Bar QS For Property
Bar QS For Property
he compel her to use his surname? Why or why not? (2%) (2009 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he has no right to compel Rona to use his surname. The law does not give him that
right simply because he gave her support (RA 9255).
Under the Family Code, an illegitimate child was required to use only the surname of the
mother. Under RA 9255, otherwise known as the Revilla law, however, the illegitimate
child is given the option to use the surname of the illegitimate father when the latter has
recognized the former in accordance with law. Since the choice belongs to the illegitimate
child, Rodolfo cannot compel Rona, if already of age, to use his surname against her will.
If Rona is still a minor, to use the surname of Rodolfo will require the consent of Rona’s
mother who has sole parental authority over her.
XVI. Absence (Art. 43, Civil Code; Art. 41, Family Code)
PROPERTY
I. Characteristics
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) False. Only right which are patrimonial in character can be considered property. Rights
which are not patrimonial, such as the right to liberty, the right to honor, family rights, and
political rights cannot be considered property.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) True. The plaintiff must have a legal or equitable title to the real property in question
or some interest therein, (or must be possession thereof, so that the action may be in
prescriptible (Article 476-477, Civil Code)
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SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
b) False. If the property lease is a movable property, like a car, an airplane or a ship, the
lessee cannot bring the action to quiet title. The property - subject matter of the action to
quiet title should be real property only (Art 477, NCC).
(c) Only the city or municipal mayor can file a civil action to abate a public nuisance.
(2%) (2017 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(c) False. Article 703 of the New Civil Code provides that a private person may file an
action on account of a public nuisance, if it is especially injurious to himself. Thus, a
private person may file a civil action to abate a public nuisance that is especially injurious
to him.
(d) Possession of a movable property is lost when the location of the said movable
is unknown to the owner. (2%) (2017 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d) False. Article 556 of the Civil Code provides that the possession of movables is not
deemed lost so long as they remain under the control of the possessor, even though for
the time being he may not know their whereabouts. Possession of a movable, therefore,
is lost only when possessor loses control over it.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(e) False. Article 620 of the Civil Code provides that continuous and apparent easement
is acquired either by virtue of a title or by prescription of ten years. Continuous non-
apparent easements and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, maybe acquired
only by virtue of a title (Art. 622, NCC). An easement must be both continuous and
apparent in Order to be subject to acquisition by prescription.
II. Classification
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In 1960, Rigor and Mike occupied two separate but adjacent tracts of land-in
Mindoro. Rigor's tract was classified as timber land while Mike's was classified as
agricultural land. Each of them fenced and cultivated his own tract continuously
for 30 years. In 1991, the Government declared the land occupied by Mike as
alienable and disposable, and the one cultivated by Rigor as no longer intended for
public.use or public service.
Rigor and Mike now come to you today for legal advice in asserting their right of
ownership of their respective lands based on their long possession and occupation
since 1960.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) As to the land occupied by Mike, the same remains a property of the public dominion.
According to jurisprudence, the classification of the property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion.
There must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the
property, has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the
property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion (Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and
September 3,2013).
As to the land occupied by Rigor, the declaration that it is no longer intended for public
use or public service converted the same into patrimonial property provided that such
express declaration was in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or in a Presidential
Proclamation in cases where the President was duly authorized by law. According to
jurisprudence, when public land is no longer intended for public use, public service or for
the development of the national wealth it is thereby effectively removed from the ambit of
public dominion and converted into patrimonial provided that the declaration of such
conversion must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a
Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that
effect (Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and
September 3, 2013).
b) Given that, according to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, M relation
to Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, the open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain as basis for judicial confirmation of imperfect title must be from
June 12, 1945, or earlier, may Mike nevertheless validly base his assertion of the
right of ownership on prescription under the Civil Code? Explain your answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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(b) No, because the land remains property of public dominion and, therefore, not
susceptible to acquisition by prescription. According to jurisprudence, the classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion. In order to convert the property into
patrimonial, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property
of the public dominion, and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription (Heirs of Mario
Malabanan v. Republic, G.R. No. 179987, April 29, 2009 and September 3,2013).
Here, the declaration of the property into alienable and disposable land of the public
domain in 1991 did not convert the property into patrimonial in the absence of an express
declaration of such conversion into patrimonial in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect.
(f) Does Rigor have legal basis for his application for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title based on prescription as defined by the Civil Code given
that, like Mike, his open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation was not since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and
his tract of land was timber land until the declaration in 1991. Explain your
answer. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) None, because Rigor's possession was short of the period required by the Civil
Code for purposes of acquisitive prescription which requires ten (10) years of
continuous possession, if possession was in good faith and with a just title, or thirty
years, in any event. While property may be considered converted into patrimonial
because of the 1991 declaration that it is no longer intended for public use or public
service (provided that the declaration be in the form of a law duly enacted by
Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in cases where the President is duly
authorized by law to that effect), Rigor failed to complete the 30-year period
required by law in case of extraordinary prescription. Since the property was
converted into patrimonial only in 1991, the period of prescription commenced to
run beginning that year only. Rigor's possession prior to the conversion of the
property into patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of completing the
prescriptive period because prescription did not operate against the State at that
time, the property then being public dominion property (Heirs of Mark Malabonan
v. Republic, G.R. No.179987 April 29, 2009 and September 3,2013). Rigor may
not likewise acquire ownership by virtue of the shorter 10-year ordinary
prescription because his possession was not in good faith and without just title.
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Joven and Juliana are the owners of a 30-hectare plantation in Cotabato, covered
by a title. One day, a group of armed men forcibly entered their house and, at gun
point, forced them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Romeo.
Romeo got the title from them and they were ejected from the house and threatened
not to come back or else they will be killed. The spouses went to Manila and resided
there for more than 35 years. They never went back to Cotabato for fear of their
lives. Word came to them that peace and order have been restored in their former
place of residence and they decided to reclaim their land for the benefit of their
grandchildren. Joven and Juliana filed a suit for reconveyance of their property.
This was opposed by the grandson of Romeo to whom the title was eventually
trans- ferred, on the ground of laches and prescription. Decide the case and rule
on the defenses of laches and prescription. Explain your answer. (5%) (2016 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The right of the registered owners, Joven and Juliana, to file suit to recover their property,
is not barred by prescription. Under Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, no title to registered
land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.
III. Ownership
a. Can the chest containing the pieces of jewelry and money be considered as
hidden treasure?
A: NO, for property to be considered hidden treasure it must consist of money, jewelry or
other precious objects, the lawful ownership of which does not appear. In the case at bar,
the chest was just lay in the backyard and the real property where it was found belongs
to the Spouses Manuel. They are thus presumed the owner of the chest where the jewelry
was found.
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A: Since it does not come within the purview of hidden treasure, the spouses Manuel
have the right to claim ownership over the chest as well as its contents.
Multiple choice.
O, owner of Lot A, learning that Japanese soldiers may have buried gold and other
treasures at the adjoining vacant Lot B belonging to spouses X & Y, excavated in
Lot B where she succeeded in unearthing gold and precious stones. How will the
treasures found by O be divided? (1%) (2010 Bar Question)
A. 100% to O as finder
B. 50% to O and 50% to the spouses X and Y
C. 50% to O and 50% to the state
D. None of the above
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The general rule is that the treasure shall belong to the spouses X and Y, the owners of
Lot B. Under Article 438 (NCC), the exception is that when the discovery of a hidden
treasure is made on the property of another and by chance, one-half thereof shall belong
to the owner of the land and the other one-half is allowed to the finder. In the problem,
the finding of the treasure was not by chance because O knew that the treasure was in
Lot B. While a trespasser is also not entitled to any share, and there is no indication in
the problem whether or not O was a trespasser, O is not entitled to a share because the
finding was not “by chance”.
The owner of a thing cannot use it in a way that will injure the right of a third person.
Thus, every building or land is subject to the easement which prohibits its
proprietor or possessor from committing nuisance like noise, jarring, offensive
odor, and smoke. This principle is known as (2011 BAR)
IV. Accession
Josef owns a piece of land in Pampanga. The National Housing Authority (NHA)
sought to expropriate the property for its socialized housing project. The trial court
fixed the just compensation for the property at P50 million. The NHA immediately
deposited the same at the authorized depository bank and filed a motion for the
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issuance of a writ of possession with the trial court. Unfortunately, there was delay
in the resolution of the motion. Meanwhile, the amount deposited earned interest.
When Josef sought the release of the amount deposited NHA argued that Josef
should only be entitled to P50 million. Who owns the interest earned? (3%)
(2017 Bar)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Josef owns the interest earned. In Republic v. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp.,
(CR. No. 172410, April 14, 2008), the Supreme Court has declared that upon deposit by
the appropriator of the amount fixed for just compensation, the owner whose property is
sought to be expropriated becomes the owner of the deposited amount. Any interest,
therefore, that accrues to such deposit belongs to the owner by right of accession. In the
case at bar, Josef became the owner of the amount deposited by NHA; thus, any interest
that accrues therefrom pertains to Josef by right of accession.
Note: In the case of NPC v. Heirs of Ramoran, OR. No. 193455, June 13, 2016, the
Supreme Court ruled that the imposable rate of interest is 12% per annum from the time
of the taking until June 30, 2013, and 6% per' annum from July 1, 2013 until full payment].
Plutarco owned land that borders on a river. After several years the action of the
water of the river caused the deposit of soil, and increased the area of Plutarco's
property by 200 square meters.
(a) If Plutarco wants to own the increase in area, what will be his legal basis for
doing so? Explain your answer. (2%) (2017 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Plutarco's legal basis for owning the increase in area would be by accretion under
Article 457 of the New Civil Code, which says that the accretion of soil which is gradually
received from the effects of the current of the waters belongs to the owners of land
adjoining the banks of the river. The requisites in order that the reparian owner will own
the alluvion deposited through the process of accretion are as follows: the deposit should
be gradual and imperceptible, the cause of the accretion is the current of the river and is
not artificial or man-made, and the land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the
river bank.
In Plutarco's case, all three requisites are met, as the accretion took place over several
years, was caused by the action of the river, and the land he owned borders a riven
therefore, he owns the increase In area by virtue of accretion.
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(b) On the other hand, if the river dries up, may Plutarco validly claim a right of
ownership of the dried-up river bed? Explain your answer. (2%) (2017 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) Rivers and their natural beds, being of public dominion (Article 502(1) Civil Code), are
not subject to appropriation or accretion. The dried-up riverbed remains to be of public
dominion and Plutarco cannot validly claim a right ownership over it (Republic v. Santos,
G.R. No. 160453, November 12,2012).
Benjamin is the owner of a titled lot which is bounded on the north by the
Maragondon River. An alluvial deposit of two (2) hectares was added to the
registered area. Daniel took posses- sion of the portion formed by accretion and
claims that he has been in open, continuous and undisturbed possession of said
portion since 1923 as shown by a tax declaration. In 1958, Ben- jamin filed a
Complaint for Quieting of Title and contends that the alluvium belongs to him as
the riparian owner and that since the alluvium is, by law, part and parcel of the
registered property, the same may be considered as registered property. Decide
the case and explain. (5%) (2016 BAR)
I will decide in favor of Daniel and dismiss the action to quiet title filed by Benjamin. Under
Article 457 of the Civil Code, the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. The
accretion however, does not automatically become registered land. It must be brought
under the Torrens system of registration by Benjamin, the reparian owner. Since he did
not, the then increment, not being regis- tered land, was open to acquisition through
prescription by third per- sons, like Daniel (Grande v. Court of Appeals, 5 SCRA 524
[1962]; Cureg v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 313 [1989]).
Pedro bought a parcel of land described as Cadastral Lot No. 123 and the title was
issued to his name. Juan also bought a lot in the same place, which is described
as Cadastral Lot No. 124. Pedro hired a geodetic engineer to determine the actual
location of Lot No. 123 but for some reason, the engineer pointed to Lot No. 124 by
mistake.
Pedro hired a contractor to construct his house and the latter put up a sign stating
the name of the owner of the project and the construction permit number. It took
more than a year before the house was constructed. When Pedro was already
residing in his house, Juan told him to remove his house because it was built on
his (Juan’s) lot.
Juan filed a Complaint for Recovery of Possession and prayed that the house be
removed because Pedro is a builder in bad faith. Pedro filed his Answer with
Counterclaim that he is entitled to the payment of the value of the house plus
damages because he is a builder in good faith and that Juan is guiltyof estoppel
and laches.
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[a] If Pedro is a builder in good faith, what are the rights given to Juan under the
law? Explain. (2.5%)
[b] If Pedro is a builder in bad faith, what are the rights given to Juan under the
law? Explain. (2.5%) (2016 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
[a] If Pedro is a builder in good faith and Juan is am owner in good faith, Juan has the
right to appropriate as his own the house after payment of indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code, which are the necessary and useful expenses. As
to useful ex- penses, Juan has the option to either refund the amount of the ex- penses,
or pay the increase in value which the land may have acquired by reason thereof.
Alternatively, under Article 448 of the Civil Code, Juan has the right to oblige Pedro to
pay the price of the land. Howev- er, Pedro cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value
is considerably more than that of the house. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if Juan does not choose to appropriate the house after proper indemnity. It is the owner
of the land who is authorized to exercise the options under Article 448 because his right
is older and by principle of accession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory
thing.
If Pedro is a builder in good faith and Juan is an owner in bad faith because Juan knew
that Pedro was building on his lot and did not oppose it (Article 453 par. 2), and Article
454 in relation to Article 447 of the Civil Code applies. Juan shall pay the value of the
house and is also liable for reparation of damages; however, Pedro also has the right to
remove or demolish the house and ask for damages.
[b]If Pedro is a builder in bad faith and Juan is an owner in good faith, Juan has three
options. He may appropriate the improvements without indemnity under Article 449 of the
Civil Code, or demand the demoli- tion of the house in order to replace things to their
former condition at Pedro’s expense under Article 450, or compel Pedro to pay the price
of the land. In addition to these options, Juan is also entitled to damages from Pedro.
If Pedro is a builder in bad faith and Juan is an owner in bad faith, it shall be as if both of
them were in good faith (Article 453, New Civil Code).
Mr. and Mrs. X migrated to the US with all their children. As they had no intention
of coming back, they offered their house and lot for sale to their neighbors, Mr. and
Mrs. A (the buyers) who agreed to buy the property for 128 Million. Because Mr.
and Mrs. A needed to obtain a loan from a bank first, and since the sellers were in
a hurry to migrate, the latter told the buyers that they could already occupy the
house, renovate it as it was already in a state of disrepair, and pay only when their
loan is approved and released. While waiting for the loan approval, the buyers
spent .Pl Million in repairing the house. A month later, a person carrying an
authenticated special power of attorney from the sellers demanded that the buyers
either immediately pay for the property in full now or vacate it and pay damages
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for having made improvements on the property without a sale having been
perfected.
a. What are the buyers' options or legal rights with respect to the they expenses
incurred in improving the property under circumstances? (2015 BAR)
A: The buyers here may be deemed possessors or builders in good faith because they
were made to believe that they were allowed to make repairs or renovation by the sellers
themselves. As builders in good faith, they have the right to seek reimbursement for the
value of the improvements in case the owner decides to appropriate them. They cannot
be asked to remove the improvements because that is not one of the options given by
law to the landowner in case the builder is in good faith.
Answer:
B (Art. 459)
Ciriaco Realty Corporation (CRC) sold to the spouses Del a Cruz a 500-square
meter land (Lot A) in Paranaque. The land now has a fair market value of Pl,200,000.
CRC likewise sold to the spouses Rodriguez, a 700-square meter land (Lot B) which
is adjacent to Lot A. Lot B has a present fair market value of P1,500,000. The
spouses Dela Cruz constructed a house on Lot B, relying on there presentation of
the CRC sales agent that it is the property they purchased. Only upon the
completion of their house did the spouses Dela Cruz discover that they had built
on Lot B owned by the spouses Rodriguez, not on Lot A that they purchased. They
spent P 1 000,000 for the house. As their lawyer, advise the spouses Dela Cruz on
their rights and obligations under the given circumstances, and the recourses and
options open to them to protect their interests. (1992, 2001, 2013)
Answer:
Based on the facts as stated, the spouses Dela Cruz as builders and the spouses
Rodriguez as landowners, are both in good faith. The spouses Dela Cruz are builders in
good faith because before constructing the house they exercised due diligence by asking
the agent of CRC the location of Lot A. and they relied on the information given by the
agent who is presumed to know the identity of the lot purchased by the Dela Cruz spouses
(Pleasantville v. CA, G.R. No. 79688, February 1, 1996). On the other hand, there is no
showing that the landowners, spouses Rodriguez, acted in bad faith. The facts do not
show that the building was done with their knowledge and without opposition on their part
(Art. 453). Good faith is always presumed (Art. 527). The owner of the land on which
anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith shall have the right:
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1. to appropriate as his own the works after payment of the indemnity provided for in
Articles 546 and 548, or
2. to oblige the one who built to pay the price of the land.
However, the builder cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than that of the building. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent if the owner of the
land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity (Art. 448).
The house constructed by the spouses Dela Cruz is considered as a useful expense,
since it increased the value of the lot. As such, should the spouses Rodriguez decide to
appropriate the house, the spouses Dela Cruz are entitled to the right of retention pending
reimbursement of the expenses they incurred or the increase in value which the thing
may have acquired by reason of the improvement (Art. 546). Thus, the spouses Dela
Cruz may demand P1,000,000 as payment of the expenses in building the house or
increase in value of the land because of the house as a useful improvement, as may be
determined by the court front the evidence presented during the trial (Depra Dumlao, G.R.
No. L 57348, May 16, 1985; Technogas Phils. v. CA, G.R. No. 108894, February 10,
1997).
Marciano is the owner of a parcel of land through which a river runs out into the
sea. The land had been brought under the Torrens System, and is cultivated by
Ulpiano and his family as farmworkers therein. Over the years, the river brought
silt and sediment from its source up in the mountains and forests so that gradually
the land owned by Marciano increased in area by three hectares. Ulpiano built three
huts on this additional area, where he and his two married children live. On this
same area, Ulpiano and his family planted peanuts, mongo, beans and vegetables.
Ulpiano also regular paid taxes on the land, as shown by tax declarations, for over
thirty years.
When Marciano learned of the increase in the size of the land he ordered Ulpiano
to demolish the huts, and demanded that he be paid his share in the proceeds of
the harvest. Marciano claims that under the civil code, the alluvium belongs to him
as a registered riparian owner to whose land the accretion attaches, and that his
right is enforceable against the whole world.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Marciano's contention is correct. Since the accretion was deposited on his land by the
action of the waters of the river and he did not construct any structure to increase the
deposition of soil ad silt, Marciano automatically owns the accretion. His real right of
ownership is enforceable against the whole word including Ulpiano and his two married
children. Although Marciano's land is registered the 3 hectares land deposited through
accretion was not automatically registered. As unregistered land, it is subject to
acquisitive prescription by third persons.
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Although Ulpiano and his children live in the 3 hectare unregistered land owned by
Marciano, they are farmworkers; therefore they are possessors not in the concept of
owners but in the concept of more holders. Even if they possessed the land for more than
30 years, they cannot become the owners thereof through extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, because the law requires possession in the concept of owner. Payment of
taxes and tax declaration are not enough to make their possession one in the concept of
owner. They must repudiate the possession in the concept of holder by executing
unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to custer of Marciano, known to Marciano and
must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Only then would his possession
become adverse.
What rights, if any, does Ulpiano have against Marciano? Explain (3%) (2009 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Although Ulpiano is a possessor in bad faith, because he knew he does not own the land,
he will lose the three huts he built in bad faith and make an accounting of the fruits he has
gathered, he has the right to deduct from the value of the fruits the expenses for
production, gathering and preservation of the fruits (Article 443, NCC).
He may also ask for reimbursement of the taxes he has paid, as these are charges on
the land owned by Marciano. This obligation is based on a quasi-contract (Article 2175,
NCC).
Krystal owns a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 12345 in Angeles City, Due to
severe financial constraints, Krystal was forced to sell the property to RBP
Corporation, a foreign corporation based in South Korea. Subsequently, RBP
Corporation sold the property to Gloria, one of its most valued clients. Wanting her
property back, Krystal, learning of the transfer of the property froth REP
Corporation to Gloria, sued both of them in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
annulment of sale and for reconveyance. She alleged that the sale by REP
Corporation to Gloria was void because ADP Corporation was a foreign
corporation prohibited by the Constitution from acquiring and owning lands in the
Philippines.
Will Krystal's suit for annulment of sate and reconveyance prosper? Explain your
answer. (4%) (2017 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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Krystal's suit will not prosper. The Supreme Court, in Borromeo v. Descallar (G.R. No.
159310, February 24, 2009, 580 SCRA 175), reiterated the consistent ruling that if land
is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or
transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid. In this case, RBP, being a foreign corporation is
prohibited from acquiring private land, making the sale of Krystal to RBP void ab However,
the subsequent transfer to a Filipino citizen cured the defect, making Gloria's title valid
and defeating Krystal's action for annulment and reconveyance.
VI. Co-ownership
Butch got a loan from Hagibis Corporation (Hagibis) but he de- faulted in the
payment. A case for collection of a sum of money was filed against him. As a
defense, Butch claims that there was already an arrangement with Hagibis on the
payment of the loan. To implement the same, Butch already surrendered five (5)
ser- vice utility vehicles (SUVs) to the company for it to sell arid the proceeds to
be credited to the loan as payment. Was the obliga- tion of Butch extinguished by
reason of dacion en pago upon the surrender of the SUVs? Decide and explain.
(5%) (2016 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the obligation of Butch to Hagibis was not extinguished by the mere surrender of
the SUV’s to the latter. Dation in payment, whereby property is alienated to the creditor
in satisfaction of a debt in money, shall be governed by the law of sales. (Article 1245).
In dacion en pago, as a special mode of payment, the debtor offers another thing to the
creditor who accepts it as equivalent of payment of an outstanding debt. The
undertaking really partakes in one sense of the nature of sale, that is, the creditor is
really buying the thing or property of the debtor, payment for which is to be charged
against the debtor’s debt. As such, the essential elements of a contract of sale, namely,
consent, object certain, and cause or consideration must be present. In dacion en pago
there is in reality an objective novation of the obligation where the thing offered as an
accepted equivalent of the performance of an obligation is considered as the object of
the contract of sale, while the debt is considered as the purchase price. In any case,
common con- sent is an essential prerequisite, be it sale or innovation to have the effect
of totally extinguishing the debt or obligation (Fiiinvest Credit Corporation vs. Philippine
Acetylene Company, Inc. G.R. No. L-50449 January 30, 1982). There being no mention
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in the facts that Hagibis has given its consent to accept the SUVs as equivalent
payment, the obligation of Butch is not thereby extinguished by mere delivery of the
SUVs.
X, Y, Z are siblings who inherited a 10-storey building from their parents. They
agreed in writing to maintain it as a co-owned property for leasing out and to
divide the net profits among themselves equally for a period of 20 years. On the
8th year, X wanted to get out of the co-ownership so he could get his 1/3 share in
the property. Y and Z refused, saying X is bound by their agreement to keep the
co-ownership for 20 years. Are Y and Z correct? Explain. (2015 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Y and Z are partly correct. The law provides that none of the co-owners shall be obliged
to remain in the co-ownership and it is the right of a co-owner to ask for partition of the
co-ownership anytime. One exception to the rule is if the co-owners agree to keep the
thing undivided which period shall not exceed ten years. In this case, the agreement to
keep the thing undivided shall be valid at the most for ten years (Art. 494).
Raul, Ester, and Rufus inherited a 10-hectare land from their father. Before the land
could be partitioned, however, Raul sold his hereditary right to Raffy, a stranger to
the family, for P5 million. Do Ester and Rufus have a remedy for keeping the land
within their family? (2011 BAR)
(A) Yes, they may be subrogated to Raffy’s right by reimbursing to him within the
required time what he paid Raul.
(B) Yes, they may be subrogated to Raffy’s right provided they buy him out before he
registers the sale.
(C) No, they can be subrogated to Raffy’s right only with his conformity.
(D) No, since there was no impediment to Raul selling his inheritance to a stranger.
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement
is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x x x
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. Under the Civil Code, a co-owner may renounce his share in the co-owned property
in lieu of paying for his share in the taxes and expenses for the preservation of the co-
owned property. In effect, there is dacion en pago because the co-owner is discharging
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his monetary obligation by paying it with his non-monetary interest in the co-owned
property. The fact the he is giving up his entire interest simply means that he is accepting
the value of his interest as equivalent to his share in the taxes and expenses of
preservation.
VII. Possession
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The remedy available to Jacob is acclon publiclana, or an action for the recovery pf the
better right of possession or possession as a real right. It also refers to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from accrual of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. Since the entry made by Liz is through
stealth, Jacob could have filed an action for forcible entry. Ordinarily, the one-year period
within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the
date of actual entry on the land, except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-
year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned thereof. Here, since more than
one year had elapsed since Jacob learned of the entry made by Liz through stealth, the
action that maybe Wed by Jacob is no longer forcible entry, but an accion publiciana
(Conks v. Tubil, G.R. No. 184285, September 25, 2009; Valdez v. CA, G.R. No. 132424,
May 4, 2006).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Jacob can file an action for unlawful detainer against Liz to regain possession of the
property. An action for unlawful detainer is proper when the defendant's Initial right to
possession of the property has terminated but he unlawfully withholds possession thereof.
It has to be filed within one year from the termination of his right to possession. Although
Liz surreptitiously entered in 2012, her possession became lawful when Jacob discovered
it and allowed her to continue possession by tolerance in 2014. Liz' right to possession
terminated in December 2016 when Jacob demanded her to vacate the property. Since
today is November 2017, it is still within one year from the termination of Liz' right to
possession. Therefore, Jacob can file an action for unlawful detainer.
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Betty thereafter filed an action against Tambunting Pawnshop for the recovery of
the jewelries. Tambunting raised the defense of ownership, additionally arguing
that it is duly licensed to engage in the pawnshop and lending business, and that
it accepted the mortgage of the jewelry in good faith and in the regular course of
its business.
If you were the judge, how will you decide the case? (1%) (2013 BAR)
(A) I will rule in favor of Betty. My ruling is based on the Civil Code provision that one who
has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the
person in possession of the same. Tam bunting's claim of good faith is inconsequential.
(B) I will rule in favor of Betty. Tambunting's claim of good faith pales into insignificance
in light of the unlawful deprivation of the jewelries. However, equity dictates that
Tambunting must be reimbursed for the pawn value of the jewelries.
(C) I will rule in favor of Tambunting. Its good faith takes precedence over the right of
Betty to recover the jewelries.
(D) I will rule in favor of Tambunting. Good faith is always presumed. Tambunting's lawful
acquisition in the ordinary course of business coupled with good faith gives it legal right
over the jewelries.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A- Article 559 of the Civil Code applies (See Dizon vs. Suntay 47 SCRA 160)
VIII. Usufruct
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(1) Antichre,sis is a real security transaction wherein the creditor acquires the right to
receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, and the obligation to apply them
to the payment of the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of his credit
(Ankle 2132, NCC). On the other hand, a usufruct is a real right which authorizes
its holder to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form
and substance, unless otherwise provided.
(2) Antichresis is always created by contract, while usufruct need not arise from
contract, because it may also be constituted by law or by other acts inter vivos,
such as donation, or in a last will and testament, or by prescription.
(3) The subject matter of antichresis is always a real property while the subject matter
of usufruct may either be real property or personal property.
(4) Both create real rights, but antichresis is an accessory contract, while usufruct
when created by contract is a principal contract.
(5) During the usufruct, the fruits belong to the usufructury not the naked owner, while
the antichretic creditor has the right to receive the fruits with the obligation to apply
the fruits to the interest, if owing, and thereafter to the principal of the credit (Art.
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2132, NCC).
(6) In antichresis the amount of the principal and the interest charge must be in writing
in order to be valid (Article 2134, NCC) while there is no particular form required
to constitute a valid usufruct.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
X, the owner, constituted a 10-year usufruct on his land as well as on the building
standing on it in Y’s favor. After flood totally destroyed the building 5 years later,
X told Y that an act of God terminated the usufruct and that he should vacate the
land. Is X, the owner of the land, correct? (2011 BAR)
IX. Easements
Tyler owns a lot that is enclosed by the lots of Riley to the North and East, of Dylan
to the South, and of Reece to the West. The current route to the public highway is
a kilometer's walk through the northern lot of Riley, but the route is a rough road
that gets muddy during the rainy season, and is inconvenient because it is only 2.5
meters wide. Tyler's nearest access to the public highway would be through the
southern lot of Dylan.
May Dylan be legally required to afford to Tyler a right of way through his property?
Explain your answer. (4%) (2017 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Dylan may not be legally required to afford Tyler a right of way through his property,
because Tyler already has an adequate outlet to the public highway through his Riley's
lot. One of the requisites for a compulsory grant of right of way is that the estate of the
claimant of a right of way must be isolated and without adequate outlet to a public
highway. The true standard for the grant of compulsory right of way is "adequacy" of outlet
going to a public highway and not the convenience of the dominant estate. In the case at
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bar, there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public
highway. Even if said outlet be inconvenient, the need to open up another legal easement
or servitude is entirely unjustified (Article 649, NCC; Dichosa Jr. V. Marcos, G.R. No.
180282, April II, 2011; Coslabella Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 80511, January 25, 1991)
In 2005, Andres built a residential house on a lot whose only access to the national
highway was a pathway crossing Brando's property. Andres and others have been
using this pathway (pathway A) since 1980. In 2006, Brando fenced off his property,
thereby blocking Andres' access to the national highway. Andres demanded that
part of the fence be removed to maintain his old access route to the highway
(pathway A), but Brando refused, claiming that there was another available
pathway (pathway B) for ingress and egress to the highway. Andres countered that
pathway B has defects, is circuitous, and is extremely inconvenient to use. To
settle their dispute, Andres and Brando hired Damian, a geodetic and civil
engineer, to survey and examine the two pathways and the surrounding areas, and
to determine the shortest and the least prejudicial way through the servient estates.
After the survey, the engineer concluded that pathway B is the longer route and
will need improvements and repairs, but will not significantly affect the use of
Brando's property. On the other hand, pathway A that had long been in place, is
the shorter route but would significantly affect the use of Brando's property. In light
of the engineer's findings and the circumstances of the case, resolve the parties'
right of way dispute. (1996, 2013)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Andres is not entitled to the easement of right of way for Pathway A. Pathway B must be
used.
The owner of a dominant estate may validly obtain a compulsory right of way only after
he has established the existence of four requisites, to wit:
1. the (dominant) estate is surrounded by other immovables and is without adequate
outlet to a public highway;
2. after payment of the proper indemnity;
3. the isolation was not due to the proprietor's own acts; and
4. the right of way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from the dominant estate to the
public highway may be the shortest (Art. 650).
However, the Supreme Court has consistently ruled that in case both criteria cannot be
complied with, the right of way shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.
The first and fourth requisites are not complied with. First, there is another available outlet
to the national highway (Pathway B). Second, the right of way obtained (Pathway A) is
not the least prejudicial to Brando's property as evidenced by the reports of the geodetic
and civil engineer.
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When there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant estate to a public
highway, even if the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to
open up another servitude is entirely unjustified (Costabella Corp. v. CA, G.R. No. 80511,
January 25, 1991). The rule that the easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate is controlling (Quimen v. CA, G.R. No. 112331,
May 29, 1996).
Franz was the owner of Lot E which was surrounded by four (4) lots one of which -
Lot C - he also owned. He promised Ava that if she bought Lot E, he would give her
a right of way in Lot C.
Convinced, Ava bought Lot E and, as promised, Franz gave her a right of way in
Lot C.
Ava cultivated Lot E and used the right of way granted by Franz.
Ava later found gainful employment abroad. On her return after more than 10 years,
the right of way was no longer available to her because Franz had in the meantime
sold Lot C to Julia who had it fenced.
Does Ava have a right to demand from Julia the activation of her right of way?
Explain. (2.5%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the right to demand from Julia the activation of the right of way, for the
following reasons:
1. An easement of right of way is a real right which attaches to, and is inseparable from,
the estate to which it belongs.
2. The sale of the property includes the easement or servitude, even if the deed of sale
is silent on the matter.
3. The vendee of the property in which a servitude or easement exists cannot close or
put up obstructions thereon to prevent the dominant estate from using it.
4. Ava’s working abroad for more than ten (10) years should not be construed as non-
user, because it cannot be implied from the facts that she or those whom she left behind
to cultivate the lot no longer use the right of way.
Note: Since a right of way is a discontinuous easement, the period of 10 years of non-
user shall be computed from the day it ceased to be used under Art. 6341(2) CC.
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5. Renunciation or waiver of an easement must be specific, clear, express and made in
a public instrument in accordance with Article 1358 of the New Civil Code.
Yes. Ava has the right to demand from Julia the activation of her right of way. A voluntary
easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. Also, like in any other
contract, an easement is generally effective between parties, their heirs and assigns,
except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not
transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law (Unisource
Commercial v. Chung, 593 SCRA 530 [2009]).
Assuming Ava opts to demand a right of way from any of the owners of Lots A, B,
and D, can she do that? Explain. (2.5%) (2010 Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the option to demand a right of way on any of the remaining lots of Franz
more so after Franz sold Lot C to Julia. The essential elements of a legal right of way
under Article 649 and 650 of the New Civil Code are complied with.
Yes. Ava has the option to demand a right of way from the other lots. The law provides
that whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition is surrounded by
other estates of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right
of way without indemnity
(Art. 652, NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. There was merely a promise to Ava that a right of way shall be granted to her in Lot
C if Ava purchased Lot E. The promise was not reduced into writing (Obra v. Baldria, 529
SCRA 621 [2007]). Hence, it was not or could not have been registered as to warn buyers
of Lot C about the existence of the easement on the property. Not having been annotated
on the TCT to Lot C, the buyer acquired Lot C free from such right of way granted to Ava.
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement
is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
xx
c. Acquisitive prescription of a negative easement runs from the time the owner
of the dominant estate forbids, in a notarized document, the owner of the servient
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estate from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement. (2009
Bar Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. In negative easements, acquisitive prescription runs from the moment the owner of
the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary public, the
owner of the servient estate from executing an act which would be lawful without the
easement (Art. 621, NCC).
X. Nuisance
The following are the limitations on the right of ownership imposed by the owner
himself, except: (2012 BAR)
a) Will/Succession
b) Mortgage
c) Pledge
d) Lease
The following cannot ask for the reduction of inofficious donation, except: (2012
BAR)
a) Creditors of the deceased
b) Devisees or legatees
c) Compulsory heirs of the donor
d) The surviving spouse of the donee.
Ernesto donated a mobile phone worth P 32,000 to Hubert orally and delivered the
unit to Hubert who accepted. Which statement is most accurate? (2012 BAR)
a) The donation is void and Ernesto may get mobile phone back.
b) The donation is void but Ernesto cannot get the mobile phone back.
c) The donation is voidable and may be anulled.
d) The donation is valid.
Jose, single, donated a house and lot to his only niece, Maria, who was of legal age
and who accepted the donation. The donation and Maria's acceptance thereof were
evidenced by a Deed of Donation. Maria then lived in the house and lot donated to
her, religiously paying real estate taxes thereon. Twelve years later, when Jose had
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already passed away, a woman claiming to be an illegitimate daughter of Jose filed
a complaint against Maria. Claiming rights as an heir, the woman prayed that Maria
be ordered to reconvey the house and lot to Jose's estate. In her complaint she
alleged that the notary public who notarized the Deed of Donation had an expired
notarial commission when the Deed of Donation was executed by Jose. Can Maria
be made to reconvey the property? What can she put up as a defense? (2015 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. Maria cannot be compelled to reconvey the property. The Deed of Donation was void
because it was not considered a public document. However, a void donation can trigger
acquisitive prescription (Solis v. CA, G.R. No. L-46753-54, August 25, 1989; Doliendo v.
Biarnesa, G.R. No. L-2765, December 27, 1906). The void donation has a quality of titulo
colorado enough for acquisitive prescription especially since 12 years had lapsed from
the deed of donation.
The Roman Catholic Church accepted a donation of a real property located in Lipa
City. A deed of donation was executed, signed by the donor, Don Mariano, and the
donee, the Church, as represented by Fr. Damian. Before the deed could be
notarized, Don Mariano died. Is the donation valid? (2014 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Josefa executed a deed of donation covering a one-hectare rice land in favor of her
daughter, Jennifer. The deed specifically provides that:
"For and in consideration of the love and service Jennifer has shown and given to
me, I hereby freely, voluntarily and irrevocably donate to her my one-hectare rice
land covered by TCT No. 11550, located in San Fernando, Pampanga. This donation
shall take effect upon my death."
The deed also contained Jennifer's signed acceptance, and an attached notarized
declaration by Josefa and Jennifer that the land will remain in Josefa's possession
and cannot be alienated, encumbered, sold or disposed of while Josefa is still alive.
Advise Jennifer on whether the deed is a donation inter vivos or mortis causa and
explain the reasons supporting your advice. (2013 BAR)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The donation is a donation inter vivos.
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When the donor intends that the donation shall take effect during the lifetime of the donor,
though the property shall not be delivered till after the donor’s death, this shall be a
donation inter vivos (Art. 729). The Civil Code prefers inter vivos transmissions. Moreover,
mortis causa donations should follow the formalities of a will (Art. 728). Here there is no
showing that such formalities were followed. Thus, it is favorable to Jennifer that the deed
is a donation inter vivos.
Furthermore, what is most significant in determining the type of donation is the absence
of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donation; on the contrary, the deeds
expressly declare them to be “irrevocable,” a quality absolutely incompatible with the idea
of conveyances mortis causa where revocability is the essence of the act, to the extent
that a testator cannot lawfully waive or restrict his right of revocation. The provisions of
the deed of donation which state that the same will only take effect upon the death of the
donor and that there is a prohibition to alienate, encumber, dispose, or sell the same
should be harmonized with its express irrevocability (Austria-Magat v. CA, G.R. No.
106755, February 1, 2002).
Lucio executed a simple deed of donation of P50 million on time deposit with a
bank in favor of A, B, C, D, and E, without indicating the share of each donee. All
the donees accepted the donation in writing. A, one of the donees, died. Will B, C,
D, and E get A’s share in the money? (2011 BAR)
(A) Yes, accretion will automatically apply to the joint-donees in equal shares.
(B) Yes, since the donor’s intention is to give the whole of P50 million to the
jointdonees in equal shares.
(C) No, A"s share will revert to the donor because accretion applies only if the joint-
donees are spouses.
(D) No, A’s share goes to his heirs since the donation did not provide for reversion to
donor.
(A) All persons who can enter into contracts and dispose of their property.
(B) All persons who are of legal age and suffer from no civil interdiction.
(C) All persons who can make a last will and testament.
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(D) All persons, whether natural or artificial, who own property.
(A) Yes, since the donation is subject to a resolutory condition which was not fulfilled.
(B) No, but Rex is entitled to recover the value of the land from the municipality.
(C) No, the transfer of ownership has been completed.
(D) Yes, the donation is not deemed made until the suspensive condition has been
fulfilled.
The residents of a subdivision have been using an open strip of land as passage
to the highway for over 30 years. The owner of that land decided, however, to close
it in preparation for building his house on it. The residents protested, claiming that
they became owners of the land through acquisitive prescription, having been in
possession of the same in the concept of owners, publicly, peacefully, and
continuously for more than 30 years. Is this claim correct?
(A) No, the residents have not been in continuous possession of the land since they
merely passed through it in going to the highway.
(B) No, the owner did not abandon his right to the property; he merely tolerated his
neighbors’ use of it for passage.
(C) Yes, residents of the subdivision have become owners by acquisitive prescription.
(D) Yes, community ownership by prescription prevails over private claims.
Multiple choice.
4. B’s mother who has a general power of attorney may accept the donation for
him.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
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No. 5. None of the above is sufficient to make B’s acceptance valid.
Since the donation covered an immovable property, the donation and the acceptance
must be in a public document. An e-mail is not a public document. Hence, No. 1 is false.
No. 2 and No. 4 are both false. The acceptance by the donee’s father alone or mother
alone, even though in a public document, is not sufficient because the father and the
mother did not have a special power of attorney for the purpose. Under Article 745 (NCC),
the done must accept the donation personally, or through an authorized person with a
special power of attorney for the purpose; otherwise, the donation shall be void.
No. 3 is also false. B cannot accept the donation anytime at his convenience. Under
Article 749 NCC, the done may accept the donation only during the lifetime of the donor.
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement
is false. Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
x x x
[e] A person can dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos. (2009 Bar
Question)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False. A person cannot dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos, i.e., an act to
take effect during his lifetime. Before his death there is no corpse to dispose. But he is
allowed to do so through an act mortis causa, i.e., an act to take effect upon his death.
PRESCRIPTION
I. Definition
X bought a land from Y, paying him cash. Since they were friends, they did not
execute any document of sale. After 7 years, the heirs of X asked Y to execute a
deed of absolute sale to formalize the verbal sale to their father. Unwilling to do so,
X’s heirs filed an action for specific performance against Y. Will their action
prosper? (2011 BAR)
(A) No, after more than 6 years, the action to enforce the verbal agreement has already
elapsed.
(B) No, since the sale cannot under the Statute of Frauds be enforced.
(C) Yes, since X bought the land and paid Y for it.
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(D) Yes, after full payment, the action became imprescriptible.
(A) When the plaintiff had no notice of the deed or the issuance of the certificate of
title.
(B) When the title holder concealed the matter from the plaintiff.
(C) When fortuitous circumstances prevented the plaintiff from filing the case sooner.
(D) When the plaintiff is in possession of the property.
What is the prescriptive period for filing an action for revocation of a donation
based on acts of ingratitude of the donee? (2011 BAR)
OBLIGATIONS
I. Definition
It is a conduct that may consist of giving, doing, or not doing something. (2012
BAR)
a) Obligation
b) Juridical necessity
c) Prestation
d) Contract
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