August 26, 2021 08:23 AM

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF OREGON

In Re: Complaint as to the Conduct of

ANDREW LONG,
Bar No. 033808
Respondent.

No. S067095

OSB Case Nos. 17-79, 17-86, 17-87, 17-88, 18-09, 18-31, 18-32, 18-33, 18-64, 18-
75, 18-76, 18-77, 18-86, 18-87, 18-88, 18-129 & 18-170
__________________________________________________________________

RESPONDENT’S AMENDED MOTION TO RECONSIDER

__________________________________________________________________
Related Proceedings: In re Long, 366 Or. 194 (2020) and Case No. S066649

Pro se Respondent: For the Oregon State Bar:

E. Andrew Long Susan R. Cournoyer,

Assistant Discipline Counsel
16037 SW Upper Boones Ferry Rd.
[email protected] Tigard, OR 97281
503-479-8546
 i

First, the Bar stated its intent to disbar Long. Then, it created this case. That

is not how attorney discipline is supposed to work. Not long ago, this Court wrote:

In Bar disciplinary proceedings, the Bar serves as a surrogate for this

court. . . . [If] performing that function itself, [this court] would make
every attempt to see to it that, whatever the outcome, an accused
lawyer would think that he or she was treated fairly in the process.

In re Hendrick, 346 Or 98, 106 (2009). In concluding his oral argument for In re

Long, 366 Or 194 (2020) (Long I), Respondent Andrew Long quoted that passage,

but observed: “This has been the most brutally unfair process I’ve ever

experienced.” Oral Argument of SC Case No. S066327 (11/1/19), at 1:09:46.

The reasons for that statement applied throughout the present case as well:

the adjudicator was plainly biased1 and the Bar’s disciplinary attorneys regularly

trampled Long’s rights by violating ethical rules and even criminal laws while

taunting him with their absolute immunity. Their goal was disbarment, not truth.

It appears the Bar deceived this Court because its opinion contains:

 self-contradiction apparent on its face;

 statements in direct conflict with indisputable record facts; and
 probably the weakest version of the “clear and convincing evidence”
standard ever employed in an Oregon attorney disciplinary case.

As such, the case should be fully reconsidered with attention to Long’s arguments.

1
The adjudicator has since been disqualified in the case on remand from Long I,
but wrote the trial panel opinion in the present matter, which Long’s opening brief
describes as “grossly inaccurate” because it “invents facts” and makes statements
directly contradicted by the record. Bias also affected every aspect of trial. The
remand of Long I has proceeded fairly thus far with a different trial panel chair.
 ii

Table of Contents

Reasons to Reconsider ...............................................................................................1

Over-reliance on Bar Attorneys Warrants Reconsideration ....................................10
Broader Concerns: Bar-Generated Discipline .........................................................12
Constitutional Arguments Left Unaddressed ...........................................................14
Deception and the July 29, 2021 Opinion: Example of Williams ...........................28
Highlights of Other Matters .....................................................................................49
Domestic Violence Awareness and the Sanctions Analysis ....................................56
Conclusion ...............................................................................................................61
 iii

` Table of Authorities

Cases
In re Bertoni, 363 Or 614 (2018) .............................................................................49
In re Day, 362 Or. 547, 552 (2018) .........................................................................53
In re Graeff, 368 Or 18 (2021).................................................................................25
In re Langley, 230 Or 319 (1962) ..............................................................................1
In re Long, 366 Or. 194 (2020) .................................................................. 1, i, 58, 59
In re McGraw, 362 Or. 667 (2018) ..........................................................................53
In re Tamblyn, 298 Or 620 (1985) ...........................................................................23
Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. McBride, 295 Or 398 (1983) ...............................53
Riley Hill General Contractor Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 303 Or 390, 405-407 (1987). 53
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) .......................................................53
State v. Jones, 111 Or 295 (1924) ............................................................................18
United States v. Bogart, 783 F. 2d 1428, 1436 (9th Cir. 1986) ...............................19
United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286, 1300 (9th Cir 1995). ................................19
Statutes
ORS 162.275 ..............................................................................................................2
Rules
RPC 1.4(a) ................................................................................................................51
RPC 1.4(b) ...............................................................................................................51
RPC-1.4 ....................................................................................................................25
RPC 1.5(a) ......................................................................................................... 49, 54
RPC-3.4(c) ...............................................................................................................23
RPC-8.1(a)(2) .............................................................................................. 21, 22, 23
RPC-8.1(a)(2). ..........................................................................................................21
Constitutional Provisions
Article I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution ......................................................28
Article I, section 10 of the Oregon Constitution ......................................................23
Other Authorities
Andreia Machado et al., Male Victims of Female-Perpetrated Partner Violence: A
Qualitative Analysis of Men’s Experiences, the Impact of Violence, and
Perceptions of Their Worth, 21 PSYCHOL MEN MASC 612, 613 (2020) ..............60
 iv

BILL EDDY, HIGH CONFLICT PEOPLE IN LEGAL DISPUTES (2016) ............................60

Criminal Law Revision Commission, Proposed Oregon Criminal Code: Final
Draft and Report (July 1970)...............................................................................18
Denise A. Hines & Emily M. Douglas, Predicting Potentially Life-Threatening
Partner Violence by Women Toward Men: A Preliminary Analysis, 28
VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 751, 765 (2013).............................................................61
Joshua L. Berger et al., The Mental Health of Male Victims and Their Children
Affected by Legal and Administrative Partner Aggression, 42 AGGRESS. BEHAV.
346 (2016) ............................................................................................................60
 1

REASONS TO RECONSIDER

This Court’s July 29, 2021 opinion ordering the disbarment of Respondent

Andrew Long contains visible self-contradiction and demonstrably inaccurate

statements, ignores facts that any reasonable person would find material, misstates

major points in Long’s arguments, adopts a strained legal analysis in conflict with

precedent, perpetuates extreme unfairness, and serves to greenlight political abuse

of the Oregon attorney disciplinary system for vindictive private ends. The opinion

thereby accelerates and strengthens threats to the security and livelihood of all

Oregon State Bar (OSB) members, especially solo and small firm practitioners.

The reason is clear: Bar disciplinary attorneys believe they can abuse their

power with impunity because this Court trusts them. Their methods are rarely

questioned. C.f. In re Langley, 230 Or 319 (1962). This case suggests the Court

trusts that disciplinary prosecutions are justified and Bar attorneys consistently act

with integrity. Both are grossly inaccurate here. This Court’s trust was betrayed.

Lacking good cause, the Bar’s attorneys deceived this Court to immediately

suspend Long. Then, they created this case by paying for witnesses with Client

Security Fund (CSF) money and trampling Long’s rights. The record cannot

support disbarment, but the Court relied on the Bar and gave little attention to

Long’s arguments. Nothing in the opinion suggests that his briefs were read. Thus,

he seeks reconsideration and highlights the following points from his briefs:
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1. The Bar’s attorney stated that “[t]he bar intends to . . . see what we can do

about getting [Long] disbarred” two months before this case was filed and

four months before the Williams claim existed. No claims likely to produce

disbarment were pending at that time. Reply Brief (RB) at 10-13.

2. Bar attorneys, including Susan Cournoyer, engaged in conduct that appears

to constitute felonious bribery of a witness (ORS 162.275) with regard to at

least their “star” witness, Williams. Opening Brief (OB) at 26, 46-47.

3. The primary argument for disbarment in this case – that Long supposedly

stole $31,689.29 from Williams – relies entirely on testimony by Williams

herself. The content of Williams’ testimony apparently determined whether

she would receive a promised $31,689.29 check from the CSF because,

although the claim had been approved for payment four months earlier, the

check had not yet issued at the time of trial. Accordingly, she would have

understood (probably correctly) that testifying Long stole from her would

result in payment, whereas testifying differently than the Bar expected

would jeopardize payment of her CSF claim and could potentially subject

her to criminal prosecution to the extent her testimony diverged from the

statements in the CSF claim she completed under Cournoyer’s influence.

OB-11, 26, 46.

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4. Nearly all former clients of Long who testified for the Bar received

significant payments from the CSF, but no client who filed a CSF claim and

did not testify against Long received any such payment.

5. All approved CSF claims involving Long required waiver of the usual

criteria for approval because none involve prior adjudication or admission,

thus inverting the process to create this case. OB-11-12.

6. Williams, who has a felony record, testified to hearsay within hearsay as the

reason she believed that Long stole her money. Specifically, she claimed to

believe that Long stole her money because Wilson told her Long said he did.

Wilson has an extensive criminal history that includes more than a dozen

felony indictments and multiple felony convictions for theft. Although a

CSF investigator urged the Bar to contact Wilson because he was “very

involved” in matters affecting Williams’ money, it is not clear whether the

Bar ever attempted to contact him. While he had been in jail for several

months prior to the CSF claim being approved, by the time of trial Wilson

was evading a warrant related to his most recent felony conviction for theft.

OB-22, 25, 45-46, 49-50.

7. Long was not notified of Williams’ CSF claim until it was fully approved for

payment by the Board of Governors (BOG) eight months after it was filed,

despite receiving notice of all other CSF claims upon filing. OB-11, 26.
 4

8. Williams never filed a Bar complaint (the Bar generated its own for this

case) and never reported any supposed theft to the police. OB-25.

9. Williams did not file a CSF claim until six months after this Court ordered

immediate, pre-hearing suspension of Long’s law license and OSB took

custodianship over all aspects of his practice, and after Cournoyer contacted

her multiple times during that six-month period. OB-23-25.

10.Nearly every complaint at issue in this case was filed after this Court granted

the Bar’s petition to immediately suspend Long, and those complaints were

based primarily on the predictable injuries that clients suffered as a result of

the sudden suspension itself. OB-13 (Of 15 total client matters at issue in

this case, 13 were filed post-petition and 12 were filed post-suspension).

OB-13.

11.Those complaints resulted from the aggressive actions of the Bar’s attorneys

(primarily Cournoyer and Nik Chourey), which included:

a. A petition for immediate suspension followed by shifting allegations

to sustain the suspension;

b. a custodianship petition filed within two days of this Court granting

the suspension petition and effectuated with a dramatic (and

unnecessary) raid upon Long’s office that included police escorts in

 5

the middle of the business day for the sole apparent purpose of

gathering the addresses of Long’s then-active clients;

c. contacting all of Long’s active clients within two weeks of taking

custodianship (which included Christmas and New Year’s) to

encourage them to contact Cournoyer personally if they felt that they

may have a claim to money or property against Long, and

d. securing nearly all of the witnesses for this case from the resulting

contacts by encouraging them to file CSF claims against Long (which

requires that the client assert dishonesty to be approved) for the

absolute maximum amount possible (generally, every dollar they may

have paid Long, including earned fees), and then shepherding those

claims to approval regardless of whether the client ever notified Long

of the supposed underlying dispute, and then leveraging statements

made in the claim forms to arrange for witnesses who would be forced

to claim dishonesty in some form or face the prospect of contradicting

the written statements they had made to obtain CSF funds, even if they

had been fully satisfied prior to the immediate suspension. OB-12-15.

12.Ultimately, all of Long’s former clients that testified for OSB and filed a

CSF claim (except one, who was in federal prison) received full payment of
 6

their claim, even where the entire amount claimed clearly constituted earned

fees, including two claimants for whom Long initiated litigation whose

claims (for approximately $25,000 total) were initially denied but were re-

opened and paid shortly after they testified for the Bar, while another client,

for whom Long also initiated litigation, had his claim denied but never

testified and his claim was never re-opened or paid. OB-12.

13.Shortly after the trial panel opinion (TPO) in this case was issued, Long

successfully moved in the companion case on remand to disqualify the

adjudicator, Mark Turner, on allegations of bias. Disqualification was

affirmed over Turner’s immediate request for reconsideration. The two cases

overlap and have progressed simultaneously, so bias in one matter likely

indicates bias in the other. Thus, disqualification of Turner in a related

matter suggests that his TPO in this matter and rulings during trial likely

reflect bias.

a. Turner’s provision of only three hours for Long to respond to a

motion to quash a valid subpoena for the deposition of Vanessa

Sturgeon, president of Long’s former landlord (TMT Development,

Inc.) in the companion case tends to show a willingness to alter

procedural rules to disadvantage Long (whose subpoena was

quashed). Similarly, when Turner advised the Bar to change their

 7

position on a motion and then ruled in favor of that new position in

the companion case, it suggested his desire to aid the Bar in the

present matter as well.

b. Turner’s bias would affect not only the TPO in this case but also

Long’s ability to present his case, as illustrated by Turner’s exclusion

of two of Long’s witnesses (and none of the Bar’s) and multiple

exhibits (and none of the Bar’s).

c. In the present matter, Turner asked a client (Charpentier) who testified

by phone leading questions to elicit that she supposedly wrote down

events in a notebook, which supposed notebook was never presented

as evidence, and then relied on the supposed notations in the supposed

notebook as a decisive factor in finding rule violations.

d. In this Court, Turner or the Bar intentionally omitted several of

Long’s exhibits from the record. Turner was compelled to add some

of them on Long’s motion to correct the record, but refused to include

others despite explicit reference to them in the transcript. OB-65-66.

14.Long was prevented from developing evidence regarding due process and

equal protection violations through:

a. questioning Bar attorneys (who were not trial counsel in this matter)

about the origins and methods of prosecution; and

 8

b. testimony by a witness who had been victimized as a client by

multiple unethical former Oregon attorneys, that would establish her

experiences with the OSB disciplinary attorneys to show they

minimized the witness/client’s concerns, discouraged her complaints,

and failed to rigorously pursue disciplinary sanction in the other cases.

OB-28-31.

15.For most of a year beginning in late 2017, the Bar’s media specialist tracked

developments that could be used to portray Long negatively and maintained

regular contact with a reporter who ultimately published about 12 newspaper

articles attacking Long. OB-19.

16. The origins of the case can be firmly located in the record because:

a. Long’s then-landlord, TMT Development, threatened Long with OSB

action if he did not immediately vacate his home within 24 hours

when he sought to discuss an incident in which Long’s former

roommate, Roach, was stealing from his apartment with help from her

friend Wilson (also relevant to Williams). After he ejected them,

Roach alleged to TMT that Long hit her (which he has consistently

denied) but never contacted the police or other authorities. Long did

not vacate.
 9

b. Within a month, Cournoyer appeared during the trial on TMT’s

eviction case against Long to notify him she had subpoenaed his

IOLTA records (despite the absence of financial complaints).

c. The next day, Cournoyer notified Long that the Bar would seek his

immediate suspension. Cournoyer’s subsequent affidavit in support of

suspension listed the attorney for TMT and Sturgeon (Bonnie

Richardson) as a primary fact source. The other source she listed

(Long’s former legal assistant, Alderman) would soon move into a

new apartment at TMT’s flagship building.

d. Following this Court’s order of immediate suspension, Sturgeon

(whom Long had never met personally), spent nearly two full business

days prominently observing the post-suspension hearing against Long

(more time than any other observer, including Long’s

partner/girlfriend). OB-8, 18, 60.

17. At every opportunity to be heard in a live hearing, Long produced clients

who testified very favorably about his dedication and willingness to reduce

or forgo fees to meet their needs, including one who stated, “I don't think I

could have found anybody who would have worked for so little money as

hard as you have, and I'm not going to be able to find somebody else;”

another who testified that Long “changed my life drastically. . . . I don't

 10

think [] another lawyer would have done what he did for me. I don't,” and

explained that Long “had more compassion” than other lawyers she talked

with, and a third client who explained that, upon collection of settlement

proceeds, Long cut her balance in half (giving up thousands of dollars) when

he learned that her sister had developed cancer so that she had the funds

needed to travel and spend time with her sister before death. OB-27-28.

OVER-RELIANCE ON BAR ATTORNEYS WARRANTS RECONSIDERATION

It is reasonable to assume that the numbered points listed above, each of

which was stated clearly and with record citation in Long’s briefs (as indicated),

would receive some reasoned consideration in the assessment of the case and,

especially if the Court expects to disbar the attorney, that consideration would find

some expression in the published opinion. This Court’s July 29, 2021 opinion

contains no such expression.

The Court orders Long’s disbarment with only a generic rejection of his

constitutional arguments, which identify repeated denials of due process and equal

protection while Bar attorneys have taunted Long with their immunity during

nearly four years of interim suspension. The opinion ignores not only the details of

the arguments but also the overall thrust of Long’s concerns, as if its author had

never seen Long’s arguments.

 11

While the Court’s opinion tells a familiar story of a selfish, cash-hungry

lawyer that would presumably justify disbarment if true, it is a false narrative

constructed by the Bar to orchestrate Long’s disbarment without legitimate cause.

The character of the disrespectful lawyer whose clients terminate him while he

keeps the fees is a fictional character in this case.

To create this narrative, Bar attorneys trampled Long’s constitutional rights,

recklessly inflicted injuries on clients, and intentionally deceived this Court.

Absent meaningful reconsideration, Bar attorneys have misled this Court to order

permanent disbarment without legitimate cause, a disgrace that should deeply

disturb the membership of this state’s bar.

In sum, nothing in the opinion suggests meaningful attention to Long’s

briefs. It is entirely possible that the opinion’s author worked solely from the Bar’s

denigrating summary of Long’s arguments.

Thus, Long requests reconsideration with particular attention to his

overarching constitutional arguments and the Williams matter, although the

opinion’s discussion of other matters also contain serious errors that warrant

reconsideration.

The appropriate basis of reconsideration in attorney disciplinary cases is not

settled. This case involves material factual errors (including those related to

constitutional argument and others described herein) and erroneous application of

 12

law (especially constitutional law and the clear and convincing evidence standard).

Most importantly, reconsideration is fully warranted by the manifest injustice

(undeserved severe and permanent injury) that will result from allowing the

opinion to stand.

This motion may present an unusual request, but it is an unusual case. Bar

attorneys have gone well beyond acceptable litigation techniques to deceive the

Court into applying that standard narrative, but it is simply not true here. Bar

attorneys engaged in misrepresentation to cause suspension, bribery to secure

witnesses, and other egregious conduct throughout the prosecution. The only

reasonable conclusion upon examining the opinion against the record and briefs is

that over-reliance on Bar attorneys misled the Court.

BROADER CONCERNS: BAR-GENERATED DISCIPLINE

For this case to end in disbarment not only signifies that this Court was

deceived by Bar attorneys, but also enhances the risk of political discipline for all

solo and small firm practitioners in Oregon.

The Court’s opinion fully credits multiple witnesses’ testimony without

accounting for the incentives the Bar attorneys intentionally created to control its

content. Witnesses testified knowing their words would determine whether they

received tens of thousands of dollar or risked criminal allegations.

 13

This pressure creates bias that undermines due process. Where essentially all

witnesses for the Bar face such pressure, it should weigh heavily against

disciplinary sanction.

This is such a case, but the Court gives no attention to the incentives

affecting testimony. It is not difficult to imagine how similar “evidence” – which

the July 29, 2021 opinion holds is sufficient to disbar – could be manufactured

against almost any attorney in this state.

The present case reveals inadequate checks on disciplinary attorneys’

conduct given the potential for improper influence by powerful private interests.

By disbarring Long, the Court approves a model of prosecution that risks making

attorney discipline merely an apology for power.

If angering certain private interests can yield disbarment – the truth behind

the present case – the public will increasingly struggle to find counsel who can

challenge powerful interests, thereby undermining self-government and

impoverishing democracy.

Absent major structural change, only rigorous examination of the record and

independent judicial decision-making in all disciplinary cases can protect the

independence and integrity of the OSB membership. Anything less poses a threat

to the profession and the public it serves. The published opinion here suggests such

a threat and warrants reconsideration.

 14

CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENTS LEFT UNADDRESSED

The Bar stated intent to disbar Long before nearly all complaints in this case

existed. Trans. in Case No. N007129 (2-13-18) (“[t]he bar intends to . . . see what

we can do about getting [Long] disbarred”) at 593; R-2492-2493. The Court’s

opinion, however, states that investigation “stemmed from complaints by clients or

third parties.” Op-8. That ignores the incontrovertible fact that nearly all

complaints in this case followed the Bar’s communications to those clients to

encourage CSF claims.

The July 29, 2021 opinion disposes of Long’s constitutional arguments in a

single footnote stating that there is “no evidentiary support” for them. Op-8, note 4.

The conclusion is demonstrably wrong on the record.

Ample evidence supports Long’s due process and equal protection

arguments. It addresses immediately relevant points, such as the dates on which

complaints were filed (R-2492-2493), and broader points of comparison, such as

the Bar’s extreme negligence (if not complicity) in allowing former attorney Lori

Deveny to continue accessing her IOLTA and handling legal matters after her form

B resignation. E.g. R-466-475, 558-569.

The question is whether such evidence requires dismissal. That issue is not

addressed by the Court’s opinion, but matters greatly.

 15

Due Process

Indications of impropriety in the Bar’s prosecution of Long are extensive.

Long first complained to this Court of multiple due process violations in March

2018, observing that the Bar had changed its main allegations at least three times in

about as many months, and that no one (including this Court) could tell him which

version of the Bar Rules of Procedure applied to his case, among other concerns.5

See Mem. in Support of Emergency Motion, Case No. N007129 (3-6-18); see also

R-677-684. Due process violations continue unabated, despite Long’s multiple

efforts to alert the Court. See Mot. to Consolidate etc., Case Nos. S066327 &

S066649 (6-10-19) and Reply (6-19-19).

Thus, when the July 29, 2021 opinion states that the Court “find[s] no

support in the record” for the assertion that “the Bar was investigating alleged rule

violations . . . for reasons other than the Bar’s legitimate regulatory purpose,” Op-

8, it suggests the Court’s view of the record was slanted toward the Bar. The record

contains significant evidence of improper motivation to disbar Long starting in

2017, which is sketched below.

5
The record demonstrates the Bar’s opportunistic arguments for two different sets
of rules. R-677-684.
 16

Origins of Bar Prosecution and Aggression

At pages 2563 and 2564 of the record, the Court can see the origins of this

prosecution. In these emails, dsated September 6, 2017, a representative of TMT

Development, Inc. Long’s landlord at the time, threatens to involve the Bar if Long

does not vacate his home immediately in response to his initial request to discuss

the incident involving his former roommate,6 Roach. The remainder of this story –

including Cournoyer’s appearance at trial and the Bar’s sudden desire for

immediate suspension – is recounted above.

Other notable facts support the same conclusion. These include media

coverage, including two private attorneys “predicting” the Bar would immediately

suspend Long. They were TMT’s counsel (Bonnie Richardson) and Beth

Creighton, who had agreed to work pro bono work against Long at Richardson’s

request. See Nick Budnick, Portland Lawyer Andrew Long Probed for Possible

Witness-Tampering, Portland Tribune (10-10-17).7 The record contains extensive

email communications between the author of that story (and 11 later such attack

pieces) and the Bar’s media specialist. R-615-652.

6
The Court’s opinion incorrectly identifies Roach as Long’s roommate. Op-6.
Long had previously told Roach she could no longer live with him due to theft.
7
It may reflect the extreme imbalance of power that the title of the article accused
Long of witness tampering when, in fact, two separate men threatened Long in and
around his immediately preceding the referenced trial. See Appendix to OB at A-
22-23 (December 2017 declaration of Long’s assistant, also an attorney, who
witnessed the intimidation).
 17

The next month, well before this Court had taken any action involving Long,

Richardson responded to his request for a correction of Sturgeon’s prior

defamatory statement about him by stating: “My testimony will corroborate Ms.

Sturgeon's statements.” Exhibit P (11-22-17), Supplemental Exhibits, Case No.

N007129, at 85 (filed 5-3-18). At the time, Long had no reason to think Richardson

would ever testify against him in any setting. A month later, this Court granted the

Bar’s petition for immediate suspension and ordered a post-suspension hearing

and, two months after that, Richardson testified at that post-suspension hearing. It

seemed as if she knew what was coming a month before this Court ordered it.

The Bar determined to take Long’s law license without a legitimate reason.

That explains why the Williams complaint, filed four months after the Bar’s

statement of intent to disbar, became the centerpiece of the Bar’s case against him

despite its dubious characters, probable criminal conduct by Bar attorneys, and

lack of any corroboration of the single witness’ testimony beyond her own text

messages. There is no legitimate reason to disbar Long, so the Bar’s attorneys

created the appearance of one (just like they said they would).

Main Due Process Arguments: Motive and Means to Disbar

Improper motive feeds the first of the three threads of due process argument

identified in Long’s opening brief. It involves the apparent ability of Sturgeon,

 18

perhaps through Richardson, to direct the Bar’s prosecutorial agenda toward

disbarring Long, reflecting a classic, and constitutionally prohibited, exercise of

control over a public entity by self-serving private interests. The evidence includes

that which bears on the timing of Cournoyer’s contact with Long, as well as the

contemporaneous nature of TMT’s threat and the Bar’s initiation of proceedings.

OB-55-61. It is also notable that Richardson and Creighton, were major fact

witnesses at the hearing on interim suspension despite knowing almost nothing

about him. The report from that hearing read as if Long’s case was not even

presented.

A second thread involves the probability of felonious conduct by Bar

attorneys to secure witnesses and the influence of CSF money on witness

testimony (especially, Williams). The legislative history of ORS 162.265

demonstrates that CSF money can be the basis of a bribe. See Criminal Law

Revision Commission, Proposed Oregon Criminal Code: Final Draft and Report

(July 1970) at 201-202 (citing State v. Jones, 111 Or 295 (1924)).9 The evidence

on point is discussed in Long’s brief. E.g. OB-57-58.

The third thread of due process argument in Long’s brief analogizes to the

outrageous government conduct doctrine, among other theories. This concept

9
In Jones, payment of a debt that was legally due constituted a bribe. Thus,
payment from the CSF would be sufficient to support conviction if promised or
manipulated to influence a witness’ testimony. 111 Or at 299
 19

recognizes, in the criminal context, “a claim that government conduct in securing

an indictment was so shocking to due process values that the indictment must be

dismissed." United States v. Montoya, 45 F.3d 1286, 1300 (9th Cir 1995). Further, a

case should be dismissed when “governmental conduct constitutes[,] in effect, the

generation ... of new crimes merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges

against the defendant." United States v. Bogart, 783 F. 2d 1428, 1436 (9th Cir.

1986) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Analogized to attorney

disciplinary, both Montoya and Bogart express the core concern here – the Bar

generated the complaints comprising this case for the purpose of prosecuting and

disbarring Long (not to protect anyone).

There was no reason that the clients-turned-witnesses in this case had to

suffer any injury but for the Bar’s headlong demand for immediate suspension. Bar

attorneys took no measures plan for predictable impacts of immediate suspension

on clients. R-588. They may have petitioned for immediate suspension precisely

because of the impacts it would have on Long’s clients to genersate CSF claims

and, thus, witnesses. Rather than holding the Bar attorneys accountable for the

foreseeable injuries they caused clients by pursuing an unjustified petition that

 20

was, at best, questionable in its urgency and allegations (and, at worst, entirely

perjuriously and fraudulent), the July 29, 2021 opinion shifts blame to Long.10

Adjudicator Bias

Bias by the adjudicator also violates due process. The evidence on point is

extensive, including Turner’s evident bias in the companion case – where he

consistently ruled exactly as the Bar requested, changed procedural rules and

imposed harsh penalties to disadvantage Long, and even provided advice to Bar

attorneys.

In the present case, Turner’s lack of impartiality meant that two of Long’s

witnesses were prevented from giving testimony, Long was not able to question

disciplinary attorneys and subpoena several witnesses, Williams was permitted to

10
The opinion implicitly absolves the Bar’s attorneys of fault for injuries they
caused by stating that the Bar attorneys’ conduct “is not a defense” because “[t]he
charged violations are established by facts demonstrating that respondent failed to
return unearned fees.” Op-6. That reasoning is problematic because the client
matters were properly designated as “earned on receipt.” The ordinary use of that
phrase suggests that, while Long would owe a debt if unable to complete services
due to suspension, money designated “earned on receipt” would not be considered
“unearned fees.”. The opinion suggests that plain meaning interpretation by stating
that such agreements “shift the risk of loss to the client,” Op-5, – a shift that was
bargained for (as consideration for sliding scale rates and flexible payment plans
on which Long bore risk of nonpayment). The model he used, under RPC
1.5(c)(3), enabled him to focus more of his practice on the needs of an underserved
low income population by shifting some of the risk of inadvertent violation away
from himself in exchange for taking on the risk that clients would not continue pay
for services after they received them.
 21

dictate the length of her own cross-examination (because Turner would not require

her to return after lunch, but no limit was placed on the direct examination), and

many of Long’s exhibits were excluded while every exhibit offered by the Bar was

admitted. Further, either Turner or someone handling the materials for the Bar

shuffled Long’s exhibits so they would be out of order in this Court’s record and

omitted several of them from the record altogether.

Due Process and Duty to Cooperate

Due process affects the Bar attorneys’ power to inquire. There is,

necessarily, a due process limit to what Bar attorneys can do or require and,

therefore, to how much abuse an attorney must accept from them on pain of

violating RPC-8.1(a)(2). Of course, it would not be a violation for an attorney to

resist (or refuse to submit to) physical torture by Bar attorneys undertaken to

extract information. Similarly, due process will not permit Bar attorneys to use

their ability to inquire such that an attorney must violate RPC-8.1(a)(2) to exercise

a fundamental right.

Chourey, in particular, used his power to inquire to interfere with Long’s

right to be heard. OB-52. The record shows that Chourey posed increasingly

demanding and detailed, often irrelevant, inquiries with increasingly short

deadlines and no opportunity to request extension as the February 2018 post-

 22

suspension hearing approached. In one instance, Chourey demanded that Long

provide a detailed account of why receiving parking tickets should not lead to

disbarment. OB-52.

The issue peaked with the Grotz matter. Chourey’s inquires regarding Grotz

appeared designed to cause Long to have to spend extensive time responding. Long

responded with three separate letters and expressed his concerns regarding abuse

of the power. The Bar nonetheless charged an RPC 8.1(a)(2) violation.

Less than two weeks before the scheduled hearing and less than one week

before the parties’ exhibits were due to the special master, Long wrote Chourey

and requested a stay of all deadlines in the disciplinary inquiries. Chourey did not

respond. Thereafter, Long did not respond to further inquiries by Chourey.11

This Court’s July 29, 2021 opinion suggests, with no apparent basis in the

record, that Long refused to comply as a bad faith means of obstructing the

investigation. Op-6. It concludes that Long violated RPC-8.1(a)(2) in Grotz and

others.

The opinion’s reasoning misses the point of Long’s argument so completely

that it seems his brief was not actually read. The opinion states that “[a] bar inquiry

is lawful if it is based on an arguable complaint of misconduct, [one] that the Bar

11
Long did, however, respond to Cournoyer the next time she sent a disciplinary
inquiry (Williams).
 23

had legal authority to investigate,” Op at 7-8 (citation omitted). That has no

relation to Long’s argument.

If Chourey used waterboarding to extract information from Long, it would

not have been a lawful inquiry. Long’s argument is not with the nature of the

complaint underlying the inquiry (he responded to the parking ticket inquiry, for

example) but with the methods Chourey used.

The inquiry was a mere pretext for Chourey to interefere with Long’s ability

to litigate his case, just as much so as if Chourey smashed Long’s computer before

trial. Therefore, it was unlawful. The Court’s opinion simply does not address this

argument, which is clearly stated in Long’s brief. OB-51-53; R-51-53.

Although primarily stated in terms of RPCs, this argument also plainly

involves due process issues.12 Long’s argument under RPC-3.4(c) and In re

Tamblyn, 298 Or 620 (1985) is, effectively, an argument to conform RPC-8.1(a)(2)

to due process principles.13 See OB-53-54.

Equal Protection Violation

12
As in his brief, Long intends also to include consideration of Or Const, art I, s 10
when discussing due process principles.
13
A similar argument was advanced under the US Americans with Disabilities Act
and is not abandoned.
 24

The same evidence becomes even more potent when contrasted with the Bar

attorneys’ treatment of similarly situated attorneys facing contemporaneous

prosecutions that involved far more serious alleged misconduct than anything even

remotely suggested of Long. The points underlying this argument demonstrate

deep and serious flaws within Oregon’s attorney disciplinary system because the

disparate treatment cannot be explained through any legitimate rationale.

The crux of the argument is that Long has been treated materially worse than

similarly situated attorneys. This is primarily a “class of one” or selective

prosecution argument.14 Two cases from the same geographic area that emerged at

exactly the same time as the prosecution against Long, those of Lori Deveny and

Erik Graeff, illustrate the point.

OSB treated those other two attorneys much better than Long without

rational explanation for the difference in treatment. Long, in fact, became the target

of what might be the most extreme false prosecution by the Bar in its history. C.f.

Stephanie Volin, In re Long, Medium.com (9-6-18) (link).

Graeff was eventually disciplined by this Court for recklessly shooting

multiple rounds from his firearm into another attorney’s office, but was not

Based on Long’s history of enduring domestic violence and his early efforts to
14

obtain support or assistance through the Bar – which are tied with the origins of
prosecution – that equal protection is also violated because of irrationally treating
male and female victims of domestic violence differently.
 25

disbarred. See In re Graeff, 368 Or 18 (2021). The Bar never sought Graeff’s

interim suspension, instead agreeing to allow him to practice for 11 months after

the shooting, until he was imprisoned.

Earlier complaints against Graeff had not been pursued and were never

prosecuted. Further, he faced pled guilty to manufacturing illegal drugs, but faced

no disciplinary charges for those acts.

One of the earlier complainants was expressly prevented from testifying by

the Bar at Graeff’s disciplinary trial on the RPC-1.4 violation charged as a result of

her complaint. The complainant also reported that Graeff had threatened her with a

loaded firearm, delayed sending her funds that were owed, and lost a portion of her

primary documents. Long called her as a witness to testify in this matter, but

Turner ruled that her experiences with the Bar’s handling of other matters was

irrelevant despite Long’s explicit equal protection arguments. .

It remains unclear why the Bar did not charge Graeff with the other reported

misconduct, including the delay in providing funds, but prosecuted Long for

similar allegations (e.g., Butler) as if it was severe – in both instances, the

attorney’s delay was apparently caused by misaddressing an envelope when

mailing the client’s check. Long, whose error was earlier in time, was charged.

Graeff was not.

 26

The Bar’s failure to prosecute an earlier complaint made by an attorney who

witnessed Graeff throw a female client into a wall, causing bruising and a police

report, also creates questions about the Bar’s prosecutorial discretion.

Similar comparisons can be made for broader issues. For example, the police

issued a warning to the public regarding Graeff because the Bar did not. However,

in Long’s case (which involved no violence or weapons), the Bar issued a warning

to the public and undertook a year-long media campaign to destroy his reputation,

along with twice featuring him in the OSB Bulletin.

Another consideration, perhaps, is that Graeff’s practice was apparently

never subject to custodianship. Long’s was taken into custodianship within two

days and Bar attorneys raided his office with police escorts despite the complete

absence of resistance or threatening behavior.

A second contemporaneous point of comparison exists as well. During the

same timeframe that the Bar attorneys were soliciting Long’s recently injured

clients to file CSF claims and facilitating payment of claims that were based

entirely on earned fees to gain leverage and produce this case, the exact same Bar

attorneys permitted former attorney Lori Deveny, who apparently stole at least

$3.4 million from her clients (most of whom suffered severe brain trauma and

required the money for basic living expenses and/or medical needs), to continue

using her IOLTA for months after resigning her license, “lost” over 90 of her files
 27

they were supposed to have custody over during the months when criminal

prosecutions were being formulated, and delayed for months after her form B

resignation in filing for a custodianship of her practice (and still made her a

signatory on her IOLTA, whereas Long’s IOLTA was fully seized by the Bar

within two days). Once they had custodianship, the Bar attorneys filed grossly

inaccurate documents as a final accounting in a failed effort to quickly close the

case. Most recently, while Bar attorneys have argued for payment of earned fees

for CSF claims against Long, in cases where Deveny apparently forged a client

signature to steal an entire settlement, they have argued that a 33% fee should

nonetheless be deducted from resulting CSF awards as Deveny’s “earned.” fees.

The Bar’s treatment of Long, when viewed alongside similarly situated

attorneys, plainly constitutes selective prosecution and/or irrationally targeting a

“class of one.” The only question may be whether the Equal Protection Clause

applies to attorney disciplinary proceedings. He argued that it does, but this Court

completely ignored the argument in its opinion.

Therefore, Long requests reconsideration. There is no question that the

record contains evidentiary support, and Long sees no reasoning in the opinion to

suggest the argument was rejected on some other basis. It seems as if the Court just

parroted the Bar’s brief without reviewing his.

 28

Conclusion Regarding Constitutional Arguments

The Court wrote that there is “no evidentiary support” for Long’s due

process and equal protection arguments in its opinion, but that statement is

indefensible. There is extensive evidence in the record.

It is difficult to imagine a clearer case for due process protection than one in

which the Bar expressly identifies disbarment as their goal before the complaints

said to justify it existed. This is that case.

The present case is also ideal setting for applying equal protection theories

in the attorney disciplinary context, whether under the U.S. Constitution or Article

I, section 20 of the Oregon Constitution. Long established much of the evidentiary

basis for his equal protection argument before the trial in this case. See Motion to

Consolidate etc., Case Nos. S066327 & S066649 (June 10, 2019). That evidence is

in the record in the present case as well. R-457-707.

Long requests that the case be reconsidered on these bases and those

articulated below.

DECEPTION AND THE JULY 29, 2021 OPINION: EXAMPLE OF WILLIAMS

In the present matter to date, the Bar has apparently deceived this Court into

ignoring the information highlighted above, adopting interpretations of evidence

strained beyond rationality, and inflicting the ultimate professional penalty upon an
 29

ethical lawyer. Further, the Court’s written opinion, while demonstrably erroneous

in material respects, adopts a denigrating tone toward Long with an apparent lack

of awareness that Bar attorneys could (and did) engage in abhorrent conduct. The

entire prosecution should have been dismissed years ago.

The Bar has put forward an intentionally deceptive case. Its discussion of the

Williams matter interweaves false and misleading information as if it were

established fact, distorts the meaning of text messages by taking select words out

of context, employs an apparent forgery, and relies primarily on evidence

inadmissible in any other context due to unreliability.

This Court took the bait. The problem may grow from excessive trust in Bar

attorneys. Short of dismissal for Bar attorneys’ conduct, a probing reconsideration

would also prevent injustice.

The Bar’s evidence fails to meet clear and convincing standard of evidence

in the Williams case and most other respects. Below, this motion assesses the

record regarding errors that suggest deceptive techniques related to character and

communications affected the opinion. On both topics, error may result from over-

reliance on the Bar’s brief without engaging Long’s briefs.

First, looking at the actions of Wilson and Long in the context of very

different background information about character fills in many of the gaps where

the Bar has used omission (essentially removing Wilson from the story) to mislead
 30

the Court. Second, a careful review of the communications in the record

demonstrates that the Bar has actively misled the Court regarding communications

discussed in the opinion. Viewed fairly, there is no legitimate way to find clear and

convincing evidence that Long committed the alleged violations charged. With

adequate care, one can see that Long did not steal from Williams, but that the

misleading information and arguments construct a false narrative to damage him.

Bar’s Omission of Wilson’s Role

The Court’s opinion shows no recognition the case may be easily explained

by considering that a professional thief (Wilson) was “very involved in [the

Williams] situation” during the period of time when Williams’ money was drawn

down. Appendix to OB-004 (CSF Investigator email to OSB personnel).

The CSF investigator for the Williams claim suggested contacting Wilson at

about the time he was in jail on his most recent felony conviction for theft. By the

time of trial, Wilson was evading a warrant related to a prior theft conviction.

If the Bar contacted Wilson and obtained useful information, it would have

used it. The lack of information suggests either that the Bar did not want to know

what Wilson would say or that they did not want to share whatever information

they obtained from him.

 31

The Bar’s brief presents Wilson in a misleading light. He is characterized as

“the individual who had introduced [Williams] to respondent” and “respondent’s

intermediary,” for example, rather than as Long’s former client with an extensive

history of theft and other felony convictions. Answering Brief (AB) at AB-5, 27.

Neither the Bar’s brief nor this Court’s opinion notes that the first

questionable event in the Williams matter – when Long gave Wilson $4,000 of

Williams’ money with only an apparent authorization from Williams – occurred

one day after Cournoyer provided notice to Long of a subpoena for his IOLTA, a

point Long’s brief emphasizes. It would have been a stupid time for Long to begin

a stealing spree – one guaranteed to lead to detection. It was, however, exactly the

moment when Wilson learned that Long had control over funds that would be

released at Williams’ direction.15

Like the Bar’s brief, the opinion completely ignores the likelihood that

Wilson either stole the money or collaborated with Williams to arrange for her to

claim the additional $31,689.29 from CSF.16 Both possibilities seem obvious and

likely, so they should have been seriously considered.

15
If Williams refused Wilson’s request for authorization to use funds for their
mutual friend’s bail, as Williams testified, it is entirely unclear how Wilson even
knew that Long was holding money for Williams.
16
If Wilson and Williams collaborated, that would explain why Williams testified
that she had never seen the email and invoice from Long that explained he would
 32

Neffandorf, a friend of both Williams and Wilson, may also have been

involved. Neffandorf has an expanding criminal history of identity theft. Long’s

former assistant, Glick, testified that the woman she had encountered shortly

before the trial as Williams was not the same woman she thought to be Williams in

2017 when she saw Long give Williams money in the company of Wilson. R-974,

979-980. By his questioning, Turner seemed to inquire whether it may have been

Neffandorf picking up money with Wilson. R-979; See also R-997 (Long’s

testimony on that possibility).

Among the scenarios, Wilson’s extensive criminal history and recent felony

convictions for theft make him the most likely suspect. That would explain why

Wilson seemed to become increasingly interested in playing a “middle man” role

between Williams and Long. It would explain why Wilson asked Williams how

much of her money Long was holding for her.

Wilson is plainly more likely to have stolen funds than Long. By blaming

Long to Williams, Wilson would gain effective cover.17 Or, if Williams and

Wilson collaborated to defraud CSF, Wilson’s role would presumably be to frame

Long for a theft that never occurred.

draw from her money in trust to pay legal fees. Yet, she acknowledged on cross
that she had provided those documents to the Bar.
17
The Bar referred the matter to the Multnomah County District Attorney in 2018.
No prosecution regarding the supposed theft was ever commenced against Long.
 33

The main question regarding Long’s actions was asked by the Chief Justice

during oral argument when she inquired Long why a lawyer would give a client

cash without obtaining a receipt. It is an important – and, perhaps for senior

attorneys seasoned by experience to be wary of risk, overriding – question.

Exploring it tends to show that it is very unlikely Long ever intentionally converted

Williams’ funds, as the Court would likely recognize but for over-reliance on the

Bar.

Several contextual factors explain why Long would distribute cash without

receipts. First, Long’s evidence coincidentally showed that he operated in cash in

multiple cases. In addition to Williams, Long transacted in cash without providing

receipts with at least four other client matters out of the approximately 19

referenced in this proceeding. R-997. Regardless of the wisdom, cash clearly was

part of how Long operated his practice at the time in question. No RPC is violated

by transacting in cash.

Also relevant might be Long’s limited practice experience and

acknowledged need to improve his practice management protocols.18 Toward that

end, Long brought in a bookkeeper who he testified was just getting his financials

organized when he was immediately suspended. See R-2452-2457.

18
If they were doing their jobs without improper motivations, Bar attorneys would
have recognized the benefit of practice management assistance or, at most,
diversion options for Long.
 34

Long had no prior experience with criminals or theft, except theft from his

apartment by Roach. His background as a law professor suggests that he was used

to dealing primarily with trustworthy law students.

Long had no past experience with someone like Wilson, whose criminal

record and other evidence suggest that he is a “con artist” or otherwise predisposed

to taking advantage of others.19 Long did not know Wilson’s background at the

time, but expressed distrust of him sometime between early October and late

December 2017.20

Naiveté explains why Long would give cash to a client on demand and

without receipts, and why he would have too easily believed Wilson’s apparent

authorization from Williams to release $4,000.

Nothing suggests that Long possessed the recklessness necessary to risk his

career and reputation to commit criminal acts that consistently result in disbarment

while yielding only small and temporary potential benefit. It would have been

19
Although it was not known to Long at the time, Glick was apparently familiar
with Wilson’s reputation because Roach “bragged about [Wilson] . . . [as] one of
the best thieves she'd ever met.” R-974.
20
In the companion to this case, as noted above, a significant amount of Long’s
evidence would or will demonstrate the impacts of trauma he had sustained
surrounding his exit from Florida and return to Oregon. Perhaps chief among these
are effects related to the loss of his children, betrayal by a trusted spouse, and the
lack of social support often experienced by males in such situations (the present
case being an excellent example of the latter and why most male DV victims stay
silent). As such, Long may also have been particularly susceptible to some types of
deception. However, he has not developed evidence on point for this case.
 35

obvious to anyone in Long’s position that he would have been caught for theft.

Nothing in the record suggests that Long has ever displayed that type of malicious

conduct. Nothing suggests a reason he would start.21

Record evidence addresses Long’s character over 20 years. Every indication

demonstrates solid moral character, even during times of extreme stress (such as

enduring domestic violence while protecting his children from their mother’s abuse

and suicidality, while also working as a scholar and law professor). E.g. R-2633-

2683.

These facts would seem highly relevant for most people seriously

considering whether Long should be disbarred on this record. The opinion does not

mention any of them, even in passing.

The Court’s opinion adopts a profoundly inaccurate view of Long. It is a

denigrating character sketch that was intentionally created by the Bar over time

and nothing less than a fraud on this Court by the Bar. The record demonstrates

that Long is not the person described by the July 29, 2021 opinion. Disbarment is

thus deeply unjust.

21
The Court’s opinion suggests Long faced some type of “financial desperation” in
October and November 2017. That claim is belied by many aspects of the record,
including statements from Long’s only account other than his IOLTA that show a
modest balance a year earlier. R-1488. Long had few resources the entire time he
practiced, but there was no special financial desperation in late 2017.
 36

Communications Fraud

The Court’s opinion seems to decide the case on the basis of a conclusion

that Long stole money from Williams, which it bases on communication in the

record. The analysis is deeply flawed.

The Court’s opinion seems to follow the Bar’s brief through a misleading set

of quotations from text messages without challenging them. The Bar’s false

representations are relatively easy to expose and become obvious if the record is

examined. As such, the Bar’s brief should be understood as intentionally

misleading the Court to adopt a view of events and of Long that is not supported

by the record.

For example, the Bar presented Williams’ texts of December 1, 2017, in

which Williams suddenly expressed a need for money to buy a house and

requested money. R-2318. Even a quick review of the record belies that story.

Williams’ message was sent at 1:15 a.m., which is an unusual time to locate

a house to buy and immediately need the funds for a down payment. R-2318. Even

more unusual, the night of November 30 to December 1, 2017 was the only night

during his time in practice that it was clear from the media that Long would not be

able to answer a text message.22 Notably, the 1:15 a.m. text from Williams came

For the only time in his life, Long was arrested. It resulted from a 911 call by a
22

TMT Development representative, with Sturgeon watching from the lobby, when
 37

five minutes after she received a 1:10 a.m. text from Wilson that said: “Need to

talk to you .. it's important about the attorney. thanks.” R-2319.

Williams’ 1:15 a.m. text was the first time – after months in which in which

she never even acknowledged in writing that Long held her money and followed

her direction in disbursing it – that Williams asked Long for money by text

message. It is not clear why, even when replying to Long’s messages informing her

of his receipt of over $30,000 and asking for her direction in disbursing it,

Williams never mentioned money in a text message until December 1, 2017. See

R-2300. Her testimony did not provide an explanation.23

he accidentally rented a room in a TMT-owned building through a Priceline special

rate that did not reveal the location. Given Sturgeon’s prominence and role in an
organization that pays the salaries of four police officers, it was not surprising that
police arrested at her request. It was then immediately reported on the internet. The
Portland Tribune reported the story as front page news, and an interview with
Sturgeon revealed her awareness that the arrest prevented Long from attending a
hearing in Florida that was crucial to his ability to see his children and potentially
obtain custody. The arrest also caused Long to miss a hearing against TMT related
to his challenge to their removal of the toilet from Long’s apartment and refusal to
provide alternate facilities (which is why he was renting a room in the first place).
23
Cournoyer, who was the original investigator on Long’s case and has worked on
the companion to this case, and was the Bar attorney who originated the Williams
matter, knows that Long had been arrested and was in jail on December 1, 2017.
She was working intensely on Long’s matter at that time and raided his office
shortly thereafter. If she was unsure about the exact date, she could certainly have
checked. As such, her argument at page 36 of her brief is patently disingenuous.
AB-36 (“He ignored her three texts that day asking for her money”). She is, in
effect, lying to the Court. This is far from the only instance.
 38

According to the Bar’s exhibits, the 1:15 a.m. message was the first in a

series of texts over about two weeks in which Williams demanded money,

frequently using multiple exclamation points for emphasis. R-2324. These text

messages are presented multiple times in the Bar’s exhibits, perhaps to create a

false sense of their volume, and frequently appear to be edited or, at least, isolated

from surrounding texts without explanation. E.g. id. No documentation suggests

what happened in the wee hours of December 1 between Wilson and Williams.

From late November forward, the Bar’s exhibits depict Wilson texting

Williams regularly, often seeking to meet with her. R-2321-2334. On December

13, 2017, Wilson asked Williams, “how much does [Long] have of ur money[?]” It

is not clear why.

December 20, 2017

The Williams-and-Wilson messages then suggest that on December 20,

2017, the day this Court suspended Long, Wilson was authorized by Williams to

go to Long’s office to retrieve Williams’ file. An email from Williams to Wilson

seems to authorize Wilson to pick up Williams’ file. R-2335.

This Court’s opinion, portrays those texts as accurate. It then states that on

December 20, 2017, “Wilson went to respondent’s office to pick up Williams’s

 39

case file and money. Respondent gave Wilson Williams’s papers and $200 cash for

Williams.” Op-24. The statement is erroneous.

This is one of very few points on which Williams’ testimony and Long’s

testimony agree: Wilson did not pick up Williams’ file or $200 from Long on

December 20, 2017.

Williams clearly testified that she never received her file or any relevant

papers from Wilson, and never received or purported to authorize release of $200.

R-789, 800. Long testified that he did not give Wilson the file, and he did not

release $200 to Wilson. R-1062.

Yet, there is a document that purports to memorialize the transaction

described by the opinion. R-2336. When asked about it, Long testified that he had

no memory of the document or of the memorialized transaction ever occurring. R-

1062. This testimony is confirmed by the uncontested fact that Long no longer held

any of Williams’ funds in his IOLTA at that time (and, thus, could not have

released $200), and the uncontested fact that the Bar picked up Williams’ file from

his office two days later.

Therefore, it is essentially indisputable that the document purporting to

memorialize a December 20, 2017 transaction (and thus the Court’s opinion

describing it as fact) describes a false “fact.”

 40

According to the Bar’s brief, “Wilson asked to meet with Williams at

respondent’s request” and, when Williams agreed, “Wilson brought her a file

release to sign for respondent. (Ex. 334; PDF 2336).” AB-6-7 (emphasis added).

The cited PDF page number is the suspicious (potentially forged) document

purporting to memorialize a transaction that never occurred.

The suspicious document appears to bear Long’s signature and is on his

letterhead, but nearly all of the handwriting on the document is not Long’s. At trial,

Long did not recognize the handwriting. R-1062. With some examination, one can

see that the most of the handwriting resembles Wilson’s signature on the document

and that it also resembles (albeit noticeably less so) Wilson’s signature on the

document recording Long’s release of $4,000 to pay Neffandorf’s bail in October

2017, which is authentic. Id.; R-2304.

The questionable document includes a signature block with Long’s apparent

signature that is different from the signature block containing Wilson’s apparent

signature. It includes an initialed line that does not seem to make sense from a

legal perspective, but might reflect an effort to mimic legal forms. See R-2336.

Immediately below Long’s apparent signature, a line contains Long’s initials after

the word “witnessed.” R-2336. All handwriting in that signature block, and

nowhere else on the document appears to be Long’s.

 41

The testimony showing that the transaction never actually occurred, the odd

set-up of the document, and the presence of what might be Wilson’s handwriting

on most of the document suggest it is inauthentic and that Long’s signature and

initials are probably forged.24 Thus, the document is not reliable and does not

provide a solid basis for the opinion to recount the memorialized transaction as

fact.

In addition, the opinion’s statement regarding the supposed December 20,

2017 transaction is effectively contradicted by another statement in the opinion,

made just a few lines later, creating inconsistency within the opinion that is

apparent without reference to the record. It states that on December 22, 2017, Long

“asked [Williams’] to confirm whether she wanted the Bar to take over her file.”

Op-25; see also 2354 (the referenced text message). If Long had given Williams’

file to Wilson on December 20, there is no reason he would ask her two days later

if she wanted the Bar to pick up her file.

Long and Williams appear to have correctly testified that no transaction

occurred on December 20, 2017. Yet, this Court’s opinion states that, on December

20, 2017, “[a]fter leaving [Long]’s office, Wilson met with Williams,” and

24
This would be fairly easy to do for anyone with a copy of Long’s signature and
letterhead who has access to basic computer equipment.
 42

Williams testified Wilson claimed that Long said he had stolen all of Williams’

money but that he would pay her back. Op-24 (emphasis added).

But the record is not clear whether Wilson went to Long’s office on

December 20, 2017. Even if he did, the record contains no evidence of the alleged

admission beyond Williams’ hearsay within hearsay testimony.25

The only thing that is clear about December 20, 2017 in this respect seems to

be that a document, possibly in Wilson’s handwriting, falsely recites a transaction

that never occurred.

December 22, 2017

Immediately after recounting that Williams testified that Wilson told her that

Long stole her money, the opinion states: “[t]wo days later, respondent texted

Williams ‘I talked to [Wilson]. Thank you for understanding.’” Op-25. The clear

implication in the opinion (but not of the text) is to confirm that the December 22,

2017 text from Long to Williams was an admission that proves theft. But that

impression is severely misleading and suggests the Court overrelied on the Bar.26

25
While statements by Long could be admissions by a party opponent, that
exception cannot apply here because the likelihood that Wilson or Williams is
lying is extremely high
26
In his reply brief, Long explained that the Bar’s selective, out-of-context use of
the text message would have earned a failing grade when he was teaching.
 43

The Bar’s brief seems to connect Long’s supposed (but non-existent)

“confession” to his text message two days later. AB-6. If the reader believes that

Long confessed, which the Bar’s brief juxtaposes with his text message from two

days later, the case is over, and the remaining analysis is rather inconsequential.

The story appears to be taken directly from Cournoyer’s inherently dishonest brief,

where It appears at the very beginning of the narrative presumably for that purpose

(to mislead this Court into erroneously and unjustly disbarring Long).

The problem is that Cournoyer’s technique is profoundly misleading.

The story put forward by the Bar is not plausible when available facts are

considered. However, it seems this Court was privy only to the facts that the Bar

chose to emphasize. The Bar’s brief by Cournoyer might as well be a fantasy world

it is so wildly inaccurate in the key respects.

There is, in fact, absolutely zero direct evidence of the supposed confession.

There is also no evidence of why, if she actually wanted to collect money she

believed that Long owed her, Williams apparently refused to go to Long’s office

for the entire month of December 2017 even though he invited her to meet several

times .

No evidence explains why Williams would choose to suffer (without the

house she claimed to want to buy at 1:15 a.m.), apparently living in hotels to spare

the attorney (Long), who she claimed to have only met one time, the inconvenience
 44

of having a theft reported. If she were actually not reporting because of some kind

of support for Long, why didn’t she answer his December 22, 2017 text message

seeking to confirm her support to oppose the custodianship?

Very much like actions that would support a suit for the tort of false light,

Cournoyer’s brief frequently presents information that may be accurate in its

details in a manner that creates a false impression in the reader. While it may be

unethical, it apparently was effective in persuading this Court.

The “record documenting documenting the communication”

the communication"

The opinion follows the path laid by the Bar through the implied

“confession” to what seems to be a key factual conclusion of the opinion: that

“Williams’s version of events is in accord with the record documenting the

communication.” Op-26. Unfortunately, that statement is effectively useless to

decide any issue in the case.

The “record documenting the communication” was supplied by Williams

alone, largely authenticated by Williams alone, and acknowledged by Williams to

be incomplete. Much of it appears edited and could have even been entirely

fabricated. Obviously, Bar attorneys selected exhibits to match Williams’ tightly

controlled testimony. A bribed witness can be very convincing.

 45

Very little of the communication is reliable. None of that provides a basis for

fact conclusions, let along deciding the case.

The use of Long’s December 22, 2017 text in the Bar’s brief is

disingenuous. It takes words out of context and puts them next to Williams’ claim

about what Wilson told her that Long said during a transaction that never occurred

but is fraudulently memorialized, probably by Wilson. That is an extremely

convoluted way to interpret a text message.

Reliance on what Williams said Wilson claimed that Long said to him is an

extremely tenuous basis for disbarment. Even Williams acknowledged that not

only was there nothing about money in Long’s December 22, 2017 text message to

her, but Wilson had forwarded Long an email from Williams late on December 20,

2017 that referenced what should occur with Williams’ file. R-800, 2335.

December
A more appropriate and honest interpretation of the July 22 text from
29, 2021

Long to Williams begins with the plain meaning of the language and then

considers the verifiable context of the writing, similar to interpretation of a

contract.

Long’s December 22, 2017 text to Williams reads, in full:

Talked with [Wilson]. Thank you for understanding. He said you would
prefer the Bar NOT take over your file. I will be at a hearing and there are a
number of my clients who do NOT want the Bar to take over. Please respond
with a "yes" to confirm: may I list you among the clients who do NOT want
the Bar to take immediate possession of their files? Thanks again.
 46

R-2354.The grammatical structure of the message suggests that the entire text

message is about one thing because it begins by thanking Williams discusses what

will happen with her file, then closes by saying “thanks again,” suggesting that

both times Long thanks Williams it is about the same thing – the thing discussed in

the middle of the two expressions of gratitude.

There is only one apparent topic in the message: whether Williams “would

prefer the Bar NOT take over your file.” Id. Nothing in the plain meaning of the

words or their structure suggests any other possible meaning. It means what it says;

no more, no less.

Next, examining the context in which the message was written may help to

determine the probable meaning that the writer intended to convey. On December

22, 2017, Long was anxiously expecting the 1:30 p.m. hearing on the Bar’s petition

for custodianship of his practice.

The message was sent at 12:55 p.m., which was about 30 minutes before the

hearing.27 Long was concerned about whether Williams wanted her file directly

because he was about to argue against the Bar’s petition for custodianship and, as

27
Long learned of the petition and hearing one day earlier, on December 21, 2017,
which further undermines the possibility that Long would have given Wilson the
file two days earlier – he had no reason give Williams her file until he was notified
of the petition.
 47

stated in the message, was collecting client sentiments in his favor to report at the

hearing.28

That seems to resolve the question. There is really no basis to use the

December 22, 2017 text message to support the Bar’s case except Williams’

testimonyy.Williams also testified that she did not know Wilson’s background or

criminal history, so even if she was telling the truth, it is still likely that he was not.

The December 22, 2017 text does not support the Bar’s case. It shows the

Bar’s attorney misled this Court.

Consistency and Avoidance

The opinion asserts that Long’s communications “were not consistent with

someone who had” already paid Williams back. Op-26. There is no apparent basis

for this statement beyond conjecture. It cannot provide clear and convincing

evidence on its own.

Long’s testimony characterized Williams as a very unusual client – a point

Cournoyer agreed with during oral argument. Perhaps it was typical for her to

declare that she found a house at 1:15 a.m. or to suddenly demand money that she

28
Long’s client Verdier was at Long’s office on December 22, 2017 and took
possession of his file directly. R-965.
 48

had already picked up. No evidence suggests it was outside the range of her

unusual behavior.

The opinion also asserts that Long “repeatedly attempted to avoid”

Williams’ messages regarding money, but that cannot be supported. Op-26.

Williams avoided Long’s texts for the first six-to-eight months of representation, in

both her regular failure to answer and avoidance of mentioning money in texts,
answerand

. Williams’ explanation for

even as Long sought direction, until December 1, 2017..

her silence was not helpful. R-791 (“out of sight, out of mind on my end”).

In December 2017, Long attempted to meet with William in response to her

inquiries, but she never accepted or went to his office in response. He also offered

to provide her with an amount of money similar to what she had previously picked

up (prior to realizing Williams’ money had all been distributed), which she also

made no effort to accept. There is no basis for concluding that Long was any more

or less engaged with Williams during December 2017 than earlier.

What changed is the tone and nature of Williams’ text messages. If the

Wilson-and-Williams texts are accurate, the change was likely a direct result of

Wilson’s increasing contacts. Prior to December 1, 2017, Williams messages were

strangely inconsistent. E.g. R-2308. From that date (when Wilson texted her at

1:00 a.m.) forward, she mostly wrote demands for money, even when Long had

just attempted to set a meeting, or just offered to send money to her.

 49

Communications do not provide clear and convincing evidence that Long

violated any RPC in the Williams matter. They are, at best, ambiguous. Williams’

interpretive gloss is heavily self-interested and does not account for Wilson’s

history and probable theft.

The Court’s trust in the Bar’s attorney is again misplaced. Cournoyer’s brief

creates meaning not supported by the record. Disbarment would constitute a grave

injustice.

HIGHLIGHTS OF OTHER MATTERS

Assessing Work Performed

On page six of the opinion, at note three, the Court explains that In re

Bertoni, 363 Or 614 (2018), turned on the fact that “the Bar failed to prove that

[the respondent] had performed insufficient work on each matter before his

suspension.” That reasoning in regard to RPC 1.5(a) (excessive fees) applies here

regarding that provision where Long put on evidence because the Bar had no direct

evidence. It should also inform assessment of Long’s work in the Williams case.

Again borrowing from Cournoyer’s brief, the opinion states: “the only work

[Long] did for Williams after receiving the funds was drafting a short demand

letter.” AB-7, Op-25. However, there is almost no evidence on point, except that

which stands in opposition to the Court’s conclusion.

 50

Based on this record, that characterization of Long’s work for Williams

cannot be supported. There is testimony from Long and Glick on point, but little

else. Neither the Bar nor the Court can point to anything approaching clear and

convincing evidence to support that statement – the matter seems decided on a

wink and a nod from Cournoyer to the Court, evidence be damned.

The Bar’s attempt to claim they know what work Long performed is

disingenuous and may be misrepresentation. Despite storming his office with

police officers in 2017, the Bar did nothing to obtain Long’s electronic files (where

he stored most of his work product) or his time records until 17 or 18 months after

Long’s practice was destroyed and he had long since been forced into indigence by

the extended interim suspension, rendering him unable to store materials in an

organized manner (i.e., he had no office and barely maintained living

arrangements). R-464, 946.

Then, the Bar’s attorney denied Long’s request for an extension of time to

produce and vowed to object if Long attempted to enter such evidence. Then, at

trial, with full knowledge Long sought to produce more, the Bar’s attorney claimed

that the seized paper file constituted the entirety of Long’s work product. R-802.

There was, however, no basis for that claim and it was contradicted by testimony

from Long and Glick. Such fanciful assertions with no evidence to support them

characterize most of the Bar’s allegations regarding the work he performed as is

 51

plain from matters such as Taffessee and Mitchell where it attempted to argue that

initiating litigation sand defending against a motion to dismiss were worth nothing.

In most cases, the only direct evidence of work performed was Long’s own

testimony. In some instances, including Williams, Glick could provide some

corroboration. The client might also have meaningful input.

Williams, however, seemed to testify that she believed an $800 payment

would be adequate to evaluate and initiate litigation in three-to-four separate cases,

apparently because that was the only testimony that would be consistent with her

CSF claim. She also claimed she never saw an invoice or the email to which it was

attached, both of which she had provided to the Bar. The apparent reason for her

strange testimony: those documents notified her of Long billing against her funds

in trust, as would obviously be necessary for Long to begin working on her matter

in earnest, and therefore conflicted with her CSF claim.

Notification of Suspension

Although the basis for the Court’s conclusions that Long violated RPC

1.4(a) and (b) is not always clear from the opinion, it appears the Court found Long

as many as eight such violations for failing to notify clients of suspension. Far

clearer than the basis for such violations, however, was the Bar’s assurance they

would notify clients.

 52

Cournoyer and Chourey literally seized Long’s files, apparently in an effort

to obtain the contact information for all of his then-active clients. For several of

those clients, no evidence exists to indicate whether Long retained contact

information. Yet, the Court found clear and convincing evidence demonstrated a

violation.

In all cases so charged, Long’s defense was that Cournoyer told him not to

bother because she would be personally contact his clients, and then she did so

within two weeks. R-464, 946.

This argument is in Long’s brief, but this Court does not address it. OB-54.

Nowhere is it more clear that the Bar caused or invented the problem

charged as a violation. That is the recurrent theme of this case and the Court’s

opinion bought into it completely. Reconsideration is appropriate.

Clear and Convincing Evidence?

Long’s rights to due process and equal protection demand no less than a

review that holds the Bar’s evidence to the same rigorous standard applied in this

Court’s prior disciplinary case law, which did not occur here.

The standard requires “clear and convincing evidence” to find a violation. It

provides the “level of certainty necessary to preserve fundamental fairness in a

variety of government-initiated proceedings,” including attorney discipline. See

 53

Mutual of Enumclaw Ins. Co. v. McBride, 295 Or 398 (1983) (quoting Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982)).

The meaning of the standard is well-settled: it requires “evidence

establishing that the truth of the facts asserted is highly probable.” In re McGraw,

362 Or. 667 (2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It must be

“"free from confusion, fully intelligible, [and] distinct,” not merely a suspicion.

Riley Hill General Contractor Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 303 Or 390, 405-407 (1987).

In a formulation of particular relevance here, the Court has stated that “If

witness testimony about key facts is in conflict, then the record must establish that

it is ‘highly probable’ that the testimony that supports the allegations is true.” In re

Day, 362 Or. 547, 552 (2018). This Court has also frequently explained that

“Respondent is entitled to a presumption that he did not engage in the alleged

misconduct.” Id.

Long argued in his briefs that the TPO adopted an approach that seemed to

invert that presumption, forcing Long to prove his innocence. To some extent, the

opinion appears to do the same. Plainly, this Court must do more than simply

follow the TPO where the evidence is unclear. Such instances cry out for

independent judicial analysis.

In the Hennagin (Mitchell) matter, for example, the opinion significantly

overstates the facts in reasoning that “Hennagin . . . testified that [Long’s] fees
 54

were charged and collected without the approval of the Worker’s Compensation

Board.” Op-13. That is inaccurate. See R-819. Hennagin wagered a guess based on

his background knowledge of the relevant law, Long’s lack of response to

Hennagin’s letters, and Long’s inexperience in the area. Hennagin did not know

whether Long had approval from the Workers’ Compensation Board, and could not

know.

Long testified to significant contact with the Board in advance of the case, in

which he acknowledged that the area was novel to him and received guidance from

the Board. R-925. He did not recall if that guidance included approval of his fees,

although it seems logical that it would have.

Where the Court’s opinion finds that Long violated RPC 1.5(a) for

collecting an illegal fee on the basis of Hennigan’s hunch alone, despite Long’s

testimony, it renders the clear and convincing standard meaningless and reverses

the presumption of innocence. The Court found a violation because Long was

accused and did not prove his innocence. Accordingly, it fundamentally changes

law that has been settled for decades.

The opinion also finds violations on evidence that falls well below that

apparent in any prior disciplinary case in Charpentier, Richman, and other matters.

In Richman, the Court credits supposed images of checks not in the record based

on client testimony that she sent them to Long (which he denies) to demonstrate
 55

she paid $1,000 more than any record demonstrates ($2,500 total). Yet, the Court

ignores the stronger evidence that Long sent a detailed invoice to the client – as

stated in an email, to which the client did not object. If the invoice exists, there is

no way any of the violations could be found. The Court necessarily required Long

to prove his innocence to avoid violation, which is essentially an impossible

standard given the 60-plus violations charged, especially where many of them

Long could not even guess what the Bar might argue

In Charpentier, the opinion leaps to the conclusion that everything

Charpentier said was correct (despite her obvious self-contradiction on cross) and

credits her testimony about a notebook, which was never seen let alone in

evidence, the supposed contents of which shifted throughout testimony (especially

when Turner effectively advised her of what contents he was looking for). At the

same time, the Court necessarily discredits everything Long testified to in that

matter.

In that way, credibility findings are used to completely eviscerate the clear

and convincing evidence standard. It means nothing at all if Charpentier’s

testimony – clearly angry, clearly confused, fully contradicted, and with no

exhibits that supported her story – is deemed “clear and convincing” even for

topics that she contradicted herself on. The actual presence of Long’s notes and
 56

invoice would have decided that matter in Long’s favor for any reasonable person

who analyzes it.

The Bar is lying and the Court believed them. That is what explains the

outcome far more than the evidentiary standard or the evidence itself.

The key to this case for the Court appears to be the Williams matter. Once

the Court was deceived by the Bar to view Long as having stolen (despite the

obvious likelihood that the matter reflects a scheme by Wilson), its assessment of

Long (unjustly) dropped to “loser” status. It might be acceptable for the remaining

analysis to be lackluster if the analysis of Long’s constitutional claims were more

than nonexistent and the analysis of Williams relied on more than the Bar’s false

statements in its briefs. As it is, “clear and convincing evidence” seems to mean

whatever the Bar says, at least in cases where the TPO supports them. Thus, the

opinion in this matter appears to be the least rigorous application of the evidentiary

standard in the history of this Court’s attorney disciplinary jurisprudence. It

warrants reconsideration.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AWARENESS AND THE SANCTIONS ANALYSIS

Long requests reconsideration of the sanction on substantive reconsideration

requested above. Regardless of the Court’s decision on those points, however,

Long also requests narrower reconsideration of the language employed in the

 57

Court’s sanctions analysis. It may ultimately be in the best interests of the Court as

an institution and the state’s legal professionals, while also removing an

unwarranted and unempathetic public insult to Long personally added to the severe

injury inflicted.

As explained previously, Long suffered extreme, sometimes life-threatening

domestic violence for several years before fleeing Florida to Oregon. He also

witnessed, and intervened to prevent, abuse of his children.

By manipulating the legal system, his ex-wife was able to retain his children

in Florida. Removing them was his primary focus and goal from 2014 through

much of 2017.

Long made steady progress and regularly visited his children in 2014-2017.

Everything changed in late 2017 – not because of some supposed “financial

desperation,” Op-7, but because several people in Oregon aligned with his ex-wife,

who consistently and falsely portrayed Long as if he were the monster described in

the Bar’s 2017 petition for interim suspension.

Long’s earliest experiences with the Bar’s disciplinary attorneys involved

his efforts to heal from trauma related to violence and loss of children. As noted in

oral argument, Long initially shared his experiences with Cournoyer because the

stress likely affected his performance and he was asking for help. She became

significantly more aggressive thereafter. Long’s own perceived need for trauma
 58

therapy seemed to become a joke to the Bar’s attorneys, as is relevant to Long I on

remand. In the post-suspension hearing, Chouery ridiculed Long’s witnesses who

discussed the violence he experienced, and generally taunted Long with his inquiry

power and statutory immunity.

Bar attorneys coordinated with Long’s ex-wife and her lawyer. Irrefutable

documentary evidence demonstrates contact between his ex-wife or her Florida

lawyer and both Cournoyer and Sturgeon shortly before TMT Development and

then the Bar targeted him. 2587 (Cournoyer), Appendix to OB at A-003

(Sturgeon).

The source of these contacts (and presumably the “cause” they suddenly

adopted) was the malice of his ex-wife, and her desire to avoid trial that would

expose her violence (Long has video, for example). At the same time, Long

became highly distraught as he learned that his legal assistant and confidante,

Alderman, and his former roommate, Roach, had formed a “secrete alliance” with

his ex-wife to “discredit the fuck out of him” so that she could cut him off from his

children without trial. See e.g. R-2534-2535 (Alderman and Roach texts with

quoted language), see also R-427-428 (Roach testimony explaining purpose).

Disbarment was clearly among the goals. R-2587 (threat from ex-wife’s family,

delivered to Long’s office mate in November 2016, that they would instigate

disbarment).
 59

Long’s experience – as a target of physical domestic violence, witness to

abuse of his children before losing access to them, and target of false allegations

coordinated between Florida and Oregon warrants acknowledgment, even if

silently. See e.g. 2682-2683 (testimony of Long’s former colleague and attorney in

Florida, who witnessed violence, testifying the Bar’s allegations in Oregon

paralleled the false allegations made by ex-wife ), OSC Case No. N007129, Long’s

Exhibits at 274-286 (testimony by Florida Department of Children and Families

representative after contacting Long to assist in defeating his ex-wife’s repeated

false allegations), see also OB-31-32, R-1973-1993, 2532-2536, 2585.29

By any definition, Long’s experience during this prosecution constitutes

revictimization. Now, this Court'sJuly

July29,
29,2021
2021 opinion not only makes the injury

permanent, but disdainfully states that Long is merely “deflecting” and “sees

himself as the victim,” which supposedly “demonstrates his unfitness to practice

law.” Op-29.

With all due respect, such language stands out as a rare example of victim

blaming in a state supreme court opinion. The anger expressed in that portion of

29
One of the national leaders in field was prepared to testify as an expert for Long
in Long I, but he was prevented from entering any evidence.
 60

the opinion suggests why male victims of domestic violence often remain silent

and are frequently right to do so.30

If this Court does not broadly reconsider the case, Long requests,

secondarily, that it consider withdrawing or revising the acutely aggressive

language used in the opinion, particularly the sanctions discussion. Long’s

experience of trauma underlies this case. It serves no legitimate purpose to employ

harmful language devoid of empathy, and it risks misguiding the profession.

There is an increasingly robust literature that may prove beneficial in

recognizing future cases with characteristics rooted in the predictable attacks on

those who leave abusive relationships. See generally BILL EDDY, HIGH CONFLICT

PEOPLE IN LEGAL DISPUTES (2016) (accessible resource for lawyers); Joshua L.

Berger et al., The Mental Health of Male Victims and Their Children Affected by

Legal and Administrative Partner Aggression, 42 AGGRESS. BEHAV. 346 (2016) (

defining and discussing effects of “legal and administrative aggression”); Denise

A. Hines & Emily M. Douglas, Predicting Potentially Life-Threatening Partner

Violence by Women Toward Men: A Preliminary Analysis, 28 VIOLENCE AND

30
See e.g. Andreia Machado et al., Male Victims of Female-Perpetrated Partner
Violence: A Qualitative Analysis of Men’s Experiences, the Impact of Violence,
and Perceptions of Their Worth, 21 PSYCHOL MEN MASC 612, 613 (2020)
(“existing [DV] services may often perceive men as the primary aggressors, even
when the female partner is the only perpetrator”).
 61

VICTIMS 751, 765 (2013) (“often, men are turned away from agencies designed to

help victims”).

Perhaps this literature may prevent compounding the harms of abuse in

future cases through recognition of false allegations and the misuse of legal

procedures. That would better serve the profession and the public than excessive

trust in Bar attorneys.

CONCLUSION

“Respondent is entitled to a presumption that he did not engage in the

alleged misconduct.” In re Day, 362 Or. 547, 552 (2018). No indication of this

presumption appears in the opinion ordering Long’s disbarment, which adopted the

Bar’s argument without apparent attention to Long’s briefs.

The sole request that Long made of this Court during oral argument in the

present matter was that the Justices actually read his briefs. They are well-crafted

and may prove helpful in ways clerks could easily miss.

The briefs may also provide insight into failings of the Oregon attorney

disciplinary system that allowed this case to become a frenzied attack on Long as

Bar attorneys simultaneously gave apparent favors to Deveny and Graeff. The

difference in treatment is unconstitutional and highlights the lack of due process

afforded Long by Bar attorneys who decided to disbar him and then created this
 62

case to do so. If Long’s disbarment stands, no Oregon attorney is safe from such

targeting for destruction of a career on false pretenses.

As a matter of professional courtesy – or common humanity – Long requests

that each Justice take the time to read through his briefs before signing an order

ending his ability to practice the profession to which he has dedicated his life.

Accordingly, he requests reconsideration.

Dated: August 26, 2021

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ E. Andrew Long

E. Andrew Long
 63

Note regarding ORAP 7.05(1)(d): The Bar has previously expressed its opposition
to this motion and can be anticipated to object by filing a response based on its
previous response to the initial motion to reconsider.
 64

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I served the foregoing on:

Oregon State Bar

Susan Cournoyer
Assistant Disciplinary Counsel
16037 SW Upper Boones Ferry Rd.
Tigard, OR 97281

via the Court’s e-filing system if available, or by first class mail.

Dated this 26th day of August, 2021.

/s/ E. Andrew Long

E. Andrew Long
Respondent