LEX PATRIAE

Review Center

ELECTION LAW
Special Lecture
Dean Hilario Justino F. Morales
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
SUFFRAGE – the right and obligation of qualified citizens to vote in the election of certain national and local officials
of the government and in the decisions of public questions submitted to the people. It includes within its scope:
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.
ELECTION – the means by which the people choose their officials for a definite and fixed period and to whom they
entrust for the time being as their representatives the exercise of the powers of government. It involves the choice or
selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. (Sambrani vs. COMELEC, 438 SCRA 319)
PLEBISCITE – a vote of the people expressing their choice for or against a proposed law or enactment submitted to
them. An election at which any proposed amendment to or revision of the Constitution is submitted to the people for
their ratification. A constitutional requirement to secure the approval of the people directly affected, before certain
proposed changes affecting local government units may be implemented.
INITIATIVE – it is the process by which the registered voters directly propose amendments to the constitution or to
propose, enact, amend laws, national or local, through an election called for the purpose. Local initiative is the legal
process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves without participation of their elected
representatives. (Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492)
REFERENDUM – it is the submission of a law passed by the national or local legislative body to the registered voters
at an election called for the purpose for their ratification or rejection.
RECALL – it is a method by which a local elective official may be removed from office during his tenure or before the
expiration of his term by a vote of the people after registration of a petition signed by a required percentage of the
qualified voters. RA 9244 effectively amended Section 70 of the Local Government Code and thus, eliminated the
preparatory recall assembly as one of the modes of initiating recall and provided for a new procedure in the conduct
of recall initiated through written petition of registered voters.
1. What are the qualifications of voters?
1. Filipino citizenship – it may be by birth or naturalization.
2. Age- a person may be registered as a voter although he is less than 18 years at the time of registration if he
will be at least 18 on the day of election.
3. Residence- at least 1 year in the Philippines, and at least 6 months where he proposes to vote immediately
preceding the election. Any person who, on the days of registration may not have reached the required
period of residence but who, on the day of election shall possess such qualification, may register as voter.
No literacy, property or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
Voters Registration
02. Discuss the System of Continuing Registration of Voters.
ANSWER: The System of Continuing Registration of Voters under RA 8189 requires the personal filing of application
of registration for voters which shall be conducted daily, Monday to Friday, except Saturdays, Sundays and holidays,
in the Office of the Election Officer, but not later than 120 days before a regular election or 90 days before a special
election. (Sec. 8, RA 8189)
03. Does Section 5(d) of RA 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents
in other countries by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the
Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
ANSWER: NO. This is an exception to the residency requirement. The Constitution’s framers intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin.
Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional
mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily
presupposes that the “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” is not physically present in the country. Under RA
9189, an immigrant may still be considered a “qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad” upon fulfilment of the
requirement of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their right of suffrage. The qualified
Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed
not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant does not
necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. He must be
(1)
given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the
affidavit. The execution of the affidavit is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit is not only proof of the
intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. (Macalintal
vs. COMELEC, GR No. 157013, July 11, 2003)
04. Are dual citizens, by virtue of RA 9225, qualified to register and vote?
ANSWER: YES. In Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC, GR No. 162759, August 4, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that
those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, may exercise the right to vote under the system
of absentee voting in RA 8189. In effect, they are likewise exempt from the residency requirements prescribed under
Article V. Section 1 of the Constitution. EXCEPTION: Under RA 9225, or Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003, the right to vote in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to those who are candidates for
or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized citizens; and /or are in active service as
commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country in which they are naturalized citizens.
Exceptions to Residency Requirement
05. What are the two exceptions to the residency requirement in the exercise of the right of suffrage under
Article V, Section 1 of the Constitution?
ANSWER: (1) Filipino Immigrants Abroad. Under RA 9189, an immigrant may still be considered a “qualified citizen
of the Philippines abroad” upon fulfilment of the requirement of registration under the new law for the purpose of
exercising their right of suffrage. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained
his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this
country. His having become an immigrant does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his
domicile of origin, the Philippines.
(2) Dual Citizens. Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, may exercise
the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in RA 8189. (Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC, GR No. 162759,
August 4, 2006)
06. What is the procedural qualification for voters?
ANSWER: A citizen, in order to be qualified to exercise his right to vote, in addition to the minimum requirements set
by the fundamental charter, is obliged by law to register under the provisions of RA 8189, otherwise known as the
“Voters registration ct of 1996.” (Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC, GR No. 147066, March 26, 2001)
07. What is the effect of registration on the right to vote, and the exercise of suffrage upon citizenship?
ANSWER: Mere registration of a voter does not confer upon him the right to vote. It is a condition precedent to the
exercise of the right to vote. It is a form of regulation, not a qualification. Likewise, the mere exercise of suffrage,
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship
cannot take the place of election of Philippine citizenship. (Republic v. Sagun, GR No. 187567, February 15, 2012)
08. Are double registrants disqualified to vote?
ANSWER: NO. Double registrants are still qualified to vote provided that the COMELEC has to make a determination
on which registration is valid and which is void because it would then give rise to the anomalous situation where a
voter could vote in two precincts at the same time. COMELEC laid down the rule in Minute Resolution No. 00-1513
that while the first registration of any voter subsists, any subsequent registration thereto is void ab initio. Thus, in
Maruhom v. COMELEC, GR No. 179430, July 27, 2009, it was held that Maruhom’s prior registration as a voter in
Marawi makes her subsequent registration in Marantao null and void. However, although her registration in Marantao
is void, her registration in Marawi still subsists. She may be barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but
she may still exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.
09. What are the disqualifications of voters? How can such disqualifications be removed?
ANSWERS: 1) Any person sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment for not less than one year.
2) Any person adjudged by final judgment of having committed (a) any crime involving disloyalty to the government or
(b) any crime against national security (c) firearms laws.
3) Insane or incompetent persons as declared by competent authority.
4) Under RA 9225, or Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, the right to vote in the Philippines cannot
be exercised by, or extended to those who are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and /or are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country in which they are naturalized citizens.
Disqualification by reason of conviction may be removed by:
1) Plenary pardon 2) Amnesty 3) Lapse of 5 years after service of sentence (Sec. 111, RA 8189)
Exclusion Proceedings
10. ANTONIO, wanted to file a petition to exclude BALDO from the list of registered voters in Barangay
Sipsipnget. Petitioner ANTONIO contended that while BALDO was born and grew up in the barangay, the
latter comes home to the barangay only for occasional visits and that he stays most of the time in the
Capital town where he has been employed for the past 5 years.
(1) In what forum must the petition be filed? (2) Decide whether to grant the petition or not.
ANSWERS:
(1) The question involving the right to vote shall be decided by the Municipal Trial Court and is expressly
withheld from the COMELEC by constitutional provision.
(2)
(2) The petition shall not be granted. Any person who transfers residence to another town or city or country by
reason of his occupation or profession or employment, shall be deemed not to have lost his original
residence. (Sec. 9, RA 8189)
COMELEC Power Over Political Parties
11. Can the COMELEC exercise jurisdiction on issues relating to political party’s identity and leadership?
ANSWER: YES. The COMELEC’s constitutional power to register and regulate political parties includes the
ascertainment of the identity of the political party and its legitimate officers responsible for its acts and the resolution
of such controversies where one party appears to be divided into two wings under separate leaders each claiming to
be the president of the entire party. (LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 161265, February 24, 2004, citing Kalaw vs.
COMELEC, GR Nos. 86177-78, August 31, 1989) The COMELEC has the power and function to enforce and
administer election all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election. In the exercise of such power and in
the discharge of such function, the COMELEC, has jurisdiction to rule upon the issue as to who, between the Party
Chairman and the Secretary General, has the authority to sign certificates of candidacy of the official candidates of
the party. The repercussions of the question of party identity and the leadership do not end at the validity of
endorsement of the certificates of candidacy of persons claiming to be the party’s standard bearer. The law grants a
registered political party certain rights and privileges, which, naturally, redound to the benefit of its candidates. (LDP
vs. COMELEC, GR No.161265, February 24, 2004)
Qualifications and Disqualifications
12. What are the qualifications of candidates? When must the required qualifications be possessed? The
common qualifications required of all elective officials are age, citizenship, residence, mere ability to read and write
(Filipino or any other local language and dialect, for local elective officials) and registration as a voter.
Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be possessed for the duration of the
officer’s active tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title to the office may be seasonably
challenged. (Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245 and Labo vs. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1) It then becomes a
ground for disqualification and eventual removal from office. This ruling was reiterated in Maquiling v. COMELEC,
GR No. 195649, April 16, 2013, thus, the citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It must
be possessed not just at the time of renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship to attack.
The required age qualification must be possessed by any candidate, national or local, on the day of election.
For national elective officials, natural-born Filipino citizenship is required. For local elective officials, the
Local Government Code requires that they must be citizens of the Philippines – either natural born or naturalized.
The law does not specifically provide when must the required citizenship be possessed. But in Altarejos vs.
COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655, the Supreme Court’s reiterated its ruling in Frivaldo, 257 SCRA 727, that repatriation
retroacts to the date of filing of one’s application for repatriation. Accordingly, petitioner’s repatriation retroacted to the
date he filed his application in 1997 and was, therefore, qualified to run for mayoralty position in the government in
May 2004 elections.
Citizenship
13. Can a former natural-born Filipino citizen who reacquired Filipino citizenship through repatriation be eligible
to run for congressman?
ANSWER: YES. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as
a natural - born Filipino, which is the citizenship requirement for members of Congress. Repatriation is effected
by taking an oath to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place
where he resides or last reside in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any
other citizenship. ( Bengson III VS. HRET, et al. GR No. 142840, May 7, 2001)
14. Are persons with mere dual citizenship disqualified to run for elective local positions under Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code? What if the dual citizenship is acquired pursuant to RA 9225?
ANSWER: NO. The phrase “dual citizenship” in Section 40 (d) of RA 7160 must be understood as referring to
“dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike
those with dual allegiance who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon filing of their certificate of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. (Mercado, supra) However, if the dual citizenship is
voluntarily acquired through RA 9225, the Dual Citizenship Law, the same can be a ground for disqualification.
Disqualification to Vote and be Elected Under RA 9225
15. Who among those who re-acquired or retained Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 cannot exercise, or are
not extended the right to vote or be elected to any public office in the Philippines?
ANSWER: The right to vote or be elected to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended
to, those who (a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or (b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country in which they are naturalized. [Section 5(5a,b), RA 9225]
(3)
In Nicolas-Lewis vs. COMELEC, GR No. 162759, August 4, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that those who
retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee
voting in RA 8189. In effect, they are likewise exempt from the residency requirements prescribed under Article V.
Section 1 of the Constitution.
Requirement for Elective Office Under RA 9225
16. What procedural requirement must be complied with by those who re-acquired or retained Philippine
citizenship under RA 9225, and who are seeking elective public office?
ANSWER: Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines who shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of filing of certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. [Section 5(2), RA 9225]
Mere filing of certificate of candidacy cannot operate as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship. The
affiant-candidate must state in clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign citizenship for it to be
effective. Absent an evidence that will show that Lopez complied with the provision of RA 9225, he is disqualified to
run for Barangay Chairman of Barangay Bagacay. (Lopez vs. COMELEC, GR No.182701, July 23, 2008)
An oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles Philippine Consul
General does not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign
citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes. The oath of allegiance
is a requirement in reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by natural born-citizens who are already naturalized citizens
of a foreign country as required by Section 3 of RA 9225, further there is nothing in the said oath that expressly
makes a renunciation of the foreign citizenship. Section 5(2) of RA 9225 categorically requires persons seeking
elective public office who either retained their Philippine citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an
oath simultaneous with or before filing off the certificate of candidacy. (Jacot vs. Dal, GR No. 179848, November 27,
2008) This rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship without regard as to whether they
are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed for the exercise of the right to run for public office. It is an
additional qualification for elective office specific only to Filipino citizens who re-acquire their citizenship under Sec. 3
of RA 9225. It is the operative act that restores their right to run for public office. (Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC,
GR No. 198742, August 10, 2012)
Use of Foreign Passport
17. Does the act of using a foreign passport constitute renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship?
ANSWER: YES. While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act
No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very
oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run
for a local elective position. (Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649, April 16, 2013)
Residence Qualification
18. What is the rationale of the law in requiring candidates to have minimum period of residence in the area in
which they seek to be elected?
ANSWER: The rationale of requiring candidates to have a minimum period of residence in the area in which they
seek to be elected is to prevent the possibility of a stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs
of a community and not identified with the latter from seeking an elective office to serve that community. The
residence requirement is rooted in the desire that officials of districts or localities be acquainted not only with the
metes and bounds of their constituencies but, more important, with the constituents themselves, (Torayno vs.
COMELEC, 337 SCRA 574)
19. Are immigrant visa or greencard holders eligible to run for public office?
ANSWER: NO. A Filipino citizens’ immigration to a foreign country constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. In other words, the acquisition of a permanent residency status is a foreign country
constitutes a renunciation of the status as a resident of the Philippines. (Caasi vs. CA, 191 SCRA 229). But the act of
a person surrendering her greencard to the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the US Embassy is clear
indication of her intention to abandon her US residency. (Gayo vs. Verceles, 452 SCRA 504)
20. What are the requisites in the acquisition of a new domicile?
ANSWER: In election cases, the Supreme Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms. In order to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) an
intention to remain there; and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. The residence at the place chosen for the
new domicile must be actual. (Romualdez vs. RTC, 226 SCRA 406) The mere approval of the application of
registration as a voter only shows, at most, that she had met the minimum residency requirement as a voter. This
minimum requirement is different from that for acquiring a new domicile of choice for the purpose of running for public
office. (Jalosjos v. COMELEC, GR. No. 193314, February 26, 2013)
21. What is the effect of renunciation of foreign citizenship upon residency?
ANSWER: Residency is not interrupted by the taking of an oath of renunciation of foreign citizenship or of an oath of
allegiance to the Philippines because a former Filipino who was naturalized abroad may choose to re-establish his
residency prior to reacquisition of citizenship. (Japzon v. COMELEC, January 19, 2009) Even foreigners may
establish their domicile here in the Philippines. Residency, for purposes of election laws includes the twin elements of
the fact of residing in a fixed place and the intention to return there permanently, and is not dependent upon
citizenship. (Cordora v. COMELEC, February 19, 2001)
(4)
22. Does mere property ownership in a locality confer upon a person the right to vote and be voted for an
office?
ANSWER: NO. In Dumpit-Michelena vs. Boado, 475 SCRA 290, the Supreme Court ruled that property ownership in
not indicia of the right to vote or be voted for an office. A beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It
can hardly be considered a place of residence. Further, domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, there must be concurrence of the following requirements: (1) an actual removal or an actual change of
domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3)
acts which corresponds with the purpose. Without clear and positive proofs of the concurrence of those 3
requirements, the domicile of origin continues. To effect change, there must be animus manendi coupled with animus
revertendi. The intent to remain in the new domicile of choice must be for indefinite period of time, the change of
residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. The
Supreme Court agreed with the Second Division of the COMELEC that Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she
has abandoned her former domicile.
In Fernandez, v. HRET, GR No. 187478, December 29, 2009, it was ruled that the Constitution does not
require a congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he
resides in the district for at least a year prior to the election day. To use ownership of property in the district as
determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the landed can establish compliance
with the residency requirement. It would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public
office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional.
23. Do Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose additional qualification for
candidate for senator? Corollary, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for
senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution?
ANSWER: YES. Section 36(g) of RA 9165 and its implementing COMELEC Resolution, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office is unconstitutional as it effectively enlarges the qualification
requirements enumerated in Section 3, Article VI of the Constitution. It adds another qualification layer to what the
1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Congress’ inherent legislative power are
subject to certain substantive and constitutional limitations. It cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such
qualification in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. The right of a citizens in the democratic process of
election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution. (Social Justice Society vs.
Dangerous Drugs Board, GR No.157870, November 3, 2008)
Conviction of a Crime
24. Are those convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude who have not served their
sentence and were granted probation disqualified to run for local elective office?
ANSWER: NO. In Moreno vs. COMELEC, GR No. 168550, August 10, 2006, the Supreme Court ruled that those
who have not served their sentence by reason of the grant of probation are not disqualified from running for local
elective office because the two year period of ineligibility does not even begin to run. The grant of probation merely
suspends the execution of the sentence.
While Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code allows prior convict to run for local elective office, the
said provision should not be deemed to cover cases wherein the law imposes a penalty, either as principal or
accessory, which has the effect of disqualifying the convict to run for elective office. (Jalosjos v. COMELEC, GR No.
205033, June 18, 2013)
A sentence of prision mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the
eligibility of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. (Jalosjos v. COMELEC, GR No.
193237, October 9, 2012)
Direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. The Local Government Code is a codified set of laws that
specifically applies to local government units. Section 40 thereof specifically and definitely provides for
disqualifications of candidates for elective local positions. It is applicable to them only. On the other hand, Section 12
of the Omnibus Election Code speaks of disqualifications of candidates for any public office. It deals with the election
of all public officers. Thus, Section 40 of the Local Government Code insofar as it governs the disqualifications of
candidates for local positions, assumes the nature of a special law which ought to prevail. (Magno vs. COMELEC,
390 SCRA 495)
Those convicted by final judgment for violating his oath of allegiance to the Republic is also another ground for
disqualification under the Local Government Code .
Removal from Office and Fugitives from Justice
25. Who are considered fugitive from justice?
Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case and fugitives from justice in criminal or non-
political cases are also disqualified under the Local Government Code. However, an elective local official who was
removed from office prior to January 1, 1992 is not disqualified from running for elective local office. (Grego vs.
COMELEC, 274 SCRA 481) The term “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment, but likewise who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. (Marquez vs. COMELEC, 243 SCRA
538)
(5)
Filing of Certificate of Candidacy
26. What is the purpose of the law in requiring the filing of certificate of candidacy and in fixing the time limit
therefore?
ANSWER: The evident purpose of the law in requiring the filing of certificate of candidacy and in fixing the time limit
therefore are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the regular election, the candidates among
whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast.
For if the law did not confine the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered candidates, there might be
as many persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious persons as
mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same election. (Miranda vs. Abaya, GR No.
136351, July 28, 1999)
27. Give the effect of the filing of certificate of candidacy of the following:
a. GALO LAGINGTALO, an employee of the PNOC-EDC, a government owned and controlled
corporation without original charter, who filed his certificate of candidacy for municipal councilor;
b. LITO LAPID an incumbent Senator who filed his certificate of candidacy for City Mayor of Makati;
and
c. TED FAILON, a broadcast journalist of ABS-CBN, who filed his certiicate of candidacy for
congressman.
ANSWERS:
a. An appointive public official is considered resigned upon filing of his certificate. This includes an employee
of a government owned or controlled corporation organized under the Corporation Code, since the law
makes no distinction. (PNOC-EDC vs. NLRC, 222 SCRA 831)
In Quinto and Tolentino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189698, February 22, 2010, the Supreme Court, in
a motion for reconsideration, reversed its earlier ruling and thus declared as not
UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso
in the third paragraph of Section 13 of RA 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
b. Any elective official, whether national or local, who has filed a certificate of candidacy for the same or any
other office shall not be considered resigned from office. (Sec. 14, RA 9006, amending Sec. 67 of BP 881)
c. Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer-reporter, on-air correspondent or personality are
deemed resigned if so required by their employer. (Sec. 6, subpar. 60, RA 9006)
In Farinas vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Section 14 of RA 9006 which in effect repealed Section 67 of BP 881.
28. SGE filed his Certificate of Candidacy for Mayor of Candihay, Bohol. ASO, who was a candidate for
councilor in the same municipality, filed before the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification against SGA alleging that
the latter’s COC was not properly sworn contrary to the requirement of the Omnibus Election Code and the 2004
Rules on Notarial Practice. ASO pointed out that in executing his COC, SGA merely presented his Community Tax
Certificate to the notary public instead of presenting competent evidence of identity. Consequently, SGA’S COC was
declared by the COMELEC as had no force and effect and should be considered as not filed. Is the ruling of the
COMELEC valid?
ANSWER: NO. It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to uphold ASO’s claim that an improperly sworn
COC is equivalent to possession of a ground for disqualification. The petition is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as enumerated in Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 40 of the Local Government
Code. Nowhere therein does it specify that a defective notarization is a ground for the disqualification of a candidate..
Et the COMELEC would uphold that petition to disqualify a candidate “for lack of qualifications or possessing some
grounds for disqualification.” The distinction between a petition for disqualification and the formal requirement in
Section 73 of the Omnibus Election Code that a COC under oath is not simply a question of semantics as the
statutes list the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate. Apart from the qualifications provided for in the
Constitution, the power to prescribe qualifications for elective office and grounds for disqualification therefrom,
consistent with constitutional provisions, is vested in Congress. However, laws prescribing the qualifications for and
disqualifications from office are liberally construed in favor of eligibility since the privilege of holding an office is a
valuable ones. (Amora v. COMELEC, GR No. 192280, January 25, 2011)
29. What is the effect of filing multiple candidacies?
ANSWER: A person who files a certificate of candidacy for more than one office should not be eligible for any of
them. (Sec 73, BP 881) However, before the deadline for filing certificates, he may withdraw all except one, declaring
under oath the office for which he desires to be eligible and cancel the certificate of candidacy for the other office or
offices. (Go vs. COMELEC, GR No. 147741, May 10, 2001)
30. What is the nature of the duty of the COMELEC to receive certificates of candidacy?
ANSWER: Subject to its authority over nuisance candidates and its power to deny due course or cancel a certificate
of candidacy, the rule is that the COMELEC shall have only the ministerial duty to receive and acknowledge receipt
of the certificates of candidacy. (Sec. 78, BP 881) The COMELEC has no discretion to give or not to give due course
to a certificate of candidacy. (Cipriano vs. COMELEC, 436 SCRA 45) EXCEPTION: Nuisance Candidacy. In denying
due course to the certificate of candidacy of a presidential candidate, the Supreme Court held that there is no
constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly, to seek the Presidency – what is recognized is
merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance
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candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is to
divine – the State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective and orderly.
Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion not to mention
the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for election- a disorderly election is not merely a
textbook example of inefficiency but a rot that evades faith in our democratic institution. (Pamatong vs. COMELEC,
427 SCRA 96)
Substitution of Candidates
31. What is the concept of substitution of candidacy?
ANSWER: If after the last day for filing certificates, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party
may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. The substitute
candidate nominated by the political party concerned may file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected not
later than the mid-day of election day. (Talaga v. COMELEC,GR No.196804, October 9, 2012)

32. What are the grounds for substitution of candidacy?

ANSWER: The grounds for substitution of candidacy are 1) death, 2) disqualification or 3) withdrawal.
33. Who among the candidates may be substituted?
ANSWER: Under the express provision of Section 77 of the OEC, not just any person, but only “an official candidate
of a registered or accredited political party” may be substituted. In the case at bar, Kimberly was an official nominee
of the Liberal Party, thus she can be validly substituted. (Cerafica v. COMELEC, GR No. 205136, December 2, 2014)
In Engle v. COMELEC, GR No. 215995, January19, 2016, it was held that the petitioner’s husband clearly
indicated in his COC that he was a nominee of Lakas-CMD and attached thereto not only the CONA signed by
Romualdez but also the Authority to Sign Certificates of Nomination and Acceptance in favor of Romualdez signed by
Lakas-CMD President Revilla and Secretary General Aquino. It was publicly known that James Engle was a member
of Lakas-CMD. As far as the party and his wife is concerned, Engle, as a member of the party, may be substituted as
a candidate upon death. There was no evidence on record that the party had notice or knowledge of the COMELEC’s
classification of Engle as an independent candidate prior to February 22, 2013, when petitioner filed her COC as
substitute for her deceased husband. The only document in record indicating that the party has been notified of
Engle’s designation as an independent candidate is the Letter dated March 21, 2013 sent by the COMELEC Law
Department to Romualdez stating that Engle was an independent candidate due to the failure of the party to submit
the authority of Romualdez to sign Engle’s CONA to the Law Department and in view thereof the petitioner’s COC
was denied due course. The letter is not binding and at most, recommendatory. The COMELEC did not cancel
petitioner’s COC on the ground of false material representation as there was none.
34. Is substitution of candidacy allowed for barangay candidates even if their election is non-partisan and that
there is no political party from which to designate the substitute?
ANSWER: YES. The argument that inasmuch as the barangay election is non-partisan and that there can be no
substitution because there is no political party from which to designate the substitute, ignores the purpose of
election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people. The absence of a specific provision
governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections cannot be inferred as a prohibition against said
substitution. Such restrictive construction cannot be read into the law where the same is not written. There is more
reason to allow the substitution of candidates where no political parties are involved than when political
considerations or party affiliations reign, a fact that must have been assumed by law. Election contests involve
public interests and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the
determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials. (Rulloda vs COMELEC, 395
SCRA 365)
35. May a disqualified candidate and whose certificate of candidacy was denied due course and/or cancelled by
the COMELEC be validly substituted?
ANSWER: NO. The concept of a substitute presupposes the existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a
person take the place of somebody who does not exist or who never was. Therefore, a disqualified candidate may
only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate
did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person
was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. (Miranda vs. Abaya, GR No. 136351,
July 28, 1999)
However, where a certificate of candidacy was never cancelled or denied due course by the COMELEC and
the same was withdrawn before the COMELEC declared that he was not a valid candidate, and that COMELEC
found that the substitute complied with all the procedural requirements for valid substitution, the latter can validly
substitute the former. The question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and
proper cognizance of the COMELEC – if the candidate made a material misrepresentation as to his date of birth or
age in his certificate of candidacy, his eligibility may only be impugned through a verified petition to deny due course
or cancel such certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Election Code. Therefore, unless a candidate’s
certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled, his certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be
validly substituted. (Luna vs. COMELEC, 522 SCRA 107)
36. What are the requisites for valid substitution? The requisites for valid substitution are:
1) The substitute must belong to the same political party. There is nothing in the Constitution or statute which
requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate must have been a member of the party concerned
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for a certain period of time before he can be nominated as such. (Sinaca vs. Mula, 315 SCRA 266) Section 77 of
the OEC requires that there be an “official candidate” before candidate substitution proceeds. Thus, whether the
ground for substitution is death, withdrawal or disqualification of a candidate, the said section unequivocally states
that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted. (Tagolino v. HRET, GR No.
202202, March 19, 2013)
2) The deceased, disqualified or withdrawn candidate must have duly filed a valid certificate of candidacy. A valid
certificate of candidacy is likewise an indispensable requisite in the case of a substitution of a disqualified
 candidate under the provisions of Sec. 77 of the Election Code. The concept of a substitute presupposes the
existence of the person to be substituted, for how can a person take the place of
somebody who does not exist or who never was. (Miranda vs. Abaya, 311 SCRA 617) A disqualified candidate
may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of candidacy in the first place because, if
the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a
candidate at all. If a person was not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Sec. 77 of the Code. (Ibid.)
EXCEPTION: This does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be
substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78 of the OEC. While the law enumerated
the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is
excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. (Ibid.)
37. When is the deadline for filing of substituted certificate of candidacy?
ANSWER: Substitution can only take place on the first day of campaign period until not later than mid-day of election
day. Different deadlines were set to govern the specific circumstances that would necessitate the substitution of a
candidate due to death, disqualification or withdrawal. In case of death or disqualification, the substitute had until
midday of the election day to file the certificate of candidacy. In case of withdrawal, which is the situation at bench,
the substitute should have filed the certificate of candidacy by December 4, 2009. The reason for the distinction can
easily be divined. Unlike death or disqualification, withdrawal is voluntary. Generally, a candidate has sufficient time
to ponder on his candidacy and to withdraw while the printing has not yet started. If a candidate withdraws after the
printing, the name of the substitute candidate can no longer be accommodated in the ballot and a vote for the
substitute will be just wasted. (Federico v. COMELEC, GR No. 199612, January 22, 2013)
Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy
38. What is the nature of the power of the COMELEC to cancel certificate of candidacy? What are the effects of
cancellation of a COC?
ANSWER: Nature and Effects. A CoC cancellation proceeding essentially partakes of the nature of a disqualification
case. The cancellation of a CoC essentially renders the vote cast for the candidate whose certificate of candidacy
has been cancelled as stray votes. If the disqualification or CoC cancellation or denial case is not resolved before the
election day, the proceedings shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner, but the
COMELEC jurisdiction to deny due course and cancel his or her CoC continues. This rule likewise applies even if the
candidate facing disqualification has already taken his oath of office. The only exception to this rule is in the case of
congressional and senatorial candidates where the COMELEC ipso jure loses jurisdiction in favour of either the
Senate of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal after the candidates have been proclaimed, taken proper
oath, and also assumed office. (Hayudini v. COMELEC, GR No. 207900, April 22, 2014)
Void Certificate of Candidacy. A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the
time of the filing of CoC can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. If the certificate of
candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person who filed such void CoC was never a candidate in the elections at
any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can
never be a first placer in the elections. If a CoC void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the day of the
election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. If a CoC void ab initio is
cancelled one day or more after elections, all votes for such candidates should also be stray votes because the CoC
is void from the very beginning. (Jalosjos v. COMELEC, GR No. 193237, October 9, 2012)
Reglementary Period and Procedure. A petition to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained in a certificate of candidacy as required
by law is false. The petition should be filed not later than 25 days from the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
Observance of Due Process. The proceeding on the cancellation of a certificate of candidacy does not
merely pertain to the administrative functions of the COMELEC. Cancellation proceedings involve the
COMELEC’s quasi-judicial function which must first be decided by the COMELEC in division. Hence, the
COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered the cancellation of a candidate’s certificate of
candidacy without first referring the case to a division for summary hearing. A summary proceeding does not mean
that the COMELEC should throw away the requirements of notice and hearing. The COMELEC should have at
least given notice to the candidate to give him the chance to adduce evidence to explain his side in the
cancellation proceedings. The COMELEC has deprived the candidate of procedural due process of law when it
approved the report of the Law Department without notice and hearing. (Bautista vs. COMELEC, 414 SCRA299)
When a candidate files his certificate of candidacy, the COMELEC has a ministerial duty to receive and
acknowledge its receipt. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or
cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. A petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy
shall be heard summarily after due notice. The law mandates that the candidates must be notified of the petition
against them and should be given the opportunity to present evidence on their behalf. This is the essence of due
process. (Luna vs. COMELEC, 522 SCRA 107)
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In Cerafica v. COMELEC, GR No. 205136, December 2, 2014, it was held that the COMELEC can
not just rely on the recommendation of the COMELEC Law Department in the issuance of a resolution to
cancel a certificate of candidacy. The Court reminded the COMELEC that, in the exercise of its adjudicatory
or quasi-judicial powers, the Constitution mandates it to hear and decide cases first by Division and, upon
motion for consideration, by en banc.
39. What are the grounds for disqualification of candidates? What constitute falsity of material representation in
the certificate of candidacy? What are the consequences of a candidate found guilty of misrepresentation?
ANSWERS: The grounds for the disqualification of candidates are (1) violation of Omnibus Election Code – Sec. 68;
(2) being a nuisance candidate – Sec. 69; and (3) falsity of material representation in certificate of candidacy. - Sec.
78
In order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of BP 881, it is essential
that the false representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter, i.e., it refers to a qualification for elective
office and affects the candidate’s eligibility. Profession or occupation not being a qualification for elective office,
misrepresentation of such does not constitute a material misrepresentation. No elective office, not even the office of
the President of the Republic of the Philippines, requires certain profession or occupation as a qualification. (Lluz vs.
COMELEC, 523 SCRA 456)
Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under Sec. 78 must consist of a “deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible.” In other words, it
must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications for public office. The use of
surname, when not intended to mislead or deceive the public as to one’s identity, is not within the scope of the
provision. (Salcedo II vs. COMELEC, 312 SCRA 447)
To prove whether or not there has been material representation, the same must not only be material, but
also deliberate and willful. (Romualdez vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 30 and Fornier vs. COMELEC GR No. 161824,
March 3, 2004)
A candidate guilty of misrepresentation may be (1) prevented from running, or (2) if elected, from serving, or
(3) prosecuted for violation of the election laws. (Bautista vs. COMELEC, 414 SCRA 299)
Effects of Disqualification Cases
40. What are the effects of a disqualification case against a candidate for elective office?
ANSWER: (1) After final judgment – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. In Cayat vs. COMELEC, GR 163776, April 24,
2007, due to his failure to pay the prescribed filing fee for his motion for reconsideration, the disqualification of Cayat
and the subsequent cancellation of his certificate of candidacy became final 23 days before the 2004 elections.
Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in his favor are stray. He was never a candidate in the 2004 elections.
(2) Before final judgment - If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the
provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption of office. Section 6 of RA
6646 and Section 72 of the OEC require a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate
to be considered stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. For
in voting a candidate who has not been disqualified by final judgment during the election day, the people voted for
him bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was
then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of the government. (Codilla Sr.
vs. De Venecia,GR. No. 150605, December 10, 2002)
41. What are the prohibited contributions and donations?
No political contribution shall be made by the following:
1. Public or private financial institutions
2. Public utilities and those who exploit natural resources
Thus, where an operator of a public utility disguised a contribution to a candidate for
governor as loan, the promissory not is void.(Halili vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 633)
3. Persons who hold contracts or sub-contracts to supply the government with goods and services
4. Persons granted franchises, incentives, exemptions or similar privileges by the government
5. Persons granted loans in excess of P25,000 by the government or any of its
subdivisions or instrumentalities
6. Schools which received grants of public funds of at least P100,000
7. Employees in the Civil Service or members of the Armed Forces
8. Foreigners (Sec. 95, BP 881)
9. Corporations (Sec. 36(9), Corp. Code)
It is prohibited for any candidate, his spouse, relative within second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or
representative to make any contribution for any structure for public use or for use of any religious or civic
organization, except the normal religious dues and payment for scholarships established and school contributions
habitually made before the campaign period. (Sec. 104, BP 881)
42. What are the lawful and prohibited election propaganda?
ANSWER: The following are the lawful propaganda
1. Forms
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a. Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers and written or printed materials not more than 8 1/2
inches by 14 inches
b. Handwritten/printed letters
c. cloth, paper or cardboard, posters measuring not more than 2 feet by 3 feet by 8 feet allowed
in announcing at the site on occasion of a public meeting or rally, may be displayed 5 days
before the date of rally but shall be removed within 24 hours after said rally.
 d. Paid print advertisements: ¼ page in broadsheets and ½ page in tabloids thrice a week per
newspaper, magazine or other publication during the campaign period. (Sec. 4, RA 9006)
e. Broadcast Media (i.e., TV and Radio)
National Positions: 120 minutes for TV, 180 minutes for Radio
Local Positions: 60 minutes for TV; 90 minutes for Radio
f. Other forms of election propaganda not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code and RA
9006, and authorized by the COMELEC.
2. Requirements
Any published or printed political matter or broadcast of election propaganda by television
or radio for or against a candidate or group of candidates to any public office shall bear and be
reasonably legible or audible words “political advertisements paid for,” followed by the true and
correct name and address of the candidate or party for whose benefit the election propaganda was
printed or aired.
If the broadcast is given free of charge by the radio or television station, it shall be
identified by the word “airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by” followed by the
true and correct name and address of the broadcast entity.
Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political party shall
not be printed, published, broadcast or exhibited without the written acceptance by the said
candidate or political party. Such written acceptance shall be attached to the advertising contract
and shall be submitted to the COMELEC. (Sec. 4, RA 9006)
43. What are the prohibited campaign?
1. Public exhibition of a movie, cinematograph or documentary portraying the life or biography of a
candidate during campaign period;
2. Public exhibition of a movie, cinematograph or documentary portrayed by an actor or media
personality who is himself a candidate;
3. Use of airtime for campaign of a media practitioner who is an official of a party or a member of the
campaign staff of a candidate or political party.
Scope
a. Prohibiting the posting of decals and stickers except in the common posting area authorized by the
COMELEC is not valid. (Adiong vs. COMELEC, 244 SCRA 272)
b. Mass media may report news relating to candidates, and mass media practitioners may give their
opinion regarding candidates. (National Press Club vs. COMELEC, 207 SCRA 1)
Rallies
1. An application for permit for a rally shall not be denied except on the ground that a prior written
application for the same purpose has been approved. A denial is appealable to the provincial
election supervisor or COMELEC. (Sec. 87, BP 881)
2. It is unlawful to give or accept transportation, food, drinks ore things of value within 5 hours before and
after a public rally, before election day and on election day. (Sec. 89 BP 881)
44. Is the prohibition on posting campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals constitutional?
ANSWER: NO. The prohibition constitute a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs are forcefully and effectively inhibited from
expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise
or permit to operate. The assailed prohibition on posting election campaign materials is an invalid content neutral
regulation which are not within the constitutional power of the COMELEC to issue and are not necessary to further
the objective of ensuring equal time, space and opportunity to the candidates
Likewise, The prohibition is not only repugnant to the free speech clause but also violates the equal
protection clause. A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other
properties in that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a
permit to operate. If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and
opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same
preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In term of ownership, the distinction between owners of
PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial. Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification. The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for
use by the public is likewise not substantial justification to set them apart from other private vehicles and other
properties. (1-UTAK v. COMELEC, GR No. 206020, April 15, 2015)
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45. A tarpaulin was posted by the Diocese of Bacolod within a private compound housing the San Sebastian
Cathedral of Bacolod containing the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)
Team Buhay with a check mark, or “Pro-RH) Team Patay with an “X” mark. The tarpaulin was neither
sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. The COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin as it will be constrained to file an election offense against the Diocese. Is
the order of the COMELEC Law Department valid?
ANSWER: NO. While respondent COMELEC cited the Constitution, laws and jurisprudence to support their position
that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin, however, all these provisions pertain to candidates and political
parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party. COMELEC does not have the
authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in
this case. Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons
who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is
regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate
only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b)reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of
enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free
expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with
respect to the time, place and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the speech be prohibited
or censored on the basis of its content. For this purpose, it will not matter whether the speech is made with or on
private property.
The present case also involves one’s right to property. Even though the tarpaulin is seen by the public, it
remains the private property of petitioners. Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property.
There may be no expression when there is no place where expression may be made. COMELEC’s infringement
upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement of their fundamental right to
speech. (The Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC, GR No. 205728, January 21, 2015)
46. What are the limitations on election expenses?
ANSWER: The following are the limitations on election expenses under Sec. 13, RA 7166:
1. Candidates
a. President and vice president – P10 per voter
b. Other candidates – P3 per voter in his constituency
c. Candidate without political party – P5 per voter
d. Party/organization and coalition participating in the party- list system – P5 per voter
2. Political party and coalition – P5 per voter in the constituency where it has candidates. (Sec. 13,
RA 7166)
47. Who are required to file a statement of contribution and expenditures? What are the effects of
failure to file? What are the penalties thereto?
ANSWER: a. Every candidate and treasurer of political party shall file within 30 days after election day a
statement of contributions and expenditures.
b. All candidates are required to file whether winning, losing or withdrawn.
1. Effect of failure to file
No persons elected shall assume office until he and his political party have filed the
required statements.
2. Penalties
a. First Offense – administrative fine from P1,000 to P30,000
b. Subsequent offense
i. Administrative fine from P2,000 to P60,000
ii. Perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Sec. 14, RA 7166)
Exception to the penalty of fine: Candidates for elective barangay office
3. Effect of withdrawal
A candidate who withdrew his certificate of candidacy must still file a statement of
contributions and expenditures, for the law makes no distinction. (Pilar vs. COMELEC, 245 SCRA
759)
Failure of Elections
48. Who has the authority to declare failure of elections and the calling of special election? What are the three
instances where a failure of election may be declared?
ANSWER: Section 4 of RA 7166 provides that the COMELEC sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members may
decide the declaration of failure of election and the calling of special election. A prayer to declare failure of elections
and a prayer to annul the election results are actually of the same nature as both are based on allegations of fraud,
terrorism, violence or analogous causes. (Banaga Jr. vs. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 701)
Sec. 6 of the OEC contemplates three instances when the COMELEC may declare a failure of election and
call for the holding of a special election. (1) when the election in the polling place has not been held on the date fixed
on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud and other analogous cases; (2) when the election in any
polling place has been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closure of the voting on account of force
majeure, violence, fraud and other analogous causes; and (3) after the voting and during the preparation and
(11)
transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in the failure to elect on
account of force majeure, violence terrorism or other analogous causes. (Mitmug vs. COMELEC, 230 SCRA 54;
Soliva vs. COMELEC, GR. No. 141723, April 20, 2001; Banaga vs. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 701 and Benito vs.
COMELEC, 349 SCRA 705)
49. What are the two conditions that must concur before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to
declare a failure of election? What is the consequence of a declaration of failure of election?
ANSWER: Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of election, two conditions
must concur: (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts due to force majeure, violence or terrorism, and (2)
the votes not cast are sufficient to affect the results of the election. The cause of the failure may arise before or after
the casting of votes or on the day of election. (Benito vs. COMELEC, 349 SCRA 705) In the event that there is a
declaration of failure of election, the COMELEC, sitting en banc, may call a special election. (Section 4, RA 7166)
Pre-proclamation Controversy
50. (1) What are pre-proclamation controversies?
(2) What issues may be raised in a pre-proclamation case? What issues are explicitly prohibited to be
raised in a pre-proclamation case under the Automated Election System?
ANSWERS:
(1) Pre-proclamation controversies refer to any question about the composition and proceeding of the board
of canvassers. After the proclamation, a controversy becomes an election contest. (Section 241, BP 881;
COMELEC Res. No. 8804, Part II, Rule 4, Section 6, March 22, 2010)
(2) The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:
a. illegal composition or proceedings in the BOC;
b. the canvassed ER’s contain certain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies
c. when the ER’s are delayed, lost of destroyed;
d. the ER’s were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, obviously manufactured or not
authentic, and
e. when substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of
which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate. (COMELEC Res.8809, Section 24,
March 30, 2010)
There shall be no proclamation cases on issues/controversies relating to the generation/printing,
transmission, receipt and custody, and appreciation of the ER’s or the COC’s. (COMELEC Res.8809, Section 24,
March 30, 2010)
51. When is there an illegal composition and illegal proceeding of the BOC? What are considered evidence of
an illegal proceeding of the BOC?
ANSWERS: There is an illegal composition of the BOC when, among other similar circumstances, any of the
members do not possess the legal qualifications and appointments. There is an illegal proceeding of the BOC when
the canvassing is a sham or mere ceremony, the results of which are pre-determined and manipulated. The
following circumstances indicate an illegal proceeding of the BOC: 1) hurried canvassing 2) terrorism 3) lack of
sufficient notice to the members of the BOC, and 4) improper venue. (COMELEC Res.8804, Section 2, March 22,
2010)
Proclamation
52. Can a winning candidate who died before his proclamation still entitled to be proclaimed? What are the
effects of the death of a winning candidate?
ANSWERS: YES. In Benito vs. COMELEC, 325 SCRA 436, it was held that a mayoralty candidate who obtained the
highest number of vote and who was ambushed and killed before his proclamation is still entitled to be proclaimed as
winner but with the information, in parenthesis, that he died, for the purpose of applying the rule on legal succession.
The death of a winning candidate: 1) cannot serve as basis for the Municipal Board of Canvassers to
exclude from tallying, counting and canvassing all votes for and in the name of the deceased candidate; 2) does not
render his victory and proclamation moot and academic but it is rather the duty of the Municipal Board of Canvassers
to proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes; and 3) does not necessarily entitle
the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office.
53. What is the so-called Rejection of the Second Placer Doctrine? What are the two specific requirements for
the application of the doctrine? When does the doctrine not apply?
ANSWER: The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified
or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. To allow the defeated and
repudiated to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate
without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s right
to elect officials of their choice. Court a quo correctly held that the second placer lost the elections and was
repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. (Loreto vs. Brion, 311 SCRA 694) For to allow the
defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to
disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of
democracy and the people’s right to elect officials of their choice. (Benito vs. COMELEC, 325 SCRA 436)
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The doctrine is equally applicable to multi-slot position such as Sanggunian member. Thus, if the 10 th spot
in the city council has been declared vacated, the 11th placer cannot be elevated to said higher position for the simple
reason that the electorate did not elect him as one of the ten city councilors. (Idulza vs. COMELEC, 427 SCRA 7012)
The doctrine will apply if two conditions concur: (1) the decision on a candidate’s disqualification case
remained pending on election day resulting in the presence of two mayoralty candidates; and (2) the decision on
such disqualification case became final only after elections. (Cayat vs. COMELEC, GR 163776, April 24, 2007)
 The doctrine was applied in Labo vs. COMELEC and a host of other cases because the judgment declaring
the candidate’s disqualification had not become final before the elections but became final only three days after the
1992 elections.
When the doctrine does not apply. On the other hand, the doctrine does not apply to Cayat vs. COMELEC
because the disqualification of Cayat and the subsequent cancellation of his certificate of candidacy (for his failure to
pay the prescribed filing fee for his motion for reconsideration) became final 23 days before the 2004 elections. Thus,
Palileng was the only candidate for Mayor of Buguias, Benguet. As the only candidate, Palileng was not a second
placer. On the contrary, Palileng was the sole and only placer, second to none. The doctrine on the rejection of the
second placer, which triggers the rule on succession, does not apply in his case because he is not a second placer
but the only placer. Consequently, his proclamation as mayor is beyond question. (Cayat vs. COMELEC, supra)
In Maquiling v. COMELEC, GR No. 195649, April 16, 2013, the Supreme Court further elucidated the
Rejection of the Second Doctrine. Thus,
“When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the
laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks
any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.
“The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible.
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-
placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates. That the
disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and assumed office is of no moment. The
subsequent disqualification based on substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the certificate of candidacy but also the proclamation.
“Arnado was both a Filipino and American citizen when he filed hid certificate of
candidacy.xxx The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long after the elections,
reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate
at all in the 2010 elections. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favour should not
have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not
apply.
Likewise, in Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 193314, June 25, 2013, the Court ruled that where the office is vacated
by an ineligible candidate whose Certificate of Candidacy was invalid at the time of filing, the eligible candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes must assume the office. The ineligible candidate who was proclaimed and who
already assumed office is a de facto officer by virtue of the ineligibility.
The rule on succession in Section 44 of the LGC cannot apply in instances when a de facto officer is ousted
from office and the de jure officer takes over. The ouster of a de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy as
contemplated in the LGC. There is no vacancy to speak of as the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the elections,
has the legal right to assume the position. (Ibid.)

Effect of Proclamation
54. What is the effect of the proclamation of a winning candidate whose proclamation is the subject of a pending
election protest?
ANSWER: Once proclaimed and duly sworn in office, a public officer is entitled to assume office and to exercise the
functions thereof. The pendency of an election protest is not sufficient basis to enjoin him from assuming office or
from discharging his functions. Unless his election is annulled by a final and executory decision, or a valid execution
of an order unseating him pending appeal is issued, has the lawful right to assume and perform the duties of the
office to which he has been elected. (Mendoza vs. Laxina, 408 SCRA 156)
55. What is the effect of the proclamation of a candidate who has been charged with an election offense?
ANSWER: The COMELEC is mandated to dismiss a complaint for disqualification of a candidate who has been
charged with an election offense under Section 261 of the OEC but who has already been proclaimed as winner by
the Board of Canvasser. If the COMELEC finds that there is probable cause, it shall order its Law Department to file
appropriate Information with the RTC which has territorial jurisdiction over the offense, but shall nonetheless,
order the dismissal of the complaint for disqualification, without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal case. If the
trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, it shall order his disqualification
pursuant to Section 264 of the OEC as amended by Section 46 of RA 8189. (Albana vs. COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98)
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Election Protest & Quo Warranto; Jurisdiction

56. Who exercise exclusive original and appellate jurisdiction over election protests and quo warranto?
ANSWER: The following exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over election protests: (1) Presidential
Electoral Tribunal – President and Vice President; (2) Senate Electoral Tribunal – Senators; (3) House of
representatives Electoral Tribunal – Congressmen; (4) COMELEC – Provincial, City and Regional; (5)
Regional Trial Court – Municipal, and (5) Municipal Trial Court – Municipal and Sangguniang Kabataan.
 The final decisions of both the RTC and MTC are appealable to the COMELEC (Division). The final
ruling of a COMELEC Division shall be elevated first to the COMELEC En Banc before the same shall be
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari. Final decisions of the SET and HRET may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.
57. Distinguish election protest from quo warranto.
ANSWER:
As to who can file
EP : any losing candidate who has filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted upon for the same office
QW: any registered voter in the constituency
As to Purpose
EP : annul The election of an elected candidate on the ground of frauds and irregularities in the
conduct of election and the counting and canvassing of votes
QW: disqualify an elected official on the ground of ineligibility due to age, citizenship or the
COMELEC of acts enumerated under Sec. 68 of BP 881
As to grounds
EP : fraud, terrorism, irregularities or illegal acts committed before, during or
after the casting and counting of votes
QW: ineligibility or disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
As to reglementary period
EP: within 30 days (president and vice president), 15 days (senator) and 10
days for all others from proclamation of election results
QW: within 10 days from proclamation of election results
Effect in the protestee
EP : Protestant may assume office after protestee is unseated
QW: Protestee may be ousted, the protestant will not be seated
58. When is an election protest said to be sufficient in form and substance?
ANSWER: An election protest is said to be sufficient in form and substance if it contains verification and certification
of non-forum shopping as required by SC Adm. Circular No. 04-94. Also an election protest should contain the
following jurisdictional allegations: (1) the protestant is a candidate who duly filed a certificate of candidacy and was
voted for in the election; (2) the protestee has been proclaimed elected; (3) the date of proclamation (Miro vs.
COMELEC, 121 SCRA 466); and (4) the precincts where the alleged fraud or irregularity took place.
59. Is the payment of docket fee jurisdictional? What is the effect, if any, of the failure of the protestant to pay
the prescribed docket fee?
ANSWERS: A court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. (Soller
vs. COMELEC, 339 SCRA 685) Failure to pay filing fees will warrant outright dismissal of the action and the election
tribunal has no jurisdiction over the case. (Banaga vs. COMELEC, 336 SCRA 701) But in Jaramilla vs. COMELEC,
414 SCRA 337, it was held that the COMELEC is not constrained to dismiss a case before it by reason of non-
payment of filing fees. The COMELEC has the discretion whether to entertain the petition or not in case of non-
payment of legal fees. And even if it were not afforded such discretion, it is authorized to suspend its rules or any
portion thereof in the interest of justice.
60. Who exercises jurisdiction over election contest relative to the election, returns and disqualifications of
members of the House of Representatives?
ANSWER: The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. Thus,
once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns and qualification
ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. (Aggabao vs. COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400)
61. When does the Supreme Court jurisdiction as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal be invoked?
ANSWER: The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court sitting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal would not include cases
directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the
elections are held. (Tecson vs. COMELEC, GR No. 161434, March 3, 2004)
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62. Who can legally contest the election of the President and Vice President? In case of death, can he be
substituted by the wife?
ANSWERS: Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered candidate for President
and Vice President who received the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the
President or Vice President, as the case may be. The Rule envisions a scenario where, if the declared winner had
not been truly voted upon by the electorate, the candidate who received the 2 nd or 3rd highest number of votes would
be the legitimate beneficiary in a successful election.
 NO. While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election contest is not
purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court
of all authority to continue the protest proceedings. The Court has allowed substitution and intervention but only by
the real party in interest. Where the widow is not a real party in interest, Court has denied substitution by the wife or
heirs. (Poe vs. GMA, 454 SCRA 142)

63. Who can be a protestant in an election contest involving municipal officials? Regional, provincial and city
officials?
ANSWER: Under the SC 2010 Rules of Procedure for Election Contest Involving Municipal Officials, any candidate
for the same office with the second or third highest number of votes can be a protestant. For multi-slot positions,
such as Sanggunian members, only four candidates following the last-ranked winner can file an election protest.
(Sec. 4) The losing candidate who is filing an election protest against an elective regional, provincial or city official
must have received the second or third highest number of votes, or in a multi-slot position, was among the next four
candidates following the last ranked winner proclaimed, as reflected in the official results of the election contained in
the SOV. (Comelec Res. No. 8804, Part III, Rule 6, Section 2, March 22, 2010)
Election Offenses
64. What is electoral sabotage? What penalty is imposed upon its violators?
Under RA 9369, The Poll Automation Law, amending RA 8436, the following shall be guilty of a non-bailable
special election offense to be known as electoral sabotage which is punishable by life imprisonment:
(1) Any person who removes the certificate of canvass posted on the wall, whether within or after the
prescribed 48 hours of posting, or defaces the same in any manner;
(2) Any person who simulates an actual certificate of canvass or statement of votes, or a print or digital
copy thereof;
(3) The Chairman or any member of the Board of Canvassers who signs or authenticates a print of the
certificate of canvass or its supporting statement of votes outside of the canvassing area;
(4) When the tampering of votes, or refusal to credit the correct votes or deduct tampered votes is/are
committed in the election of national elective office which is voted upon nationwide and such acts shall adversely
affect the results of the election to the said national office to the extent that losing candidate/s is/are made to appear
the winner/s;
(5) Regardless of the elective office involved, when the tampering of votes committed, or the refusal to
credit the correct vote or to deduct tampered votes perpetrated, is accomplished in a single document and involved in
the said tampering exceed 5000 votes, and the same adversely affects the true results of the election. (6) Any and
all other forms of tampering increase/s and/or decrease/s perpetuated or in cases of refusal to credit the correct
votes or deduct the tampered votes, where the total votes involved exceed 10,000 votes.

65. Can a person criminally liable for election offenses be exempted by the COMELEC from prosecution?
ANSWER: YES. Those who have committed election offenses but volunteer to give information and testify on any
violation of said law in any official investigation, or proceeding with reference to which his information and
testimony is given transactional immunity. The testimony of a voluntary witness in accord with his sworn statement
operates as a pardon for the criminal charges to which it relates. If such witness later refuses to testify or testifies but
contrary to his affidavit, he loses his immunity from suit and may be prosecuted for violation of Sec. 261 (a) and (b) of
the OEC, perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, or false testimony under Art. 180 of the same Code.
(COMELEC vs. Espanol, 417 SCRA 554)
The power to grant exemption is vested solely on the COMELEC. This power is concomitant with its
authority to enforce election laws, investigate election offenses and prosecute those committing the same. The
exercise of such power should not be interfered with by the trial court. Neither may the Supreme Court interfere with
the COMELEC’s exercise of its discretion in denying or granting exemptions under the law, unless the COMELEC
commits a grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. (Ibid.)
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