On the Grammar of `Enjoy'

G. E. M. Anscombe

The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 64, No. 19, Sixty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the American
Philosophical Association, Eastern Division. (Oct. 5, 1967), pp. 607-614.

Stable URL:
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0022-362X%2819671005%2964%3A19%3C607%3AOTGO%60%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3

The Journal of Philosophy is currently published by Journal of Philosophy, Inc..

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/about/terms.html. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained
prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in
the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at
http://www.jstor.org/journals/jphil.html.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.

JSTOR is an independent not-for-profit organization dedicated to and preserving a digital archive of scholarly journals. For
more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

http://www.jstor.org
Fri May 18 08:16:44 2007
by a network of evidence. For example, sex ratios vary more than can
be reasonably accounted for by chance from one community and one
circumstance to another, but they have always been close to 51 per
cent. Therefore, far from having an initial prejudice against this
frequency's applying to Boston, I happen to be prejudiced in favor
of its vicinity.
Evidently, my attitude toward universals tends to be reductionist.
I would analyze them away as elliptical and, often more or less delib-
erately, ambiguous statements of a variety of finite conjunctions. But
I must confess a serious difficulty in this reductionist program. Any
ordinary proposition of ostensibly particular form, such as "This
ball is red", is intended and understood to imply many things not
yet observed and indeed many propositions that would ordinarily
be regarded as universals. For example, "This object will look red to
me and others whenever examined by daylight for some ill-specified
time to come", "It has about the same diameter in every direction",
"It will not soon change shape if left undisturbed", etc. We can at-
tempt more cautious particular propositions, such as "I see white in
the upper-left quadrant", hoping thus to avoid being deceived by ap-
pearances inasmuch as we report only appearances. But universals
lurk even in such reports of sense data. The notions of "I", "upper",
"right", and "white" all seem to take their meanings from orderly
experience. Indeed, I cannot imagine communication in the absence
of expectation of continued order in domains as yet unperceived. T o
be sure, each universal implicit in an ostensible particular can itself
be subjected to reductionist analysis like other universals, but the
ideal of eliminating universals altogether seems impossible to me. We
have come once more, but along a different path, to the place where
personalists disagree with necessarians in expecting no solution to
the problem of the tabula rasa.
LEONARD J. SAVAGE
Yale University

ON T H E GRAMMAR OF 'ENJOY' *
HAT does the verb 'to enjoy' take? An object, as in 'He

W enjoyed the joke'? Sometimes; but should we speak of it

as "taking an object" in 'He enjoyed compelling Jones to
support the motion'? Or in 'He enjoyed swimming in the lake'? Here
we have complex expressions which include verbs, i.e., 'compelling'
* T o be presented in an APA Symposium on Pleasure, December 29, 1967. Com-
mentators will be Terence Penelhum (University of Calgary) and B. A. 0.Williams
(Cambridge University).
608 THE JOURNAL OF PHIL.OSOPHY

and 'swimming'. Someone may feel inclined to say that this complex-
ity is the sign of a proposition and that, logically speaking, we have the
right to say: Enjoyment is here enjoyment that such and such is the
.
case, just as belief is belief that. . .
There is one objection to saying this which is really a misunder-
standing. It sounds ludicrous to speak of enjoying a proposition,
except in cases where that is like being amused by one. That would be
the same sort of thing as enjoying a joke or a tragedy. When I, say, en-
joy talking to people, or again enjoy being away from everybody, I
don't enjoy a proposition! But why not? 'Being away from everyone'
-that's a description of a state; we have at least as much right to speak
of a proposition being taken by the verb 'to enjoy' here as of a
proposition being taken by the verb 'to believe' in 'I believed I was
away from everyone'. I t will seem wrong only if our conception
of believing is that it is a relation to or operation on some sort
of abstract entity intermediary between the subject and things. But
we need not have that conception.
T h e idea we are concerned with is this: if, in a report of enjoyment
the expression telling what was enjoyed is a complex expression c6n-
taining a functioning verb, then the enjoyment must be understood
as enjoyment that. . . . This idea is a symptom of what we might
call "the Tractatus in the blood streamv-an affection to which no
one in philosophy of a certain tradition is quite immune, whether he
likes it or not. We find in the Tractatus:
Wherever we have complexity, we have argument and function, and
that means we already have all the logical constants (5.47).
T o say that we have "argument and function" is to say that we
have a predicative connection of expressions. What is this, and when
do we have it? T h e passage says: wherever we have complexity; but
all that is implied is that when there is complexity, then there is a
proposition i n the ofing. The conception that we are considering at
the moment is that the complex expression telling what was enjoyed
should itself be explained as, or be rephrased as, a proposition. For it
typically contains a verb, and that gives us a predicate or function. If
the verb has indeed such a role, then here, in the verb and whatever
completes it, we must have before us at least the equivalent of a propo-
sition-what amounts to one.
In logic we assimilate other verbs to 'being' with its complement,
and we call them all predicates. We use a notation in which we write
F(a) equally for 'a is F' and 'a F's'. We would even treat "becoming F"
in the same way, putting B(a) where B = "becoming F".
 There is a deep ground for this assimilation. It is to be found in
the predicative mode of connection of expressions. Consideration of
the verb 'to enjoy' will help to bring this out. There is such a thing
as "enjoyment that. .. ." T h e expression is not good English; but
if we insert the words 'the fact' or 'the idea', there is no objection to
it. Thus I may have enjoyed, taken pleasure in, the fact that I was
riding with N. But that is not the same thing as actually to have
enjoyed riding with N. T h e fact may have given me pleasure, but
if I am candid I may have to confess that I did not enjoy the activity
itself.
We may therefore use the very fact that there is such a thing as
enjoyment that . . . against saying: where what is enjoyed is de-
scribed by a complex expression containing a functioning verb, enjoy-
ment is always enjoyment that. . . .
Now the contrast between enjoying F-ing and enjoying the fact
that one is F-ing does not remain in being where we put a negation
into the phrase telling what was enjoyed-I will call it the enjoyment-
phrase. If I enjoyed not swimming, that is the same thing as to have
enjoyed the fact that I wasn't swimming. 'Not' is one among many
logical signs. There are the other truth-particles, i.e., the truth-
functional connectives, and there are the many quantifying applica-
tives, like 'some', 'only', 'most', and 'the' where this is the mark of
a "definite description." Any of these may occur in the enjoyment
phrase. When they occur, they can sometimes be displaced, i.e., be put
outside the verb 'to enjoy', leaving the whole sentence equivalent
to the one we started with. But sometimes they can't. Thus, on natural
interpretations, the quantifier 'all' is displaceable in
I enjoyed talking to all the people in the office

but not in
I enjoyed being admired by all the people in the office.

For the former is naturally taken as equivalent to

Of each of the people in the office it held that I enjoyed talking to him.

But, by the most natural way of taking the second report, the 'all'
must remain inside the enjoyment-phrase.
Similar contrasts can be found for truth-functional 'if' and 'and'.
I had a splendid holiday, I enjoyed fishing and climbing and riding
and playing bridge. Perhaps this is equivalent to "I enjoyed fishing
and I enjoyed climbing and I enjoyed. . . ." Rut perhaps not. If not,
61o THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

we have here a case of enjoyment that. . . . (Note, however, that in

'I enjoyed lying in a hot bath and reading' the 'and' is not nuth-func-
tional.) An interesting example was given me by Sue Larsen: 'I en-
joyed paying by cheque if I wanted to'. This is enjoyment of that
fact or idea; i.e., it is enjoyment that.
With these considerations in view, we may adopt as the mark of
predicative connection the admissibility of three things-any or all
of them; it doesn't matter, for they go together. T o have a verb--or
other predicable expression-connected to a further expression by
the predicative mode of connection, so that the verb becomes a
predicate and the further expression is a subject-expression, means
that we have the admissibility of
(a) the combination of two such structures by truth-connectives
(b) the introduction of quantified expressions--e.g., their substi-
tution for proper names
(c) the introduction of negation.
What I mean by 'admissibility' is this: these procedures don't make
a difference to the type of thing being said, like the difference between
'I enjoyed F-ing' and 'I enjoyed the fact that I was F-ing'. Thus, sup-
pose I "enjoyed talking to the most handsome person present." This is
so far ambiguous-was it just an accident that he was the most hand-
some person present? That is, was it just that this man was the most
handsome person present, and I enjoyed talking to him? I don't
mean: was it an accident that he was handsome? But rather: does the
definite description 'the most handsome person present' belong un-
displaceably in the enjoyment-phrase? If so, then the enjoyment
phrase manifests, not just a significant connection, but a predicative
connection of expressions, and we may say that here is a case of
enjoymentthat. . . .
When we have a predicative connection of expressions, we can
discern in the whole that is so connected at least one part which is a
predicate and discern, or supply as implicitly present, at least one part
which is a subject-expression. (An example of the subject-expression's
being implicit is supplied by 'I enjoyed not swimming'.)
I am saying that, if the definite description belongs properly in the
enjoyment-phrase, 'talking to the most handsome person present' is
signalized as a predicative connection of expressions by the mere fact
that it contains a definite description in significant connection with
the verb 'talking to'. There are several points to dwell on here.
First, significant connection is of course more than mere juxta-
position. No doubt we grasp significant connections of words if we
use and respond to them--e.g., answer them, or obey them, or act
an than, or pass on their gist. But it is more sophisticated to have
the concepts of significant connections. One is taught these concepts
by being trained in grammar.
I n grammar we acquire the concepts of subjects and objects of verbs
by being presented with sentences containing verbs, say 'He ran',
and being trained to answer the question 'Who or what ran?' by
repeating the word 'HeY.Or, given the sentence 'John kicked Jim' and
the question 'Whom or what did John kick?' we answer, "Jim."
We can reasonably extend the notion of a verb so that it in-
cludes whatever extras are necessary to be quoted in asking the "Who
or what?" or "Whom or what?" questions. Thus I have called 'talking
to' a verb, and would call 'swimming in' one.
The teacher who asks such questions knows how to ask them-e.g.,
he doesn't ask "John who or what Jim?" And while he himself may
have been taught in turn by a similar training, some original gram-
marian must have leapt to understanding, to the formulation of the
concepts of subject and object, in framing these questions. Such a
question is not necessarily apt just because we have a functioning
verb. For example, given a sentence 'It's not my custom to swat flies'
the question 'Who or what to swat flies?' ought not to be asked, and
certainly not to get the answer 'custom' or 'It's not my custom'. The
question would be an ineptitude.
This is sometimes so even when the verb is in the indicative mood.
Take for example 'Anyone who eats cheese is a scoundrel'. The ques-
tion 'Who or what is a scoundrel?' goes through smoothly; we are
prompted to give 'Anyone who eats cheese' as an answer. But the
questions 'Who or what eats cheese?' or 'Who or what eats cheese is a
scoundrel?' should not prompt an answer 'Who' or 'Anyone who'.
We may compare learning to answer this sort of question to
learning to answer the question "What letter comes after L in the
alphabet?" Only there is more intelligence in it, for it is not a matter
of merely repeating, say, the whole of what precedes the verb in a sen-
tence or the whole of what succeeds it. Thus, given "Smith is a
ninny and James is a dolt" and asked "Who or what is a dolt?" the
learner answers "James," not "Smith is a ninny and James"; but,
given "The man next to James is a dolt" he answers not "James" but
"The man next to James."
At the bottom of our understanding in innumerable cases there lies
a catching on to what is done which is not dictated to us by the ele-
ments of the situation. (If this catching on were to be explained by an
inborn capacity, we should have before us, in some form or other, a
doctrine of innate ideas. Someone who wishes so to explain it has to
612 THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

consider, then, what he may mean by a doctrine of inborn capacity,

innate ideas. For if inborn capacity is an explanation, it cannot
amount to the mere fact that we do master language.)
We have an example of significant connection, then, when subject
or object can aptly be asked for. But now, so long as we are dealing
with predicative connections of expressions, there is no philosophical
point in making any distinction between subjects and objects of
verbs. We can assimilate a sentence containing subject, verb, and
object to a sentence stating a relation. And just as we may call not only
was to the right OF B

But also
A was to the right of
a predicate, occurring in
A was to the right of B

with 'A' as subject-expression in the first case and 'B' in the second,
so also in
Mary was talking to the most handsome person present

we may call
Mary was talking to
a predicate, with 'the most handsome person present' as a subject-
expression connected with it. (The point will be familiar to students
of Frege.)
Thus-though we are here not following the terminology of high
school grammar-if, singling out the enjoyment-phrase 'talking to
the most handsome person present' I ask 'talking to whom or what?',
the correct answer can be said to give a subject and the connection to
be predicative, if the enjoyment-phrase contains the definite descrip-
tion undisplaceably.
If, however, the definite description is displaceable, i.e., if we pro-
duce an equivalent report, as the sentence was meant, by placing
the definite description outside the enjoyment-phrase, then we do
need the distinct concept of an object of the verb in the enjoyment-
phrase. For it may be that, though--of course-the expressions in the
enjoyment-phrase do stand in significant connection, they do not
stand in predicative connection: the enjoyment is not enjoyment
that. ... Where a purely logical sign belongs essentially in the
enjoyment-phrase or could be introduced without altering the kind of
thing being said, we have enjoyment that. . . . Where this is not
so, we have enjoyment of activities themselves, or things, or happen-
ings, or existence itself. I will call this "enjoyment of substance" and
the other kind "enjoyment of fact."
It will be wise to remark at this point that both kinds may be
illusory-the fact (as we say) not a fact, the activity not one that is
indeed taking place. This is a large topic on which I don't want to
embark here, but the observation is necessary lest for example a case of
enjoyment that . . . should seem to be wrongly called "enjoyment of
fact" if the that-clause was false. We do in any case need a qualifica-
tion here, however: a usual one would be a parenthetic 'as he thought',
or 'as I thought'--e.g., 'What I enjoyed about the occasion was that,
as I thought, there were no Left-wingers present'. "Enjoyment of fact"
is a notion which I would want to cover this sort of case too.
Enjoyment of substance is much more important than enjoyment of
fact; perhaps neither occurs pure among those who have language;
perhaps at least enjoyment of fact is always grounded in some enjoy-
ment of substance. But my immediate aims and interests in this paper
are rather restricted: I am interested in the characterization of predi-
cative connection. I t is in a way an accident that the starting point of
the inquiry concerned pleasure. I t is not an accident, in the following
way: the different logical characteristics of different types of enjoy-
ment-phrase are what have caused me to distinguish between the pred-
icative mode of connection and another, but still significant, mode
of connection of words. I suspect that enjoyment of substance may be
compared to perception; that the phrases 'a man swimming', 'a red
circle', occurring, as they may, as object-phrases in reports of percep
tion, are further examples of nonpredicative connection of expres-
sions. Certainly there is a mysterious difference between 'a man swim-
ming' and 'a man is swimming'. This is not to be explained-as one
might at first blush be tempted to explain it-as the difference be-
tween, say, concept and judgment, the latter being qualified by an
act of acknowledgment (Brentano's Anerkennung) absent in the
former. For 'a man is swimming' may occur as, e.g., the antecedent of
a conditional, and then it isn't "judged" or "acknowledged." Nor
does the 'is' seem to be the essential thing that is important here-we
could imagine 'a man swimming' being used to make the assertion
or as the antecedent of a conditional. If it were so used, nothing would
seem to have got left out.
What is in question seems to be the distinction between a concept or
term and a proposition. It will be remembered that our whole inquiry
opened with the question whether we should think of the verb 'to
614
THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY

enjoy' as "taking" what ought properly to be upderstood as a proposi-

tion.-But I would not choose to call even cases of enjoyment that
.
. . cases where the verb takes a proposition. The reason is that
the reflexive pronoun, which would usually be at least implicitly
present as subject-expression,makes a mess of the idea of a proposition
here. For I assume that a proposition should be an independent unit.
But ' A believes that he himself . . .' doesn't seem to be a substitution-
instance of ' A believes that x. . . .' For it is not equivalent to ' A be-
lieves that A . . .', since the two might have different truth-values
when completed in the same way. A might not know that he was A .
Thus, only if there is such a thing as my enjoying the fact that N
. . .,am I willing to speak of 'enjoy' as taking a proposition. Here one
would have to inquire whether, in order to make the thought explicit,
there isn't needed an insertion involving myself or an activity or state
of myself, before 'the fact that N'. For example, suppose that I enjoy
the fact that N is discomfited. Does that require a construe as:
I enjoy thinking of the fact that N is discomfited
where "thinking" is an activity? or as
I enjoy knowing that N is discomfited
which I would argue is a case of enjoying that. . . ,but of a kind that
involves myself, i.e.,
I enjoy [the fact] that I know that N is discomfited

Thus it appears problematic whether we should ever think of

'enjoy' as "taking a proposition," even though we are content to think
of it as sometimes taking a that-clause. 'That' doesn't necessarily
serve to introduce a proposition.
A standard conception of a proposition is that it is an instance of
a certain sort of complex of signs (or what is expressed by that) which
is such as to be true or false. Now in putting forward my suggestions
about predicative connection I am, as it were, turning the whole thing
round: I am saying that a predicative connection of expressions is
just the sort of connection into which we introduce negative signs and
quantifying applicatives, and which we combine with others by truth-
connectives.
G . E. M. ANSCOMBE
Somerville College, Oxford