Special Civil Actions 2000 Edition Rule 70– Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

Rule 70
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER

Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer cases are the most famous Special Civil Actions. Also with Rule 65,
Certiorari. In Bar exams, out of 10 questions in Special Civil Actions, 70% deals with Rule 65 and Rule 70…Forcible
Entry and Unlawful Detainer.

How do you define this kind of SCA? It is a real action which involves possession of real property. It is the only real
action exclusively triable by the Municipal Trial Court.

The other one is accion publiciana provided the property is P20,000.00 or less.

So accion publiciana could be MTC or RTC, but mostly RTC yan because properties are usually more than
P20,000.00. Pero iyong forcible entry, no problem. The jurisdiction of the MTC is not governed by the nature of the
action.

So let us try to go back to the fundamentals of Property.

Q: What are the possible actions to be filed in court governing real property?
A: They are the following:
1. Accion Reinvindicatoria - recovery of ownership
2. Accion Publiciana - recovery of possession
3. Accion Interdictal –
a. forcible entry (detentacion); or
b. unlawful detainer (des halicio)

Now, Forcible Entry (FE) and Unlawful Detainer (UD) are now found under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 70. Forcible
Entry is Section 1.

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.— Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding
section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or
stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession, by virtue of any contract,
express or implied, or the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may,
at any time within one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the
proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or
any person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such possession, together with damages and
costs. (1a)

SEC. 2. Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand.— Unless otherwise stipulated, such action by
the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate is
made upon the lessee, or by serving written notice of such demand upon the person found on the premises, or by
posting such notice on the premises if no person be found thereon, and the lessee fails to comply therewith after
fifteen (15) days in the case of land or five (5) days in the case of buildings. (2a)

Q: As defined under Section 1, how do you describe forcible entry?

A: Forcible Entry consists in depriving a person of the possession of land or building for a period of time not
exceeding one (1) year by force, intimidation, strategy, threat, or stealth (FISTS). (Tenerio vs. Gamboa, 81 Phil. 55)

So, there is a deadline - one year. You can only file it within one year. The entry of the defendant over your land or
building should be through any of the five means. So force, di gaano. Majority is strategy or stealth in the middle of the
night. Squatting ba.

Q: What do you mean by strategy and stealth?

A: Strategy means machinations or artifice. Stealth is defined as any secret, sly or clandestine act to avoid discovery
and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another without permission. (Sumulong vs. CA, 232 SCRA 372)

Q: How do you define Unlawful Detainer?

A: Unlawful Detainer consists in the unlawful withholding by a person from another, for not more than one (1) year,
of the possession of any land or building after the expiration or termination of the right to hold such possession by virtue
of a contract, express or implied. (Torres vs. Ocampo, 80 Phil. 36)

Example: You want to eject your lessee from your apartment or house. Actually, the usual grounds are non-payment
of rentals or violation of any conditions of the lease contract. Maybe he has paid his rentals but he violated other
provisions, or expiration of the lease contract. These are the normal grounds for unlawful detainer.

Q: Distinguish Forcible Entry from Unlawful Detainer ?

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A: The following are the distinctions:

1. In forcible entry, possession is unlawful from the very beginning. Like squatters ba.
In unlawful detainer, possession was lawfully acquired and became unlawful only because of termination
of the right. Like a lessee, he occupied the property lawfully but it became unlawful later. (Medel vs.
Militante, 41 Phil. 526)

2. Based on Section 2, in forcible entry, formal demand is not required before filing the action.
In unlawful detainer for failure to pay rent or to comply with the conditions of the lease contract, a formal
demand to pay and to vacate is required otherwise the court has no jurisdiction over the case. (Dikit vs.
Ycasiano, 89 Phil. 44)

The issue to be resolved in forcible entry and unlawful detainer is merely physical possession, not ownership; not
right of possession but physical possession. The only issue to be determined is: Does the plaintiff have a prior physical
possession of property in forcible entry? And then, was he deprived of his possession unlawfully through FISTS?

Q: Can a squatter occupying a property file a forcible entry case against another squatter who forcibly ejected him,
when technically both of them have no rights? If we will say no because you also have no right, then what will happen?
The first squatter has no recourse under the law so his only recourse is to use force also to deceive away the second
squatter and there will be breaches of peace in the society.
A: So even if he is not the owner, he can file a case because according to the SC, the purpose of the actions, this is
regardless of the actual condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable and quiet possession of the land or
building shall not be turned out by strong hands of violence or terror. The object of the law is to prevent breaches of
peace and criminal disorder which will ensue if there were no such remedy. (Villaflor vs. Reyes, January 30, 1968)

Q: How do you distinguish Accion Interdictal from Accion Publiciana because both deal with recovery of
possession ?
A: The following are the distinctions:

1. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are under the summary proceeding governed by the Summary Rules the
purpose of which is recovery of possession de facto.
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil action the purpose of which is recovery of the right of possession which
we call possession de jure - Real right.

2. Forcible entry and Unlawful Detainer : exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC

Accion Publiciana: It is with the RTC if it its value exceeds P20,000. If its P20,000 or less, MTC. But it is not
governed by the Summary Rules. Only forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by the
Summary Rules.

3. The period to file the action ?

Forcible entry and Unlawful detainer: One (1) year from unlawful deprivation or unlawful withholding of
possession.
Accion publiciana may be filed at any time before ownership or other real rights of the real property involved
are lost by acquisitive prescription. Normally, 10 years. If in bad faith, 30 years.

Case: SARONA vs. VILLEGAS G.R. No. L-22984, March 27, 1968

But actually in this distinction, acquisitive prescription applies only to untitled property.
If the property is titled under the Torrens Title, you can file the case even after 100 years
because prescription will not work against a Torrens Title.

4. As to the grounds:
Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer: Only the causes (FISTS) mentioned in Section 1.
Accion Publiciana: any other cause of unlawful dispossession other than FISTS or even FISTS under Section 1
but after the lapse of one year.

5. The immediate execution of the Unlawful Detainer or Forcible Entry judgment is governed by Rule
70, Section 19.
Immediate execution or execution pending appeal in Accion Publiciana is governed by Rule 39 Section 2.
There must be a good reason. So iba ang basis.

Finally, there are instances when it is very easy to determine whether it is FE or UD. But there are some instances
when it is hard eh. What is the correct action? Because the correct action will also determine the proper jurisdiction. Like
in the case of

LIM KIEH TONG VS. CA.

March 18, 1991

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Special Civil Actions 2000 Edition Rule 70– Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer

FACTS: Reginaldo Lim and his family resided in room 301 of the building of Lim Kieh Tong, Inc.
until they transferred to their new residence in Quezon City. However despite the fact that they moved to
Quezon City, Reginaldo Lim retained possession of the room to keep his important belongings. So he did
not give up the lease of that room 301. The building has only one common main door through which all the
occupants of the various rooms can get in.
Accordingly, all occupants including Reginaldo Lim were given a key to the main door lock by Lim
Kieh Tong Inc.
However, when Reginaldo Lim wanted to go inside his room on September 30 to get some things
which he needed, he found out that the key he possessed was no longer compatible with the lock. So
pinalitan na yung lock sa main door, di na mabuksan ng susi niya.
He requested Lim Kieh Tong to provide him with the appropriate key but his request was denied. So
Reginaldo Lim filed a complaint against Lim Kieh Tong alleging those grounds. And he alleges that he has
a clear and unmistakable right to the use of the room and he prays that Lim Kieh Tong be commanded to
provide him the appropriate key to the lock of the main building. That was the complaint.

ISSUE: What kind of a complaint is that? Is that a complaint for FE or a complaint for specific
performance wherein jurisdiction is vested with the RTC?

HELD: The SC said from the facts of the case it appears that Lim Kieh Tong Inc. through stealth
deprived Reginaldo Lim of the possession of the rented room. Therefore, the suit is one for FE under Rule
70 of the Rules of Court.

TIME BROADCASTING NETWORK VS. CA

June 19, 1997 (274 SCRA 366)

FACTS: Petitioner Times Broadcasting Network leased a portion of Hotel Arocha in Ozamis City
owned by private respondent Filomeno Arocha. The subject of the lease consisted of two rooms with a total
area of 7 meters by 11 meters, a terrace with an area of 25 square meters, and the rooftop of the four-storey
building. The premises were to be used by petitioner to operate a radio station.
In June 1993, petitioner began installing its equipment and apparatus in the leased premises. Petitioner,
however, installed its radio antenna on the third floor rooftop of the hotel, instead of the fourth floor
rooftop as stipulated in the contract.
Private respondent Arocha filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Dipolog,
Branch 1 a verified complaint for ejectment with payment of back rentals and damages against petitioner
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. It argued that the MTCC has no jurisdiction over the case
because private respondent's cause of action is actually not for ejectment but for specific performance.
Petitioner contended that private respondent's action was not simply for recovery of possession of the
premises but was for compliance with the terms of the lease contract. Hence, petitioner asserted that it was
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), not the MTCC, which had jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE: Whether the complaint filed by private respondent is one for ejectment or specific
performance.

HELD: The nature of the action and the jurisdiction of courts are determined by the allegations in the
complaint. The aforequoted complaint shows that the private respondent is the owner of the Hotel Arocha
building in Ozamis City and that the petitioner, through stealth and strategy, and without any authority
from the owner, used the third floor rooftop of the building as mounting pad of its radio antenna.
In the case at bar, private respondent was unlawfully deprived of the possession of the third floor
rooftop of Hotel Arocha when petitioner used it as mounting pad for its antenna. Private respondent sought
to recover physical possession thereof through an action for ejectment filed before the MTCC. Hence, the
case properly falls within the jurisdiction of the MTCC.

Q: In a FE case, what are the important allegations which must appear in the complaint?
A: There are two (2):
1. The plaintiff must allege that he has been in prior physical possession of the questioned land or building;
and
2. The plaintiff was unlawfully deprived of his possession by the defendant through any of the means
recognized by law (FISTS).

Q: In one case, the complaint for forcible entry alleges “that defendant unlawfully turned the plaintiff out of the
possession of the property in question.” Is that an allegation of prior physical possession? Is the complaint sufficient?
A: YES. While it is not true that there was an express allegation of prior physical possession by the plaintiff, this fact
can be inferred from the words "unlawfully turned the plaintiff out of possession" for how can a person turn someone out
of possession if the latter was not in the physical possession of the property. The allegation of prior physical possession
by the plaintiff need not be express. It is enough that said allegation is inferable from the other allegations in the
complaint. (Maddammu vs. Mun. Court of Manila, 74 Phil. 230)

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Q: On the other hand, suppose the complaint for FE alleged “that before plaintiff could take possession of and
occupy the said house, defendant surreptitiously occupy the same without the knowledge and consent of the plaintiff.” Is
the complaint sufficient?
A: NO, it is not sufficient. It is clear from the allegation that the plaintiff have not had prior physical possession
because “before plaintiff could take possession of…” (Maddammu vs. Mun. Court of Manila, 74 Phil. 230)

Q: In another case of FE, the complaint alleged that the plaintiff has been “deprived” of the land in question by the
defendant. Is it a sufficient complaint for FE?
A: NO. There was no allegation that the deprivation of possession was illegal though FISTS. Thus, you must alleged
that you were deprived through FISTS. (Gumiran vs. Gumiran, 21 Phil. 174)

How about in Unlawful Detainer cases?

Q: What is the important allegation?

A: Of course, you must have to admit that the defendant was already there legally. And then there must be an
allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession of plaintiff. (Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672)

Like in a lease, you admit that you lease your building to him, and then he could not pay rentals; you asked him to
leave; you gave him until the end of the month to vacate; he did not vacate. Therefore from that moment, he is now
unlawfully withholding possession of the land or building.

Take note in Section 2, the basic distinction between FE and UD is that a demand to vacate is not required in FE.
But a demand to vacate by the plaintiff and the defendant refuses to vacate, is an essential requisite in UD. That is where
you determine that the defendant is unlawfully withholding.

The possession of the defendant cannot be unlawful until you asked him to leave and he refuses to leave. Therefore,
if there is no demand to vacate, the case will be dismissed because the MTC has no jurisdiction. So that is a jurisdictional
requirement. Why? Because if there is no demand to vacate, according to the SC, your action actually is accion
publiciana which is normally cognizable by the RTC.

That is why Section 2 says “Lessor to proceed against lessee only after demand”. Obviously, Section 2 applies only
to UD.

Q: What is the demand?

A: 1. Demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease contract; AND
2. Demand to vacate.

The normal ground for UD is failure to pay rentals. Or even if the defendant has been paying rentals, if he violates
the other conditions of the lease contract, then that is also a ground because “demand to pay OR to comply”. So it is
either of the two because logically, failure to pay is already a violation of lease contract, di ba?

Take note, “failure to pay or to comply with the condition of the lease AND to vacate.” ‘AND to vacate’!

Suppose I will write you a letter. “This is to remind you Mr. Lessee that you have not been paying your rentals for
the past 3 months. I hereby giving you exactly one week to pay all your rentals.” He did not pay. I will file a case after
one week. But where is you demand to vacate? Your demand is only to pay rentals. You should say “I am giving you
one week to pay your back rentals and to vacate!” Yan! Kailangan ‘yung “and to vacate” eh, because if it is only failure
to pay rentals, there is no demand to vacate; your claim is a sum of money.

Now, we will go to the issue of demand…

Q: Suppose “Mr. Lessee, this is to inform you that starting next month, your monthly rentals will be increased from
P1,000/month to P1 ,500/month. Therefore I am giving you until next month to pay the increased rentals OR to vacate.”
Meaning, if you will pay, no problem. Kung ayaw mo, lumayas ka. Now, is that a sufficient demand? Alternative kasi
eh.?
A: Here, there are some conflicting decisions:

LESACA vs. CUEVAS

125 S 384

HELD: An alternative demand to pay rentals or to vacate is legally sufficient for the purpose of
ejectment suit. A more definite and unconditional demand to vacate is not necessary where the lessee has
no legal right to remain in the premises for his refusal to pay the increased rentals.

PEÑAS, SR. vs. CA

233 SCRA 704

“I am giving you until next month to pay OR to vacate.”

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HELD: No proper demand to vacate. In other words, it should be “pay the rentals AND to vacate!”
Hindi pwedeng you may vacate or you may not vacate. Kailangan talaga merong word na and to vacate.

GOLDEN GATE vs. IAC

152 SCRA 684

FACTS: The lessee was in arrears for P18,000 so he received a letter from the lessor. "I am giving you
5 days to pay back rentals, otherwise I will file an ejectment case against you." Of course after the
deadline, he did not pay. So the lessor filed a case for UD.
According to the defendant, there is no demand to vacate; you are definite to file a case against me but
where is the demand to vacate?
HELD: The letter is sufficient. Pwede na ‘yon! And the SC said, “When the private respondents
defaulted in the payment of rents in the amount of P18,000.00, they lost their rights to remain in the
premises. Hence, when the petitioner demanded payment of the P18,000.00 due and unpaid rentals or a
case for ejectment would be filed against them, the owner was giving strong notice that "you either pay
your unpaid rentals or I will file a court case to have you thrown out of my property." The word "vacate" is
not a talismanic word that must be employed in all notices. The alternatives in this case are clear cut. The
tenants must pay rentals which were fixed and which became payable in the past, failing which they must
move out. There can be no other interpretation of the notice given to them. Hence when the petitioner
demanded that either he pays P18,000.00 in five days or a case for ejectment would be filed against him, he
was placed on notice to move out if he does not pay. There was, in effect, a notice or demand to vacate.”

Compare that with the case of

LA CAMPANA FOOD PRODUCTS vs. CA

233 SCRA 151

Here, the lessee has not also been paying his rentals and water bills. So the lessor wrote a letter to the
lessee, “Warning: Upon your failure to pay your unpaid rentals and unpaid water bills, I will forward this
matter to our legal counsel for proper action.” Is there a sufficient demand?

HELD: No. We do not see in this statement an unequivocal or even an implied demand on the lessee
to vacate from the premises. The doctrine in the Golden Gate case is therefore not applicable.

BANDOY vs. CA
175 SCRA 459

FACTS: Prior to filing of ejectment case against the defendant, the plaintiff brought the matter to the
Barangay Captain, but to no avail. A certification to file a case was issued by the Barangay Captain. So
nag-file ng kaso ang plaintiff. The complaint for UD contained no allegation that there was a prior demand
to vacate.
“Motion to dismiss,” sabi ng defendant, “no demand to vacate. Have you written me a letter? Did you
notify me to vacate?”
According to the plaintiff, “My golly! We have already talked with the Baranggay. May usapan na
tayo dun! Pareho na rin yun!” So the plaintiff contended that no further demand to vacate is needed after a
certification to file a case was issued by the Barangay Captain for the reason that the case was already
certified to court for action. Any further demand to vacate is merely repetitive and unnecessary.

HELD: Plaintiff is wrong. Mali! The certification of the Barangay Captain is not conclusive as to the
jurisdiction of the Court to which the case was subsequently filed. What was certified by the Baranggay
Captain was that no settlement was reached by the parties in the Barangay level. It did not certify that all
the requisites for the filing of the UD case was complied with. Therefore the case is dismissed.

So demand to vacate is jurisdictional. Kaya to play it safe, sabihin mo na lang “I am requesting you to pay your
rentals AND TO VACATE!” I-capitalize mo yung ‘AND TO VACATE’ para wala ng samok… because it has been the
cause of so many problems eh. It reaches the SC just because of the issue: was there a demand to vacate? The best thing
is to use that words so that there could be no room for controversy.

Q: Is there a possibility that an UD case will be filed without a prior demand to vacate?
A: It would seem so. Demand to vacate, if you observed, is essential if you ground for UD is non-payment of rentals
or failure to comply the condition of the lease.

Q: Now, suppose the ground for ejectment is expiration of the lease contract. Example: “Mr. Lessee, this is to
remind you that the lease contract will going to expire at the end of this month. I will not renew your contract so you
better look for another place to move.” Well, that is just a reminder. There is no demand to vacate. At the end of the
month, nandun pa rin ang lessee. File ka ng UD. But where is the demand to vacate?
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A: There are some decided cases where the SC said that the demand to vacate may be dispensed with because
anyway, the ground for ejectment is not non-payment of rentals or violation of conditions of the lease contract. Meaning,
the defendant should be informed straight ahead that he could not extend his stays anymore.

That is what Section 2 seems to convey, “…such action by the lessor shall be commenced only after demand to pay
or comply with the conditions of the lease and to vacate…”

Actually I experienced this eh years ago. I filed an action for UD without any demand to vacate because my ground
is expiration of the lease contract. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss because no demand to vacate. I was telling the
court, “Your Honor, demand to vacate is not really necessary in all cases. When the ground is expiration of lease
contract, hindi na kailangan. And these are decided cases...”

And the judge does not know the cases. He does not know the exception. He knows the general rule! So I appealed
to the old CFI. Na-reverse. Bumalik. The hearing took almost 8 months.

And I said, this is a lesson for me. I will stick with the general rule most of the time because you do not expect the
judge to know the exception. So that is a lesson in my practice.

Q: Where do you compute the one year period ?

A: For Forcible Entry, from the date of unlawful deprivation.
For Unlawful Detainer, from the date of unlawful withholding. That is evident by the demand to vacate because
you give a deadline. You count the one year period from your deadline.

Q: Suppose, hindi nag-vacate. Hindi ka rin nag-file ng case. Pinabayaan mo lang. Then after one year you gave
another demand to vacate. When do you count the one year period ? From the date of the first demand or second
demand?
A: Standing Rule : LATEST DEMAND.
PEÑAS, JR. vs. CA
233 SCRA 794

HELD: The one year period provided for in Section 1, Rule 70 should be counted from the last letter of
demand to vacate. The reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right of action based on the
previous demand and let the lessee remain in the meanwhile. In effect, I legalize his possession all over
again by not doing anything.

Now, the next provisions starting form Section 3 to 14 are new provisions and reiterations of the rules of Summary
Procedure. Remember when we took up Summary Procedure, all FE and UD cases are covered by the Summary Rules.
That is why in 1997 when the SC decided to amend the rules in Civil Procedure, sinama na nila ang mga ito.

Sec. 3. Summary procedure — Except in cases covered by the agricultural tenancy laws or when the law
otherwise expressly provides, all actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, irrespective of the amount of
damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the summary procedure hereunder
provided. (n)

Sec. 4. Pleadings allowed — The only pleadings allowed to be filed are the complaint, compulsory
counterclaim and cross-claim pleaded in the answer, and the answers thereto. All pleadings shall be verified. (3a,
RSP)

Sec. 5. Action on complaint — The court may, from an examination of the allegations in the complaint and
such evidence as may be attached thereto, dismiss the case outright on any of the grounds for the dismissal of a
civil action which are apparent therein. If no ground for dismissal is found, it shall forthwith issue summons. (n)

Sec. 6. Answer — Within ten (10) days from service of summons, the defendant shall file his answer to the
complaint and serve a copy thereof on the plaintiff. Affirmative and negative defenses not pleaded therein shall be
deemed waived, except lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Cross-claims and compulsory counterclaims
not asserted in the answer shall be considered barred. The answer to counterclaims or cross-claims shall be served
and filed within ten (10) days from service of the answer in which they are pleaded. (5, RSP)

Sec. 7. Effect of failure to answer — Should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period
above provided, the court, motu proprio or on motion of the plaintiff, shall render judgment as may be warranted
by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein. The court may in its discretion
reduce the amount of damages and attorney’s fees claimed for being excessive or otherwise unconscionable,
without prejudice to the applicability of section 3 (c), Rule 9 if there are two or more defendants. (6, RSP)

Sec. 8. Preliminary conference; appearance of parties — Not later than thirty (30) days after the last answer
is filed, a preliminary conference shall be held. The provisions of Rule 18 on pre-trial shall be applicable to the
preliminary conference unless inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
The failure of the plaintiff to appear in the preliminary conference shall be cause for the dismissal of his
complaint. The defendant who appears in the absence of the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment on his
counterclaim in accordance with the next preceding section. All cross-claims shall be dismissed. (7, RSP)

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If a sole defendant shall fail to appear, the plaintiff shall likewise be entitled to judgment in accordance with
the next preceding section. This procedure shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under a
common cause of action who had pleaded a common defense shall appear at the preliminary conference.

No postponement of the preliminary conference shall be granted except for highly meritorious grounds and
without prejudice to such sanctions as the court in the exercise of sound discretion may impose on the movant. (n)

Sec. 9. Record of preliminary conference — Within five (5) days after the termination of the preliminary
conference, the court shall issue an order stating the matters taken up therein, including but not limited to:

1. Whether the parties have arrived at an amicable settlement, and if so, the terms thereof;
2. The stipulations or admissions entered into by the parties;
3. Whether, on the basis of the pleadings and the stipulations and admissions made by the parties, judgment
may be rendered without the need of further proceedings, in which event the judgment shall be rendered within
thirty (30) days from issuance of the order;
4. A clear specification of material facts which remain controverted; and
5. Such other matters intended to expedite the disposition of the case. (8, RSP)

Sec. 10. Submission of affidavits and position papers — Within ten (10) days from receipt of the order
mentioned in the next preceding section, the parties shall submit the affidavits of their witnesses and other
evidence on the factual issues defined in the order, together with their position papers setting forth the law and the
facts relied upon by them. (9, RSP)

Sec. 11. Period for rendition of judgment — Within thirty (30) days after receipt of the affidavits and position
papers, or the expiration of the period for filing the same, the court shall render judgment.
However, should the court find it necessary to clarify certain material facts, it may, during the said period,
issue an order specifying the matters to be clarified, and require the parties to submit affidavits or other evidence
on the said matters within ten (10) days from receipt of said order. Judgment shall be rendered within fifteen (15)
days after the receipt of the last affidavit or the expiration of the period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the foregoing procedure just to gain time for the rendition of the judgment. (n)

Sec. 12. Referral for conciliation — Cases requiring referral for conciliation, where there is no showing of
compliance with such requirement, shall be dismissed without prejudice, and may be revived only after that
requirement shall have been complied with. (18a, RSP)

Sec. 13. Prohibited pleadings and motions — The following petitions, motions, or pleadings shall not be
allowed:

1. Motion to dismiss the complaint except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, or
failure to comply with section 12;
2. Motion for a bill of particulars;
3. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of a judgment, or for reopening of trial;
4. Petition for relief from judgment;
5. Motion for extension of time to file pleadings, affidavits or any other paper;
6. Memoranda;
7. Petition for certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the court;
8. Motion to declare the defendant in default;
9. Dilatory motions for postponement;
10. Reply;
11. Third-party complaints;
12. Interventions. (19a, RSP)

Sec. 14. Affidavits — The affidavits required to be submitted under this Rule shall state only facts of direct
personal knowledge of the affiants which are admissible in evidence, and shall show their competence to testify to
the matters stated therein.
A violation of this requirement may subject the party or the counsel who submits the same to disciplinary
action, and shall be cause to expunge the inadmissible affidavit or portion thereof from the record. (20, RSP)

Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction.— The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession against the
plaintiff.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5) days
from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall decide the
motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (3a)

Q: Can the court issue a writ of preliminary injunction ?

A: YES under Section 15, to prevent the defendant from further acts of disposition.

Q: Can the plaintiff file in an action for UD and FE a petition for mandatory injunction ?
A: YES

Q: Is the remedy of preliminary injunction available in UD and FE cases, especially the remedy of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore the plaintiff immediately in the possession of real property?
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A: YES.

If you look at Article 539 of the New Civil Code, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (PMI) is only possible in FE
cases. There is no such thing under the CC as PMI in UD cases. You cannot get a PMI against your lessee.

But you look at the new law, Section 15 “A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful
detainer…” Therefore the remedy of PMI has been made applicable also under the new rules to UD cases. Naging
broader na.

The applicability of PMI in UD cases was first laid down by the SC before 1997 in the case of DAY vs. RTC of
ZAMBOANGA Branch 13, 191 SCRA 610.

Before, I was wondering when this thing came out. How about the objection: Did the Rules of Court a procedural
law, amended the Civil Code which is a substantive law? This is tantamount to Rules of Court amending Article 539 of
the CC. Of course may reason talaga ang SC nyan. But where did the SC get also that rule?

I went back to the case of DAY vs. RTC to find out the basis. And the SC said it was authorized by SEC 33 of the
Judiciary Law BP 129 that MTC can issue Provisional Remedies in all cases.

“(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, including
the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases…” Sec. 33, BP 129

That’s how the SC explained. Actually, the Judiciary Law is substantive law. This was passed by the Congress. So
in effect, the Judiciary Law has already amended Article 539 of CC which is also a substantive law. It is not the SC that
modified or expanded the substantive right in the CC. It was the Congress and the SC is just interpreting it. Yaan!

This reminds me about the first question asked in Political Law in last Sunday’s Bar Exam: A senator makes a
remark: “The Supreme Court is a continuing constitutional convention.” Do you agree or disagree?

Actually, both sides are defensible. But you have to understand what the question is…because if you cannot
understand, it can bother you: how can the SC be a constitutional convention where a constitution can only be amended
by a convention called for that purpose by the Congress in joint session? How can the SC amend the constitution? That
would be unconstitutional!

But you go deeper: who interpret the Constitution? Supreme Court man ba! Kaya nga sabi ng isang American
Justice: ‘The Constitution is what the Supreme Court says.’ Kahit mali ang pag-interpret, tama man ba!. And take note,
decisions of the SC form part of the law of the land. So everytime there is a constitutional issue and the SC interprets it,
they are made into doctrines. So in effect, you can say that the SC keeps on amending the Constitution by interpreting
the different provisions of the Constitution. So in that sense, the SC is a continuing constitutional convention.

SEC. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of
ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. (4a)

Now this is taken almost word for word from the Judiciary Law, Sec 33.

Judiciary Law Sec 33 - Jurisdiction of MTC, RTC and MCTC in Civil Cases

“…2.Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of FE and UL provided that when in some cases the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership. The issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of
possession. “
.
The language is identical. So this is taken from that provision.

In FE and UD, the issue or controversy is possession. Ownership is irrelevant, immaterial in FE and UD. Not even
possession as a right or possession de jure but purely physical possession. That is why a squatter can file an action for
FE, even if technically, he has no legal right to the property he is possessing. Why? Because ownership is not the issue.
Who has the legal right should be threshed out in accion publiciana.

The only issue is the recovery of physical possession.

Q: What happens if there is also the issue of ownership? Can the MTC rule on the issue of ownership if it is raised?
A: YES, if it is necessary to rule on the issue of possession. Sometimes the issue of possession hinges on the issue
of ownership. But if the court says that based on the evidence, the court is of the opinion that the owner is A, that is a
declaration of ownership which is only prima facie. The court really has no power to rule on the issue of ownership in
FE and UD.

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If you want to quarrel on ownership, you want to find out who really is the owner, punta kayo sa RTC… dun kayo
mag away, huwag dito. But if I (MTC) will rule on ownership only as a preliminary step only to decide on the issue.
That is only prima facie.

That is why the SC said :When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding on the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only
to determine the issue of possession. The decision of ownership is not final. That should be decided with the RTC

Q: Is it possible that we have two cases against each other? In the MTC on possession in the FE or UD, in the RTC
we are fighting on the issue of ownership.
A: YES. There is no interference.

Q: Suppose I file a case against you for FE or UD. Now you file a case also in the RTC where you raise the issue
that you are the owner. I'm claiming possession in the MTC and you are claiming ownership in the RTC. Suppose the
person claiming ownership would say, "Alright, since we are quarrelling on ownership already in the RTC, the MTC
should not try the case of FE or UD. The cases of FE or UD should be dismissed because the issue of ownership is
being litigated in the RTC.” Is that a correct position?
A: NO. The two can continue. RTC decides on ownership, the MTC decides on possession. The two are separate
issues. If I will file a case against you for FE or UD, which is actually a summary proceeding for ejectment, you can
easily defeat that by filing a case against me in the RTC where you raise the issue of ownership, although your
opposition is not serious. You will then contest the ownership just to kill my case. That would be improper.
REFUGIA vs. CA,
258 SCRA 347. July 5, 1996

HELD: By virtue of the express mandate set forth in Section 33, paragraph 2 of the Judiciary Law,
which is also Section 16, inferior courts or first level courts, i.e. MTC, have the power to resolve the
question of ownership raised as an incident of an ejectment case where the determination thereof is
necessary for a proper and complete adjudication on the issue of possession. Any such pronouncements
made affecting ownership is to be regarded merely as provisional.
Hence it will not bar nor prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the land.
HILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
260 SCRA 420

HELD: Even where the defendant alleges ownership or title to the property in his or her answer, the
first level court will not be divested of its jurisdiction. (It will not be deprived of its role) A contrary rule
will pave the way for the defendant to trifle with the ejectment suit which is summary in nature. He could
easily defeat the same through the simple expedient of asserting ownership.

In the MTC, we are quarrelling with the issue of possession. In the RTC, we are quarrelling with the issue on
ownership. The MTC does not have to give way to the jurisdiction of the RTC. That is the principle to remember.

There are some RARE instatnces na baliktad pa nga. There are two cases between the same parties and the court
said everything should be decided on the ejectment case or UD. It should be the RTC (to give way for the MTC)...
baliktad. One of them is UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS SERVICES INC. vs. CA (233 SCRA 86).The case is related to
one of the grounds for a motion to dismiss i.e. litis pendentia. There is another action pending between the same parties
for the same cause.As a general rule, when there are two cases pending between the two parties, for the same cause,
which should be dismissed? The first or the second case? Based on priority in time, the second will be dismissed.

Q: Is there a possibility that it should be the first (which must be dismissed)?

A: YES. When the first case was filed as an anticipatory suit, on the theory that the best defense is an offense. You
are converting your defense as a cause of action. That is what happened here.

UNIVERSITY PHYSICIANS SERVICES INC. vs. CA

233 SCRA 86

FACTS: UPSI is a corporation that operates a school. It bought 2 parcels of land in Manila where an
apartment was constructed. The obvious purpose of the company is to demolish it. They will put up a
school (building) there or classrooms. However, one unit of the apartment was occupied by a certain
Jocelyn Formentira. Despite the demand to vacate, Formentira refused. Hence UPSI commenced the
demolition of the apartment.
When Formentira saw that the apartment was demolished little by little, what she did was to file a
complaint for damages against UPSI, claiming that the demolition was unlawful. With it was a prayer for
preliminary injunction and restraining order against UPSI in the RTC. As main relief, she demanded that
UPSI be permanently enjoined from doing any act to force out or cause her ejectment from said apartment
unit.
UPSI, in turn, filed a complaint for ejectment against formentira in the MTC of Manila. Dalawa na
ang kaso:

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1. The first by Formentira i.e. damages with Preliminary Injunction; and

2. The second was filed by UPSI for ejectment.

ISSUE: Which of the two cases shall take precedence over the other? If we follow the rule of first-
come-first-serve, we will conclude that the case filed by UPSI (the second case) should be dismissed.

HELD: Formentira's action for damages should be dismissed. It is the RTC case filed ahead that
should be dismissed. Formentira cannot deny that the complaint for damages taken in its full context was
meant to prevent UPSI from ejecting her. The main action kunuhay, is damages. Kunuhay lang ba! But
with the prayer for injunction, in effect she is using the case for damages to stop her ejectment from the
apartment. Her complaint for damages bears unmistakable earmarks that show of its true nature and
character, touching as it does, on her alleged right to continue possession of the premises.
Though not couched in specific terms, Formentira is virtually asking for an indefinite extension of the
lease of the disputed premises. Admittedly, while she claims indemnity for what she believes were
wrongful and illegal acts committed against her by the UPSI, it is nevertheless indisputable that the pivotal
issue presented by the complaint involves the determination of her right or the lack of it over the disputed
property. It follows therefore that the damages allegedly suffered by her is merely an incident to the
question of possession disputed by the parties.
The issue of whether Formentira has the right should be threshed out in an ejectment suit and not an
action for damages, though the question of possession is likewise in issue. We cannot simply ignore the
fact that Formentira, after her unjustified refusal to vacate the premises was aware that an ejectment case
against her was forthcoming.

Sec. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render
judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorney’s fees and costs. If it finds that said
allegations are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is
established, the court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as
justice requires. (6a)

There will be hearing, and after these and the court finds that the allegations in the complaint are true, it shall render
judgement in favor of the plaintiff.

Q: Ano ang judgment?

A: The judgment ordering the defendant to vacate .the property involved or the restitution… surrender the
possession, the sums due as arrears of rent. So if UD, you pay all the back rentals. And the back rental could go as high
as more than P200,000 or as reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the premises.

For example, in FE, what rentals are you talking about? How can you compute the rental? If it is UD, klaro. The
rental of the lessee is, lets say P2,000 a month. Kung FE anong rental ang sinasabi mo dun? Wala mang rental, squatter
man yan. But he has to pay… the reasonable compensation of the use and occupation of the premises. Meaning, how
much, by way of damages is the plaintiff entitled to recover for the use and occupation of the property.

The court will now fix the reasonable compensation. The court can also award attorney's fees and costs. It should
not exceed P20,000.

If the allegations are not true, then the case will be dismissed and if there is a counterclaim, the same can be
awarded.

Q: Suppose you occupy my property, so I file FE. I will pray for ejectment, payment for reasonable compensation
for the use of my property, attorney’s fees, costs, damages i.e. moral and exemplary, unrealized profits (somebody
wanted to lease my property but cannot kasi andyan ka!). Or, if UD, I will eject you from my building, may sira ang
bahay, nasira ang walls, roof, floor, windows, doors, etc. So I will pay for damages for the deterioration you caused to
my building. My question is: Can the court award these damages i.e. moral, exemplary, or unrealized profits, for the
value of the destroyed portions of my house or building?
A: NO. The only thing you can recover are unpaid rentals, or in case of FE, reasonable compensation, attorney's fees
and costs.

Q: How about my claims for damages and unrealized profits?

A: If you want to recover, you file another case. Damages are not recoverable in FE and UD except such damages
as attorney’s fees, costs, unpaid rentals, or reasonable compensation. All other damages are not recoverable. File another
case.

While damages seems to be recoverable, these are limited only to:

1. attorney's fees;
2. costs;
3. unpaid rentals; and
4. reasonable compensation.(REYES vs. CA ,38 SCRA 138; BAEN vs. CA, 125 SCRA 634)

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SEC. 18. Judgment conclusive only on possession; not conclusive in actions involving title or ownership. The
judgment rendered in an action for forcible entry or detainer shall be conclusive with respect to the possession
only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the ownership of the land or building. Such judgment shall not bar
an action between the same parties respecting title to the land or building.

The judgment or final order shall be appealable to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which shall decide
the same on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in the court of origin and such memoranda and/or
briefs as may be submitted by the parties or required by the Regional Trial Court. (7a)

When there is a judgement in a FE or UD, they will be conclusive with respect to the possession only. Definitely,
the MTC has no power to rule on the issue of ownership or title.

There is no res adjudicata. But there is as to the issue of possession.

However, if you say that the court has the power to rule on the issue of possession, it also means all other issues
incident to the possession, e.g. has the lease contract expired? Or on the interpretation of terms and provisions of the
contract?

These issues are res adjudicata, except as to ownership. That is why Section 18 is related to Section 16. When
there is an issue raised in the pleadings as to the ownership, such will be resolved for the purpose of resolving the issue
of possession. But definitely, there should be another case to be filed as to the ownership.

Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same if judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay execution
files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the plaintiff to pay
the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless, during the
pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract, he shall
deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the preceding
month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of each succeeding
month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the other papers, to the
clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed.
All amounts so paid to the appellate court shall be deposited with said court or authorized government depositary
bank, and shall be held there until the final disposition of the appeal, unless the court, by agreement of the interested
parties, or in the absence of reasonable grounds of opposition to a motion to withdraw, or for justifiable reasons, shall
decree otherwise. Should the defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the
pendency of the appeal, the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, and upon proof of such failure, shall order the
execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of possession, but such execution shall not be a
bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition thereof on the merits.
After the case is decided by the Regional Trial Court, any money paid to the court by the defendant for purposes
of the stay of execution shall be disposed of in accordance with the provisions of the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court. In any case wherein it appears that the defendant has been deprived of the lawful possession of land or building
pending the appeal by virtue of the execution of the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court, damages for such
deprivation of possession and restoration of possession may be allowed the defendant in the judgment of the Regional
Trial Court disposing of the appeal. (8a)

Plaintiff files a complaint for FE or UD. The complaint prays for the decision to order the defendant to vacate the
property. Chances are rentals are included. After the hearing, the court renders the judgment: "WHEREFORE. finding
the plaintiff to have proven his cause of action, the same being meritorious, the court hereby (orders the defendant) to
pay all his unpaid rentals, beginning last year, at the rate of P1,000 a month, until he vacates." Or kung FE, "pay
P1,000 as reasonable compensation for the occupation of the property from the time he entered it to the time he
vacates." plus attorney's fees. So oredered.”

So panalo ka. The decision will be furnished to you. Following the usual pattern.

If we follow the general rules of civil procedure, the judgement is not yet final. The defendant has 15 days to
appeal. Now under the Rules, the plaintiff can file a motion to execute after the period to appeal, when there is no
appeal.

That is the rule, although as an exception, the plaintiff can file a motion for discretionary execution i.e. execution
pending appeal, provided there is a good reason… yun lang. So kung walang good reason, pasensya. So you have to
convince the court that there is a good reason. Otherwise you stick to the general rule.

Now, I file a case of FE against you or UD. Decision… panalo ako. Of course we assume that I will also receive
the decision today. It is not yet final. Now, under Section 19, tomorrow, I will file a motion for immediate execution,
because under the Rules, the judgement for UD or FE is IMMEDIATELY executory.

Palag si Cholo: "Wala mang good reason?"

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Q: Does the plaintiff have to cite good reason?

A: No good reason is required. The only reason is – I won. And according to the SC " it is a ministerial duty of the
MTC to order." Hindi kailangan na you have to wait for the judgment to become final. It is not necessary that you wait
for it to be final – that is only applicable to ordinary cases. Pagtanggap…file ka bukas. And the court will issue an order
of execution… because under Section 19 "a judgement is immediately executory".

That is a unique rule no? (tuod gid eh!)

We will now go to the side of the defendant. So there is now an order to eject you. The sheriff will go to you
anytime and kick you out. Is there a way for me to stop him?

Q: (As defendant) Can I stop the order of execution?

A: YES. There are three (3) things that you must do:

1. You must appeal.- You must appeal the judgement to the RTC. Appeal to the RTC.. Meaning, prevent
the judgment from becoming final.

2. The defendant must file a supersedeas bond to the RTC. - Ano ang supresedeas bond? A supersedeas bond
will answer for all the amount due to the plaintiff up to the date of the judgment.

Halimbawa ang back-rentals mo ay one year na. You have not been paying your rentals for a
year. At P1,000 a month, lets say P12,000. You post a supersedeas bond for P12,000. If the rental is
P2,000 a month, you pay a bond of P24,000.

You appeal, file bond, and you let the court approve the bond. With that the MTC will now
withdraw the order of execution.

Your appeal will now proceed. The records will be elevated to the RTC. The money you
deposited will be with the clerk of court. When the case reaches the RTC you do the third
requirement.

Remember, you filed the bond to answer the accounts due to the plaintiff under the judgement.

3. Pagdating sa RTC, be sure that every month you go to the office of the clerk of court. You make periodical
deposits of the rents falling due during the pendency of the appeal every month . Example, each month
P2,000 (if such is the monthly rental). While the appeal is going on, takbo nang takbo yung rental.

Kailan? Not later than the 10th day of the months succeeding. On or before the 10 th day of the
succeeding month or period. E.g. If the rental is due on September, on or before September 10. For
October, not later than October 10.

What happens if nalimutan mo? Nalimutan… ? What will the plaintiff do? The plaintiff,
through his lawyer will now file a motion to execute in the RTC… to execute the judgement of the
MTC. Bakit? Non-compliance. According to jurisprudence, it is the ministerial duty of the RTC to
order the execution.

So out. Paano yung appeal mo? Tuloy! Your appeal will continue, but in the meantime, out ka.
Kung nanalo ka, pabalikin ka. In the meantime, out ka!

The purpose of this law is to prevent the prolonged agony of the plaintiff.. The squatter or the
delinquent lesee can always delay. Kahit na talo na sige appeal… appeal… appeal (isang appeal pa…
appeal! umm!). These are the counter-measures.

Remember the three requirements. You fail to observe one, yari ka!. That is the rule. These are all intended to
restore the possession of the property to the plaintiff. That is the rule to remember. This is unique eh.

Q: Now, when do you file the supersedeas bond? What if I file my notice of appeal on the 10th day, and the bond
on the 16th?
A: The SC said, EXECUTE! The supersedeas bond should be deposited together within the 15 days. Hindi pwede
ma-extend. NO EXTENSION for the filing of the supersedeas bond.

CORDOVA vs. GABAYLEN

249 SCRA 172, October 10, 1995

HELD: While it is true therefore that defendant deposited the amount which approximates the
monetary judgment for unpaid rentals, since the same was filed late, it could not qualify as a supersedeas
bond. What is considered material for the purpose of the stay of execution pending appeal under Rule 70 is
not the fact of payment but more importantly, the timeliness of the filing of the supersedeas bond.
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Execution could not be legally stayed by reason of the admittedly belated filing of the aforequoted
supersedeas bond.

CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

286 SCRA 437, February 24, 1998

ISSUE: When do you file the supersedeas bond? Now there is no problem about the notice of appeal.
Your notice of appeal is filed within 15 days, otherwise it is file out of time. But is there a deadline for the
filing of the supersedeas bond? If you look at the law, wala man.

HELD: If the defendant-appellant perfected the appeal but failed to file a supersedeas bond, immediate
execution of the judgement automatically follows. Conversely, the filing of the supersedeas bond will not
stay the execution if the appeal is not perfected also. (Kailangan dalawa). Necessarily then, the
supersedeas bond should be filed within the period for the perfection of the appeal.

So everything within 15 days in order for the execution to not proceed. Take note of that.

Now normally, sino ba ang dapat mag-deposit while the case is on appeal? Normally defendant eh. Yung natalo.
Now in the old case of Cruz v. Hugo (77 Phil), the person under obligation to make the rental deposits is the defendant.
Not the plaintiff. But let us see what happened in the case of

CITY OF MANILA vs. CA

149 SCRA 150

FACTS: In a case involving the premises of an underpass in the Quiapo district, which is owned by the
City of Manila, below are stalls which the City is leasing. The stall owners were paying rentals per month,
lets say P4,000 a month. Manila increased the rental, let's say from P4,000 to P6,000. Ayaw nila. They
refuse to pay.
The City filed UD. The old city court of Manila rendered a decision upon.. . BINAYOT BA: "Ok, the
City Can increase the rental from P4,000 to P5,000”. Halfway bah! Payag ang mga store owners. It is the
City that is aggrieved, and it appealed. It appealed on that issue on whether the court was authorized to fix
its own rate as against what the lessor is setting. So appeal. And when the appeal was going on, these
defendants did not deposit in the clerk of court the P5,000 monthly rental. So that City moved to execute.
The judgement.

HELD: The SC said that the rule that immediate execution of judgement should be applied is not only
when it is the defendant appealing but also when it is the plaintiff appealing. Both sides.
Remember that the decision of the city court is P5,000, ayaw ng City. Ikaw (defendant), payag ka?
“Yes, payag" O, kung payag ka, ba’t ayaw mong mag-deposit (gago!)! There is something wrong there.
You are not questioning the decision yet you refuse to deposit. So you should deposit.
“We rule that Sec. 8 of Rule 70 (referring to the 1964 Rules) can apply even if it is the lessor who
appeals in the sense that in such a case, if the lessee desires to prevent execution pending appeal, he (the
lessee) must still file the supersedeas bond and deposit in court the accruing rentals. Our doctrine in CRUZ,
ET AL. vs. FERNANDO JUGO, ET AL. is reversed insofar as it conflicts with the present case. The
rationale for Our ruling is simple: why should the lessee continue occupying the premises without filing the
supersedeas bond and making the necessary deposit for ensuing rentals (particularly when, by his failure to
appeal, the lessee does not question said accrued and incoming rents)?”

Q: Under Section 19, what is the RTC executing?

A: The RTC is executing the judgment of the MTC. The case will still be decided by the RTC

Sec. 20. Preliminary mandatory injunction in case of appeal. Upon motion of the plaintiff, within ten (10)
days from the perfection of the appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the latter may issue a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore the plaintiff in possession if the court is satisfied that the defendant’s appeal is
frivolous or dilatory, or that the appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie meritorious. (9a)

There are two (2) instances when preliminary mandatory injunction can be availed of under Rule 70. The first is
Section 15, second paragraph i.e. before the case is decided, immediately upon the filing of the complaint. Now,
(second) eto namang appeal, in case the defendant will appeal or the plaintiff will appeal, the plaintiff can still ask for it
on appeal. That is on appeal if the defendant is frivolous or dilatory or the appeal of the plaintiff is prima facie
meritorious.

That is different from yung failure to file the supersedeas bond

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Sec. 21. Immediate execution on appeal to Court of Appeals or Supreme Court The judgment of the Regional
Trial Court against the defendant shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal that may be
taken therefrom. (10a)

So, talo ka sa MTC, you appeal to the RTC, you post bond, pay rentals, so plaintiff cannot file for execution
pending appeal.

Natalo ka parin sa RTC. Appeal ka sa CA under Rule 42, Petition for Review. But I will file a motion to execute
because the decision of the RTC is immediately executory.

You can appeal and cause more delay of a case under the summary procedure.

Under Section 17, you will file a motion in the RTC for the execution of the MTC decision. The RTC decided to
affirm the decision, so you will also file another motion for execution under Section 21.

Q: Where will you file your motion to execute under Section 21?
A: MTC or RTC.

Q: What are you actually executing?

A: The decision of the RTC or the MTC as affirmed by the RTC. (City of Manila vs. CA, 204 SCRA; SY vs.
Romero, 214 SCRA; Salientes vs. IAC, 246 SCRA 150 [1995]- the latest.)

What you are going to execute is the original decision of the MTC, so the records are brought back there and you
file your motion to execute in the MTC.

-oOo-

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