Siegfried Pausewang

Chr. Michelsen Institute

Bergen

THE TWO-FACED AMHARA IDENTITY

In the St. Petersburg Journal of African Studies, the late Sevir B. Cherne-
tsov published in 1993 a remarkable article which, even more remarkably,
was not noticed by the majority of scholars on Ethiopia. To my knowledge,
not a single serious academic comment underscored its main thesis or its
important historical and political significance. And no later publication on
relevant issues I know of has quoted the article or indeed given S. Chernetsov
credit for his contribution through referencing it. Even Tronvoll and Vaug-
han, who in their Culture of Power1 describe in some detail the difference
between urban Amhara identity and rural ethnic Amhara culture, do not men-
tion Chernetsov in their reference list.
The article by S. Chernetsov, entitled «On the Origins of the Amhara»,2
described Amhara culture as a culture of assimilation. The language and the
culture of the Imperial Court was Amharic since the reign of Yekunno Amlak
and, through him, the «Solomonic line» of kings emanating from the historic-
al Amhara province.
S. Chernetsov observes that today the Amhara are counted as the second
largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, much more populous than what the tiny
province of Amhara could be expected to procreate. This is because whoever
wanted to advance in the court, the administration or in the military of the
Emperors had to speak Amharic reasonably well and usually also had to adopt
the Orthodox Christian religion. The court retained an Amhara culture, but
attracted ambitious and bright individuals from other ethnic groups, provided
they volunteered to adopt the language, the religion and the customs at the
court. The culture of the court thus became an ethnic melting pot, a culture of
assimilation. But it was also a culture conscious of its of superiority.

Ethiopian history created two different groups of Amhara

In some way this may appear almost self-evident. Yet, this historical ex-
planation was sensational because it enables us to better understand some of
the hotly debated issues and differences among ethnic groups and «nationali-
ties» in Ethiopia today. It appears strange that nobody among the Ethiopianist
1
VAUGHAN, SARAH — TRONVOLL, KJETIL, The Culture of Power in Contemporary
Ethiopian Political Life, Stockholm: SIDA, 2003.
2
See CHERNETSOV, SEVIR, «On the Origin of the Amhara», St. Petersburg Journal
of African Studies 1 (1993), 97–103.

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scholars reacted to the article, though it explicitly refers to an ongoing debate

on the nature of the Amharic ethnicity at that time (1992–1993). Some parti-
cipants maintained that the Amhara did not exist as an ethnic group, while
others insisted that the Amhara, as any other ethnic group, had to identify
themselves as a nationality. But Chernetsov’s challenge was not followed up,
and even when he in 1995 published an enlarged version of the same article,
with the title «On the problem of ethnogenesis of the Amhara»,3 the issue
was not reflected in academic debate. It is difficult to tell if this silence is due
to the fact that the St. Petersburg Journal of African Studies, which appeared
from 1993 to 1996, unfortunately never achieved a wide distribution and may
have escaped the attention of many scholars. The enlarged article was hidden
in a volume entitled Der Sudan in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart 4 — not
exactly a place where one would search for a crucial contribution to Ethio-
pian ethnic debates. Another possible explanation might be that there are
large groups and interests within Ethiopia who do not want to recognise any
distinction in the ethnogenesis between the Amhara and other Ethiopian eth-
nic groups, nor between two different groups of Amhara.
Whatever the reason, the article deserves much more attention than it has
so far received, and here may be the place to draw attention to its academic
importance. For it directs our attention to a difficult issue in Ethiopian social
and political life today. Chernetsov should maybe have given his article the
title «Who are the Amhara?» For at the bottom of his analysis is the observa-
tion that two types of Amhara cultural self-consciousness developed in paral-
lel though certainly not without mutual influence on each other. There are to-
day two different and quite distinct groups and identities attached to this name.
Amhara peasants understood — and still understand — Amhara as their (lo-
cal) culture, their way of life and their identity, just like Oromo or Gurage or
Sidama peasants are conscious of theirs. Quite distinct from this is the identity
of the urban, generally well educated, ethnically mixed, assimilated cultural
Amhara, who understand themselves as Ethiopians with an Amhara language.
It must be noted here that the «rural Amhara» — or indeed the peasant
groups today identifying as Amhara — were also strongly influenced by
Amhara court culture. Indeed, areas like Manz, and (rural) Shoa Amhara in
general, as well as large parts of Gojam, for example, only became Amhara
through a military expansion, in particular, through the cultural influence of
the military and of the Amhara administration on their rural surroundings. As

3
In 1997 it was also published in a Catalan translation: «Entorn al problema de
l’ethnogenesi dels Amhara», Studia Africana (Barcelona) 8, 1997.
4
See CHERNETSOV, SEVIR, «On the Problem of Ethnogenesis of the Amhara», in:
GUNDLACH, ROLF — MANFRED KROPP — ANNALIS LEIBUNDGUT (eds.), Der Sudan in
Vergangenheit und Gegenwart (Sudan Past and Present), Frankfurt am Main: Lang,
1996 (Nordostafrikanisch/Westasiatische Studien,1), 17–35.

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 S. Pausewang %#

Taddesse Tamrat shows,5 the population of Gojam is in fact by itself a mix-

ture of many waves of ethnic immigration, unified in an Amharic culture and
identity. Equally, the Shoa Amhara are a mixture of different ethnicities, uni-
ted in the culture of a ruler who, by himself of ethnically mixed stock, identi-
fied with the Amharic Solomonic Dynasty.6 It appears that the borders between
the rural Amhara and the court Amhara were never clear, nor strict, nor im-
permeable. Individuals who returned into the rural community after some
years experience in the military or the court, would carry parts of the court
culture and personality into their rural surroundings. In terms of «Amhara»
interests and identities today, however, there appear to be good reasons to
separate the two groups.
In the debate of 1992–1993, which S. Chernetsov reviews in his articles,
the contestants give two different descriptions of «the Amhara», which es-
sentially fit one or the other of the two mentioned groups. But none of them
identifies «his» interpretation of the term as referring to a distinct group within
the «Amhara». One side (Meles Zenawi, Endreas Eshete) claims that the
Amhara are a nation with their territory and their culture as any other ethni-
city in Ethiopia, and should take their proper place — which is true for the
«ethnic» (rural) Amhara in some regions in Ethiopia. The other side (Mesfin
Wolde Mariam, Getachew Haile) describes the characteristics of the urban
assimilated cultural Amhara, and claims that they are the beginning of a truly
Ethiopian nation and must have the right to live anywhere in Ethiopia. Refu-
sing to recognise that both descriptions are correct, but refer to different sec-
tions of people with different characteristics, confuses the understanding and
blurs political conceptions and activities. The debate of 1993 could easily
have been resolved, had one just agreed to distinguish the two groups.
In the 12th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies in Michigan 1994,
Takkele Taddese presented a paper entitled «Do the Amhara exist as a distinct
ethnic group?»7 He came very close to distinguishing the two groups, giving a
description of the history of the Amhara language and consciousness. But his
conclusion describes the Amhara as «being a fused stock, a supra ethnically
5
See TADDESSE TAMRAT, «Ethiopia in Miniature. The Peopling of Gojam», in:
MARCUS, HAROLD GOLDEN (ed.), New Trends in Ethiopian Studies. Papers of the 12th In-
ternational Conference of Ethiopian Studies, Michigan State University, 5–10 Sep-
tember 1994, Lawrenceville, NJ: The Red Sea Press, 1994, vol. 1, 951–962.
6
See CLAPHAM, CHRISTOPHER, Haile-Selassie’s Government, with a foreword by
Dame Margery Perhame, London: Longmans, 1969; ID., «From Haile Selassie to Meles:
Government, People and the Nationalities Question in Ethiopia», paper presented at
a conference on «Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa», in September 2004 in
Bergen, Norway (to be published).
7
See TAKKELE TADDESE, «Do the Amhara Exist as a Distinct Ethnic Group?», in:
MARCUS, New Trends in Ethiopian Studies. Papers of the 12th International Confe-
rence of Ethiopian Studies, vol. 2, 168–187.

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conscious ethnic Ethiopian serving as the pot in which all the other ethnic
groups are supposed to melt. The language, Amharic, serves as the center for
this melting process in spite of the fact that it is difficult to conceive of the
existence of a language without the existence of a corresponding distinct eth-
nic group speaking it as a mother tongue». The Amhara, he argues, think and
feel as Ethiopians. They do not distinguish between different ethnicities but try
to integrate all into Ethiopia. Thus, he concludes, insisting on the Amhara
being a distinct ethnic group amounts to breaking apart the Ethiopian nation.
In that sense, the «urban Amhara» group assumed without much reflec-
tion the role of speaking for all Amhara. They identified their cultural and
political views as the Amhara position, thus effectively absorbing and domi-
nating the rural Amhara. Pressurised to identify as ethnicity, they adopted in
early 1992 the name «All Amhara People’s Organisation» (AAPO) for the
newly founded political organisation under Prof. Asrat Woldeyes. On the
other side of the political spectrum, the Amhara National Democratic Move-
ment (ANDM) repeated the same assumption. Organised by the TPLF-domi-
nated Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in the
years before the overthrow of the military government, from among Amhara
prisoners of war, ANDM became the official party representing the Amhara
as one group. In effect, the Amhara peasants were — and are — the last
ethnic group without any political organisation and representation, as both
AAPO and ANDM represent urban Amhara views, but claim to speak for all
Amhara. AAPO, moreover, sometimes assumed to speak for all nationalistic
Ethiopians. Consequently it has recently re-organised itself into the «All Ethio-
pian Unity Party» — without abandoning its claim to represent the Amha-
ra — both urban and rural.
And the peasants fell into the trap without realising that they were being
duped. They were swayed by nationalist appeals to come to the rescue of
Amhara who were attacked by other ethnic groups — by an Oromo mob in
Arsi and by other groups in the South. Little did they realise that these «Amha-
ra» were in fact the descendants of Menilek’s soldiers conquering these areas
in the late 19th cent., who were given administrative offices, land titles and
privileges in the conquered areas of other ethnic groups. Often these «Amha-
ra» were ethnic Oromo or Gurage themselves, assimilated into Menilek’s
army and administration. But as landlords and administrators, as Näft³äñña
(«gunmen» or «gens d’armes»), and as Orthodox Christians, they were iden-
tified as «Amhara» by the local peasants.

Ethnicity is identity, not race

Ethnicity has in fact always been, and still is defined not by blood or race,
but by cultural identity — a subjective rather than a biological category. Re-
ligion was often a stronger factor in determining identity than blood relations

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 S. Pausewang %%

or language, and not only in Ethiopia. The history of the Jews may be the best
known example to demonstrate this trend. The Jews survived as an «ethnici-
ty», as a «nation», in the Diaspora for several hundred years, not because of
their ethnic, cultural or biological heritage, but rather in spite of it, facing the
hatred of the host societies because of these characteristics. Many groups
even lost their language, Hebrew only remaining as religious language. The
Jews in Poland spoke «Jiddish», which was a dialect derived from German.
Their religious identity alone made them preserve a distinct culture. They
never even tried to maintain their «blood». Cross-cultural marriages were
never a problem for them. As long as the partner from outside their group
was willing to adopt the Jewish religion, anyone was accepted and assim-
ilated into the Jewish cultural community. Those who abandoned their faith,
lost their Jewish identity. Before racial laws were invented, they were — at
least after one or two generations — no Jews any more.
The Amhara assimilation culture, too, had a religious identity as one
of its components determining identity. The term «Amhara» changed its me-
aning depending on local conditions. In many contexts, it just signified a
Christian. The practice of conversion to Christianity involved taking a new,
Christian (baptismal) name, usually a biblical Ge’ez or Amhara name. Thus,
assimilated people could no longer be identified as Gurage or Sidama or
Wolaita by their names. It is one of the ironies of the dynamics of cultural
development, that many students during the revolution of 1974–1975 chan-
ged back to their original (ethnic) names, only to turn a few years later back
again to their Christian (Amharic) names.
In the border areas between Wollo and North Shoa, along the escarpment
where Amhara people had been exposed to Moslem influence for a prolong-
ed period, the term «Amhara» signifies today a Christian, while a Moslem of
the same ethnic, cultural and language background would not be considered
an Amhara. In Sidamo as well, during Haile Selassie’s time, the term «Am-
hara» could variably signify a Christian or a Näft³äñña.
The same change of meaning also occurs in other ethnic words: in Bora-
na, for example, I was told, in Haile Selassie’s time, an Oromo would insist
on being called a Galla, not an Oromo. Generally, Oromo people strongly
resent the term «Galla», as a pejorative Amharic term which implies con-
tempt for the Oromo, almost equal to a slave. But these Borana Oromo saw
the term «Oromo» to mean a pagan, while «Galla» implied that they had
adopted Christianity (here usually in the protestant version), or indeed Islam.
Again, one should add that historically, most peasants in Amhara areas held
more strongly to their local identities: peasants in Gondar felt as Gondare, in
Gojjam as Gojjame, if they did not identify themselves even more locally as
the people of Achefer or Dangilla or Dega Damot. In the same way, most
Oromo would identify as Arsi or Borana — a common Oromo identity is, in
fact, an invention of the 1960s.
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Assimilation had different connotations

Certainly the Amhara were not the only ethnic group inviting assimila-
tion. All ethnic groups have more or less been open to the integration of
outsiders. Cross-ethnic marriages have occurred wherever ethnicities over-
lapped or bordered one another. They did not cause any problem as long as
the wife moved to the husband’s community and integrated into his culture.
However, at the same time, professional minorities are in the peasant socie-
ties in Ethiopia often despised and identified as different ethnicities. For an
Oromo and Amhara alike, marriage with a «fuga» is considered improper.
Often there is no other distinction except that these groups are segregated by
their profession, suggesting that their ethnic identity was a result of profes-
sional segregation rather than being its cause. We have one interesting expe-
rience in recent times: in the elections of 2000, a professional minority in
Sidama, the Hadicho, formed their own separate political party and ran as an
opposition, identifying themselves ethnically as Sidama-Hadicho,8 in order
to gain the status of a Special Woreda for the one area where they had a
majority to rely on. Once they succeeded in winning the (repeated) election,
they joined EPRDF as a separate ethnicity. In a similar process, the Silte
eventually succeeded in separating themselves from the Gurage and becoming
recognised as a distinct ethnicity. The Oromo, too, are renowned for freely
assimilating outsiders from different ethnic backgrounds. They are said to
have freely integrated those who lived among them and joined into their cul-
ture, identity and common interests. Also slaves could be adopted or allowed
to establish themselves as peasants and assimilate.
Assimilation is and always was a fact of life. A general trend of smaller
groups being absorbed into larger ones probably took place all over Africa.
Assimilation is a motor of change, development, adaptation, progress.
There was one difference in the pattern of assimilation: becoming an
Amhara was tantamount to becoming eligible for an office in the govern-
ment, and belonging to the dominating and superior people.9 As such, becom-
ing Amhara meant shifting from an inferior culture over into the superior
Ethiopian culture. Becoming an Oromo, on the other hand, was a purely local
affair, adjusting to local conditions but giving away any chance of joining the
elite of the Ethiopian state.
The Amhara court culture, in contrast, developed differently from Amha-
ra peasant culture in several ways. Amhara court culture became a culture of
domination, superiority — a culture of rulers. The legend of the Solomonic
descent of the Ethiopian kings was expanded to give the Amharic court cul-

8
See SOLBERG, KJELL, «Political Apathy and Class/Caste Conflict», in: AALEN —
PAUSEWANG — TRONVOLL, Ethiopia since the Derg, 141–155, here 144, 150.
9
See CHERNETSOV, «On the Origin of the Amhara», 25, 27.

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 S. Pausewang %'

ture the myth of legitimacy as rulers, the chosen people, the «true Israel», as
expressed in the Kébrä Nägäœt in the 14th cent. This myth gave not only the
kings, but the general Amharic court culture, a flair of legitimacy as rulers
and leaders. To some degree, this aspect of culture has been diffused into
Amhara peasant culture, for example as described by Alan Hoben in Gojjam.
S. Chernetsov quotes this example in his article,10 and I do not need to repeat
the quotes. It may seem, though, that Gojjam peasant culture itself was amha-
rised by the rulers and their settlement of soldiers in the vicinity, partly replac-
ing, partly assimilating the local dialects and cultures. In the same way, Shoa
Amhara culture is, no doubt, a result of the expansionist policies of the Shoan
aristocracy, rather than a genuine development of an ethnic culture. The land
holding patterns in Ankober and Manz, for example, mirror a history of con-
quests and retreats, hardly allowing an uninterrupted ethnic development.
And the victories and the settlement policies of the kings, more than peasant
interactions and dispositions, made Northern Shoa develop an Amharic pea-
sant culture.
The borders between Amhara peasants and Amhara court culture are thus
never clear. Peasants could be absorbed into the court, and soldiers could
become peasants or Näftäñña, spreading their culture in the rural peoples.
Nevertheless, the result is the development of two distinct versions of Amha-
ra culture. In the 20th cent. the court culture developed into a culture of edu-
cation.11 In order to staff the modernising administration, education was es-
sential, and the Amhara elite had preferred access to education. Again, ambi-
tious and gifted individuals were admitted from other ethnic groups, but for
their majority there was little room in the education system. When the Oromo
General Tadese Birru in 1961 wanted to create better chances for Oromo
youths to advance through education, he was discretely but firmly advised to
scrap his ideas.12 One did not want to create the opportunity for too many
Oromo to enter the elites: the Oromo majority was destined to remain in the
lower social classes. In frustration, Tadesse Birru founded the «Mecha-Tula-
ma Association», and with it started the growth of an Oromo nationalism
among those members of the amharised elites who remembered their Oromo-
ness and became proud of being Oromo. From these circles grew, in the early
1970es, the founders of OLF (Oromo Liberation Front).
The administrational and military Amhara elite grew into an urban and
educated elite, a group of potential administrators, civil servants, military
officers and top leaders. They were raised to become leaders, and they came

10
See CHERNETSOV, «On the Problem of Ethnogenesis of the Amhara», 25.
11
See CHERNETSOV, «On the Problem of Ethnogenesis of the Amhara», 31.
12
See LEENCO LATA, The Horn of Africa as Common Homeland. State and self-
determination in the era of hightened globalisation, Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Lau-
rier University Press, 2004.

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 & Scrinium I (2005). Varia Aethiopica

to feel as such. Urban «New Amhara» culture became elitist, to some degree
condescending, and arrogant.13 However much individuals developed a taste
for socialist ideas of equality or for democratic values, their culture retained
the characteristics of a ruling class.

´All-Amharaª becomes Ethiopian nationalism

The urban, educated, ethnically mixed Amhara understand themselves to
be the progressive elites, the people destined to be the leaders in Ethiopia.
After 1975, and especially after 1991, they developed a strong tendency to-
wards identifying themselves as Ethiopians, in opposition to centrifugal ten-
dencies in the political sphere and to an increasing ethnic consciousness. In
1975, this was probably in reaction to the early Derg period, when the mili-
tary regime opened up free expression to all ethnic cultures and promised the
equality of ethnic groups. When the Derg changed its policy to a pan-Ethio-
pian sentiment of «Andénnät», unity, it was too late to quell the revived eth-
nic movements, which reorganised as ethnically based resistance movements.
Irony of incidences, the «Red Terror» in 1976–1977 fed into their recruit-
ment, when it tried to suppress the resistance of the educated youth (see be-
low). The strengthened ethnic resistance movements were one of the reasons
why EPRDF decided in 1991 to reorganise the country along ethnic lines.
They had hardly any choice: In 1991, no-one could expect to win legitimacy
without offering the re-vitalised ethnic groups an acceptable solution, that is,
at least a reasonable degree of self-determination.
But the urban elites also changed their political world view after 1975.
Many young idealists joined the regime in the hope of gradually reforming it
into a strong national movement, and helping to form a national Ethiopian
state as a strong power in the region. Their aspirations were also soon frust-
rated, but their nationalism brought them over into the ranks of the after-1992
«All-Amhara» thought and movement.
Provoked by pressure to identify as an Amhara «nationality», the urban
Amhara escaped again into Pan-Ethiopian nationalism. The term «All Amha-
ra People’s Organisation», was adopted as a compromise formula to identify
this group within an ethnically structured federation. It is in fact not the iden-
tity of all Amhara — but of all «assimilated urban elites» speaking Amaréñña,
regardless of their ethnic origin. They cherish an all-Ethiopian nationalism
which at times comes dangerously close to chauvinism. They try to replace
ethnic identities with a pan-Ethiopian national identity, and attempt to sup-
press or reform any sub-national ethnicity, integrating all Ethiopians into one
nationality, irrespective of their origin. For them, reorganising Ethiopia as a

13
See CHERNETSOV, «On the Problem of Ethnogenesis of the Amhara», 32.

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 S. Pausewang &

federation of ethnically self-determined regions or states was a travesty of

Ethiopian unity. Hence they accused the new government after 1991 of a
policy of «divide and rule». They strongly opposed Eritrean independence,
as they opposed the Tigrean claim to leadership. Symptomatic of this trend
may be the argument forwarded in 1994 by Getachew Haile (in a debate at
the Ethiopian Studies Conference in Michigan) that Eritrean independence
was illegitimate, as was the Referendum of 1993, because it did not give the
entire Ethiopian population a vote: You can not amputate my arm and call it
voluntarily, he said, if you ask only the arm…
In the period after 1991, such nationalistic views were most aggressi-
vely expressed by Ethiopian nationalists in the diaspora, those who had be-
come refugees after the overthrow of the military government or before. But
they were also very strong among urban elites in Addis Ababa. Even if these
were more reluctant to speak out in public, in personal meetings one en-
countered such attitudes as an expression of frustration with the course of
events. Of course there are also other views represented among the urban
Amhara; and the attitudes towards Eritrean independence have changed
markedly since 1995. Yet, as a group, the pan-Ethiopian nationalist position
of the urban Amhara has been remarkably consistent.14 The political posi-
tion of this particular group is so dominant in the urban public debate that
large parts of the foreign community take it uncritically as «the public opi-
nion» in Ethiopia.
The newest political demand originating from this developing pan-Ethio-
pian nationalist ideology is the claim that Ethiopia needs a harbour. This
demand surfaced in 1999, in the course of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war. The
newspapers in Addis Ababa eagerly took up this issue, and there raged a
protracted debate in 1999–2000. It fell very much in line with the govern-
ment adopting a nationalist «pan-Ethiopianism», while accusing Eritreans
living in Ethiopia of treason. The harbour issue brought the urban Amhara
opposition for some time considerably closer to the government. It is a popu-
lar claim, which stimulated populist attempts to incite a nationalistic wave of
patriotism. It was useful for the government to draw the Amhara peasants, as
well as peasants from other ethnic groups, as cannon fodder into a war, riding
on a wave of idealistic national euphoria. It proved also attractive to elites of
other ethnic groups. Even Beyene Petros, the leader of the Southern Ethio-
pian People’s Democratic Coalition and the Coalition of Alternative Forces
for Peace and Development in Ethiopia, fell into this trap and joined the
demand for access to a harbour.
The only harbour Ethiopia could possibly claim is Assab. But Assab be-
longs to Eritrea, a sovereign state which gained its independence in 1991,

MERERA GUDINA , Ethiopia: Competing Ethnic Nationalisms and the Quest for
14

Democracy, 1960–2000, Addis Ababa: Shaker Publishing, 2003.

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after a UN-observed referendum and with Ethiopian acclaim. Assab is not to

be had without a new war. The demand is political nonsense. Especially in
the times of internet and international air traffic, no nation needs a harbour.
Switzerland, Austria, Czechia have been leading economic and political po-
wers in Europe without harbours. Ethiopia needs good relations with its neigh-
bours, not a harbour. A red, yellow and green flag over Assab would not
bring the harbour a single kilometre closer to Addis Ababa. The harbour
issue serves only to rally uncritical support for the nationalist rhetoric of the
political parties of the urban Amhara.
Should Ethiopia really not have stopped the offensive in 2000 before taking
at least Assab, or even Asmara, to have a token for negotiations? The border
issue and the war, seemingly about Badme, strengthened the nationalistic
trend of the urban elites and offered them a chance to draw large groups from
other ethnicities into a euphoria of all-Ethiopian nationalism.
The war, indeed, pulled a number of members of the former regional elites
and of the opposition into the Pan-Ethiopian nationalistic fold, and hence
into the orbit of All-Amhara identity. This is a process which can be observed
in different areas and ethnic groups, and with different motivations. It even
includes Tigreans who are posted in Addis Ababa and who have gradually
lost interest in the ethnic federation, or who realise that it does not fulfil their
expectations. It also includes regional elites from most ethnic groups who are
disappointed with the development of the federation for it has not solved
many of the old problems and has created a number of new ones. They begin
again to see a better future in a national state of Ethiopia.

Modern nationalism originating in the French Revolution

In Africa, nationalism in its modern form is a European implant. When
the colonial powers understood that they could no more hold on to their
colonies, they handed over power to those elites with whom they had coope-
rated earlier and whom they had educated to run an administration. As they
had never cared for ethnic differences in drawing their boundaries, all colo-
nies contained fractions of many ethnicities. Nation building became the
magic word of the first generation of independent African leaders. Instead
of giving ethnic groups their self-determination, the Organisation of African
Unity adopted the doctrine of not tampering with the colonial borders. Once
ethnicity is recognised as the basis of border revisions and the creation of
new states, it will not end until all African states fall apart — that was the
argument.
The doctrine was realistic in that point. But it did not recognise that Afri-
can identities are much more closely tied to language and to cultural peers
than to loyalty to a state. And least of all the colonial state, which Africans
experienced as a means of suppression and exploitation, was attractive as a

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 S. Pausewang &!

new focus of identification. Nation building was bound to fail, at least in the
short and middle term.15
But nationalism was indeed invented in a situation not too different from
that of Ethiopia today. It was Napoleon, who after the French Revolution
seized power in France and had the difficult task of defending the revolutio-
nary state against an alliance of revengeful European monarchs. Before Na-
poleon, rulers like Louis XIV and even Louis XVI could not care less whether
the people in Alsace spoke German, whether people in the Camargue felt like
Occitans rather than French, so long as they were the obedient subjects of
their sovereign. Just as Frederik the Great, king of Prussia, did not mind
whether his subjects spoke Polish, Czech, Danish or German, were Catholics
or Protestants, so long as they remained subjects to his absolutist reign. But
Napoleon demanded more of his subjects. Only by creating a nationalistic
wave of euphoria for «La Grande Nation», the Great Nation of France, could
he recruit massive armies of drafted soldiers, many of them in fact volun-
teers. A nationalistic wave embracing all corners of France was the secret
weapon that allowed him to crown himself Emperor and to engulf the whole
of Europe into a series of nationalistic wars. Other nations followed suit. The
new French ideas spread into Germany, where the former Empire was divi-
ded into thirty-six mini-states of dukes and princes who claimed sovereignty
and watched each other jealously to protect their prerogatives. German natio-
nalism thus developed as a movement of the urban elites uniting all Germans
from East to West and North to South against the princes and for one German
republic. The German tragedy was that their enthusiasm was perverted by the
leading regional princes. The Prussian king eventually prevailed in assuming
the crown of the new Empire, converting nationalism from a revolutionary to
a conservative device for coercing the people into unity. And when the Ger-
man Emperors (of the Prussian dynasty) lost the First World War, Hitler suc-
ceeded in rallying this perverted patriotic nationalism into a fascist ideology
of a «Herrenvolk» destined to cleanse itself and lead Europe.
This historical parallel should not be misused to suggest that Ethiopia, or
indeed Amharic Pan-Ethiopianism, is on the way to fascism. History does
not repeat itself so crudely. But it is reasonable to conclude that there are
inherent dangers in populist mass mobilisation being misused for antidemo-
cratic and anti-humanist political risings. And nationalism taken to the ex-
treme has also proven its destructive force in Ethiopian history, and shows its
ugly face today in Eritrea, where the rulers attempt to force an entire popula-
tion into a permanent state of nationalist euphoria, in the name of national
sovereignty and autonomy.

15
DAVIDSON, BASIL, The Black Man’s Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation
State, London: James Currey, 1992; CHABAL, PATRICK — JEAN-PASCAL DALOZ, Africa
Works: Disorder as a Political Instrument, Oxford: James Currey, 1999.

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 &" Scrinium I (2005). Varia Aethiopica

All Amhara nationalism has political consequences

Understanding the difference between ethnic identity and the urban Amhara
identity is essential to understanding some aspects of the particular character
of Amhara all-Ethiopian nationalism. In the Ethiopian Constitution of 1995,
there are two articles that were contested at the period of its drafting and
continue to be so. They concern the rights of ethnicities and the regulation on
land tenure.
Article 39 gives every «nation, nationality and people» the right to self-
determination «including secession». This constitutional guarantee is often
criticised as a device of disunity, an expression of «divide and rule». How-
ever, this argument totally overlooks the situation of 1991, when the victo-
rious liberation movements, all ethnically defined, had to invite all other
movements and nationalities and political forces into a coalition. After the
«Red Terror», there was no other alternative open. In the «Red Terror» cam-
paign, the Derg had targeted anyone who was young and educated as a po-
tential enemy. Those who could escape ended as refugees in the diaspora or
hid away in their rural home areas. There, if they wanted to continue any
political activity at all, they had only one choice — to join the ethnically
defined resistance movements. Thus the «Red Terror» inadvertently fed into
the recruitment of the ethnic liberation fronts. In 1975, no government could
hope to win legitimacy without solving the land question. In 1991, no one
could win legitimacy without accommodating the demand of the different
ethnic groups for freedom from domination. Yet, the urban elites were fa-
vouring a united Ethiopian state and resented ethnic nationalism. Their poli-
tical agenda became the common denominator of a political «public opi-
nion», only because the rural majority lacks the information, is less vocal
and has no access to media.
Even more controversial is the issue of land tenure. Article 40 of the Cons-
titution declares all land the property of «the State and the peoples of Ethio-
pia». This is squarely rejected by the urban opposition, who claim that state
land prevents economic liberalisation. To be developed, land needs invest-
ment, they maintain, and people will only invest if they own it. The EPRDF,
in response, argues that as long as a large majority of people feed themselves
in the rural areas, they can take care of themselves. If they are forced to sell
their land and move to towns, they would demand jobs and investments on a
scale no government could provide. Second, the EPRDF can claim that «com-
mon property» defends the traditional land holding rights of rural people, and
guards their culture and their economic adaptations.
The most important problem in this controversy is the practice of local
authorities today. State agents misuse state ownership of land to hold pea-
sants ransom: — if you don’t support us, you may ask land from your party,
not from us… They assume that as local agents of the state, they can dispose

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 S. Pausewang &#

of the state land freely. In addition, a growth close to 3 percent makes the
population double within one generation. Land scarcity is growing worse
over time. Yet, to reduce the number of peasants is no solution, as long as
there is no alternative livelihood available for those forced to leave.
But the voices of peasant farmers are not heard in the public debate. Pub-
lic opinion in Addis Ababa does not show any consideration for their inter-
ests. Even scholars carring out research in rural areas often claim to under-
stand the interests of peasant farmers without really enquiring. Public debate
and public opinion just exclude the overwhelming majority of the Ethiopian
people who live in rural areas, most of them illiterate and uninformed about
what is debated in the capital. The interests of the urban elites are simply
assumed to be the common interest.16
Maybe the reason why the article by S. Chernetsov was not taken note of, is
precisely this. Understanding his argument, might have forced scholars and
politicians to see the arrogance of an elite deciding for the majority without
any mandate to do so. Without realising its imposition, this urban elite force-
fully adopts the position of speaking for «the» Amhara, and in some contexts
even for the population at large, assuming to know best what people need. By
the strength of their educational achievement, their vocal advantage, their su-
perior access to communication, and their political influence, they present their
nationalistic views and their interests as those of all Amhara. They seduce the
Amhara peasants into adopting their rhetoric, into following their political views,
into demanding access to a harbour — hardly knowing what this means. The
name «Amhara» with its language and cultural associations allows them to
uncritically mix the group identities of the Amhara peasants with their own
urban group identity. Despite their name, they represent not all Amhara, but
the «assimilated» urban elites feeling Amhara regardless of their ethnic origin.
If the Amhara peasants had their own political organisation, they would
probably have expressed much more concern for peace, for more conducive
conditions for agriculture and more control for the peasant himself over his
conditions of cultivation and marketing, than for a war or a border town or
«national sovereignty». As this representation does not exist, hardly anybody
knows what, really, Amhara peasants think and demand.
The rural-urban split of interests is of course more universal. In Ethiopia
it is particularly associated with a lack of access to representation for the
rural views. The Oromo or Wolaita or Sidamo peasants also have very little
voice and influence in Ethiopia these days. But the claim of the Amhara to be
a supra-ethnic group with a national outlook and no territorial affiliation is
only true for a small but vocal fraction of the Amhara speakers — but it

16
PAUSEWANG, SIEGFRIED, Local Democracy and Human Security in Ethiopia: Struc-
tural Reasons for the Failure of Democratisation, Johannesburg 2004: SAIIA (South
African Institute of International Affairs), 28, 32.

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 &$ Scrinium I (2005). Varia Aethiopica

imposes their views as those of «the» Amhara. And they are up to now al-
lowed to do so without any protest or reaction.
Anti-Amhara feelings also often confuse these two identities. Eating in an
Ethiopian restaurant with a group of Oromo people in Europe, we heard that
some guests had asked the owner not to talk in Amaréñña to them. If he could
not speak their language, they would prefer English to the language of «their
colonisers». Just think if Nelson Mandela had refused to talk English or Ben
Bella French — history might have taken a different course.
One can well be proud of being both Amhara and Ethiopian, as others can
be Oromo, Wolaita or Sidamo and Ethiopians. Ethnicity is identity, not race
or belief or culture. A nation consists of those who feel to be, who identify
themselves as one. Nationalism becomes dangerous when it is used to en-
gage others for a suggested common ground, hiding differences of interest
for the sake of creating unity for an undefined and obscure agenda.

SUMMARY
The term Amhara relates in contemporary Ethiopia to two different and dis-
tinct social groups. The ethnic group of the Amhara, mostly a peasant population,
is different from a mixed group of urban people coming from different ethnic
background, who have adopted Amharic as a common language and identify them-
selves as Ethiopians. Sevir B. Chernetsov explained in 1993 their difference as a
result of a historical process of assimilation. Though the difference has significant
consequences in contemporary political life, it appears little reflected, maybe even
consciously veiled, in the interest of a pan-Ethiopian nationalist elite claiming to
represent all Amhara.

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