Sps. Huang v.

LBP
G.R. No. 218867, February 17, 2016

Petitioner Sps. Huan are the registered owners of parcels of land in Bataan. The property was
acquired by the DAR through the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. DAR offered the sum
of P109,429.98 as just compensation for the 1.5073-ha. portion of the subject property. Rejecting
the valuation, petitioners instead filed the present petition for determination of just
compensation. In defense, respondent claimed that its valuation was based on DAR
Administrative Order (AO) No. 11, series of 1994, as amended by DAR AO No. 5, series of
1998. It also contended that petitioners' appraisal was biased. The RTC, sitting as a special
agrarian court, rejected the valuation given by respondent and set the just compensation at 250
pesos per square meter or P3,768,250.00 in total. Respondent's motion for reconsideration was
denied on 14 June 2002.

Sometime in September 2006, petitioners filed a motion for execution, alleging that while they
received a copy of respondent's Notice of Appeal dated June 19, 2002, upon verification, no such
appeal was actually filed before the RTC. Respondent denied petitioners' claim and asserted that
it filed a Notice of Appeal in accordance with the rules and has, therefore, perfected its appeal.
As such, the RTC's January 17, 2002 Decision was not yet final and executory. The RTC gave
due course to the appeal and directed the entire records to be transmitted to the CA, after finding
that respondent had perfected its appeal and based on equitable considerations and the highest
interest of justice.

On April 26, 2013, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of respondent for failure to
prosecute, arguing that from the time the RTC gave due course to its appeal in 2008, respondent
had not made any further action on its appeal, particularly with regard to the payment of the
prescribed appeal fees. In its defense, respondent argued that the RTC no longer had jurisdiction
to entertain petitioners' motion after its Notice of Appeal had been given due course. It
maintained that petitioners' motion should have been filed not before the RTC, but before the
CA.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to decide on the motion to dismiss

Held: Yes.

Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. - Within the period for taking an appeal,
the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed
from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of
said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record
on appeal.
[T]he procedural requirement under Section 4 of Rule 41 is not merely directory, as the payment
of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and
jurisdictional. The requirement of paving the full amount of the appellate docket fees within the
prescribed period is not a mere technicality of law or procedure. The payment of docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. Without such payment,
the appeal is not perfected. The appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action and the Decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and executory.

In relation thereto, Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court states: Section 9. Perfection of
appeal; effect thereof. - A party's appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon
the filing of the notice of appeal in due time.

A party's appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject
matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time.

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of
appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties.

In the present case, respondent failed to perfect its appeal before the RTC by not paying the full
amount of the prescribed appellate docket fees. Consequently, the RTC did not lose jurisdiction
over the case and, as a matter of discretion, properly dismissed the appeal for failure to
prosecute.
PBCOM v. CA
G.R. No. 218901, February 15, 2017

PBCOM filed a case for collection of sums of money in the amount of P8,971,118.06 against
private respondents before the RTC of Makati. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of
the complaint, contending that the RTC had no jurisdiction for failure of PBCOM to pay the
correct docket fees.

The RTC, on September 29, 2010, ordered PBCOM to pay additional docket fees in the amount
of P24,765.70, within fifteen days from receipt of the order. On 21 October 2010, PBCOM was
able to pay the additional fees but it was only able to file its Compliance on 11 November 2010.

On November 4, RTC issued its order dismissing PBCOM's complaint for failure to comply with
its September 29 order. PCOM filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. PBCOM
then filed a notice of appeal. However, the same was denied by the RTC on the ground that an
appeal was not the proper remedy.

Without filing a motion for reconsideration, PBCOM filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus
with the Court of Appeals. The CA denied the petition, ruling that part from availing itself of a
wrong mode of appeal, PBCOM failed to comply with the mandatory requirement of a motion
for reconsideration. The CA emphasized that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a
condition sine qua non for a petition for certiorari to prosper.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for certiorari was the correct remedy in questioning that
disallowance of the notice of appeal

Held: Yes.

While it is a settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie unless a
motion for reconsideration is filed before the respondent court; there are well-defined exceptions
established by jurisprudence, such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the
court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and
passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the
petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a
motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process
and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings
were ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue
raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.
The first exception applies in this case.

Rule 41, Section 13 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 13. Dismissal of appeal. - Prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on
appeal to the appellate court, the trial court may, motu proprio or on motion, dismiss the appeal
for having been taken out of time or for non-payment of the docket and other lawful fees within
the reglementary period.

In Salvan v. People, this Court held that the power of the RTC to dismiss an appeal is limited to
the instances specified in the afore-quoted provision. In other words, the RTC has no jurisdiction
to deny a notice of appeal on an entirely different ground - such as "that an appeal is not a proper
remedy."

The authority to dismiss an appeal for being an improper remedy is specifically vested upon the
CA and not the RTC.

In the present case, the assailed RTC Order which denied due course to PBCOM's notice of
appeal on the ground that it was a wrong remedy, is a patent nullity. The RTC acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction. Thus, the filing of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was proper.
PNB Republic Bank v. Spouses Cordova
G.R. NO. 169314 : March 14, 2008

Petitioner filed a complaint for rescission of a contract of lease. Respondent filed an answer with
a counterclaim. In its February 18, 2002 Decision, the Regional Trial Court dismissed th
epetition by granted respondent's counterclaim. Thus, petitioner timely filed a notice of appeal on
20 March 2002. Respondents also moved for reconsideration of the decision. In an Order dated
July 2, 2002, the trial court reconsidered and amended its February 18, 2002 Decision to increase
the amount of damages awarded to respondents.

After receiving a copy of the order dated 2 July 2002, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the trial court. Thereafter, or on 23 October 2002,
petitioner filed a second notice of appeal. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the appeal. As
this motion was denied by the trial court, they re-filed it with the appellate court. In their motion,
respondents argued that petitioner only had one (1) day left to file the second notice when it
received the order denying the MR, inasmuch as it had already consumed the 15-day
reglementary period when it filed the MR on August 22, 2002. Since the February 18, 2002
Decision was vacated, revised and replaced by the July 2, 2002 Order, the first notice of appeal
became ineffective and invalid.

The CA denied the motion to dismiss the appeal. However, when respondents moved for
reconsideration, the appellate court granted the same and dismissed the appeal. Petitioner's
motion for reconsideration was denied. Thus, the petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the case and in declaring that the
first notice of appeal is ineffective and invalid

Held: Yes.

Petitioner's appeal is deemed perfected "as to [it]" when it timely filed its first notice of appeal,
following Section 9, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. Incidentally, this perfected appeal is not
docketed with the CA, because the trial court, which was still to resolve respondents' motion for
reconsideration, had not yet transmitted the records of the case to the appellate court. Incumbent,
nonetheless, on the part of the RTC is the elevation of the records after a resolution of the merits
of respondents' motion.

Its appeal having been perfected, petitioner did not need to file a second notice of appeal even if
the trial court granted, as it did, the other party's motion for reconsideration and modified the
decision to increase the monetary award. It could also not be said that petitioner abandoned its
perfected appeal when it filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner's filing of the said motion
does not have the effect of a waiver of the appeal, and, like the second notice, is a pointless
formality which does not prejudice the already perfected appeal.
When the appeal is perfected as to petitioner's filing of the first notice in due time, the trial court,
insofar as the petitioner is concerned, loses its jurisdiction over the case except to issue orders for
the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter
litigated by the appeal. Obviously, the issue of the correctness of the decision is the subject of the
perfected appeal. The trial court no longer had jurisdiction to reverse the February 18, 2002
Decision, as modified by the July 2, 2002 Order, which would have meant petitioner's
abandonment of its appeal. In fact, to paraphrase the words of remedial law expert Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, petitioner, with its appeal already perfected, cannot withdraw the same for
the purpose of reviving the jurisdiction of the trial court and enabling it to take another course of
action calling for the exercise of that jurisdiction. This is because by filing the notice of appeal,
petitioner insofar as it is concerned has perfected its appeal to the CA, and it should be in that
court where he may pursue any further remedy.
Batara v. CA, Punongbayan
G.R. No. 127906. December 16, 1998

Two (2) separate actions were filed and thereafter consolidated by agreement of the parties. The
first suit was for recovery of possession of real property filed by private respondents. The other
action was for quieting of title filed by petitioner.

These cases stemmed from a deed of assignment executed by Sps. Obsequio in favor of
petitioner for a parcel of land, which remains to be unregistered. The Batara spouses took
possession of the subject property.

While petitioner Batara made payments pursuant to the deed of assignment, respondent Erlinda
Obsequio mortgaged the land to the Punongbayan Spouses. As a result, petitioners stopped
paying the installments. Thereafter, Erlinda sold the land to the Punongbayans, who had
registered the Deed of Absolute Sale in their name. Thus, the Punongbayans filed a case for
recovery against the Bataras who were in turn prompted to bring an action for quieting of title.

The trial court upheld the validity of the sale between the Obsequios and the Punongbayans and
awarded the possession in favor of the latter. On 6 November 1995 counsel for petitioners
received the decision of the court a quo who within the reglementary period filed a motion for
reconsideration by mail. In its Order of 13 February 1996, received by petitioners counsel on 23
February 1996, the court denied the motion for lack of merit. On 5 March 1996 petitioners filed a
Notice of Appeal. However, it was disapproved by the trial court on 11 March 1996 for having
been filed beyond the mandatory and jurisdictional 15-day reglementary period or after "a total
period of twenty (26) days elapsed.

On 15 April 1996 petitioners sought to set aside the Order of the trial court of 11 March 1996
through a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On 5
November 1996 respondent Court of Appeals denied the petition on the ground that (a) the
appeal was filed "after twenty-two (22) days had already elapsed, to the effect that the appeal
was late by seven (7) days;" (b) a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 could not lie as a substitute
for a lost appeal; and (c) only errors of jurisdiction were correctible by a special civil action for
certiorari, hence, it could not look into the merits of the case nor correct errors of procedure and
judgment by the trial court.

Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of the appeal was correct

Held: Yes.

The power of this Court to suspend its own rules or to except a particular case from its operations
whenever the purposes of justice require it, cannot be questioned. In a considerable host of cases
has this prerogative been invoked to relax even procedural rules of the most mandatory character
in terms of compliance, such as the period to appeal. Clearly, when 'transcendental matters' like
life, liberty or State security are involved, suspension of the rules is likely to be welcomed more
generously.

In the present case, the reason for the delay in filing the notice of appeal was the counsels
erroneous understanding of the law on appeal. Certainly, it is neither compelling enough nor
does it impress us as a highly exceptional circumstance to depart from the rule that "the
perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the
judgment final and executory.

Although the rule that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for lost appeal admits
certain exceptions as enumerated in Sanchez v. Court of Appeals, none of such exceptions
obtains in this case where appeal was still the speedy and adequate remedy for petitioners to
contest the factual findings of the lower court. The fact that they failed to do so on account of
sheer inexcusable negligence cannot sustain a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.
Hence, the final and executory judgment of the trial court resulting from petitioners failure to
seasonably file an appeal can no longer be disturbed by this petition.

On computation of the reglementary period:

In the case, the applicable law is the last paragraph of Art. 13 of the Civil Code which reads: "In
computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the last day included." Here, counsel for
petitioners received copy of the trial courts decision on 6 November 1995. A motion for
reconsideration dated 17 November 1995 was mailed and considered filed by the court a quo on
21 November 1995 which was the last day of the 15-day period within which an appeal may be
perfected. In computing petitioners period to appeal, this last day should be excluded so that
when their counsel received copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration on 23
February 1996 petitioners still had one (1) day within which to perfect an appeal. This one day
should again be computed in accordance with the manner aforecited. By excluding the date of
receipt and including the next day which was 24 February 1996, a Saturday, the delay incurred
by petitioners reckoned therefrom totaled ten (10) days as they filed their notice of appeal only
on 5 March 1996
Siguenza v. CA, Quimbo
G.R. No. L-44050 July 16, 1985

Private respondents filed a complaint in the CFI against petitioners for breach of contract and
payment of damages. The complaint alleged that petitioners entered into a contract of sale with
the respondents for two lots purportedly owned by petitioners. However, private respondents
later discovered that such lots have already been sold to Irenea Maningo. Petitioners refused to
give back the downpayment paid by the respondents. In their answer, petitioners admitted the
sale of the lots to the spouses but argued that they had nothing to do with the sale as the one
responsible was Bert Osmeña and Associates. On March 31, 1975. the trial court rendered
judgment in favor of the private respondents.

On April 14, 1975, the petitioners received a copy of the decision. On April 29, 1975, they filed
their motion for reconsideration and on May 14, 1975, they filed another motion captioned as
"Amended Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial." On May 20, 1975, these motions were
denied by the trial court, the order of which was received by petitioners on May 27, 1975. On the
same day, they filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond, and motion for extension of time to file
the record on appeal.

On May 29, 1975, the spouses Quimbo filed a motion for execution of judgment against the
petitioners on the ground that the judgment had become final and executory for failure of the
petitioners to perfect their appeal on time. The spouses alleged that since the petitioners' motion
for reconsideration was pro forma for not having been accompanied by an affidavit of merit and
verification, said motion did not stop the running of the period to perfect the appeal. The writ of
execution was issued by the trial court on the grounds that the motions filed by the petitioners
were pro forma as they were based on forgotten evidence, i.e., the deed of partition, and that said
motions were not supported by affidavits of merit thus making them fatally defective. The trial
court likewise disapproved the petitioners' notice of appeal, appeal bond, and motion for
extension to file a record on appeal for having become academic. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners' have lost their right to appeal

Held: No.

An appeal is an essential part of our judicial system, the Supreme Court have advised the courts
to proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that
every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition
of his cause, freed from the constraints oftechnicalities

The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The rules of
procedure are used only to help secure not override substantial justice. However, the allowance
in filing of an appeal in some cases where a stringent application of the rules would have denied
it, only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise cf our
equity jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, the petitioners' delay in filing their record on appeal should not be strictly
construed as to deprive them of the right to appeal especially since on its face the appeal appears
to be impressed with merit.
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Saludanes
G.R. No. 146581, December 13, 2005

The present case stemmed from 21 petitions for just compensation filed by several landowners
with the RTC Tagum, sitting as a special agrarian court. The petitioners involved several tracts
of land forming part of a banana plantation operated by the AMS Group of Companies. The
landowners offered to sell these parcels of land to the government in accordance with the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program. On 7 February 2000, the RTC rendered a joint
decision. On 7 March 2000, LBP filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. On 17
March 2000 and 23 March 2000, the LBP and DAR filed their notices of appeal, respectively.
On 24 March 2000 and 6 April 2000, the RTC denied LBP’s and DAR’s notices of appeal,
respectively.

On April 14, 2000, the LBP filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated March 24, 2000
but was denied by the Special Agrarian Court in its Order dated March 24, 2000. Counsel for the
LBP received a copy of this Order on May 2, 2000.

On May 3, 2000, the joint Decision, having become final and executory, was entered in the Book
of Entries of Judgment of the Special Agrarian Court.

On August 2, 2000, the LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari. The petition
was however denied for being filed 32- days beyond the 60-day reglementary period. Hence, this
appeal.

Petitioner bank admits that its petition before the Court of Appeals was indeed filed thirty-two
(32) days late. However, it pleads for an exemption from the operation of Section 4, Rule 65 by
reasons of justice and equity.

Issue: Whether or not the petition must be given due course despite being belatedly filed

Held: No.

Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, provides:

SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. – The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days
from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial
is timely filed or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty day
period shall be counted notice of the denial of said motion.

The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the act or omission of a lower
court or of a corporation, board, officer, or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the
Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the
Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, If it involves the acts or omissions of a
quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be
filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.

No extension of time shall be granted except for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding 15
days.

In Yutingco v. Court of Appeals, we held that the period of 60 days to file a petition for certiorari
is reasonable and sufficient. It provides for ample time for a party to mull over and prepare a
petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court, tribunal, board, or officer, It was
specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of
parties to a speedy disposition of their cases. Hence, the 60-day period must be considered non-
extendible, except where a good and sufficient reason can be shown to warrant an extension.

While we agree with petitioner LBP that this Court has the power to suspend its Rules, however,
it has not shown any compelling reason why we should do so. Moreover, records reveal that
petitioner has paid respondents the amounts specified in the joint Decision of the Special
Agrarian Court. This has rendered the case moot and academic.
Triste v. Leyte State College Board of Trustees
G.R. No. 78623, December 17, 1990

The Leyte State College became a chartered state college by virtue of PD 944. Section 4 of such
law provides that "the governance and administration of each College and the exercise of its
corporate powers shall be vested exclusively in the Board of Trustees and in the President of the
College insofar as authorized by said Board."

The Board passed Resolution No. 53 "confirming the designation of Professor Ofelia TRISTE as
vice-president of LSC to include allowances normally extended to the office of vice-president
subject to the usual auditing and accounting regulations. Petitioner discharged her duties and
functions as the vice president for more than two years. In February 1986, the composition of the
Board of Trustees was changed as the president retired and was thereafter replaced. The board
appointed private respondent as the new vice president, replacing petitioner, through Board
Resolution No. 42.

On 12 January 1987, petitioner filed an appeal despite non-receipt of the board resolution
denying her petition for reconsideration to be the vice president, with the Review Committee of
the Ministry of Justice organized to implement Executive Order No 17. The Review Committee
dismissed the petition on the ground that was filed beyond the 10-day period provided under
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 15. After her requests for certified copies of the designation of
Dr. Gonzaga as vice-president and the board resolution denying her petition for reconsideration
remained unacted upon, Dr. Ofelia P. TRISTE filed the instant petition for certiorari. Private
respondent Gonzaga asserts that petitioner, not having appealed to the president, had not
exhausted all administrative remedies available to her before she filed the instant judicial
remedy.

Issue: Whether or not the filing of the petition is proper despite non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies

Held: Yes.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies is not an iron-clad rule. It is not necessary when, from the
facts of the case, petitioner has to look to the courts for speedy relief; when the question
presented is "purely a legal one," the controverted act is "patently illegal" and "nothing of an
administrative nature is to be or can be done;" and when petitioner was denied due process. Each
of these exceptions may exempt the petitioner from the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies before filing a court action. Considering that all these exceptions are present in this
case, petitioner may avail herself of the instant remedy.

Although the petition is captioned "petition for review on certiorari," thereby creating the
impression that the same was filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, we shall consider it as
one for certiorari under Rule 65 it having been alleged that the respondents have abused their
discretion in their questioned actions.
Nunez v. GSIS Family Bank
G.R. No. 163988, November 17, 2005

Leonilo Nunez obtained three loans from GSIS Family Bank, secured by two mortgages over
certain parcels of land. When the three loans were maturing, Leonilo purportedly obtained a
fourth loan, securing another real estate mortgage over properties covered by TCT Nos. NT-
145734, 143001, 143004, 143005, 143006, 143007. Upon maturity of the three loans, Leonilo
executed a promissory note. More than 19 years after Leonilo’s promissory note mature, the
bank undertook to extrajudicially foreclose the properties secured in the first two loans on 11
December 1997. In the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, the bank alleged that Leonilo
violated the terms and conditions of the loans when he failed to pay his principal obligations.
The sheriffs issued a notice of extra-judicial sale. With the bank as the highest bidder, a
certificate of sale was issued to it.

Leonilo filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure sale, reconveyance and
cancellation of encumbrances, before the RTC. The RTC ruled in favor of Leonilo, who died and
was substituted by his heirs. The bank filed a motion for reconsideration19 on September 20,
2002, the last of the 15-day period within which it could interpose an appeal, but it did not
comply with the provision of Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on notice of hearing,
prompting herein petitioners to file a Motion to Strike Out Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The RTC denied the motion for reconsideration
for failure to comply with the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The bank then filed a notice of
appeal. The same was dismissed for being filed late.

Thus, the bank filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA ruled in favor of respondents,
holding that while the right to appeal is a statutory and not a natural right, it is nevertheless an
essential part of the judicial system, hence, courts should be cautious not to deprive a party of the
right to appeal; and in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the trial court should have given the
bank’s Notice of Appeal due course to better serve the ends, and prevent a miscarriage of justice.

After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 with the Supreme Court.

Issues: (1) Whether or not the filing of a petition for certiorari under rule 65 was proper; (2)
whether or not the notice of appeal must be given due course for failure to comply with Section
4, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court

Held:

(1) No.

Petitioners and counsel confuse their petition as one Petition for Review under Rule 4535 with a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.36 For while they treat it as one for Review on Certiorari,
they manifest that it is filed "pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation
to Rule 45 of the New Rules of Court."

In Ligon v. Court of Appeals38 where the therein petitioner described her petition as "an appeal
under Rule 45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court," this Court, in frowning over what it described as a "chimera," reiterated that the
remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive.

To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most
apparent is that errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 while errors of judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review
under Rule 45.

This Court, however, in accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and
in the interest of justice may treat a petition for certiorari as having filed under Rule 45, more so
if the same was filed within the reglementary period for filing a petition for review.

The records show that the petition was filed on time both under Rules 45 and 65. Following
Delsan Transport, the petition, stripped of allegations of "grave abuse of discretion," actually
avers errors of judgment which are the subject of a petition for review.

(2) No.

Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which governs appeals from Regional Trial Courts
provides:

SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. –

(a) Ordinary appeal. – The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon
the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other
cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
xxx

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. – The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the
appellants shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice
of the judgment or final order. However, on appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within
forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.

The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.
On the other hand, Rule 22 provides for the manner of computing time and the effect of
interruption:

SEC. 1. How to compute time. – In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these
Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from
which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of performance
included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal
holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

SEC. 2. Effect of interruption. – Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running

of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice
of the cessation of the cause thereof.

The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded in the computation of the period.

The requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 in connection with Section 2, Rule
37 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. Absence of the mandatory requirement renders the motion
a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court
has no authority to act upon. Being a fatal defect, in cases of motions to reconsider a decision,
the running of the period to appeal is not tolled by their filing or pendency.

In fine, the failure to timely perfect an appeal cannot simply be dismissed as a mere technicality,
for it is jurisdictional.

In the present case, when the bank then filed its Motion for Reconsideration on the last of the 15-
day period for taking an appeal and it was subsequently denied, the bank had only one (1) day
from December 9, 2002 when it received a copy of the order denying the motion or until
December 10, 2002 within which to perfect its appeal. It filed the Notice of Appeal, however, on
December 11, 2002, hence, out of time, and the decision of the trial court had become final and
executory.

The explanations proffered by the bank behind its failure to incorporate a notice of hearing of the
Motion for Reconsideration — inadvertent deletion from its computer file of the standard clauses
for pleadings during the printing of the finalized draft of the motion and the handling counsel’s
heavy workload — are unsatisfactory.

To credit the foregoing explanations would render the mandatory rule on notice of hearing
meaningless and nugatory as lawyers would simply invoke these grounds should they fail to
comply with the rules.

As to the claim that the government would suffer loss of substantial amount if not allowed to
recover the proceeds of the loans, this Court finds that any loss was caused by respondent’s own
doing or undoing.

Nor can petitioner invoke the doctrine that rules of technicality must yield to the broader interest
of substantial justice. While every litigant must be given the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities, the failure to
perfect
an appeal within the reglementary period is not a mere technicality. It raises
a jurisdictional problem as it deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction over the appeal. The
failure to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period is akin to the failure to
pay the appeal fee within the prescribed period. In both cases, the appeal is not perfected in
due time. As we held in Pedrosa v. Hill, the requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere
technicality of law or procedure, but an essential requirement without which the decision
appealed from would become final and executory. The same can be said about the late filing of a
notice of appeal.