G.R. No.

199894

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

CARLITO CLARO y MAHINAY, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In every criminal case where the accused enjoys the presumption of innocence, he is entitled
to acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt.

The Case

The accused seeks to undo the decision promulgated on March 24, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03702,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment rendered on November
17, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, in Manila convicting him of rape. 2

Antecedents

The accused was charged with rape under the following information, to wit:

That on or about March 14, 2006, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs and by means of force,
violence and intimidation, and fraudulent machination, have carnal knowledge with said
AAA, 3 by then and there texting the latter to see each other at the corner of Augusto Francisco
Street, inviting her for a stroll at Rizal A venue, ordering food from Jollibee, bringing her at
Aroma Motel under the pretext that they will just talk and eat their food thereat, entering a room
at said motel and locking the door, pulling her on the bed and kissing her,underssing (sic) her
and thereafter inserting his penis into her vagina then succeeded in having carnal knowledge
of her, against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.4

Evidence of the Prosecution

At around 9:00 o'clock in the morning of March 14, 2006, AAA, a housemaid, received a text
message from the accused asking if they could meet. He was then working as a security guard
near AAA's place of work. AAA accepted his invitation and met with him on Augusto San
Francisco Street, Sta. Ana, Manila, where they boarded a passenger jeepney bound for Rizal
A venue in Sta. Cruz, Manila. Arriving in Sta. Cruz, they entered a Jollibee restaurant on Rizal
Avenue and ordered food. They later on went to a nearby house, later identified as the Aroma
Motel. She refused to go up the stairs of the motel, which impelled him to hold her by the hand
and pull her upstairs, insisting that they would only talk and eat. He then talked to a male
attendant who ushered them into a room.
Upon entering the room, AAA tried to leave, but the accused closed the door and pushed her
towards the bed. She still attempted to leave but the door was locked. He pulled her back to
the bed, telling her that he loved her. Instead of responding to him, she said that she needed to
go to the toilet. Once inside the toilet, she called her cousin, Alberto German (German), a
police officer, but she was unable to give him her exact location after her phone ran out of
charge. It was then when the accused barged inside the toilet and again pulled her back to the
bed. He forcefully undressed her completely, went on top of her, and forcibly inserted his penis
inside her vagina. She kept on punching to try to stop him, but to no avail. After he was done,
she immediately put on her clothes and left the room. But she was compelled to ride with him
in the same passenger jeepney because she did not know her way back.

Upon arriving home, she promptly reported the incident to German, who instructed her to
contact the accused and agree to meet with him again so that they could apprehend him. She
did as instructed. Just as they agreed, the accused went to the meeting place, where German
quickly approached him and introduced himself as a police officer. The accused tried to run
away, but German seized him and brought him to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
for investigation.

Dr. Wilfredo E. Tierra, the NBI medico-legal officer, conducted the medico-genital examination
of AAA. He found the presence of fresh deep hymenal laceration at 5 o'clock position with
edges bleeding; abrasion measuring 1.3 cm. on the left breast; and contusion measuring 1.5
cm. on the right hand of AAA. 5

Evidence of the Defense

The accused denied the accusation.

The accused claimed that he and AAA had first met on January 6, 2006, and became friends;
that their friendship had blossomed into romance, with them becoming lovers after two months;
that they had gone out once on a date on March 6, 2006, and had agreed to go out on a date
again on March 14, 2006; that on the latter date, they had met at Augusto San Francisco
Street, Sta. Ana Manila, and had proceeded on board a passenger jeepney to the Jollibee
restaurant on Rizal Avenue; that at the Jollibee restaurant, he ordered food and asked her
whether they would push through with their plan to go to a motel; that after she assented, they
walked together to the motel, where a room boy led them to their designated room, which had
a doorknob that could be locked from the inside; that once they entered the room, she went to
the restroom and later came out wearing only a towel; that she told him that she loved him,
and they started kissing each other; that she took off the towel, while he undressed; that she
did not resist when he went on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina, but he stopped
when she told him that she was not yet ready; that they then got dressed, left the motel
together, and boarded a passenger jeepney; that after parting ways, she called him through his
cellphone and asked if they could see· each other again; and that once he arrived at the
meeting place, a police officer later identified as German arrested and handcuffed him.

Also testifying for the Defense was the mother of the accused. She asserted that AAA was
already her son's girlfriend prior to the incident; that when she went to the police headquarters
upon learning of her son's arrest, she saw AAA but the latter asked her to talk to German
instead; that German told her: Wala nang madami pang usapan, basta mangako ka sa akin na
magbibigay ka ng ₱200, 000. 00; and that she asked AAA about what had really happened,
but the latter refused to answer her query.6

Ruling of the RTC

As stated, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape, decreeing:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused CARLITO CLARO Y MAHIN A

Y GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of

reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim, AAA the total amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. With costs. It appearing that accused is
detained, the period of his detention shall be credited in the service of his sentence.

SO ORDERED.7

Decision of the CA

On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, disposing:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant APPEAL is DENIED. Accordingly, the

Decision dated November 17, 2008 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in Criminal
Case No. 06-242729 convicting accused-appellant of the crime of rape is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.8

The CA regarded AAA's testimony as credible; and ruled that the presence of bruises and
abrasions on the body of AAA proved that she had been subjected to bodily harm before he
accomplished his lustful desires. It observed that the fact that the parties had gone home
together after the incident was sufficiently explained by AAA's statement that she had no
choice but to go with him because she did not know her way back.

Issue

Did the R TC and the CA correctly find and pronounce the accused guilty of rape beyond
reasonable doubt?

Ruling of the Court

The Court acquits the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt.

It is noticeable that the versions of AAA and the accused ultimately contradicted each other on
whether rape or consensual sex had transpired between them. Their contradictions
notwithstanding, the circumstances - whether based on her recollection or on his - indicated
that she had willingly met with him on March 14, 2006 in order to go on a lovers' date. Their
meeting on Augusto San Francisco Street in Sta. Ana, Manila, and their going together by
jeepney to Rizal Avenue, where they entered the Jollibee restaurant to share the meal were
undoubtedly by their prior agreement. It was while they were in the restaurant when they
discussed checking in at the Aroma Motel, but once she assented to their checking in the
Aroma motel, they walked together towards the motel, and entered together.

The sweetheart defense is not usually regarded with favor in the absence of strong
corroboration. 9 This is because the mere fact that the accused and the victim were lovers
should not exculpate him from criminal liability for rape. In People v. Orquina,  10 the Court
observed that an allegation of a "love relationship" between the parties, even if found to be
true, did not eliminate the use of force to consummate the crime because the gravamen of
rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her will and without her consent. As
declared in People v. Gecomo:  11

It should be borne in mind that love is not a license for carnal intercourse through force or
intimidation. Even granting that appellant and complainant were really sweethearts, that fact
alone would not negate the commission of rape. A sweetheart cannot be forced to have sex
against her will. From a mere fiancee, definitely a man cannot demand sexual submission and,
worse, employ violence upon her on a mere justification of love. A man can even be convicted
for the rape of his common-law wife.

It is a time-honored tenet that the appreciation and assessment by the trial judge of the
credibility of witnesses are accorded respect primarily because the trial judge personally
observed the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses as to enable him or her to determine
whether they were telling the truth or merely fabricating it. 12 Another tenet of long standing is
that the factual findings of the CA affirming those of the trial judge are generally binding upon
the Court, which is not a trier of facts. 13 Based on these tenets, it would be easy to simply
affirm the conviction of the accused herein especially considering that both the RTC and the
CA regarded AAA as a credible witness whose testimony was worthy of belief.

Yet, it is not fair and just to quickly reject the defense of consensual sexual intercourse
interposed by the accused. To be noted first and foremost is that he and AAA were adults
capable of consenting to the sexual intercourse. The established circumstances - their having
agreed to go on a lovers' date; their travelling together a long way from their meeting place on
board the jeepney; their alighting on Rizal Avenue to take a meal together; their walking
together to the motel, and checking in together at the motel without the complainant
manifesting resistance; and their entering the designated room without protest from her -
indicated beyond all doubt that they had consented to culminate their lovers' date in bed inside
the motel.

Although she claimed that he had held her by the hand and pulled her upstairs, there is no
evidence showing that she resisted in that whole time, or exhibited a reluctance to enter the
motel with him. Instead, she appeared to have walked with him towards the motel, and to have
entered it without hesitation. What she did not do was eloquent proof of her consent.

Noting the medico-legal findings of bruises and abrasions on AAA, the CA concluded that she
had been subjected to some "bodily harm" by the accused to force himself on her, to wit:

x x x In the case before Us, We are convinced that the element of force was present. This is
shown by the fact that the accused-appellant held private complainant's hands to the point of
dragging her up the stairs of the motel, and by the fact that he pushed private complainant to
the bed when the latter tried to escape. Moreover, as We have mentioned above, the presence
of bruises and abrasions on private complainant's body evince the fact that latter was
subjected to bodily harm before accused-appellant succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
her. 14

That the medico-legal examination of March 14, 2006 turned up with the findings of abrasions
on AAA's left breast and contusions on her right hand did not necessarily mean that the
accused had applied force in the context of forcing her to have sex with him. The conclusion of
the CA was, therefore, too sweeping, for it inexplicably ignored the probability of consensuality
between the parties. Such findings did not justify the full rejection of the demonstrable
consensuality of their sexual intercourse. Moreover, the mere presence of abrasions and
contusions on her did not preclude the giving of her consent to the sexual intercourse, for
abrasions and contusions could also be suffered during voluntary submission of the partners
to each other's lust. Such possibility calls for us to open our minds to the conclusion that the
sexual intercourse resulted from consensuality between them.

In every criminal case, the accused is entitled to acquittal unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,
excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Only moral certainty is required, or
that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. 15

In the face of all the foregoing, we have reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused for rape.
Reasonable doubt –

x x x is not mere possible doubt; because everything relating to human affairs, and depending
on moral evidence, is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It is that state of the case
which, after the entire comparison and consideration of all the evidence, leaves the
minds of jurors in such a condition that they cannot say they feel an abiding conviction,
to a moral certainty, of the truth of the charge. The burden of proof is upon the prosecutor.
All the presumptions of law independent of evidence are in favor of innocence; and every
person is presumed to be innocent until he is proved guilty. If upon such proof there is
reasonable doubt remaining, the accused is entitled to the benefit of it by an acquittal.
For it is not sufficient to establish a probability, though a strong one arising from the
doctrine of chances, that the fact charged is more likely to be true than the contrary; but
the evidence must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty; a
certainty that convinces and directs the understanding and satisfies the reason and
judgment of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it. This we take to be
proof beyond reasonable doubt; because if the law, which mostly depends upon
considerations of a moral nature, should go further than this, and require absolute
certainty, it would exclude circumstantial evidence altogether. 16

The requirement of establishing the guilt of the accused in every criminal proceeding beyond
reasonable doubt has a long history that even pre-dates our Constitutions. As summed up by
jurisprudence of American origin:

The requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a

reasonable doubt dates at least from our early years as a Nation. The 'demand for a
higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently expressed from ancient
times, (though) its crystallization into the formula 'beyond a reasonable doubt' seems to
have occurred as late as 1798. It is now accepted in common law jurisdictions as the
measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must convince the trier of all the
essential elements of guilt.' C. McCormick, Evidence 321, pp. 681-682 (1954); see also 9 J.
Wigmore, Evidence, 2497 (3d ed.1940). Although virtually unanimous adherence to the
reasonable-doubt standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it as a
requirement of due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way
in which law should be enforced and justice administered.' Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
155' 1451 (1968).

Expressions in many opinions of this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that
proof of a criminal charge beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required. See,
for example, Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881); Davis v. United States, 160
U.S. 469, 488 , 358 (1895); Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 253, (1910); Wilson v. United
States, 232 U.S. 563, 569 -570, 349, 350 (1914); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174,
1310 (1949); Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 795, 1005, 1006 (1952); Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 138, 136, 137 (1954); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-526, 1342
(1958). Cf. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895). Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated that
'(i)t the duty of the Government to establish ... guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This
notion-basic in our law and rightly one of the boasts of a free society-is a requirement
and a safeguard of due process of law in the historic, procedural content of 'due
process." Leland v. Oregon, supra, 343 U.S., at 802 -803 (dissenting opinion). In a similar
vein, the Court said in Brinegar v. United States, supra, 338 U.S., at 174 , that '(g)uilt in a
criminal case must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt and by evidence confined to
that which long experience in the common-law tradition, to some extent embodied in
the Constitution, has crystallized into rules of evidence consistent with that standard.
These rules are historically grounded rights of our system, developed to safeguard men
from dubious and unjust convictions, with resulting forfeitures of life, liberty and
property.' Davis v. United States, supra, 160 U.S., at 488 stated that the requirement is
implicit in 'constitutions ... (which) recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed
essential for the protection of life and liberty.' In Davis a murder conviction was reversed
because the trial judge instructed the jury that it was their duty to convict when the evidence
was equally balanced regarding the sanity of the accused. This Court said: 'On the contrary,
he is entitled to an acquittal of the specific crime charged, if upon all the evidence, there is
reasonable doubt whether he was capable in law of committing crime .... No man should be
deprived of his life under the forms of law unless the jurors who try him are able, upon their
consciences, to say that the evidence before them .. .is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable
doubt the existence of every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged.' Id., at 484, 493,
360.

The reasonable-doubt standard plays a vital role in the American scheme of criminal
procedure. It is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on
factual error. The standard provides concrete substance for the presumption of
innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.' Coffin v. United States, supra,
156 U.S., at 453. As the dissenters in the New York Court of Appeals observed, and we agree,
'a person accused of a crime ... would be at a severe disadvantage, a disadvantage amounting
to a lack of fundamental fairness, if he could be adjudged guilty and imprisoned for years on
the strength of the same evidence as would suffice in a civil case.' 24 N.Y.2d, at 205, 299
N.Y.S.2d, at 422, 247 N.E.2d, at 259.

The requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal
procedure for cogent reasons. The accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake
interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his
liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the
conviction. Accordingly, a society that values the good name and freedom of every
individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there is
reasonable doubt about his guilt. As we said in Speiser v. Randall, supra, 357 U.S., at 525
-526: 'There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in factfinding, which
both parties must take into account. Where one party has at stake an interest of transcending
value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced as to him by the
process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the
conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Due process commands that
no man shall lose his liberty unless the Government has borne the burden of ...
convincing the factfinder of his guilt.' To this end, the reasonable-doubt standard is
indispensable, for it 'impresses on the trier of fact the necessity of reaching a subjective
state of certitude of the facts in issue.' Dorsen & Rezneck, In Re Gault and the Future of
Juvenile Law, 1 Family Law Quarterly, No. 4, pp. 1, 26 (1967).

Moreover, use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the

respect and confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law.1avvphi1 It
is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of proof
that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also
important in our free society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs have
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty.

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt
standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. 17
Requiring proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt necessarily means that mere suspicion of the
guilt of the accused, no matter how strong, should not sway judgment against him. It further
means that the courts should duly consider every evidence favoring him, and that in the
process the courts should persistently insist that accusation is not synonymous with guilt;
hence, every circumstance favoring his innocence should be fully taken into account. 18 That is
what we must be do herein, for he is entitled to nothing less.

Without the proof of his guilt being beyond reasonable doubt, therefore, the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused herein was not overcome. His acquittal should follow, for, as
we have emphatically

reminded in Patula v. People:  19

x x x in all criminal prosecutions, the Prosecution bears the burden to establish the guilt of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. In discharging this burden, the Prosecution's duty is to
prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a finding of
guilt for that crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein. The Prosecution must
further prove the participation of the accused in the commission of the offense. In doing
all these, the Prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence, and not anchor
its success upon the weakness of the evidence of the accused. The burden of proof
placed on the Prosecution arises from the presumption of innocence in favor of the
accused that no less than the Constitution has guaranteed. Conversely, as to his
innocence, the accused has no burden of proof, that he must then be acquitted and set
free should the Prosecution not overcome the presumption of innocence in his favor. In
other words, the weakness of the defense put up by the accused is inconsequential in
the proceedings for as long as the Prosecution has not discharged its burden of proof
in establishing the commission of the crime charged and in identifying the accused as
the malefactor responsible for it.20

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETSASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals

promulgated on March 24, 2011 affirming the conviction for rape of CARLITO
CLAROy MAHINAY under the judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, in
Manila; ACQUITS CARLITO CLARO y MAHINAY for failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; ORDERS his immediate release from the National Penitentiary unless there
are other lawful causes warranting his continuing confinement thereat; and DIRECTS the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections to implement the release of CARLITO
CLARO y MAHINAY in accordance with this decision, and to report on his compliance within l
0 days from receipt.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

G.R. No. 226158

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee vs. LIBERA TO PENTECOSTES y

CRONICO, Accused-appellant
 DECISION

CAGUIOA, J.:

This is an Appeal1 under Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the Decision2 dated
September 4, 2015 (questioned Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Special Fourteenth Division
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06498. The questioned Decision affirmed the Decision3 dated
December 28, 2012 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch
58 (RTC), in Criminal Case No. T-2830, which found herein accused-appellant Liberato C.
Pentecostes (Liberato) guilty of the crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code.

The accusatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about March 24, 2005 at Barangay Tinawagan, Municipality of Tigaon, Province of
Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
abovementioned accused, with treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously assault and attack VIVIAN VARGAS Y BRIONES, a 7 year
old4 minor by submerging (drowning) her in water thus causing her instantaneous death, to the
damage and prejudice of her heirs.5

When arraigned, Liberato pleaded "not guilty."6 After termination of the pre-trial conference on
February 8, 2006, trial on the merits ensued.7

The Facts

The prosecution alleged the following:

On March 24, 2005, Liberato was having a drinking spree at the house of Angel Vargas
(Angel), the father of the victim, Vivian Vargas (Vivian).8 Likewise present were Joel Basagre,
Mesio Caruito, Gerardo Rabal, and Daniel Briones.9 The drinking spree ended at around 2:00
in the aftemoon.10 At that time, Angel asked Vivian to go to the house of a certain Auring
Rabal, which was about two hundred (200) meters away, to return a chair that they
borrowed.11 Vivian would never return.12

Meanwhile, Liberato went home at 3:00 in the afternoon.13 At around 3:30 to 4:30 p.m., Antonio
Vargas (Antonio), the cousin of Vivian, together with his friend, Jason Basagre (Jason),
encountered Liberato at Antonio's com plantation.14 The plantation was around a kilometer
away from the house of Liberato.15 During the encounter, Liberato was seen carrying Vivian on
his back and appeared to be headed towards a nearby body of water.16 Jason greeted
Liberato, who then merely looked back at them angrily.17

Later that day, with Vivian still missing, Angel began searching for Vivian with the help of some
relatives and barangay tanod, but to no avail.18 The following morning, however, on March 25,
2005, Vivian's lifeless body was recovered near the house of Joel Basagre, the father of
Jason.19
Immediately thereafter, the policemen summoned and investigated all those present at the
drinking spree in Angel's house.20 However, when Liberato's turn for questioning came, he ran
away.21

An autopsy later performed on Vivian's body revealed "asphyxia by submersion" or drowning

as the cause of death by Dr. Raoul Alcantara.22

On the other hand, Liberato, as sole witness for the defense, presentedthe following counter-
statement of facts:

At the outset, Liberato denied knowing Vivian or any of the children of Angel.23 He confirmed
his presence at the drinking spree and claimed that he went home alone at around 3:00 p.m. of
March 24, 2005.24 He arrived home shortly at around 3:10 p.m.25 A few minutes later, at around
3:20 p.m., Liberato claimed to have seen Joel Basagre passing by his house with Vivian.26

Thereafter, at around 3:30 p.m., Angel arrived at Liberato's house to ask for help in searching
for Vivian.27 Liberato then claimed to have told Angel that he saw Vivian with Joel Basagre.28

On the following day, during the investigation of Vivian's death, Liberato admitted to running
away from the authorities but testified that it was because he was afraid of being shot by one
of the investigating officers.29

Later on, during his testimony before the RTC, Liberato retracted his previous statements and
admitted to knowing Vivian because he was able to talk to her on a separate occasion.30 Upon
further questioning, however, Liberato suddenly claimed that he never talked to Vivian and
only learned about her name when he was helping Angel search for her.31 It was also placed
on record that Liberato was previously convicted of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
was released from prison sometime in 2003.32

Ruling of the RTC

In the Decision dated December 28, 2012, the RTC found Liberato guilty of the crime of
Murder, qualified by treachery. Therein, the RTC found that there was enough circumstantial
evidence to produce a conviction and to overcome Liberato's defense of alibi and denial.33 The
dispositive portion stated:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused Liberato Pentecostes is

hereby found GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the felony of Murder and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, as well as to pay to the heirs of Vivian
Vargas the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.34

Liberato appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal.35 Liberato filed his Brief dated April 16,
2014,36 while the plaintiff-appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Brief
dated July 22, 2014.37 In a Manifestation dated August 11, 2014, Liberato waived his right to
file a Reply Brief.38

Ruling of the CA

In the questioned Decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction with modification only as to
the damages awarded, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. the appellant is not eligible for parole;

2. the award of civil liability ex delicto is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00;

3. the appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱30,000.00 and
₱25,000.00 as exemplary and temperate damages, respectively;

4. the appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim interest at the legal rate of 6% per
annum on all the amounts of damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this
decision until fully paid.

IT IS SO ORDERED.39

Hence, this Appeal.40

In lieu of filing supplemental briefs, Liberato and plaintiff-appellee filed separate manifestations
respectively dated March 28, 201741 and February 28, 2017,42 foregoing their right to file the
same.

Issues

Liberato assigns the following errors committed by the CA in the questioned Decision:

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED BASED ON A DEVIOUS
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO

THE INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF MOTIVE IN THE
COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.43

The Court's Ruling

The Appeal is denied. The issues, being interrelated, shall be jointly discussed below.

The circumstantial evidence

sufficiently proves Liberato's guilt
beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of Murder

Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not indispensable to criminal prosecutions; a

contrary rule would render convictions virtually impossible given that most crimes, by their very
nature, are purposely committed in seclusion and away from eyewitnesses.44 Thus, our rules
on evidence and jurisprudence allow the conviction of an accused through circumstantial
evidence alone, provided that the following requisites concur:

(i) there is more than one circumstance;

(ii) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(iii) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.45

Simply put, an accused may be convicted when the circumstances established form an
unbroken chain leading to one fair reasonable conclusion and pointing to the accused - to the
exclusion of all others - as the guilty person.46

Now to this case. As summarized by the lower courts, the following factual circumstances are
undisputed:

1. Liberato was present at the residence of the victim on March 24, 2005 when Vivian was
reported to be missing;47

2. Liberato left the residence of Vivian after the drinking spree at about 3:00 in the aftemoon;48

3. Angel sent Vivian to return a chair to Auring Habal also after the drinking spree and she
failed to return home;49

4. Antonio and Jason both saw Liberato carrying Vivian on his back at around 3:30 or 4:30 in
the afternoon at the com plantation;50

5. On the following morning, March 25, 2005, the lifeless body of Vivian was found in the com
plantation;51
6. Antonio and Jason both testified that Liberato, while carrying Vivian on his back, proceeded
to the direction of the stream, according to Antonio, and the creek, according to Jason;52

7. The cause of death of Vivian is "asphyxia by submersion (drowning);"53

8. Liberato fled while being investigated by the police.54

Based on the foregoing, the Court is simply tasked to determine whether the foregoing pieces
of evidence, considered in their totality, are sufficient to prove Liberato's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt for the murder of Vivian.

The Court rules in the affirmative.

First. Liberato was positively identified as the last person seen with Vivian before she
disappeared on the afternoon of March 24, 2005. The concurring testimonies of Antonio and
Jason show this:

[Direct Examination of Antonio]

Q: While you were at your com plantation with Jason, do you remember having seen a
person?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And tell us who was that person?

A: Pay Batoy, sir.

Q: Do you know the complete name of that person?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Tell us.

A: Liberato Pentecostes.

Q: Was Liberato Pentecostes alone at that time?

A: They were two (2), sir.

Q: And who was with Liberato Pentecostes? According to you they were two (2) persons?

A: Vivian Vargas.

Q: How did you observe the two (2) persons when you said it was Liberato Pentecostes and
Vivian Vargas?
A: He was carrying her at [his] back, sir.

Q: Who was that person carrying another on his back?

A: Liberato Pentecostes.

Q: And who was that person being carried by Liberato Pentecostes.

A: Vivian Vargas.55

xxxx

[Direct Examination of Jason]

Q: Alright. When you reach (sic) the com plantation what happened next?

A: I saw Pay Batoy, sir.

Q: Are you referring to the accused in this case?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: Was he carrying anything?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was he carrying at that time?

A: A child, Vivian Vargas, sir.

xxxx

Q: How did Liberato Pentecostes carrying (sic) Vivian Vargas?

A: He was carrying Vivian on his back with Vivian's arms encircled on the neck of Liberato,
sir.56

While Liberato strongly disputes this fact, pointing instead to Joel Basagre as the last person
he saw with Vivian, no independent testimony was ever presented to corroborate Liberato's
version of the facts. Hence, when weighed against Liberato' s bare allegations, the testimonies
of Antonio and Jason placing Liberato near the scene of the crime with the victim deserve
more credit. The Court echoes the keen observations of the RTC on this issue:

Accused's testimony that Angel went to his house at 3:30 in the afternoon and asked for his
help in searching for Vivian is also doubtful. Angel sent Vivian to return the chair to Awing
Habal after the drinking spree. According to Angel, the drinking spree ended at 2:00
o'clock (sic) while according to the accused, the drinking spree ended at 3 :00 in the afternoon.
Whatever may be the actual time the drinking spree ended, it would appear that Vivian was
gone for only 30 minutes before Angel came looking for her. Indeed, the accused concocted
the story that Angel asked for his help in searching for Vivian at 3 :30 p.m. in order to counter
the testimonies of Angel and Jason that they saw him carrying the victim on his back at around
3:30 or 4:30 in the afternoon. Angel's testimony that he asked for the help of the accused in
searching for Vivian at 6:00 o'clock in the evening is more credible.57

Moreover, the fact that Liberato was the last person seen with Vivian assumes significance in
this case. In People v. Lagao, Jr.,58 the Court convicted the accused solely based on
circumstantial evidence, among which was the fact that the accused was identified as the last
person seen with the deceased. Notably, Lagao resulted in a conviction notwithstanding the
fact that the corpus delicti was only recovered the following day, as in the present Appeal.

Second. The records disclose that Vivian's cause of death was "asphyxia by submersion
(drowning).59 Significantly, both Antonio and Jason testified to the fact that Liberato, while
carrying Vivian on his back, was headed towards a body of water within the vicinity of
Antonio's com plantation.60 Furthermore, Vivian's body was later recovered in the same com
plantation.61 These factual circumstances form an unbroken chain of events that is consistent
with the prosecution's theory that Vivian drowned to her death at the hands of Liberato.

To discredit the prosecution's eyewitness accounts, Liberato makes much of certain

discrepancies in the testimonies of Antonio and Jason.62 However, such discrepancies, which
pertained only to peripheral matters, have already been thoroughly reconciled by the RTC, as
affirmed in toto by the CA:

Antonio Vargas and Jason Basagre both testified that they saw the accused carrying Vivian at
his back. There were some inconsistencies in their testimonies: for one, Antonio testified that
he saw the accused at around 3:30 in the afternoon, while Jason testified that he saw him at
around 4:30 in the afternoon. Antonio claimed that the accused headed down the slope
towards the stream while Jason said that he headed towards the creek where there were
banana plants. At any rate, they appear to refer to one and the same body of water. This Court
thinks that these inconsistencies or discrepancies in their statements refer to trivial and
inconsequential details. Antonio only finished Grade VI while Jason did not even finish Grade
II. Hence, they cannot be expected to know or remember the exact time when they saw the
accused carrying the victim. The discrepancy of one hour in their testimonies is also
inconsequential. It should be remembered that at the time of the incident, Antonio Vargas was
only fourteen (14) years old while Jason Basagre was only thirteen (13). It is settled that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses on minor details and collateral matters do not
affect the substance of their declarations, their veracity, or the weight of their testimonies;
slight contradictions in fact serve to strengthen the sincerity of a witness and prove that his
testimony is not rehearsed. x x x

Antonio Vargas also testified that the accused, while carrying Vivian on his back, proceeded to
the direction of the stream; Jason Basagre testified that he went towards the direction of the
creek. While they may have used different terms to describe the body of water where the
accused proceeded, it appears from their description of the location thereof that they are
referring to one and the same body of water. Taken together with the testimony of Dr.
Alcantara and his medical certificate that the cause of death of the victim is "asphyxia by
submersion (drowning)," the theory that the accused is responsible for the death of the victim
is rendered much stronger.63 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

It is a settled rule that the trial court is in the most advantageous position to assess the
credibility of witnesses as well as their testimonies given its unique opportunity to observe the
witnesses' behavior when placed on the stand, which opportunity is denied to the appellate
courts.64 Hence, the trial court's assessment is necessarily accorded great weight and respect
by the Court, especially when affirmed by the CA.65 Verily, considering the uniform findings of
the RTC and CA, the Court finds that no cogent reason exists in the records warranting a
disturbance of such findings.

Third. During the investigation of Vivian's death, which included four (4) other suspects who
were present during the drinking spree at Angel's house, Liberato fled the police station.66 In
countless occasions, the Court has held that the flight of an accused may be taken as
evidence to establish his guilt;67 "[t]he wicked flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are
as bold as the lion."68

To explain his sudden departure, Liberato paints an atmosphere of intimidation by the police
officers, claiming that the investigators "cocked their firearms at him" and that he was in
solitude while being subject to inquiry.69 However, as observed by the RTC, his flip-flopping
testimony on this very matter drives the Court to conclude against the truthfulness of his
assertions:

x x x In the said investigation, accused was asked what happened to the missing child and he
answered that they were searching for her but could not find her. Accused narrated that he fled
during the investigation because he was afraid of PO Artita who cocked his gun on (sic) his
presence. He thought that the said officer would shoot him, hence, he ran away to their farm. x
xx

On cross-examination, x x x [h]e declared that he was investigated by some police officers

together with other suspects. He admitted that he indeed fled because he was frightened but
only after the investigation was finished and the investigators cocked their firearms at him.

On re-direct examination, accused confirmed that he was the fifth suspect who was
investigated. During the investigation, he was alone with the three policemen. Upon
clarificatory question from the court, the accused responded that: "you see, your honor, we are
five (5) suspects and all the suspects were present but when we were investigated, we are
only alone when we were investigated by these three (3) policemen." (TSN, November 29,
2011, pg. 16)
On re-cross examination, accused admitted that when he was investigated alone, the other
four suspects were just beside him and that they could even hear what was being asked from
him.70

Notably, despite Liberato's admission that there were four (4) other suspects around that could
have easily witnessed the alleged impropriety of the police officers, not one of them was ever
presented to corroborate his claims. Neither was there any indication in the records that
Liberato filed a criminal complaint or administrative charge against the police officers
concemed.71 Hence, without more, Liberato's claim of intimidation cannot be given credence by
the Court.

In criminal cases, "proof beyond reasonable doubt" does not entail absolute certainty of the
fact that the accused committed the crime, and neither does it exclude the possibility of
error.72 What is only required is that degree of proof which, after a scrutiny of the facts,
produces in an unprejudiced mind moral certainty of the culpability of the accused.73

In People v. Casitas, Jr., the Court explained that establishing guilt through circumstantial
evidence is akin to weaving a "tapestry of events that culminate in a vivid depiction of the
crime of which the accused is the author:"74

[T]he combination of the following established facts and circumstances affirm the trial court's
finding of guilt:

First, appellant was in a store right in front of the house where the crime was committed, just
before the victim was found dead.

Second, he was seen climbing over the fence of the house where the murder had occurred a
few moments before.

Third, he was spotted walking away from the house while tucking in his bloodied shirt.

Fourth, he was the only person seen leaving the house prior to the discovery of the victim's
lifeless body.

Fifth, he hastily left for Manila soon after the commission of the crime.

Sixth, he attempted to elude the police authorities until a warrant for his arrest was presented
to him.

Seventh, he was observed by the trial court to be restless and fidgety during the course of his
testimony.

xxxx

The pieces of circumstantial evidence in the case at bar, when analyzed and taken together,
definitely lead to no other conclusion than that appellant perpetrated the dastardly deed.
On the basis of the foregoing established facts, it can reasonably be inferred that appellant
was the only person inside the house with the victim when the latter was brutally killed. Before
the dead body was found, no other person had been seen entering or leaving the house. The
act of appellant - climbing over the fence of the house with his clothes soaked in blood,
coupled with the subsequent discovery of the dead body lying in a pool of blood - impels us to
arrive at the logical conclusion that he was responsible for the killing. If he truly had nothing to
do with it, he would have gone out through the gate of the house and immediately asked for
help from the neighbors. Instead, he left the victim sprawled in a dreadful bloodbath and
surreptitiously fled from the scene of the crime, hoping that nobody would notice him leaving.

Furthermore, appellant immediately left for Manila when the police authorities began to look for
him. When he was finally located there, he tried to run away again, even when the police had
shown him a valid warrant for his arrest. If he were really innocent of the charges as he claims,
he would have wasted no time in submitting himself to the investigators, so that he would have
a chance to disprove the accusations against him at the soonest possible opportunity.75

Meanwhile, the Court concurs with the RTC and CA in appreciating the qualifying
circumstance of treachery in this case. Treachery or alevosia is present in the killing of children
who, by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.76 In People v.
Diaz, the Court held that the killing of an eleven (11)-year old was deemed ipso facto qualified
by treachery by reason of the child's "inherent defenselessness."77 The Court therefore relies
on the Diaz ruling in this case, especially considering that Vivian was murdered at the tender
age of six (6) years old.78

Thus, after thorough examination of the records of this case, the Court is fully convinced that
the evidence presented by the prosecution constitutes proof of Liberato's guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. While it is true that no direct evidence was adduced by the prosecution,
circumstantial evidence is by no means a "weaker" form of evidence vis-a-vis direct
evidence.79 Our prevailing jurisprudence has recognized that in its effect upon the courts,
circumstantial evidence may even surpass direct evidence in weight and probative
force.80 Accordingly, to the mind of the Court, the confluence of the established circumstances
leads to the fair and reasonable conclusion that Liberato was indeed responsible for the death
of Vivian.

Liberato's defense of alibi and denial

failed to overcome the prosecution's
evidence establishing his guilt

The defenses of denial and alibi are inherently weak and unreliable due to the ease by which
they may be fabricated or concocted.81 If not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
such defenses are considered self-serving and are bereft of weight in courts of law.82 Such is
the case in this Appeal.

After the prosecution successfully overcame Liberato's presumption of innocence, it was

incumbent upon him to present evidence to the contrary. In doing so, Liberato resorted to mere
denial and alibi, claiming instead that he was alone at his house during the time that he was
seen by Antonio and Jason.83 However, as already discussed above, Liberato's sole testimony
is highly deficient to counteract the evidence adduced by the prosecution.

Furthermore, for alibi to prevail, it must be established by positive, clear and satisfactory proof
that it was physically impossible for the accused to have been at the locus criminis at the time
of the commission, and not merely that he was somewhere else.84 In People v. Consorte, the
Court held that a distance of twenty (20) kilometers was not enough to establish such physical
impossibility.85 Here, as borne out by the records, the body of Vivian was recovered only a few
kilometers away from the house of Liberato. Thus, the Court affirms the questioned Decision
on this matter, which held in the following wise:

The defense invoked by the appellant is mere denial and alibi. He contends that he was just in
his house at about 3:10 in the afternoon of 24 March 2005. For alibi to prosper, however, it is
not enough to prove that the appellant was somewhere else when the crime was committed;
he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene
of the crime at the time of its commission. Unless substantiated by clear and convincing proof,
such defense is negative, self-serving, and undeserving of any weight in law.

Here, the appellant failed to establish that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. The appellant's house, where he claims to
have stayed at the time of the commission of the crime, is not that far from the place where the
body of the victim was found so as not to afford him the opportunity to be at the crime scene to
commit the felony. Furthermore, the appellant failed to present any corroborative evidence to
support his defense that he was in his house at the time of the commission of the crime.

In the same vein, the appellant's bare denial must fail. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating
justification, is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, such as in this case, regresses to blatant
impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes self-serving negative evidence which cannot be
accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.86

Motive is not an essential element of

the crime and the absence thereof
does not preclude a finding of guilt

Finally, insisting on his innocence, Liberato makes the claim that the CA erred in convicting
him despite the prosecution's failure to establish a motive for the killing.87 Liberato is gravely
mistaken.

Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal
activity.88 It is not an essential element of a crime and need not be proven by the State in
criminal prosecutions.89 Hence, proof of motive alone will not establish guilt in the same way
that the absence thereof cannot establish innocence.90 In previous occasions, the Court has
held that the question of motive only becomes material when there is doubt as to the identity of
the malefactor committing the offense charged.91
Here, the totality of circumstantial evidence on record sufficiently dispels any doubt that
Liberato was responsible for the ghastly death of Vivian. Thus, in People v. Rendaje,92 where
the Court similarly grappled with circumstantial evidence only, the accused was still convicted
despite the absence of proof of motive:

After a careful review of the records of the case, this Court is convinced that the trial court did
not err in convicting appellant on the strength of six (6) pieces of circumstantial evidence,
which form an unbroken chain leading to the fair and logical conclusion that he killed the
victim.

xxxx

Due to the lack of direct evidence to establish the identity of the assailant, appellant insists that
proof of motive becomes essential.1âwphi1 However, as already discussed, the Court believes
that the prosecution has established his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It was able to pinpoint
him, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the one responsible for the crime. Thus, the
presence or the absence of motive is not essential.93 (Emphasis supplied)

Following Rendaje, considering that Liberato was positively identified by two (2) eyewitnesses,

coupled with the other pieces of circumstantial evidence establishing Liberato's authorship of
the crime, the Court finds that the RTC and CA did not err in convicting Liberato despite the
lack of evidence showing motive.

Finally, in view of prevailing jurisprudence,94 the Court hereby increases the damages awarded
by the CA as follows: One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as civil indemnity; One
Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as moral damages; and One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as exemplary damages. The award of temperate damages is hereby
increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
Decision dated September 4, 2015 of the Court of Appeals, Special Fourteenth Division in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 06498, finding accused-appellant Liberato C. Pentecostes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION,
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without possibility of parole and
ordering him to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱l00,000.00) as civil indemnity, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as moral
damages, One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱l00,000.00) as exemplary damages, and Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as temperate damages. All monetary awards shall earn interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.

SO ORDERED.