ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S.

Marata

G.R. No. 143275 March 20, 2003

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
ARLENE DE LEON and BERNARDO DE LEON, respondents

FACTS:

Petitioners-appellees Arlene de Leon and Bernardo de Leon are the registered owners of a
parcel of land situated at San Agustin, Concepcion, Tarlac with a total area of 50.1171 hectares.
The property was voluntarily offered for sale to the government at P50,000.00 per hectare.
However, the DAR only made a counter-offer of P17,656.20 per hectare/total of P884,877.54
and later, P1,565,369.35.

In view of the petitioners-appellees' failure to respond to the new offer made by DAR, the
DARAB took cognizance of the case. Subsequently, the DARAB issued an Order directing
respondent-appellant LBP to recompute the value of the subject property. An aggregate amount
of P2,491,731.65 was arrived at but this was again rejected by the petitioners-appellees.

In a petition, petitioners asked the Regional Trial Court, Br. 63, Tarlac (the designated special
agrarian court in the area) to fix the just compensation of the property. The court rendered a
summary judgment, fixing the compensation of the subject property at P1,260,000.00 for the
16.69 hectares of rice land and P2,957,250.00 for the 30.4160 hectares of sugar land.
Respondent-appellant moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the court.

DAR filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. Petitioner LBP also filed a notice of
appeal of the said decision. The Third Division of the Appellate Court gave due course to the
petition for review. The Fourth Division of the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, dismissed
petitioner LBP's ordinary appeal for lack of merit reasoning that the mode of appeal followed by
petitioner LBP was erroneous. Considering the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law mandates
that Appeals from Special Agrarian Courts should be by petition for review. LBP filed a Motion
for Reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Land Bank of the Philippines had chosen the wrong mode of appeal.

RULING:

Decisions of the Regional Trial Court sitting as Special Agrarian Court (SAC) in eminent domain
cases may be appealed to the Court of Appeals by means of a petition for review, rather than
ordinary appeal, because of the need for absolute dispatch in the determination of just
compensation. Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a
notice of appeal or completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. On the
other hand, a petition for review hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners
for the government-acquired property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal.
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

The case at bar requires an interpretation of Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657. The said
provisions provide that:

Section 60. Appeals, - An appeal may be taken from the decision of the Special Agrarian Courts
by filing a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of
notice of the decision; otherwise, the decision shall become final.

Section 61.- Procedure in Review. Review by the Court of appeals or the Supreme Court, as the
case may be, shall be governed by the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals, however, may
require the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from
notice, after which the case is deemed submitted for decision.

Respondent spouses point to Section 60 of RA 6657 to support their view that the mode of
appeal initiated by petitioner LBP was erroneous. On the other hand, petitioner LBP believes
that the mode of appeal it used is permissible under Section 61 of the same law.

What indeed is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of the Regional Trial Courts, sitting as
Special Agrarian Courts, in the determination of just compensation an appeal by way of a
petition for review or an ordinary appeal?

Section 2 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure provides for three modes of
appeal, to wit:

Sec. 2. Modes of Appeal.

(a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and
other cases or multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such
cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.

(b) Petition for Review. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional
Trial Court in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review in
accordance with Rule 42.

(c) Appeal by Certiorari. In all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule
45.

Petitioner LBP, in its bid to maintain the legitimacy of its appeal, contends that the proper mode
of appeal from a decision of the Special Agrarian Court is by way of a notice of appeal due to
the reference by Section 61 of RA 6657 to the Rules of Court as the governing procedure for
appeals to the Court of Appeals. This being the case, the petitioner claims that the procedure for
ordinary appealed cases provided for in Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure must be followed, that is, a notice of appeal is required in order to perfect the
appeal. According to the petitioner, this is the proper mode of appeal in the case at bar
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

considering that the appealed decision is that of the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction. Moreover, Section 1 of Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure[11] (pertaining to appeals by way of petitions for review to the Court of Appeals of
decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and the Court of Tax Appeals), does not include decisions
of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts.

We deny the petition.

A petition for review, not an ordinary appeal, is the proper procedure in effecting an appeal from
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts acting as Special Agrarian Courts in cases involving the
determination of just compensation to the landowners concerned. Section 60 of RA 6657 clearly
and categorically states that the said mode of appeal should be adopted. There is no room for a
contrary interpretation. Where the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for construction,
but only application.

According to the petitioner, Section 61 of RA 6657 should be followed, not Section 60. The
reference by Section 61 to the Rules of Court implies that an ordinary appeal requiring a notice
of appeal is the proper manner of appealing decisions of Special Agrarian Courts on just
compensation because Section 2(a) of Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
provides that decisions of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction
follow the procedure governing ordinary appeals.

We do not agree.

First, there is no conflict between Section 60 and 61 of RA 6657 inasmuch as the Rules of Court
do not at all prescribe the procedure for ordinary appeals as the proper mode of appeal for
decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Section 61 in fact makes no more than a general
reference to the Rules of Court and does not even mention the procedure for ordinary appeals
in Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure as the appropriate method of
elevating to the Court of Appeals decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases.

Second, the failure to mention Special Agrarian Courts in Section 1 of Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be construed to mean that a petition for review is not
permissible for decisions of the said special courts. In fact, the said Rule is not relevant to
determine whether a petition for review is the proper mode of appeal from decisions of Regional
Trial Courts in agrarian cases, that is, when they act as Special Agrarian Courts. Section 1 of
Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure merely mentions the Court of Tax
Appeals and the other different quasi-judicial agencies without exclusivity in its phraseology.
Such omission cannot be construed to justify the contention that a petition for review is
prohibited for decisions on special agrarian cases inasmuch as the category is for quasi-judicial
agencies and tax courts to which the Regional Trial Courts do not properly belong. Although
Supreme Court Circular No. 1-91 (precursor to Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure)
included the decisions of Special Agrarian Courts in the enumeration requiring petition for
review, its non-inclusion later on in Rule 43 merely signifies that it was inappropriately classified
as a quasi-judicial agency.
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

What is indisputable is that Section 60 expressly regards a petition for review as the proper way
of appealing decisions of agrarian courts. So far, there is no rule prescribed by this Court
expressly disallowing the said procedure.

Third, far from being in conflict, Section 61 of RA 6657 can easily be harmonized with Section
60. The reference to the Rules of Court means that the specific rules for petitions for review in
the Rules of Court and other relevant procedures in appeals filed before the Court of Appeals
shall be followed in appealed decisions of Special Agrarian Courts. Considering that RA 6657
cannot and does not provide the details on how the petition for review shall be conducted, a
suppletory application of the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court is necessary. In fact,
Section 61 uses the word review to designate the mode by which the appeal is to be effected.
The reference therefore by Section 61 to the Rules of Court only means that the procedure
under Rule 42 for petitions for review is to be followed for appeals in agrarian cases.

According to the petitioner, an ordinary appeal prescribed under the Rules of Court should
prevail over a petition for review provided under Section 60 of RA 6657 inasmuch as a contrary
interpretation would violate the constitutional provision granting to the Supreme Court the power
to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleadings, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
Integrated Bar, and Legal Assistance to the underprivileged. (italics supplied)

As earlier mentioned, there is nothing in the Rules of Court that categorically prohibits the
adoption of the procedure for petitions for review of decisions of Special Agrarian Courts.
Section 60 of RA 6657 and the provisions of the Rules of Court can be harmonized and can co-
exist.

Moreover, the same Section 5 (5), Article VIII, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution quoted by the
petitioner states that rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. Section 60 is obviously a special
procedure. Contrary to the petitioners contention, it cannot be otherwise merely because it was
formulated by the legislature and not by any special body. As long as the said section provides
for a particular process for the governance of the special court concerned, the provision is
accurately classified as a special procedure. Subject to constitutional limitations, the statutory
enactment of a special procedure cannot be said to encroach on the power of this Court to
formulate rules of procedure for the reason that we have not yet provided for a particular
process specifically governing agrarian courts. In fact, this Court exercises its constitutional
power to promulgate special rules of procedure by adopting Sections 60 and 61 of RA 6657
declaring a petition for review as the proper mode of appeal to the Court of Appeals.

The reason why it is permissible to adopt a petition for review when appealing cases decided by
the Special Agrarian Courts in eminent domain cases is the need for absolute dispatch in the
determination of just compensation. Just compensation means not only paying the correct
amount but also paying for the land within a reasonable time from its acquisition. Without
prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered just for the property owner is made to
suffer the consequences of being immediately deprived of his land while being made to wait for
a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with his loss. Such
objective is more in keeping with the nature of a petition for review.
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

Unlike an ordinary appeal, a petition for review dispenses with the filing of a notice of appeal or
completion of records as requisites before any pleading is submitted. A petition for review
hastens the award of fair recompense to deprived landowners for the government-acquired
property, an end not foreseeable in an ordinary appeal. This is exemplified by the case at bar in
which the petition for review before the Special Third (3rd) Division (CA-G.R. SP No. 47005)
was disposed of way ahead of the ordinary appeal filed before the Fourth (4th) Division (CA-
G.R. CV No. 60365) in the Court of Appeals.

Inasmuch as the notice of appeal filed by petitioner LBP did not stop the running of the
reglementary period to file a petition for review, the time to appeal the decision of the Special
Agrarian Court has lapsed, rendering the said decision final and executory.
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

G.R. No. 183409 June 18, 2010

CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, Respondent.

SUMMARY:

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued administrative orders and a memorandum regarding
the procedures governing land conversion from agricultural to nonagricultural. Petitioner
assailed its constitutionality, stating that the Secretary committed grave abuse of discretion in
including lands already reclassified by LGUs and the President under the coverage of the said
orders whereby such lands must now undergo the conversion process over which the DAR has
jurisdiction. According to petitioner, this violates the autonomy granted to the LGUs. The SC did
not agree with petitioner as the power of LGUs to reclassify lands is not absolute and that the
LGU recognized this by providing that the rules on reclassification will not modify RA 6657
(CARP). Moreover, since the Secretary has been vested with the power to implement the
CARP, he has the power to promulgate rules pursuant thereto, such as in the case at bar.

FACTS:

Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella organization of some 3,500 private
corporations, partnerships, single proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly involved in
land and housing development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production
and supply, and services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, community
planning and development financing.

The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued the following:

DAR AO No. 07-97 (Oct 29, 1997) entitled Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses consolidated all existing
implementing guidelines related to land use conversion.

 Embraced all private agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and

commodity produced, and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands
reclassified by Local Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15
June 1988.

DAR AO No. 01-99 (March 30, 1999) entitled Revised Rules and Regulations on the
Conversion of Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses amended the previous rules on land
use conversion. Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands, to wit:

1) Those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional and other

non-agricultural purposes.
2) Those to be devoted to another type of agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry,
and fishpond ─ the effect of which is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive
Agrarian
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

Reform Program (CARP) coverage.

3) Those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that previously authorized.
4) Those reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses
on or after the effectivity of RA No. 66575 on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 206 of
RA No. 7160 and other pertinent laws and regulations and are to be converted to such
uses.

DAR AO No. 01-02 (Feb 28, 2002) entitled 2002 Comprehensive Rules on Land Use
Conversion which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO No. 01-99, and repealed
all issuances inconsistent therewith.

 Covered all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses

or to another agricultural use.

DAR AO No. 05-07 (Aug 2, 2007) amended certain provisions of DAR AO No. 01 particularly
addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities. Memorandum No. 88 (April 15,
2008) addressed the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate
development.

 Temporarily suspended the processing and approval of all land use conversion
applications.

By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing projects, which,
in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and illegal squatting problems to the
substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner and its members but more so of the whole nation.
This is the contested provision:

Section 3. Applicability of Rules. – These guidelines shall apply to all applications for conversion, from
agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use, such as:
xxxx

3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGU or by way of a
Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the
effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988, x x x.

ISSUE + HELD:

Whether or not the Sectary of Agrarian Reform exceeded his authority in issuing the said orders
and memorandum – NO

ARGUMENTS + RATIO

Argument #1: Lands reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other
nonagricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for purposes of
conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. The Secretary had no authority expand or enlarge the
legal signification of the term agricultural lands (in RA 6657) through DAR AO No. 01-02.
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

Argument #2: There is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 or in any other provision
of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or authority to require that non-awarded lands or
reclassified lands be submitted to its conversion authority.

SC: Executive Order No. 129-A37 vested upon the DAR the responsibility of implementing the
CARP.

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have been included in the
definition of agricultural lands. In so doing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform merely acted
within the scope of his authority stated in the aforesaid sections of Executive Order No.
129-A, which is to promulgate rules and regulations for agrarian reform implementation
and that includes the authority to define agricultural lands for purposes of land use
conversion. Further, the definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
merely refers to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion
to non-agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the
context of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.

More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990 clarified that after the effectivity
of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the authority to approve
land conversion. Concomitant to such authority, therefore, is the authority to include in the
definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or
other nonagricultural uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use conversion.

After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go
through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. However,
agricultural lands, which are already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657
which is 15 June 1988, are exempted from conversion.

Argument #3: DAR AO No. 01-02 (making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the
requirements and procedure for land use conversion), violates Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7160, because it was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be subject to
conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DAR’s approval or clearance must be
secured to effect reclassification. It also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local
autonomy under the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

SC: It is true that the DAR’s express power over land use conversion provided for under Section
65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded
have, after five years, ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes,
or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for
residential, commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that these are the only
instances that the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in Republic
Act No. 6657 which every landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian reform
program. It should logically follow, therefore, from the said department’s express duty
and function to execute and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private
land as a residential, commercial or industrial property, on or after the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 should first be cleared by the DAR.
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

Reclassification of lands does not suffice. Conversion and reclassification differ from each other.
Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other
use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how agricultural lands
shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, and commercial, as
embodied in the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedures for land use
conversion. In view thereof, a mere reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically
allow a landowner to change its use. He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is
permitted to use the agricultural land for other purposes.

Agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or other non-

agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before they can be used
for the purpose to which they are intended.

It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential, commercial,

industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the LGUs or by way of Presidential
Proclamations because either way they must still undergo conversion process.

It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public agricultural lands have
been reserved in whole or in part for public use or purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in
such a case, conversion is no longer necessary. Only a positive act of the President is needed
to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public purpose. As such,
reservation of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose in effect converted the same to
such use without undergoing any conversion process and that they must be actually, directly
and exclusively used for such public purpose for which they have been reserved, otherwise,
they will be segregated from the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to
qualified beneficiaries under the CARP. More so, public agricultural lands already reserved for
public use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain suitable for agriculture.

The power of the LGUs to reclassify agricultural lands is not absolute. The authority of
the DAR to approve conversion of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to
non-agricultural uses has been validly recognized by said Section 20 of Republic Act No.
7160 by explicitly providing therein that, "nothing in this section shall be construed as
repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657."

Argument #4: The promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
constitute deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law. Lands that are not
within DAR’s jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from
legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is discrimination
and violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution because the aforesaid
administrative order is patently
biased in favor of the peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society.

SC: In providing administrative and criminal penalties in the said administrative order, the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform simply implements the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of
Republic Act No. 6657 (CARP).
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

The administrative and criminal penalties provided for under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended,
are imposed upon the illegal or premature conversion of lands within DAR’s jurisdiction, i.e.,
"lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for other nonagricultural uses
before 15 June 1998."

Argument #5: DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not a valid exercise of police power for it is the
prerogative of the legislature and that it is unconstitutional because it suspended the land use
conversion without any basis.

SC: Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction of the President in order to address
the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate development because of the
worsening rice shortage in the country at that time. Such measure was made in order to ensure
that there are enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may be carried
into. The issuance of said Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general welfare of
the
public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis.
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

G.R. No. 112526 October 12, 2001

STA. ROSA REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioner Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation (hereafter, SRRDC) was the registered
owner of two parcels of land, situated at Barangay Casile, Cabuyao, Laguna, with a total area of
254.6 hectares. According to petitioner, the parcels of land are watersheds, which provide
clean potable water to the Canlubang community, and that ninety (90) light industries are now
located in the area.

The Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a notice of
coverage to petitioner and invited its officials or representatives to a conference. During the
meeting, the following were present: representatives of petitioner, the Land Bank of the
Philippines, PARCCOM, PARO of Laguna, MARO of Laguna, the BARC Chairman of Barangay
Casile and some potential farmer beneficiaries, who are residents of Barangay Casile,
Cabuyao, Laguna. It was the consensus and recommendation of the assembly that the
landholding of SRRDC be placed under compulsory acquisition. Petitioner filed a protest before
MARO on the ground that the area was not appropriate for agricultural purposes.

The area was rugged in terrain with slopes of 18% and above and that the occupants of the land
were squatters, who were not entitled to any land as beneficiaries. farmer beneficiaries together
with the BARC Chairman answered the protest and objection stating that the slope of the land is
not 18% but only 5-10% and that the land is suitable and economically viable for agricultural
purposes, as evidenced by the Certification of the Department of Agriculture, municipality of
Cabuyao, Laguna. Secretary of Agrarian Reform Miriam Defensor Santiago sent two (2) notices
of acquisition to petitioner, stating that petitioner’s landholdings covered by TCT Nos. 81949 and
84891, containing an area of 188.2858 and 58.5800 hectares, valued at P4,417,735.65 and
P1,220,229.93, respectively, had been placed under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program. Petitioner SRRDC in two letters separately addressed to Secretary Florencio B. Abad
and the Director, Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, sent its formal protest, protesting
not only the amount of compensation offered by DAR for the property but also the two (2)
notices of acquisition.

Secretary Abad referred the case to the DARAB for summary proceedings to determine
just compensation under R. A. No. 6657, Section 16. DARAB promulgated a decision (1) The
dismissal for lack of merit of the protest against the compulsory coverage of the landholdings of
Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation in Barangay Casile, Municipality of Cabuyao,
Province of Laguna under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform; (2) The Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP) to pay Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation the amount of
P7,841,997.64) for its landholdings covered by the 2 Transfer Certificates of Title. Should there
be a rejection of the payment tendered, to open, if none has yet been made, a trust account for
said amount in the name of Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation; (3) The Register of
Deeds of the Province of Laguna to cancel with dispatch Transfer certificate of Title Nos.
84891 and 81949 and new one be issued in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, free
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

from liens and encumbrances; and (4) Program is hereby affirmed the Regional Office of
the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and Provincial Agrarian Reform
Office to take immediate possession on the said landholding after Title shall have been
transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and distribute the same to the
immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-beneficiaries as determined by the
Municipal Agrarian Reform Office of Cabuyao, Laguna.

Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review of the DARAB decision
and the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision affirming the decision of DARAB. The case
before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming the decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(hereafter DARAB) ordering the compulsory acquisition of petitioner's property under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).

The Court issued a Resolution which reads: The Court therefore, resolved to restrain: (a)
the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board from enforcing its decision dated
December 19, 1991 in DARAB Case No. JC-R-IV-LAG-0001, which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals in a Decision dated November 5, 1993, and which ordered, among others,
the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Municipal and
Provincial Reform Office to take immediate possession of the landholding in dispute after title
shall have been transferred to the name of the Republic of the Philippines and to
distribute the same through the immediate issuance of Emancipation Patents to the farmer-
beneficiaries as determined by the Municipal Agrarian Officer of Cabuyao, Laguna, (b) The
Department of Agrarian Reform and/or the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board, and all persons acting for and in their behalf and under their authority from entering
the properties involved in this case and from introducing permanent infrastructures
thereon; and (c) the private respondents from further clearing the said properties of their
green cover by the cutting or burning of trees and other vegetation, effective today until further
orders from this Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the property in question is covered by CARP despite the fact that the entire
property formed part of a watershed area prior to the enactment of RA No. 6657.

RULING:

Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (P. D. No. 1067) provides: "Art. 67. Any
watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any ground water
may be declared by the Department of Natural resources as a protected area. Rules
and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control such
activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may
damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with
the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters."

Watersheds may be defined as "an area drained by a river and its tributaries and
enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from adjacent watersheds."
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

Watersheds generally are outside the commerce of man, but the compelling question is
why was the Casile property titled in the name of SRRDC? The answer is simple. At the time
of the titling, the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources had not declared the
property as watershed area. The parcels of land in Barangay Casile were declared as "PARK"
by a zoning and Land Use Regulatory Board.

On January 5, 1994, the Sangguniang Bayan of Cabuyao, Laguna issued a Resolution voiding
the zoning classification of the land at Barangay Casile as Park and declaring that the land
is now classified as agricultural land. However, more than the classification of the subject
land as PARK is the fact that subsequent studies and survey showed that the parcels of
land in question form a vital part of a watershed area. However, the scenario has changed, after
an in-depth study, survey and reassessment. We cannot ignore the fact that the disputed
parcels of land form a vital part of an area that need to be protected for watershed
purposes. In a report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a
research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and
Kabanga-an river watersheds, they concluded that: The Casile and Kabanga-an
watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to thousands of
inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it. From these watersheds come the natural
God-given precious resource – water. x x x x x Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally
inconsistent with sound watershed management.

More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building and erection of
permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the Casile farmers
are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds would cease to be
of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of thousands of people
dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable comprehensive watershed
development policy and program be immediately formulated and implemented before the
irreversible damage finally happens. Hence, the following are recommended:

 The Casile farmers should be relocated and given financial assistance.

 Declaration of the two watersheds as critical and in need of immediate
rehabilitation.
 A comprehensive and detailed watershed management plan and program
be formulated and implemented by the Canlubang Estate in coordination
with pertinent government agencies."

Another factor that needs to be mentioned is the fact that during the DARAB hearing,
petitioner presented proof that the Casile property has slopes of 18% and over, which exempted
the land from the coverage of CARL. Hence, during the hearing at DARAB, there was proof
showing that the disputed parcels of land may be excluded from the compulsory acquisition
coverage of CARP because of its very high slopes

In the case at bar, DAR has executed the taking of the property in question. However, payment
of just compensation was not in accordance with the procedural requirement. The law required
payment in cash or LBP bonds, not by trust account as was done by DAR.
ARNOLD N. AMBOANG, JR. • JD2B • Agrarian Law I Case Digest • Atty. Marcelino S. Marata

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals. In lieu
thereof, the Court REMANDS the case to the DARAB for re-evaluation and determination
of the nature of the parcels of land involved to resolve the issue of its coverage by the
Comprehensive Land Reform Program. In the meantime, the effects of the CLOAs issued
by the DAR to supposed farmer beneficiaries shall continue to be stayed by the
temporary restraining order issued on December 15, 1993, which shall remain in effect until
final decision on the case.

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