com/practices/litigation/economic-sanctions-aml/
publications/president-biden-revamps-communist-chinese-military-companies-ccmc-sanctions-
program?id=40293.
256 “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,”
Commerce Department, 86 Fed. Reg. 4909 (January 19, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/01/19/2021-01234/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-
services-supply-chain.
257 Select Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives on U.S. National Security and Military/
Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, “U.S. Export Policy Toward the PRC,
vol. III, ch. 9.” May 25, 1999, https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851/
pdf/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851-3-5.pdf; and Ellen Nakashima and Gerry Shih, “China Builds
Advanced Weapons Systems Using American Chip Technology,” Washington Post, April 9,
2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-hypersonic-missiles-american-
technology/2021/04/07/37a6b9be-96fd-11eb-b28d-bfa7bb5cb2a5_story.html.
258 “Supercomputer Export Controls Strengthened,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.
org/node/3147.
259 Ellen Nakashima and Gerry Shih, “China Builds Advanced Weapons Systems Using American Chip
Technology,” Washington Post, April 9, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-
hypersonic-missiles-american-technology/2021/04/07/37a6b9be-96fd-11eb-b28d-bfa7bb5cb2a5_story.
html.
260 “Addition of Certain Persons to the Entity List; and Removal of Person From the Entity List Based on
a Removal Request,” Commerce Department, 80 Fed. Reg. 8,524 (February 18, 2015), https://www.
federalregister.gov/documents/2015/02/18/2015-03321/addition-of-certain-persons-to-the-entity-list-and-
removal-of-person-from-the-entity-list-based-on-a.
261 Ana Swanson, Paul Mozur, and Steve Lohr, “U.S. Blacklists More Chinese Tech Companies Over
National Security Concerns,” New York Times, June 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/
us/politics/us-china-trade-blacklist.html; and Kate O’Keeffe and Asa Fitch, “U.S. Targets China’s
Supercomputing Push With New Export Restrictions,” Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2019, https://www.
wsj.com/articles/u-s-targets-chinas-supercomputing-push-with-new-export-restrictions-11561129547.

142 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

262 “Commerce Adds Seven Chinese Supercomputing Entities to Entity List for Their Support to China’s
Military Modernization, and Other Destabilizing Efforts,” press release, Commerce Department,
April 8, 2021, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/04/commerce-adds-seven-chinese-
supercomputing-entities-entity-list-their.
263 Jane Zhang and Che Pan, “China’s Blacklisted Supercomputer Organisations: Who Are They and
What Do They Do?,” South China Morning Post, April 9, 2021 https://www.scmp.com/tech/tech-war/
article/3128963/chinas-blacklisted-supercomputer-organisations-who-are-they-and-what; and Ana
Swanson, Paul Mozur, and Steve Lohr, “U.S. Blacklists More Chinese Tech Companies Over National
Security Concerns,” New York Times, June 21, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/21/us/politics/
us-china-trade-blacklist.html.
264 Jeff Gerth, “U.S. Raises Trade Issue With China,” New York Times, July 2, 1997, https://www.nytimes.
com/1997/07/02/world/us-raises-trade-issue-with-china.html; and Tom Mullaney, “The Origins of
Chinese Supercomputing,” Foreign Affairs, August 4, 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/
china/2016-08-04/origins-chinese-supercomputing.
265 Mark Cancian and Adam Saxton, “What’s in a Name? Billions in Cuts Depend on Defining ‘Legacy,’”
Breaking Defense, March 10, 2021, https://breakingdefense.com/2021/03/whats-in-a-name-billions-in-
cuts-depend-on-defining-legacy/; Jack Detsch, “‘No Decisions, No Changes’: Pentagon Fails to Stick Asia
Pivot,” Foreign Policy, November 29, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/29/pentagon-china-biden-
asia-pivot/; and Joe Gould, “Tech Startups Still Face the Pentagon’s ‘Valley of Death,’” Defense News,
January 30, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/2020/01/30/tech-startups-still-face-the-pentagons-
valley-of-death/.
266 Daniel Gonzales et al., “Unclassified and Secure: A Defense Industrial Base Cyber Protection Program
for Unclassified Defense Networks,” RAND Corporation, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_
reports/RR4227.html.

JON BATEMAN 143

LIMITING CHINESE NATIONAL SECURITY ESPIONAGE
267 “The China Threat,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, https://www.fbi.gov/investigate/
counterintelligence/the-china-threat.
268 Christopher Wray, “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to
the Economic and National Security of the United States” (video lecture, Hudson Institute, Washington,
DC, July 7, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-
the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states.
269 “Chinese National Who Conspired to Hack Into U.S. Defense Contractors’ Systems Sentenced to 46
Months in Federal Prison,” Justice Department, July 13, 2016, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/chinese-
national-who-conspired-hack-us-defense-contractors-systems-sentenced-46-months.
270 “Russia, China and Iran Hackers Target Trump and Biden, Microsoft Says,” BBC, September 11, 2020,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54110457.
271 Mark Mazzetti, Adam Goldman, Michael S. Schmidt and Matt Apuzzo, “Killing C.I.A. Informants,
China Crippled U.S. Spying Operations,” New York Times, May 20, 2017, https://www.nytimes.
com/2017/05/20/world/asia/china-cia-spies-espionage.html.
272 Zach Dorfman, “China Used Stolen Data to Expose CIA Operatives in Africa and Europe,” Foreign
Policy, December 21, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/21/china-stolen-us-data-exposed-cia-
operatives-spy-networks/.
273 “China’s Collection of Genomic and Other Healthcare Data From America: Risks to Privacy and U.S.
Economic and National Security,” National Counterintelligence and Security Center, February 2020,
https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/SafeguardingOurFuture/NCSC_China_Genomics_Fact_
Sheet_2021revision20210203.pdf.
274 Zach Dorfman, “Tech Giants Are Giving China a Vital Edge in Espionage,” Foreign Policy, December
23, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/23/china-tech-giants-process-stolen-data-spy-agencies/.
275 Bojan Pancevski, “U.S. Officials Say Huawei Can Covertly Access Telecom Networks,” Wall Street
Journal, February 12, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials-say-huawei-can-covertly-
access-telecom-networks-11581452256; and Gordon Corera, “Eric Schmidt: Huawei Has Engaged in
Unacceptable Practices,” BBC, June 18, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-53080113.
276 Christopher Wray, “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to
the Economic and National Security of the United States” (video lecture, Hudson Institute, Washington,
DC, July 7, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-
the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states.
277 Stuart A. Thompson and Charlie Warzel, “Twelve Million Phones, One Dataset, Zero Privacy,” New York
Times, December 19, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/12/19/opinion/location-tracking-
cell-phone.html; and Molly Olmstead, “A Prominent Priest Was Outed for Using Grindr. Experts Say It’s
a Warning Sign,” Slate, July 21, 2021, https://slate.com/technology/2021/07/catholic-priest-grindr-data-
privacy.html.
278 Joseph Cox, “How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data From Ordinary Apps,” Motherboard, November
16, 2020, https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgqm5x/us-military-location-data-xmode-locate-x; and Justin
Sherman, “Data Brokers Are Advertising Data on U.S. Military Personnel,” Lawfare, August 23, 2021,
https://www.lawfareblog.com/data-brokers-are-advertising-data-us-military-personnel.
279 Edward Wong, “How China Uses LinkedIn to Recruit Spies Abroad,” New York Times, October 14,
2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/27/world/asia/china-linkedin-spies.html.
280 Karen Weise and Paul Mozur, “LinkedIn to Shut Down Service in China, Citing ‘Challenging’
Environment,” New York Times, October 14, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/14/technology/
linkedin-china-microsoft.html.
281 Ben Kesling and Georgia Wells, “U.S. Military Bans TikTok Over Ties to China,” January 3, 2020, Wall
Street Journal, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-bans-tiktok-over-ties-to-china-11578090613.

144 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

282 Jenna McLaughlin and Zach Dorfman, “‘Shattered’: Inside the Secret Battle to Save America’s
Undercover Spies in the Digital Age,” Yahoo News, December 30, 2019, https://www.yahoo.com/
entertainment/shattered-inside-the-secret-battle-to-save-americas-undercover-spies-in-the-digital-
age-100029026.html.
283 More appropriate protections would include national data security and privacy standards, plus
regulations, trainings, and counterintelligence programs specifically focused on the online activities of
U.S. military members.
284 Martin Egnash, “Defense Travel System Data Breach Leaves Thousands Open to Identity Theft,” Stars
and Stripes, March 1, 2018, https://www.stripes.com/defense-travel-system-data-breach-leaves-thousands-
open-to-identity-theft-1.514499.
285 “Provisions Pertaining to Certain Investments in the United States by Foreign Persons,”
Treasury Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 3,112 (January 17, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/01/17/2020-00188/provisions-pertaining-to-certain-investments-in-the-united-states-
by-foreign-persons.
286 David J. Lynch, “Biotechnology: The US-China Dispute Over Genetic Data,” Financial Times, July 31,
2017, https://www.ft.com/content/245a7c60-6880-11e7-9a66-93fb352ba1fe.
287 CFIUS also seems to be scrutinizing transactions involving much smaller pools of genetic data than its
regulations would suggest. In October 2020, it reportedly prevented a Chinese entity from buying a
San Diego fertility clinic. Eamon Javers, “U.S. Blocked Chinese Purchase of San Diego Fertility Clinic
Over Medical Data Security Concerns,” CNBC, October 16, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/16/
trump-administration-blocked-chinese-purchase-of-us-fertility-clinic.html.
288 Echo Wang, “China’s Kunlun Tech Agrees to U.S. Demand to Sell Grindr Gay Dating App,” Reuters,
May 13, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-grindr-m-a-beijingkunlun/chinas-kunlun-tech-agrees-
to-u-s-demand-to-sell-grindr-gay-dating-app-idUSKCN1SJ28N.
289 Kamran Kara-Pabani and Justin Sherman, “How a Norwegian Government Report Shows the Limits
of CFIUS Data Reviews,” Lawfare, May 3, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-norwegian-
government-report-shows-limits-cfius-data-reviews.
290 “President Trump Orders Divestiture of StayNTouch, Inc. by Shiji Group of China,” Covington,
March 9, 2020, https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2020/03/president-trump-orders-
divestiture-of-stayntouch-inc-by-shiji-group-of-china.
291 Jena Tesse Fox, “Hotel Owner-Operator to Acquire PMS Company StayNTouch,” Hotel Management,
August 31, 2020, https://www.hotelmanagement.net/tech/mcr-to-acquire-pms-software-company-
stayntouch.
292 Marriott International, Inc., “Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020,” Securities and
Exchange Commission, https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/0001048286/0001628280210
02433/mar-20201231.htm.
293 “Marriott Announces Starwood Guest Reservation Database Security Incident,” press release, Marriott,
November 20, 2018, https://marriott.gcs-web.com/news-releases/news-release-details/marriott-
announces-starwood-guest-reservation-database-security.
294 Emphasis added. “Secretary Michael R. Pompeo at a Press Availability,” State Department, July 8, 2020,
https://2017-2021-translations.state.gov/2020/07/08/secretary-michael-r-pompeo-at-a-press-availability-8/
index.html.
295 Executive Order 13971, “Addressing the Threat Posed by Applications and Other Software Developed or
Controlled by Chinese Companies,” 86 Fed. Reg. 1249 (January 5, 2021), https://www.federalregister.
gov/documents/2021/01/08/2021-00305/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-applications-and-other-
software-developed-or-controlled-by-chinese; Maria Abi-Habib, “India Bans Nearly 60 Chinese
Apps, Including TikTok and WeChat,” New York Times, June 30, 2020, https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/06/29/world/asia/tik-tok-banned-india-china.html; and Sameer Yasir and Hari Kumar, “India
Bans 118 Chinese Apps as Indian Soldier Is Killed on Disputed Border,” New York Times, September 2,
2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/world/asia/india-bans-china-apps.html.

JON BATEMAN 145

296 Emphasis added. Beijing’s Long Arm: Threats to U.S. National Security: A Hearing Before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, 117th Cong. (2021) (testimony of William R. Evanina, August 4, 2021),
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-bevanina-080421.pdf; and Dina
Temple-Raston, “China’s Microsoft Hack May Have Had a Bigger Purpose Than Just Spying,” NPR,
August 26, 2021, https://www.npr.org/2021/08/26/1013501080/chinas-microsoft-hack-may-have-had-a-
bigger-purpose-than-just-spying.
297 Greg Roumeliotis and Echo Wang, “Exclusive China’s Tencent in Talks With U.S. to Keep Gaming
Investments -Sources,” Reuters, May 5, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-chinas-
tencent-talks-with-us-keep-gaming-investments-sources-2021-05-05/.
298 Jenny Leonard, Saleha Mohsin, and David McLaughlin, “Tencent’s Gaming Stakes Draw U.S.
National Security Scrutiny,” Bloomberg, September 17, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2020-09-17/tencent-s-game-investments-draw-u-s-national-security-scrutiny.
299 Executive Order 14034, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,” 86 Fed. Reg.
31,423 (June 9, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/06/11/2021-12506/protecting-
americans-sensitive-data-from-foreign-adversaries.
300 Joseph Marks, “The Cybersecurity 202: Our Expert Network Says It’s Time for More Cybersecurity
Regulations,” Washington Post, June 11, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/06/11/
cybersecurity-202-our-expert-network-says-it-time-more-cybersecurity-regulations/; and Robert D.
Williams, “To Enhance Data Security, Federal Privacy Legislation Is Just a Start,” Brookings Institution,
December 1, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/to-enhance-data-security-federal-privacy-
legislation-is-just-a-start/.

146 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

PREVENTING CHINESE SABOTAGE IN A CRISIS
301 “Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Ensuring the Continued Security of the United States
Critical Electric Infrastructure,” Department of Energy, 86 Fed. Reg. 21,309 (April 22, 2021), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/04/22/2021-08482/notice-of-request-for-information-rfi-on-
ensuring-the-continued-security-of-the-united-states; and “Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense
Facilities,” Department of Energy, 86 Fed. Reg. 533 (January 6, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/01/06/2020-28773/prohibition-order-securing-critical-defense-facilities.
302 Emily O. Goldman and Michael Warner, “Why a Digital Pearl Harbor Makes Sense . . . and Is
Possible,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 16, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.
org/2017/10/16/why-digital-pearl-harbor-makes-sense-.-.-.-and-is-possible-pub-73405.
303 Britain quickly abandoned this strategy due to its large costs. But that does not mean that China
would never consider its own similar strategy in a future Sino-U.S. crisis. If Beijing implemented such
a strategy, it might once again turn out to be a mistake. But an initial blow against the United States
could nevertheless be powerful, justifying U.S. efforts to prevent and mitigate such a scenario. Nicholas
Lambert, “Brits-Krieg: The Strategy of Economic Warfare,” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, October 16, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/10/16/brits-krieg-strategy-of-economic-
warfare-pub-73403.
304 “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Director of National Intelligence, April
9, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
305 Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Saravalle, “China’s Use of Coercive Economic
Measures,” Center for a New American Security, June 2018, https://s3.us-east-1.amazonaws.com/files.
cnas.org/documents/China_Use_FINAL-1.pdf; and Evan A. Feigenbaum, “Is Coercion the New Normal
in China’s Economic Statecraft?,” Macro Polo, July 25, 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/07/25/
is-coercion-new-normal-in-china-s-economic-statecraft-pub-72632.
306 For example, the Lowy Institute’s most recent Asia Power Index identified “a short-term reprieve from an
established pattern of relative US decline” compared to China. Hervé Lemahieu and Alyssa Leng, “Asia
Power Index: Key Findings 2021,” Lowy Institute, 2021, https://power.lowyinstitute.org/downloads/
lowy-institute-2021-asia-power-index-key-findings-report.pdf. See also James Dobbins, Gabrielle Tarini,
and Ali Wyne, “The Lost Generation in American Foreign Policy,” RAND Corporation, 2020, https://
www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA232-1.html.
307 The Biden administration’s 100-day review of the U.S. supply chain makes this point elegantly. Though
not focused on critical infrastructure per se, it outlines a range of domestic and international risks to U.S.
resilience in key sectors, and wisely treats hostile subversion from China as just one of many challenges.
“Building Resilient Supply Chains, Revitalizing American Manufacturing, and Fostering Broad-Based
Growth,” White House, June 2020, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/100-day-
supply-chain-review-report.pdf.
308 Ken Dilanian and Kelly O’Donnell, “Russian Criminal Group Suspected in Colonial Pipeline
Ransomware Attack,” NBC News, May 10, 2021, https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/national-security/
russian-criminal-group-may-be-responsible-colonial-pipeline-ransomware-attack-n1266793.
309 Adi Robertson, “AT&T Recovers From Multi-state Outage After Nashville Bombing,” The Verge,
December 28, 2020, https://www.theverge.com/2020/12/28/22202822/att-outage-nashville-christmas-
bombing.
310 “Hack Attack Causes ‘Massive Damage’ at Steel Works,” BBC, December 22, 2014, https://www.bbc.
com/news/technology-30575104.
311 Nick Thieme, “After Hurricane Maria, Puerto Rico’s Internet Problems Go From Bad to Worse,” PBS,
October 23, 2018, https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-internet/.
312 William Yuen Ye, “With U.S. Restrictions on Huawei and ZTE, Where Will Rural America Turn?,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 10, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-
perspectives-asia/us-restrictions-huawei-and-zte-where-will-rural-america-turn.
313 Matt Kapko, “Rural US Carriers Secure $1.9B to Rip Out Chinese Equipment,” SDxCentral, December
23, 2020, https://www.sdxcentral.com/articles/news/rural-us-carriers-secure-1-9b-to-rip-out-chinese-
equipment/2020/12/.

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314 William Yuen Ye, “With U.S. Restrictions on Huawei and ZTE, Where Will Rural America Turn?,”
Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 10, 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-
perspectives-asia/us-restrictions-huawei-and-zte-where-will-rural-america-turn.
315 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning,” December 1, 2020, https://www.jcs.mil/
Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp5_0.pdf.
316 “National Critical Functions Set,” Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), April 2019,
https://www.cisa.gov/national-critical-functions-set.
317 “Systemic Cyber Risk Reduction Venture,” CISA, https://www.cisa.gov/systemic-cyber-risk-reduction.
318 “2019 National Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment (THIRA): Overview and
Methodology,” Federal Emergency Management Agency, July 25, 2019, https://www.fema.gov/sites/
default/files/2020-06/fema_national-thira-overview-methodology_2019_0.pdf; and “Homeland Security
Planning Scenarios and Summary Descriptions,” Brookings Institution, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/20051026_3-1.pdf.
319 Executive Order 13920, “Securing the United States Bulk-Power System,” 85 Fed. Reg. 26595 (May 1,
2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2020/05/04/2020-09695/securing-the-united-states-
bulk-power-system.
320 “Large Power Transformers and the U.S. Electric Grid,” Department of Energy, June 2021, https://www.
energy.gov/sites/prod/files/Large%20Power%20Transformer%20Study%20-%20June%202012_0.pdf.
321 Black Sobczak and Peter Behr, “Security – China and America’s 400-Ton Electric Albatross,” E&E
News, April 25, 2019, https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060216451/.
322 “Prohibition Order Securing Critical Defense Facilities,” Department of Energy, 86 Fed. Reg. 533
(January 6, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/01/06/2020-28773/prohibition-
order-securing-critical-defense-facilities.
323 “Notice of Request for Information (RFI) on Ensuring the Continued Security of the United States
Critical Electric Infrastructure,” Department of Energy, 86 Fed. Reg. 21,309 (April 22, 2021), https://
www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/04/22/2021-08482/notice-of-request-for-information-rfi-on-
ensuring-the-continued-security-of-the-united-states.
324 “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,”
Commerce Department, 86 Fed. Reg. 4909 (January 19, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/01/19/2021-01234/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-
services-supply-chain.
325 “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain,”
Commerce Department, 86 Fed. Reg. 4909 (January 19, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/01/19/2021-01234/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-
services-supply-chain.
326 Brandon L. Van Grack, Charles L. Capito, and Joseph A. Benkert, “Biden Administration Carries
Forward Trump Era Executive Order Scrutinizing Imports and Sales of Certain Communications
Technology and Services,” Morrison Foerster, April 1, 2021, https://www.mofo.com/resources/
insights/210401-trump-executive-order.html.
327 As discussed earlier, Biden issued an executive order outlining “a criteria-based decision framework and
rigorous, evidence-based analysis” to help guide the rule’s application to internet-connected software.
The Commerce Department subsequently proposed to incorporate this guidance into the ICTS rule, and
invited comment on whether Biden’s criteria should also govern reviews of other kinds of software and
hardware. Executive Order 14034, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,” 86
Fed. Reg. 31,423 (June 9, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/06/11/2021-12506/
protecting-americans-sensitive-data-from-foreign-adversaries; and “Securing the Information and
Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain; Connected Software Applications,”
Commerce Department, 86 Fed. Reg. 67,379 (November 26, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/11/26/2021-25329/securing-the-information-and-communications-technology-and-
services-supply-chain-connected-software.

148 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

328 Francesca M.S. Guerrero and Jennifer L. Parry, “Veritas, a U.S. Genetic Sequencing Company, Suspends
U.S. Operations Due to Decreased Funding; CFIUS Thought to Be Leading Cause,” Winston & Strawn,
December 23, 2019, https://www.winston.com/en/global-trade-and-foreign-policy-insights/veritas-a-us-
genetic-sequencing-company-suspends-us-operations-due-to-decreased-funding-cfius-thought-to-be-
leading-cause.html.
329 Bill Gertz, “Lexmark, Lenovo Tech Funnels Data to China Intelligence Services,” Washington Times,
February 24, 2020, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/feb/24/lexmark-lenovo-tech-
funnels-data-china-intelligenc/; Roslyn Layton, “Why Is U.S. Policy Tough on Huawei and TikTok
but Not Lenovo?,” Forbes, June 26, 2020, https://www.forbes.com/sites/roslynlayton/2020/06/26/
why-is-us-policy-tough-on-huawei-and-tiktok-but-not-lenovo/?sh=3cdcb5cc7b6e; James Marks, “The
Chinese Threat That’s Hiding in Plain Sight,” The Bulwark, September 12, 2019, https://thebulwark.
com/the-chinese-threat-thats-hiding-in-plain-sight/; Roslyn Layton, “Stealing From the States:
China’s Power Play in IT Contracts,” China Tech Threat, March 2020, https://chinatechthreat.com/
wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CTT-Report-Stealing-From-States-Chinas-Power-Play-in-IT-Contracts.
pdf; Ryan McMorrow and Kathrin Hille, “Lenovo’s Sales Strong Despite Growing Threat of US
Sanctions,” Financial Times, August 13, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/a5f5f290-04c9-4776-ae8d-
ee881b13bb3a.
330 Robert K. Knake, “A Cyberattack on the U.S. Power Grid,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 3, 2017,
https://www.cfr.org/report/cyberattack-us-power-grid.
331 “Strategic Transformer Reserve,” Department of Energy, March 2017, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/
files/2017/04/f34/Strategic%20Transformer%20Reserve%20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf.
332 Robert K. Knake, “A Cyberattack on the U.S. Power Grid,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 3,
2017, https://www.cfr.org/report/cyberattack-us-power-grid; and “Strategic Transformer Reserve,”
Department of Energy, March 2017, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/04/f34/Strategic%20
Transformer%20Reserve%20Report%20-%20FINAL.pdf.

JON BATEMAN 149

LIMITING CHINESE INFLUENCE OPERATIONS
333 Christopher Wray, “The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to
the Economic and National Security of the United States” (video lecture, Hudson Institute, Washington,
DC, July 7, 2020), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-
the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states.
334 Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Zach Dorfman, “Suspected Chinese Spy Targeted California
Politicians,” Axios, December 8, 2020, https://www.axios.com/china-spy-california-politicians-
9d2dfb99-f839-4e00-8bd8-59dec0daf589.html; Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian and Zach Dorfman,
“Republican Donor Cindy Yang Linked to Chinese Influence Machine,” Foreign Policy, March 12, 2019,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/03/12/962067-china-unitedfront-corruption-scandal/; and Bethany
Allen-Ebrahimian, “China Built an Army of Influence Agents in the U.S.,” Daily Beast, July 18, 2018,
https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-china-built-an-army-of-influence-agents-in-the-us.
335 Joshua Kurlantzick, “How China Is Interfering in Taiwan’s Election,” Council on Foreign Relations,
November 7, 2019, https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/how-china-interfering-taiwans-election; Amy
Searight, “Countering China’s Influence Operations: Lessons From Australia,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, May 8, 2020, https://www.csis.org/analysis/countering-chinas-influence-
operations-lessons-australia; and Alex Joske, Lin Li, Alexandra Pascoem and Nathan Attrill, “The
Influence Environment: A Survey of Chinese-Language Media in Australia,” Australian Strategic
Policy Institute, December 2020, https://s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2020-12/The%20
influence%20environment.pdf?Mjytg1N_V2azySJlJoahgWzMOqxEpMYk.
336 “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,” Director of National Intelligence, April
9, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
337 “Intelligence Community Assessment: Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections,” National
Intelligence Council, March 10, 2021, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-
declass-16MAR21.pdf.
338 Alex Joske, Lin Li, Alexandra Pascoem, and Nathan Attrill, “The Influence Environment: A Survey of
Chinese-Language Media in Australia,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, December 2020, https://
s3-ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/ad-aspi/2020-12/The%20influence%20environment.pdf?Mjytg1N_
V2azySJlJoahgWzMOqxEpMYk.
339 Alex Hern, “Revealed: How TikTok Censors Videos That Do Not Please Beijing,” Guardian, September
25, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/sep/25/revealed-how-tiktok-censors-videos-
that-do-not-please-beijing; Isobel Asher Hamilton, “A Senior TikTok Executive Admitted the Company
Used to Censor Content Critical of China, ‘Specifically With Regard to the Uighur Situation,’” Business
Insider, November 5, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/tiktok-censor-china-critical-content-
uighur-uighurs-2020-11.
340 Jon Bateman, Elonnai Hickock, Laura Courchesne, Isra Thange, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Measuring
the Effects of Influence Operations: Key Findings and Gaps From Empirical Research,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 28, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/28/
measuring-effects-of-influence-operations-key-findings-and-gaps-from-empirical-research-pub-84824.
341 Major platform efforts include revisions to community standards, enforcement actions taken against
proscribed activity, and adjustments to the functionality of platform products. For overviews of
each of these three areas, see Jon Bateman, Natalie Thompson, and Victoria Smith, “How Social
Media Platforms’ Community Standards Address Influence Operations,” Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, April 1, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/01/how-social-media-
platforms-community-standards-address-influence-operations-pub-84201; “Disinfodex,” Berkman
Klein Center at Harvard University and the Ethics and Governance of Artificial Intelligence Fund at
The Miami Foundation, 2020, https://disinfodex.org/; and Kamya Yadav, “Platform Interventions: How
Social Media Counters Influence Operations,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 25,
2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/01/25/platform-interventions-how-social-media-counters-
influence-operations-pub-83698.

150 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

342 “One Year After Stop Hate for Profit: Platforms’ Progress,” Stop Hate for Profit, June 16, 2021, https://
www.stophateforprofit.org/platforms-progress-year-later; and Jessica Guynn, “Facebook Winning War on
COVID-19 Vaccine Lies, Hoaxes and Conspiracies. Twitter and TikTok? Not So Much, Report Says,”
USA Today, May 7, 2021, https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2021/05/07/facebook-twitter-tiktok-
covid-vaccine-conspiracy-theories-lies-hoaxes/4994731001/.
343 Olivia Solon and Ken Dilanian, “China’s Influence Operations Offer a Glimpse Into the Future of
Information Warfare,” NBC News, October 21, 2020, https://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-
news/china-s-influence-operations-offer-glimpse-future-information-warfare-n1244065.
344 Betsy Woodruff Swan, “DHS Stands Up Domestic Terror Intelligence Team,” Politico, May 11, 2021,
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/05/11/dhs-domestic-terror-intelligence-487145.
345 Executive Order 13942, “Addressing the Threat Posed by TikTok, and Taking Additional Steps to
Address the National Emergency With Respect to the Information and Communications Technology
and Services Supply Chain,” 85 Fed. Reg. 48,637 (August 6, 2020), https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2020/08/11/2020-17699/addressing-the-threat-posed-by-tiktok-and-taking-additional-steps-
to-address-the-national-emergency.
346 “Fact Sheet: Executive Order Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,” White
House, June 9, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/09/fact-
sheet-executive-order-protecting-americans-sensitive-data-from-foreign-adversaries/; and Executive Order
14034, “Protecting Americans’ Sensitive Data From Foreign Adversaries,” 86 Fed. Reg. 31,423 (June
9, 2021), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2021/06/11/2021-12506/protecting-americans-
sensitive-data-from-foreign-adversaries.
347 Marco Rubio, “Rubio Requests Biden Administration’s Plan for TikTok, Protecting Americans’ Data,”
press release, October 12, 2021, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2021/10/rubio-requests-
biden-administration-s-plan-for-tiktok-protecting-americans-data.
348 Greg Roumeliotis and Echo Wang, “China’s Tencent in Talks With U.S. to Keep Gaming Investments
-Sources,” Reuters, May 5, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/technology/exclusive-chinas-tencent-talks-
with-us-keep-gaming-investments-sources-2021-05-05/.
349 Vishnu Kannan, forthcoming paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; and Kamya Yadav,
“Countering Influence Operations: A Review of Policy Proposals Since 2016,” Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace, November 30, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/11/30/countering-
influence-operations-review-of-policy-proposals-since-2016-pub-83333.
350 Jon Bateman, Elonnai Hickock, Laura Courchesne, Isra Thange, and Jacob N. Shapiro, “Measuring
the Effects of Influence Operations: Key Findings and Gaps From Empirical Research,” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, June 28, 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/28/
measuring-effects-of-influence-operations-key-findings-and-gaps-from-empirical-research-pub-84824;
and Jon Bateman, Elonnai Hickock, Jacob N. Shapiro, Laura Courchesne, and Julia Ilhardt,
“Measuring the Efficacy of Influence Operations Countermeasures: Key Findings and Gaps From
Empirical Research,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, September 21, 2021, https://
carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/21/measuring-efficacy-of-influence-operations-countermeasures-key-
findings-and-gaps-from-empirical-research-pub-85389.

JON BATEMAN 151

DENYING SUPPORT FOR CHINESE AND CHINA-ENABLED
AUTHORITARIANISM AND REPRESSION
351 “Freedom on the Net 2021: China,” Freedom House, 2021, https://freedomhouse.org/country/china/
freedom-net/2021.
352 John Hudson, “As Tensions With China Grow, Biden Administration Formalizes Genocide Declaration
Against Beijing,” Washington Post, March 30, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/
china-genocide-human-rights-report/2021/03/30/b2fa8312-9193-11eb-9af7-fd0822ae4398_story.html.
353 Alina Polyakova and Chris Meserole, “Exporting Digital Authoritarianism,” Brookings Institution,
August 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/FP_20190826_digital_
authoritarianism_polyakova_meserole.pdf.
354 “Treasury Sanctions CEIEC for Supporting the Illegitimate Maduro Regime’s Efforts to Undermine
Venezuelan Democracy,” Treasury Department, November 30, 2020, https://home.treasury.gov/news/
press-releases/sm1194.
355 “Interim National Security Strategic Guidance,” White House, March 2021, https://www.whitehouse.
gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/NSC-1v2.pdf.
356 Matthew S. Erie and Thomas Streinz, “The Beijing Effect: China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’ as Transnational
Data Governance,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, April 1, 2021, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3810256.
357 Matthew S. Erie and Thomas Streinz, “The Beijing Effect: China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’ as Transnational
Data Governance,” New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, April 1, 2021, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3810256.
358 Steven Feldstein, “When It Comes to Digital Authoritarianism, China Is a Challenge—But Not the
Only Challenge,” War on the Rocks, February 12, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2020/02/when-it-
comes-to-digital-authoritarianism-china-is-a-challenge-but-not-the-only-challenge/.
359 “Three Former U.S. Intelligence Community and Military Personnel Agree to Pay More Than $1.68
Million to Resolve Criminal Charges Arising From Their Provision of Hacking-Related Services to a
Foreign Government,” press release, Justice Department, September 14, 2021, https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/three-former-us-intelligence-community-and-military-personnel-agree-pay-more-168-million;
Associated Press, “Germany Searches Premises of Spyware Maker FinFisher,” October 14, 2020,
https://apnews.com/article/germany-munich-spyware-software-7dd9b8d8cdd8021334b709165db94
9b6; “Commerce Adds NSO Group and Other Foreign Companies to Entity List for Malicious Cyber
Activities,” press release, Commerce Department, November 3, 2021, https://www.commerce.gov/
news/press-releases/2021/11/commerce-adds-nso-group-and-other-foreign-companies-entity-list; Yonah
Jeremy Bob, “Defense Min. Limits Countries Israeli Cyber Companies Can Sell to Post-NSO – report,”
Jerusalem Post, November 25, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-min-limits-countries-
israeli-cyber-companies-can-sell-to-post-nso-report-687004; and Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israeli Defense
Ministry Tightens Cyber Exports Post-NSO Scandal,” Jerusalem Post, December 6, 2021, https://www.
jpost.com/breaking-news/defense-ministry-to-tighten-regulation-on-cyber-exports-687998.
360 Thomas Lum and Michael A. Weber, “Human Rights in China and U.S. Policy: Issues for the 117th
Congress,” Congressional Research Service, March 31, 2020, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/
pdf/R/R46750.
361 Amy K. Lehr, “The United States Blacklisted 28 Chinese Entities Over Repression of Muslim Minorities
in Xinjiang. What Does This Mean for Human Rights?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
October 11, 2019, https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-blacklisted-28-chinese-entities-over-
repression-muslim-minorities-xinjiang.
362 “Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory,” U.S. Government, July 13, 2021, https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2021/07/Xinjiang-Business-Advisory-13July2021-1.pdf.
363 Lily Kuo and Jeanne Whalen, “Biden Administration Bars Imports of Solar Panels Linked to Forced
Labor in China’s Xinjiang Region,” Washington Post, June 24, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2021/06/24/china-solar-forced-labor-imports-custom/; and Phred Dvorak and Matthew

152 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

 Dalton, “Solar-Energy Supply Chain Depends on Region Where China Is Accused of Genocide,” Wall
Street Journal, April 11, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/solar-energy-supply-chain-depends-on-
region-where-china-is-accused-of-genocide-11618147228.
364 “Treasury Sanctions CEIEC for Supporting the Illegitimate Maduro Regime’s Efforts to Undermine
Venezuelan Democracy,” press release, Treasury Department, November 30, 2020, https://home.
treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1194; and “U.S. Imposes Visa Restrictions on Certain Employees
of Chinese Technology Companies That Abuse Human Rights,” State Department, July 15, 2020,
https://2017-2021.state.gov/u-s-imposes-visa-restrictions-on-certain-employees-of-chinese-technology-
companies-that-abuse-human-rights/index.html.
365 Will Knight, “MIT Cuts Ties With a Chinese AI Firm Amid Human Rights Concerns,” Wired, April 21,
2020, https://www.wired.com/story/mit-cuts-ties-chinese-ai-firm-human-rights/.
366 Biden’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy states that “our objective is not to change the PRC but to shape the
strategic environment in which it operates.” Trump’s own China Strategy likewise stated that “United
States policies are not premised on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic governance model.” “Indo-
Pacific Strategy of the United States,” White House, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2022/02/U.S.-Indo-Pacific-Strategy.pdf; and “United States Strategic Approach to
the People’s Republic of China,” White House, May 2020, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/05/U.S.-Strategic-Approach-to-The-Peoples-Republic-of-China-Report-5.24v1.pdf.
367 Robert O’Brien, “The Chinese Communist Party’s Ideology and Global Ambitions,” University
of Southern California US-China Institute, June 24, 2020, https://china.usc.edu/robert-
o%E2%80%99brien-chinese-communist-party%E2%80%99s-ideology-and-global-ambitions-
june-24-2020.
368 Farhad Manjoo, “Dealing With China Isn’t Worth the Moral Cost,” New York Times, October 9, 2019,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/09/opinion/china-houston-rockets.html.
369 Anonymous, “The Longer Telegram: Toward a New American China Strategy,” Atlantic Council,
January 28, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/
the-longer-telegram/.
370 The Broken Promises of China’s WTO Accession: Reprioritizing Human Rights: A Hearing Before the
Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 115th Cong. (2017) (testimony of Sophie Richardson,
March 1, 2017), https://www.cecc.gov/sites/chinacommission.house.gov/files/CECC%20Hearing%20
-%20WTO%20-%20Sophie%20Richardson%20-1Mar17.pdf.
371 “A Human Rights Approach to US-China Policy,” Human Rights Watch, February 17, 2021, https://
www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/17/human-rights-approach-us-china-policy.
372 Kate O’Keeffe, Heather Somerville, and Yang Jie, “U.S. Companies Aid China’s Bid for Chip
Dominance Despite Security Concerns,” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/u-s-firms-aid-chinas-bid-for-chip-dominance-despite-security-concerns-11636718400.
373 Zach Dorfman, “Tech Giants Are Giving China a Vital Edge in Espionage,” Foreign Policy, December
23, 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/23/china-tech-giants-process-stolen-data-spy-agencies/;
Katja Drinhausen and Vincent Brusee, “China’s Social Credit System in 2021: From Fragmentation
Towards Integration,” MERICS, March 3, 2021, https://merics.org/en/report/chinas-social-credit-
system-2021-fragmentation-towards-integration; Ryan Hass, “Assessing China’s ‘Common Prosperity’
Campaign,” Brookings Institution, September 9, 2021, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-
chaos/2021/09/09/assessing-chinas-common-prosperity-campaign/; and Ann Listerud, “Chinese
Communist Party Cells in Private Companies: Though Not Yet Universal, Increasingly Situated to Play
Greater Roles in Corporate Governance,” Sayari, April 7, 2021, https://sayari.com/resources/chinese-
communist-party-cells-in-private-companies-though-not-yet-universal-increasingly-situated-to-play-
greater-roles-in-corporate-governance/.
374 Thomas Carothers, “Does Democracy Promotion Have a Future?,” in Democracy and Development,
ed. Bernard Berendsen (Amsterdam: KIT Publishers, 2008), https://carnegieendowment.org/files/
DemocracyDevm-Carothers-sec.pdf.
375 Clayton Thomas, Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard, and Christina L. Arabia, “Arms Sales in
the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service,
November 23, 2020, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf.

JON BATEMAN 153

376 “Addition of Entities to the Entity List, Revision of Entry on the Entity List, and Removal of Entities
From the Entity List,” Commerce Department, 85 Fed. Reg. 83,416 (December 22, 2020), https://
public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2020-28031.pdf.
377 Cate Cadell, “Drone Company DJI Obscured Ties to Chinese State Funding, Documents Show,”
Washington Post, February 1, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/01/
china-funding-drones-dji-us-regulators/; Blake Schmidt and Ashlee Vance, “DJI Won the Drone Wars,
and Now It’s Paying the Price,” Bloomberg Businessweek, March 26, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/features/2020-03-26/dji-s-drone-supremacy-comes-at-a-price; Matt Rivers, Max Foster, and James
Griffiths, “Disturbing Video Shows Hundreds of Blindfolded Prisoners in Xinjiang,” CNN, October 7,
2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/10/06/asia/china-xinjiang-video-intl-hnk/index.html; and Liselotte
Mas, “Drone Video Shows Blindfolded, Handcuffed Prisoners in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Region,”
France 24, September 25, 2019, https://observers.france24.com/en/20190925-drone-video-shows-mass-
displacement-prisoners-china-xinjiang-uyghur-region.
378 John Venable and Lora Ries, “DJI Placed on the Entity List for Human Rights Abuses, but Concerns
About Data Security Should Not Be Overlooked,” Heritage Foundation, January 7, 2021, https://www.
heritage.org/cybersecurity/commentary/dji-placed-the-entity-list-human-rights-abuses-concerns-about-
data.
379 “Treasury Identifies Eight Chinese Tech Firms as Part of the Chinese Military-Industrial Complex,”
press release, Treasury Department, December 16, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/
jy0538.
380 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act of 2021, Public Law No. 117-78, § 3, https://www.govinfo.gov/
content/pkg/PLAW-117publ78/pdf/PLAW-117publ78.pdf.
381 Zak Doffman, “Is Microsoft AI Helping to Deliver China’s ‘Shameful’ Xinjiang Surveillance State?,”
Forbes, March 15, 2019, https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/03/15/microsoft-denies-new-
links-to-chinas-surveillance-state-but-its-complicated/; and Jacob Fromer, Cissy Zhoum, and Finbarr
Bermingham, “US Farm Brand John Deere at Forefront of Surging Cotton Machinery Sales to Xinjiang,
as Human Rights Sanctions Loom,” South China Morning Post, August 8, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/
economy/china-economy/article/3096510/us-farm-brand-john-deere-forefront-surging-cotton-machinery.
382 Executive Order 14032, “Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Certain
Companies of the People’s Republic of China,” June 3, 2021, https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2021/06/07/2021-12019/addressing-the-threat-from-securities-investments-that-finance-
certain-companies-of-the-peoples; and Tamer A. Soliman, Andrew Olmem, Timothy J. Keeler, and Jason
Hungerford, “US Investment Ban Targeting Companies Deemed Linked to Chinese Military Expanded
to Chinese Surveillance Technology Sector,” Mayer Brown, June 9, 2021, https://www.mayerbrown.com/
en/perspectives-events/publications/2021/06/us-investment-ban-targeting-companies-deemed-linked-to-
chinese-military-expanded-to-chinese-surveillance-technology-sector.
383 “Frequently Asked Questions: Chinese Military Company Sanctions” (question 900), Treasury
Department, June 3, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/faqs/topic/5671.
384 “Fact Sheet: Executive Order Addressing the Threat From Securities Investments That Finance Certain
Companies of the People’s Republic of China,” White House, June 3, 2021, https://www.whitehouse.
gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/06/03/fact-sheet-executive-order-addressing-the-threat-from-
securities-investments-that-finance-certain-companies-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china/.
385 “Treasury Sanctions Perpetrators of Serious Human Rights Abuse on International Human Rights Day,”
press release, Treasury Department, December 10, 2021, https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/
jy0526.
386 UIGHUR Act of 2019, S. 178, 116th Cong. (2019), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-
bill/178/text; and Matt Spetalnick, Patricia Zengerle, David Brunnstrom, “U.S. Uighur Bill’s Threat to
Surveillance Economy Puts China on Offensive,” Reuters, December 5, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-china-xinjiang/u-s-uighur-bills-threat-to-surveillance-economy-puts-china-on-offensive-
idUSKBN1Y92TV.
387 Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020, Public Law No. 116-145.

154 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

388 “Joint Statement on the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative,” White House, December 10,
2021, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/10/joint-statement-on-the-
export-controls-and-human-rights-initiative/.
389 “White House Announces Launch of the International Grand Challenges on Democracy-Affirming
Technologies for the Summit for Democracy,” White House, December 8, 2021, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/12/08/white-house-announces-launch-of-the-international-
grand-challenges-on-democracy-affirming-technologies-for-the-summit-for-democracy/.
390 These are just a few of the possibilities. See Winnona DeSombre et al., “Countering Cyber Proliferation:
Zeroing in on Access-as-a-Service,” Atlantic Council, March 1, 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/
in-depth-research-reports/report/countering-cyber-proliferation-zeroing-in-on-access-as-a-service/#policy
recommendations.
391 Commerce Department, “Commerce Adds NSO Group and Other Foreign Companies to Entity List for
Malicious Cyber Activities,” November 3, 2021, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2021/11/
commerce-adds-nso-group-and-other-foreign-companies-entity-list; Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Defense Min.
Limits Countries Israeli Cyber Companies Can Sell to Post-NSO – Report,” Jerusalem Post, November
25, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/israel-news/defense-min-limits-countries-israeli-cyber-companies-
can-sell-to-post-nso-report-687004; and Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Israeli Defense Ministry Tightens Cyber
Exports Post-NSO Scandal,” Jerusalem Post, December 6, 2021, https://www.jpost.com/breaking-news/
defense-ministry-to-tighten-regulation-on-cyber-exports-687998.
392 “Join the Effort to Create A Bill of Rights for an Automated Society,” White House, November 10, 2021,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/ostp/news-updates/2021/11/10/join-the-effort-to-create-a-bill-of-rights-for-
an-automated-society/.

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COUNTERING UNFAIR CHINESE ECONOMIC PRACTICES AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT
393 Two fairly exhaustive lists of U.S. grievances compiled by the Trump administration include “Findings of
the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer, Intellectual
Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,” USTR, March 22, 2018, https://
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF; and “How China’s Economic Aggression
Threatens the Technologies and Intellectual Property of the United States and the World,” White House,
June 18, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/FINAL-China-
Technology-Report-6.18.18-PDF.pdf.
394 “2021 China Business Climate Survey Report,” AmCham China, March 2021, https://www.
amchamchina.org/climate-survey/2021-business-climate-survey/.
395 “Findings of the Investigation Into China’s Acts, Policies, and Practices Related to Technology Transfer,
Intellectual Property, and Innovation Under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,” USTR, March
22, 2018, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/Section%20301%20FINAL.PDF; “U.S. Accuses China
of Violating Bilateral Anti-hacking Deal,” Reuters, November 9, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/
article/usa-china-cyber-idUKL2N1XK06K; Ton Zuijdwijk, “Understanding the Intellectual Property
Disputes between China and the United States,” Centre for International Governance Innovation, May
15, 2019, https://www.cigionline.org/articles/understanding-intellectual-property-disputes-between-
china-and-united-states/; and Stephen Ezell, “False Promises II: The Continuing Gap Between China’s
WTO Commitments and Its Practices,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, July 26,
2021, https://itif.org/publications/2021/07/26/false-promises-ii-continuing-gap-between-chinas-wto-
commitments-and-its.
396 “Statement by the President Regarding Trade With China,” White House, June 15, 2018, https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-regarding-trade-china/.
397 Jeanne Whalen, “Biden’s Commerce Secretary Pick Pledges a Tough Line on China but Doesn’t Detail
How She’d Deal With Huawei,” Washington Post, January 26, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
technology/2021/01/26/gina-raimondo-confirmation-china/.
398 “Statement From President Donald J. Trump on Additional Proposed Section 301 Remedies,” White
House, April 5, 2018, https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-
donald-j-trump-additional-proposed-section-301-remedies/; and Ana Swanson, “W.T.O. Says American
Tariffs on China Broke Global Trade Rules,” New York Times, September 15, 2020, https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/09/15/business/economy/wto-trade-china-trump.html.
399 Jeffrey J. Schott and Euijin Jung, “In US-China Trade Disputes, the WTO Usually Sides With the
United States,” PIIE, March 12, 2019, https://www.piie.com/blogs/trade-and-investment-policy-watch/
us-china-trade-disputes-wto-usually-sides-united-states.
400 Nina M. Hart and Brandon J. Murrill, “The World Trade Organization’s (WTO’s) Appellate Body: Key
Disputes and Controversies,” Congressional Research Service, July 22, 2021, https://crsreports.congress.
gov/product/pdf/R/R46852; Gary Clyde Hufbauer, “WTO Judicial Appointments: Bad Omen for the
Trading System,” PIIE, June 13, 2011, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issues-watch/wto-
judicial-appointments-bad-omen-trading-system; Manfred Elsig, Mark Pollack, and Gregory Shaffer,
“The U.S. Is Causing a Major Controversy in the World Trade Organization. Here’s What’s Happening,”
Washington Post, June 6, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/06/06/
the-u-s-is-trying-to-block-the-reappointment-of-a-wto-judge-here-are-3-things-to-know/; Steve
Charnovitz, “The Obama Administration’s Attack on Appellate Body Independence Shows the Need
for Reforms,” International Economic Law and Policy Blog, September 22, 2016, https://worldtradelaw.
typepad.com/ielpblog/2016/09/the-obama-administrations-attack-on-appellate-body-independence-
shows-the-need-for-reforms-.html.
401 Brandon J. Murrill, “The WTO’s Appellate Body Loses Its Quorum: Is This the Beginning of the End
for the ‘Rules-Based Trading System’?,” Congressional Research Service, December 19, 2019, https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/LSB/LSB10385; and Marianne Schneider-Petsinger, “Reforming
the World Trade Organization,” Chatham House, September 11, 2020, https://www.chathamhouse.
org/2020/09/reforming-world-trade-organization/04-dispute-settlement-crisis.

156 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

402 Bryce Baschuk, “Biden Picks Up Where Trump Left Off in Hard-Line Stances at WTO,” Bloomberg,
February 22, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-22/biden-picks-up-where-trump-
left-off-in-hard-line-stances-at-wto.
403 WTO, “Principles of the Trading System,” https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/
fact2_e.htm. “WTO” here is used as shorthand for various international agreements, starting
chronologically with the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, that the WTO now
oversees. The WTO regime is complemented by other international bodies that have also adopted
nondiscrimination as a core economic principle. See “Guidelines for Recipient Country Investment
Policies Relating to National Security,” Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2009, https://www.oecd.org/investment/investment-policy/43384486.pdf.
404 Bryce Baschuk, “Biden Picks Up Where Trump Left Off in Hard-Line Stances at WTO,” Bloomberg,
February 22, 2021, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-02-22/biden-picks-up-where-trump-
left-off-in-hard-line-stances-at-wto.
405 A WTO panel reviewed this history at length in a landmark 2019 decision regarding Russia’s claim of
a “national security exception” vis-à-vis Ukraine. “Russia – Measures Concerning Traffic in Transit:
Report of the Panel” (Appendix), WTO, April 5, 2019, https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.
aspx?filename=q:/WT/DS/512R.pdf.
406 Peter Van den Bossche and Sarah Akpofure, “The Use and Abuse of the National Security Exception
Under Article XXI(b)(iii) of the GATT 1994,” World Trade Institute, Working Paper no. 345, September
15, 2020, https://www.wti.org/research/publications/1299/the-use-and-abuse-of-the-national-security-
exception-under-article-xxibiii-of-the-gatt-1994/.
407 “2021 Trade Policy Agenda and 2020 Annual Report of the President of the United States on
the Trade Agreements Program,” USTR, March 2021, https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/
reports/2021/2021%20Trade%20Agenda/Online%20PDF%202021%20Trade%20Policy%20
Agenda%20and%202020%20Annual%20Report.pdf.
408 “A Conversation With Ambassador Katherine Tai, U.S. Trade Representative,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, October 4, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/conversation-ambassador-
katherine-tai-us-trade-representative.
409 “Ambassador Katherine Tai’s Remarks as Prepared for Delivery on the World Trade Organization,”
USTR, October 14, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/speeches-and-
remarks/2021/october/ambassador-katherine-tais-remarks-prepared-delivery-world-trade-organization.
410 “U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council Inaugural Joint Statement,” press release, USTR, September
29, 2021, https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2021/september/us-eu-trade-
and-technology-council-inaugural-joint-statement.
411 “A Conversation With Ambassador Katherine Tai, U.S. Trade Representative,” Center for Strategic
and International Studies, October 4, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/conversation-ambassador-
katherine-tai-us-trade-representative.

JON BATEMAN 157

COMPETING AND LEADING IN STRATEGIC INDUSTRIES
412 Remco Zwetsloot et al., “China Is Fast Outpacing U.S. STEM PhD Growth,” Center for Security and
Emerging Technology, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-is-fast-outpacing-
u-s-stem-phd-growth/; “The Human Capital Report 2016,” World Economic Forum, 2016, https://
www3.weforum.org/docs/HCR2016_Main_Report.pdf; and “Gross Domestic Spending on R&D,”
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2021, https://data.oecd.org/rd/gross-
domestic-spending-on-r-d.htm.
413 Robert Greene and Paul Triolo, “Will China Control the Global Internet Via Its Digital Silk Road?,”
SupChina, May 8, 2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/05/08/will-china-control-global-internet-
via-its-digital-silk-road-pub-81857.
414 For a review of this history, see James L. Schoff, “U.S.-Japan Technology Policy Coordination: Balancing
Technonationalism With a Globalized World,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 29,
2020, https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/06/29/u.s.-japan-technology-policy-coordination-balancing-
technonationalism-with-globalized-world-pub-82176.
415 Mark Scott and Emily Birnbaum, “How Washington and Big Tech Won the Global Tax Fight,” Politico,
June 30, 2021, https://www.politico.eu/article/washington-big-tech-tax-talks-oecd/.
416 James Andrew Lewis, “Mapping the National Security Industrial Base: Policy Shaping Issues,” CSIS,
May 19, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/mapping-national-security-industrial-base-policy-shaping-
issues.
417 The blue-ribbon Cyberspace Solarium Commission expressed a version of this concern: “Chinese national
companies like Huawei are part of an integrated strategy to use predatory pricing to dominate and
eventually monopolize key information and communications technology supply chains. The goal is to
drive non-Chinese alternatives out of business, leaving the Chinese Communist Party and its business
allies with a stranglehold on the global supply chain.” “Final Report,” Cyberspace Solarium Commission,
March 2020, https://www.solarium.gov/report.
418 John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Public Law No. 115-232, §
1702(c)(1).
419 Commerce Department, “Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies,” 83 Fed. Reg. 58,201
(November 19, 2018), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/11/19/2018-25221/review-of-
controls-for-certain-emerging-technologies.
420 Peter Lichtenbaum, Victor Ban, and Lisa Ann Johnson, “Defining ‘Emerging Technologies’: Industry
Weighs in on Potential New Export Controls,” China Business Review, April 17, 2019, https://www.
chinabusinessreview.com/defining-emerging-technologies-industry-weighs-in-on-potential-new-export-
controls/; Paul H. DeLaney, “Business Roundtable Comments on the Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (ANPRM) Regarding the Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies,” January
12, 2019, https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-comments-on-the-advance-notice-
of-proposed-rulemaking-anprm-regarding-the-review-of-controls-for-certain-emerging-technologies; and
Linda Dempsey, “Comments of the National Association of Manufacturers on the Review of Controls
for Certain Emerging Technologies (Docket BIS 2018-0024),” National Association of Manufacturers,
January 9, 2019, http://documents.nam.org/iea/NAM%20Comments%20on%20Emerging%20
Technology%20for%20BIS%20(final).pdf.
421 Council on Governmental Relations et al., “RIN 0694-AH80, Identification and Review of Controls for
Certain Foundational Technologies ANPRM,” November 2020, https://www.cogr.edu/sites/default/files/
AAU_COGR_ACE_APLU_AAMC_ANPRM%20Foundational%20Technologies.pdf.
422 Steven W. Popper and Caroline Wagner, “Identifying Critical Technologies in the United States: A
Review of the Federal Effort,” Journal of Forecasting 22, no. 2–3 (2003), https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/5141648_Identifying_critical_technologies_in_the_United_States_A_review_of_the_
federal_effort; and Mary Ellen Mogee, Technology Policy and Critical Technologies: A Summary of Recent
Reports (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 1991), https://www.nap.edu/read/20840/chapter/5.
423 “National Critical Technologies Report—Appendix A: National Critical Technologies List,” White
House, March 1995, https://clintonwhitehouse3.archives.gov/WH/EOP/OSTP/CTIformatted/AppA/
appa.html.

158 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

424 “National Strategy for Critical and Emerging Technologies,” White House, October 2020, https://
trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/National-Strategy-for-CET.pdf.
425 “Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update,” National Science and Technology Council, February
2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-
Technologies-List-Update.pdf.
426 Emphasis in original.
427 “Asymmetric Competition: A Strategy for China & Technology,” China Strategy Group, Fall 2020,
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/20463382-final-memo-china-strategy-group-axios-1; and
Jeffrey Ding and Allan Dafoe, “The Logic of Strategic Assets: From Oil to AI,” Security Studies 30, no. 2
(2021), https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2021.1915583.
428 The United States does not have a single company that competes on a one-for-one basis with Huawei
or ZTE in 5G telecommunications equipment markets. However, U.S. partners Finland (Nokia) and
Sweden (Ericcson) do compete in aspects of these markets, and the United States has an interest in
preventing Chinese dominance. Moreover, U.S. companies support various aspects of the 5G supply
chain, and could do so more fully and effectively if the open, software-based 5G standard known as
O-RAN continues to develop as a viable alternative to the closed, hardware-based systems sold by
Huawei and ZTE.
429 Justin Hodiak and Scott W. Harold, “Can China Become the World Leader in Semiconductors?,” The
Diplomat, September 25, 2020, https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/can-china-become-the-world-leader-in-
semiconductors/; Christopher A. Thomas, “Lagging But Motivated: The State of China’s Semiconductor
Industry,” Brookings TechStream (blog), Brookings Institution, January 7, 2021, https://www.brookings.
edu/techstream/lagging-but-motivated-the-state-of-chinas-semiconductor-industry/; Arjun Kharpal,
“China Is Ramping Up Its Own Chip Industry Amid a Brewing Tech War,” CNBC, June 4 2019,
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/04/china-ramps-up-own-semiconductor-industry-amid-the-trade-
war.html; and Jordan Schneider, “China’s Chip Industry: Running Faster But Still Falling Behind,”
Rhodium Group, April 22, 2021, https://rhg.com/research/china-chips/.
430 Alexandra Alper, Toby Sterling, and Stephen Nellis, “Trump Administration Pressed Dutch Hard to
Cancel China Chip-equipment Sale: Sources,” Reuters, January 6, 2020, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-asml-holding-usa-china-insight/trump-administration-pressed-dutch-hard-to-cancel-china-
chip-equipment-sale-sources-idUSKBN1Z50HN; and Justin Hodiak and Scott W. Harold, “Can China
Become the World Leader in Semiconductors?,” The Diplomat, September 25, 2020, https://thediplomat.
com/2020/09/can-china-become-the-world-leader-in-semiconductors/.
431 Karen Freifeld, “Huawei Gets U.S. Approvals to Buy Auto Chips, Sparking Blow Back,” Reuters, August
25, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/exclusive-us-approves-licenses-huawei-
buy-auto-chips-sources-2021-08-25/.
432 For an explanation of this issue, see Evan Burke, “Trump-Era Policies Toward Chinese STEM Talent:
A Need for Better Balance,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 25, 2021, https://
carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/25/trump-era-policies-toward-chinese-stem-talent-need-for-better-
balance-pub-84137.
433 Ellen Nakashima and Jeanne Whalen, “Key Security Agencies Split Over Whether to Blacklist Former
Huawei Smartphone Unit,” Washington Post, September 19, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/huawei-honor-security-export/2021/09/19/6d49d27c-17ef-11ec-b976-f4a43b740aeb_
story.html.
434 Michael McCaul et al., letter to Gina Raimondo, August 6, 2021, https://gop-foreignaffairs.house.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2021/08/8-6-21-CTF-Letter-to-Sec-Raimondo-RE-Honor-Device-Co-1.pdf.
435 Christine Fox, “An Entwined AI Future: Resistance Is Futile,” 2020, JHU APL, https://www.jhuapl.edu/
assessing-us-china-technology-connections/dist/071c25aa35e135f3c20c2f53f182de11.pdf.
436 Regarding China’s potential advantages in certain AI sub-fields, one recent study noted that “a
disproportionate share of China’s highly cited and top-venue [AI] publications include publications on
general-purpose computer vision research, as well as applications of AI to surveillance and industry.”
Ashwin Acharya and Brian Dunn, “Comparing U.S. and Chinese Contributions to High-Impact AI
Research,” Center for Security and Emerging Technology, January 2022, https://cset.georgetown.edu/
publication/comparing-u-s-and-chinese-contributions-to-high-impact-ai-research/.

JON BATEMAN 159

437 Rand Waltzman et al., “Maintaining the Competitive Advantage in Artificial Intelligence and Machine
Learning,” RAND Corporation, 2020, https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA200-1.html.
438 Sam Shead, “Why the Buzz Around DeepMind Is Dissipating as It Transitions From Games to Science,”
CNBC, June 5, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/05/google-deepmind-alphago-buzz-dissipates.
html.
439 A much more detailed and comprehensive set of proposals, related primarily but not exclusively to
AI, can be found in the report of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence. “Final
Report,” National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence, March 2021, https://www.nscai.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Full-Report-Digital-1.pdf.
440 Robert D. Atkinson, “The Case for a National Industrial Strategy to Counter China’s Technological
Rise,” Infornation Technology & Innovation Foundation, April 13, 2020, https://itif.org/
publications/2020/04/13/case-national-industrial-strategy-counter-chinas-technological-rise.
441 Robert D. Atkinson, “The Case for a National Industrial Strategy to Counter China’s Technological
Rise,” Infornation Technology & Innovation Foundation, April 13, 2020, https://itif.org/
publications/2020/04/13/case-national-industrial-strategy-counter-chinas-technological-rise.

160 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

OBTAINING GENERAL LEVERAGE OVER CHINA
442 Michael S. Schmidt and Maggie Haberman, “Bolton Was Concerned That Trump Did Favors for
Autocratic Leaders, Book Says,” New York Times, June 17, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/
us/politics/john-bolton-trump-book-barr.html; and “Trump Says Huawei Could Be Part of Trade Deal,”
BBC, May 24, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/business-48392021.
443 John D. McKinnon, “Trump Says ‘There Has Been No Folding’ Over Possible ZTE Deal,” Wall Street
Journal, May 16, 2018, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trump-says-there-has-been-no-folding-over-
possible-zte-deal-1526494867.
444 Sarah Zheng, “US-China Relations: Meng Wanzhou’s Return Clears One Roadblock to a Reset,” South
China Morning Post, September 27, 2021, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3150302/
us-china-relations-meng-wanzhous-return-clears-one-roadblock.
445 Sha Hua and Timothy Puko, “U.S.-China Surprise Cooperation on Climate Change Driven by Biden
and Xi’s Need for Deal,” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-
and-xi-pressed-for-u-s-china-climate-statement-11636718318.

JON BATEMAN 161

SHAPING U.S. DOMESTIC NARRATIVES
446 “High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk
Areas,” Government Accountability Office, March 2, 2021, https://files.gao.gov/reports/GAO-21-119SP/
index.html.
447 Yajana Sharma, “Top US Research Universities Freeze Ties With Huawei,” University World News,
February 11, 2019, https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20190211124159161.
448 Georgia Wells, Jeff Horwitz, and Aruna Viswanatha, “Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Stoked
Washington’s Fears About TikTok,” Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/
facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerberg-stoked-washingtons-fears-about-tiktok-11598223133.
449 “Statement by Secretary Steven T. Mnuchin on the President’s Decision Regarding the Acquisition by
ByteDance Ltd. of the U.S. Business of musical.ly,” press release, Treasury Department, August 14, 2020,
https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1094.
450 Georgia Wells, Aaron Tilley, and John D. McKinnon, “How Dark Horse Oracle Became TikTok’s
Leading Suitor,” Wall Street Journal, September 14, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/oracle-tiktok-
deal-trump-politics-microsoft-11600129980.
451 Robert Chesney, “TikTok, WeChat, and Biden’s New Executive Order: What You Need to Know,”
Lawfare, June 9, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/tiktok-wechat-and-bidens-new-executive-order-
what-you-need-know.

162 U.S.-CHINA TECHNOLOGICAL “DECOUPLING”: A STRATEGY AND POLICY FRAMEWORK

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