Plaintiffs' Opposition To Defendants' Joint Motion To Dismiss W Exhibits

Sam Meziani (9821)
GOEBEL ANDERSON PC
405 South Main Street, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801.441.9393
[email protected]
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
AARON JAMES and TIFFANY JAMES,

Heirs and Personal Representatives of the Estate PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO
of Zane James and in their individual capacities; DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO
DISMISS
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 210906323
vs.
Judge Kara Pettit
CASEY DAVIES, and CITY OF
COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, Tier 3
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Defendants’ motion to dismiss should be denied in part because Aaron and Tiffany James
are the lawful representatives of the Estate of Zane James, and the Estate’s claims are not barred
by the statute of limitations. Aaron and Tiffany James have been appointed personal
representatives of the Estate of Zane James, as Defendants acknowledge.1 As such, they are the
proper parties to maintain claims on behalf of the Estate.
Defendants argue the Estate’s claims for violations of the Utah Constitution are time barred
by the statute of limitations. This argument fails because the Estate’s claims are tolled under 28
U.S.C. §1367(d).
On May 16, 2019, Plaintiffs filed claims in the United States District Court for the District
of Utah against Casey Davies and the City of Cottonwood Heights arising from the May 29, 2018
shooting of Zane James. Copies of the docket and the relevant pleadings are submitted herewith.2
The May 16, 2019, complaint (Dkt. 2) asserted claims under the Utah Constitution, including due
process (Article I, §7) and excessive force (Article I, §14). Plaintiffs amended the complaint on
August 5, 2021, which Amended Complaint (Dkt. 96) asserted the same claims. Both complaints
allege the state Constitutional claims are subject to supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§1367. The United States Supreme Court has held the supplemental jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C.
§1367(d), tolls the statute of limitations while the claims are pending in federal court. Because
Plaintiffs’ state claims are currently pending in federal court, the limitations clock stopped running
on May 16, 2019 and remains tolled. Defendants’ argument the statute of limitations has run is
therefore without merit.
1
See also Statement of Informal Appointment of Co-Personal Representatives in In the Matter of
the Estate of Zane James, Case No. 193901069, dated April 2, 2020 (Robert P. Faust)
2
To the extent Defendants, who have appeared in the federal case through the same counsel,
dispute the fact of and contents of the federal filings, the court can take judicial notice of their
contents. State v. Cooper, 2011 UT App 412, ¶15, n. 8 (“A court can take judicial notice that a
pleading was filed or that a judgment was entered. Likewise, a Court can take judicial notice
that court filings contained certain allegations….”).
2
Turning to the wrongful death claims, it appears Defendants are correct the wrongful death
claims are barred because former counsel did not timely serve a notice of claim. Although former
counsel held a press conference related to this case on May 16, 2019, he did not serve a notice of
claim prior to May 29, 2019. The undersigned was retained in 2021, well after the deadline to
serve a notice of claim had passed. Plaintiffs asserted the wrongful death claims herein to preserve
all their rights, including rights in relation to former counsel.
Based on the above, if the court dismisses the wrongful death claims, the claims belonging
to the Estate remain viable. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion should be denied in part to allow
the Estate’s claims to move forward.
ARGUMENT
I. Claims Belonging to the Estate of Zane James Are Tolled
As Defendants concede, the Estate’s claims for violation of the Utah Constitution are not
subject to the Governmental Immunity Act.3 Plaintiffs filed their state law claims in federal court
within one year of the shooting death of Zane James. Plaintiffs’ federal filing tolled the claims.
In Artis v. District of Columbia,4 the Supreme Court held Section §1367(d) is a tolling provision:
“We hold that §1367(d)’s instruction to ‘toll’ a state limitations period means to hold it in
abeyance, i.e., to stop the clock.”5 “That is, the limitations clock stops the day the claim is filed in
federal court and, 30 days post dismissal, restarts from the point at which it had stopped.” 6 In
3
“[T]he Utah Governmental Immunity Act does not apply to claims alleging state constitutional
violations..” Jensen v. Cunningham, 250 P.3d 465, 479 (Utah 2011); McCubbin v. Weber
County, 2017 WL 3394593, *21 (D. Utah 2017) (“…the UGIA does not apply to state
constitutional claims”).
4
138 S. Ct. 594 (2018)
5
Id. at 598.
6
Id. at 603.
3
Pinedo v. Martinson,7 Judge Campbell from the District of Utah applied Artis to hold plaintiff’s
state law claims are tolled based on §1367(d).
Because Plaintiffs’ federal filing tolled the statute of limitations, the Estate’s claims are not
time barred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, claims belonging to the Estate of Zane James should not be
dismissed.
DATED: March 9, 2022.
/s/ Sam Meziani

Sam Meziani
Attorney for Plaintiffs
7
2021 WL 5084271, *5 n. 7 (D. Utah 2021)
4
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 9th day of March, 2022, a true and correct copy of the
PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS was
electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court using the Utah Trial Court/ECF system, which sent
notification of such filing to all parties of record.
Mark F. James
Mitchell A. Stephens
Justin L. James
James Dodge Russell & Stephens, P.C.
10 West Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City UT 84101
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Attorneys for Casey Davies
Heather White
Dani N. Cepernich
Bryson R. Brown
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Salt Lake City UT 84145
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Attorneys for Cottonwood Heights
/s/ Karen Harwood
5
EXHIBIT 1
EXHIBIT 2
Case 2:19-cv-00341-HCN-DBP Document 2 Filed 05/16/19 PageID.2 Page 1 of 27
Robert B. Sykes (#3180)

C. Peter Sorensen (#16728)
SYKES MCALLISTER LAW OFFICES, PLLC
311 S. State Street, Suite 240
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone No. (801) 533-0222
[email protected]
[email protected]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

Heirs and Proposed Personal COMPLAINT
Representatives of the Estate of Zane & JURY DEMAND
James,
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. _______________
vs.
Judge ____________________
CASEY DAVIES, an Officer of the
Cottonwood Heights Police Department;
and COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UTAH,
Defendants.
Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, hereby complain against
Defendants, and assert the following allegations in their totality and in the alternative:
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The following allegations are based upon the undersigneds’ understanding of
information presently available. This is a civil rights action in which Plaintiffs seek relief
for the Defendants’ violations of the rights of Zane James, guaranteed by the United States
Constitution, specifically, the Fourth and/or the Fourteenth Amendments, which rights are
further secured by the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1988.
This action also seeks relief under the Constitution of the State of Utah, Article I, Section 14,
to the extent applicable under the facts.
On May 29, 2018, Zane James was fleeing law enforcement in Cottonwood
Heights, Utah. He had robbed two stores with an “airsoft” or toy gun loaded with BBs, and
had fled on a motorbike. At the time of the shooting by Defendant Casey Davies, he was
running away and was non-threatening. The Defendant Officer Davies pulled up as Zane
was fleeing, opened his car door and shot Zane in the back as he fled, seriously injuring him.
One bullet apparently severed Zane’s spinal cord at C-6. This injury led to his death three
days later. Defendant improperly used deadly force on a fleeing suspect by shooting him in
the back. The shooting violated Zane’s rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.
PARTIES
1. Plaintiff Tiffany James (“Tiffany”) is a citizen of the United States and
a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Tiffany is the mother and an heir of Zane
James, deceased, and will be co-personal representative of the Estate of Zane James.
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2. Plaintiff Aaron James (“Aaron”) is a citizen of the United States and
a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Aaron is the father and an heir of Zane James,
deceased, and will be co-personal representative of the Estate of Zane James.
3. At all relevant times, Defendant Casey Davies (“Davies”) was a police
officer with the Cottonwood Heights Police Department (“CHPD”), which is a department
of the City of Cottonwood Heights.
4. Defendant Cottonwood Heights (“CH”) is a political subdivision of
the State of Utah.
5. At all times alleged in this Complaint, Davies was acting within the
course and scope of his employment.
6. Plaintiffs are suing Davies in his individual capacity.
7. The CHPD, acting for CH, made and enforced policies and procedures
for police officers in CH, and for Davies.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
8. This action arises under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution of the United States and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Accordingly, the Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343. The Court has supplemental
jurisdiction of Plaintiffs’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
9. The claims made in this Complaint occurred and arose in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah. Accordingly, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.
3
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS
10. On the morning of May 29, 2018, Zane James (“Zane”) was a “fleeing
felon,” having robbed two stores in nearby Sandy, Utah.
– Zane’s History –
11. Zane was an accomplished high-level competitive hockey player and
academic.
12. He initially showed great promise as a hockey player.
13. In order to pursue a possible college or professional career, Zane
relocated for his senior year in high school to play Junior League hockey in the northwest.
14. While playing hockey in the northwest, Zane sustained two serious
concussions.
15. In order to deal with the pain and disability from these injuries, medical
professionals recommended he terminate his hockey career.
16. As a result of this recommendation, Zane became severely, clinically
depressed, but did complete his high school degree with honors.
17. Due to prescriptions from medical professionals, Zane became addicted
to opiates as he coped with long-term physical and emotional symptoms of his concussions.
18. Zane attempted several times to extricate himself from the addiction,
with some success, and was actively seeking additional treatment at the time of the shooting.
4
– Zane’s Appearance, Deportment and Injury –
19. Zane was 19 years old on May 29, 2018. He was 6'1" tall and weighed
165 pounds.
20. On 5/29/19, at about 6:00 am, Zane had just robbed a store in Sandy
with an airsoft gun loaded with BBs.
21. No BBs or other ammo were fired at the scene of the robbery.
22. Zane fled on a motorbike toward his home, located in CH.
23. He was unable to make a turn due to pursuit by officers.
24. He crashed his motorbike on a narrow neighborhood street, and slid
along until it stopped.
25. The crash was witnessed by Defendant Davies and one other CHPD
officer, Betenson.
26. Any reasonable officer witnessing this motorbike crash would have
known that it would have caused significant injuries.
27. Zane is believed to have severely injured his knees, and had multiple
other injuries caused by sliding on the pavement as he laid his motor bike down.
28. Zane got up and tried to run, limping seriously as he tried to get away.
– No Weapon in Hands –
29. The BB or airsoft gun was not in Zane’s hands, but was tucked away
in his clothing.
5
30. It was obvious, or would have been obvious to any reasonable officer,
that Zane did not have any weapon(s) in his hands as he ran.
– No Immediate Threat of Harm –
31. At no time was Zane threatening to shoot at anybody.
32. At no time was any officer in immediate danger of death or serious
bodily injury as Zane fled.
33. At no time was any citizen in immediate danger of death or serious
bodily injury as Zane fled.
34. As Officer Davies pulled up, Zane was running away and his back was
to Officer Davies.
– Shooting Details –
35. Officer Davies stopped his police vehicle, got out to pursue, then went
back to his car. Davis then fired four shots fired at Zane.
36. This was a populated area, with homes all around.
37. Two bullets missed Zane.
38. Two bullets struck Zane.
39. One bullet struck Zane in the back of his left shoulder.
40. The second bullet struck Zane in the back of his left thigh.
41. Multiple shots were not necessary.
6
42. The bullet that struck Zane in the shoulder traveled in an inside
trajectory and struck his spinal cord at C-6, causing immediate and full paralysis, and causing
Zane to fall to the ground.
43. It may be, but is unknown at this time, that Zane was rendered a
quadriplegic because that shot damaged his spinal cord.
44. Eyewitnesses say that at one point, Zane lifted his head. An officer
forcibly and roughly shoved his head back to the ground.
45. Officers roughly flipped Zane over onto his back.
46. Rough treatment by the police at the scene, including moving Zane, may
have contributed to or caused the quadriplegia.
47. Eyewitnesses also reported that officers at the scene seemed uninterested
and indifferent to Zane’s condition, and displayed no urgency in attending to his injuries.
48. This injury resulted in Zane being unable to use his hands or his feet,
as well as suffering the loss of the necessary autonomic body functions to survive unassisted,
such as heart rate, blood pressure and breathing.
– Davies’ History –
49. Davies is believed to have graduated from the police academy in about
2010.
50. He is believed to have been hired by CHPD in about 2008.
7
51. Davies is an instructor in tasers, firearms, control defensive tactics, and
SWAT. Despite his training at an instructor level on multiple suppression tactics, including
nonlethal tactics, Davies displayed a disregard for disciplined situation control in shooting
Zane.
– Davies’ Self Dispatch –
52. At approximately 6:10 am, a dispatch went out from the CHPD, which
was heard by Officer Davies who was off-duty, announcing the robbery.
53. There was a general dispatch to officers on 5/29/18 at about 6:12 am.
The following is recounted in a report from Sgt. Ricks of the CHPD:
... at approximately 0610 hours ... Officer Betenson stated over the police radio
that he was behind a dirt bike that matched the description of one that had fled
from C.H.P.D. officers previously and it appeared he was trying to evade him.
I asked Officer Betenson if he was in pursuit with the motorcycle and he stated
no I'm attempting to catch up with just his emergency lights activated.
Officer Betenson then advised the subject was fleeing from him and he was
terminating the pursuit. Betenson then advised he was just following and I
advised him to terminate. A Sandy Police Officer then got on our channel and
advised that the suspect on the motorcycle matched the description of an armed
robberies suspect that occurred in their area, last night. Officer's Davies and
Betenson stated they were pursuing the suspect north bound on 2300 East.
54. Defendant Davies was never dispatched to the scene.
55. Davies overheard the general dispatch and decided to join the pursuit.
56. Davies is believed to have stopped his police vehicle at approximately
6:12 am and shot at Zane from near his vehicle.
57. Davies was not wearing a lapel camera, as CHPD policy required.
8
58. Officer Betenson was not wearing his lapel camera, or had turned it off.
– Witnesses –
59. Nearby residents witnessed the shooting.
60. Among other things, witnesses stated:
a) Zane did not have a visible weapon.
b) Officer Davies pulled his car to a stop and shot Zane in the back,
as he was running away.
c) No effective warning or opportunity to stop was given by either
Officer Davies or Officer Betenson.
d) No citizens or officers were nearby or in danger from Zane.
e) Zane did not yell any threats at officers or others.
f) Zane appeared to be injured and limping as he ran.
g) No officer said anything like “stop or I’ll shoot.”
h) Witnesses confirm that Officer Betenson arrived on scene just
as Davies fired is fourth shot.
61. After crashing, Zane began running away from Officers Betenson and
Davies.
62. Zane’s back was to Davies as he ran away.
9
– No Threats of Arrest or Other Warnings –
63. Davies drew his handgun and fired four shots at Zane while Zane was
running away from him.
64. Based on information and belief, Davies did not issue any warning to
Zane to “stop or I’ll shoot” before firing four shots.
65. Neither Davies nor Betenson told Zane at any time he was “under
arrest.”
66. Davies was approximately 25-30 feet away from Zane when he fired the
shots.
– Non-Lethal Options –
67. Davies had available nonlethal methods of force, including a taser.
68. Davies did not attempt to taser Zane.
69. Davies did not give chase, despite being just a short distance from Zane,
who was injured by the crash.
70. Davies did not fire a warning shot.
71. At no time did Davies order Zane to “Stop or I will shoot.”
72. Before Davies fired the shots, Davies knew or suspected that Zane had
been seriously injured in the crashing and skidding of the motorbike.
73. Before Davies fired the shots, he knew that other officers were nearby
and could be of assistance.
10
74. Before Davies fired the shots, he knew that he and other officers could,
more likely than not, apprehend Zane without using deadly force.
75. When Defendant Davies fired the shots, Zane had no weapon in either
hand.
76. When Defendant Davies fired the shots, Zane was physically incapable
of running very far or resisting, and posed no realistic threat of imminent danger to anyone.
77. One of the shots was the paralyzing shot that entered Zane’s body at the
shoulder, but traveled to the cervical spine, which caused the severe injuries and damage
described herein.
78. Either shot alone would have been sufficient to injure Zane and keep
him from fleeing further or escaping. It was unnecessary to shoot more than once.
– Davies’ Falsehoods and Cover-Up –
79. After the shooting and death, Defendant Davies engaged in efforts to
cover up his unlawful actions.
80. For example, Davies reportedly claimed that Zane broke stride like he
was reaching for a gun.
81. But that claim makes no sense because Zane knew he did not have a real
gun, so why would he reach for a toy gun, knowing armed officers were close behind?
82. In reality, Zane was not reaching for anything, but was trying to run after
a serious injury from the motorbike crash.
11
83. Davies refused to make a statement to investigators about his decision
to shoot Zane, which is highly unusual.
84. Other officers gave written and oral statements that day.
85. CHPD followed the shooting with public statements about Zane being
a known violent criminal to support the officer’s conduct.
86. Defendant Davies falsely claimed that Zane was digging through his
pockets and “continued to conceal his hands and reach in his pockets.”
87. After the shooting, Davies falsely claimed that he shot Zane to death
because he was worried about the threat of Zane shooting him.
88. There was no immediate threat to an officer or to public safety.
– Officer Betenson’s Cover Up –
89. Officer Betenson was interviewed by Officer Involved Critical Incident
(OICI) personnel, as per protocol after a deadly shooting.
90. Officer Betenson claims to have witnessed the crash of the motorbike
and saw Zane skid along the pavement after the crash.
91. Eyewitnesses dispute that Betenson could have seen the crash.
92. Officer Betenson, were he a reasonable officer at the time, would have
understood that Zane was likely significantly injured by this crash.
12
93. Officer Betenson told one investigator that Zane’s actions only caused
him “concern.” Betenson did not have his gun drawn when Davies fired shots at Zane. This
contradicts Betenson’s claims that there was some imminent risk of Zane shooting an officer.
94. Officer Betenson claimed to OICI investigators that as Zane ran away,
he saw his “arms go from a running motion to his hands reaching for something in the front
of his body.” However, eyewitnesses dispute whether Betenson could have seen this.
95. The above statement by Officer Betenson is false or exaggerated.
– Davies’ Bullets –
96. In total, two of Davies’ shots struck Zane James:
a. One bullet penetrated the upper left shoulder, i.e., was a posterior
entry, back to front. This bullet entered the upper back near the neck, and lodged in the
spinal cord at C-6. This may have contributed to Zane becoming a quadriplegic. Part of the
bullet was recovered from the spinal canal at the C5/6 level.
b. A second bullet perforated Zane’s left thigh from the back. Part
of this bullet was likewise recovered in the medial proximal left thigh.
– Improper and Questionable Investigation –
97. As part of the protocol for investigating an officer-involved shooting,
the Salt Lake County Attorney’s Office detached an investigator to the scene within minutes
of the shooting.
13
98. The investigator requested an interview with Davies. However, “Officer
Davies, on the advice of his attorney, did not answer questions or provide a statement or offer
information about the OICI to protocol investigators, as is his constitutional right to do so
[sic].” Sam Gill Letter, 10/08/18, p. 6.
99. Davies had obtained legal representation within hours of Zane James’
death.
100. All other officers at the scene were interviewed by the investigators on
May 29, 2018, the day of the shooting.
101. Since Zane was shot in the back, and did not have his hands on a
weapon, the OICI and CHPD were obligated to do a detailed investigation focusing whether
there was justification to shoot a fleeing felony suspect in the back.
102. In the entire report of the OICI task force, there is never any significant
mention of the fact that Zane was shot in the back by Officer Davies. See Sim Gill report,
October 8, 2018.
103. In fact, the report shows the following: 1) failure to determine why Zane
was shot in the back; 2) failure to determine why non-lethal means were not employed and
no consideration/acknowledgment that Zane was injured from the motorcycle crash; 3)
failure to account for each bullet fired, including the two bullets either of which were capable
of stopping Zane from fleeing; 4) inquiry into why there was no collection of eyewitness
accounts other than one police officer; 5) inquiry into why Davies and Betenson's body and
14
dash cameras were not on during the chase and shooting or other officers who arrived on the
scene after the shooting; 6) no inquiry into why Officer Davies chose to pursue a suspect
while off duty; 7) no inquiry into Officer Davies’ past history of use of excessive force; and
8) no inquiry into the danger that Officer Davies presented to the public by firing multiple
shots into a residential neighborhood, where the third and fourth bullets fired by Davies
would have lodged.
– Camera Evidence –
104. It is not clear yet why the other officers did not have body cam or dash
cam recordings.
105. Officers Davies and Betenson did not have body or dash cam on at the
time of the shooting, despite having policy for this procedure.
106. Apparently only Officer Harris was using a body camera.
107. She arrived at the scene after the bullets had been fired.
108. Officer Kawa’s report said: “I did not have my department issued body
camera on my person during the time of my involvement due to me turning [it in] before the
end of my shift which ended at 0600 hours.” This demonstrates that the CHPD culture and
practice support lack of body camera usage and condones a practice of self-dispatch.
– Miscellaneous Facts –
109. Davies did not use situation management or de-escalation tactics.
110. Davies was not disciplined in connection with the Zane James incident.
15
111. Davies’ actions toward Zane were consistent with Cottonwood Heights’
policies.
112. In fact, Davies was awarded a commendation by Cottonwood Heights
during the active investigation.
113. Other officers’ actions toward Zane were consistent with Cottonwood
Heights’ policies.
– Tragic Consequences and Damages –
114. Three (3) days after Zane James was shot, Zane confronted the terrifying
realization that if he lived, he would be paralyzed for life from the neck down. This caused
him to experience fear and terror in the last three days of his young life.
115. As a result of these depressing facts, Zane requested no life saving
methods be used to preserve his life.
116. Zane died on May 31, 2018 of the consequences of the shooting.
117. In addition to any other damages, the Estate of Zane James is entitled
to pain and suffering and general and other damages as may be allowed by law, in an amount
that is reasonable as determined by a jury.
118. Zane was much beloved by his mother, Tiffany James, and his father,
Aaron James, as well as by his siblings. They have all been deprived of the society and
companionship of Zane, which society and companionship they would have otherwise
16
enjoyed for many years. Tiffany and Aaron are entitled to an amount for loss of society and
companionship that is reasonable as determined by a jury.
119. They are also entitled to any other damages available under law, for
either themselves personally or for the estate.
120. Zane’s siblings may also, under some circumstances, be entitled to
compensation for Zane’s loss.
121. The Estate of Zane James and Plaintiffs are entitled to all damages
allowed under Berry v. City of Muskogee, Okl., 900 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1990), which
references are incorporated herein by reference.
122. The actions of Defendant Davies were the result of willful and malicious
conduct, and/or manifested a knowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of,
the rights and very life of others.
CLAIMS FOR RELIEF
The headings stated under each individual cause of action are for general
descriptive purposes only, and are not intended to limit the Plaintiffs’ claims for relief. The
Plaintiffs reserve the right to assert any legal theory or claim for relief applicable to the facts
set forth in this Complaint or an amended complaint pursuant to F.R.Civ.P. 8.
123. The claims for relief asserted herein are asserted individually and/or in
the alternative.
17
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Deprivation of Federal Constitutional Rights – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Against Defendant Davies
124. Plaintiffs incorporate by reference all other paragraphs of this Complaint
as though fully set forth herein.
125. At all times relevant hereto, and in performance of the acts set forth
herein, Defendant Davies acted under color of state law.
126. At all times relevant hereto, and in performance of the acts set forth
herein, Davies actively and personally caused the violations of constitutional rights alleged
herein.
127. If deadly force is used, then an officer’s use of that force is reasonable
only “if a reasonable officer in Defendants’ position would have had probable cause to
believe that there was a threat of serious physical harm to themselves or others.” Estate of
Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2008).
128. Furthermore, even if deadly force is necessary in the first instance,
Tenth Circuit law requires officers to justify each additional bullet after the first bullet. See
Fancher v. Barrientos, 723 F.3d 1191, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Prior to shooting Dominguez,
Barrientos stepped back, felt safer, and noticed Mr. Dominguez slump. This allowed him
enough time ... to recognize and react to the changed circumstances and cease firing his gun.
Under these circumstances, we have no trouble concluding Barrientos lacked probable cause
to believe Dominguez posed a threat of serious harm to Barrientos or others at the time he
18
fired shots two through seven”); Estate of Fuentes ex rel. Fuentes v. Thomas, 107 F. Supp.
2d 1288, 1300 (D. Kan. 2000) aff'd sub nom; Cerca v. Thomas, 30 F. App’x 931 (10th Cir.
2002) (unpublished opinion) (“The court cannot find that Cpl. Thomas's actions were
objectively reasonable because the evidence... is such that a rational fact-finder could infer
that the defendant fired the third shot after the threat was abated. Because Cpl. Thomas has
not shown that his actions were objectively reasonable, he is not qualifiedly immune to
prosecution”).
129. The Fourth Amendment requires police officers making an arrest to use
only an amount of force that is objectively reasonable in light of the circumstances facing
them. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7-8.
130. CHPD training materials and actual training warned or should have
warned Davies that deadly force may only be used where there is an immediate threat of
serious bodily injury or death to the officer or others. “Where the suspect poses no
immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to
apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471
U.S. 1, 11, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1701 (1985).
131. Davies’ conduct alleged herein, including Davies’ use of unreasonable
or unnecessary deadly force by shooting Zane in the back, subjected Zane to the deprivation
of his rights protected under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
19
132. If, under the facts, Zane is not deemed to have been “seized” under the
Graham factors relating to the Fourth Amendment, and not deemed to be in custody, then
Defendant Davies’ actions deprived Zane of life, liberty, and bodily integrity, as
substantively guaranteed to Zane under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
133. The unreasonable, excessive, and dangerous deadly force used by
Defendant Davies, which directly caused Zane’s death as described above, deprived him of
a liberty interest without due process of law, in violation of the Fifth and/or Fourteenth
Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
134. Davies’ actions violated Zane’s clearly established constitutional rights
of which reasonable police officers are or should be aware.
135. Defendant Davies’ actions proximately caused pain and emotional
distress to Zane.
136. Defendant Davies’ actions proximately caused Zane’s death and the
harm alleged by Plaintiffs.
137. As a result of Davies’ unlawful actions, and to remedy misconduct of
significant importance to the public, Plaintiffs have had to retain counsel.
138. Davies’ actions manifested malicious, reckless, and callous indifference
to the rights and the very life of Zane James.
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Deprivation of Federal Constitutional Rights – 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Against Defendant Cottonwood Heights
140. The actions of Defendant Davies toward Zane James were pursuant to,
and consistent with, an established policy, practice, or custom of Defendant CH.
141. The actions of Davies were pursuant to a CHPD policy, practice, and/or
custom that consists of arming police officers with deadly weapons and condoning their use
without requiring the consideration of less-lethal alternatives, and without providing proper
training and/or supervision regarding their safe, reasonable, and appropriate use.
142. Defendants CHPD and CH were deliberately indifferent toward the
proper training, arming, and supervision of its officers and agents.
143. Among other actions showing deliberate indifference, CHPD is believed
to have hired Davies despite a prior known history of using excessive force.
144. The actions of Defendants CHPD and CH were the proximate cause of
pain and suffering to Zane, the death of Zane, and the other damages sustained by Plaintiffs.
145. As a result of these Defendants’ actions, and in order to remedy this
important issue of public concern, Plaintiffs have had to retain legal counsel.
21
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF
Violations of Utah Constitution, Art. I, §§ 1,6, 7, 14, 25

Against All Defendants
147. The actions of Defendants described herein violated Zane’s rights
secured by Article I, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution (“All men have the inherent and
inalienable right to enjoy and defend their lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect
property[.]”).
148. The actions of Defendants described above violated Zane’s rights
secured by Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of Utah (“No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.”).
149. The actions of Defendants described herein violated Zane’s rights
secured by Article I, Section 14, which states in relevant part: “The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated.”
150. The actions of Defendants described herein violated Plaintiffs’ rights
secured by Article I, Section 25, which states in relevant part: “This enumeration of rights
shall not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.”
22
151. Based upon the text and historical context, case law, and other
considerations, the protections and rights afforded by Article I, §§ 1, 7, 14, and 25 are
broader than the interests and rights afforded by the United States Constitution.
152. Defendants’ actions described herein amount to flagrant violations of
Zane’s rights under the Utah Constitution.
153. There is no other adequate state law remedy for these violations.
154. Injunctive relief cannot redress Plaintiffs’ injuries.
155. Defendants’ actions as alleged herein were the proximate cause of pain
and suffering to Zane, of Zane’s death, and of the damages sustained by Plaintiffs.
156. In order to remedy Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct, Plaintiffs have
had to retain counsel.
FOURTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Informational at the Present Time)
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

158. These allegations are informational at the present time.
159. Under Utah law, Plaintiffs are required to provide notice of causes of
action against a governmental entity, beginning with a notice of claim, which will occur, or
has occurred, shortly. The governmental entity thereafter has 60 days in which to respond.
23
It is anticipated that no response will be made or that this claim will be denied, after which
Plaintiffs will seek to add the Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief as official causes of action,
and will do so by the amending process under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Therefore, both the Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief are for informational purposes only
and do not require an answer at this time, but are provided now to assist the Defendants and
the Court in knowing what is coming in the future.
160. Defendant Davies’ intentional and/or reckless actions as described
above constituted outrageous conduct under the circumstances.
161. Davies’ actions offended generally accepted standards of decency and
morality, and were not consistent with the sworn oath of an officer of the law.
162. Any reasonable person would have known that the intentional and/or
reckless actions of Defendant Davies would result in severe emotional distress to Zane and
to Zane’s parents and siblings.
163. Zane’s parents and siblings have in fact suffered such emotional
distress.
24
FIFTH CLAIM FOR RELIEF

(Informational at the Present Time)
Willful Misconduct/Wrongful Death

165. Defendant Davies acted, or failed to act, through willful misconduct that
resulted in the wrongful death of Zane. Among other things, Davies acted with the intent to
cause an unconsented harmful and/or offensive contact to Zane.
166. Defendant Davies did in fact commit such unconsented harmful and/or
offensive contact against Zane that resulted in Zane’s death and other harm to Plaintiffs.
COMPLIANCE WITH GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT OF UTAH
167. Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims are not subject to the provisions of the
Utah Governmental Immunity Act.
168. With respect to the Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief, Plaintiffs will,
as a precaution, shortly comply with applicable provisions of the Governmental Immunity
Act of Utah, Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-101, et seq., and will provide a Notice of Claim to
Defendants.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs request a jury trial on all issues in this case.
25
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for judgment against Defendants as follows:
1. For damages for wrongful death due to the unconstitutional conduct and
for shooting Zane in the back as he was running away. This includes all economic damages
as well all appropriate pain and suffering damages, and damages available under federal
common law, as per Berry v. City of Muskogee, supra.
2. A declaration and judgment that the actions of Defendant Davies, as
well as Defendant Cottonwood Heights’ policies and customs regarding the use of lethal
force, are and were unconstitutional;
3. Economic and noneconomic damages as provided under applicable law
and deemed appropriate by a jury;
4. Attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988, Utah
law, and equity, to the full extent provided under applicable law;
5. Punitive damages against Defendant Davies, as provided under
applicable law and to the extent deemed appropriate by a jury;
6. Costs as provided under applicable law;
7. Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest as provided under applicable
law.
8. All other equitable relief deemed just and appropriate by the Court,
including an order (a) requiring CHPD officers to be equipped with and utilize body cameras
26
and vehicle dash cameras while on patrol, (b) requiring CH’s law enforcement officers to
carry non-lethal as well as lethal weapons while on patrol, but to prioritize use of non-lethal
weapons, (c) to provide and require annual training regarding the use of non-lethal as well
as lethal force, and (d) to implement regular training, at least quarterly, on the management
of situations such as occurred with Zane, so as to meet federal and state constitutional
requirements.
DATED this 16th day of May, 2019.
SYKES MCALLISTER LAW OFFICES, PLLC
/s/ Robert B. Sykes

ROBERT B. SYKES
C. PETER SORENSEN
190516.James Complaint.wpd
27
Case 2:19-cv-00341-HCN-DBP Document 2-1 Filed 05/16/19 PageID.29 Page 1 of 2
JS 44 (Rev. 08/18) CIVIL COVER SHEET
The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as
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I. (a) PLAINTIFFS DEFENDANTS

AARON JAMES and TIFFANY JAMES, Heirs and Proposed Personal CASEY DAVIES, an Officer of the Cottonwood Heights Police
Representatives of the Estate of Zane James, Department; and COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, UTAH,
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Improper use of deadly force
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EXHIBIT 3
Sam Meziani (9821)

Seamus Appel (17783)
GOEBEL ANDERSON PC
405 South Main Street, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Telephone: 801.441.9393
[email protected]
[email protected]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

Heirs and Personal Representatives of the Estate
of Zane James and in their individual capacities;
AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiffs,
vs. Case No. 2:19-cv-00341
CASEY DAVIES, and CITY OF District Judge Howard C. Nielson, Jr.

COTTONWOOD HEIGHTS, Magistrate Judge Dustin B. Pead
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
On May 29, 2018, Casey Davies shot 19-year old Zane James in the back.
Zane did not pose a threat to Davies or others at the moment Davies decided to shoot.
When Davies fired the fatal shots, Zane was reeling from a car accident— a car accident caused
by Davies when Davies tried to run Zane over. Zane was injured; he was not fleeing and he did
not take any action that would cause a reasonable officer to believe Zane was an imminent threat.
1
ZANE JAMES
2
PARTIES
1. Aaron James is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Salt Lake County,
Utah.
2. Tiffany James is a citizen of the United States and a resident of Salt Lake County,
Utah.
3. Aaron and Tiffany James are the heirs and representatives of the Estate of Zane
James. Aaron and Tiffany also assert claims herein in their individual capacities.
4. Casey Davies is a resident of Salt Lake County, Utah, and a former officer of the
Cottonwood Heights police department. Davies was acting within the course and scope of his
employment and under color of state law. Davies is sued in his individual capacity.
5. The City of Cottonwood Heights is a political subdivision of the State of Utah and
is a body corporate and politic. The City of Cottonwood Heights is responsible for training
3
police officers in its police department. The City of Cottonwood Heights is responsible for
implementing and enforcing use of force policies.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
6. This court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §1331 and §1343, and
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims under 28 U.S.C. §1367.
7. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §1391.
ALLEGATIONS
First Use of Deadly Force
8. On May 29, 2018, minutes before 6:10 a.m. Davies heard on the police radio there
was a pursuit of a motorcycle in progress.
9. Cottonwood Heights Officer Betenson reported a motorcycle failed to yield.
Betenson recognized the motorcycle; he reported the motorcycle had “fled from us before.”
10. Betenson was reportedly not wearing a body worn camera and did not have a car
camera.
11. Upon information and belief, Betenson and Davies recognized the motorcycle
driver as Zane James. Other officers on the radio, including Officer Jamie Croft, also recognized
the driver as Zane James.
12. The Cottonwood Heights Police Department knew Zane James as a non-violent
young man from a strong family that was struggling with opioid addiction.
13. Betenson reported the motorcycle was going 40 miles per hour.
14. Cottonwood Heights police Sergeant Ricks ordered the pursuit “shut down.”
4
15. 30 seconds later, an officer from Sandy City, an adjacent suburban municipality,
appeared on the Cottonwood Heights radio and reported the motorcycle driver was an armed
robbery suspect. Sandy City reported the motorcycle driver was a suspect in an earlier grocery
store robbery.
16. There was no report of shots fired.
17. There was no report of physical harm to any person.
18. There was no report of burglary or trespass to property.
19. Less than one minute after the report from Sandy City, and although the pursuit
was ordered shut down, Officer Betenson reported “I’m behind him again.”
20. Betenson reported he was on Castle Hill Drive going approximately 35 miles per
hour.
21. Davies was armed with a Glock 17 handgun with hollow point bullets and a
Taser.
22. Davies heard the report of the pursuit and decided to join.
23. Davies did not announce over the radio he had joined the pursuit. Officer
Betenson called out over the radio “. . . I’ll be car two . . .” because Davies had joined the pursuit
as primary vehicle. Ex. 1 at 2:43-2:46.
24. GPS data show Davies joined the pursuit at 6:10:40 a.m.
25. Seconds after joining the pursuit, Davies told Betenson that Davies would be the
primary officer on the pursuit: “… you call this, I’ll maintain primary.” Davies thus decided he
would be the primary officer in a pursuit that had been ordered shut down.
5
26. In his employer statement, discussed below, Davies described the mini-bike as a
poor-performing motorcycle capable of reaching speeds of only 30-40 miles per hour, while
going downhill. “…it was a… shitty bike. I mean, it wasn’t going anywhere fast. It was going
maybe 30, 40 miles an hour, top speed, down the hills what I remember.”
27. Davies stated he removed his Glock from its holster when he crossed Fort Union
Boulevard.
Q: “Did you pull your gun out, just so I can kind of get the
timeline down….?
A: It was actually- I pulled it out on Fort Union.”
28. Drawing a gun is appropriate only when the use of the gun is justified or likely to
be justified in the immediate future.
29. Davies placed his Glock loaded with hollow point bullets by the steering wheel
and windshield and continued to drive.
30. Davies was contemplating and anticipating using deadly force within seconds of
joining the pursuit.
31. GPS data show from the time Davies began the pursuit to the time he removed his
gun from its holster at Fort Union Boulevard, only 60 seconds elapsed.
32. The thought of shooting Zane was beginning to gel in Davies’ mind.
33. After crossing Fort Union Boulevard, with his Glock on the dashboard and with
thoughts of using deadly force swelling in his mind, Davies came on the radio and stated:
“confirm he was armed on the armed robbery.” Ex. 1 at 3:22-3:26.
34. Davies asked for confirmation because he wrongly believed he was allowed to use
deadly force against a fleeing felon, qua a fleeing felon.
6
35. In his employer statement, Davies claims Zane reached into his pocket during the
pursuit. However, that statement is false.
36. Zane did not reach into his pocket.
37. Zane did not reach into his pocket because he had only a toy airsoft gun.
38. Zane did not have a firearm.
39. Zane knew Davies, like all officers, carried a firearm while on duty.
40. A reasonable officer would have understood Zane did not have the ability to harm
Davies during the pursuit by any type of vehicle impact because Zane was driving a lightweight
mini-bike at low to moderate speeds in a residential area, and Davies was behind him.
41. A reasonable officer would have understood there was no harm to motorists from
a lightweight slow speed mini-bike and given the context the suspect was likely a teenager.
Davies stated in his employer statement there was no one on the road and Betenson reported “no
traffic.”
42. At no point during the pursuit was Zane driving his mini-bike towards Davies.
43. Zane did not have the opportunity to harm Davies during the pursuit because
Davies was behind and following him while under the cover of his police cruiser.
44. Zane did not have the desire to harm Davies or anyone else during the pursuit.
45. Zane did not have the intention to harm Davies or anyone else during the pursuit.
46. Davies could have increased his distance to create additional space and reaction
time and to eliminate any theoretical opportunity for attack.
47. Zane did not make any aggressive or hostile movements toward Davies or any
other officer during the pursuit.
7
48. Zane did not make any threats to Davies during the pursuit.
49. At no time during the pursuit did Zane take any action that a reasonable officer
would perceive as a threat.
50. Davies never saw Zane’s hands touch a gun or any other object.
51. The pursuit continued northbound on 2300 East. Then, Zane made a left turn to
head West onto 6675 South.
52. 6675 is a residential street with multiple speed bumps.
53. At this point, according to Davies’ statement, Zane was driving approximately 15-
20 miles per hour.
54. Other officers were in the immediate vicinity and were engaged in the pursuit.
Davies did not coordinate a response with the other officers who were actively engaged in the
pursuit.
55. Without communicating with other officers on the radio, Davies impulsively and
unilaterally decided he was going to use deadly force.
56. Davies told the investigator: “So I made the decision I’m gonna run him over.”
57. Davies did not give Zane a warning over the car loudspeaker before deciding to
crash into him.
58. At that early hour, there were no other vehicles on the street and no pedestrians.
Indeed, Officer Betenson appeared on the radio during the pursuit and said “no traffic.” Ex. 1 at
2:50-2:52. Similarly, in his employer statement, referencing 6675 South, Davies stated “there’s
nobody on the street.”
8
59. Davies told the investigator, “So I floored it, hit him as we- as he was going over
that second speed bump or that third, right in front of where we, uh, my car ended.”
60. GPS data show that at the time or immediately before Davies hit Zane he was
going approximately 48 miles per hour. (GPS at 6:12:28 a.m.). Davies’ police car slammed
into Zane going more than 40 miles per hour.
61. Intentionally hitting a driver on a lightweight mini-bike with a police cruiser at
speeds greater than 40 miles per hour is likely to cause serious bodily injury or death.
62. The impact caused Zane to lose control of the mini-bike and caused a severe
crash.
63. Officer Betenson reported on the radio that Zane crashed. Although he was
following directly behind Davies, Betenson did not report over the radio that Davies caused the
crash.
64. GPS data show that from the moment Davies joined the pursuit at 6:10:40 a.m., to
the time he stopped his car on 6675 South at 6:12:30, only one minute and 50 seconds elapsed.
65. The entire pursuit lasted 110 seconds— less than two minutes.
66. From the moment he joined the chase, Davies intended to use deadly force against
Zane. Davies pulled out his Glock within one minute of giving chase. Davies did not think
about his Taser. Davies asked for confirmation of an armed robbery within 15 seconds of
removing his Glock. Contrary to what he told the investigating officer, Davies never told any
other officer over the radio that Zane was reaching into his pocket or anything remotely similar.
Davies stated he wanted to shoot Zane from the window of his car, but decided against it.
9
67. Without consulting with other officers or Sergeant Ricks, Davies hit Zane at more
than 40 miles per hour.
68. After being hit by Davies’ car going more than 40 miles per hour, Zane slammed
into the asphalt at high speeds and in a violent collision. Zane was not wearing a helmet.
69. Hitting asphalt at high speeds is severely painful and is likely to cause injury.
70. Zane was injured, in pain, and disoriented from being hit by Davies’ car, and by
hitting the asphalt.
71. Zane sustained injuries including to his hand, wrist, and shoulder. Zane had just
been hit by a car going more than 40 miles per hour and was disoriented and likely concussed.
72. Zane knew he could no longer run.
73. Zane did not want to lay in the asphalt so he hobbled to the nearest lawn to
compose himself, take care of his injuries, and wait for his inevitable arrest.
74. As shown from this aerial view, the lawn at 2209 East 6675 South where Davies
shot Zane is the closest lawn to the crash. There are hard surfaces in every other direction.
10
75. A reasonable person experiencing the shock and trauma of a car crash would head
to a nearby lawn, instead of laying on the asphalt or trying to sit or lay down on a hard surface.
76. The lawn was closer to Davies than alternative escape routes. For example, if
Zane was purely interested in fleeing, he would have kept his same course westbound on 6675
South. Or, alternatively, he would have run down 2200 East in an attempt to escape. Travel
along both these routes would have been away from Davies. But Zane, unarmed and holding no
object in his hands, chose to head towards the lawn. See diagram in Paragraph 74.
11
77. Based on these facts, a reasonable jury could correctly conclude Zane was trying
to get to a safe spot after the shock and trauma of being hit by a car and therefore was no longer
trying to escape from Davies.
78. After the car crash, Zane was no longer fleeing from Davies.
79. Zane was visibly injured and appeared injured to any reasonable officer.
80. Although he hit him with a car, Davies did not take the time to consider that Zane
was injured and was no longer trying to escape.
81. After being hit by a car, Zane knew he could no longer outrun the police. Zane
believed he was going to be arrested. He believed he was headed to jail.
82. Zane did not know he was about to die.
Second Use of Deadly Force
83. Although Davies: (a) chose not to wear his body worn camera in order to keep his
actions secret, or (b) destroyed body cam video evidence reported to exist, there is an eyewitness.
84. On May 29, 2018 Heather Dodd lived on the northwest corner of 6675 South and
2200 East.
85. Dodd was in her house preparing for work in the early morning of May 29, 2018.
86. She heard sirens so she walked to the front window to see what was going on.
87. This is a photograph taken from the front of the house, showing the view from the
window:
12
88. Dodd had a clear and unobstructed view.
89. Dodd saw Zane limping or hobbling towards her neighbor’s front lawn.
90. Dodd’s first impression was that Zane was injured.
91. Dodd observed Zane’s hands. One hand was hanging near his body as if it was
injured, and the other hand was pressed to his lower stomach below the belly button near the top
of his pants.
92. Dodd’s initial impression was the young man was hurt in the area near his pants,
or was trying to keep his pants from falling down.
13
93. Seconds later, Dodd saw Davies stop his police car.
94. Zane’s back was to Davies.
95. Zane did not make any verbal threats to Davies.
96. Zane did not make any aggressive physical moves toward Davies.
97. Zane did not point anything at Davies.
98. Zane did not make any moves as if he was reaching into his pockets or anything
similar.
99. Zane’s hands were not in his pockets.
100. Zane did not make any hostile motions towards Davies.
101. Zane was on the lawn and moving away from Davies.
102. Zane was far enough from Davies that Davies, combined with the cover provided
by his police car, had no objective reason to believe Zane could threaten him.
103. Davies did not order Zane to show his hands.
104. According to Davies’ employer statement, Zane was not holding any object and
did not point any object at Davies.
105. Zane posed no immediate threat to Davies.
106. Davies opened the car door with his gun drawn. He was holding his Glock
handgun with both hands.
107. Davies did not wait for his back up, Betenson, who was following immediately
behind Davies, before making the decision to take Zane’s life.
108. Although he carried a Taser and was in range to use a Taser, Davies decided he
would not use his Taser.
14
109. Davies did not pick up his Taser because he had already decided early in the
pursuit he was going to shoot his Glock; the same Glock that he removed from its holster within
60 seconds of joining the pursuit and that remained on his dashboard.
110. Davies took one or two steps, positioned himself behind the cover of his car door,
and within 2-3 seconds of opening the door, fired multiple shots.
111. Davies did not order Zane to show his hands before shooting.
112. Davies did not give a warning before shooting Zane in the back.
113. In his employer statement, Davies did not identify any specific facts that would
cause a reasonable officer to believe there was an imminent threat of serious bodily injury or
death.
114. Davies’ employer statement reveals Zane was not holding any object; Zane did
not point any object at Davies; Davies never saw an object in Zane’s hand, much less a gun; and
Zane did not make any hostile movements towards Davies.
115. Instead, Zane was in shock and tending to his injuries, as a reasonable officer who
had just hit a kid on a motorcycle would easily understand.
116. Davies did not wait for additional information or assistance, and he did not allow
additional time to fully assess the situation and evaluate whether the crash he caused changed his
assessment of using deadly force.
117. Acting deliberately, immediately, and in line with his plan and desire to use
deadly force, Davies fired shots within only 2-3 seconds of stopping his car.
118. After hitting a young man with his car, 2-3 seconds was not enough time for
Davies to re-assess the changed facts and circumstances. No reasonable officer would have fired
15
within 2-3 seconds, and in less than two minutes after joining a pursuit. A reasonable officer
would have known that a victim of a car accident may hold his body differently, particularly
extremities impacted from slamming into the asphalt after being hit by a car going more than 40
miles per hour. For example, football players may get up slow and hold their bodies after a
particularly hard hit.
119. A reasonable officer would have known Zane was disoriented and injured from
the crash and was moving and holding his hands and body accordingly.
120. After crashing into Zane, Davies did not take the time to re-assess the situation.
He acted rashly and in line with his previous thoughts and intent of using deadly force.
121. Although Davies’ idea to shoot Zane was formed in less than two minutes, it was
premeditated.
122. A reasonable officer would have evaluated Zane’s actions in light of the fact he
had just been hit by a car.
123. But Davies’ behavior is worse than merely failing to consider the new facts and
circumstances after crashing into Zane, Davies’ decision to shoot was the result of the firm
decision reached in his mind to use deadly force. Once made, this decision influenced every step
of the pursuit in Davies’ mind.
124. According to Davies’ employer statement, Davies was thinking about shooting
Zane from the window of his car while the two were moving. Davies stated in his employer
statement: “So I-I-I mean deadly force is deadly force no matter which type you look at using. So
I figured if I was justified in shooting him through the window for the same thing I’m justified in
running him over.”
16
125. When Davies saw that Zane was hobbling and not dead after the violent car crash,
Davies was surprised his use of deadly force did not work. Davies then opened his car door, and
without thinking or evaluating new facts, pulled the trigger within 2-3 seconds to finish the job.
126. No reasonable officer would have fired within 2-3 seconds of crashing into a
driver at more than 40 miles per hour, and no reasonable officer would have fired his weapon
without issuing a verbal warning to Zane.
127. According to Davies’ employer statement, after Zane was hit with the first round,
he began to fall to the ground. At this point, he was no longer capable of moving. Thus, the
second round was not necessary, and itself was excessive. Davies’ employer statement shows he
was trained to deliver multiple rounds even if a previous round neutralized any threat, or he was
not trained that rounds fired after a suspect no longer poses a threat are excessive.
128. Just as Davies ignored Utah law requiring him to wear a body worn camera while
using force, Davies ignored the Utah statute requiring a warning before use of deadly force.
129. The “Zane reached into a pocket” theory was an ex post excuse to justify Davies’
illegal shooting. But even reaching into a pocket does not justify the use of deadly force within
2-3 seconds under these circumstances.
130. Courts may consider facts learned after the use of force to evaluate the
information that was available to the officer prior to the use of force. The objective facts learned
after the shooting show Davies’ employer statement claims that Zane was reaching into his
pocket are false.
131. Dodd, an eyewitness, will testify Zane did not reach into his pockets.
17
132. Dodd’s testimony is consistent with the other facts and circumstances. Zane did
not reach into his pocket when he was driving the mini-bike or after the crash because Zane
would never have pointed any weapon at any officer. In addition, there was nothing in his
pocket that could have offered any protection or that could have been used against Davies. Zane
did not believe his airsoft gun could have offered any protection against Davies and he did not
reach for it during the pursuit or after Davies crashed into him.
133. Two rounds from Davies’ Glock hit Zane.
134. One of the rounds paralyzed Zane from the neck down.
135. Davies and other officers continued to injure Zane and caused pain and trauma by
handling his body roughly and aggressively, worse than hunters treat a dead deer, as he lay shot
and bleeding on the lawn. See Ex. 2.
136. For example, Davies is seen on video picking up Zane’s head by his hair and then
slamming it into the ground. See Ex. 2 at 1:56-2:00.
137. Davies and other officers did not treat Zane with respect or even in accordance
with basic first aid principles of treating a patient with a potential spinal injury.
138. Officers treated Zane aggressively and with little regard for his injuries. They
rolled him around and shook him. Officers kept Zane face down in the grass even though his
breathing was labored. See Ex. 2 at 4:00-8:38.
139. While officers were mistreating Zane, they kept paramedics away who were ready
and waiting to render aid.
140. Once transported to the hospital, Zane was diagnosed with permanent paralysis
from the neck down.
18
141. Zane was disoriented and likely concussed after this accident.
142. A reasonable officer would have known that there was high likelihood of a head
injury after this crash and a resulting inability of crash victim to immediately comprehend
situation.
143. Imaging taken at the hospital showed Zane had a bullet lodged in his spinal canal.
This rendered Zane a quadriplegic.
144. Zane was unable to survive without a ventilator and external life support.
145. Zane died on May 31, 2018 at 2:48 pm.
146. This is a photograph of Davies taken at the scene after he shot Zane.
19
147. As shown in the photograph, Davies has the clip to hold his body worn camera
firmly and properly affixed to his shirt. Davies affixed the clip after fastening the buttons to his
shirt.
Immediate Defense and Cover Up
148. Russo and Bartlett heard about the shooting immediately after it happened.
149. Russo and Bartlett learned the victim was Zane James.
150. Russo and Bartlett knew and disliked Zane and the James Family.
20
151. Although they knew Zane was shot and was taken to the hospital, Russo and
Bartlett did not call the family.
152. Russo and Bartlett did not have the integrity, class, or courage to call the James
Family and report their son was shot.
153. Russo and Bartlett were scrambling and scheming to protect Davies and the police
department from criticism, bad publicity, and liability.
154. In the aftermath of the shooting Russo and Bartlett were in contact with Davies to
work on stories and influence his statement.
155. Aaron James contacted the police on the morning of May 29, because Zane did
not return home the night before.
156. When Aaron arrived at the station, the staff was eerily quiet.
157. The front office person told Aaron someone would be with him shortly.
158. Several minutes later Bartlett emerged and told Aaron that Zane had been shot
and was taken to the hospital.
159. Bartlett did not tell Aaron and Tiffany the name or location of the hospital where
Zane was being treated.
160. Aaron and Tiffany James finally located their son at Intermountain Medical
Center.
161. Aaron and Tiffany tried to visit Zane at the hospital. Officers would not allow
Aaron and Tiffany access to the intensive care unit where Zane was being treated.
21
162. Doctors, nurses and medical staff pressed law enforcement to allow Aaron and
Tiffany access to Zane because Zane was paralyzed from the neck down and not in a stable
condition.
163. The police department tried to prevent access to Zane. Officer Olsen eventually
granted Zane’s family temporary access to Zane before kicking them out of the ICU.
164. Aaron and Tiffany had to use an attorney, Robert Miner, to persuade Cottonwood
Heights officers to allow permanent access to their son.
165. Hours passed before the family had access to Zane. By the time the family was
granted access, Zane’s condition was unstable. These actions also prevented the family from
consulting with physicians on surgery options.
166. At the hospital, Cottonwood Heights officers treated the James family with
hostility and disrespect.
167. In the wake of the shooting of Zane, Cottonwood Heights knowingly spread false
information regarding the shooting, including that Zane’s condition was “fair but stable” and that
Zane was a violent offender, rather than a 19-year old struggling with opioid addiction after
sports injuries, like many victims of the opioid epidemic in Utah.
168. On June 13, 2018, Bartlett called the James family and told them the video of the
shooting was going to be released. On June 13, 2018, the City released body cam video, but the
video showed only the aftermath of the shooting.
169. On or about June 13, 2018, in response to media inquiries, Bartlett told reporters
there was no body cam video of the shooting.
22
170. Bartlett told reporters there was no video because Davies did not have the
opportunity to grab his body worn camera.
171. Bartlett, with the full knowledge, approval, and mandate of Russo, told reporters
Davies did not have the opportunity to wear his body worn camera because Davies was not
present at the police station that morning: “I wish we could plan for everything and be able to say
we had a bulletproof plan. We don’t. It’s unfortunate it happened at this time in the morning.”
172. Russo also told reporters Davies was on his way to work when he joined the
pursuit.
173. These statements were false.
174. Bartlett and Russo lied to the public.
175. Bartlett and Russo lied to protect the police department from inquiry, criticism
and liability.
Employer Statement
176. The Cottonwood Heights police department required Davies to give a statement
after the shooting.
177. The ostensible purpose of the statement was to allow Davies’ employer to
evaluate his actions.
178. On June 18, 2018, Davies, represented by counsel, gave a statement to Ryan
Shosted, who was employed by the Cottonwood Heights police department, and was anything
but an unbiased investigator.
179. Prior to the meeting, Davies met with counsel and had the opportunity to prepare
for the statement.
23
180. The purpose of the interview by a fellow Cottonwood Heights police officer was
not an objective and genuine investigation into the use of deadly force. Rather, it was an
opportunity for Davies to respond to leading and softball questions and to put forward a
purported justification for the shooting.
181. Despite this, Davies’ statements are damning. Davies told the officer investigator
he was in the Cottonwood Heights police department listening to radio traffic on the morning of
May 29, 2018 before joining the pursuit.
So that morning, I think it was Tuesday morning I came in, uh,

a little bit earlier than normal on my day off to work a ten
hour, uh, seatbelt shift. So I was – all my – all my gear and my
uniform I keep in the locker room.”
182. GPS data confirm Davies’ car was at the Cottonwood Heights police station in the
early morning of May 29, 2018.
183. Davies, however, submitted sworn testimony to the court that he had not yet
arrived at the station, and that is why he did not have his body worn camera. Davies signed a
Declaration submitted in this case. 1
184. In his Declaration Davies stated under penalty of perjury: “I was not wearing my
body camera during the incident involving Zane James on the morning of May 28, 2019. I had
been on my way to work at the time and had not yet gotten to the police station to pick up my
body camera.” 2
185. This statement is false.
1
(Dkt. No. 31-3)
2
(Davies Decl., at ¶ 3)
24
186. Davies told the investigator he was inside the police station the morning of the
shooting. Davies’ presence at the station is confirmed by GPS data.
187. The knowing submission of false testimony by Davies is a second degree felony.
See Utah Code Ann. 76-8-502(1).
188. The Davies Declaration does not contain the name of its outside counsel on the
caption suggesting the Declaration was drafted by the City Attorney, as influenced by Russo and
other high-level City employees, all as part of an agreement to cover up and withhold facts from
the public.
189. Davies knowingly presented false testimony to the court. He should be held in
criminal contempt, and referred for prosecution. Given the stakes of this case, all persons and
attorneys who aided in the knowing submission of false testimony should be treated similarly.
190. Data show that Davies’ body worn camera was removed from its docking station
before 5:50 a.m. on May 29, 2018.
191. In his employer statement, however, Davies told the investigator the camera was
in the docking station when he left on the pursuit. “At that time I hurried and rushed. I – so my
camera was still in the docking station at this point and so my belt was hanging- I was in my
uniform at this time so I just grabbed my belt, threw it on, ran out….”
192. Davies lied to the investigator about the location of his camera in the docking
station.
193. Davies told the investigator that as Zane allegedly reached into his pocket, he
called it out on the radio to inform officers. “Yeah. At this time I – I called out on the radio,
25
‘Hey, he keeps reaching for something up in that front. I thought I said front left but I know I
got on the radio and said- told everybody that he is reaching for something.”
194. This statement is false.
195. The dispatch radio recording of Davies does not contain any report of Zane
reaching for anything. A true and correct copy of the dispatch recording is submitted as
Exhibit 1.
196. Davies lied to the biased investigating officer about a highly critical element of
this case. Indeed, Davies lied about the most critical aspect of this case.
197. Although a warning is required by Utah statute and Supreme Court precedent,
Davies’ employer statement reveals he did not give a warning to Zane before firing the deadly
shots.
198. At this time, Plaintiffs do not know whether the statement was intentionally or
inadvertently produced in advance of an evidentiary hearing in this case. In any event, because
both Bartlett and Russo made public statements that Davies had not yet arrived at the station,
Plaintiffs believe Defendants intended to suppress Davies’ employer statement and intended to
rely on the false narrative that Davies was not present at the police station that morning in order
to present an excuse to the public for his failure to wear a body worn camera in violation of Utah
law and in an attempt to suppress evidence and obstruct justice.
199. Davies knowingly violated Utah law by destroying body camera evidence or by
not wearing his body camera during a pursuit and while using deadly force.
200. Davies submitted false testimony to the court.
201. Davies lied to the investigator about the pursuit.
26
202. Davies is not an honest witness and his account of the shooting is not credible.
203. Knowing this, the City continues to defend Davies and his actions as justified.
The City has not appointed separate counsel for Davies. The City’s failure to acknowledge, and
indeed approval and defense of, the numerous violations of law and policy emphasize the
compelling need for punitive damages.
204. Davies, through counsel and before this court, has stated he will exercise his Fifth
Amendment rights in response to questions about his actions in running over and then shooting
Zane.
Body Camera Video
205. Defendants claim there is no body camera video of the shooting of Zane.
206. It is unacceptable and itself a violation of law that the Cottonwood Heights police
department did not require officers to wear body worn cameras when engaged in dispatched
vehicle pursuits and use of force.
207. There either is or is not a body camera video of Davies shooting Zane.
208. Plaintiffs have developed substantial evidence a video exists. This evidence
includes: (a) Davies submitted false testimony regarding his presence at the police station the
morning of the shooting as a way to excuse his alleged failure to wear a camera; (b) Davies’
employer statement is not credible; and (c) Council Member Natalie Bruce testified under oath
she saw the video at a closed meeting of the Cottonwood Heights City Council on June 12, 2018,
at which no recordings or minutes were taken as required by Utah law. 3
See Utah Code Ann. §52-4-206(1).

27
209. Bruce testified the video was taken from a first person standpoint, similar to a
body camera.
210. Bruce testified Davies did not give Zane a warning he was going to shoot.
“There was no verbal command.”
211. Bruce testified Zane was shot in the back.
212. Bruce testified Zane was not holding any weapon.
213. Bruce testified Zane appeared injured. “He was clearly injured.”
214. Bruce testified Zane did not make any aggressive or hostile moves towards
Davies, and did not take any action that would cause Davies or a reasonable officer to believe
he/she was an immediate threat.
215. In the event a video exists and it has been hidden or destroyed, Defendants and
any persons who have knowledge or aided and abetted are not only guilty of spoliation in this
case, but are guilty of obstruction of justice.
216. There are multiple cameras outside of the Cottonwood Heights police department.
The cameras record views of the cage area where police cars are securely stored, as well as the
streets and parking lot in front of the station. These cameras recorded Officer Davies as he left
on the pursuit. These cameras likely contain a definitive record of whether Davies was wearing
a body worn camera on May 29, 2018.
217. By email on July 22, 2021, Plaintiff asked Defendants what they have done to
preserve this pivotal video evidence. Defendants refused to answer the question of whether such
video exists and refused to disclose the efforts, if any, to preserve this critical evidence.
28
218. Even if Davies was not wearing a body worn camera, Davies acted in violation of
the law.
219. On May 29, 2018, Utah law required officers to wear a body worn camera prior to
an enforcement stop, a dispatched call, a traffic stop, and most importantly, prior to use of force.
Utah Code Ann. §§77-7a-103; 77-7a-104(4) (“An officer shall activate a body-worn camera
prior to any law enforcement encounter….”). 4 The statute is mandatory not permissive.
220. In the event a video does not exist, when Davies began the pursuit he knew he
was violating Utah law but he did not care.
221. Davies knew that because he was not wearing a camera, there would be no visual
or audio record of any of his actions.
222. When he made the decision to hunt Zane down and execute him, Davies knew
that without a camera, his statement would be the only version of the events relied on by his
employer and biased investigators seeking above all to protect the officer and the police
department.
223. Davies knew Russo did not care about failure to wear body cameras and he knew
he would face no adverse employment action. Davies did not suffer any sanctions for failing to
activate his body worn camera prior to use of force as required by Utah statute. Instead, he was
granted an award and commendation in a ceremony on August 29, 2018, and received an award
noted in the October 2018 Cottonwood Heights newsletter.
4
Utah Code Ann. §77-7a-103 was effective on May 10, 2016. The version of §77-7a-104
effective in 2017 and 2018 required officers to wear body worn cameras prior to any “law
enforcement encounter.”
29
224. Before the pursuit even started, Davies determined he would decide when he
would follow the law and when he would not.
Death of Zane James and Plea for Reform
225. The James Family’s agony and loss from the death of their son and brother Zane
cannot be put into words and cannot be expressed in a legal pleading.
226. Aaron and Tiffany were distressed by Davies’ decision to shoot Zane in the back
without justification, and by the City’s obstinate, false, and misleading cover-up. They wanted
something positive to come from these horrible events.
227. They refused to accept that the death of their son would be meaningless.
228. Like many others across the United States, Aaron and Tiffany believed there was
a need for better police training in use of force, de-escalation, and proportionality.
229. Aaron and Tiffany are certainly not “anti-police.” As citizens, they wanted to
participate in a conversation with police officers and they wanted the loss of their son to bring
about some positive change.
230. On October 24, 2018, Aaron and Tiffany met with the Salt Lake County District
Attorney. When asked why the District Attorney’s investigation did not address Davies’ use of
lethal force when he had other non-lethal alternatives like a Taser, and other officers in close
proximity to provide assistance, Sim Gil stated his role was not to determine if an officer
followed policies and procedures. Gil told the James family the City is the appropriate party to
address procedures and any findings resulting from the City’s internal investigation.
231. After meeting with Gil, Aaron and Tiffany met with the Cottonwood Heights
Mayor and City Manager on November 12, 2018.
30
232. Aaron and Tiffany told the Mayor and City Manager they were not interested in
filing a lawsuit. Instead, they were interested in understanding how this could have happened
and in working cooperatively to obtain some type of meaningful reform.
233. During this meeting the James asked why Davies and the responding officers
were not wearing body worn cameras and why Davies decided to shoot Zane instead of using a
Taser, and if an internal investigation had been completed. They also asked if the City would be
willing to discuss policy reform and training based on lesson’s learned from Zane’s case.
234. The City Mayor and Manager explained they did not know if there were policies
and procedures for an internal investigation. The Mayor and Manager told the Jameses they
could file a GRAMA request to find out.
235. The City Mayor and Manager told Aaron and Tiffany they did not know the
specifics of any mandatory camera policy or de-escalation policy, and that while the City was
looking at police reform, they were not sure they could engage in a policy discussion due to the
risk of litigation.
236. The Mayor and Manager committed to speaking with the City attorney and
“getting back” to the James.
237. The Mayor and Manager did not make any good faith efforts to communicate
with the James Family, and rebuffed Aaron and Tiffany’s good faith offer to discuss policies and
training instead of litigation.
238. This lawsuit followed.
31
COUNT 1
Wrongful Death
Violation of Due Process
Constitution of the State of Utah
Article XVI, Section 5
Article I, Section 7
(Davies, City of Cottonwood Heights)
239. Plaintiffs repeat the foregoing allegations.
240. Article XVI, section 5, of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in

death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall
not be subject to any statutory limitation….
241. Article XVI, Section V of the Utah Constitution is self-executing.
242. Article I, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution provides:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of

law.
243. Davies shot and killed Zane.
244. Davies did not act in self-defense or with legal justification.
245. Davies was the aggressor and Zane was the victim.
246. Davies was acting within the course and scope of his employment when he
unlawfully shot Zane.
247. The City of Cottonwood Heights failed to train Davies properly in the use of force
and implemented and maintained policies that allowed shootings where there was no imminent
threat of harm.
248. As a result of the shooting, Zane was deprived of his life without due process.
249. As a result of the shooting, Plaintiffs have suffered damages in an amount to be
determined.
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250. As a result of the shooting, Aaron and Tiffany James have suffered loss of
society, love, companionship, protection and affection in an amount to be determined.
COUNT 2
Implementation and Maintenance of Unlawful Use of Force Policies
And
Failure to Train
42 U.S.C. §1983
(City of Cottonwood Heights)
252. As shown by his employer statement, Davies did not understand the law
governing use of force.
253. Davies erroneously believed deadly force can be used to stop a fleeing suspect
that does not pose an immediate threat to public or officer safety.
254. Robert Russo is the chief policy making official of the Cottonwood Heights police
department.
255. Russo was in charge of developing and overseeing all aspects of officer training.
256. Russo developed and/or approved of all Cottonwood Heights police training
materials.
257. The City’s officer training programs were inadequate in that they did not
adequately teach the law and standards set forth by Garner, Graham v. Connor and Scott v.
Harris, among other precedents.
258. Russo and the City’s officer training programs did not contain sufficient materials
on use of deadly force, de-escalation and proportionality of the use of force.
33
259. Under established law enforcement standards, an officer shall use de-escalation
techniques whenever possible and appropriate before resorting to force and to reduce the need
for force.
260. The goal of de-escalation is to slow down the situation so that the subject can be
guided toward a course of action that will not necessitate the use of force, reduce the level of
force necessary, allow time for additional personnel to arrive, or all three. When de-escalation
techniques are not effective or appropriate, an officer should consider the use of non-lethal force
to control an actively resistant individual. The City’s training materials did not teach these
principles.
261. The City’s training materials did not include standard use of force models that
make these principles easy to understand for officers, such as the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center model:
34
262. The City of Cottonwood Heights has chosen to have its own independent police
force. Conversely, the majority of municipalities in the Salt Lake Valley are part of the Unified
Police Department. The City of Cottonwood Heights is directly responsible for training the
officers in its own police department and for the drafting, implementation, maintenance and
enforcement of use of force policies.
263. Russo and the City did not train on use of force on an annual basis.
264. Russo and the City did not train on proportionality of use of force.
265. Russo and the City did not train on de-escalation.
35
266. Russo and the City maintained a culture where ego and control dominated
officers’ thoughts and actions and where unlawful use of force was rewarded in the name of
public perception.
267. Russo and the City were deliberately indifferent to citizens’ rights in adopting
outdated and deficient training practices.
268. The Supreme Court has explained, “…city policymakers know to a moral
certainty that their police officers will be required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its
officers with firearms, in part to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train
officers in the constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force…can be said to be ‘so
obvious’ that failure to do so could properly be characterized as ‘deliberate indifference’ to
constitutional rights.” 5
269. Davies’ mistaken beliefs and lack of understanding of proper use of force is a
direct result of the City’s failure to properly train its officers and caused the Constitutional
violations in this case.
270. Davies believed he could use deadly force against a fleeing felon, even if there is
no imminent threat to the officer or the public.
271. Based on a deep misunderstanding of Garner, maintained to date by its counsel in
pleadings and arguments before the court, the City maintained an official policy and practice and
custom of training its officers that they may use deadly force at any time to stop a fleeing
suspect, even a suspect that does not pose an imminent threat to public or officer safety.
5
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n. 10 (1989)
36
272. The policy, practice, and custom was created by the City’s failure to train on use
of force, and its evident improper training erroneously taught officers they may use deadly force
against a fleeing suspect that does not present an imminent threat.
273. Russo and City willingly ignored Davies’ violations of law and policy because
they determined they must stand behind police employees whether or not they violate the law.
274. The City and Russo have an established unwritten policy and practice of ignoring
and/or downplaying legal and ethical violations by its officers.
275. The City and Russo did not sanction Davies for violation of policy and Utah law.
Indeed, they reward officers despite violations, as they did here with Davies.
276. As a result of Russo and the City’s failure to train and its maintenance of unlawful
policies, Plaintiffs have been damaged in an amount to be determined.
COUNT 3
Violation of Fourth Amendment
Excessive Use of Force
United States Constitution, Amendment No. 4
42 U.S.C. §1983
(Casey Davies)
278. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons…against

unreasonable…seizures, shall not be violated….
37
279. The Supreme Court has held the shooting of a reported fleeing felon is
unreasonable if the person does not pose an imminent threat of harm to the officer or the public. 6
280. Zane did not pose an imminent threat to Davies or the public that justified the use
of deadly force.
281. Davies and all the other officers involved in the pursuit had vehicles capable of
traveling at much higher speeds than Zane’s poor-performing mini-bike.
282. Davies and other officers could have employed any number of de-escalation
tactics or alternative measures to terminate the low-speed pursuit without the use of deadly force.
283. Sergeant Ricks previously terminated the same pursuit before Davies joined.
284. After Davies attempted to run Zane over, Zane was injured and did not have the
ability or intent to cause harm.
285. Zane had just suffered a car/motorcycle crash that slammed his body against the
asphalt.
286. Zane suffered injuries including to his hand, wrist, and shoulder.
287. Zane was in shock and physically unable to harm Davies, and he was not armed
with a firearm capable of matching Davies’ firepower.
288. Because he knew he was not armed with a real gun, Zane did not intend to
threaten Davies.
289. Zane would never harmed an officer, or anyone else.
290. Zane was not armed; he had no ability or intent to harm Davies.
6
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); Reavis v. Frost, 967 F.3d 978, 985 (10th Cir.
2020) (“district court correctly concluded that Deputy Frost had fair notice that opening fire at a
fleeing vehicle that no longer posed a threat to himself or others was unlawful.”)
38
291. Zane was not holding anything in his hand.
292. Zane made no hostile motions towards Davies.
293. As shown by the eyewitness testimony of Heather Dodd, Zane was clutching his
hand to his lower stomach because he was visibly injured. A reasonable officer would have
considered a suspect’s physical condition after a car crash where an officer tried to run him over.
294. Zane did not reach into his pocket because there was nothing in his pocket that
could have provided any assistance in that moment.
295. Zane did not make any hostile motions to Davies.
296. Zane’s hands were not in his pockets.
297. Davies’ claim Zane reached one hand into a pocket is false.
298. Zane was trying to reach the lawn to rest from his crash and injuries.
299. A person who was hit by a car and was injured and disoriented would not
continue to lay in the road on the asphalt but would reasonably seek refuge on the closest green
space.
300. Davies did not take the time to assess the extent of Zane’s injuries and his
manifest intentions in moving towards the lawn.
301. Davies did not warn Zane that he was about to be shot with a hollow point round
in violation of Utah law and Supreme Court precedent.
302. Zane did not take any actions that would cause a reasonable officer to believe
Zane presented an immediate threat to public or officer safety.
303. In evaluating whether use of deadly force is unreasonable, the Tenth Circuit
considers whether an officer’s own conduct created a situation where deadly force was
39
necessary. 7 In this case, Davies’ “own reckless and deliberate conduct during the seizure
unreasonably created” the alleged need to use force.
304. It was established on May 29, 2018 by the United States Supreme Court and the
Tenth Circuit that an officer may not use deadly force to stop a fleeing suspect where a
reasonable officer would have perceived he was in no imminent danger at the time he fired his
weapon.
305. By first hitting Zane with his car in an attempt to run him over, and then shooting
Zane in the back causing his death, Davies seized and murdered Zane in violation the Fourth
Amendment. Davies’ use of deadly force in this case was objectively unreasonable.
306. As a result of Davies’ violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Estate of Zane
James has been damaged in an amount to be determined.
COUNT 4
Excessive Use of Force
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 14
(Casey Davies)
308. Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons against….unreasonable

searches and seizures shall not be violated.
309. This provision is self-executing.
310. At the time of the shooting, Utah law and Cottonwood Heights policy did not
allow the use of deadly force absent an imminent threat to the officer or the public.
7
Allen v. Muskogee, Oklahoma, 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997).
40
311. Unlike the federal qualified immunity doctrine, which has no basis in the text or
history of Section 1983, the Utah Supreme Court has held there are instances that will support
personal liability against an officer “where a defendant’s conduct will be so egregious and
unreasonable that it constitutes a flagrant violation of a constitutional right even in the absence
of controlling precedent.” 8
312. Upon information and belief, the policy in effect in May 2018 provided: “An
officer may use deadly force to protect him/herself from what he/she reasonably believes is an
imminent threat of death or serious bodily injury.”
313. Davies’ knowing violation of law and policy was flagrant.
314. For the reasons set forth above, Davies’ use of deadly force was unreasonable and
a violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages pursuant to Utah law and 42 U.S.C. §1983 as
Defendants’ conduct, acts, and omissions alleged herein constitute malicious, wanton, reckless
and callous indifference to Plaintiffs’ rights. Defendant’s continued defense of Davies despite
the obvious violations of law call for severe punitive damages.
JURY DEMAND
Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury of all issues so triable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 38.
8
Jensen v. Cunningham, 250 P.3d 465, 482 (Utah 2011)
41
JUDGMENT
Plaintiffs seek judgment as follows:
1. Actual and compensatory damages;
2. Punitive damages;
3. Attorney fees and costs as allowed by 42 U.S.C. §1988(b);
4. Expert fees as allowed by 42 U.S.C. §1988(c);
5. An order holding Davies in criminal contempt for his knowing submission of
false testimony;
6. Permanent injunctive relief including ordering the City of Cottonwood Heights to
eliminate its defective training programs; create legally compliant training programs; referring
this matter to the Department of Justice with the recommendation to appoint a supervisor or
independent monitor of the Cottonwood Heights police department; appointing a supervisor over
the police department to audit the department’s training and ethical standards; and for such other
equitable relief as is appropriate given the grave legal violations and profound injustice of Zane’s
homicide.
DATED: August 5, 2021
/s/ Sam Meziani

Sam Meziani
Seamus Appel
Attorney for Plaintiffs
42
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 5th day of August, 2021, I electronically filed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED COMPLAINT via the court’s electronic filing
system which sent notification to counsel of record.
/s/ Sam Meziani
43
EXHIBIT 1
(Audio file – filed conventionally with the Court)

Exhibit 2
(Video file – filed conventionally with the Court)

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Sam Meziani (9821)

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AARON JAMES and TIFFANY JAMES,

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

proper parties to maintain claims on behalf of the Estate.

therefore without merit.

all their rights, including rights in relation to former counsel.

the Estate’s claims to move forward.

I. Claims Belonging to the Estate of Zane James Are Tolled

state law claims are tolled based on §1367(d).

DATED: March 9, 2022.

/s/ Sam Meziani

PLAINTIFFS’ OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS’ JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS was

notification of such filing to all parties of record.

/s/ Karen Harwood

Robert B. Sykes (#3180)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

AARON JAMES and TIFFANY JAMES,

Plaintiffs, by and through their counsel of record, hereby complain against

The following allegations are based upon the undersigneds’ understanding of

to the extent applicable under the facts.

States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution.

1. Plaintiff Tiffany James (“Tiffany”) is a citizen of the United States and

2. Plaintiff Aaron James (“Aaron”) is a citizen of the United States and

deceased, and will be co-personal representative of the Estate of Zane James.

3. At all relevant times, Defendant Casey Davies (“Davies”) was a police

of the City of Cottonwood Heights.

4. Defendant Cottonwood Heights (“CH”) is a political subdivision of

the State of Utah.

course and scope of his employment.

6. Plaintiffs are suing Davies in his individual capacity.

for police officers in CH, and for Davies.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

jurisdiction of Plaintiffs’ state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

County, State of Utah. Accordingly, venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

felon,” having robbed two stores in nearby Sandy, Utah.

11. Zane was an accomplished high-level competitive hockey player and

12. He initially showed great promise as a hockey player.

13. In order to pursue a possible college or professional career, Zane

professionals recommended he terminate his hockey career.

16. As a result of this recommendation, Zane became severely, clinically

17. Due to prescriptions from medical professionals, Zane became addicted

– Zane’s Appearance, Deportment and Injury –

with an airsoft gun loaded with BBs.

22. Zane fled on a motorbike toward his home, located in CH.

23. He was unable to make a turn due to pursuit by officers.

24. He crashed his motorbike on a narrow neighborhood street, and slid

along until it stopped.

known that it would have caused significant injuries.

– No Immediate Threat of Harm –

31. At no time was Zane threatening to shoot at anybody.

32. At no time was any officer in immediate danger of death or serious

bodily injury as Zane fled.

33. At no time was any citizen in immediate danger of death or serious

bodily injury as Zane fled.

36. This was a populated area, with homes all around.

37. Two bullets missed Zane.