MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES

NAME OF STUDENT: NEWMAN CHIUMYA

REG NUMBER: R213919Y

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT FOR DEVELOPMENT PRACTITIONERS (MADS 739)

ASSIGNMENT QUESTION: MUGABE’S ARGUMENTS WITH THE WEST WILL

ONLY BE UNDERSTOOD WITH TIME. DO YOU AGREE?

1
INTRODUCTION

Robert Gabriel Mugabe was a figure who, like a few others, polarized worldwide public opinion
(Moore, 2015). To some, he was a despicable tyrant who deserved to be imprisoned for crimes
against humanity. He was an undeniable success on his terms. First, he brought Zimbabwe
independence after decades of white minority rule. He subsequently ruled for 37 years, outlasting
his biggest adversaries and competitors, including Tony Blair, George W Bush, Joshua Nkomo,
Morgan Tsvangirai, and Nelson Mandela. And he undermined Zimbabwe's white community's
economic clout, which was predicated on their control of the country's most fertile land. His
compatriots, except for a small, well-connected elite, paid the price, with the collapse of what
was once one of Africa's most diverse economies.

Below are the arguments by Robert Mugabe concerning the West.

Robert Mugabe argued that the West owes Zimbabwe a future

In 2017, Robert Mugabe said that Zimbabwe was still suffering from the burden of repaying
loans incurred by a pre-independence white supremacist administration (Spreen, 2019). In 2011,
the Jubilee Debt Campaign studied Zimbabwe's debt history. That debt, now estimated to reach
close to $10 billion in 2017, was and continues to be unpayable by a country in economic
decline. However, it also demonstrates the role that Western governments, international
institutions, and multinational companies played in Zimbabwe's devastation. Zimbabwe's debt
stems from loans used to boost the military force of the white supremacist government of
Rhodesia (Southern Rhodesia was Zimbabwe's colonial name at the time) in violation of UN
sanctions. These loans (worth $700 million at the time) were passed on to Mugabe, who
inherited a country with "middle income" economic status but significant levels of poverty and
inequality.

The new Zimbabwe incurred further debts solely to avoid destabilization from apartheid South
Africa, which was nevertheless supported by states such as the United Kingdom far into the
1980s (Asuelime and Simura, 2013). My organization asked for the discharge of these "apartheid
debts" as early as 1998. However, they are still being recycled, with little recognition of the
devastation caused by that tragic chapter in Southern Africa's history. The long-term conflicts
created by these practices would have been difficult to manage even by a well-meaning

2
administration, let alone Mugabe's cruel rule. The outcomes had an impact on every aspect of
society. Land redistribution, which was desperately required, was curtailed, and the country grew
reliant on food imports. The once-thriving textile industry went bankrupt. Unemployment has
risen to nearly 50%.

Zimbabwe was also handed a series of loans by European countries frequently referred to as
"assistance" that benefited large businesses while the bill was essentially picked up by
Zimbabwe's poor (Heinicke, 2021). For many years, British "assistance" was contingent on
purchasing British-made items. Between 1989 and 1997, the British government-funded the sale
of Hawk fighter planes, which Mugabe used to interfere in Congo, as well as 1,000 police land
rovers, which were used to quell opposition. Britain supported other nations in backing the
terrible Hwange coal power facility, which was excellent for foreign firms but produced so little
power that the interest on the loans was not even paid.

Taking these realities into account, Robert Mugabe's argument with the West will only become
clear with time, because Zimbabwe is still burdened by this debt and the policies pushed by the
West.

Robert Mugabe’s refusal to the provision of the Constitution relating to the land for both
Britain and the United States

Zimbabwe's current crisis, like other crises, has historical origins. Zimbabwe's historical origins
may be traced back to the European invasion of the nation and the following brutal confiscation
of the indigenous population's land (Munzara, 2015). The white supremacist dictatorship of
Rhodesia was permitted to continue in power until 1980, thanks to Western countries' support.
The area was battled over in Rhodesia's liberation war against white-settler authority. 6,000
white commercial farmers held 15.5 million hectares of the best land in the country when the
country gained independence in 1980, while 700,000 black communal land farmers toiled on
16.4 million hectares of the poorest soil.

The Lancaster House Constitution, established by the British, stated that whites, who made up
around 1% of the population, would keep 20 seats out of 100 in parliament and vote on a
separate voting register for seven years after independence (Moyo and Yeros, 2015).
Furthermore, for the next 10 years, whites could not be discharged from civil service jobs. The

3
most contentious clause was the preservation of private property. In addition to upholding the
principle of private property, the Constitution stipulated that the government could only acquire
land on a willing-seller, willing-buyer basis. Only underutilized land could be acquired by force.
The government was compelled to pay the land's market value in foreign currency. Such
payments were to be paid as soon as possible.

Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo, head of the Patriotic Front Zimbabwe African People's Union (PF
ZAPU), refused to sign the land clause of the Constitution unless Britain and the United States
pledged that money would be made available for the purchase of white commercial farms for
land resettlement (Stoneman, 2018). The bulk of Africans could not imagine paying for the land
they had been brutally evicted from under white colonial control. Although it is claimed that the
British and Americans did not commit to a particular amount, Sam Moyo, a prominent specialist
on the land issue in Zimbabwe, claims that the British promised 75 million pounds and the
Americans committed US$200 million for land reform informally. In the case of the United
States, the $200 million was a far cry from the billion pledged by Henry Kissinger in the early
1970s "to provide for Governmental purchase and redistribution of large white-owned holdings
of fertile farmland, an essential component of national reconstruction in a country where whites,
4 percent of the population, occupied the majority of commercially viable land." The
international community's willingness to contribute significant resources for land reform in
Zimbabwe remains a difficult subject.

Finally, the US government never delivered on the money promised for land reform/distribution.
Instead, funds were mostly allocated to community areas for agricultural inputs (tractors, food
security). The US administration stated that if these regions were developed, no land transfer
would be required. According to Moyo, the British administration "cornered land reform as if it
were 'theirs' in the post-independence period." The informal commitment of 75 million pounds,
however, did not materialize.

In summation, Robert Mugabe’s refusal to give land to the US and Britain was beneficial to
Zimbabwe because the two countries intended to invest in the Zimbabwean land and then
repatriate proceeds to their countries without any economic development in Zimbabwe.
Therefore, Robert Mugabe made a long-term decision that help and will help Zimbabwe in the
future.

4
Robert Mugabe argued that land ownership by the West restores land which was
misappropriated from indigenous people without compensation

The indigenization of the Zimbabwean economy is viewed as a component of the Third

Chimurenga (Magure, 2013). The land reform program and the Indigenization and Economic
Empowerment Act of 2008 (IEE Act) comprises the policy (Chowa, 2013). President Robert
Mugabe maintains that the program just returns to the rightful owners' property that was
wrongfully taken from indigenous people without compensation (Mazingi and Kamidza, 2009).
Similarly, others say that Zimbabwe's mineral riches belong to local people rather than foreign-
owned enterprises, which leave Zimbabweans with ghost towns when the minerals run out. As a
result, the IEE Act is intended to protect mining communities while also providing Zimbabweans
with the most value for their natural resources (Munzara, 2015).

The indigenization program introduced by Robert Mugabe’s government was a source of income
to Zimbabwe through job creation and the establishment of income through taxation
(Shangahaidonhi and Gundani, 2014). The 51/49 rule made the country have access to funds that
were used for economic development in Zimbabwe. In the short term, the indigenization policy
seemed to be a disadvantage to the Zimbabwean economy because it crowded out investors who
ran away from taxes. Furthermore, in the long run, Zimbabwe was going to benefit from the
policy through reduction of the gap between the rich and the poor because the level of income to
the Zimbabwean citizens was improved.

CONCLUSION

The Zimbabwe issue has highlighted basic questions about the West's capacity to influence the
policies of authoritarian governments throughout the world without resorting to military action.
This is primarily due to the West's history of poor policies, which has resulted in a lack of
legitimacy to have a moderating impact on such governments. While it is undeniable that the
Mugabe regime is despotic and should be stopped from terrorizing its people, it is unrealistic for
the West to believe that after supporting a despotic regime for two decades, it will have any
semblance of credibility to have a moderating influence at a time when the regime is on the
verge of being deposed.

5
As a result of flawed Western policies for more than two decades, the Mugabe regime has been
extremely successful in exploiting the contradictions of such policies, most notably the
perception that the West only cares about Zimbabwe because of the presence of a significant
number of whites, to divide not only African states but also the West and international
organizations. As a result, international economic sanctions and suspension from the
Commonwealth have had little effect on Mugabe's administration. In the end, regime change will
have to occur within the country. The misery of the Zimbabwean people will do more to destroy
the dictatorship than foreign economic sanctions or megaphone diplomacy aimed at the regime's
worldwide isolation. With no diplomatic channels open to them, many Western countries are
powerless to influence the shifting dynamics in Zimbabwe.

6
REFERENCE LIST

1. Asuelime, L. and Simura, B., 2013. Robert Mugabe against all odds: a historical
discourse of a successful life president?. African Renaissance, 10(2), pp.51-65.
2. Heinicke, J., 2021. Creating Counter-Public Sphere (s): Performance in Zimbabwe
Between the Influence of Mugabe and Western NGOs. In Theatre from Rhodesia to
Zimbabwe (pp. 131-147). Palgrave Macmillan, Cham.
3. Magure, B., 2013. Foreign investment, black economic empowerment and militarised
patronage politics in Zimbabwe. In 'Progress' in Zimbabwe? (pp. 75-90). Routledge.
4. Moore, D.B., 2015. Robert Mugabe: An intellectual manqué and his moments of
meaning. In Mugabeism? (pp. 29-44). Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
5. Moyo, S. and Yeros, P., 2015. Land Occupations and Land Reform in Zimbabwe:
Toward the National Democratic Revolution (pp. 229-262). Routledge.
6. Munzara, A.T., 2015. The Consequences of Implementing the Indigenisation and
Economic Empowerment Policy Framework on the Banking Sector in
Zimbabwe. Journal of Business and Management, 17(11), pp.55-57.
7. Shangahaidonhi, T. and Gundani, B., 2014. The feasibility of value addition in the
mining sector in the wake of the indigenization policy in Zimbabwe. Journal of
Emerging Trends in Economics and Management Sciences, 5(2), pp.128-137.
8. Spreen, D., 2019. Dear Comrade Mugabe: Decolonization and Radical Protest in
Divided Germany, 1960–1980 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Michigan).
9. Stoneman, C., 2018. Zimbabwe land policy and the land reform programme. In Land
reform in Zimbabwe: Constraints and prospects (pp. 47-57). Routledge.

7
8