Contents v

Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand? 57 Satisfaction and Happiness 101
Political/Conflict Theories 58 Cultural Development 102
Economic Theories 60 Sustainability 103
Cultural Theories 61 Causes and Effects: Why Does Development
Diffusion Theories 62 Happen? 103
Great Britain, the United Kingdom, Institutions:The Market-State Debate, Revisited 104
or Neither? State and Nation in England and Scotland 65 Institutions: Beyond the Market-State Debate 106

C A SES IN CO N TEX T
Culture and Development 107
Civil Society, Social Capital, and Trust 107
Mexico 56
Religion 109
France 59
Value Systems 109
United Kingdom 62
Systems and Structures: Domestic and International 110
Nigeria 63
Domestic Economic Structures and Class Interests 111
CHA PTER 4 International Economic Structures and Class Interests 111

Political Economy 70 Geography 112

Explaining the Development

Concepts 72
of North and South Korea 114
Inequality 73
C A SES IN CO N TEXT
Employment and Inflation 75
India 99
Types 76
Nigeria 101
Markets and States in Modern Economies 76
China 105
Markets and Economic Performance 77
Brazil 112
States and Economic Performance 79
Economic Functions of Modern States 82 CH A PTER 6
States and Economic Management
Investments in Human Capital: Education and Health
82
83
Democracy and Democratization 119
Infrastructure and Other Public Goods 85 Concepts 121
Democracy and Democratic Regimes 121
Welfare State Functions 85
Procedural (Minimal) Definitions of Democracy 122
Causes and Effects: Why Do Welfare States Emerge? 86 Substantive Definitions of Democracy 123
Cultural Changes 87 Regime Change and Democratization 124
Industrial Capitalism 87
Mobilization and Political Action 89
Types 125
International Learning Effects 92 Types of Democracy 125
Representative Democracy 126
Welfare States in the Nordic
Direct Democracy 128
Countries: What Can We Learn and How? 93 Types of Democratization 129
C A SES IN CO NTEXT Democratic Transitions 129
United States 72 Democratic Consolidation 129
United Kingdom 77 Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 131
Japan 84 Modernization 132
Germany 87 Culture and Democracy 134
The International System 135
CH A PTER 5
Domestic Institutions 136
Development 96 Agents and Actors: The Role of Individuals and Groups 137
Combining Arguments and Theories: Multiple Causes 139
Concepts 98
l l ! l l ! i m i M U M I i m is American Democracy
Types 98
a Model? 141
Poverty 98
Social Outcomes and Human Development 99 C A SES IN CO N TEXT

Gender Relations and Racial and Ethnic Identities 100 Brazil 130
■

Contents

China 131 Types 176

India 133 Flexible and Rigid Constitutions 177
United States 140 Separation of Powers: Judicial Review and Parliamentary
Sovereignty 178
CH A PTER 7
Federalism and Unitarism 180
Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Federalism 180
Breakdown 145 Unitarism 182
Authoritarian and Democratic Constitutions 183
Concepts 147
Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Regimes 147 Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal
Transitions to Authoritarian Regimes 148 Constitutions? 184
Are Federal Constitutions Good for Social Stability? 185
Types 148
Are Federal Constitutions Good for Democratic Rights? 187
Types of Authoritarianism 148
Are Federal Constitutions Good for the Economy? 188
Totalitarian Regimes 148
Judicial Review and Democracy 190
Theocracies 149
Personalistic Dictatorships 149 What Explains the Similarities
Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes 151 Between the Brazilian and South African
Hybrid and Semi-authoritarian Regimes 151 Constitutions? 193
Types of Transition (or Nontransition) to Authoritarianism 152 H B aiiB B iflm i
Authoritarian Persistence 153 United Kingdom 181
Democratic Breakdown 155 Iran 185
Transition to Hybrid or Semi-authoritarian Regime 157 Nigeria 187
Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes India 189
to Emerge and Persist? 158 United States 192
Historical Institutionalist Theories 159 CH A PTER 9
Poverty and Inequality
State Weakness and Failure
160
162
Legislatures and Legislative Elections 198
Political Culture Theories of Authoritarian Persistence 163 Concepts 200
Barriers to Collective Action 164 What Legislatures Are 200
Special Causal Circumstances Surrounding Hybrid What Legislatures Do 201
and Semi-Authoritarian Regimes 166
Types 202
Why Did Zimbabwe Become Unicameral and Bicameral Legislatures 202
and Remain Authoritarian? 167 Electoral Systems 205
C A S E S IN C O N TEX T District Systems 205

Iran 150 Proportional Representation (PR) 208

Mixed or Hybrid 209
Russia 153
Mexico 154 Executive-Legislative Relations 211

Germany 157 Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns

France 157 of Representation? 213
Patterns of Representation 213
Electoral Systems and Representation 215
Legislative Decision Making and Representation 218
Executive-Legislative Relations and Representation 220

part ill: Institutions of Government Representation in New Zealand

and Beyond 222
CH A PTER 8 ES3Q2SE31
Constitutions and Constitutional Design 171 United Kingdom
Brazil 209
206

Concepts 174 Japan 210

Constitutions 174 Germany 212
Constitutional Design 175 United States 217
 Brief Contents

p a r t i: Comparative Political Analysis 14 Race, Ethnicity, and Gender 325

15 Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics 348

1 The Comparative Approach: An Introduction 1

2 Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 23

part The Comparative-International
V:
Nexus
part II: The State, Development,
Democracy, and Authoritarianism 16 Comparative Politics and International
Relations 372
3 The State 46

4 Political Economy 70 part v i: Country Profiles and Cases

5 Development 96 Brazil 399

6 Democracy and Democratization 119 China 412

7 Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic I I France 427

Breakdown 145 P B B Germany 441

^ 2 lndia 455
part ill: Institutions of Government
] Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran) 468
8 Constitutions and Constitutional Design 171
| ♦ | Japan 482
9 Legislatures and Legislative Elections 198
a Mexico 496
10 Executives 226
n Nigeria 510
11 Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest j j j j Russia (Russian Federation) 525
Groups 252
I H H United Kingdom 539

part IV: Politics, Society, and Culture ■ United States 553

12 Revolutions and Contention 277

13 Nationalism and National Identity 304

 Contents
Insights, xiii Hypothesis Testing 31
Preface xv Correlation 31
Maps of the World xxvi Causation 33

Critiques: Using Theory and Evidence 39

Empirical Critiques: Using Deviant Cases 39
Theoretical Critiques: Improving Theories and Hypotheses 39

The Challenges of Measurement: Biases,

Errors, and Validity 41
pa r ti: Comparative Political Analysis
EU SM BBS* Qualities of Good Analysis
C HA PTER 1 and Argumentation 42

The Comparative Approach: An Introduction 1 Step 1: Asking Good Questions: Why? 43

Step 2: Hypothesis Testing: Generating Good Hypotheses
Asking Why: Research Questions in Comparative and Testing Them Fairly 43
Politics 2 Step 3: Balancing Argumentation: Evidence, Originality,
Major Questions in Comparative Politics 4 and Meaningfulness 43
Empirical Arguments Versus Normative Arguments 6
Solving Intellectual Puzzles: A Contemporary Analogy 7

Concepts 9
Features of Good Concepts 9
Conceptualization 10
Operationalizing: From Concepts to Measures 11 partii: The State, Development,
Empirical Evidence 12 Democracy, and Authoritarianism
Facts and Evidence 12
Cases and Case Studies 13 CH A PTER 3

The Comparative Method 14 The State 46

Variables and Comparison 14
Concepts 48
Most-Similar-Systems Design 15
The Modern State 48
Most-Different-Systems Design 18
State Capacity 49
Comparative Checking 18
Failed States 50
Within-Case Comparison 20
The State-Society Relationship 50
Is the Study of Politics a Science? The Limits of the
Types 52
Comparative Method 20
Cha racteristics of Modern States 52
CHA PTER 2 Bureaucracy 52

Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 23 Impersonality

Sovereignty 54
53

Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 24 Traditional Functions of States 55

Theories 25 Defense 55
Flypotheses 25 Policing 55
How Theories Emerge and Are Used 27 Taxation 56
Types of Evidence 29 Order, Administration, and “Legibility" 57

L h
 ■NSgggf

Contents vii

CHAPTER 10 Germany 262

Executives 226 Russia

Mexico
265
267
Concepts 228

Types 229
Executive Structures: Presidential and Parliamentary 230
Formal Powers 232
Partisan Powers 235
Coalitions 235 part iv: Politics, Society, and Culture
Informal Powers 240
CH A PTER 12
Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive
Stability? 240 Revolutions and Contention 277
Stable and Unstable Regimes: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Concepts 279
and Democracy 241 What Is "Contention"? 279
Stable and Unstable Executives: Styles of Presidential Rule 243 Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary Contention 279
Stable and Unstable Executives: Patterns of Parliamentary
Rule 246 Types 280
Social Movements 280
U i lllim i l M M H H m Beyond the American
Revolutions 284
and British Models 247
Insurgencies and Civil Wars 287
C A SES IN CO NTEXT Terrorism 287
France 231 “Everyday Resistance" 289
United States 231 Thinking About Contention: Summary 290
Russia 234
Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen? 291
China 236
Relative Deprivation 291
Nigeria 241
Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunities 292
Rational Choice 294
CH A PTER 11
Culture or "Framing" Explanations 296
Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Q ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Q ^ ^ T h e "Arab Spring" of 2011 298
Groups 252 C A SES IN CO N TEXT
Concepts 255 Brazil 282
Political Parties 255 France 285
Party Systems 255 Russia 292
Interest Groups 256 China 293

Types 257 Iran 297

Political Parties: Elite, Mass, and Catch-All Parties 258

CH A PTER 13
Party Systems: Dominant-Party, Two-Party, and Multiparty
Systems 259 Nationalism and National Identity 304
Interest Groups: Pluralism and Corporatism 264 Concepts 306
Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, Identity 306
and What Effects Do They Have? 267 Nationalism and the Nation 306
Party Systems and Representation 267 Types 307
What Factors Shape Party Systems? 267 Primordialist Approaches 307
How Do Party Systems Shape Political Outcomes? 269 Perennialist Approaches 308
Interest Groups and Representation 272 Modernist Approaches 308
Party Systems in Sub-Saharan Types of Nationalism 311
Africa 275 Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National
C A SES IN CO NTEXT Conflict? 313
China 260 Primordial Bonds 316
Japan 261 Cultural Boundaries 317
viii Contents

Material Interests 318 Types 354

Rational Calculation 318 Modern Ideologies 354
Social Psychology 320 Liberalism 354

Ending Ethnic and National Fascism 355

Violence 321 Socialism 356

Modern Forms of Religion in Politics 357
Lay and Religious States 358
United Kingdom 308
Denominationalism 359
Mexico 309
Japan 310 Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion and Ideology
Germany 312 Remain Prevalent in Modern Politics? 360
Nigeria 316 Why (and How) Does Modernization Alter Religion's Role
in Politics? 360
CH A PTER 14 Modernization Theory and Secularization 361

Race, Ethnicity, and Gender 325

The ‘Religious Economies"Approach 362
Institutional Theories 363
Concepts 327 Why Didn't Ideology (and History) End? 364
Race and Ethnicity
Gender 328
327
JBBBSMMESkTwo Lefts in Latin America? 367
C A SES IN CO N TEXT
Sexual Orientation 329
United Kingdom 355
Types 329
Russia 357
Disentangling Race and Ethnicity 329
France 359
Discrimination Based on Race and Ethnicity 332
Iran 360
Gender Discrimination 333
Nigeria 361
Empowerment of Women and Minority Groups 334

Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence

the Political Representation of Women
and Minority Groups? 337
Social Movement Mobilization 337
Political Parties Based on Gender or Ethnicity 339
Institutions for Promoting Women's and Minority Group
part V: The Comparative-International
Representation 341 Nexus
WOmmwMEfrIndicators of Gender CH A PTER 16
Empowerment 344
C A S E S IN C O N TEX T Comparative Politics and International
Iran 334 Relations 372
Japan 335 Concepts 375
Brazil 336
Issues 376
Mexico 340
Globalization and Trade 376
India 341
International Institutions and Integration 380
C HA PTER 15 Immigration 382

Ideology and Religion in Modern

Environment and Sustainability 384
Transnational Networks 387
Politics 348 Nuclear Threats and Terrorism 388
Concepts 350 Causes and Effects: What Are the Main Causes
Modernity and Modernization 350 in International Relations? 390
Ideology 351 Realism 390
Religion 351 Liberalism 393
Secularization, Religion, and Modern Politics 352 Constructivism 394
Religious Conflict 353 Marxism 395
 Contents ix

The EU and Levels of Analysis 395 Historical Development 429

Regime and Political Institutions 431
C A SES IN CO NTEXT
Political Culture 432
United States 381
Political Economy 433
France 383
C A S E S T U D IE S 434
Japan 387
Iran 389 The State in France (Chapter 3) 434
Authoritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France
India 389
(Chapter 7) 435
• Qom Electing the French President: What Do Runoffs Do? (Chapter 10) 436
I RAN The French Revolution (Chapter 12) 437
Esfahan »
Religion and Secularism in France (Chapter 15) 438
• Dezful
® Yazd Globalization and Culture in France (Chapter 16) 439

part vi: Country Profiles and Cases Germany 441

m Brazil 399 2^
Introduction
441
441
399 Historical Development 443
Introduction 399 Regime and Political Institutions 446
Historical Development 401 Political Culture 447
Regime and Political Institutions 404 Political Economy 448
Political Culture 405 usm am i 449
Political Economy 406 The German State: Unification and Welfare (Chapter 4) 449
CA SE STU D IES 407 Democracy and Authoritarianism in Germany (Chapter 7) 450
Does the Global Economy Help or Hurt Developing Nations? Institutional Design: Germany's Bundestag and Bundesrat
(Chapter 5) 407 (Chapter 9) 451
Democratic Consolidation in Brazil (Chapter 6) 408 Consensus-Based Politics in Germany (Chapter 11) 452
Electoral Rules and Party (In)Discipline in Brazil's Legislature Ethnic Boundaries of the German Nation? (Chapter 13) 453
(Chapter 9) 409
Brazil's Landless Movement (Chapter 12) 410 India 455
Gender and Political Representation in Brazil: Where Has
455
Progress Come From? (Chapter 14) 410
Introduction 455

HI China 412 Historical Development

Regime and Political Institutions
457
460
412 Political Culture 461
Introduction 412 Political Economy 462
Historical Development 414 C A S E S T U D IE S 463
Regime and Political Institutions 417
What Explain India's Recent Growth? (Chapter 5) 463
Political Culture 418
Democracy's Success in India: What Can We Learn from
Political Economy 419
a Deviant Case? (Chapter 6) 464
C A SES TU D IES 420 Federalism and Differences in Development in India (Chapter 8) 464
How Did China Become an Economic Power? (Chapter 5) 420 Ethnicity and Political Parties in India (Chapter 14) 465
Is China Destined for Democracy? (Chapter 6) 421 India in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic Politics, Identity,
Who Governs China? (Chapter 10) 423 and Security (Chapter 16) 466
The Chinese Party System (Chapter 11) 424
The Chinese Revolution (Chapter 12) 425 C 2 Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran) 468
1 1 France 427 2^
Introduction
468
468
427 Historical Development 470
Introduction 427 Regime and Political Institutions 473
X Contents

Political Culture 474 Regime and Political Institutions 515

Political Economy 474 Political Culture 515
Political Economy 516
B E E uE H E I 475
Democratic Features of Authoritarian Systems? The Case of CA SE STU D IES 517
Iran (Chapter 7) 475 What Is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed?
Constitutional Design: Theocracy in Iran (Chapter 8) 476 The Case of Nigeria (Chapter 3) 517
Iran's Islamic Revolution and "Green Revolution"? (Chapter 12) 478 Why Are Natural Resources Sometimes a Curse?
Gender in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Politics (Chapter 14) 479 The Nigerian Case (Chapter 5) 518
Religion and Politics in Iran (Chapter 15) 479 Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding Together
Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Proliferation (Chapter 16) 480 or Tearing Apart? (Chapter 8) 519
The Presidency in Nigeria: Powers and Limitations

Japan 482 (Chapter 10) 521

The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War: Nationalism and Ethno-
^ 482 National Conflict in a Post-Colonial Society (Chapter 13) 522
Introduction 482 Religious Difference and Conflict in Nigeria: Disentangling
Historical Development 484 Ethnicity and Religion? (Chapter 15) 523

Russia (Russian Federation) 525

Regime and Political Institutions 487
Political Culture 488
Political Economy 488
525
C A SE STU D IES 490 Introduction 525
State-Led Development in Japan (Chapter 4) 490 Historical Development 527
The Hybrid Electoral System of the Japanese Diet Regime and Political Institutions 531
(Chapter 9) 491 Political Culture 532
How Did Japan's Dominant Party Win for So Long? Political Economy 532
(Chapter 11) 491
Importing National Identity in Japan? (Chapter 13) 493
m m 533
Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia
Gender Empowerment in Japan? (Chapter 14) 493
(Chapter 7) 533
Resource Management in Japan (Chapter 16) 494
Executives in Russia: Formal and Informal Powers
(Chapter 10) 534
I I Mexico 496 Personalism and the Party System in Russia (Chapter 11) 535
The Russian Revolution (Chapter 12) 536
496
Communist Ideology in Practice— Russia and the Soviet Union
Introduction 496
(Chapter 15) 537
Historical Development 498
Regime and Political Institutions
Political Culture 502
501
IHH United Kingdom 539
Political Economy 503 539
Introduction 539
ES22S3 504 Historical Development 541
The Mexican State and Rule of Law (Chapter 3) 504
Regime and Political Institutions 544
Mexico's "Perfect Dictatorship" and Its End (Chapter 7) 505
Political Culture 545
The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico (Chapter 11) 506
Political Economy 545
Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity
in Mexico (Chapter 13) 507 I4M 4-W H.IIH 546
Why Aren't There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico? The State in the United Kingdom (Chapter 3) 546
(Chapter 14) 508 Political Economy of Britain (Chapter 4) 547
No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality in the
I I Nig­eria 510 United Kingdom (Chapter 8) 548
The Mother of Parliaments: The United Kingdom and the
510 Westminster Model (Chapter 9) 549
Introduction 510 National Identity in the United Kingdom (Chapter 13) 550
Historical Development 512 Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom (Chapter 15) 552
 Contents

United States 553

Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem?
(Chapter 8) 563
The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or Functioning by
553
Design? (Chapter 9) 564
Introduction 553
"The Most Powerful Person in the World”? Checks on American
Historical Development 555
Presidents (Chapter 10) 566
Regime and Political Institutions 558
The United States and the World: A Love-Hate Relationship?
Political Culture 559 (Chapter 16) 567
Political Economy 560

I 2 2 J2I3I3 561 Notes 569

Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich? Will They in Glossary 581
the Future? (Chapter 4) 561 References and Further Reading 591
Is American Democracy in Trouble? Credits 617
(Chapter 6) 562 Index 618
r
 Insights

CHAPTER 3 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States 60

Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework
for Interpreting Recorded Human History 61
Philip Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modem Europe 62
Hendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Competitors 64
John Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco Ramirez, World Society and the
Nation-State 65

CHAPTER 4 Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 79

Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation 80
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 89
Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time 90
Gasta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism 91

CH A PTERS Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery 107
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins ofComparative
Development 108
Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity 109
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System 113
Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates ofHuman Societies 114

CHAPTER 6 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics and Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy ’ 132
Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 135
Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 137
Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule 139
Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human
Development Sequence 140

CHAPTER 7 Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in theMaking
of the Modem World 161
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 162
Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five
Nations 164
Timur Kuran, Now Out ofNever: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989 165
Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War 166

CHAPTER 8 William Riker, Federalism:Origin, Operation, Significance 186

Alfred Stepan, Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model 186
Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism 189
Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Economic Management in
Multi-Tiered Systems 190
Ran Hirschl, Toward Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism 193
Insights

CHAPTER 9 Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, Legislative Politics in Latin America 213
Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 214
Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House 219
Morris Fiorina, Divided Government 221
Michael Mezey, Comparative Legislatures 222

CHAPTER 10 Juan Linz, The Perils ofPresidentialism and The Virtues of Parliamentarism 242
Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart.duan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A Critical
Appraisal 243
Guillermo O'Donnell, DelegativeDemocracy 244
Kenneth Roberts, Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin America: the Peruvian
Case 245
Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy 247

CHAPTER 11 Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City 266
Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques [Political Parties] 268
Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems:A Framework for Analysis 269
Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy 271
Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory ofGroups and The Rise
and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities 273
CHAPTER 12 Mark Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks 289
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, and Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel 292
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 294
Marc Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma 296
John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions 298

CHAPTER 13 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism 309

Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity 310
David Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence 319
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict 320

CHAPTER 14 Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence of Identity and Culture 338
Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity 338
Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America 340
Mala Htun, Is Gender Like Ethnicity? The Political Representation ofIdentity Groups 342
Mona Lena Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selection Reform Worldwide 344

CHAPTER 15 Jose Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World 358

Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide 361
Anthony Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty 362
Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States, France, and Turkey 364
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man 365
Samuel Huntington, The Clash ofCivilizations and the Remaking of World Order 366
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt. Multiple Modernities 366

CHAPTER 16 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons 386

Moises Naim, The Five Wars of Globalization 388
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics 392
Michael Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs 393
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics 394
T
he field of comparative politics is changing, not only in how it’s studied but
in how it’s taught. We set out to write this textbook because we saw the need
for a new approach—one that is truly comparative, that goes beyond a litany of
facts or abstract ideas. In the process, we had to rethink what a book for this
course should look like. We started with a central aim: to get students to think
like comparativists. Toward that end, we have integrated theories and methods
with a range of country case applications to address the big questions in com­
parative politics today.
Many undergraduates take a course in comparative politics because they are
broadly interested in world affairs. They want to understand issues such as democ­
racy and democratization, economic and social development, transnational social
movements, and the relationship between world religions and conflict around the
globe, just as we did as students (and still do!). This book focuses squarely on these
big issues and offers a framework for understanding through comparison.
Our job is to teach students how to think critically, how to analyze the world
around them. We want our students to do more than just memorize facts and theo­
ries. Ultimately, we want them to learn how to do comparative politics. This course
is successful if students can use the comparative method to seek out their own an­
swers. We are successful as educators if we give them the analytical skills to do so.

What's New in This Edition?

We have thoroughly updated this edition of Comparative Politics to reflect feed­
back we received from numerous readers, instructors, and students, not to men­
tion our own experiences of teaching with the book. We are truly grateful to
those who have shared their perspectives with us.
Whereas the first edition covered the state, political economy, and develop­
ment across two chapters, the second edition expands this coverage into three:
• Chapter 3 now focuses on describing and defining the state, emphasizing
its organizational form, its order-generating characteristics, and its linkages
to both domestic and international conflict. This chapter retains a focus
on explaining the rise of modern states in the “Thinking Comparatively”
section and includes an expanded discussion of civil society and society-
state relations.
• Chapter 4 is now devoted entirely to political economy, including
considerable discussion of welfare states and efforts to explain variation
in their form and extent.
• Chapter 5 picks up the thread from the political economy discussion and
focuses on development issues.
 In addition to these changes in several key chapters, we have made the follow­
ing revisions throughout the book:
• Streamlined the chapter on nationalism and national identity, and in the
process highlighted its focus on intergroup conflict.
• Substantially revised several of the “Thinking Comparatively” features that
close the chapters, showing how comparativists work with models as a
crucial step in their method.
• Emphasized the case studies that readers found most useful, while elimi­
nating some that were less so.
• Updated the entire set of country materials and the broader text.

An Integrative Approach
One of the distinctive features of this book is the way we have integrated theories,
methods, and cases. Rather than focusing on either country information or themes

Democracy's Success in India:

What Can We Learn from a Deviant Case?

India is a major anomaly for modernization theories of develop­ 2. What, if anything, does Indian suggest
ment. In essence, the relationship between its political and eco­ about the importance of leadership,
nomic development has been the inverse of what modernization and institutional design?
theory would predict. India is the world's second largest society 3. Can you think of a way to theory in
and its largest democracy— consider, therefore, the share that the face of the case of India?
Indian citizens hold in the world's broader democratic popula­
tion. This anomaly has potentially serious implications and
makes the puzzle of Indian democratization all the more
intriguing.
For more on the case of democratization in India, see the
case study in Part VI, p. 464. As you read it, keep in mind the
following questions:
1. What, if anything, does Indian anti-colonial resistance
have to do with the country's democratization?

Indian voters, 2012. India is the world's largest democracy.

Democracy's Success in India: What Can We Learn

from a Deviant Case? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 133

How does modernization theory account decide that this anomaly disproves or re­ economic development facilitates democ­
for low-income democracies such as futes modernization theory, and turn to ratization and democratic consolidation?
India? As discussed in chapter 6, modern­ some other theory of democratization. Why would this be different? Because the
ization theory predicts that economic de­ For example, we could turn to institu­ theory would now say that it is unlikely th a t
velopment will lead to democratization tional theories of democratization as an India could successfully democratize with­
and democratic consolidation. Indeed, alternative. Perhaps something about the out first achieving a higher level of eco­
this relationship generally holds. More parliamentary form of government rather nomic development, but not that it is
often than not, increasing economic de­ than presidential government contrib­ im possible. A more flexible theory of mod­
velopment increases the probability that uted to India's rather successful democ­ ernization might be compatible with in­
any given society will have democratic racy (as is discussed in chapter 10); one cluding insights from other theories. For
 of comparative politics, we have combined these approaches while emphasizing
application and analysis. By providing students with the tools to begin doing their
own analyses, we hope to show them how exciting this kind of work can be. These
tools include theories (presented in an accessible way), the basics of the comparative
method, and manageable case materials for practice, all in the context of the big
questions.
We thus take an integrative approach to the relationship between big themes
and country case studies. This text is a hybrid containing sixteen thematic
chapters plus linked materials for twelve countries of significant interest to
comparativists. The country materials following the thematic chapters include
both basic country information and a series of case studies dealing with spe­
cific thematic issues.
We link the country cases to the thematic chapters via short “call out” boxes—
"C a se s in C o n te x t " —at relevant points in the chapters. For example, a “Case in
Context” box in a discussion of theory in chapter 6, “Democracy and Democra­
tization,” points students to a full case stu d y on democratization in India, in­
cluded at the back of the text.
Another “Case in Context” box in chapter 6 invites students to consider whether
democratization in China is inevitable. Other boxes in that chapter focus on issues
of democracy and democratization in Brazil and the United States.
Using these short “linking” boxes has enabled us to integrate a complete set of
case materials without interrupting the narrative flow of the chapters. The kind
of reading we suggest with the structure of this text is similar to following hy­
perlinks in online text—something students do easily. This flexible design fea­
ture also caters to the diversity of teaching styles in today’s political science.
Instructors can choose to have students follow these links to case studies as they
go, using all or just some of them, or they can choose to teach thematic chapters
and country materials separately.
The text integrates theories, methods, and cases in other ways as well. "Insights"
boxes make connections by briefly summarizing important scholarly works repre­
sentative of the major schools of thought.

Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity

INSIGHTS
bvlM>c,h<$0feld • '
reenfeld argues that nationalism is fundamentally c u ltu ra l serve their interests well. Greenfeld hypothesis
G and needs to be understood as an imaginative response to against a number of cases (includingi^ ^ ^ K . F rance, Russia,
social conditions. To understand nationalism's emergence and Germany, and Japan), finding pronounced status-inconsistency
growth, we must understand why the idea spread that humanity in each case in the key groups that are most central in redefining
is divided into distinct "peoples" who are "sovereign" and "equal." their societies as nations. At the same time, Greenfeld acknowl­
For Greenfeld, the key preconditions for the development of na­ edges the importance of institutions like the state prior to na­
tional identity are problems in s tra tific a tio n system s through tional identity's emergence in helping to shape the type that
which societies hierarchically divide themselves, such as the class develops in any given case. Scholars working with this theory
structure. Elite statu s-in co nsiste ncy— a condition present when also note that political institutions play an important role in
the stratification system breaks down and elites are no longer spreading and preserving national identity.
sure of their status— leads some groups to seek to transform Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
identity, and national identity often seems to such groups to University Press, 1992.
 TfTTT
W h y Did Z i m b a b w e B e c o m e an d Remain
Authoritarian? iW i

A
u th o ritarian regim es com e in m any varieties, and they com e from m any
different origins. W e have em phasized th a t there is no single th in g called KEY M ETH OD O LO GICA L TOOL

“authoritarianism” that one theory can explain. Rather, authoritarian regimes have Evidence and
distinct features and exhibit m any different types o f transitions (and nontransi­
Empirical Critiques
tions). Scholars have developed a num ber o f explanatory models to account for
One reason that many theories con­
these. Some of the main general factors in m ost cases, though, include (1) histori­ tinue to endure in different areas of
cal relationships between contending groups, (2) the strength and form o f exist­ comparative politics is that most of
ing institutions, (3) a country’s level o f economic development, (4) political-cultural the major theories have some empiri­
traditions and tendencies, and (5) th e strategic situations and choices o f key cal support. This makes it challenging
actors. O f course, as we have seen in o th e r chapters, it is n o t enough to merely to determine which theory is the
most accurate. In reality, most theo­
list such con trib u tin g factors; w e m u st figure o ut how such factors interact ries will not be accurate under all
and w hich are m ost im portant. W h a t do you think? A n d how could we test your circumstances, but rather each will
ideas empirically? explain some outcomapiiacter than
As we noted at the outset of the chapter, modern-day Zimbabwe is an authori­ others. So how do yoi|
tarian regime that is characterized by many o f the features we have discussed. It is a making "laundry lists'!
tier) and saying, "Every
“personalist” regime, the population o f which is subject to many o f the vagaries of au­ In preparing to make thee
thoritarianism. It is characterized by repression, a lack o f secure political rights, seem­ arguments, it is of course ifl
ingly arbitrary rule, and so on. N ot everywhere in A frica is like this, and Zimbabwe for any particular question 1
itself has not always been like this, so our research question m ight be “W h y is how the empirical evidenc®
with the theoretical predicw
Zimbabwe authoritarian? W h y did it become so, and why has it rem ained so?”
the specific hypotheses y o p
W e should expect theories o f authoritarian rule to be able to account for an
offer. One very useful tool J
authoritarian regime like Robert M ugabe’s Zimbabwe. Looking at the various evidence that allows you jb critique a
causal theories o f authoritarianism we can consider how each m ight propose an particular argument.
explanation for the emergence and/or persistence o f the regime. In th e section on In aiming to build arguments.

Each chapter after the introduction closes with a "Thinking C o m p a ra tiv e ly "
feature, which focuses on a case or set of cases to illustrate how students can
apply the theories discussed in the chapter.
In these features we highlight important methodological tools or strategies,
such as the use of deviant cases and the most-similar-systems (MSS) design. We
then model for students how to use these analytical tools in practice.

Organization
The sixteen thematic chapters of this book are divided into five parts:
• Part I (chapters 1 and 2) focuses on basic methods in comparative politics,
covering conceptualization, hypothesis testing, the formation of theories,
and the use of evidence. The goal in these first two chapters is not to focus
on the details of methodology, which can be taught in more specialized
courses, but on the overarching logic of comparative inquiry.
• Part II (chapters 3 through 7) focuses on the state (chapter 3), political
economy (chapter 4), development (chapter 5), democracy and democrati­
zation (chapter 6), and the various forms of authoritarian regimes (chapter 7).
• Part III (chapters 8 through 11) focuses on the analysis of political institu­
tions, giving students the tools to analyze institutional design in constitutional
structures and judiciaries (chapter 8), legislatures and elections (chapter 9),
executives (chapter 10), and political parties and interest groups (chapter 11).
• Part IV (chapters 12 through 15) focuses on issues that link comparative
politics to political sociology, such as the study of revolution and other forms
of contention (chapter 12), national identities and nationalism (chapter 13),
race, gender, and ethnicity (chapter 14), and religion and ideology (chapter 15).
 '

Preface xix

Part V consists of a single chapter, 16, which links comparative politics to

international relations, emphasizing how global politics has produced new
sets of problems that both comparativists and international relations scholars
must analyze. As such, the book points to another kind of integration,
pushing students to see connections between comparative politics and other
courses in political science.
After chapter 2, the thematic chapters follow a common format. They are di­
vided into three main sections:
• Concepts: covers basic definitions and develops a working vocabulary.
• Types: discusses useful typologies, such as the major types of dramatic social
change that interest political scientists.
• Causes and Effects: walks students through the major theories that aim to
explain causes and effects, ending with the “Thinking Comparatively” feature
to model analysis.
The final part of the book, Part VI, comprises country " p r o f i l e s " and in-
depth " c a s e s t u d i e s . " We selected twelve countries after surveying more
Preface

than 150 instructors of comparative politics to see which they considered most
crucial for inclusion. The cases are Brazil, China, France, Germany, India,
Iran, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United
States. This selection offers broad coverage of every major world region, dem­
ocratic and authoritarian polities, every major religious tradition, highly vary­
ing levels of economic and social development, and quite different institutional
designs.
For each country, we first provide a “profile”: an introduction with a table of
key features, a map, and pie charts of demographics; a timeline and historical
overview; and brief descriptions of political institutions, political culture, and
political economy.
Following each profile is a set of case studies (five or six for each country)
that we reference in the thematic chapters as described earlier (via the " C a s e in
C o n t e x t " boxes).
The case sets end with research prompts to help students get started as
comparativists.

Flexibility in Instruction:
Ways of Using This Text
The chapters are arranged in a logical order yet written in such a way that
instructors might easily rearrange them to custom-fit a course. Some in­
structors, for example, may wish to pair chapter 3 (on the state) with chapter
13 (on nationalism and national identity). Others might wish to assign
chapter 15 (on religion and ideology) alongside chapters 6 and 7 (on demo­
cratic and authoritarian regimes). We have written the book with the flexi­
bility to facilitate such pairings. Indeed, while we strongly suggest beginning
with chapters 1 and 2, students will be able to follow the text even without
reading them first.
Similarly, the book’s structure supports a range of options for using the coun­
try materials. Some instructors may wish to teach selected country materials at
or near the beginning of a course. Some may wish to make reference to country
materials as the course proceeds, assigning students to read them as they are
clearly and visibly “called out” in the text. One approach could require all stu­
dents in a course to familiarize themselves with only a subset of the countries
detailed here, rather than all twelve. Another might require each student to
select three or four countries, following rules or categories of countries as laid
out by the instructor.
The book also works with or without supplemental materials chosen by the
instructor. The “Insights” boxes throughout the text provide indications of excel­
lent options for further readings. Many other choice readings are noted in the
“References and Further Reading” section at the back of the text, organized by
chapter. A companion book of classic and contemporary readings is available
(see Packaging Options, p. xxii). In short, instructors can use this text alone or
link it seamlessly to other readings.
Summary of Features
We have built a number of useful features into the text, some of which we have
already mentioned:
• "C a se in C o n text" boxes tie in to the narrative of the main chapters,
pointing students to full case studies in the book’s final part.
• "in sig h ts" boxes illustrate causal theories by describing the work of key
authors in the field, making this work accessible to introductory students.
• "Thinking C om p a ra tiv e ly " sections at the end of every chapter (after
chapter 1) model the application of theories and the testing of hypotheses.
Each “Thinking Comparatively” section includes a "K e y M ethodological
Tools" feature, which introduces key skills and strategies for doing compar­
ative political analysis and reinforces lessons learned in the first two chapters.
• "Thinking It T h r o u g h " questions close every chapter. These help students
test their ability to apply comparative politics theories to cases.
• Every section of case studies offers a series of "R esearch Pro m pts" that
can be used to develop comparative projects and papers, applying what
students have learned as they start to do comparative analysis.
• Every chapter ends with a "C h ap ter Su m m ary," enabling students and
instructors to review the main points at a glance.
• At the back of the text, we include "R eferen ces and Further R e a d in g " by
chapter that students can use to dig deeper into the issues raised or as they
begin their own research.
• A running g lo ssa ry in the margin of the text highlights the meaning of
key terms as they appear and serves as a quick study reference.

Supplements
Oxford University Press offers instructors and students a comprehensive ancil­
lary package for qualified adopters of Comparative Politics: Integrating Theories,
Methods, and Cases.

Ancillary Resource Center

The Ancillary Resource Center (ARC) at www.oup-arc.com is a convenient,
instructor-focused single destination for resources to accompany this book.
Accessed online through individual user accounts, the ARC provides instructors
with up-to-date ancillaries while guaranteeing the security of grade-significant
resources. In addition, it allows OUP to keep instructors informed when new
content becomes available.
The ARC for Comparative Politics contains a variety of materials to aid in
teaching:
• Instructor’s Resource Manual with Test Item File—The Instructor’s
Resource Manual includes chapter objectives, detailed chapter outlines,
lecture suggestions and activities, discussion questions, video resources,
xxii Preface

and Web resources. The Test Item File includes more than eight hundred
test questions selected and approved by the authors, including multiple-
choice, short-answer, and essay questions.
• Computerized Test Bank—Using the test authoring and management tool
Diploma, the computerized test bank that accompanies this text is designed
for both novice and advanced users. Diploma enables instructors to create
and edit questions, create randomized quizzes and tests with an easy-to-use
drag-and-drop tool, publish quizzes and tests to online courses, and print
quizzes and tests for paper-based assessments.
• PowerPoint-Based Slides—Each chapter’s slide set includes a succinct
chapter outline and incorporates relevant chapter graphics.
• CNN Videos—Offering recent clips on timely topics, this collection
includes fifteen films tied to the chapter topics. Each clip is approximately
5-10 minutes, providing a great way to launch your lectures.

Course Cartridges
For qualified adopters, OUP will supply the teaching resources in a course car­
tridges designed to work with your preferred Online Learning Platform. Please
contact your Oxford University Press sales representative at (800) 280-0280.

E-Book
This text is also available as a CourseSmart eBook (978-0-19-027102-2) at www
.coursesmart.com. CourseSmart’s eTextbooks can be read on any browser-enabled
computer or mobile device and come with the ability to transfer individual chapters
or the entire book offline. Furthermore, CourseSmart was the first to introduce free
eTextbook apps for the Android and Apple devices for an even better reading
experience.

Companion Website
Comparative Politics is also accompanied by an extensive companion website at
www.oup.com/us/dickovick. This open-access website includes a number of
learning tools to help students study and review key concepts presented in the
text. For each chapter, you will find learning objectives, key-concept summaries,
quizzes, essay questions, web activities, and web links.

Packaging Options
Adopters of Comparative Politics: Integrating Theories, Methods, and Cases can pack­
age A N Y Oxford University Press book with the text for a 20% savings off the
total package price. See our many trade and scholarly offerings at www.oup.com,
then contact your OUP sales representative at (800) 280-0280 to request a pack­
age ISBN. In addition, the following items can be packaged with the text for free:
• Oxford Pocket World Atlas, Sixth Edition—This full-color atlas is a
handy reference for political science students. Please use package ISBN
978-0-19-046231-4.
 • Very Short Introduction Series—-These very brief texts offer succinct intro­
ductions to a variety of topics. Titles include Nationalism, Citizenship, Global
Economic History, Fascism, and Democracy, to name just a few.
• The Student Research and Writing Guide for Political Science—This brief
guide provides students with the information and tools necessary to conduct
research and write a research paper. The guide explains how to get started
writing a research paper, describes the parts of a research paper, and presents
the citation formats found in academic writing. Please use package ISBN
978-0-19-046160-7 to order.

Acknowledgments
We are very grateful to a number of individuals who have been helpful to us as
we worked on this project. At Washington and Lee University, we thank our
respective provosts, deans, and department chairs who have supported our
work. This includes June Aprille, Bob Strong, Daniel Wubah, Larry Peppers,
Rob Straughan, Hank Dobin, Suzanne Keen, Mark Rush, Lucas Morel, David
Novack, and Krzysztof Jasiewicz. We are very grateful to the many friends and
colleagues, both at Washington and Lee and elsewhere, who read and com­
mented on chapters or country profiles, including Francoise Fregnac-Clave,
Rachel Beatty Riedl, Tim Lubin, Dan Kramer, Christian Jennings, Robin
Leblanc, Ay§e Zarakol, Rich Bidlack, David Bello, Ken W hite, and Alessandra
Del Conte Dickovick. We also thank Hardin Marion for his excellent close
reading of the first edition and the comments he generously shared with us. We
have many other colleagues and friends who have given us intellectual and
moral support for which we are grateful. Numerous students have been extraor­
dinarily helpful as well. We are particularly grateful to Miranda Galvin and Ali
Greenberg. Other students to whom we wish to express our appreciation in­
clude, but are not limited to, Samara Francisco, Morten Wendelbo, Maya Reimi
Wendelbo, Linnea Bond, Natasha Lerner, Amy Dawson, Justine Griffin-
Churchill, David Razum, John Twomey, Grant Russell, Lauren Howard, and
Kate LeMasters. We are also thankful to students in numerous iterations of
Politics 105 (Global Politics), many of whom offered insightful questions on a
“prototype” of this text (in early years) and on the first edition (more recently),
as well as students who read the book in Eastwood’s International Comparative
Sociology course. We owe thanks to Washington and Lee for support for the
work of some of the students mentioned previously through the Summer Re­
search Scholar Program, and our own work through the Lenfest Sabbatical
Grant, and the Glenn Grant, Lenfest Grant, and Hess Scholars programs for
summer research.
Our families have been characteristically supportive and gracious throughout
the several years that we worked on this project. Their collective patience has
been extraordinary. We owe eternal gratitude to our spouses, Maria Emilia Nava
and Alessandra Del Conte Dickovick. We are also grateful to (and for) our won­
derful children: Gabriela Eastwood, Carolina Dickovick, Gabriela Dickovick,
Samuel Eastwood, and Alexander Eastwood. We owe much gratitude to our
parents and extended families as well, of course.
xxiv Preface

We are grateful as well to the fine editorial staff at Oxford University Press.
We particularly appreciate the excellent ideas and efforts of Jennifer Carpenter,
Lauren Mine, and Thom Holmes. All of them improved this text substantially
with their insights and hard work over several years. We have also benefited from
the work of Jane Lee, Barbara Mathieu, David Bradley, Maegan Sherlock, and
Brianna Provenzano, among others.
We owe gratitude as well to those who developed our passion for (and under­
standing of) comparative politics. With the standard caveat that any errors of
fact or interpretation in this text are solely our own, we want to thank first our
earliest teachers of comparative politics. Above, all, we wish to thank Kent Eaton
and Liah Greenfeld. We also owe great thanks to Jeffrey Herbst, Deborah
Yashar, Chuck Lindholm, Scott Palmer, John Stone, and Evan Lieberman, as
well as Nancy Bermeo, Atul Kohli, Lynn White, and Claudio Veliz, among
others.
Finally, we thank the external evaluators of this edition, who gave generously
of their time and expertise:

Diane Bulpett Jeffrey Lewis Cheryl Van Den Handel

Northeastern University Cleveland State University Northeastern State University
Ivy Hamerly Vanja Petricevic Adryan Wallace
Baylor University Florida Gulf Coast University University of Hartford.
Katherine H. Keyser Laura Roselle
Drew University Elon University
Eric Langenbacher Hootan Shambayati
Georgetown University Florida Gulf Coast University

We also thank the many reviewers of the first edition, whose insights helped
shape the book:

Dauda Abubakar Karolyn Benger Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz

Ohio University Georgia Institute of Technology Michigan State University
Despina Alexiadou Anna Brigevich William Crowther
University of Pittsburgh The University of North Carolina The University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill at Greensboro
Michelle Allendoerfer
George Washington University Joel R. Carbonell Ian Down
Kent State University at Stark University of Tennessee—Knoxville
Jason Ross Arnold
Virginia Commonwealth Ryan Carlin Glen Duerr
University Georgia State University Cedarville University
Andrew Appleton Luis F. Clemente Matthew Fails
Washington State University Ohio University Oakland University
Tanya Bagashka Howard Cody Ronald A. Francisco
University of Houston University of Maine University of Kansas
 Preface

Nathan W. Freeman Galiya Lahav Tracy H. Slagter

University of Georgia Stonybrook University University of Wisconsin Oshkosh
Joseph J. Foy Ricardo Rene Laremont Marcus Stadelmann
University of Wisconsin-Parkside Binghamton University University of Texas at Tyler
John D. Granger Jeffrey Lewis Jeffrey K. Staton
University of Central Florida Cleveland State University Emory University
Ivy Hamerly Rahsaan Maxwell Emmanuel Teitelbaum
Baylor University University of Massachusetts George Washington University
Amherst
Keisha Haywood Anca Turcu
Ramapo College of New Jersey Mary M. McCarthy University of Central Florida
Drake University
Tobias Hofmann Rollin F. Tusalem
National University of Singapore Gregory J. Moore Arkansas State University
Eckerd College
Jennifer Horan Meredith Weiss
The University of North Carolina Katarina Moyon University at Albany-SUNY
at Wilmington Winthrop University
Aubrey Westfall
John Hulsey Anna Ohanyan Virginia Wesleyan College
James Madison University Stonehill College
Jennifer J. White
Eunsookjung Sanghamitra Padhy University of Georgia
Fairfield University Davidson College
Fiona Yap
Peggy Kahn Juris Pupcenoks University of Kansas
University of Michigan—Flint Washington College
Gamze Cavdar Yasar
Stephen Juan King Dietmar Schirmer Colorado State University
Georgetown University University of Florida
Jiangnan Zhu
Natalie A. Kistner James Seroka University ofNevada-Reno
James Madison University Auburn University
Lada V. Kochtcheeva Oxana Shevel
North Carolina State University Tufts University

The field of comparative politics is always changing, and a book of this sort
covers a huge array of research areas. As such, we anticipate a need to update this
text in the future. We are very eager for suggestions, corrections, and other com­
ments that instructors or students might make. We have established an e-mail
address specifically for these inquiries, and all comments will go to and be read
by the authors. The address is com p ara tiv e.p o litic s@ o u p .co m . So if you have
any suggestions for future issues, or find any errors or omissions, please let us
know. We hope you enjoy the book.
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 CHAPTER 1

The Comparative
Approach:
An Introduction

• Germany's Angela Merkel and Russia's Vladimir Putin converse at the World Cup in Brazil, July 2014.
 op quiz. Fill in the blank in the following sentence:

I n _____________________, Columbus sailed the ocean blue.

A large proportion of American students who have completed elementary

school will be able to answer correctly: fourteen hundred ninety-two.
This recollection from childhood illustrates the ways we first begin to learn
about societies and their histories. We learn important events and the dates,
names, and places associated with them. We learn simple facts: that Columbus
set sail in 1492 and discovered the New World. For many of our
IN THIS CHAPTER
formative years, this is what we think learning means in our
Asking Why: Research Questions courses on social studies, history, world affairs, or current events.
in Comparative Politics 2
Major Questions in Comparative Politics 4
Scholarship is not defined, however, by knowledge of
Empirical Arguments Versus Normative facts alone, and the learning we do as adults must be differ­
Arguments 6 ent: It must be based on more than just description and recall.
Solving Intellectual Puzzles:
The task now, at the collegiate level, is to develop analytical
A Contemporary Analogy 7
skills. In this book, we examine the similarities and differ­
Concepts 9
Features of Good Concepts 9
ences in politics within and between countries around the
Conceptualization 10 world, using comparisons and contrasts as our central tools.
Operationalizing: From Concepts We cover more than just facts about the politics of China, or
to Measures 11
India, or France. We analyze politics comparatively.
Empirical Evidence 12
Facts and Evidence 12
Cases and Case Studies 13
The Comparative Method 14
Variables and Comparison 14 Asking Why: Research Questions
Most-Similar-Systems Design 15 in Comparative Politics
Most-Different-Systems Design 18 To illustrate the type of learning this book promotes, we turn to
Comparative Checking 18 another mnemonic device from primary school:
Within-Case Comparison 20
List the “Five W’s”used to ask questions.
Is the Study of Politics a Science? The Limits
of the Comparative Method 20 You may easily recall the answer (or be able to reconstruct it):
Who, What, Where, When, and Why. (And to this list we
often add “How”.)
Now ask yourself about the relative merits of these “Five W ’s.” Which of these
questions are the most profound and lead us to learn the most? Are we likely to
gain a deep understanding of the social and political world from questions of the
general form “Who did this?” or “Where did this happen?” or “When did this
happen?” For the most part, these relatively simple questions lead us to answers
 Asking Why: Research Questions in Comparative Politics 3

based on simple facts, such as prominent historical figures (Who), or places

(Where), or dates (When). Consider how most of the “Five W ’s” are answered in
the sentence In fourteen hundred ninety-two, Columbus sailed the ocean blue. Who
is the subject? Columbus. Where did this event occur? The ocean blue. When did
it happen? 1492. W hat did the subject do (or how did the event happen)? He
sailed. Within one easily remembered rhyme, we have answers to a host of basic
questions. And, of course, the same is true for more contemporary politics. For
instance, saying, “In 2012, Franpois Hollande was elected president of France”
also provides answers to who, where, what, and when questions.
Even if we don’t know certain facts, we can often find them easily in modern
life, and we do not need rhymes, other mnemonics, or even reference books. Online
search engines (e.g., Google) provide virtually free access to basic facts (though
they can also provide access to inaccurate information). Smart phones, laptops, and
other devices make basic information accessible almost anywhere. Try typing some
basic questions using the “Five W ’s” into a search engine. Who is the president of
Brazil? Where (or what) is the capital of Estonia? When did Tanzania become a
free and independent nation? For these questions, the correct and complete answer
is available almost instantly. Some knowledge of basic facts is obviously important,
but this is not the type of question that interests us in this text. We will not focus
simply on descriptions of who did what and when, nor on where things happened.
Now try searching for “Why did Columbus sail the ocean blue?” or “Why did
Tanzania gain independence from its colonizer?” or “Why was Fran 5ois Hollande
elected president of France?” Your search will probably lead to an essay full of
reasoning and argumentation, as well as facts. O f course, the essay may or may not
be reliable, and more comprehensive searching—using scholarly articles and book
chapters—could provide you with other essays that offer contrary perspectives. These
why questions lend themselves to richer discussions and debates than who/what/
when/where questions. We cannot answer many why questions in one or two sen­
tences. Answering why correctly requires more research, more reasoning, and more
debate than the preliminary factual questions about who did what, where, and when.
We can debate the correct answer to why questions. You may think you have a
simple answer to why Columbus set sail: He was an explorer by nature, intellectu­
ally curious and seeking adventure. But a classmate may offer an equally compel­
ling answer: The exploration westward across the Atlantic was promoted and
financed by the Spanish crown (King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella), who were
forced by geopolitical rivalries and strategic concerns to extend and expand their
territories. Who is correct? In your answer, you focus on Columbus himself, while
your classmate makes reference to impersonal factors (such as geopolitical strategy)
that push individuals toward certain actions. Both of you include facts in defending
your answers, such as the relevant actors (who), the period in which this took place
(when), and the country from which Columbus set sail (where). But the debate is
not easily resolved, even with these basic facts. We can respectfully disagree on the
primary cause of why something happened. We construct arguments by supplying argument The placement of
evidence in a logical form in support of positions or claims, and the relative merit evidence in logical form in support
of our arguments depends on who has the better supporting evidence. of a position or claim.
Generally, we do not debate at great length about when an explorer set sail,
who he was, or where he left from and where he went.1We either know these facts
4 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

or don’t. Anyone who has watched Jeopardy! or played trivia games will notice
that such games almost never ask why something happened. The answers would
surely be too long and almost certainly too debatable. Basic factual knowledge
may earn you points on a game board, but it alone cannot be the route to a deeper
understanding of the social and political world.
Questions that begin with that little word—why—are often answered not
with a simple fact; rather, the answers begin with another deceptively powerful
word: because. Note that the root of the word because is cause. Why questions give
rise to answers that talk about the causes of events, and they turn basic facts
(who, what, where, when, and how) into evidence supporting a claim about cause
comparative politics The and effect.2 This is the core pursuit of comparative politics: We seek to develop
subfield of political science that strong claims about cause and effect, testing various hypotheses (that is, possible
aims to analyze multiple cases answers to our questions) using factual evidence, and developing larger theories
using the comparative method. about why the world operates the way it does. Through most of this book, we will
provide some basic information necessary to speak the language of comparative
scholars, but our emphasis is on asking and trying to answer why questions.
We do not ignore factual information when we ask questions. Indeed, some
knowledge of a particular case usually makes us interested in a topic and moti­
vates the questions we want to ask. We find some set of facts that does not fit
with our intuition, and we pursue it further. We are intrigued by facts that pre­
sent us with puzzles. The number of such puzzles is virtually infinite, but certain
major questions take center stage in comparative politics. Many are easy to ask
but challenging to answer. As we note later, some may be phrased as how ques­
tions, but the logic behind them is the same: We seek to understand causes and
effects to comprehend the world around us.
Few political phenomena are monocausal', or caused by just one thing. Often
many factors combine to produce an outcome. Explaining something does not
amount to simply naming one or another of these factors. Rather, we try to ex­
plain by identifying not just the necessary conditions to produce an effect, but
those that are sufficient to produce it. For example, the fact that a given commu­
nity is divided into different groups might be a necessary factor of civil war. But
since most such divided countries are not engaged in civil war most of the time,
the condition of being divided is clearly not sufficient to produce this effect by
itself, and thus probably cannot be said to be the main cause of war.3

Major Questions in Comparative Politics

Comparative politics focuses on certain key questions that researchers have de­
bated for years. Some important questions that we examine in this book are listed
in Table 1.1. All of these are about causes and effects and can be answered, at
least partly, by comparing and contrasting the politics of different countries.
Some such questions, like the last two in the table, may also imply research on
relations between countries as well as politics within countries.
The questions in the table are very general, and we would likely begin research
by asking a more specific version of such questions about one or two countries.
Rather than “Why do countries go to war?” we might ask, “Why did France opt
not to support the Iraq War in 2003?” This question is more specific but also open-
ended enough to have many possible answers. In scientific terms, this question can
 Asking Why: Research Questions in Comparative Politics

ta b le i.i Prominent Questions in Comparative Politics

Why are some countries democratic and others not?

Why are some countries rich and others not?

Why do countries have different institutions and forms of government?

Why do countries have different policies in a variety of areas?

Why do some social revolutions succeed and endure while others fail?

Why do some countries develop strong senses of statehood and nationhood and others not?

Why do countries go to war or establish peace?

Why are some societies subjected to terrorism and others not?

have several competing hypotheses we can test out using evidence, as we discuss
later in this chapter and in the next. Possible answers may be based on France’s
strategic interests and calculations, its position in global affairs, French attitudes
or culture with respect to war, and/or other possibilities.
Contrast this question with a more leading one, such as “How did French
defeat in World War II lead to France’s decision not to support the Iraq War?” In
this version, the questioner presumes he/she knows the answer to why France
decided not to support the war. The researcher is entering the research expecting
to confirm one particular answer.
Given our own human biases, this researcher may well choose evidence selec­
tively, neglecting that which does not fit his/her assumptions and preconceptions.
It is highly unlikely that someone asking this leading question will answer with
“France’s defeat in World War II had no effect.” This type of question can there­
fore lead to a biased argument.
Forming questions with why is a good rule of thumb, but good questions may
also begin with other words, such as how. The questions in Table 1.2 also lead to
debates about cause and effect. The first question asks about “consequences,”
which is just another way of asking about the effects of certain causes (in this
case, the causes would be institutions). The question is also open-ended; that is, open-ended question A ques­
no hunch or expected answer is built into it, so the researcher can remain open to tion that, in principle, is open to
what the evidence reveals. The second question is just a bit more specific, identi­ numerous possible answers.
fying a certain consequence and a certain institution, but it is also open-ended.
As we get more specific, we must take care not to commit the error of building
the answer into the question, or assume that what we are researching is the only
answer. In this case, we would not want to assume that a presidential versus a
parliamentary system of government is the main factor that shapes education
policy.4The next question asks “under what conditions” democracies form, which
is just another way of asking about the causes of democracy, if we compare and
contrast where and when and how it happens. So too does the final question ask
about cause and effect, as shown by the verb affect. These are all valid research
questions, even if they don’t begin with why.
6 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

Students in Paris, France, protest the Iraq War in 200S. Why did France opt not to support the
Iraq War?

ta b le 1.2 Additional Research Questions About

Cause and Effect
What are the consequences of different kinds of institutions for policy?

What are the consequences of presidential versus parliamentary systems of government for
education policy?

Under what conditions will democracies emerge and consolidate?

How do major social revolutions affect subsequent political developments in their respective
countries?

Some questions that begin with why may be poor questions, or at least they may
be ill suited to cause-and-effect research. Contrast the following two questions,
where the how question is a more open-ended and better question than the why.
• Why did the United States foolishly invade Iraq in 2003 for no good reason?
• How did the decision to initiate military action against Iraq come about?
It is perfectly legitimate to ask “why the United States invaded Iraq” as an
open-ended social science question, but the tone of the why question here sug­
gests that it is focused more on the issue of right and wrong than on cause and
effect. The key is keeping our minds open to the possibility that any of several
hypotheses may have the power to explain what we want to explain.

Empirical Argum ents Versus Normative Arguments

empirical Drawn from observa­ The issue of right and wrong relates to the issue of causal or empirical arguments
tions of the world. versus normative arguments. In this text, we mainly address empirical arguments:
 Asking Why: Research Questions in Comparative Politics 7

arguments that link cause and effect, uncovering answers to why the political
world operates as it does. Normative arguments, by contrast, emphasize the way normative Concerned with speci­
things should be. 1116 following pair of questions highlights the distinction: fying which sort of practice or
• Why are some countries democratic and others authoritarian? (causal/ institution is morally or ethically
empirical) justified.
• Why is democracy preferable to authoritarianism? (normative)
Comparativists answer questions like the first more often than the second,
though we care about the answers to both types of questions. We are not primar­
ily concerned in this book with resolving normative arguments about what is
right and wrong. This is not because comparativists are indifferent to moral con­
cerns. To the contrary, most social scientists hold strong convictions, indeed
probably stronger normative views about politics than the average citizen, given
their choice of career. Comparativists would overwhelmingly express a prefer­
ence for democracy over authoritarianism if asked, though some might note the
limitations of democracy and/or argue that authoritarian rule has sometimes led
to economic growth. Yet, as comparativists, we do not usually spend our intellec­
tual energy coming up with new arguments for why democracy is morally super­
ior to authoritarianism. Rather, we spend this energy trying to solve the puzzle
of why democracy and authoritarianism arise in the first place.
So the point of analyzing politics comparatively is not to come up with good
arguments in favor of democracy, or grearer wealth, or peace. Rather, our job is to
find what causes these things, and we can assume that a commitment to uncover­
ing the causes comes from some interest in the outcome. Comparativists are like
doctors diagnosing social problems: Instead of explaining why it is better to be
healthy, we focus on explaining how we can be healthy as a political society. Com­
parative political scientists often have an ethical or moral passion that drives re­
search, as we may wish to make government and society more effective, efficient,
equitable, just, responsive, and accountable. Yet our principal role in that process
is to describe what is and explain why, rather than proclaim what ought to be.

Solving Intellectual Puzzles: A Contem porary Analogy

Social science is a process of problem solving. By way of analogy, we can glimpse
the sort of intellectual puzzles we solve through the mirror of pop culture.
Among the most successful TV shows in the world today (apart from reality
shows) are those in which researchers, academics, and scientists are presented
with a puzzle that they must solve, usually within a short period. Medical dramas,
legal dramas, and crime dramas all fit this mold. The researchers may be doctors
trying to diagnose a potentially fatal disease, detectives trying to solve a murder
using forensic evidence, or attorneys trying to prosecute a case against a pre­
sumed perpetrator. Examples are legion: NCIS, The Mentalist, Sherlock (or the
Sherlock Holmes adaptation Elementary), and the long-running CSI: Crime Scene
Investigation, among others.
What these shows have in common is the basic approach to puzzle solving
used by the experts. The protagonist will typically be presented with a puzzle
early in the episode and will then begin gathering evidence and formulating
hypotheses. Usually, some of these hypotheses will be inconsistent with the
Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

evidence, or new evidence will emerge that contradicts a hypothesis. In such

shows, this development is deliberate, of course, in order to build suspense and
mislead the viewer. We may find, for example, that the person we were supposed
to think was the killer had an alibi and was somewhere else on the night of the
murder. By the latter part of the show, the protagonist usually comes across some
piece of evidence that pulls the case together and gives it a logical interpretation.
The episode typically concludes when a hypothesis is confirmed, sometimes sig­
nified by a criminal’s confession or maybe by a medical treatment that succeeds.
Social scientists operate in a similar fashion to these puzzle-solving profes­
sionals, but comparativists face some additional constraints. (If we really want to
solve our puzzles, we have to be even more clever than the people on TV.) The
most obvious constraint is the lack of laboratories in comparative politics.5
Whereas physicians, forensicologists, and prosecutors often have recourse to
physical evidence such as blood samples or DNA or cell phone records, social
scientists rely on social facts and evidence of a more qualitative and historical
nature. The evidence used by social scientists is often subject to interpretation.
For example, one political scientist may deem Mexico a democratic success story
since 2000, because an opposition party won a presidential election, and multiple
parties now compete successfully for power. Another may argue that Mexico is
not a democratic success story, because the country still suffers from high levels
of social and economic inequality and from unequal political participation.6
Many academics and other professionals rely on evidence and logic and reason
to make persuasive arguments, even in the absence of absolute proof. Returning
to our pop culture analogy, the detective Sherlock Holmes often rules out many
options by process of elimination, gathers evidence that is consistent with a cer­
tain interpretation of the facts, and builds a hypothesis. Sometimes, Sherlock
will have a particular hypothesis that is shown to be wrong by some new bit of
evidence. In those instances, he must generate a new hypothesis to solve the case.
Typically, at the end of a detective story, proof comes with a confession that re­
veals the full story. In courtroom dramas, to use another example, there may not
be “prooF’ that someone committed a crime, but the jury may be convinced
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that the accused is guilty. Again, in some instances,
there may eventually be a confession by the perpetrator that does lead to “proof,”
once the hypothesis is backed by substantial evidence and the perpetrator is in­
formed of the strength of the prosecution’s case. Medical dramas are similar in
that the doctors must diagnose complicated cases using the evidence available to
them. The solution usually takes the form of a treatment that cures or saves the
patient. In all of these cases, the common theme is the need to solve a puzzle
using a combination of evidence, logical reasoning, and educated guesses.
Unfortunately for social scientists, the world never confesses its secrets like
some TV criminal, and we cannot typically administer some pharmaceutical in
controlled fashion to cure a body politic. The best social scientists can do is work
with a standard that requires scholars to make the strongest and most persuasive
case possible by using and interpreting the available evidence. Many social scien­
tists who use statistical methods—including sociologists, political scientists, and
most economists—even formalize standards for what is a persuasive finding.
Some use 95 percent certainty as a crucial benchmark in testing and trying to
 Concepts 9

confirm hypotheses (however arbitrary that 95 percent threshold may be, and
even this threshold only relates to their confidence that they can reject the “null
hypothesis” that the factor in question has absolutely no eifect). Good scholarship
seeks evidence, tests hypotheses, makes arguments, and contributes to theoretical
debates. We address theories and hypotheses in greater detail in chapter 2. First,
however, we turn to the ideas of concepts, variables, and causal relationships.

Concepts
Social science works with concepts, abstract ideas that we usually attempt to concept An idea comparativists
define as we ask and answer our questions. Examples of concepts are numerous use to think about the processes
and include freedom, democracy (as well as liberal democracy, electoral democ­ we study.
racy, delegative democracy, and many other subtypes), justice, nationalism, con­
stitutionalism, federalism, identity, gender relations, special interests, and social
movements, among many others. Working with concepts helps us think about
the social world, which is too complex to analyze without them. We must be very
careful in defining them, because bad concepts make for bad analysis.
Most concepts are categories. In some areas, such as physical and natural sci­
ence, certain categories are relatively clear.7The elements of the periodic table are
an example. Concepts like “helium” and “oxygen” describe things in the real
world that have certain numbers of electrons and protons. Yet there are few such
clear-cut categories in social and political life. Concepts like “democracy” and
“revolution” do not define phenomena the same way that “hydrogen” refers to an
atom composed of a single proton and a single electron. Social and political con­
cepts like democracy and revolution shade into each other by degree. Definitions
do not capture exact boundaries between social and political phenomena in the
real world, but we use them so that we can get a handle on that world. Reasonable
concepts and categories help us make sense of all the events that take place.

Features of Good Concepts

What makes a concept worthwhile? Good concepts have several features, including
clarity, coherence, consistency, and usefulness. The concept of “democratization”
when used correctly is an example of a concept that is worthwhile on all these counts.
First, concepts must be clear and coherent.8 Maybe you begin a research proj­
ect because you are troubled by differences in levels of democratization across
different countries. At the beginning, you have a common-sense understanding
of democratization. To do good comparative work, however, you must make the
meaning of the term explicit and clear. W hat do you mean by democratization?
W hat is it you are studying? You cannot say “democratization consists of all the
positive things that happen when a society changes.” This is neither clear nor co­
herent. A clearer and more coherent statement would be “democratization is the
process by which civil liberties and political rights are extended to all adult citi­
zens in a nation.” We begin with common-sense concerns about specific prob­
lems, but we need to define our key concepts precisely.
Second, concepts must be logically consistent, both internally and from one
to another. For example, one cannot conceptualize democratization in terms of
“expansion of liberty and equality” without addressing the likelihood that increasing
10 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

liberty will likely lead to some degree of inequality. The issue here is whether our
concept of democratization is internally consistent. Likewise, one cannot concep­
tualize democracy as being about a “set of institutional arrangements,” such as
elections, while viewing democratization as being about a “sort of political cul­
ture or set of values and norms.” This is an issue of logical consistency between the
concepts of democracy and democratization, which we presume are related, but
which seem to point in different directions here.
Third, concepts should be useful. They must be specific enough that they
allow you to draw distinctions in analyzing examples. The concept of democrati­
zation can be useful because we can meaningfully distinguish between countries
that have democratized and those that have not. Our use of concepts is prag­
matic, because we identify concepts based on how they help us answer research
questions.9 For comparative analysis, concepts must allow us to identify varia­
tions between places, which the concept of democratization does: It allows us to
differentiate and examine the variations between places that have undergone the
process and those that have not. To be useful, concepts must also allow us to
measure variables, which we examine further later.

Conceptualization
Using concepts may be creative, because social scientists need to develop their
own in many cases. The process of making up and defining concepts is called
conceptualization The deliberate conceptualization. It is often necessary to come up with new ideas and defini­
process through which we create tions, though we must be self-conscious and thoughtful in how we conceptual­
and select social-scientific ize. In comparative politics, a good practice is to look to how scholars have
concepts. already conceptualized major ideas in books (including textbooks) and articles.
We should not coin a new phrase just for the sake of it, and we do not want to end
up with a thousand different definitions of a concept like “democracy” when
there are already several good and accepted definitions available. Too much cre­
ation of concepts could generate confusion and make discussion more difficult.
Nonetheless, no concept is perfect, and you may need to conceptualize in novel
ways on your own, depending on your specific projects.10 Doing so can be part
of an intellectual contribution, so long as your concepts are clear, consistent, and
useful.11
Some concepts are very general, while others are very specific. To take “na­
tionalism” and “national identity” as an example, we might see the concept of
collective identity (an individual’s sense of belonging to a group) as being quite
general, though sometimes we ask questions that don’t require more specific
concepts.12 Greater specificity comes with adding more attributes to the con­
cept, maybe by specifying that we are interested in those collective identities
that are political. More specific still, one can divide political identities into more
specific subtypes, for example, political identities that say that everybody in
your country is like you and that they are all equal. Some questions require more
general concepts, and others more specific concepts. This issue is sometimes
Sartori's ladder of abstraction referred to as “Sartori’s ladder of abstraction.”13 The ladder ranges from gen­
The idea that we can organize eral concepts at the top to very specific concepts at the bottom, and the rung one
concepts on the basis of their stands on depends on the specific questions being asked and the cases being
specificity or generality. examined.
 Concepts 11

The Concept of Freedom

I n societies such as the United States, freedom is seen as a core from colonial powers, produce authoritarian regimes that do not
lvalue. Virtually everyone is a supporter and defender of freedom, promote individual freedoms. Often, the members of these soci­
and popular images present the American nation as the "land of eties nevertheless celebrate them as distinctively free. Note that
the free." Yet what it means to be free is not so clear, and the term all of these meanings of the term (and we could list many more)
has multiple, distinct, and perhaps even contradictory meanings.14 resonate with millions of people in the world today.15
Some view freedom in "negative" terms: One is free to the extent
that nobody impinges on his or her ability to act in accordance with
his or her will. Others view freedom in "positive" terms: One is free
to the extent that one can engage in particular sorts of acts or
ways of life. Others may view freedom in mystical terms, suggesting
that one is free to the extent that one experiences transcendence
through service to others, through participation in collective action,
or through spiritual contemplation. There are also Marxist-inspired
interpretations of freedom holding that one is free to the extent
that one is not alienated from others, from one's work, and from a
sense of purpose or meaning. (And, last but not least, Janis Joplin
sang that "Freedom's just another word for nothing left to lose")
All of these understandings take freedom to be a quality of
an individual. Yet many also speak of the collective freedoms of Libyan women celebrate liberation from Qaddafi's rule.
groups. For instance, many societies, in seeking independence Tripoli, September 2011.

Operationalizing: From Concepts to Measures

Once we have a clear notion of a concept, we need to be able to measure it; that
is, we need to operationalize our concept. To operationalize a concept is to make operationalization The process
it workable, mainly by making it measurable. When a concept is operational— through which we make a concept
or we have an operational definition—we can begin to explain what we are study- measurable,
ing. We can start to explain cause and effect only when we have clarified what we
are talking about and can measure it.
There may be many ways to operationalize a certain concept, as shown by
the example of democratization in Table 1.3. All of these may be valid ways to

t a b l e 1.3 Possible Operational Definitions

of Democratization
A case of democratization occurs when...
• a country holds a free and fair multiparty election
• two turnovers of government at the ballot box have occurred, in which the ruling party loses
an election and peacefully steps down from power
• free and fair elections are held, and a constitutional law is in place guaranteeing the rights of
freedom of speech, press, assembly, and religion to all citizens
• there is no verifiable suppression of political participation and expression
• more than two-thirds of citizens in a survey express values that reject authoritarian rule
12 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

operationalize democratization, so long as the operational definition matches up

with the concept. If we conceptualize democratization in terms of elections, we
should measure it in terms of elections (not, for example, by values people hold).
As we begin to measure our concepts, we move more toward the “real,” or empir­
ical, world we observe.

Empirical Evidence
Questions demand answers. Social scientists do not ask questions just to ask them,
but to attempt to answer them. So how do social scientists answer their questions?
In short, they couple empirical evidence with theory. In comparative politics, em­
pirical means those observations we can make from looking at the real world rather
than using abstract theories or speculation. We look at how theory and evidence
interact in chapter 2. For the moment, we only highlight the forms of evidence
most often used in comparative politics, since this is necessary for understanding
the method. A key is the distinction between facts and evidence.

Facts and Evidence

Facts—understood here as simple statements about what is or is not the case—
are abundant, but evidence is more precious. As noted previously, online sources
such as Wikipedia and Google provide almost costless access to a massive set of
evidence A set of facts or obser­ facts (though a lot of information found online is inaccurate or incorrect). Evidence
vations used to support a proposi­ consists of facts used in support of a proposition or hypothesis. Notice something
tion or hypothesis. built into these definitions: evidence is indeed based on facts. So a point of view
or an opinion, whether your own or someone else’s, is not evidence. The fact that
someone else believes something does not mean there is evidence for it, even
if that opinion has been published by a prominent scholar or public figure. Evi­
dence should be available for the reader to gather as well, and not be simply based
on hearsay, though research sometimes requires anonymity of sources. Wherever
possible, research should be replicable by someone else.
To use a simple example of varying qualities of evidence, say we ask two stu­
dents to make a simple claim about whether Saudi Arabia is a democracy and to
back this claim with evidence. In the two examples in Table 1.4, the difference

ta b le 1.4 Examples of Strong and Weak Use of Evidence

Student 1 Student 2

Claim: Saudi Arabia is not democratic. Claim: Saudi Arabia is not democratic.

Evidence: Saudi Arabia has not held free and Evidence: Saudi Arabia is an Islamic country
fair elections for its national government. whose economy is based on exporting oil. It is
Women do not have the same political and a long-time ally of the United States and is led
social rights as men. by King Salman and a large royal family.

Claim: strong Claim: strong

Facts: correct Facts: correct
Evidence: strong Evidence: weak
 Empirical Evidence 13

between the two students is not the correctness of the claim, which is the same.
Nor is it the facts, which are true on both sides. Rather, the difference is in how
well evidence is used to back the claim. Successful comparativists are known not
for the correctness of their assertions but for the ways they empirically support
their claims.
Strong evidence has several characteristics. Most obviously, it must be rele­
vant to the issue at hand. If you are arguing about Saudi Arabia’s democracy, the
fact that the country is Muslim, or an oil exporter, is not an indicator of democ­
racy. We may debate whether these factors help came democracy or a lack of
democracy, but they are not measures of democracy itself the way free and fair
elections and civil rights are.
The evidence should also be at the same level of analysis as the claim you are level of analysis The level (e.g.,
making—that is, at the individual, organizational, or societal level, for example. individual, organizational, societal)
We can ask good research questions at many levels of analysis: individuals, groups at which observations are made, or
within a country, whole countries and societies, regions of the world, and the at which causa! processes operate.
world as a whole. But we need to be careful that our evidence reflects our level of
analysis. Countries are made up of individuals, but individuals are not countries,
and there are important differences between individuals, groups, and societies at
large. So if you are seeking evidence about gender attitudes in Saudi Arabia, it is
insufficient to note what a certain small group of men in the capital city thinks,
unless you can show that these men happen to be representative of the country at
large. The same is true the other way around: If you are talking about an individ­
ual or a small group, you cannot assume you know everything about them just
because of what country they come from; this is essentially stereotyping. Ana­
lysts risk committing logical fallacies if they do not pay attention to levels of
analysis.

Cases and Case Studies

Cases are the basic units of analysis in comparative politics. In many instances, case In comparative analysis, a -
our cases are countries, usually for a certain period. We may seek, for example, unit or example of a phenomenon
to explain North Korea’s lack of democracy versus the (imperfect) progress of to be studied.
democracy in South Korea; the cases here are the two countries we are com­
paring, and perhaps our time frame will be the period after the Korean War of
the 1950s.
A case is not always a country, however. To start with, we could consider other
geographical units: We may be interested in the social history of the state of
California or Texas, or in comparing the two. Or we may be interested in the
state of Gujarat in India, or in the city of Caracas, Venezuela. We may be inter­
ested in contrasting the European Union with the African Union, or the “major­
ity Catholic nations of southern Europe” with the “majority Protestant nations of
northern Europe.” In this instance, the case for study would still be a geographic
area but not a nation-state.
Cases can also take other forms. They may be political groups, organizations,
specific institutions, historical processes, eras, or even discrete events. The civil
rights movement in the United States may be a case of a social movement. To
do a comparison, one might examine the “civil rights movement of the 1960s”
in juxtaposition to the “women’s suffrage movement of the early 1900s.” Or one
14 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

might examine the “presidency of John F. Kennedy” and the “presidency of Barack
Obama” as two cases for comparison. The French Revolution may be a case of a
social and political revolution, and so too may the “Revolutions of 1848” (which
took place across many countries in Europe) be treated as a “single case” of social
and political revolution. Finally, we may also look at comparisons over time
within a single country. An example might be comparing “the politics of health
care in 1960s America” with “the politics of health care in twenty-first-century
America.” The key is delineating one’s case as a unit that can be usefully under­
stood as a cluster of events or attributes.
Comparative politics studies vary considerably in terms of how many cases
they handle. Some studies focus on a single case.16 Most scholars feel that single
cases can be illuminating but that they are not sufficient for testing all hypothe­
ses. At the other end of the spectrum, some studies deal with large-N compari­
sons, in which many cases are analyzed through statistical searches for common
features (this is discussed further in chapter 13). In between these approaches, at
the heart of traditional comparative politics, we find small-N comparisons of two
or more cases.

The Comparative Method

Comparative politics—unlike, say, the study of American government or inter­
national relations—is defined by its method. It reaches conclusions about cause
and effect through structured and systematic comparing and contrasting of cases.

Variables and Comparison

variable An element or factor that The causes and the outcomes we are trying to measure are called variables in the
is likely to change, or </ary, from social sciences, because they vary from one case to another. For instance, if we
case to case. were to argue that the African country of Ghana has a high level of democracy
because it was colonized by the British, while the neighboring country of Togo
has a low level of democracy because it was colonized by the French, then both the
outcome Typically used as a sy­ cause and the effect vary from one country to the other. The effect (or outcome)
nonym for "effect," something that is the level of democracy, which is high in one case and low in the other. The cause
is produced or changed in any we would be proposing is the colonizer, which is British in one case and French in
social or political process. the other.
We will typically be seeking to explain a certain outcome or result or conse­
quence. In the cause-and-effect story of X Y, our research will center on inves­
dependent variable In hypothe­
tigating the various possible causes (you might think of them as “X factors”) to
sis testing, the dependent variable
explain “the Y.” Since outcomes depend upon the causes, a social science conven­
tion is to call the outcome the dependent variable, while the cause(s) is (are)
is the effect or outcome that we

called the independent variable(s). Many terms are used, but for our purposes,
expect to be acted on (or have its
value altered) by the independent
all of the expressions in each column in this table are nearly synonymous.
variable.
cause -> effect (or result or consequence)
independent variable In hypo­
thesis testing, an independent independent variable -> dependent variable
variable is one that we expect to
explanatory variable -> outcome
"act on" or change the value of the
dependent variable. X variable Y variable
 The Comparative Method 15

The city of Nogales straddles the border between Mexico (left) and the United States, divided
by a three-mile fence completed in 2011. Why do these neighboring countries have such striking
differences?

If we compare or contrast two or more cases in order to make a causal argu­

ment, we will be looking for similarities and differences (also called variations) variation Difference between
between the cases. Using just two countries for the moment (to keep it simple), cases in any given study of compa­
we may look to explain why two countries have different outcomes, or we may rative politics.
look at variations in outcomes between two countries. We may ask why one
country is wealthy but a neighboring country is poor. Or, conversely, we may ask
why two very different countries had very similar outcomes, such as becoming
democracies around the same time.
To address such questions, we can use two simple tools as points of departure:
most-similar-systems analyses and most-different-systems analyses.17 These ap­
proaches use comparison for the same fundamental purpose: ruling out plausible
explanations for certain phenomena. That is, quite similar or quite different cases
are used as comparative checks to see what arguments cannot account for a cer­
tain outcome. Ruling out these other arguments allows the researcher to narrow
down the research process, by focusing on the possible causes that remain, and
testing evidence supporting these causes.

Most-Similar-Systems Design
The most-similar-systems (MSS) design is predicated on the logic that two most-similar-systems (MSS)
cases (such as two countries) that are similar in a variety of ways would be ex­ A research design in which we
pected to have very similar political outcomes. Thus, if two cases have variations compare cases that are similar with
in outcomes, we would look for the variations that can explain why the countries respect to a number of factors but
are dissimilar. with distinct outcomes.
While Table 1.5 may make the analysis appear formal, people actually do this
type of analysis informally all the time. Consider discussions you have with
Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

t a b l e 1.5 Most-Similar-Systems Design

REGIME TYPES IN AFRICA

Variable Case 1:Togo Case 2: Ghana

Similarities

Climate Hot Hot

Income Low Low

Ethnic Demography Heterogeneous Heterogeneous

Largest Religion Christian Christian

Other Religions Islam, Traditional Islam, Traditional

Outcome

Regime Type Authoritarian Democratic

Cause

Hypothesis: Colonizer France United Kingdom

others about things seemingly as simple as why we like certain movies. Virtually
all feature films released in cinemas are of similar length, are filmed for large
screens, use professional directors and producers, have a plot with a protagonist
(often a big star), use carefully chosen music as a soundtrack, and elicit emotion
from the audience (or at least are intended to). Yet we all have preferences for
some films over others. Amid these significant similarities among all films, we
can identify—through comparison—the certain factors that lead each of us to
appreciate or dislike a film.
If we can demystify the process of comparison by realizing that we use it sub­
consciously all the time, it is just a half-step to how this might be done in practice
when analyzing political questions. Consider the presentation in Table 1.5 of two
African countries, neither of which you are assumed to know a great deal about.
We are wondering why one country (Ghana) is a democracy and another
(Togo) is not. The table notes several similarities between the two countries,
making the variation in outcomes a true puzzle. If we were to hypothesize a
cause, we might argue that the colonial legacies of the countries mattered: Togo
was colonized by France (and previously Germany) and Ghana by Britain. As
we look for the cause of variations in outcomes, we can essentially cross out the
many variables on which the countries are similar, as they are unlikely to cause
differences. For instance, the hot climate of Togo cannot explain why it is more
authoritarian than Ghana, because Ghana is hot as well. Eliminating these simi­
larities as potential causes leaves us looking for other possible causes where the
countries vary.
So “colonizer” might fit the bill, as Table 1.5 suggests. Does this mean we
have proven that colonizer is the answer? Not at all. We would need to do several
 The Comparative Method 17

People wait to vote in Accra, Ghana, in 2004, Despite many similarities with its neighbor Togo, Ghana is a democracy, while Togo
is not. Why?

things to make this case, as we shall see going forward. First, we would consider
alternative hypotheses. Instead of colonizer, we might just as easily have said that
the economic performance of each country was the key factor that shaped regime
type, or that the nature of the military command was the key cause, or that the
ideology of the founding fathers of each country mattered most. Only by exam­
ining and weighing these various causes could we gain real insight into why one
country is democratic and the other is not. Thus, our second caveat is that we
would need to find plausible evidence and have a strong argument linking the
cause to the outcome. We would want to explore the ways in which colonization
affected politics in these African countries. We would assess the evidence to
determine whether it had an impact, and we would make sure there is a plausible
story that allows us to connect the dots between the cause and the effect.
One potential source of initial confusion is that MSS designs place a premium
on identifying the differences between cases, not the similarities. You might
think of it this way: If two cases are most similar, what is remarkable about com­
paring them? W hat is remarkable is where most similar cases differ. Differences
in outcomes between similar cases are noteworthy, and differences in possible
causes are what will help us explain them. We invert this logic when using the
other tool that serves as a basic point of departure in comparative politics: most-
different-systems designs.
18 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

Most-Different-Systems Design
most-different-systems (MDS) The most-different-systems (MDS) design uses a logic that mirrors that of the
A research design in which we MSS. In this approach, the researcher identifies two cases that are different in
compare cases that differ with nearly all aspects yet are similar on a particular outcome. This puzzle leads the
respect to multiple factors but in researcher to develop hypotheses to explain the peculiar similarity. See Table 1.6,
which the outcome is the same. which presents an example of two major revolutions in world history, which hap­
pened in very different geographical and historical contexts.
Just as MSS designs place a priority on identifying differences between cases,
MDS designs place a premium on identifying the similarities that can give us
analytical leverage. Again, the name is revealing: In an MDS design, what vari­
ables are noteworthy and telling? Those that are not different. If France in 1789 and
China in 1949 are so different, what accounts for both having major social revolu­
tions? In the interest of cultivating your habit of building comparisons, we leave it
to you to insert your own hypotheses. Might both countries have had populations
facing extreme deprivation at these times? Or perhaps in both countries new
actors emerged at these moments in history to lead a revolution? We will not
answer these questions here, but since several major variables differ between these
“most different” cases, we may surmise that similarity in revolution will be attrib­
utable to one of the relatively scarce number of other similarities we can find.

Comparative Checking
While the MSS and MDS designs are the foundation for initial comparisons,
comparative checking The pro­ they do not complete our analysis. Analysts must constantly remain aware that
cess of testing the conclusions one pair of cases does not “prove” a hypothesis to be true everywhere, any more
from a set of comparisons against than one case study can prove a hypothesis. Rather, we must constantly engage
additional cases or evidence. in comparative checking, or examining the conditions under which certain

t a b l e 1.6 Most-Different-Systems Design

M A JO R SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS

Variables Case 1: France (1780s) Case 2: China (1940s)

Differences

Continent Europe Asia

Population (approx.) < 30 million > 500 million

Century Eighteenth Twentieth

Regime Monarchy Nationalist Party

Outcome(s)

Social Revolution Yes Yes

Cause

[Insert Your Hypothesis Here] ??? ???

 The Comparative Method 19

arguments hold. This checking typically involves mixing MSS and MDS designs
to test our hypotheses further and to give us a sense of how generalizable they generalizability The quality
are, or how applicable to a wide number of cases. that a given theory, hypothesis,
Return briefly to Table 1.5, the MSS table using Togo and Ghana as exam­ or finding has of being applicable
ples. That MSS analysis provided us with a glimpse of the possibility that colo­ to a wide number of cases.
nizer or colonial legacy may affect regime type. From that table, we might think
we have found that being colonized by France leads to authoritarian rule, while
the good fortune of being colonized by Britain leads to democracy. However,
even just a bit of comparative checking beyond these two cases will reveal that
the story is not so simple, as Table 1.7 shows.
This table illustrates that a simplistic explanation of African regime types
based on colonizer is insufficient. Benin, which neighbors Togo, was colonized
by the French and is now democratic, in counterpoint to our simplistic view from
the MSS table (Table 1.5). The fact that a single case does not correspond to this
theory’s prediction does not “prove” that colonizer is irrelevant to regime type,
any more than our first MSS “proved” that colonizer is relevant to regime type.
Rather, it shows that a more sophisticated examination of the causes of democ­
racy is needed. How might we proceed?
In looking for other possible causes, we have many strategies to pursue. We
can look to a larger number of cases to see if other hypothesized arguments might
still hold. We should also dig in to our original cases once again, to see if there are
any variations or hypotheses that we may have overlooked. We can also revisit the
scholarly literature—a strategy under-utilized by many beginning comparativists—
digging in to see how scholars explain the outcome that interests us. We may find
new hypotheses, or refine the hypothesis we have already worked with. In this case,
perhaps we would find from the literature that colonialism has impacts on regimes,

t a b l e 1.7 Comparative Checking

Variable Case 1:Togo Case 2: Ghana Case 3: Benin

Similarities

Climate Hot Hot Hot

Income Low Low Low

Ethnic Demography Heterogeneous Heterogeneous Heterogeneous

Largest Religion Christian Christian Christian

Other Religions Islam, Traditional Islam, Traditional Islam, Traditional

Outcome

Regime Type Authoritarian Democratic Democratic

Cause

Colonizer France UK France

20 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

but that it takes shape over time differently in different cases; maybe colonialism
is something that matters but needs to be understood in a more sophisticated
fashion, and not as simply either “French” or “British.” Finally, we could use a
strategy that links to the issue of how politics happens over time, called within-
case comparison.

W ithin-Case Comparison
within-case comparison The Within-case comparison means looking more carefully within one’s own case(s)
comparative analysis of variation to examine the variations there. For instance, to use the Togo/Ghana example,
that takes place over time or in we might find that there are certain pieces or moments within the Togo case
distinct parts of a single case. where there was some democracy. Maybe people in certain cities or regions of
the country gained more rights, while people in other cities or regions were left
without.18 Or maybe Togo democratized (somewhat) at certain moments, such
as the early 1990s, only to backslide to an authoritarian regime. Looking at dif­
ferent moments in time or in space may allow us to dig deeper into a case to better
understand our evidence.
To use another example, consider why hopefulness about the future may have
been relatively high in the United States in the 1990s but is lower today. Many
variables are similar across these two periods: The basic governmental structure
of the country and certainly the geography of the country are quite stable, for
instance. In other words, a country at an earlier period (call it Time 1) is “most
similar” to the same country at Time 2. Yet some things do change over time,
and those variables are good candidates to explain changing outcomes. The
economy may change, for instance, or the composition of the workforce, or
international events, or the political mood. Many other examples can also illus­
trate the virtues of comparing periods within a country. The takeaway point is
that comparison does not end with simple charts listing attributes of different
countries, but instead is a way to delve systematically into the evidence case stud­
ies provide.

Is the Study of Politics a Science?

The Limits of the Comparative Method
We speak of political science even though in comparative politics, we rarely find a
“proof ” of the kind found in geometry, for example. Some scholars view the
common methods for the study of politics to be inherently scientific in nature.
Some even think the study of politics is (and should be) a science that aims to
uncover general laws about political and social life. Others think it is a science
but one that shows probable relationships between variables, rather than showing
general laws.19 Others outside the discipline (including some natural and phys­
ical scientists) may view the study of politics in a more skeptical fashion, arguing
that the term science is more aspirational in nature: For them, politics is not yet a
science, though it may aim to be. Still others may argue that politics is not a sci­
ence, and should not be. It may be more interpretive and may relate more to the
humanities than to other sciences.
 Is the Study of Politics a Science? The Limits of the Comparative Method

To be sure, for many questions, social scientists cannot use one of the major
tools that drives knowledge in the natural and physical sciences: the controlled
experiment. We cannot subject individual countries to precise conditions to
examine the effects the way we can in a chemistry lab, although many social
scientists do look for so-called “natural experiments,” in which real-world events
mimic laboratory conditions in key ways.20 In general, truly definitive proof is
hard to come by in the social sciences. The sorts of comparative designs we have
discussed in this chapter comprise one way to make up for our inability to do
experiments everywhere. When we observe countries that are quite similar in the
MSS design, we are approximating the controlled experiment of the laboratory:
We hold many variables constant, and vary one or two key variables to see if we
can measure their impact.
Given the complexity of the world and the many factors that affect political
life, hypotheses that are confirmed “beyond a reasonable doubt” are generally the
best we can aim for. Physicists have described the “law of gravity,” but social
scientists do not typically uncover fully analogous “laws” that appear to hold
everywhere. We instead rely on theories that give more or less powerful explana­
tions about how the world operates. The strongest theories persist over long
periods, even if they do not explain each and every possible case or circumstance.
We elaborate on this point in the next chapter.
In this book, we take the approach that comparative politics can aspire to sci­
entific inference, even if it has certain limitations.21 Some argue that mathemat­
ical approaches focusing on many cases are the gold standard in political science,
because with large numbers of cases, researchers are liberated from the idiosyn­
crasies and complexities of individual cases. In one version, political science
could replace “proper names” with variables.22 We do not, however, presume that
we must follow the models of quantitative research designs (which we will dis­
cuss further in chapter 2). There are many ways in which detailed studies of
smaller numbers of cases can show us things obscured from view in quantitative
studies of many cases. Qualitative analyses—such as deep historical probing of
individual cases and detailed descriptions of social contexts—can be as scientific
as white-coated lab work. Moreover, quantitative and qualitative methods com­
plement each other, a point that seems to be increasingly recognized in political
science.
Comparative work may contribute to knowledge in many ways. These include
conceptualization, refining the basic ideas and terms we use, and categorizing
cases. Other contributions come from theoretical critiques, which can highlight
inconsistencies of certain explanations, allowing researchers to develop a better
theory. And, of course, many good critiques will also be empirical, pointing out
cases that do not fit with favored explanations. Each of these forms of contribu­
tion is consistent with the scientific method, even if it does not always involve
direct testing of hypotheses. In the next chapter, we explore how these aspects of
the comparative approach help us build theories in comparative politics.
22 Chapter 1: The Comparative Approach: An Introduction

C h ap ter Su m m ary
Asking Why: Research Questions • One of the main empirical approaches is the use of case
in Comparative Politics studies and comparisons between cases.
For scholars of comparative politics, the key questions are
about why something happens, or about cause and effect, The Comparative Method
even though we are often also interested in normative Variables are features that vary from one case to another
questions about right and wrong. and enable comparison between cases.
• Research in comparative politics addresses questions on • Two approaches to comparison involve the most-similar-
such major issues as economic development, political re­ systems design and the most-different-systems design,
gimes and institutions, and a range of social outcomes. both of which examine variations and similarities between
cases to assist in testing hypotheses.
Concepts Good comparative study requires more than just brief
• Concepts are the ideas we use to categorize the world and examination of similar and different variables: it often
enable us to measure and compare observations. involves further examination through steps such as com­
• Good concepts are clear, coherent, consistent, and useful. parative checking and within-case comparison.
Social scientists often must do their own conceptualization,
or develop their own concepts, and must operationalize Is the Study of Politics a Science?
their concepts to enable measurement. The Limits of the Comparative Method
• While the study of politics aspires to scientific conclusions,
Empirical Evidence it is rarely able to prove its conclusions with absolute
Comparative politics relies heavily on facts and evidence to certainty.
support arguments about cause and effect.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. Imagine you are going to do a project that tries to explain why 4. Take one of the questions you have formulated in response
democracy has been relatively successful in the United States. to question 3. Now think of how you could construct a most-
What sort of conceptual work would you need to do before you different-systems (MDS) design to compare cases and answer
could complete this study? your question.
2. If you were to conceptualize democracy as a political system in 5. Take one of the questions you have formulated in response
which (1) certain individual rights are respected, (2) elections to question 3. Now think of how you could construct a most-
are periodically held, and (3) political transitions are peaceful, similar-systems (MSS) design to compare cases and answer your
what would you have to do to operationalize this concept for question.
the purposes of a comparative study?
3. What are the five most interesting why questions about com­
parative politics that you can think of? What are the main con­
cepts they imply?
 amm
W .

CHAPTER 2 f

Theories,
Hypotheses,
and Evidence

• A medical worker undergoes Ebola response training during the outbreak that began in 2014.
 I n 2014, a deadly outbreak of the Ebola virus hit several countries in West
I Africa. Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were especially hard hit. Medical
professionals from around the world came to the region in an attempt to con­
tain the outbreak. Some villagers, however, did not welcome them, and in
fact at least one youth group mobilized to fight off the doctors because they
noticed something: soon after the doctors arrived, people in a village began
to die. As The New York Times reported, some villagers reached a simple con­
clusion: the doctors bring death, and the way to stop Ebola
was to stop the doctors.1
IN THIS CHAPTER
This kind of faulty logic almost certainly proved deadly
Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses,
and Evidence 24
to some. Examples like this show how important it is to have
Theories 25 good theories that can help us understand— not misunder­
Hypotheses 25 stand—how the world works. Such an example also shows
How Theories Emerge and Are Used 27 how important it is to interpret evidence correctly. In this
Types of Evidence 29
story, it is the case that the disease was claiming lives despite
Hypothesis Testing 31
the doctors’ best efforts, not that the doctors were doing the
Correlation 31
killing. Villagers were confusing correlation— observing fac­
Causation 33
tors that accompany each other—with causation, or an argu­
Critiques: Using Theory and Evidence 39
Empirical Critiques: Confirming Cases
ment that one thing causes another.
and Deviant Cases 39 In this chapter, we discuss how theories work. We dis­
Theoretical Critiques: Improving Theories cuss how to form hypotheses, or educated guesses about what
and Hypotheses 39
will happen under certain circumstances, and how to avoid
The Challenges of Measurement: Biases,
Errors, and Validity 41 certain pitfalls in testing those hypotheses. All this will pre­
pare you better for examining the issues of comparative poli­
THINKING COM PARATIVELY tics that make up the rest of the book.
Qualities of Good Analysis and
Argumentation 42
Step 1: Asking Good Questions: Why? 43
Step 2: Hypothesis Testing: Generating
Good Hypotheses and Testing Them
Fairly 43
Step 3: Balancing Argumentation: Evidence,
Introduction to Theories,
Originality, and Meaningfulness 43 Hypotheses, and Evidence
Social scientists look for convincing answers to important ques­
tions about why things happen: Why are some countries demo­
cratic and others not, or why do revolutions occur, or why do some countries have
two main political parties while others have many parties in their legislatures? The
first step in comparative politics is asking good research questions about the causes
and effects of political events. Chapter 1 gave us an approach—the comparative
24
 Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 25

method—to begin to answer those questions by comparing and contrasting cases,

most often different countries or specific events in different countries. We may
examine the political party systems of Germany and France, or the communist
revolutions in Russia and China, for instance. To do so, we juxtapose the facts of
the different cases to make an argument about the similarities and differences
between them.
In this chapter, we talk about the tools we need to answer questions, with a focus
on two elements that help us to formulate possible answers: theories and hypoth­
eses. We discuss what theories and hypotheses are, and how they differ from one
another. We then discuss how evidence is used to test hypotheses and theories.

Theories
Theories are general explanations of empirical phenomena, or explanations theory A general set of explana­
about how the world operates. A theory aims to explain more than just one or tory claims about some specifiable
two cases or examples, and it is typically backed by a considerable number of sup­ empirical range.
porting facts as empirical evidence. An explanation or framework in the social
sciences will rarely earn the right to be called a theory if we cannot find consider­
able support for its arguments in the real world.
This may not be the only way you hear the word theory used. There is also a more
casual everyday usage to describe a hunch or idea. For instance, imagine a friend
who says, “The Chicago Cubs are going to win the World Series this year, that’s my
theory.” From a social scientific point of view, this is a prediction, not a theory. It
may be a good or a bad prediction (probably the latter, knowing the Cubs), but it is
speculative at best, a hopeful guess. Without some logical argumentation and
backing in facts, it is not really a theory based on reason and evidence. If, on the
other hand, the friend offers a detailed explanation that shows how the team with
the strongest pitching routinely wins the World Series, and proceeds to detail how
Chicago’s pitching is stronger than that of other teams (it’s probably not), then the
friend is approaching a general theory about the relationship between two vari­
ables: pitching and championships. In this theory, pitching is the cause and win­
ning the championship is the consequence, also called the effect or the outcome.
In political science, there are two different types of theory, typically referred
to as normative theory and empirical (also known as positive) theory. Normative
theory deals with questions of values and moral beliefs. An example might be the
question “W hat is the best kind of political system we could construct?” This is a
matter of morals and ethics. Empirical theory, by contrast, deals with empirical
questions. An example is “Which factors are most likely to produce a preferred
political system?” This is about the factors and variables that cause things to
happen. In this book, we are mostly focused on empirical theories: we discuss
theory as a general explanation of why things happen.

Hypotheses
Hypotheses are specific proposed explanations for why an outcome occurs. To hypothesis A specific prediction,
answer research questions, we may generate or formulate hypotheses that we derived from a theory, that can be
think can explain a set of facts upon further research. Hypotheses are not expla­ tested against empirical evidence.
nations already backed by lots of evidence. Instead, they are possible answers to
a question, which we plan to test out by applying them to data, looking at specific
26 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

cases to see if there is evidence to support the idea. Informally, you can think of
them as hunches. If the hypothesis receives that support from the evidence, it
may become a thesis in an argument.2
Developing hypotheses requires us to make imaginative leaps from unanswered
questions to possible explanations. Hypotheses can be generated from existing
deductive reasoning The process theories in a deductive fashion: starting with general ideas and then testing
of moving from general claims or whether they work on specific examples. For example, say we are asking about why
theories to specific observations or an anti-colonial revolution happened in a certain African country in the 1950s. We
predictions about a phenomenon may begin our research with a major theory that holds that social revolutions (such
or set of cases. as the French Revolution, Russian Revolution, or Iranian Revolution) are caused by
the social upheavals produced by modernization. We seek to apply this theory to
the African country we are studying. Using the theory as our general model, we
might hypothesize that the anti-colonial revolution in the African country was pro­
duced by a history of modernization. Another way to think of this sort of approach
is to consider it an effort to test an observable implication of the starting theory.3
Not all hypotheses are deduced from general theories, of course. Some can
also come from looking at a case that deviates from a particular theory. We can
deviant case (outlier) A case that learn a great deal from so-called deviant cases, or “outliers,” that do not do as
does not fit the pattern predicted we might expect. For instance, in many international comparisons the United
by a given theory. States is a deviant case. It has both higher income inequality and greater differ­
ences in life expectancy between racial groups (to name just two variables) than
one might expect based on its level of economic development. By focusing on
some characteristics that make the United States different from other cases, we
might sometimes understand general relationships better. For example, perhaps
it is not a country’s overall level of economic development that predicts the life
expectancy of its people, but individual life chances. By this thinking, U.S.
income inequality may help us to account for the fact that high development does
not lead to high life expectancy for all U.S. groups.
We often formulate a hypothesis with some initial knowledge of the topic at
hand, but we do not want to ask questions to which we presume we already know
the answer. We do not normally aim to create a hypothesis from empirical data in
Inductive reasoning The process an inductive way—moving from specific observations to general claims. That is,
of moving from specific observa­ we don’t do the research, find the answer, then go back and propose our hypoth­
tions to general claims. esis (although sometimes our analysis does suggest new hypotheses, and inductive
approaches to theory generation do exist). Instead, we approach our hypothesis
with an open mind toward what answers we may find. Our hypotheses may be
supported or rejected by the research we do, so there is always the possibility that
they are wrong. In fact, most hypotheses are wrong, and rarely if ever can we fully
confirm or disprove a hypothesis with limited research.4The goal is not to pick the
correct hypothesis at the outset, but rather to learn something from the study we
undertake. In fact, many social scientists believe that our knowledge advances
more from refuting hypotheses than from defending or supporting them.
Hypotheses and theories inform one another. Theories help guide us in for­
mulating hypotheses, and confirming hypotheses may either support or under­
mine theories. In general, hypotheses are more tentative and speculative than
theories. A specific hypothesis is generated for each research question and is put
on the line to be tested in each case. While the evidence from testing a specific
 Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 27

hypothesis may support or oppose a particular theory, it usually is insufficient to

reject or confirm a theory by itself. Generating a theory is a more elaborate, long­
term process than generating and testing a single hypothesis.
After testing hypotheses for a specific study, scholars will typically offer a
thesis, a claim to argue on the basis of evidence from research. One can think of thesis A statement for which one
a thesis statement that usually appears near the beginning of a well-written argues on the basis of evidence.
scholarly paper. In comparative politics, a thesis is an argument supported by the
research evidence that comes from testing a hypothesis. While a thesis has evi­
dence supporting it, that does not mean it is a full theory. Before achieving the
status and prestige of being called a theory, an idea requires ample evidence to
support it, typically based on research by many scholars. For the most part, stu­
dents of comparative politics test hypotheses, make specific claims in the form of
theses, and are expected to use evidence to argue in support of their theses,
taking account of existing theories. We are informed by theory and can contrib­
ute to debates by theorizing, but we rarely craft or destroy entire theories alone.

How Theories Emerge and Are Used

Theories emerge and are used all the time to explain the world around us. Let us
take a prominent theory from beyond comparative politics that has long featured
prominently in social and political debate: the theory of evolution. First, we offer
a very abridged version of the theory, followed by one specific hypothesis derived
from the theory.
Theory (abridged): The origin and development of species are based on a
process of natural selection, in which organisms with a genetic advantage
in a given natural environment thrive and propagate their genes, whereas
organisms at a genetic disadvantage will fall out of the gene pool over the
long term.
Hypothesis (example): The theory of evolution accounts for humans’
walking on two legs. Human ancestors first began to walk on two legs in
African savannahs where grasses grew tall; those walking on two legs had
an advantage over similar four-legged mammals because they could better
see and more easily flee predators.
In testing this hypothesis—that humans first walked upright in order to flee
predators—a scholar will examine whether the evidence is consistent with such
an explanation. The evidence uncovered may include fossils and archaeological
evidence. As part of his or her work, the scholar may note that other prominent
arguments are inconsistent with one or more substantial pieces of evidence,
thereby making this hypothesis relatively more capable of explaining the ob­
served facts.
O f course, even if the scholar finds that the evidence is consistent with the
hypothesis, a single study will not be the end of the story. Counter-arguments
will emerge. Indeed, the existence and progress of the social sciences depends
precisely on the common efforts of the scholarly community to question existing
explanations and to provide alternative ones. In our example, some scholars who
accept the evolutionary perspective may argue that humans first walked upright
in order to conserve energy while foraging for food. Scholars who reject the
28 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

theory may also contribute arguments to the debate,

and even non-scientists may do so, as long as their
arguments are tested empirically. We can pursue the
scientific endeavor by further testing related hypoth­
eses to see how the theory changes as a result.
We narrow in on good explanations by finding
increasing evidence that certain hypotheses are con­
sistent with the evidence while others are inconsistent
with the evidence. We can rarely, if ever, confirm a
hypothesis or prove it fully true; rather, we can find
that a hypothesis is increasingly viable as we find more
and more evidence to support it. Ideally, much like a
courtroom lawyer that has the evidence on his or her
side, we will make our case “beyond a reasonable
doubt” as we defend our claim.
Theories have facts and evidence supporting them,
but these are not proof that a theory is valid and cor­
rect in all circumstances. Often, a wrong theory will hold sway for a long period
of time until it is supplanted by a stronger theory. For example, the earth was
long believed to be situated at the center of the universe, and this appeared con­
sistent with many facts, such as the sun and moon rising and falling beyond the
horizon each day. However, this theory eventually came into conflict with obser­
vations that suggested that the earth revolved around the sun. Both theories
persisted for a time until it became clear that the heliocentric (sun-centered)
theory best explained the structure of our solar system. Thus, competing theories
may coexist, and there may simultaneously be facts and evidence that support a
theory and other facts and evidence that contradict the theory. Theories may ul­
timately fail and be rejected, but ideally theories only “die” when replaced by new
ones that better explain existing evidence.5
Theories in political science explain tendencies and help us understand many
cases, but there are almost always exceptions to the rules. Nothing in political
science works in all cases the way the laws of physics work everywhere on earth.
For example, as you will read in chapter 6, there are several competing theories
to explain why countries become democracies. There is considerable evidence
that wealthier countries are likelier to be democratic than poor countries, but this
does not mean every rich country will be a democracy and every low-income
country will be under authoritarian rule. Rather, the theory of the link between
wealth and democracy posits a tendency, much as eating healthy foods and not
smoking will tend to increase one’s life expectancy. Not everyone who eats well
and avoids smoking will live to old age, and not everyone who smokes and eats
junk food will die young. Cause-and-effect relationships in the social sciences are
general patterns, not absolute laws. As a result, building theory is an intensive
process over an extended period of formulating and testing hypotheses, gather­
ing and examining evidence, and understanding and synthesizing debates. Theo­
ries are imperfect but can be improved over time.
Since theories compete with one another as the best explanations of social
phenomena, it may be natural to think of scientists competing with one another
 Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence 29

to come up with the best theory. This is true in part, but the social sciences are
also a collective endeavor. In this sense, when a theory is rejected, it represents an
advance of our understanding. Even critiques of one scientist’s effort by another
scientist are part of the process of testing and contesting the best explanations.

Types of Evidence
For most students being introduced to comparative politics, the dominant form
of evidence will be qualitative, meaning it comes from accounts of historical or qualitative A form of analysis that
contemporary events. For instance, if I wish to test the hypothesis that the aims to discern relationships be­
French Revolution of 1789 was caused by the emergence of a self-conscious tween events or phenomena as
middle class {bourgeoisie), then I may look to accounts of that class and its atti­ described in narrative form, such as
tudes and involvements in political life in the years leading up to 1789 in France, an account of a historical process.
perhaps comparing it to other countries where a revolution did not take place. In
this case, my data are not numbers and figures inserted into a spreadsheet, but
rather the detailed accounts of historical record. I may test my hypothesis using
the facts of who did what, when and where they did it, and how. Qualitative evi­
dence may come from many sources, such as written works like constitutions and
laws, historical or journalistic accounts or reports, and interviews or surveys
of people.
Social scientists use quantitative data such as statistics and figures to comple­ quantitative Quantitative analysis
ment qualitative data as they aim to make inferences, or conclusions based on aims for the mathematical discern­
evidence, about cause and effect. Examples include measures of average incomes ment of relationships between
or average life expectancies across countries. Such quantitative comparisons may variables, typically involving a large
be undertaken using national statistics from government agencies, numerical number of cases or observations.
data from surveys, or data collected by researcher observations. Various data
inference The process through
sources may be used to compare and contrast outcomes in different countries. At
which we aim to test observable
a more advanced level, such descriptive statistics can be used to formulate and
implications (often about cause
begin to test hypotheses about the causes and effects of differences between
and effect) of any given theory; also
countries. Other quantitative research in comparative politics focuses on the
refers to conclusions reached
construction of formal mathematical models of the strategic behavior of indi­
through this process.
viduals and groups in political situations. Quantitative data differ from qualita­
tive data in their presentation, but both types are used to generate and test
hypotheses. While the details of statistical methodologies and formal mathe­
matical modeling are beyond the scope of this book, we work from the premise
that both qualitative and quantitative work may be used to categorize and explain
differences across cases, but also they can be used to test hypotheses about the
causes of those differences.6
In comparative politics, you will use historical accounts and data more often
than you will make predictions about the future. This is because we have real evi­
dence only for things that have happened, and not for what might happen. O f
course, the past may give us expectations about the future, which is why we hear
that those who fail to learn about the past are doomed to repeat it. But in terms
of concrete evidence, we cannot know what has yet to happen. For this reason, we
work with existing cases to develop hypotheses and theories. For instance, we
may hypothesize that China, which is not currently a democratic country, will
move toward democracy as it grows wealthier. This hypothesis may come from
observations about what has happened in other countries as they have grown
30 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

The Qualitative-Quantitative Debate

detail needed to make arguments meaningful. From this per­

T
he increasingly sophisticated use of statistics in social science
has generated considerable debate about the best methods spective, quantitative arguments that travel too far miss the real
and types of data for research. Qualitative (non-mathematical) causes in a case as they unfold over time. Despite this debate,
research often closely treats a few cases. Such approaches, as qualitative and quantitative research are increasingly interdepen­
mentioned in chapter 1, are often called small-N studies, with N dent in contemporary social science, and they complement each
meaning the number of cases. Quantitative approaches often other in important ways. The perspective of this text is that ex­
handle many cases, using mathematical techniques to measure treme views of one or another sort are ill-advised. In general,
the degree of association between a set of variables that cut quantitative work has the potential to make strong empirical
across each case. Scholars who prefer quantitative work maintain claims about large numbers of cases and general associations
that qualitative studies of one, two, or three cases are susceptible between variables, and some would argue that qualitative work
to reaching conclusions that only work for those selected cases has the ability to reveal causal mechanisms or processes at the
and not a larger number of cases (some people call this the case-specific level. It has been argued that a common logic un­
small-N problem). According to this perspective, qualitative argu­ derpins any good social science work.7While this position is con­
ments may not “travel well." On the other hand, scholars who troversial, much of political science relies on formulating research
advocate strongly for qualitative work may argue that quantita­ questions and then using available data to test hypotheses
tive research is unpersuasive because it neglects the context and about answers to these those questions.8

wealthier. Well-regarded theories may strongly suggest that China will democ­
ratize, and we may hypothesize and argue that it will do so, but to test the hy­
pothesis we will have to await future events. Evidence comes only from events
that have happened.

Spring Festival travel rush in Shenzhen City, China, 2012. Will China move toward democracy
as its middle class grows larger? We address this question in the discussion of democratization
in chapter 6.
 Hypothesis Testing

Hypothesis Testing
The core of comparative politics is testing hypotheses about cause and effect be­
tween two or more variables. We defined variables in chapter 1 as some measure
that can vary from one observation to the next. Examples range from a country’s
average income or average life expectancy, to whether a revolution occurred in a
given country, to the most prominent religion in a particular state, to the religion
of a particular person.
In social science, cause-and-effect arguments are based on examining differ­
ent variables, and how those variables relate to one another and may depend on
one another. If country A is wealthy and country B is poor, what does country A
have that country B does not that makes it so?9 An explanation will hinge upon
identifying what variable might cause A to have become rich and B to remain
poor. Our goal will be to identify what other variables go alongside wealth that
are lacking in countries that are poor, in order to examine whether those vari­
ables made the difference. Our first key distinction here is between correlation
and causation.

Correlation
Correlation measures the association between two variables. When two vari­ correlation A relationship
ables correlate, they are related to one another (or, to separate the words, they between two variables in which
“co-relate”). To use a simple example, the temperature in many places will cor­ they tend to move in either the
relate with the month of the year: when it is February in the Northern Hemi­ same direction (positive
sphere, the temperature will be relatively cold, whereas in July the temperature correlation) or in opposite
will be relatively hot. This does not mean it is impossible to have a hot day in directions (negative correlation).
February or a cold day in July, just that there is an association in general. There is
thus a correlation between the variable “month of the year” and the variable
“temperature.”
If two variables have a positive correlation, they tend to increase together.
One increases as the other increases. An obvious example is the income of a
person and the amount the person spends on luxury goods. People with low in­
comes cannot afford to spend money on luxury goods, while the wealthy may
spend a large amount on luxury goods. These two variables are positively corre­
lated. A negative correlation is just the opposite, and means that as one variable
tends to increase, the other tends to decrease. An example might be the number
of cigarettes one smokes per day and one’s life expectancy.
Just as we can find a positive correlation between wealth and democracy, we
can conversely find a negative correlation between another pair of variables: pov­
erty and democracy. Consider the number of people in a country living on an
income below $2 per day (call this variable the absolute poverty rate) and the level
of democracy. In this case, the rich countries have relatively low levels of poverty
and high levels of democracy, while many countries in Africa have high levels of
poverty and low levels of democracy. When we look at the nearly two hundred or
so countries in the world today, these correlations are apparent, even though it
should be noted that there are some countries that are rich but not democratic,
and some that are low-income yet are democratic.
 Correlation: Wealth and Democracy

ealth and democracy of nations appear to be positively Canada, Japan, and several other countries are highly democra­

W correlated. This correlation can be easily observed on a

world map that shows which countries are wealthy and which
tized and are quite wealthy. Many countries in Africa, on the
other hand, have low incomes and low levels of democracy.
are poor, set alongside a map that shows which countries are de­ Where "incomes" are high, "democracy" is high, and where "in­
mocracies and which are not. Europe, the United States, Australia, comes" are low, "democracy" is likely to be low.

IR ELAND GEORGIA
isrC'
JAPAN
CHINA
| NORTH KOREA
SOUTH KOREA
i/IBODIA
G UIN EA— _
BISSAU
SIERRA
LEONE
It o g o
BR AZIL BURUNDI
NIGER

DEM %
REP I AUSTRALIA
CO NG O ’ ZIM BABW E

The Global D istrubution of Wealth

A co u n try 's G D P p er capita as percentage
o f w orld average ($10,500), 2009:
I O ver 400% -j H i 2 5-50% ■>
f F irst T ier <xxx ?■ T h ird T ier
| 200-400% J mSm 1-25% J
11| 100-200%
50-100%

Democracy in the W orld 2015

| Free
H P artly Free
I N o t Free

32
 Hypothesis Testing 33

Causation
Causation exists when one variable causes another. This helps us answer the fun- causation The property that
damental questions raised in chapter 1, such as “Why are some countries democ- obtains when one thing can be
racies?” Recall that why questions are often best answered with because answers, shown to cause another.
As the word because implies, answering why involves explaining causes. Without
causal arguments and theories, correlations are just patterns in search of an ex­
planation. When we have causation, we usually have correlation, but the opposite
is not true. Failing to distinguish between correlation and causation can lead to
a variety of problems, as we will show.
Does the correlation between wealth and democracy prove that getting rich
causes democracy to happen? Not necessarily. It may be that this correlation
points in the direction of a causal argument, such as wealth —>democracy. Or
maybe the other way around: democracy —» wealth. On the other hand, it may be
that the correlation exists, but there is no causal reason for it. It may be simply
due to chance that rich countries happen to be democracies. Or there may be
other factors that result in both wealth and democracy.
As it turns out, one of the central theories of comparative politics suggests
that countries that grow wealthy are likely to become democratic for specific
reasons we detail in chapter 6. The causal argument, beginning with the positive
correlation between wealth and democracy, finds that historically, countries have
developed a middle class as they have grown wealthier. This middle class, rather
than the elite, ends up being a central force that pushes for more rights for all citi­
zens. In poor countries without a middle class, democracy is unlikely to succeed,
but growing middle classes in countries that are growing rich have helped bring
democracy with them. While the correlation here does have a causal explanation,
notice that the correlation needed an argument and logic to bring the story to­
gether and to make the fact of the correlation into evidence that supports an
argument.
We cannot assume that all correlations between two variables (call them X
and Y) mean that X leads to Y. We will use various examples to illustrate possible
relationships between variables. The first of those was the causal argument that
X leads to Y (Figure 2.1).10

Causation: Legislative Elections and the Number of Political Parties

in Legislatures

hile almost no arguments in social science get "proven," because (note the use of because) such parties get a small per­
W the argument linking district-based electoral systems and
political systems with few parties has substantial support. In
centage in many districts, which may result in winning no seats if
Republicans and Democrats get higher percentages; by contrast,
countries like the United States, electing a single representative if the whole country voted in one big district, and Congressional
from each Congressional district means that small parties like the seats were distributed in proportion with the vote received,
Green Party, Reform Party, and Libertarian Party end up with vir­ these small parties would win more seats. In this sense, the struc­
tually no members of Congress, even in years when they have ture of the elections is at least one of the causes of the two-party
5 percent or more support from voters nationwide. This is clearly system.
Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

Figure 2.1 Causal Relationship Between Correlated Variables (X and Y)

But there are many other possibilities. Figure 2.2 shows some possible rela­
tionships between variable X and variable Y that are not the simple causal rela­
tionship where X —>Y. If we assumed X -» Y in each of these cases, we could run
into a number of analytical problems.
We discuss each of these problems in order.

( 1) (4)

( 2) (5)

(3) (6 )

Figure 2.2 Possible Problems with Causal Arguments About Correlated Variables (X and Y)

(1) Definitional problems and falsifiability problem

X Y

The first problem is one that is rarely noted, because it apparently involves
arguments that are “too correct.” In reality, one common problem is confusing
cause-and-effect between two variables with two variables that are the same by
definition. If X is measuring the same thing as Y, they will correlate perfectly.
But this is not because X —» Y, but rather because X = Y.11 A common problem
for comparativists is defining two variables that are so nearly the same that the
causal argument is meaningless, or tautological. This definitional problem relates
 Hypothesis Testing 35

to the problem of falsifiability, which is the idea that for an explanation to be falsifiability The testability of
meaningful, it must be contestable. To argue that something is true means some­ a theory or hypothesis. A good
thing only if there is a chance it could at least possibly be incorrect and could be hypothesis could be logically
proved wrong. For instance, say we are asked why a baseball team won a game, demonstrated to be false by
and our “analysis” is that the winning team “just scored more runs” than the evidence.
losing team, or “just got it done.” This argument is correct, in the narrow sense
that it is not inaccurate, but it is also meaningless, precisely because it can never
be otherwise: scoring more runs over the course of a game and winning the game
are one and the same, by definition. By contrast, if we say that none of the world’s
democratic countries will ever again succumb to dictatorship, then that argu­
ment is falsifiable because a contrary example is possible.

(2) Reverse causality problem

The reverse causality problem is rather simpler to understand. Our story at the
beginning of the chapter held that villagers noted that contagious epidemics
brought doctors into villages and people in the villages began to die, and they
concluded that doctors were causing the illness, rather than the illness bringing
the doctors to the village. In this case, two variables are correlated, but the causal
argument linking the two may be the opposite of what we anticipate. Instead of

Definitions and Falsifiability: Dictators and Dictatorships

*
n trying to explain why countries become dictatorships, we may
I often be drawn to the actions of certain key individuals. Say we
argue that North Korea is a dictatorship because North Korean
people have no practical rights under Kim Jong-un.The cause is
Kim Jong-un's rule and the consequence is dictatorship, as de­
fined by a lack of political rights for citizens. We may then note
that Kim Jong-un, like his father, Kim Jong-il, is a dictator who
*r, %.
does not allow free and fair elections, tramples civil liberties, and \
rules with an iron fist.12 But if we say that these aspects of Kim
Jong-il's rule are the causes of North Korea becoming a dictator­
ship, we are defining cause and effect the same way. We are char­
acterizing the rule of Kim Jong-il as a dictatorship more than we
are giving a real cause for why dictatorial rule in North Korea Kim Jong-un, General Ri Yong Ho, and Kim Jong-il of North
came about. Arguing that individuals like Kim Jong-il cause dic­ Korea in 2010. When Kim Jong-il died in 2011, his son Kim
tatorships may work as long as we are careful in our causal argu­ Jong-un took over the dictatorship. Why has this authoritarian
ment and separate it from our definition, but in this case our regime persisted despite international isolation and poor
cause and our effect are the same. economic performance?
36 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

Reverse Causality: Cancer Rates and Longevity

old more often than the young, so where people live longer they
F
or much of the twentieth century, cancer rates were higher in
countries with long life spans than they were in countries are likelier to suffer from cancer. Because many people in coun­
where the average life span was shorter. Given this correlation be­ tries with short life spans (such as some African countries, unfortu­
tween the variables, one (wrong) conclusion might be that cancer nately) do not live to old ages, cancer is infrequent. Understanding
causes people to live longer. This would, of course, have the "which way the causal arrow goes" is crucial: In this case the arrow
causal relationship backward. Cancers are diseases that affect the goes longevity -» cancer, rather than cancer -> longevity.

X leading to Y, perhaps Y leads to X. Getting the “causal arrow” pointed in the

right direction is essential, and reversing causality has the potential to lead to
disastrous consequences.

(3) Endogeneity problem

endogeneity The name given to The endogeneity problem is about circularity: It happens when two variables
any circumstance in which two exhibit mutual or reciprocal effects. You may know of a simple expression such as
variables exhibit mutual or recipro­ “the chicken and the egg” problem, though endogeneity arises any time variables
cal effects. mutually affect one another. If X and Y correlate and seem to go together, we
may be left trying to figure out whether X caused Y to happen or Y caused X to
happen. Reasonable people may disagree about which direction the causal arrow
goes.13 Endogeneity problems are common in the real world. When we talk of
vicious circles (of, say, poverty and dictatorship) or virtuous circles (of, say, eco­
nomic growth and human development), we are describing a situation in which
many important variables are endogenous. Indeed, endogeneity as such is not a
problem but a feature of many social and political phenomena. It becomes a prob­
lem when we mistakenly claim one variable causes another when the two vari­
ables are, in fact, endogenously linked. Even so, social scientists don’t want
simply to identify multiple variables as endogenous, but to understand more

Endogeneity: Education and Health

f ' hildren's health and children's education seem to correlate making improved health a cause of improved educational out­
*— .positively: When one improves, so does the other. So, do im­ comes. Conversely, better education may lead to more knowl­
provements in education lead to better health, or do improve­ edge about healthy practices, including nutrition and sanitation.
ments in health lead to better education? Both are plausible. So education may make for less frequent visits to the doctor. In
Healthier students will be more likely to have good attendance at this case, the two variables are endogenous.
school and will be better able to thrive in their work there,
 Hypothesis Testing 37

precisely the ways endogenously linked variables interact over time. One of the
leading strategies for resolving this dilemma in qualitative research is closely
tracing the historical sequence. Where we have good information about when
and where things happened, who did them, or how events unfolded, we may be
able to determine whether X -> Y or Y —>X. If we can identify clearly whether
the chicken came before the egg (or vice-versa), we may be able to address this
problem. This is not, however, always possible, as the box on education and
health shows.
In addition, there are statistical strategies for dealing with this problem that
we cannot explore here, but you could learn about them by taking a more ad­
vanced social science methods course.

(4) Intervening variable problem

z
Y

Intervening variables are another potential problem, though they are not
always problematic. The situation here is that X leads to Y, but indirectly: The
effect of X on Y is mediated through another variable, Z. This is not always a
problem. An example is eating fatty foods and having a higher risk of heart
disease. Eating lots of fatty foods leads to an accumulation of cholesterol in the
arteries, which leads to higher risk of heart disease. Even though there are in­
tervening steps between the actual eating and the risk of heart disease, we can
still say eating fatty foods causes higher risk of heart disease. As long as we can
specify the argument and its steps, we do not have an intervening variable
problem. The potential problem arises when we miss an intervening variable
and this leads us to a wrong interpretation. The following example illustrates
this problem.

Intervening Variables: Communism and Democratization

n 1989, many of the countries of central-eastern Europe became

I democracies as they left the communist bloc dominated by the
communist rule, generated by civil society and civic groups, and
directed at the authoritarian regimes. Communism cannot
former Soviet Union. An amateur analyst might be tempted to meaningfully be said to have caused the democratization. Rather,
conclude that communism therefore caused democracy. The intervening variables, such as citizens' long pent-up frustrations,
communist regimes must have encouraged the citizenry to combined with some particular trigger events, brought on the
demand their rights, and then they agreed to hold elections to fall of communism. An interpretation of the democratic wave of
fulfill those rights.This is nonsense. In reality, the democratization 1989 as a consequence of communism would have the argument
of the region came about as a reaction and response to years of quite wrong if it lacked the key intervening variables.
38 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

(5) Omitted variable problem

We frequently miss or omit variables that should be in our analysis. We ob­

serve an empirical relationship between X and Y, and assume this means that one
creates the other, when in fact both are attributable to a third factor, sometimes
also called a confounding or “lurking” variable, because though it is there in the
background we might not see it. If X and Y are positively correlated, it may not
be that X —>Y or Y —>X at all. Instead, some factor Z may lead to both X and Y,
thus giving rise to the correlation between them. That is, Z —>X and Z —» Y.

(6) Spurious correlation problem

Finally, there are many variables out there in the world, and some are bound
to correlate with one another even in the absence of any causal relationship.
Many problems that seem to be of this sort will actually be omitted variable
problems upon further investigation, but there are examples of correlations
where simply no meaningful causal relationship exists. Lucky superstitions are
examples where two variables seem to correlate, but there is no plausible rela­
tionship between them. Perhaps your college’s sports team always seems to win
when you put your lucky hat on for the game. This correlation may continue for
some time, but there is no reasonable scientific explanation linking your hat-
wearing tendencies to victory, and no reason to expect that you putting on your
hat will lead your team to win the next game. Though the variables “hat wear­
ing” and “victory” may correlate, there is no causation. (Sorry. You can take off
your hat now.)

Omitted Variables: Ice Cream Sales and Murders

cream lead people to murder? Unlikely. Murdering someone

T
here is a peculiar correlation between ice cream and murder
rates, often cited in methodology textbooks.14 Let's say a gives a craving for ice cream? Probably not. The answer is a miss­
study gives convincing evidence of a positive correlation be­ ing variable: the temperature outside. This omitted variable af­
tween increases in ice cream sales and increases in murder rates. fects both ice cream sales and murder rates, both of which
What's more, the analyst plausibly claims to have a causal argu­ increase in the summertime. Failing to account for omitted vari­
ment. What could such a causal argument be? Does eating ice ables can lead to dangerously flawed causal arguments.
 Critiques'. Using Theories and Evidence 39

Spurious Correlation: Stock Markets and Butter Production in Bangladesh

ccording to an accomplished statistician now at the Univer­ American stock prices and butter production in Bangladesh but
A sity of California, Berkeley, the variable most highly corre­
lated with the performance of American stock markets for several
not any of the other variables that might also be expected to link
the two (such as the overall performance of the global econ­
decades was not U.S. corporate profits, or rates of inflation or omy). With the seemingly boundless number of variables we
unemployment in the United States, but rather butter produc­ might observe in the world, some are bound to correlate even
tion in Bangladesh.15If this is true, surely it is so by coincidence. It when there is no real relationship between them.
is highly improbable that some factor happens to affect only

Critiques: Using Theories and Evidence

Evidence can be used to support an argument, but it can also help us counter an
argument, and this too is a meaningful contribution to advancing our under­
standing and knowledge. It is clear that we often want to use evidence to support
our own arguments. Less obviously, however, evidence can be used to enhance a
theory or an argument by providing a helpful critique of the conventional
wisdom. Accordingly, empirical critiques have a prominent place in comparative
politics, as do the theoretical critiques they enable.

Empirical Critiques: Using Deviant Cases

In testing hypotheses, we often hope to find evidence that supports a particular
theory. Specifically, we want to find cases that confirm or reaffirm our theory or
support our hypothesis. But many interesting advances come from empirical evi­
dence that does not fit a theory well. Deviant cases—those that do not fit a
theory or are exceptions or outliers—are very important in advancing social sci­
ence theory. These cases help us test out why a theory doesn’t work, and under­
stand what improvements need to be made to our knowledge. They allow us to
make an empirical critique of a theory because they do not support it. Much empirical critique An effort to
like getting a bad result on a certain test can encourage us to do better where we point to important evidence that
fell short, so too a deviant case forces us to think about how to improve our does not support a conventional
arguments. version of any given theory.

Theoretical Critiques: Improving Theories

and Hypotheses
Theoretical critiques are new ideas that improve upon the logic or reasoning of theoretical critique An effort
existing theories. Theory and empirical evidence constantly interact, and where to show that a given theory has
deviant cases help provide an empirical critique, these can help us improve our logical limitations.
theories. They often provide the impetus for improvement of the theory.
Empirical critiques allow us to advance social science by pointing out anomalies,
inconsistencies, and deviations from a theory. Theoretical advances can also
come from critiques of the theory itself, through reexaminations of the logic,
assumptions, or arguments underpinning it. The following box gives an example
of how a theoretical critique emerged from empirical evidence that didn’t fit
a theory.
40 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

Empirical Critique: Ghana and Modernization Theory (see chapter 6)

hana is a low-income West African country that defies ex­ Ghana is advancing on some of these criteria, the country clearly
G pectations by having a robust democracy. This presents an is poor with a limited industrial base, low levels of education, and
intriguing challenge to the theory of modernization, which we only some recent urbanization. Yet it is a rather successful de­
present further in chapter 6. Modernization theory holds that mocracy with free and fair elections and protections for citizens'
democracy can be expected as a consequence of economic de­ rights and liberties. Ghana thus becomes a very interesting case
velopment, industrialization, education, and urbanization, all of to examine, precisely because it facilitates an empirical critique
which contribute to the emergence of a middle class.16 While of a prominent theory about democratization.

O f course, theories can also receive theoretical critiques from other scholars
who are not looking to refine and better them, but rather to offer an entirely dif­
ferent theoretical perspective. This is certainly the case with the dependency
theory example, which has been challenged in many ways. For the comparative
analyst’s purposes, theoretical critiques can be favorable amendments to a theory,
or they can oppose a theory entirely.
Critiques help us craft better arguments and theories. First, they can improve
scope conditions The conditions our understanding of scope conditions, or the conditions under which an argu-
or range of cases for which an ment works. Identifying and examining cases that do not fit an argument is a
argument works. good potential avenue for further research. Second, critiques based on empirical
evidence can help improve our concepts and lead to clearer understanding of
what exactly we are studying. For instance, the tiny, oil-rich country of Equato­
rial Guinea has grown rapidly to become one of the wealthiest countries in
Africa, but much of its wealth goes just to the dictator’s family. Studying this
empirical example might give us more insight into what exactly a country’s
“economic development” means. By identifying weaknesses in arguments and
offering alternative explanations, critiques give us better understandings of why
things happen.

Theoretical Critique: Dependency Theory in Latin America (see chapter 5)

rom the 1940s to the 1960s, many leading scholars of Latin

F
including Peter Evans and Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo
America argued that the continent suffered from economic Faletto. (Cardoso, incidentally, later became president of Brazil in
dependency relative to the world's industrial powers. This "de­ the 1990s.) This next generation of dependency theorists charac­
pendency theory" suggested that poor Latin American countries terized the relationship between Latin America and the core
essentially lost money, resources, and power to the wealthy and countries as one of "dependent development," in which the con­
powerful countries of the world. The image was of exploitation tinent could develop and grow, but still in a subordinate position
of the poor countries on the world's periphery by the rich "core" that furthered its dependence on capital from the wealthy coun­
countries. However, empirical evidence after World War II chal­ tries. This theoretical critique came from the recognition that the
lenged this theory, as countries such as Brazil managed to grow, original dependency theory had a failing: It could not explain or
develop, and industrialize with some success. As a result, depen­ account for growth or progress in Latin America.
dency theory received a theoretical critique from other scholars.
 The Challenges of Measurement: Biases, Errors, and Validity 41

The Challenges of Measurement:

Biases, Errors, and Validity
The challenges of garnering and wielding evidence are multifaceted. Beyond de­
termining how to gather evidence and which pieces to use, we must pay attention
to measures and indicators (elements or features suggesting underlying factors). indicator An element or feature
Without careful and thoughtful measurement, we may accidentally introduce that indicates the presence of an
biases and errors into an analysis. Bias is a preference for one idea or perspective underlying factor.
over another, especially a preference that may result in unbalanced use of evi­
bias A preference for one idea or
dence or in analytical error.
Bias aside, it is possible to simply make measurement errors, such as by
perspective over another, espe­
cially a preference that may result
typing the wrong number in a spreadsheet. This kind of error happens more often
in unbalanced use of evidence or
than you might expect and sometimes in consequential ways. As a well-known
in analytical error.
example, a spreadsheet data error in work by Harvard economists Carmen
Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff produced erroneous results in highly influential measurement error Either an
research about government debt and economic growth (note that this error was episodic error, such as improperly
discovered by a graduate student!).17 Less obvious might be how a measurement recording data, or a systematic
cannot fully reflect what it is trying to measure. Most college students have taken error, meaning that a measurement
standardized tests such as the SAT or ACT, which attempt to measure overall does not fully reflect what it is
competence in math and language. Scores for most students will fluctuate from designed to measure.
one test to the next depending on the specific questions. Whatever their merits,
the tests thus have a degree of measurement error in conveying competence.
A second measurement problem is measurement bias. One example of bias measurement bias A measure is
comes from respondents in a survey who are untruthful, whether consciously or biased if it will not produce compa­
subconsciously.18 Another would be if the questions we ask people are interpreted rable results for all observations.
differently by different groups of respondents. Perhaps the most serious form of
bias for beginning researchers is seeking to confirm one’s favored hypothesis. This
can include a tendency to believe things are a certain way that we want to see them.
Imagine that a gung-ho capitalist student wants to show that countries with free
markets have performed better economically than countries that have more active
government involvement in the economy. The eager student knows that the United
States performed better than the U.S.S.R. in economic growth rates in the 1980s
and uses these cases to “prove” the hypothesis that less government involvement in
the economy is better for the economy. Subconsciously, the student may have
chosen those cases because he knew what he would find, and that it would support
his preference. But looking at the same question in other cases (say, Scandinavia or
Canada vs. African countries) might show very different results. The point is not
that the student is wrong—in fact, he may be correct—but that the student’s pre­
conceptions biased the research. We must ask research questions and test hypoth­
eses fairly, by ensuring the answer is not predetermined.
Even when researchers are careful not to bias their measures, we must con­
sider the problem of measurement validity—that is, whether a given measure measurement validity Whether a
effectively captures or represents what is being researched. Indicators that are given measure effectively captures
valid accurately reflect our concept. Informally, validity means measuring what or represents what we are
we claim we are measuring. In some cases, this is straightforward, and our mea­ researching.
sures may be perfectly valid. To measure the “total number of political parties
represented in a legislature,” we may simply find a record of every member of the
42 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

Measurement Validity Problems: Nationalism in Latin America

omplex concepts like those in comparative politics have real sentiment and the construction of national monuments. Is this
C potential for problems of validity, and this is especially true assumption correct? If not, does this mean that we should disre­
of cultural phenomena that are less subject to precise mea­ gard such imperfect indicators? There is often a tension between
surement. For example, Miguel Angel Centeno aimed to mea­ measurement validity and our desire to have measures that are
sure levels of nationalism in several nineteenth-century Latin objective and precise. The construction of monuments is rela­
American societies.19 For obvious reasons, nineteenth-century tively easy to measure, but it may not fully capture national senti­
Latin Americans cannot be surveyed (and there are limitations to ment; on the other hand, measuring national sentiment by more
what surveys can reveal about identities in any case). Therefore, extensive accounts (say, from diaries and newspapers of the
Centeno needed to select indicators of national sentiment. time) may give us greater validity, but the measure may be fuzz­
Among others, he chose the presence (or relative lack) of na­ ier than the measure using monuments. We often must use ne­
tional monuments. Is the presence of national monuments a cessarily imperfect indicators, but we must remember their
valid indicator of “nationalism" or "national sentiment”? To say limitations, and search for the best available measures.
yes, we must suppose there is a relationship between national

legislature, note which party each member is from, then count the number of
distinct parties to which legislators belong. On the other hand, consider the
challenge of trying to measure overall health outcomes of a given country. Is life
expectancy the right measure for this? Or infant mortality rates (the percent of
infants that die before the age of two, e.g.)? Or rates of asthma, malaria, or HIV/
AIDS? In truth, each of these is a valid measure of something specific, but none
precisely measures “overall health.”
Several guidelines can help here. We should strive for valid measurement to
the greatest extent possible, but sometimes, when dealing with certain questions
and sets of data, we will have to work with imperfect indicators of the concepts
that interest us. We should explicitly state our reservations about our measures
when we present our work. This allows others to make their own judgments. In
addition, we should be mindful of how our measured variables relate to our con­
cepts and questions. In your own research, you should ask yourself the following
two questions. First, can this actually be measured? Second, does this measure
actually correspond to the concept we are trying to study?

THINKING
COM PARATIVELY Qualities of Good Analysis and Argumentation
omparative politics tests hypotheses and builds theories by using evidence
C and identifying causal relationships. Careful use of theory and evidence
allows a researcher to give a hypothesis a good test. The results of that test and
that research will lead to a thesis that can be well substantiated and compelling.
Good argumentation will avoid, or at least address, the problems of causal infer­
ence and measurement shown in this chapter. We conclude the chapter with
some guidance for high-quality analysis in comparative politics.
 Qualities of Good Analysis and Argumentation 43

Step 1: Asking Good Questions: Why?

Good arguments are generally good answers to good questions. It is nearly im­
possible to have a good answer to a bad question. For this reason, we begin with
asking good questions. Good questions have a number of characteristics, among
them the following. First, good questions can be answered with evidence. The
question of why human beings form political societies is not a bad question for
political philosophers, but it is not an especially good question for comparative
politics, because it is virtually impossible to answer using empirical evidence.
Second, good questions are interesting. Questions can be interesting in several
ways. They may produce knowledge that is relevant to making policies and laws,
for example. But especially important is that they somehow contribute to existing
theories. Related to this, they should elicit curiosity, both from a potential audi­
ence and from you, the analyst. Third, good questions can be answered, at least
in a preliminary but meaningful fashion, given the time and resources at your
disposal. Finally, good questions ask for causal explanations. They do not just ask
for descriptive accounts of processes, but they push us to explain why some phe­
nomenon or phenomena has (or have) come to pass.

Step 2: Hypothesis Testing: Generating Good Hypotheses and Testing Them Fairly
The second set of issues for beginning comparative political analysis is formulat­
ing an appropriate hypothesis and testing it with as little bias as possible. A hy­
pothesis should be based upon clearly defined variables and concepts. To explain
why country X became a democracy, for example, we need a good definition for
democracy and how we know country X is a democracy. A good hypothesis will
typically be rooted in some existing theory from comparative politics. For ex­
ample, can modernization theory (see chapters 5 and 6) offer a hypothesis for
why country X democratized? Good hypothesis testing often involves reading
theories and arguments about cases other than the one we are interested in. Gen­
erating a hypothesis about democratization in country X may require us to read
theories and arguments not just about country X itself, but also about other coun­
tries. Good hypothesis testing will not mean the researcher goes looking to prove
her/his own pet argument, picking and choosing evidence to make the point.
Once a hypothesis is formulated, it should receive a fair test from the researcher,
who can and should use the available evidence to weigh the proposed argument
and how well it works or does not.

Step 3: Balancing Argumentation: Evidence, Originality, and Meaningfulness

A final key to good comparative analysis is making meaningful claims and avoid­
ing trivial arguments. If you are developing your own argument, you should offer
your own distinct hypothesis and then your own original claim based upon your
research. Self-evident and obvious arguments contribute much less to social sci­
ence than arguments that are memorable. Ideally, you would like those hearing
your argument to think it is one “only this person would make in this way,” while
also thinking you have defended your argument well. Another way to put this is
to see that your argument produces new knowledge rather than reproducing old
knowledge. You do not want to replicate, copy, or transcribe others’ ideas; you
want to generate and defend your own.
44 Chapter 2: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

THINKING 1 Originality matters, but it must be balanced with a respect for existing know­
ledge. Originality does not mean developing ridiculous and goofy arguments or
COM PARATIVELY J j ignoring previous research. Serious evaluation of existing evidence is as important
in formulating one’s argument as it is in testing the hypothesis. Good comparative
analysis means more argumentation than pure description and more attention to
evidence than pure opinion. It is neither an opinion piece nor a book report about
a country. It represents a middle ground in which you have an argument where
original claims and interpretations are backed with evidence. Basing your argu­
ment on significant reading and research will be the likeliest route to success.
There is no substitute for this research work. Indeed, original research is original
precisely because it contributes in helpful ways to an existing research tradition.
One challenge from extensive research is that there will frequently be multiple
variables that can be shown to have some impact on a particular outcome. For
instance, a country’s economic growth may be shown to depend upon the follow­
ing: geographic location, relationship to the dominant powers in the world econ­
omy, policies, leadership, culture, institutions, histories of colonialism, chance
and luck, and many other variables. It is important, however, to do more than
make a “laundry list” and simply say “all of these matter.” The challenge is to pri­
oritize the variables that have the most significant and substantive impact on the
outcome. In the jargon, we call this being parsimonious, selecting the most im­
portant variables and giving them pride of place in the argument.
Doing all of this will enable a researcher to engage with the larger scholarly
literature and the central debates in comparative politics. The strongest works of
comparative politics—the major books and articles in the field—are the product
of years of research work and refined thinking, but the basic process can be emu­
lated by those new to the field. The best student work comes from analyses that
draw on diverse sources, including theoretical sources, to weigh the validity of
different claims, show competent understanding of relevant literature, build on
relevant concepts and theories, and highlight the individual’s unique synthesis
and contribution. This asks a great deal, and it requires practice, but our guidance
boils down to the suggestions in Table 2.1.
Comparative research requires considerable thought and planning, but it is also
best learned by doing. This comes from reading in the field to see how scholars
analyze politics, and by conducting one’s own research for papers, presentations,

table 2.1 Guidelines for Comparative Research

Guideline Step 1: Ask Good Questions Step 2: Test Hypotheses Step 3: Write Your Argument

Do the basics Ask open-ended why questions Define concepts and Read and use the scholarly
about cause and effect. variables clearly. literature on your topic.

Be original and informed Ask questions you do not know Use theories from scholarly Aim for meaningful, original
the answer to before starting books and articles to help claims, and avoid laundry lists of
your research. form hypotheses. factors that just "matter."

Consider the evidence Ask questions for which Be aware of your biases Use evidence and not opinion
evidence is available to test a and work from the to make your claims,
hypothesis. evidence, not assumptions.
 Chapter Review 45

exams, or other outputs. The remainder of the book will help provide you with this r THINKING
practice. In the next chapters, we turn to the major themes of comparative politics
^COM PARATIVELY
and use these to work on the process of formulating and generating questions,
hypotheses, arguments, and theories. We provide some of the requisite knowledge
of these topics, and examples of quality research, while pushing you to analyze
comparative politics on your own.

C h ap ter Su m m ary
Introduction to Theories, Hypotheses, Critiques: Using Theory and Evidence
and Evidence Political science can advance by developing critiques of
Social scientists use theories, hypotheses, and evidence to existing theories and arguments. Critiques can be empiri­
build arguments about how the world operates. Theories are cal, based on demonstrating cases that do not fit a theory,
general explanations of how empirical phenomena operate or can be more purely theoretical by using reason and logic
across a range of cases. They are typically backed by some to show problems with a theory.
evidence. Hypotheses are potential explanations of cause
and effect for specific cases. They are designed to be tested The Challenge of Measurement:
using evidence and are often derived from theories. Errors, Biases, and Validity
Measurement is a leading challenge facing comparative
Hypothesis Testing political scientists. Comparativists aim to avoid measure­
• The central practice in comparative politics is testing hy­ ment errors and biases, and seek to ensure that measures
potheses about causal questions using empirical evidence. are valid, or measure what they claim to measure.
This involves measuring variables and seeing how variables
correlate across cases. Thinking Comparatively
• Variables that correlate with one another may have a causal Good practices in comparative politics include asking
relationship, but not necessarily. causal "Why” questions, developing unbiased hypothesis
• There are several fallacies and logical traps to avoid when tests, and making arguments that are original yet informed
making causal arguments about correlated variables, to by an understanding of existing theories and findings.
include reverse causation, omitted variables, intervening
variables, and spurious correlation.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. Considering the examples of problems with causal arguments 4. What beliefs do you have about politics that you think are rooted
in Figures 2.1 and 2.2, come up with your own examples of in a theory? For example, do you have beliefs about how politi­
omitted-variable problems in the real world. cians tend to behave, the media's role in politics, or the likelihood
2. Considering the theory of modernization, which holds (among that student activists can "change the world"? If so, consider what
other things) that wealth is likely to lead to democracy, what you think the theory is, and contemplate it in light of this chapter.
sorts of countries would you seek out if you wanted to test the What are the achievements and shortcomings of the theory?
theory on deviant cases? Think of some examples, or do some 5. Ask yourself what puzzles you about politics or social life in a
preliminary research online that will help you identify some. certain country (perhaps including the United States). Now try
3. What are some examples of measurement problems that you to develop a hypothesis for a possible answer that would ex­
could foresee if you were to conduct a study of how a country's plain the puzzle. How could you develop a research plan that
culture affects its wealth? would allow you to gather evidence and test your hypothesis?
• Egyptian police and soldiers outside a voting center in 2011. The m ilitary and police shape the development and functioning ofthe state in critical ways.
I nEuropean
the years just after World W ar II, many observers thought of the Western
state system as fairly settled. It was in this region that the idea of
modern states had first developed. The consolidation of states’ power was
high, even in cases like Germany and Italy, which unified only in the late
nineteenth century. And despite the 1945 split of Germany into East and
West, followed by its reunification several decades later, the European states
on the whole seemed likely to persist into the distant future.
But at least two recent developments have called into ques­
tion the stability of the Western European system of nation­
IN THIS CHAPTER
states. The first is the movement over the second half of the
Concepts 48
twentieth century toward European integration, beginning
The Modern State 48
with the European common market and culminating in the State Capacity 49
creation of the European Union (EU). Some have wondered Failed States 50
whether a European “super-state” might form, and others have The State-Society Relationship 50

made arguments for and against this possibility.1 The second Types 52
development is the notable presence of secessionist and sub­ Characteristics of Modern States 52
Traditional Functions of States 55
state nationalist movements in the region, perhaps most nota­
Causes and Effects: Why Did States
bly in Catalonia (an area on the Mediterranean coast of Spain)
Emerge and Expand? 57
and Scotland (which is part of the United Kingdom). In the Political/Conflict Theories 58
fall of 2014 Scotland held a referendum on becoming indepen­ Economic Theories 60
dent from the United Kingdom. The referendum failed, but Cultural Theories 61

some of its supporters are undaunted. Similarly, many in Cata­ Diffusion Theories 62

lonia are hopeful of forming an independent state in the future. THINKING COMPA RATI VELY
Could such developments gather steam? If Catalonia or Scot­ Great Britain, the United Kingdom, or
land successfully forms a new state, will others in the region Neither? State and Nation in England
and Scotland 65
follow in its wake? To answer such questions, we must under­
stand the processes through which states have been formed C A S E S IN CONTE XT
and, before that, the characteristic features of modern states. Mexico France • United Kingdom
It is impossible to understand modern politics without un­ Nigeria
derstanding the state. It is states that are authoritarian or dem­
ocratic, and it is states that exhibit the institutional features
such as executives and legislatures that we discuss later in this book. It is
states that groups with national identities and other political identities aim to
influence and control, and that social movements and revolutions aim to
transform. States are key factors in economic development, and they shape the
experiences of citizens, residents, and still other individuals. Finally, states
48 Chapter 3: The State

are the central characters in the story of international politics: Even in this
rapidly globalizing world in which non-state and transnational actors are in­
creasingly important, the state remains perhaps the most important and pow­
erful force.
But what is the state? W here do states come from, and what does this tell
us about their character and likely future? W hat do states do? How do they
differ from one another, and why are some strong and others weak or even
failed states? These are the questions we begin to answer in this chapter and
those that follow.
• * •

Concepts
Analysts of comparative politics do not always agree completely on the defini­
tions of words such as state or development or democracy. Often, though, there is a
sort of lowest common denominator, an agreed-on general idea about what a
concept covers. With respect to the state—and here we focus on the modern state
that evolved over the last several centuries2~this lowest common denominator is
the classic definition posited almost a century ago by Max Weber: The state is the
central political institution that exerts a “monopoly on the legitimate use of phys­
ical force within a given territory.”3 Note that by “legitimate” Weber means rec­
ognized by members of the society in question as generally justified. Political
scientists do not themselves decide what is or is not “legitimate.”
W hat does Weber’s definition mean? Definitions work, in part, by telling us
what something is not. W hat is a state not? Well, it is clear from this definition
that a political arena with many distinct actors using legitimate force would not
state The most important form of be a state. Consider a scenario of anarchy, for example, the famous “war of all
political organization in modern against all.” If a society has no central authority that can use force, then perhaps
politics, which, in its ideal form, is anyone can. In such a society, individuals need to either acquire the ability to use
characterized by centralized con­ force themselves or make an arrangement with someone who can. If they do not,
trol of the use of force, bureaucratic they remain vulnerable to the threat that someone else could harm them, and
organization, and the provision of without some higher authority, they have no one to turn to. Yet the diversity of
a number of public goods. political societies is not limited to the extremes of anarchic systems and modern
states. Indeed, there are many intermediary types.

The Modem State

We begin by comparing the modern state to another sort of political society that
was not anarchic, but in which a nonstate order was present: European feudalism
in the medieval era.4In the feudal political order, hierarchical ties linked peasants,
at the bottom, to kings, who at least nominally sat at the top (in tenuous balance
with the church), with a nobility mediating between them. In the feudal order,
however, kings were understood to be the greatest among nobles, and their rule
over the population of their kingdoms was mostly indirect. There was little stan­
dardized taxation, there were few standing armies, and the king’s administration
 Concepts 49

did not provide meaningful public services. Peasants in such a system were un­
likely to find recourse against local nobles by petitioning the king.5 Achieving
such recourse was not impossible in principle, but the organizational capacity of
the system typically made it unfeasible. Most people traveled very little, and the
authority to which they were subjected was local, and often arbitrary. Law was
present, but rule of law, referring to a political system in which the law is consis­ rule of law A system that imposes
tently applied equally to all, was not. No single, centralized authority could claim regularized rules in a polity, with
to control the legitimate use of force.6 Indeed, it was considered legitimate for a key criteria including equal rights,
variety of actors to exert force, and not just because such authority had been del­ the regular enforcement of laws,
egated to them.7 The king’s authority was rivaled by both the authority of the and the relative independence of
church and the nobility. the judiciary.
Now think about the state you live in (and by this, of course, we mean your
country). Imagine an incident of violence taking place within this state. Is that
violence considered legitimate or illegitimate? This will depend on who is doing
it and why. If it is your neighbor, and he or she holds no official position, chances
are the violence is illegitimate. W hat about a police officer subduing a violent
suspect? W hat is critical here is that all of the use of force considered legitimate
in a society ultimately traces its legitimacy back to the state. In other words, in a
society with a state, violence is tremendously concentrated in the military and
law enforcement agencies.8This means that in well-functioning states, interper­
sonal violence is likely lower than in other systems: States with high capacity
limit and control interpersonal violence, to the extent that citizens of well-
functioning states are often able to ignore what little interpersonal violence is
present. This does not mean, though, that states with high levels of capacity are
nonviolent. Rather, they represent the greatest concentration of the capacity to
exert force that the world has ever known.9 modern state A concept used to
So far we have used a fairly minimal definition of the state. It is worth noting distinguish states in the modern
that there are other important features of modern states, which we discuss fur­ world from earlier forms of political
ther later in the chapter, including their bureaucratic type of organization, their centralization; it includes features
impersonality, and above all the fact that they claim sovereignty. Moreover, such as extensive bureaucracy,
states aim to do many things, and as time passes these actions of the state get in­ centralization of violence, and
corporated into our idea of what a state is. impersonality.

State Capacity
State capacity is the measurement of a state’s ability to accomplish its goals.10 In state capacity The ability of the
general, today we would say that a state has high capacity when (1) it has established state to achieve its objectives,
a monopoly on the use of force; (2) it has a properly functioning bureaucracy, especially the abilities to control
with relatively low levels of corruption and irregularity, accomplishing tasks such violence, effectively tax the popula­
as coordinating defense, maintaining infrastructure, and managing projects in tion, and maintain well-functioning
education and public health; and (3) rule of law is maintained, producing a pre­ institutions and the rule of law.
dictable and manageable environment for citizens as they go about their business.
To do this it must successfully generate revenue, usually by taxing its population,
a task more difficult than you might imagine.11
As we will see later, the goals that states have taken on have increased over
time.12 Because the list of states’ necessary activities is a moving target, so is the
definition of “state capacity”: A state that would have been considered to have
high capacity in the late seventeenth century, such as the English or French state
50 Chapter 3: The State

of that time, would today be considered weak or to have low capacity. For ex­
ample, seventeenth-century France—unquestionably a strong state with high
capacity in its historical context—did not provide (or aim to provide) public edu­
cation, but today this is considered a key function of states. A state that fails at
doing so is now considered to have lower capacity than a state that succeeds.
Another way to think about this would be to see states as moving along a con­
tinuum of stateness.13 In other words, rather than thinking of state or non-state as
a dichotomous (“yes” or “no”) variable, we could think of stateness as a quality of
a given political order: State capacity, from this point of view, is the degree to
which a political order has achieved stateness.

Failed States
As with many other concepts, scholars do not always agree about how to precisely
failed state A state that cannot define and measure failed states, but, put simply, states fail when their capacity
or does not perform its expected declines to a certain point. So a failed state is one that cannot or does not do what
functions. states are conventionally supposed to do. Perhaps the clearest example in recent
years has been Somalia, where the state as such is just one actor among many. Rival
groups, essentially large gangs, control their own territory and battle over it at the
margins. Public service provision is minimal where it exists at all. We will examine
failed states at greater length in the next chapter on political economy.

The State-Society Relationship

We have said that the state is fundamental to understanding modern politics. At
the same time, it is important to remember that the state is part of society. It does
not exist outside or above the society but is one among many organizations. “So­
ciety” can be thought of as the set of webs of ties that connect people to each
other. In other words, it can be thought of as a space created by lots of different
overlapping social networks. So society is composed of webs of friendships, pro­
fessional linkages, voluntary groups and religious organizations, media ties, and
many other structured systems of relationships. In these patterns of overlapping
networks, power is distributed. In modern societies, formally organized power is,
as we have seen, concentrated in the state. But in most modern societies, despite
the state’s concentration of formal power, there is a great deal of political activity
that is not controlled by state actors. We need to be able to take this activity into
account.
When political scientists speak of the state-society relationship, they imply
that the modern state is partially autonomous and is situated in relationships
with other actors, and that these relationships are important to study. Why? Be­
cause sets of relationships with other actors affect the state’s goals and constrain
its policy options and, thus, its actions. These relationships also have implica­
tions for those other actors, and especially for participants in “civil society,”
which we discuss further later in the chapter. W hen we say that the state is par­
tially autonomous we mean that it is not subject to the total control of other
organizations. Instead, it tends to serve as a base to control those other organiza­
tions. For example, before the creation of modern states in Europe, the political
institutions that preceded them (confusingly, also often called “states”) existed
in dynamic tension with the Catholic Church. In essence, these organizations
 Concepts 51

shared sovereignty in complicated and even contradictory ways. Modern states,

though, tend to be more autonomous from religious organizations, as we explore
more fully in chapter 15.
So the state is part of society more broadly, but in many modern societies it
assumes a kind of directing role, coordinating key forms of collective action
within it. In well-institutionalized states, non-state actors do not declare wars,
for example, or otherwise usurp the state’s roles and functions. And when crises
emerge, populations often turn to states, demanding that they address those
crises and often holding them accountable if they do not. Societal actors can also
attempt to remake aspects of the state itself. Democratic states institutionalize
mechanisms that aim to allow for the regular and peaceful participation of
the citizenry in coordinating state action. W hen this does not work, as we shall
see in chapter 12, social movements, insurgencies, and even revolutions can
emerge from society to constrain or transform the state and its activities. Many
analysts believe, though, that revolutionary transformation is very rare in strong
states, and in particular in strong democratic states.14
The quality, strength, and type of state are not the only important factors in this
connection. Many scholars think that countries have different degrees and types of
civil society with different organizations, networks of social actors, media, and civil society A space in society
customs and habits of organizing, talking, and meeting. Scholars do not all agree outside of the organization of the
about how precisely to define civil society, but most use this term to mean some­ state, in which citizens come
thing like a space relatively autonomous from state coercion within which people together and organize themselves.
can deliberate and strategize about matters that have political implications. Orga­
nizationally, civil society can be thought of as housed in labor unions, in social
clubs and other voluntary groups, in churches, mosques, and synagogues, and in
many other such sites. From a networks perspective, we can see civil society as de­
pendent on the existence of dense and transitive ties that are not fully embedded in
the arms of the state. In other words, civil society depends on the possibility of lots
of us being able to know and communicate with each other, without those ex­
changes being predominantly coordinated (or limited) by state actors.
These civil society organizations and networks allow groups of citizens to
analyze politics and make claims on the state.15 According to many scholars,
strong civil society accompanies strong states with well-institutionalized democ­
racies, but it is more problematic for authoritarian states, which will often seek to
co-opt or even eliminate citizen activities of this sort.16 This is intuitive: an au­
thoritarian state’s position is strengthened to the extent that potential rivals do
not have the organizational capacity to challenge it. For this reason, many polit­
ical scientists believe that proponents of democratization would do well to invest
in civil society: for example, by subsidizing a diverse array of organizations or by
trying to help lay the infrastructure for dense and transitive networks to form.
Moreover, this is not just a theory, but a policy that has been put in practice by
many groups and organizations, including the (U.S.-government-funded) Na­
tional Endowment for Democracy, the World Bank, and the United States
Agency for International Development.
Other scholars take a different view, seeing “strong societies” as potential ob­
stacles to the formation of strong states.17Why might this be so? Think again for
a moment about the key characteristics of modern states, described previously.
52 Chapter 3: The State

States concentrate power, enforce laws, and distribute resources. As such, the
creation of modern states almost always produces considerable struggle, particu­
larly between state-builders and other actors who are relatively well off (in terms
of power or other resources) in a pre-state or weak-state environment. Well-
organized networks or clusters of actors in society can often resist state-building
efforts by leveraging their power to avoid taxation, the full application of the rule
of law, or the extension of rights and privileges to other groups. However, propo­
nents of the view that civil society leads to stronger, more democratic states
would argue that these sorts of groups are not what they mean by “civil society.”
This realization may lead us to develop our concept of civil society a bit further.
Perhaps the concept applies only when there is a certain amount of openness. If
isolated and exclusive organizations resist the state for the sake of their minority
interests, perhaps that’s not “civil society,” which may be found only when par­
ticipation and public deliberation is broad based and egalitarian.
In general, we could say that strong, democratic states tend to be relatively
autonomous from civil society but nevertheless responsive to citizens. Para­
doxically, many of the strongest states might be those that are self-limiting in a
lot of key ways. Weak states are often simultaneously less autonomous and less
responsive to the broader citizenry. Weak states do not necessarily refrain from
intervening in economy and society: rather, they tend to intervene often but ir­
regularly and unpredictably. And strong states sometimes help societies solve
problems of collective action, providing “public goods” that would be impossible
for individuals in large-scale societies to produce on their own.18Nonetheless, a
debate continues about whether having a “strong society” that is influential and
wields political power correlates with a “strong state” or a “weak state.”19

Types
As noted earlier, states have many other characteristics besides exerting a mon­
opoly on the legitimate use of force. In the discussion that follows, we focus first
on several key characteristics of states and next on state functions.

Characteristics of Modern States

States are defined in part by characteristics such as a bureaucratic mode of orga­
nization, impersonality, and the claim of sovereignty. Here we discuss each of
these in turn.

Bureaucracy
When you read the word bureaucracy you might think of the Department of
Motor Vehicles or maybe even one of the offices at the college or university where
you are taking this course. There is a pretty good chance that the word does not
conjure up images of efficiency, rationality, and precision, but rather of frustra­
bureaucracy A form of organiza­ tion, delay, and inefficiency. Yet social scientists think of at least some bureaucra­
tion that, in its ideal form, has indi­ cies as ideal—typically efficient and rational.
viduals operating and working Organizations are bureaucratic when they have a rational, universally applic­
under established, specified, and able system, administered on the basis of rules and by office holders.20 Bureau­
complex rules. cracies are, in their ideal form, impersonal and transparent. In other words, in a
 Types 53

well-functioning bureaucracy, those rules are available for all to see. Think about
the Department of Motor Vehicles. There is a good chance that you, or at least
people you know, have a driver’s license and had to pass through bureaucratic
channels in order to acquire it. Your receipt of your license was probably not de­
pendent on, for example, who you are related to, the whims of your examiner, or
the paying of a bribe. And you probably couldn’t just go to your friend the mayor
and ask him or her to give you a license rather than dealing with the appropriate
bureaucratic authority. Instead, there is a clearly stipulated set of rules governing
who can and cannot receive licenses and also governing who can and cannot
make judgments about who has satisfied the appropriate conditions. O f course,
the individual who takes you out for your practice test has the ability to exercise
a bit of personal judgment—perhaps you roll ever so slightly through a stop sign
and he or she is feeling generous and lets it slide—but this personal judgment is
sharply delimited: The examiner cannot declare that since you are so nice you get
a special license that also allows you to fly a plane, for example.
Now, why would anyone want a bureaucratic system? Going to the Depart­
ment of Motor Vehicles is notoriously painful and frustrating, and working there
is probably not much better. Ironically, our common perception that bureaucra­
cies are inefficient is partly a consequence of their working well. Granted, some­
times this perception is true—sometimes bureaucracies really are poorly run and
inefficient—and even well-functioning bureaucracies will often lead to frustra­
tion. But the key issue is the ends or goals toward which bureaucracies are ori­
ented. When we say that bureaucracies are efficient, we mean that they are the
most efficient way to organize collective action in pursuit of common projects. Think
of the military as an example. Wars are not conducted on the basis of the whims
of individual troops but rather through their bureaucratically organized action.
A well-functioning bureaucracy is like a system of levers linking a leader or group
at the top of an organizational hierarchy to a large number of individual actors
lower down (see Figure 3.1). Bureaucracies turn the people who hold offices into
instruments for the realization of goals set higher up in the organization. If this
mode of organizing collective action still seems inefficient to you, imagine ad­
ministering a welfare program or a health care system, or waging a war, through
non-bureaucratic channels.
Modern states are, pure and simple, much more bureaucratic than other, older,
political organizations. This feature of modern states—combined with their un­
precedented abilities to extract resources (in the form of taxes) from the popula­
tions subjected to their control—helps explain their efficacy and power. Note that
states with less functional bureaucracies necessarily have far lower state capacity.

Impersonality
Modern states are also more impersonal than many other political organiza­ impersonality A quality attribu­
tions.21 This feature is related to their bureaucratic character but not reducible to ted by some scholars to modern
it. When we say that they are impersonal, we mean that they are not closely iden­ states, which are presumed to be
tified with the personality of an individual. less likely to be identified with the
You might find this a bit confusing. Don’t we pay an awful lot of attention to personalities of their leaders.
our presidents and prime ministers? And haven’t there been some societies with
modern states in which cults of personality center on individual dictators, such as
54 Chapter 3: The State

Figure 3.1 This is a simplified model of how a bureaucratic structure can achieve the
coordination of complex tasks carried out by individual office-holders. Imagine that this
organization's mission requires the coordinated performance of nine complex tasks. How
difficult might it be to accomplish these tasks in the absence of bureaucratic organization?

Kim Jong-un of North Korea? Indeed, both of these things are true, and the im­
personal character of the modern state is a matter of degree. Think of the differ­
ence, though, between the type of legitimacy accorded a president of the United
States and that accorded a king in a pre-modern kingdom. Imagine what would
happen if the President of the United States, for example, were to declare that the
Constitution is just a manifestation of his or her will, or that the country is his or
her personal possession. The point is not that a modern state has never had such a
leader but that such claims are rare and typically regarded as illegitimate.
This same impersonality is extended to the treatment of the general popula­
citizenship A form of relationship tion. The ideal-typical modern state treats members of the population as citizens,
between the state and individuals meaning that it regards them as essentially equal in terms of their political role
subject to its control, in which and rights. Modem states tend to offer fewer special privileges to individuals
citizens have certain basic rights based on who they are. O f course, there are still elite cliques in modern states, and
and are in some way represented the mere fact that these states formally treat citizens impersonally does not eradi­
in the state. cate preference or discrimination based on personal characteristics.

Sovereignty
sovereignty The key way the The third key dimension of modern states that we consider here is sovereignty. The
authority of the modern state is concept of sovereignty has several overlapping meanings. The two most important,
conceptualized: states are under­ though, are (1) sovereignty as the control over some territory and (2) sovereignty
stood to be the ultimate authority as the source of legitimate authority.22 O f course, these two meanings are related,
within their specifically demarcated and they derive partly from the basic feature of the state—that it exerts a monopoly
territories. on the use of force.
As states developed, the relationship between political organizations and ter­
ritory changed in important ways. Before modern statehood, boundaries tended
to be very permeable. For example, the Pyrenees Mountains (which separate
France and Spain) were once a kind of informal division, a shared space across
which people easily moved back and forth, blurring the differences between sub­
jects of the French and Spanish kings. After the rise of modern states, however,
the frontier was redefined as a formal boundary, and the population became fixed
as citizens of either France or Spain.23 Today, the boundaries between state ter­
ritories are sharply delineated.
Related to this territorial distinction is the notion that the state holds ultimate
authority within its territorial zone. States are sovereign not only because they
can exercise constraining force but because they can act in other ways as well.
They can tax, organize the citizenry, and produce a variety of public services.
Territoriality is a key principle in doing so, and territorial disputes have been
quite common in the history of the state system. Sometimes such disputes are
settled by violence and other times by diplomacy. International recognition is
typically a key feature of sovereignty. That is, it is difficult for a state to maintain
claims about its sovereignty over a given territory if other states do not recognize
its sovereignty.
This characteristic leads us to a further consideration of the question of what
states do. As we have said, states have a tendency to acquire more roles and func­
tions over time, and so it is ultimately impossible to construct an exhaustive list
of the state’s activities. But in the contemporary world we can observe a number
of particularly important ones, several of which we discuss next.

Traditional Functions of States

States provide defense against external threats, police internal threats, tax their
citizens, and document and sort populations, in addition to managing the econ­
omy. (We discuss additional key functions of modern states in the domain of
political economy in the next chapter.)

Defense
A first key function of states is the coordination of military action, ostensibly, at
least, to protect the citizenry against potential foreign threat. As we shall see
later, this feature of states, like taxation, was a key component in their emer­
gence. Moreover, it is one of the most visible tasks of states. Modern states tend
to have highly organized, bureaucratized, permanent military organizations.
Flow, precisely, the military is positioned within the state varies. As we shall see
in later chapters, in some instances military officials are key players in state deci­
sion making. In others, civilian control is well institutionalized.24 This is often
very important, because if civilian control is not well institutionalized one often
sees a higher incidence of coups d’etat, and the political instability generated by
such events can have important short- and long-run effects. Even in societies
with relatively well-established civilian control of the army, however, the mili­
tary remains a potentially important actor within most modern states.

Policing
States do not just establish and maintain militaries for use in conducting foreign
policy. They also establish organizations to police their societies internally. States
that do this effectively have well-institutionalized rule of law and transparent
56 Chapter 3: The State

V 1 ra illlm
a
The Mexican State and Ruie of Law PAGE 504

Mexico is a country that has had varying success in terms of state- For more on rule of law in Mexico, see the case study in Part VI,
building. In recent years, rule-of-iaw issues have been of special pp. 504-505. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
concern. The Mexican government has made an effort to crack 1. Is Mexico really likely to become a failed state, as some
down on organized crime, leading to high levels of violence. The have worried, or is this fear hyperbole? Why or why not?
causes of this violence, and the policies that might reduce it, are 2. Does the United States play a role in Mexico's recent dif­
subject to much debate. ficulties in maintaining rule of law? If so, how?

judicial procedures.25 Again, this characteristic of states is related to the core

aspect of their definition discussed previously: Policing is one of the key mecha­
nisms through which the monopoly on force is maintained. Sometimes this role
is shared with the military. For example, a number of states use national guards
to provide internal security. More generally, the organizational and administra­
tive arrangement of policing varies a lot, and how these functions are organized
has much to do with how a country’s specific political institutions are structured,
as we discuss in later chapters.
States also create and maintain systems of punishment linked to the police
and judicial systems. Some states continue to use physically violent forms of pun­
ishment, such as the death penalty. States typically use incarceration as a key
strategy, though they vary quite considerably in the frequency and extent of im­
prisonment. The United States, for example, incarcerates an astonishingly high
percentage of its population, in relative terms.26 States also vary considerably in
the quality of their prison systems. Some scholars have emphasized the centrality
of systems of policing and incarceration in creating the modern state.27

Taxation
To perform the basic functions just discussed (defense and policing) among other
responsibilities, states need money. Taxation is thus among the key roles of states.
The state’s very existence is dependent on taxation, and strong states tend to be
those that tax their citizenry successfully and efficiently.28 The reason is perhaps
obvious: In many societies, at least, the state is not mainly in the business of
producing goods for sale on the market and therefore it is dependent on revenues
generated by economic activity that takes place outside of the state.
Although funding their own activities is crucial for states, efficient taxation
serves other purposes as well. States with high levels of capacity often encourage
citizens to feel that they are contributors to the state’s collective projects via
paying taxes. Without effective taxation, citizens may feel disconnected from
the state, regarding it as an alien organizational force or seeing it simply as a dis­
tributor of resources. O f course, inefficient and arbitrary taxation—or taxation
perceived to outweigh individual and collective benefits—can likewise generate
alienation and opposition.
 Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand?

The processes through which the earliest modern states established systems of
effective taxation were arduous and often violent. A number of early social and
political revolutions were, at least in part, responses to centralizing states’ efforts to
extract more resources.29 Today, many societies in the developing world continue
to experience taxation difficulties, and the situation is often a catch-22: Weak
states have trouble taxing their citizenry, but they cannot become stronger until
they do. These problems are sometimes exacerbated in developing states that are
rich in natural resources. In such instances, leaders may avoid the political con­
flicts involved in trying to increase taxes, because they can instead rely on revenues
from exports of those resources. This situation, sometimes called the “resource
curse,” is seldom good for the long-term development of state or society.30

Order, Adm inistration, and “Legibility”

Modern states also carry out some less obvious ordering practices. Given the
challenges of administering complex societies, most states gather considerable
information about their territory and about their population. Both state and pri­
vate actors invest heavily in maps and in the demarcation of different types of
territory. For example, public lands might be administered by the state, private
lands regulated, and other forms of land ownership (e.g., communal land owner­
ship, in a number of historical and contemporary cases) transformed into one or
the other. The use of private property is often subjected to considerable regula­
tion. Sales and purchases of lands, houses, and businesses are tracked, and zoning
laws proscribe certain uses of each.
States also go to great expense to learn about their populations. Public ser­
vices are often contingent on government registration, and states often try to
bestow services on some and withhold them from others (this includes access not
just to the state’s resources but, in the case of migrant populations, to its terri­
tory). In the process, various statuses (e.g., citizen, legal resident, migrant, and so
forth) are bestowed on different individuals. Population surveys and censuses
enumerate residents, document their characteristics, and sometimes even catalog
their beliefs and values. Scholars like James Scott have referred to this as the pro­
cess through which states render their populations “legible,” by which they mean
knowable and, as such, amenable to centralized administration.31 Some scholars
emphasize that these efforts to render populations “legible” sometimes lead to
the creation and perpetuation of consequential social and political categories, for
better and worse.32 On the one hand, being able to categorize and know about
the populace may make it possible to deliver needed public services more effi­
ciently. On the other hand, the process of viewing society through certain cate­
gories (which Scott called “seeing like a state”) can lead to states micro-managing
society in ways that are intrusive and counterproductive.

Causes and Effects: Why Did States

Emerge and Expand?
In this section we consider a core explanatory question about the rise of the
modern state: Why did states emerge in the first place and become the dominant
form of political organization around the world? In other words, why do we live
58 Chapter 3: The State

in a world dominated by states? In 1500 there were few if any strong states, and
none that had the capabilities of contemporary states. Today all large-scale so­
cieties try to have states, and therefore at least nominally do. This is perhaps
the most important change in modern global politics, and is in need of causal
explanation.
Several major theories of the modern state concentrate on trying to explain
state system The condition that the rise of states as such, while others seek to explain the rise of the state system
many of the most important actors and its global diffusion from early modern Europe to the rest of the world. We
in international relations are states, begin with the first set of theories, which includes political/conflict theories, eco­
which can be understood as syste- nomic theories, and cultural theories of the state.
mically linked to one another.
Political/Conflict Theories
Political or conflict theories of the state argue that the state’s rise was a conse­
quence of conflict. One set of such explanations, rooted in classical political
theory, tries to explain the state as essentially a compromise between warring
factions.33These theories tend to be abstract, and they may be influenced by their
close linkage to political theories that aim to justify the state. You may have heard
of Thomas Hobbes’ idea that a strong state, manifested in “the sovereign,” is
needed to keep internal conflict at bay.34 Some scholars see the state as having
developed as a sort of predatory institution through which stronger actors as­
serted their dominance and extracted resources from others.35 Some, in turn,
focus on predation as a case of state failure: In these cases what we need to ex­
plain in the rise of strong states is how predation is minimized or restrained.36

The Arrival of Napoleon Bonaparte at Schloss Schdnbrunn, engraved by Aubertin, c. 1820.

According to conflict theories of the state, under certain conditions war making can help states
grow stronger. It encourages the state's ability to extract revenue, its ability to mobilize the
population, and its capacity to exert the Weberian monopoly on legitimate force.
 Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand? 59

__ S I
CASE IN CONTEXT ' ' ■'^ ■ .' - Ac ^ : «§
J The State in France p a g e 434

France was one of the earliest strong states in Europe and came For more on the French state, see the case study in Part VI,
to be the region's great power in the seventeenth century. pp. 434-435. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
Indeed, under the Bourbon kings in the seventeenth and eigh­ 1. What would the bellicist theory say about French state
teenth centuries, it was the foremost example of royal absolut­ formation?
ism. As such, it figures prominently in many accounts of the 2. What are some of the distinctive features of the state in
state's rise. It is a central case in most of the major theories of the France?
state's emergence discussed in this chapter.

The authors of some of these theories of the state have tried to trace the actual
historical development of the state as an organization. A much-cited version of
this theory is the “bellicist theory of the state,” which holds that states are cre­ bellicist theory Theory associa­
ated by war.37The core idea is that for states to rise they have to figure out how to ted with scholars such as Charles
do three things. First, political administration must be at least partly centralized. Tilly, who argue that interstate wars
In the first states that emerged in Europe, this meant that feudalism had to go. were decisive in the creation of the
Second, extraction of revenues from the underlying population must be dramati­ modern state.
cally enhanced. Administering a modern state costs lots of money, and until the
state gets good at taxing its citizenry it cannot do very much. Third, the state
must develop the ability to mobilize the population in collective endeavors.
According to proponents of the bellicist theory, warfare is particularly useful
for all three tasks, particularly once innovations in military technology changed
conflict so as to make large armies necessary.38 If frequent foreign warfare takes
place, states need to increase their revenue generation and to mobilize important
elements of their populations in order to win. The threat posed by total warfare
also presumably helps to convince otherwise unwilling individuals to make these
sorts of sacrifices. In the process, such warfare undermines the power of non­
state actors like a military nobility. In medieval Europe, where knights were the
main combatants, the upper nobility’s control of related resources ensured them
great power. But military innovations like advanced archery and gunpowder “de­
mocratized” warfare in a certain sense, also rendering it far more costly, requir­
ing large-scale collective efforts and revenue extraction.39
Essentially, the bellicist theory argues that warfare forges strong states. One
of the virtues of the theory is that it seems able to account for the particular his­
torical trajectory of Europe in the global comparative context. For many scholars,
the fact that strong states developed first in Europe is a mystery, precisely because
of the relative backwardness of Europe in preceding centuries when you compare
it to great civilizations like China or the Islamic world.40 Indeed, these other
civilizations had developed complex, bureaucratic, imperial structures that in
many respects looked like modern states. But according to the bellicist theory,
the very dominance of these organizations helps explain why strong modern
states did not first develop in Asia or the Middle East: These large empires did
not face frequent interstate “total wars” against their rivals, though they did face
60 Chapter 3: The State

Coercion, Capital, and European States

INSIGHTS
by Charles Tilly

T
illy is the most famous exemplar of the bellicist theory of the state-building in the Netherlands and some Italian city-states
state, as epitomized by his phrase from an earlier book: "War came as monarchs borrowed funds from merchants and paid for
made the state and the state made war.'41 He explains why mercenary armies. "Capitalized coercion" came in Britain and
modern states replaced previous structures, as well as why the France and was based on capital accumulation in large towns like
form of this change differed across cases. Tilly finds that warfare is London and Paris, combined with large rural populations that
the critical driver of state-building because war demands extrac­ could also be coerced to produce rents. According to Tilly, this
tion of resources from the population and complex administra­ last model produced the strongest modern states.42 Competi­
tive systems. Modern state development took three forms. tion eventually produced modern states in all of these cases be­
"Coercion-intensive" formation came in Russia, an agrarian soci­ cause states proved better at fighting wars than other forms of
ety with little commercial development and little concentrated government.
capital, where the Czars used coercion to force their population Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990-1992.
to fund wars by producing agricultural surplus. "Capital-intensive" Oxford Blackwell, 1992.

plenty of conflicts. Europe’s backwardness—the fact that it was internally di­

vided with small, petty kingdoms endlessly fighting each other—meant that for
several centuries the forming European states were essentially constantly at war.
As a result, according to this theory, they developed into powerful war-fighting
machines, and their rulers effectively established the ability to tax and mobilize
the population, marginalizing their rivals in the process. Some proponents of
this theory have even used it to try to explain relatively weak state structures
elsewhere. For example, one has argued that the allegedly weak states of Latin
America may be due to the fact that Latin American states almost never fight
foreign wars.43 The theory has also been used to try to explain Africa’s relatively
weak states.44

Economic Theories
Economic theories of the state don’t ignore the role of geopolitical conflict, but
their proponents think that economic modernization is the fundamental cause of
the rise of modern states. Karl Marx was an influential proponent of this idea.
For Marx, the modern state simply represents the interests of the bourgeoisie, the
owners of capital.45 These capitalists create the state as an organization so that
they can manipulate the circumstances that will maximize their profits, which
ultimately, from this point of view, means exploiting labor. O f course the actual
historical processes through which this happened, according to Marxist scholars,
is more complex than this formulation suggests, and requires understanding
the specific mechanisms through which these changes happen in given places at
given moments in time.
Not all proponents of economic theories of the state have a Marxist or left-
wing perspective, however. Others see states as products of elite coalitions re­
sponding to new economic circumstances. From this point of view, the best way
to explain the rise of any given state is to trace the process through which elite
 Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand?

coalitions were formed and maintained. A good example is the work of North,
Wallis, and Weingast (see the “Insights” box on Violence and Social Orders).
Critics of economic theories of the state note that they often treat the state
merely as a reflection of underlying interests rather than an autonomous actor.46
You might think about whether this criticism applies equally well to both Marxist
and non-Marxist versions of this theory. And how might proponents of economic
theories answer such criticisms?

Cultural Theories
Some scholars argue that structural factors like geo-political conflict and eco­
nomic change are not enough to explain the rise of states. For these scholars, we
must include cultural factors such as changing beliefs and values in the expla­
nation.47 Among the most persuasive reasons for including such factors is the
notion that state-building involved a dramatic disciplining in the daily life of
individuals.48 Could state-building really have been coerced from the center of
society? Or, perhaps, did cultural changes increase people’s willingness to do
things like accept state scrutiny, pay taxes, comply with regulations, face periodic
conscription, and accept more extensive policing?
How could such “cultural factors” have played a role in the rise of states?
One possibility is that nationalism and national identity (discussed further in
chapter 13) may have contributed to the willingness to accept these impositions in
emerging states.49 The core idea here is that national identity is closely bound to
the state. If I consider myself a member of a nation, I might see the state as the
expression of that nation, and I might accept its legitimacy. Moreover, nationalists
might have been able to justify projects of state expansion on the grounds of na­
tional interest or national pride. A second idea is that religion might have played
a role in early modern state formation. In particular, some scholars have argued
that the rise of Calvinism was key to the success of early modern European state-
building (see the “Insights” box on Gorski’s Disciplinary Revolution).

Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework

INSIGHTS for Interpreting Recorded Human History
by Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast

orth, Wallis, and Weingast aim to explain the emergence of by their power positions vis-a-vis competitors and the mon­
N what they call "open access orders" versus "natural states.” arch. These authors argue that the rule of law and open access
Open-access orders are relatively democratic, with a powerful orders emerged when important coalitions had an interest in
state, a well-established rule of law, and other rule-governed, au­ giving up their prerogatives in exchange for protection. Spe­
tonomous organizations to which everyone in principle has cifically, when elites judged that they would be better off with
access. 'Natural states" are still personalized, with a weak rule of rights than with special privileges, open access orders were
law and less autonomous organizations. Prior to the develop­ able to emerge.
ment of the modern state, "natural states" were the rule, as
Douglass North, John Wallis, and Barry Weingast, Violence and Social Orders:
powerful landowners served their own material interests by A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York:
forming and shifting alliances. Actors were constrained mainly Cambridge University Press, 2009.
62 Chapter 3: The State

The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise

INSIGHTS of the State in Early Modern Europe
by Philip Gorski

orski argues that states develop not just because elites create to religious conflict in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries,
G organizations, but also because populations become increas­ early modern states often became partners in this endeavor. Not
ingly willing to follow their commands.50Gorski asks why anyone surprisingly, "disciplined" populations were easier to govern than
would be willing to accept the increasing discipline of life under a populations with other cultural influences.52 Calvinists were not
modern state.5' He answers that Calvinism— an influential and the only religious actors to emphasize these modes of discipline,
austere form of Protestant Christianity— paved the way in Europe. but they set the standard.
Calvinists created "disciplined" societies of hard work, chaste Philip Gorski, The Disciplinary Revolution: Calvinism and the Rise of the State in
sexual relationships, and systematic relief for the poor, among Early Modern Europe. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003.

other things. Moreover, because political conflict became linked

We should note that few analysts of comparative politics view cultural factors
such as religion or nationalism as the sole explanation for the emergence of states.
These factors may, however, be critical as they interact with the economic or pol­
itical processes discussed previously.
Indeed, all major theories of the state’s emergence focus on both political/
conflict and economic factors, and most ascribe at least some importance to cul­
ture. For example, even characteristic proponents of the bellicist theory note the
importance of economic factors, and many proponents of economic theories of the
state acknowledge that frequent warfare in early modern Europe played an impor­
tant role in state-building projects there. As you will see in later chapters, theoreti­
cal advances in comparative politics are often made not by replacing old theories
with completely new ones, but by synthesizing existing theories, considering them
against new evidence, and adding new dimensions or features to them.

diffusion The process through Diffusion Theories

which a practice or idea spreads Not all theories of the state begin by trying to explain the rise of states in Western
locally, nationally, and globally, Europe. Indeed, some theories are more interested in explaining diffusion, or

C A S E IN C O N T E X T

^ i r ^ The State in the United Kingdom PAGE 546

Some analysts see in early modern England one of the earliest For more on the state in the United Kingdom, see the case
strong states, and at least one major theorist sees the early for­ study in Part VI, pp. 546-547. As you read it, keep in mind the fol­
mation of a modern English state in the late medieval era.53 lowing questions:
Others see in the United Kingdom a historically minimal state. 1. What evidence is assembled by those who argue for
Could both views be correct? If so, how could they both be cor­ strong early state-formation in the United Kingdom?
rect? What circumstances might favor the juxtaposition of early 2. Was the United Kingdom ever a fully absolutist state?
state development with a relatively limited state? Why or why not?
 Causes and Effects: Why Did States Emerge and Expand? 63

the global spread of the state as a form of organization. W hy and how, these the­
ories ask, did the state come to be the dominant way of doing politics everywhere?
O f course, such theories are not incompatible with those that we have considered
so far. Indeed, often they are based on implicit or even explicit answers to that
prior question.
When a social or political form like the state appears to spread, there are at
least three logical explanations. One is that its development is purely coincidental.
Given the extent of the spread of the state, however, this seems unlikely. The
second is that common underlying features present in all cases explain each indi­
vidual case. For example, maybe over the course of the twentieth century—when
many modern states were created—we merely saw a repeat of the same processes
that had been witnessed in early modern Europe, such as increasing interstate
warfare. But the evidence does not seem to fully fit this picture. A third logical
possibility is that the spread of the state had systemic qualities.54 In other words,
there is some sort of international system through which it diffused globally. Here
we will try to distinguish three basic models for how this might have happened.
Note that these are not necessarily incompatible or mutually exclusive.
The first version of this theory has an affinity with the bellicist theory of the
state’s emergence. Once states are formed as war-making machines, we might
expect them to rapidly out-compete rivals because of their skill in making war.
Proponents of this sort of theory would point to the extent to which state forms
were bound up with colonialism: The European states, over just a couple of cen­
turies, extended political control over most of the world, bringing state forms of
organization with them. Their military and technological capacity allowed them
frequently to achieve relatively easy victories over civilizations that often judged
them to be barbarians (not without justification, some would say).
Not all versions of this theory focus exclusively on the state’s military prowess,
however. Instead, some variations note that the state can produce social and eco­
nomic gains that, in turn, reinforce it (see the “Insights” box on Spruyt’s Sovereign
State and Its Competitors).
The second version of this theory has a still greater affinity with economic
theories of the state. This version says that states spread to serve the interests of
the international capitalist class. Building on the Marxian idea that the state

llf f ' 3332

What Is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed? The Case of Nigeria page s i?

One major state where boundaries were created by colonial For more on the Nigerian state, see the case study in Part VI,
powers is Nigeria, which is also perennially cited as a problematic pp. 517-518. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
or weak state. Some argue that state weakness in Nigeria is a con­ 1. Is colonialism responsible for Nigeria's relatively weak
sequence of oil, others that it is a function of ethnic and religious state?
differences. Finally, some think state weakness there and else­ 2. What is the relationship between the state's strength, cor­
where might be caused by the legacies of colonialism. ruption, and economic development in Nigeria?
64 Chapter 3: The State

The Sovereign State and Its Competitors

INSIGHTS
by Hendrik Spruyt

pruyt focuses on the development of states in early modern explanation because other formations (such as city-states) were
S Europe, but his theory is about the spread of the state as an often as good at fighting wars. Rather, states did other things that
organizational form, and the resulting emergence of the state helped them out-compete their rivals. In particular, states did
system. The state had several rival types of organizations, including things that were good for their long-term economic develop­
the feudal order, city-states, and leagues of merchant cities like ment, such as standardizing currencies and measures and estab­
Germany's "Hanseatic League," yet the modern state survived lishing clearer territorial boundaries. Spruyt also notes that states
while these other forms essentially disappeared. Why? Spruyt won out in part by "mutual empowerment," as they preferred to
argues the state rose up as a product of both economic changes deal with other states and encouraged the emergence of one
and political conflict. States became formidable fighting machines, another's organizational and institutional forms.
so their relative success might be partly explained through a kind Hendrik Spruyt,The Sovereign State and Its Competitors. Princeton: Princeton
of "survival of the fittest," but Spruyt says this is not a sufficient University Press, 1996.

represents capital’s interests, and Lenin’s idea that capitalism turned to imperial­
ism in order to protect itself from internal “contradictions,”55 proponents of this
version argue that colonialism aimed to create new markets for European goods
and also sources of raw materials and exploitable labor of certain kinds. From this
point of view, colonial subjugation was one way to achieve capitalism’s desired
ends, but not the only one: Indeed, ongoing neo-colonial exploitation can take
place perfectly well via a division of core and peripheral states in the international
system.56
Yet there is a third strategy in which some scholars try to explain the spread
of the state, one which has more of an affinity with cultural theories of the state’s
emergence. Here the notion is that organizational forms like the state are them­
selves cultural phenomena or ideas, and that ideas about how organizations
should be structured play an important role in determining the organizational
organization Institutionalized forms adopted by others. Organizations in a given field very often take on the
group such as a state, corporation, same or at least a very similar structure, a phenomenon known as isomorphism.57
political party, social movement, For example, it used to be that universities did not have specific registrar’s offices,
or international body. financial aid offices, and so forth, just like political organizations once did not
have professional, standing armies. When organizational forms spread, there
isomorphism In institutional
seem to be two main sources of their spread: efficiency with respect to the orga­
theory, the quality that two or
nization’s chosen ends and fit with cultural models and expectations for how such
more organizations have by virtue
organizations are supposed to be organized.58 In the first case, a university might
of being structurally very similar.
develop a registrar’s office because increasing complexity requires an office to co­
ordinate classrooms, meeting times, and so forth. In the second case, anyone who
world society theory A theory starts a university already “knows” that a university is “supposed to” have such an
associated with scholars such as office: A cognitive map or template for the organization already exists. According
John Meyer, who argue that basic to world society theory (sometimes called “world polity theory”), the state is very
organizational features of the state much like this: It became an institutionalized part of modern politics and is
system are cultural and have diff­ therefore replicated culturally even when causes that might have been operative
used globally. in its initial emergence are not present.59
 Great Britain, the United Kingdom, or Neither? State and Nation in England and Scotland 65

INSIGHTS
World Society and the Nation-State
by John Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez

and institutions. Global organizational norms are spread through

&
J
ohn Meyer and his co-authors are proponents of a "world so­
ciety" or “world polity” theory focused on "cultural" factors. several channels, including international organizations like the
The "world society" school treats the spread of such organiza­ United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary
tions as not entirely coercive, pointing out that people in many Fund, as well as NGOs. Indeed, social science itself— including
societies willingly and even eagerly adopt existing models of the comparative politics— probably plays a role in these develop­
state. The authors propose a thought experiment. They tell us to ments. When political scientists attempt to find ways to measure
imagine a new island society discovered by the global commu­ and combat corruption, for example, or even to define features
nity. The society would, within just a couple of years of contact of strong or successful states, they publicize their results and thus
with the global order, likely define itself as a nation-state, estab­ contribute to global organizational convergence when changes
lish a government, a currency, a taxation system, boundaries, are implemented.
provisions for its defense, and so forth. A thought experiment is
John Meyer, John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco 0. Ramirez, "World
not proof, but there is also empirical evidence in the overlap in Society and the Nation-State," 1997. American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 103,
structure between states and other national-level organizations No. l,pp. 144-181.

THINKING
Great Britain, the United Kingdom, COM PARATIVELY
or Neither? State and Nation
in England and Scotland KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

erhaps the simplest tool in comparative politics is the single case study (often Thinking through
P a country, as noted in chapter 2). Through this type of examination, we can
gather information to develop hypotheses that cut across other cases. Case analy­
Case Studies
Political scientists use case studies for
sis can help us identify key mechanisms and define general relationships. Debates a variety of purposes. In later chapters
in comparative politics are seldom ended on the basis of a single case study, but we will formally specify hypotheses
this approach nonetheless has much to contribute. Here we will consider how and methods for testing against
them, but here we begin by using a
looking at the single case of the United Kingdom (from England to Great Britain)
basic case study to think about gen­
might help us think about theories of state formation. eral theories. In this example, we
The island now known as Great Britain was long made up of distinct king­ consider three of the major theories
doms (Map 3.1). For much of their political history, state-building projects were of state-building discussed in this
specific to these kingdoms. The most influential of these in political history has chapter and ask what each would say
about the development of the state
been England, which comprises a large share of the island’s territory (with Wales
(and nation) in the United Kingdom.
to the west and Scotland to the north). Although all three theories seem
A number of scholars have considered the English state-building project to be capable of explaining the general
a paradigmatic case. To some extent, the nobility’s power to rule over the inhabi­ outlines of this case, they are not

tants of the countryside was curbed as early as the 800s, but with the Magna necessarily equal. Political scientists
concerned with these problems must
Carta of 1215 the crown also took on some limitations. After Henry VIII in the
come up with strategies to get lever­
sixteenth century, the state was independent of the Roman Catholic Church, age over the competing theories.
having separated from Rome and created its own church with the monarch at its
head. Over the course of the seventeenth century, despite—and perhaps because
of—civil conflict, parliamentary power grew, and nationalism and national
66 Chapter 3: The State

THINKING identity were stoked. By the close of the century, a truly “constitutional monar­
chy” was established. Slowly, England developed the characteristics of a full-
COM PARATIVELY
fledged modern state: effective local administration developed60 into a centralized
bureaucracy, which resulted in a standing army and the authority to collect taxes
regularly after 1688.61The country went through many fluctuations in royal power,
but the rough balance of power between the crown and the parliament progres­
sively shifted toward the latter.

D unbar
(to Scotland
^ c . 975)

S TR A T HC L Y DE BAMBURGH
10th century

SCANDINAVIAN
YNYS Scandinavian YORK
MANAU Lancashire
(probably
part o f York)

GWYNEDD

POWYS
MERCIA
DANELAW
918

BRYCHEINIOG
c. 920 Hwicce
GWEt
Lundenwic •

0 km 50

0 miles

Map 3.1 (a) The land that became the United Kingdom, circa 900; (b) the United Kingdom
today.
 Great Britain, the United Kingdom, or Neither? State and Nation in England and Scotland 67

THINKING
COM PARATIVELY

England’s political history merged into a single state with the other parts of the
modern United Kingdom. At different stages, this took place in different ways.
English kings conquered Wales and governed it from the thirteenth century.
Dynastic ties often meant partially shared governance between England and
Scotland. With the Act of Union (1707), Great Britain was born from a merger of
the Kingdoms of England and Scotland. Thereafter (at least until our day), many
state institutions were consolidated, and efforts undertaken—for a time seemingly
quite successful—to create a “British” rather than “English” or “Scottish” national
68 Chapter 3: The State

identity.62 Interestingly, this does not mean that English or Scottish (or Welsh)
identities disappeared. Rather, they co-existed with an overarching sense of
Britishness. Meanwhile, over the course of centuries Ireland had been, in good
measure, incorporated by force; even after the secession of the Republic of Ireland
in 1922, Northern Ireland remained part of the “United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland.”
We can find evidence in this case study for all of our major theories of state-
building—bellicist, economic, and cultural. Let’s consider briefly how each of
these might view this single case:
Bellicist: In the early modern period, like the rest of Europe, the British Isles
were often involved in inter-state war. The imperatives of war and continental
alliances meant that the state had to be prepared for conflict, which meant
taxation and, as time went on, greater investment in the military.63 There is
little doubt that this military preparation contributed to state-building.
Economic: At the same time, the giving up of privileges in exchange for the
rule of law (as analyzed by North, Wallis, and Weingast) probably saw its
earliest expression in England. And it was Britain that, according to in­
stitutional economists, first saw the emergence of sustained economic
growth. Proponents of the economic state-building theory argue that
these developments were probably linked. They see state growth as a con­
sequence of the extension of the rule of law, the protection of property,
and the establishment of a well-functioning state.
Cultural: Both the culturalist theories focusing on Calvinism (Gorski) and
nationalism (Greenfeld)64 also find ample evidence in the English/British
case. Calvinism in a variety of forms was influential there, and according
to some, this case is one of the earliest instances of modern nationalism.
What should we make of this evidence? It shows us several things. First, it shows
us what a case study can and cannot do. Typically in comparative politics a case study
cannot fully adjudicate between rival theories of general processes. In looking only at
the United Kingdom, we will probably be unable to decide among the theories con­
sidered in this chapter. But this case also shows us that existing theories may be too
simple. If all of the factors these theories emphasize are operative, we could use a
new theory that addresses how those factors fit together. Thinking along these lines
might help you create a better model of state- and nation-building in general.
Such questions are not just matters of historical interest. State- and nation-
building might settle into equilibrium at various times, but they are not really
static phenomena. Several decades ago many would have been skeptical that a
strong Scottish independence movement would emerge, that a referendum would
be held (as happened in September 2014, when 55 percent of Scots voted to
remain part of the U.K.), and that there would be talk of a possible written con­
stitution for the United Kingdom as well as a distinct English Parliament. It re­
mains to be seen how these issues might be resolved, but there is no denying that
both the state and the nation are in potential flux in the United Kingdom today.
As you think about ongoing processes of nation- and state-building, consider
whether the major comparative-historical theories discussed in this chapter have
something to say to us about twenty-first-century politics.
 Chapter Review 69

C h ap ter Su m m ary
Concepts Causes and Effects
• The state is the most important form of political organiza­ • Theories about why modern states emerge focus on
tion in modern politics and is characterized in ideal form political conflict, economics, culture, and processes of
by control of the use offeree, bureaucratic organization, global diffusion.
and the provision of public goods.
• The related ideas of the modern state, state capacity, and Thinking Comparatively
failed states are some of the core concepts in comparative We considered some of the uses of the single “case study,"
politics. noting that the case of the United Kingdom seems to offer
some support for several of the major theories of state-
Types building discussed in the chapter.
• Major features of modern states include bureaucracy,
impersonality, and sovereignty.
• States are coordinators of collective projects, such as
taxation, defense, and policing.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. In the "Causes and Effects" section of this chapter, we consid­ state compete and divide a fixed amount of power, or do they
ered the causes of state formation. Since the map of the world is reinforce each other, each making the other more powerful?
now covered with states, do you think these theories are of Think of a case study that might help you examine this question.
purely historical interest? Or do they still matter today? Think in 4. Return to the opening paragraphs of this chapter, which dis­
particular of countries recently in the news— such as Afghani­ cussed the possibility of the formation of new states in contem­
stan, Iraq, Somalia, or Syria— where commentators and policy­ porary Western Europe. After reading the chapter, what do you
makers still talk about a need for "state-building." Do theories of now think about the likelihood of this happening? Ground your
state formation have any relevance today in those countries? answer in the theories of state formation you have learned.
2. Test the theories of state formation considered here against 5. Many people agree that our world is rapidly "globalizing." This
your knowledge of U.S. history. Which of the theories seems to globalization can be economic, can involve social norms, cus­
explain the formation of the American state best, and why? toms, and institutions, or it can involve organized force (e.g., in­
What were the major steps in state formation in the American ternational organized crime, terrorist groups, and imperial
state, and how well can each theory address these stages? powers). If the globalization of organized force gets carried very
3. Consider whether you think the presence of a strong civil soci­ far, what implications, if any, might this have for the utility of the
ety will tend to make a state relatively strong or relatively weak, Weberian definition of the state? Would a radically (politically)
in the sense of the state being a powerful decision maker that globalized world be one in which new types of states were ob­
affects lots of social and political activity. Do civil society and the servable? Or would it be a world of weak states?
• Prime MinisterAlexis Tsipras speaks to the Greek Parliament in 2015. The fiscal situation of the Greek state— and Greece's relationship with the
broader European economy— has been the subject ofheated debate and much anxiety in recentyears.
 he subject of this chapter is political economy, which can be loosely
T defined as the ways politics and economics interrelate and affect one an­ political economy The
other.1 O ur emphasis is on politics and public institutions that affect the interaction or interrelationship
economy, though we will also note ways that economic change affects poli­ between politics and the economy
tics. In the next chapter, we consider the political economy of so-called de­ in a given country or internatio­
veloping countries specifically (especially those in Africa, Asia, and Latin nally, to include how politics affects
economies and how economies
America), while the emphasis in this chapter is on what are sometimes called
affect politics.
the “advanced, industrialized countries.”
As a subject area, political economy has a rich heritage.
IN THIS CHAPTER
You are probably reading this textbook for a course in a de­
Concepts 72
partment called “political science,” or possibly “politics,” “gov­
Inequality 73
ernment,” or “international affairs.” But two hundred years Employment and Inflation 75
ago, the academic study of “political science” in its modern Types 76
sense didn’t really exist. Prominent philosophers and thinkers Markets and States in Modern
who considered questions of political organization and public Economies 76
Economic Functions of Modern States 82
action had another name for their area of study: political econ­
Causes and Effects: Why Do Welfare States
omy. Implicit in this name was the idea that politics and eco­
Emerge? 86
nomics were deeply intertwined. To political thinkers of the Cultural Changes 87
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, including Adam Smith Industrial Capitalism 87
and Karl Marx, what happened in the economy would affect Mobilization and Political Action 89

politics in almost any country, and vice versa. International Learning Effects 92

Later on, the disciplines of “politics” and “economics” THINKING COMPARATIVELY

became separate (along with sociology, among other fields), as Welfare States in the Nordic Countries 93
the social sciences underwent a division of labor. Political scien­
C A S E S IN CONTEXT
tists focused especially on issues such as the state (see chapter 3),
types of governing regimes (chapters 6 and 7), and government Japan • Germany United Kingdom
United States
institutions (chapters 8 through 11). Yet the study of politics has
remained deeply concerned with questions about society and
the economy. Many chapters in this text address these inter­
twined issues. Chapters 12 through 15, for instance, examine questions related
to social institutions, identification, organization, and action. In this chapter,
we explore the enduring linkages between politics and economics. O ur par­
ticular emphasis here is on the political economy of so-called “advanced, indus­
trialized countries,” such as those in most of Europe, plus other economically
powerful countries like Japan, Australia, Canada, and the United States.

71
72 Chapter 4: Political Economy

Concepts
To better understand political economy, we should define several of the key mea­
sures and indicators that help characterize a country’s economy. Which statistics
can tell us something about its overall level—that is, its sophistication and advance­
ment? Is it a large economy, is it wealthy on average, and how is wealth distributed?
Apart from the level of a country’s economy, how is it performing? A country may
be rich and successful, but its economy may be declining and performing poorly,
just as a country may be relatively poor but performing well. (We examine this
question of performance in low-income countries more in chapter 5.)
gross domestic product (GDP) The most common ways of measuring a country’s economy involve the gross
The total value of goods and domestic product (GDP), or similar measures such as gross national income
services produced in a given (GNI). Each of these provides a composite measure of a country’s total economy but
country or territory; per capita GDP measures it slightly differently. GDP is the total market value of all goods and ser­
is divided by the population. vices produced within a country’s borders, usually in a year’s time. In other words,
the gross domestic product is the total (or gross) amount of goods and services pro­
gross national income (GNI)
duced (i.e., the product) in a given country (hence, domestic) in a given year. GNI
A measure of the total income of all
is the total income from all goods and services earned by a country’s producers, re­
of a country's citizens, whether
gardless of where they operate. So a German company operating in India that earns
living in their home country or
profits would be counted in the GDP of India but in the GNI of Germany. We will
abroad.
refer to GDP as our most common basic measure of a country’s economic activity.
We often wish to compare the average wealth of individuals in different coun­
tries, not just the total wealth of each country. Economists therefore turn to per
capita measurements of GDP, which represent average income per person. Rela­
tively wealthy countries (such as the United States, Japan, and many in Western
Europe) may have annual GDP levels of $30,000 per capita or more, while the
poorest countries have GDPs per capita of less than $500 per year, and “middle-
income” countries are in the range of a few thousand dollars per year. One benefit
of this approach is that it standardizes GDP across countries of different sizes,

CASE IN CONTEXT

Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich?

Will They in the Future? PAGE 561

The idea of economic strength has been important for many years For more on political economy in the United States, see the
in the United States. The country has had an extremely powerful case study in Part VI, pp. 561-562. As you read it, keep in mind the
and dynamic economy for some time, but now there is consider­ following questions:
able worry and handwringing about the future of American eco­ 1. In what sense should we think of the United States as a
nomic performance. Income inequality has reached alarming "developed" society? What does this case reveal to us
heights, and a host of social indicators for some populations re­ about the notion of "development"?
semble those usually seen only in the "third world." The economy 2. What specific development dangers are likely to emerge
did not recover quickly from the recession induced by the financial in post-industrial societies? Flow, in cases like this, might
crisis of 2008. Finally, the U.S. government faces serious long-term aspects of development itself prove potentially risky for
fiscal problems. Perhaps even the "most developed" countries are later-stage development?
never fully developed and continue to face development hurdles.
 Concepts 73

dividing production by the population size. Otherwise it would be very difficult

to compare the economic performance of large and small countries.
The overall GDP and GDP per capita measure the overall size and income level of
an economy, and GDPgrowth from year to year is the simplest measure of economic
performance. Very high GDP growth, such as in China over the last twenty years, is
in the neighborhood of 7 percent to 10 percent. Such rates of growth are possible in
low-income countries that are starting from a low economic base, where many people
are not employed to their full potential. In advanced, industrialized countries, how­
ever, which tend to be wealthier, 5 percent growth would be very strong, and a growth
rate of about 3 percent a year or lower is more typical. Some countries also have nega­
tive GDP growth rates. This happens in times of recession in advanced economies,
and it has happened frequently in poorer countries, such as many in Africa.
GDP is a simple concept, but the value of a person’s income also depends on
how much money can buy. That is, the cost of living matters. An income of
130,000 per year goes much further in a country where rent is $250 a month and
a week’s groceries cost $50, than in a country where rent is $1,000 a month and
a week’s groceries cost $200. Because prices are frequently lower in low-income
countries, a dollar (or local currency) can go farther. The adjusted measure schol­
ars often use is income based on purchasing power parity (PPP). In many in­ purchasing power parity (PPP)
stances, in countries where average incomes are very low (such as in Africa), a An adjustment made to income
GDP/capita of about $400 may correspond to a GDP/capita at PPP of over measures to account for differences

$1,000. Conversely, in countries where prices are very high (such as Japan and in cost of living.

Scandinavia), a GDP/capita may be reduced by adjusting for PPP; for instance,

someone earning $50,000 in one of these countries may only be able to buy as
much as an average person earning $40,000 in the United States (see Table 4.1).
The measurement of economic performance may extend beyond the economic
indicators discussed previously. Measures also include a range of social outcomes
including such factors as standards of living, quality of life, and cultural change.
The section on “Types” outlines several important ways of measuring develop­
ment besides economic growth.

Inequality
Measures of income such as GDP do not provide much information about how
income is distributed among people. An average GDP per capita of $30,000 can
result in a country where half the people earn $60,000 and half earn nothing, or
it can happen in a country where everyone earns $30,000 exactly. The first coun­
try would obviously have a more unequal distribution of income, and would have
half of its population in grave poverty. Measuring poverty and inequality is thus
important to many who study development.
Inequality measures how income is distributed. Some societies have incomes inequality In the social sciences,
that are distributed very equally across people, while other countries have in­ the differential distribution of

comes that vary dramatically between different people. Imagine two societies. access to goods like power, status,

In the first, the average income for someone in the richest 10 percent is $150,000, and material resources.

and the average income for someone in the bottom 10 percent is $12,000. In the
second, the average income for someone in the top 10 percent is less (say, $75,000),
and the average income for someone in the bottom 10 percent is higher (say,
$16,000)- We might say the first country is more unequal because the ratio of the
incomes between those at the top and those at the bottom is much larger.
74 Chapter 4: Political Economy

t a b l e 4.1 Economic Measures Around the World

GDP Growth Consumer Absolute
Country GDP/Capita {$) (% ) Inflation (%) Poverty Rate* Gini Index**

Brazil 11,208 2.5 6.2 3.8 52.7

China 6,807 7.7 2.6 6.3 37.0

France 42,503 0.3 0.9 <2 31.7

Germany 46,269 0.1 1.5 <2 30.6

India 1,499 5.0 10.9 23.6 33.6

Iran 4,763 -5.8 39.3 <2 38.3

Japan 38,634 1.6 0.4 <2 32.1

Mexico 10,307 1.1 3.8 <2 48.1

Nigeria 3,006 5.4 8.5 62.0 43.0

Russia 14,612 1.3 6.8 <2 39.7

South Korea 25,977 3.0 1.3 <2 31.3

United Kingdom 41,788 1.7 2.6 <2 38.0

United States 53,042 2.2 1.5 <2 41.1

Sources: World Bank, World Development Report data 2015.

*Note: Poverty rate is measured as percent of the population living on less than $1.25/day (PPP) on average between 2002 and 2012.

** Note: Estimates for the Gini index are from 2013 or the most recent year available from the World Bank, with years available varying by country.

A poor neighborhood, or favela, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Notice the wealthier neighborhood off
in the distance. Though Brazil has made some progress in recent years, it has often been held up
as an example of high income inequality.
 Concepts 75

To use specific examples, the United States has a more unequal distribution of
income than the countries of Scandinavia. The most commonly used measure of
inequality across an entire population is the Gini coefficient, which measures Gini coefficient The most
how much of a society’s wealth or income is held by which percentage of the common measure of income
population. The number ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 being absolute equality inequality in any given population,
with everyone having the same amount of wealth or income, and 1 being a sce­ usually expressed as a number
nario in which a single person owns all wealth.2 Rough Gini coefficients can be between 0 and 1, with 0 being total
calculated using deciles or quintiles of the population (each tenth or fifth). There equality and 1 being maximal
are quicker measures of inequality one can calculate as well. As noted previously, inequality.
one may simply examine the incomes of the top 10 percent versus the bottom
10 percent of the income range, for example. Inequality is a pressing concern in
many countries, from the United States to Brazil. Information about Gini coef­
ficients and other measures of inequality and economic performance of this sort
can be easily found online. See, for example, the Human Development Reports
provided by the United Nations.

Employment and Inflation

Other economic measures relate to how people experience the economy on a daily
basis. Employment and unemployment are especially important because of their employment Ongoing, regular
impact on people’s well-being and on a country’s overall economic health. Employ­ access to paid work.
ment can be measured by the total number of jobs created or lost, or as a percentage
of the population with or without paid employment. Underemployment is another
unemployment The lack of
ongoing, regular access to paid
factor being tracked, signifying the degree to which members of the labor force are
work.
employed less than they wish to be (e.g., part-time instead of full-time) or are in
jobs “below their skill level.” In many developing countries, analysts draw a dis­ underemployment When
tinction between formal and informal employment as well, and most consider workers are employed less than
formal employment preferable, because it tends to offer more benefits, rights, and they wish to be or below their
support. In developed economies, far fewer people are informally employed (say, as skill level.
unofficial and unlicensed street vendors) than in much of the developing world.
Inflation is a measure of how quickly prices are rising. Prices affect the cost of inflation Increase in the prices of
living, and people find it more difficult to plan for the future when they are uncer­ goods and services.
tain what prices will be in the future. Inflation can ruin people’s savings by making
the amount they have saved worth less in terms of what it can buy. As a result,
high levels of inflation have brought about the collapse of many regimes. In the
worst cases, countries have slipped into hyperinflation, in which prices rise by as hyperinflation Exceedingly high
much as several thousand percent per year, or more. Conversely, deflation (or inflation, which dramatically erodes
declining prices) is also a significant problem that arises in economic crises, as the value of money over time.
people stop buying to await lower prices in the future, and the values of homes
deflation Decline in the prices of
and other assets decline. Finally, it is worth noting that inflation and employ­
goods and services, often associa­
ment, though distinct, are related in ways that you might find surprising. Indeed,
ted with depressions or serious
central banks and other policymakers often face trade-offs when they try to keep
slowdowns in economic activity.
both unemployment and inflation low. An emphasis on keeping inflation low at
all costs is associated by many with higher levels of unemployment.
Fiscal measures—that is, measures of the government’s revenues and fiscal measures Measures of a
expenditures—of a country’s economic health, such as total indebtedness, may government's revenues and/or
also be taken as indicators of a country’s economic well-being. In many circum­ expenditures.
stances, poor fiscal indicators will imply economic challenges in the future, as
Chapter 4: Political Economy

debts come due. By the same token, some argue that an excessive focus on fiscal
balance sheets can hamper governments’ ability to engage in counter-cyclical
spending, evening out the business cycle and avoiding recessions. Indeed, one of
the great debates of political economy pits those who favor fiscal conservatism
and “Keynesians,” who favor higher levels of government spending. This distinc­
tion often aligns with another that pits those who favor policies designed to
reduce inflation with those who favor policies conducive to “full employment.”
As you can see, thinking about the indicators of a healthy political economy leads
directly to what is probably the field’s central debate, which concerns the role of
the state in economic life.

Types
In this section, we will think about the respective roles of the market and the
state in modern economies. We first look at market-led and state-led economies
as two main types, and we consider the intellectual arguments for why each
might enhance economic performance. We then consider the types of state ac­
tivities in an economy.

Markets and States in Modern Economies

Perhaps the most meaningful way to consider the different types of political
economies around the world is to think about how the role of the state plays out
differently across countries. We addressed the concept of the state in chapter 3,
focusing on how it originated, and on the basic features of a functioning state,
especially with respect to national defense and the administrative ordering of the
polity. However, it is clear that modern states do far more in this day and age
than simply exercise a “monopoly on the legitimate use of force in a given terri­
tory.” In the process of governing in the modern world, states act in ways that
affect the political economy. States provide a range of public services and public
goods, perhaps with a view toward creating opportunities for the citizenry and
toward protecting the vulnerable. O f course, the role of the state in the economy
is limited in most countries. In modern economies, private actors (from individu­
als to corporations) play an important role, and many economic decisions are
made not by governments, but by these private actors.
Think about buying lunch from a sandwich shop. This is largely a private
transaction. The government doesn’t set the price of the sandwich (in most
countries), although it may levy a tax on the sale of the sandwich. Rather, the
seller sets the price based on a couple of considerations. One is the cost of
making the sandwich, which factors in not only the cost of the ingredients but
also the shop’s rent and the sandwich maker’s pay, for example. Another con­
sideration is how much potential buyers might be willing to pay. In turn, the
potential buyer has to decide whether a sandwich at a given price is worth it.
(Maybe some days it is, and other days not.) In general terms, we might call
this a “market” transaction, even if it doesn’t take place in an actual market­
place. We say this because the transaction is between two or more private
actors, based on prices set by what a seller is willing to charge and a buyer is
willing to pay.
 Types 77

Many people studying political economy would argue that a “market-based”

economy relying on private actors is more efficient and will perform better than
a “state-led” economy. For example, imagine the government mandated that an
egg salad sandwich must be made in a particular way. The sandwich business’s
ability to meet buyers’ preferences would be reduced, potentially resulting in re­
duced sales of sandwiches. On the other hand, many observers would note the
important roles states play in making economies work, and in promoting eco­
nomic performance. If the government guarantees the contract between the
sandwich shop owner and the bank, or helps the owner access capital, this may
help the business and, indirectly, the customers. The costs and benefits of such
government (and private) actions undoubtedly accumulate across the set of ex­
changes. Political economists have different estimates of the aggregate results.

M arkets and Economic Performance

A central debate in political economy, then, in recent years has been over which
actors should take the lead in promoting national economic advancement: private
markets or the state. Which is more likely to foster development: governmental
intervention in the economy, or freely functioning markets with no governmen­
tal intervention? O f course, a range of factors can condition how a country per­
forms economically, ranging from geography, to how political institutions are
organized, to technological advancements, to the strategies of businesses, to a
range of cultural factors that may vary from one place to another. However, the
most significant debate in political economy has to do with the role of the market
and the role of the state in guiding economic decision making. We consider the
idea that a country with a market-led economy will perform well, and will follow
that with a consideration of how an economy with significant state intervention
might perform well.
A leading argument in political economy is that free markets are the basis for
creating wealth. This argument has a long and fruitful history, famously

CASE IN CONTEXT

j Political Economy of Britain PAGE 547

The United Kingdom is one of the most interesting cases for the For more on development in the United Kingdom, see the
comparative analyst for several reasons. First, it was the first case study in Part VI, pp. 547-548. As you read it, keep in mind the
major industrializer and is considered to have been one of the following questions:
first societies to establish a modern, growth-oriented economy. 1. Which major theories have been used in efforts to explain
Second, it has developed over many centuries, moving from the economic development in the United Kingdom, and
being a predominantly agrarian society to an industrial economy what are their strengths and limitations in relation to this
to a post-industrial one, so it allows us to ask long-term questions case?
about such a sequence. Third, it was the country from which 2. What does this case suggest about the relationship be­
some of the leading theories of political economy we are consid­ tween the political economy of development and the
ering here were first conceived and, to some extent, transformed social-scientific construction of theories of development?
into policy.
78 Chapter 4: Political Economy

beginning with Adam Smith’s publication of The Wealth of Nations in 1776. The
free market perspective spawned the field of economics, whose modern school of
neoliberalism An ideological market-oriented thought is nowadays often called n e o lib e ra lism . Smith’s idea of
tendency that favors liberal the “invisible hand” offered the marvelous conclusion that through the individ­
democracy and market-led ual efforts of people seeking only their own well-being, society as a whole is made
development. better off. Society benefits not from generosity and kindness, but from the eco­
nomic efficiency and expansion that takes place when everyone pursues their own
gain. This logic of market is expected to promote economic advancement within
any given country, and it also extends to the world economy as a whole, with the
idea that free trade between countries makes all countries better off.3
Advocates of free market economics are influential in policymaking today and
argue that the “invisible hand” should operate largely unrestrained, without gov­
ernment interference. The proper role of government, in this logic, is largely to
establish a rule of law that protects property rights and enforces contracts.4
Beyond this, the theory is that government should leave most economic activity
to the market.5 This means that government should not be doing things such as
creating and financing companies, running factories, or setting wages. Where
government has been doing these things, the pro-market perspective holds that
privatization Transfer of control economic activity should undergo p riv a tiz a tio n , or transfer of control from
(of a business, industry, or service) public to private. Such a pro-market perspective has informed policy recommen­
from public to private. dations to developing countries for many years, as we discuss in chapter 5.
The argument in favor of markets is that markets promote economic well­
being, and also that states do not. Neoliberal economists commonly hold that
government intervention in the economy results in inefficiencies and losses to so­
ciety as a whole. They argue that this is because only markets are able to coordinate

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The Australian Stock Exchange. "Markets" in large-scale industrial and post-industrial economies
are often highly complex phenomena, difficult even for experts to understand.
complex information about values and goods that state planners simply cannot
master.
“Public choice theory” supplements these arguments by characterizing
public officials as self-interested actors who often get in the way of markets.
Public officials may claim they promote the public good, but they are human
beings, all with their own self-interests, their own agendas, and their own fail­
ings. Just because someone chooses to go into public service does not mean they
will truly be willing to set aside their own needs for the good of the people.
One founder of this school of thought called this view of public service “politics
without romance.”6 To begin with, public officials are susceptible to bribery,
influence peddling, and corruption. Even in the absence of outright corruption,
public officials will typically focus first and foremost on their own incentives.
Elected officials will look to the next election, and appointed bureaucrats will
look to move up the career ladder. They all will try to maximize their own
power and influence, often at the expense of the public they are nominally serv­
ing, and giving officials authoritative control over economic resources will lead
to poor outcomes. Governments can be expected to “fail,” with damaging
results.
Neoliberal approaches lead to a relatively clear set of policy recommendations,
many of which center on “getting the state out” of the economy. They also have
the powerful backing of many in the highly reputed field of economics. This
contributes to the wide adoption of market-led approaches to development, in
countries ranging from the United States to Poland to Chile. state interventionism An
approach to economic
States and Economic Performance management in which the state
As a central institution in public life, the state takes a very active role in eco­ plays a central role, not just
nomic life in many countries. Whereas free market theorists expect this activity through enforcing contracts and
to lead to economic decline and poor performance, other scholars argue that property rights but through active
state intervention can be instrumental in supporting good economic outcomes. interventions such as coordinating
Proponents of s ta te in te r v e n tio n is m hold that markets are unlikely to generate investment, supplying credit, and,
national wealth on their own. According to this argument, where states func­ in many instances, through the
tion well, they have an ability to coordinate the behavior of various economic establishment and running of
actors, stimulate needed investment, and promote human capital and advanced state-owned enterprises.

Capitalism and Freedom

by Milton Fried-■■re-;

growth. In the 1980s, the thinking of scholars such as Friedman

&
I
ilton Friedman was arguably the leading academic pro­
ponent of free market economics in the twentieth century. influenced the policies of President Ronald Reagan in America
Friedman was a Nobel Laureate based mainly at the University of and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in Britain. A bit earlier, in
Chicago. Friedman's prominence was reflected in his leadership the 1970s, a market-based economic strategy for a developing
of the "Chicago School" of economic thought, and in his influ­ country was implemented by the dictatorial regime in Chile,
ence on prominent public officials. Friedman argued that whose economists had been trained at Chicago under Friedman
government intervention— other than in a few limited areas— and who came to be called the "Chicago Boys.”
generally had unintended negative consequences for economic Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
80 Chapter 4: Political Economy

industrial production. Many state poli­

cies can promote successful industry.
These policies may include various ways
of protecting local businesses from for­
eign competition, especially in the early
stages of development when a country is
trying to build up its “infant industries.”
They may also involve direct state invest­
ment in important industries (such as
steel), or incentives or advantages pro­
Economic Freedom
vided to private businesses (such as low-
(Extent o f Free M arket) interest loans to build factories).
Governments may also actively intervene
Figure 4.1 Markets and Development: A Prediction from Neoliberalism
to make their currency cheaper and their
exports thus more desirable to foreign
consumers; as any American who has bought inexpensive Chinese goods at
Wal-Mart can attest, this policy has been used successfully by several countries
at their early stages of development.
Advocacy for state interventionism in economic management grew in the
twentieth century, with governments taking on much larger economic roles than
they previously had. Around the mid- to late 1800s, European countries such as
Germany and Italy unified and consolidated into nation-states. Some new gov­
ernment roles came in terms of social welfare provision. A landmark change was
the establishment of social insurance programs (such as a state-supported old-age
pension and disability insurance) in Germany under Chancellor Otto von Bis­
marck in the late 1800s (see “Case in Context” box). Soon thereafter, the world
went through major events that led to increased central state power: countries
mobilized militaries in the lead-up to the horrors of World War I (1914-1918),

Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation

INSIGHTS
: by Peter Evans

E
vans looked at countries with very different states, many of targets for promoting industry and development. Brazil was "in
which are developing countries. These included South Korea, between” these two cases, with a state that had some segments
Brazil, Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the Congo), as well as acting like South Korea's (such as the effective bureaucracies that
India. Considering the first three countries, Zaire supported the promoted heavy industries) and some segments acting like
pessimistic view of state action offered by public choice theo­ those in Zaire. Evans attributes the performance of the three
rists: The state was staffed with self-interested actors, and indi­ countries in industrialization— South Korea at the top and Zaire
vidual interests took precedence over public interests. On the at the bottom, with Brazil in between— to these variations in the
other hand, South Korea (like Japan) had a state with very differ­ state. These issues of the role of the state in developing countries
ent structures and personnel with different networks and work receive further treatment in the next chapter on the topic of
expectations. The South Korean state successfully collaborated development.
with industry while still remaining independent of interest Peter Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation. Princeton,
groups. They did so by supporting selected companies that met NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
 Types 81

and the subsequent Great Depression (mainly in the 1930s) gave rise to much
more active state involvement in the economy. Pushes for more government in­
volvement in economic and social life ranged from Franklin Roosevelt’s New
Deal in the United States (which included the establishment of the pension pro­
gram known as Social Security) to Adolf Hitler’s National Socialism (Nazism)
in Germany. Each of these resulted in states that took on larger roles in societies
and their economies, in very different ways that ranged from simply increased
social services in liberal democracies to state-dominated overhauls of the econ­
omy in totalitarian systems.
As states took on more prominent roles in the economy, a major debate emerged
about the best institutions to promote economic performance, with views reflect­
ing the pro-market and pro-state perspectives noted previously. To represent this
debate, consider Table 4.2. As Table 4.2 shows, the statist argument is not simply
the opposite of neoliberalism or market-led approaches. The neoliberal approach
generally expects states to hinder economic performance where they intervene,
but statism does not expect states to promote the economy in every possible way.
Rather, success depends upon the quality of states and the decisions they make.
Actions by states may promote or may hinder the economy, depending on whether
the state is strong or weak and makes good or bad decisions. In the next chapter,
we will see that this argument has continued application to developing countries
when considering regions such as East Asia (note South Korea in Table 4.2) and
much of Africa. In considering the evidence in Table 4.2, we put a question mark
by the United States, and list it as possible evidence for both the pro-market and
pro-state arguments. To see why, consider the “Cases in Context” box on the
United States and its political economy; you may think of the United States as the
paragon of market economics, but it is not clear that this was always so.
Social scientists increasingly recognize that both the market and the state can
play important roles in promoting and facilitating economic performance.

t a b l e 4.2 The Market-State Debate: An Overview

Perspective Market State

Does policy matter? Yes Yes

What causes economic success? Free markets Strong states / Quality state interventions

Weak or low-quality state / Poor state

What causes poor performance? Too much state involvement
interventions

Testing the Theory: What countries provide good United Kingdom South Korea
evidence? United States? United States?

After 1979, opening up to the

Testing the Theory: Why has China been Even after 1979, strong state remains active
market has led to economic
successful?(see chapter 5) in managing economy.
success.

Reduce the size of the state Build the capacity of the state to intervene
Main Policy Recommendation
and its role in economy. well.
82 Chapter 4: Political Economy

Especially since the collapse of global communism at the end of the Cold War,
most would argue that economies are best built on the principles of private prop­
erty and through the use of markets to set most prices and allocate many re­
sources. At the same time, there is also substantial agreement that states are
public goods Goods or services, needed to provide some p u b lic g o o d s —ranging from law and order to defense to
often provided by a government, public health and other investments in human capital and physical infrastructure—
for use by all members of a society that may not be provided by the market. States are also presumed necessary to
and for which one person's use of correct certain market failures and to protect the most vulnerable. They must
the good does not compromise provide a positive environment in which individuals and private enterprise will
anyone else's use of the good. have incentives to invest in themselves and in their society over the long run.
Examples include national defense, Despite some consensus, the market-state debate rages, renewed by changing
basic infrastructure, and a healthy events and challenges to existing interpretations and existing evidence. We
environment. might find some role for both markets and states, and some scholars attribute
successful development to a proper balance between the two. This logic extends
to contemporary developing countries, as discussed in the next chapter.

Economic Functions of Modern States

Having explored the key conceptual distinction between market economies and
statist economies (while acknowledging that most countries blend elements of
both), we turn now to consider some specific roles states play in modern political
economies: states commonly engage in economic management, invest in human
capital, and build infrastructure. They also intervene in the economy to support
those who might be vulnerable, such as the poor, or the elderly who may no
longer be able to engage in as much economically productive work. This last cat­
egory of state action can be called the provision of a welfare state, as in ensuring
a degree of social well-being.

States and Economic M anagem ent

economic management States' Citizens also typically hold their states responsible for e c o n o m ic m a n a g e m e n t.
efforts to shape the economic This does not mean that all modern states play the same economic role: Some
performance of their societies, states intervene greatly in the economy, holding ownership of firms in key eco­
especially in fiscal and monetary nomic sectors, for example, while others intervene less. However, even the least
policy. interventionist states participate in considerable economic management. Typi­
cally poor economic performance on the part of a government leads to declining
legitimacy. Sustained and extraordinarily poor economic performance can un­
dermine the state itself.
States endeavor to manage the economy in several main ways. As we men­
tioned, some take ownership of key industries. Additionally, all states regulate
the economy, though the extent and form of regulation vary. They perform basic
functions such as enforcing contracts. They establish and enforce rules about the
banking system, helping structure the ways in which capital is accumulated and
invested. States create rules that govern labor and its contractual relationships
with employers, codifying rules about strikes, collective bargaining, and mini­
mal conditions, such as safety protections, work hours, and, in some cases, wages.
States also often regulate commercial products: for example, a number of states
regulate the nature of advertising claims, ban toxic products such as lead paint,
and impose controls on pollution from factories.
 Types • _83 l

Equally important, modern states carry out economic management through

attempts to influence the business cycle. States try to engender economic growth
and to avoid or at least mitigate periodic economic downturns. The two main
tools states have in this connection are fiscal policy and monetary policy.
Fiscal policy essentially involves taxing and spending. States can attempt to fiscal policy Budget setting,
produce economic growth during downturns by increasing their spending (or by which is dependent on generating
cutting certain taxes), which essentially adds to existing demand in the economy. revenue followed by government
This practice is often called fiscal stimulus or counter-cyclical spending because spending.
it aims to counter the business cycle, evening out economic performance and
producing steady growth over time. Also important to fiscal policy is the man­
agement of the state’s balance sheets: A certain amount of debt is normal, but
excessive debt can produce crises that can threaten economic performance and
the political viability of regimes holding power.
Monetary policy involves the government’s efforts to shape how much money monetary policy States' efforts to
is in circulation and the value of a state’s currency. Governments have a variety of shape the value of a society's cur­

specific tools that help manage how the prices of goods and services rise and fall. rency, often through the use of a

Some states will try to reduce the value of their currency in relation to other central bank in the case of a

countries’ because this policy will favor their exports. Others will aim to estab­ modern state.

lish and maintain a strong currency. Inflation (or rising prices) and deflation (or
falling prices) are frequent worries, and while governments cannot completely
control the rising and falling value of prices and currencies, modern states are
typically considered responsible for this sort of economic management.

Investments in H um an Capital: Education and H ealth

As mentioned previously, the modern state has periodically taken on new roles
over the course of its history. One such role is coordinating the provision of

A public school classroom in Myanmar. States do not just make wars and police their territories,
but also provide numerous public services like education.
84 Chapter 4: Political Economy

education, public health, and other investments in human capital. O f course,

education is in some societies provided partly by private organizations, but even
in such instances the state is usually involved, through regulation and often
through subsidies. Public education has really existed only over the last couple of
centuries, and some states still have difficulty providing it.
Historical research shows that states initially endeavored to use public educa­
tion to help create citizens.7 This is still an important function of educational
systems, which teach people about the rights and duties attached to their status
as members of the society subject to the state’s authority. Above all, though, poli­
cymakers view education as a way for a state to enhance the long-run global
economic competitiveness of its society. An educated workforce has more skills
than an uneducated one, and as a result becomes more attractive to prospective
employers. Higher education has expanded globally as states have developed and
states often heavily subsidize higher education, both because they hope to edu­
cate their workforce and because they view institutions of higher education as
sources of technological innovation that they hope will be economically
beneficial.
The modern state is also held responsible for many aspects of public health,
such as coordinating and regulating vaccination, overseeing food distribution
and safety, and managing infectious diseases. Indeed, the expansion of state-
managed public health, along with economic growth, has produced the lion’s
share of global health advances in recent years, including rising life expectancies
and declining rates of infant mortality. States in most advanced industrial or
post-industrial societies often aim to take on for themselves the task of paying for
health care services, or at least contributing to this effort. Many developing
countries, too, have established public health care systems, though the quality
and reach of these programs vary considerably. States have come to provide these
services because important constituencies have demanded that they do so, bol­
stered by the expanding perception over several decades that this is simply part
of what states do. At the same time, as with education, these initiatives can be
viewed as the state’s investment in human capital. Healthier populations tend to
be more productive as labor forces and to possess higher skills. Even something
as simple as ensuring that children have a healthy diet can potentially produce
long-term gains.

State-Led Development in Japan PAGE 490

Japan's modern state began to develop in the late nineteenth For more on the state in Japan, see the case study in Part VI,
century and grew in the twentieth, alongside the country's rapid p. 490. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
economic development. For this reason it is often cited as a rapid 1. Flow, historically, has the Japanese state been involved in
modernizer. This case also shows that states can play a key role in the economy?
successful economic performance, as we discuss further in 2. Flow has this involvement changed in recent years?
chapter 5.
 Types 85

Infrastructure and O ther Public Goods

States are also typically responsible for the establishment and maintenance of a
variety of forms of infrastructure of common life. States license and regulate
media infrastructure, controlling, for example, radio, television, phone, and
Internet systems. States typically create and maintain civil engineering infra­
structure as well, particularly highways. They are also often involved in at least
the regulation and often the administration of ports and airports, and many play
a role in the establishment and maintenance of rail systems as well. These things
matter a lot, and not just because of the convenience afforded private citizens by
having functional highways, railways, and airports. Commerce depends on reli­
able and efficient transportation, and states that neglect investment in these areas
often handicap their societies’ economic performance, and, therefore, ultimately
their own strength.
As with all of these typical activities of states, there is considerable variation
in the style and level of a state’s involvement. Some states centrally plan the con­
struction and maintenance of infrastructure and ensure that these activities
remain 100 percent public (which means carried out and controlled by the state).
Others aim to work via partnerships with private contractors: A state may allow
a private firm to maintain a toll highway or a rail system, the firm generating its
own revenues by charging consumers for services, or a state may indeed hire an
outside firm to provide some such service. There are major philosophical differ­
ences about the degree to which services like education, transportation infra­
structure, health care delivery, and even prisons should be “public” or “private.”
These concerns link to broader debates about the future of the welfare state men­
tioned earlier. Over the course of the twentieth century, the advanced industrial
and post-industrial state came to be one that robustly served the roles we have
discussed in this section, one that did so while aiming to reduce inequality,
defend workers’ rights, and ensure a minimal standard of living, all while main­
taining a mixed capitalist economy.

Welfare State Functions

In the period after the Second World War, advanced industrial societies con­
verged, to some extent, on the idea that the state should serve certain broad
economic and social functions, and they were to some extent followed in this,
where possible, by developing-world states. The model that was constructed is
often referred to as the w elfa re sta te , meaning that the state should have as a key welfare state A state that aims to
task the maintenance of its population’s welfare. As we shall see in the “Causes provide a basic safety net for the

and Effects” section in this chapter, scholars try to explain the development of most vulnerable elements of its

the state’s expanding role in a variety of ways. Before exploring the reasons population, often accomplished

behind the emergence of the welfare state, we note what some of the basic func­ through social insurance, public

tions of welfare states are. health care plans, and poverty

While welfare states do many different things, their key tasks include provid­ relief.

ing social insurance or pensions that protect the elderly and disabled, unemploy­
ment insurance that protects those who cannot find work, and health care for
their citizens. They vary widely in their ambition in this respect, and in their ef­
ficacy. Some would argue that the United States has shown a more modest com­
mitment to the welfare state model, whereas the Scandinavian countries are
86 Chapter 4: Political Economy

often held up as exemplars of strong and successful commitment to welfare state

goals. We would stress that all welfare states provide benefits to a range of citi­
zens and residents, not just the poor. In the United States, for example, societal
members are eligible for Social Security and Medicare. Also key to most welfare
states is the idea that citizens are entitled to certain basic social rights that go
beyond narrow political freedoms. As you can see, welfare state functions were
marked departures from modern states’ historical roles in the period of their early
formation, which were more centered on war making and internal policing
(though the state’s effort to manage the economy goes back a long way8).
While most advanced industrial and post-industrial societies have welfare
states, this should not lead us to suppose that they are all the same. Indeed, they
vary in terms of how they collect most of their taxes, how much tax they collect,
and the extent and form of their social spending. Today some argue that the
welfare state is in crisis. At least since the 1980s, it has been subjected to the
critique that it is inefficient and not well suited to the competitive environment
of today’s global economy. Indeed, many welfare states currently face fiscal dif­
ficulties, in part because of demographic trends. As “Baby Boomers” age, social
insurance and health care provision will grow more costly. On the other hand,
supporters of welfare states point out that these fiscal problems have often been
exacerbated or even caused by tax cuts and other actions carried out by the wel­
fare state’s opponents. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the question of
what will happen to the welfare state will be one of the most important issues in
global politics in the coming years.

Causes and Effects: Why Do Welfare

States Emerge?
One of the leading questions raised in this chapter is “W hat explains economic
performance?” with the role of the market and that of the state being important
hypotheses to explain variations in outcomes across countries. This hypothesis
shapes the debate in both advanced, industrial economies (the subject of this
chapter) and lower-income, developing countries (the subject of the next chap­
ter). We address these hypotheses in the next chapter on development. As a
result, we turn now to another important (and related) question about the politi­
cal economy in advanced, industrialized societies: Why are states as economically
active as they are? In a sense, this section bridges the various discussions about the
state and the economy, as seen in the key causal question in chapter 3 (Why did
states emerge?) to the key causal question in chapter 5 (Why do economies per­
form as they have?). We ask here why states have gone from having been rela­
tively minimal economic actors in the nineteenth century to having larger roles
as more robust “welfare states” in the world’s most advanced economies in the
twenty-first century.
As we noted earlier, the modern welfare state began to develop in the nine­
teenth century, when a number of states, notably France and Germany, experi­
mented with “social insurance.”9 The major causal question we address here is
why the economic functions of the state have changed over time. In particular,
we consider the expansion of the state’s role in regulating or even providing for
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Welfare States Emerge? 87

The German State: Unification and Welfare PAGE 449

Germany is a country of perennial interest to political scientists, For more on the German state, see the case study in Part VI,
among other reasons because it achieved political unification pp. 449-450. As you read it, keep in mind the following
only in the late nineteenth century and shortly thereafter began guestions:
to develop some limited welfare state functions. Its process of 1. What, if anything, is the relationship between Germany's
change was thus highly compressed. Whereas some other later unification and its early partial welfare state
modern states existed as such for decades or even centuries development?
before coming to take on welfare state functions, Germany did 2. Why did the conservative Bismarck adopt welfare func­
so only very briefly. tions for the German state?

the welfare of its citizens. In other words, why have states increasingly taken on
tasks like providing health care, social insurance, and other social safety-net fea­
tures over the course of decades?
Note that this question should not imply that all movement is in one direction
on this issue. Countries have often moved toward reducing the role of the state in
providing social welfare services. Prominent examples include the United King­
dom under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and the former Communist countries
of Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Nonetheless, a major research ques­
tion has been why states have generally gone from entities with limited economic
functions to ones that have larger roles over time. To address this question, we
look at several prominent theories about the emergence of welfare states.

Cultural Changes
Some scholars have argued that welfare states emerge because of changing values
and norms.10 From tTis point of view, earlier states did not develop a social safety
net because nobody really wanted them to. One can argue that this is because
other institutions were regarded as more suitable to the provision of welfare: for
example, religious organizations or workhouses before the late nineteenth cen­
tury. Another argument is that something in the post-Enlightenment world
made people start to think that formerly intractable social problems could be
solved and that the state should play a role in solving them.11 One classic theory
of the welfare state focuses on changing ideas of citizenship in this connection, as
argued most influentially by T. H. Marshall.

Industrial Capitalism
Another important theory, though, has been that industrial capitalism creates
welfare states. This makes sense, given that the welfare state is typically described
as a state that responds to problems produced by capitalist development. Indus­
trial capitalism has, without doubt, led to massive economic growth, but it has
also generated social and economic changes that have proved dislocating to many
people and many societies. At a very fundamental level, capitalist societies (with
their more advanced economies) have more complex divisions of labor in the
Chapter 4: Political Economy

economy. For example, a few centuries ago the vast majority of working people
in the world were farmers, but today only a small fraction are in the most indus­
trialized nations. This economic change—however much opportunity and
growth it brought—disrupted long-standing social institutions. Thus, in “tradi­
tional” agrarian societies, families played many roles in providing what we may
think of today as government social services: support to the elderly, and some
form of education to the young (with the latter often coming in the form of ex­
perience in farming practices or a trade learned from a family member or close
associate). Meanwhile, religious institutions and norms about charity or alms­
giving would have been the primary means of providing protection to the unfor­
tunate in some places; self-organized mutual-aid associations and community
institutions might have supported the indigent, rather than “the state.” In more
complex economies, as the prospects for growth took off, things changed: more
people went to factories or offices to work, families became more nuclear, and so
on. In this process, institutions such as the family and the church lost some of
their roles to a state that emerged as an important agent in managing the com­
plexity of the economy. In this general sense, capitalism and the attendant com­
plexity of modern society may itself account for the rise of the welfare state.
There are several very distinct theories about how capitalism leads to welfare
states. Some are more Marxist and emphasize a critique of capitalism. Some of
these theories see the welfare state as essentially reactionary. Marx thought that
capitalism would inevitably undermine itself because it would produce larger
groups of impoverished suffering workers who would eventually overthrow the
state. However, some Marxists argue that welfare states involved the co-optation
of workers by the state and the owners of capital, such that “immiseration” did not
proceed as Marx had predicted. In general, the position most closely associated
with Marx on these questions has been that the welfare state as such cannot, in
the end, do away with exploitation, which can only happen with a revolution.12At
the same time, though, many self-described Marxists and others on the left have
been strong proponents of expanding the welfare state on humanitarian grounds.
Scholars with a different ideological orientation have seen a very different
causal relationship between capitalism and the welfare state. Those who lean
more to the right have tended to view the welfare state not as a bulwark against
socialist revolution, but as creeping socialism itself.13 From this point of view, in
societies outside the orbit of the Soviet Union, proponents of socialism have
needed to use the institutions of democratic society to achieve their aims. The
welfare state is, from this point of view, the creation of social actors disaffected
with capitalism and who would end capitalist development if they could.
Finally, another view holds that the welfare state is neither capitalism’s effort
to save itself nor the work of its enemies, but rather a response to the social dis­
locations that industrialization generates. Perhaps it would be better to think of
this position as a range of possible theories or views holding as follows: Industrial
capitalism is indeed central to the development of the welfare state, but this is not
a simple story either of capitalism’s co-optation of the poor or of the poor’s co­
optation of capitalism. Rather, some scholars argue that industrial capitalism
more generally produced such dramatic changes that a new sense of order was
needed.
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Welfare States Emerge? 89

Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy

INSIGHTS
by Joseph Schumpeter

chumpeter, an iconoclastic economist, agreed with Marx that

S
interested in undermining it. Intellectuals in particular, he argued,
capitalism would inevitably undermine itself. However, he would seek to reduce inequality of condition as a way of satisfy­
thought this would happen in a very different way than Marx had ing their envy of society's allegedly most productive members.
forecast. Schumpeter regarded the essence of capitalism as re­ From this point of view, the welfare state is a key mechanism
siding in the entrepreneurial activity of capitalists. Progress is through which non-capitalist actors could be expected to
made because of the "creative destruction" that such activity impose socialism on capitalist societies, through regulation, re­
unleashes as old modes of economic activity are replaced by distributive taxation, and related strategies.
productivity-enhancing new ones. However, according to Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 3rd ed. New York:
Schumpeter, this could not last indefinitely because capitalism is Harper, [1942] 1962.
so successful that it generates powerful social actors who are

Both of the views highlighted in the “Insights” boxes (Schumpeter’s and

Polanyi’s, on the next page) have an affinity with an ideological position.
Schumpeter’s view is essentially critical of the welfare state from the right. Its
proponents would likely advocate shrinking or dismantling the welfare state in the
interest of expanding entrepreneurial activity and the scope of the free market.
Polanyi’s view is more supportive of the welfare state, regarding it as an institution
that helps to make industrial capitalism manageable and livable. (Of course, it is
also possible to offer a critique of the welfare state from the left, with many on the
left supporting the expansion of welfare state functions and more redistribution,
or arguing that the state does not do enough to help the less fortunate.) It is very
important to recognize here that while different theories might have ideological
implications (or policy implications), as comparative political analysts we should
not let these implications drive our research. In other words, the fundamental
causal question here is not “W hat should we do about the welfare state?” but
“Why did it emerge?” We may be motivated by policy outcomes or ideology, but
we benefit from being able to distinguish these from our causal analysis.

Mobilization and Political Action

A number of scholars who are interested in the welfare state are critical of both
sorts of theories mentioned so far (cultural changes and industrial capitalism).
The first focuses on ideas in the creation of welfare states, the second on the
impact of social structures. Where, one might ask, are the actors in these theo­
ries? Those searching for an alternative approach might focus on trying to iden­
tify the key actors in the creation of welfare states and seeing how they are
interested. The main relevant ones to consider would, in the opinion of many
scholars, be more concrete groups that claim to represent economic classes, such
as labor unions and business groups, and the state itself.
In essence, this third theory sees the state as a product of negotiation and
conflict among different interest groups.14 Imagine, for example, an industrial
society with a minimal state. In this society, business leaders exert a strong influ­
ence on politics, using that influence to ensure that the state does not regulate
90 Chapter 4: Political Economy

The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic

INSIGHTS Origins of Our Time
byKarlPolanyi

olanyi argued that economic relationships are always “em­ Polanyi's supposition is essentially that human beings cannot
P bedded” in society more generally. He meant, in essence, that live like this. That is, an economy that is truly "disembedded” from
people's economic behavior could not be fully understood with­ social relations is impossible. Industrial capitalism destroyed old
out understanding its social and cultural context. Economic be­ social relations, but the tendency to establish social relations is
havior is never neutral but is always organized around ideas resilient, and new ones would be rebuilt. A strong welfare state
about the good life and what society ought to ultimately value. linked to liberal democracy was one such strategy. However, it
However, industrial capitalism aimed to "disembed” itself from was not the only one, and Polanyi also thought that the fascist
ordinary social relations. Changing habits and tastes, rural-to-ur- movements of the twentieth century were efforts to reimpose a
ban migration, social mobility, the breakdown of old local and sense of community and embeddedness in the wake of the dis­
religious ties, as well as the loss of traditional methods of eco­ locations provoked by capitalism.
nomic self-support (and social support) accompanied the dizzy­ Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our
ing growth and potential improvement in living standards that Time. 2nded. Boston: Beacon Press, [1994] 2001.
industrial capitalism yielded.

their management of labor. Imagine also that a strong labor movement develops.
Further, some members of the labor movement are proponents of “seizing the
means of production” (e.g., taking over factories) and destroying the position of
business leaders, while others wish to expand their influence and pursue their
interests within the context of the state itself. Finally, imagine that some political
leaders, or perhaps a political party, declare themselves the representatives of
labor. Think about the strategic position of the different actors we have identified
in this simplified story. In narrow terms, the laborers want to expand their inter­
ests, seeking basic rights, higher pay, safer conditions, and perhaps monopolistic
access to certain jobs. The business leaders wish to maintain their interests in the
face of those demands. Political leaders wish to acquire office or stay in office.
To oversimplify a bit, we could say that laborers have two options: to push for
radical social change or to compromise. Business owners face the same sort of
choice: either compromise and accept a moderately redistributive and regulatory
state (but one that is unlikely to dramatically impinge on their interests), or hold
on in efforts to preserve a more minimal state. It is not hard to see how such a
situation could present at least the possibility of a welfare state compromise.
One of the greatest advantages of this general theoretical approach is that
it can potentially explain variation in types of welfare regimes.15 Not all wel­
fare states are the same. Scandinavian welfare states have been very robust and
have retained high popularity with their citizens. Welfare states in France and
Germany have been somewhat more modest, though they too have survived re­
trenchment (efforts to cut back the welfare state) fairly well. The United States
stands out for having a relatively weak welfare state in comparative terms,16with
less generous transfers and a more individualistic orientation: Retrenchment has
been relatively strong in the United States.17 Moreover, much of the state’s wel­
fare functioning targets the middle class and has been “submerged,” in the sense
that its action is partly hidden from the view of the average citizen.18
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Welfare States Emerge? 91

Experts on the welfare state in Japan discuss its structure and efficacy. Even as welfare states experience some difficulties in long­
standing industrial and post-industrial economies, some newly industrializing societies are building their own. Will they look to
Japan and Europe as they do so or develop their own models?

Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism

INSIGHTS
byGesta Esp iiy-ird m e n

sping-Andersen's modern classic is best known for two of its these different regimes developed, and he focuses on “the
E many features. First, it emphasizes “de-commodification” as nature of class mobilization" as well as “class-political coalition
the key goal of welfare states. This draws upon Polanyi's ideas structures" and “the historical legacy of regime institutionaliza­
discussed previously, and certain arguments of Karl Marx: Under tion."'9 Early welfare state development, he argues, depends in
capitalism the individual becomes "commodified"— because part on the class position of farmers. In Scandinavia, small farm­
workers sell their labor for wages in the labor market— and this is ers developed a coalition with urban workers. In mature welfare
thought to be de-humanizing. Esping-Andersen argues that wel­ state development in the post-war period, the position of the
fare regimes, through providing for basic human needs, push middle class is key. In Scandinavia, the middle class emerged as
back against the commodification of persons. part of the welfare state coalition. In some other societies, it was
Esping-Andersen's second contribution is to argue that three more ambivalent. Moreover, these processes are path depen­
main types of welfare regimes developed in the twentieth cen­ dent. The type of welfare state created in Scandinavia not only
tury: (1) liberal regimes in places like the United Kingdom and the owed its success to middle class support, but it was structured in
United States, (2) corporatist regimes as developed in continen­ such a way as to retain that support. Other welfare states might
tal Europe, and (3) social democratic regimes as developed in have been institutionally designed in ways that would later pro­
Scandinavia. They vary in the extent to which they successfully duce political weaknesses.
resist the commodification of citizens, with social democratic re­ Cetsta Esping-Andersen, Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton: Princeton

gimes being most successful. Further, he tries to explain why University Press, 1990.
92 Chapter 4: Political Economy

Any fully satisfactory theory of the emergence of the welfare state should be
able to account for these sorts of variations. The theories just discussed can try, if
they can show that the independent variables they are interested in vary in ways
th^t match the pattern. For example, such a theory could potentially explain the
varied paths of welfare states by talking about different forms of capitalism or
different timing of industrialization. But actor-centered theories are poised to
offer detailed accounts of variation in welfare state regimes. They can point to
differences in, for example, (1) the relative power, size, and interests of actors
such as labor and business interests; (2) different institutional features of the state
that can facilitate or impede certain types of compromise; or (3) different organi­
zational methods for aggregating interests, such as parties or labor unions, with
varying capacity to mobilize.
Another advantage of actor-centered theories is that they seem more capable
of handling contingencies and exogenous shocks to political development.
A critical juncture in the creation of European welfare states was the dual shock
of the Great Depression and the Second World War. Think about how these
events might have changed (1) the willingness of key groups, such as the middle
class, to participate in a welfare-state-supporting coalition and (2) the ability of
the welfare state, once created, to maintain such a coalition by maximizing mid­
dle-class interests. Note that structural factors from industrial capitalism are not
missing from this account, and that ideas can be brought into such theories as
well. For example, many analysts see Keynesian economics and its focus on gov­
ernment management of the business cycle as having an affinity with the welfare
state. The rise of Keynesian policies in the post-Depression world also likely con­
tributed to the welfare state’s institutionalization.

International Learning Effects

A final theory that should be considered may be especially useful for understand­
ing how and why welfare states have proliferated, expanded, and propagated
across the world. We will not fully understand how welfare states emerged and
took shape around the world if we think about countries operating in a vacuum.
Rather, countries may alter their welfare states based on experiences they observe
elsewhere, because other countries may provide examples of good practices or
cautionary tales about what not to do. From the beginnings of the welfare state
in the late 1800s, countries have looked to other countries’ experiences, some­
times emulating them, sometimes avoiding them, and sometimes adapting inter­
national experiences to local realities. At present, states in Asia are rapidly taking
on many of the functions performed by welfare states in the world’s wealthiest
regions such as Europe; in so doing, the Asian states are building in a matter of
perhaps a decade what took “Western” countries many decades to build.20
This idea that countries “learn” from one another is not to imply that late-
developing welfare states like those in Asia simply mimic what happened in
Europe or other advanced, Western economies. First, countries may adapt the
form and functioning of the welfare state to local realities. For instance, there is
evidence that Japan’s welfare state gave a greater role to the family than was the
case in Western Europe, and that Asian countries attempted to adapt the welfare
state to respond to the decline in the size of families and households (given the
 Welfare States in the Nordic Countries: What Can We Learn and How? 93

importance of these foundational social units in Asia, as elsewhere) during a

period of rapid industrialization after World War II.21 Similarly, international
“learning” can flow from successful experiments in lower-income developing
countries; it is not simply a matter of the poor countries learning from the rich. A
recent example is seen in the experiences with so-called conditional cash transfers
in Latin America, which are cash payouts to citizens (often low-income citizens)
that are conditional on the citizen undertaking certain actions. In Brazil, a pro­
gram known as Bolsa Familia provides cash to low-income Brazilians as long as
they keep their children in school and up-to-date on vaccinations. Such policies
have also flourished in Mexico, among other countries. In addition to some evi­
dence of poverty reduction, initial experiences with these programs have gener­
ated policy interest in other countries across Latin America, and in other regions
of the world as well that have considered “learning” from existing programs.
As is the case with many theories, this one about international learning ef­
fects can be combined with other theories discussed in this chapter. For instance,
the rapid emergence of welfare states in Asia in recent years may be linked to the
rise of industrial capitalism in that region, or it may be a response to the mobili­
zation of important political actors in Asia, or changing notions of citizenship in
that part of the world. The emphasis is not on one theory to the exclusion of
others, but on understanding how each might contribute to our overall under­
standing of the emergence of the variety of welfare state programs observed
around the world today.

THINKING
Welfare States in the Nordic Countries: COM PARATIVELY
What Can We Learn and How?
or many social scientists, the goal of a research project is to test a hypothesis
F and, using evidence (often from case studies), to reach a conclusion. Ideally,
that conclusion will help inform more general theories about the way the world
KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

Formulating
works. However, not every good piece of research will result in a clean test of a Hypotheses
hypothesis. In many instances, good research will delve into the particular expe­ Formulating a hypothesis is one of
the most important steps in com­
rience of a case study, noting factors that seem relevant in understanding that
parative analysis. Usually, analysts '
case. This process may generate a hypothesis for future use, rather than be a full generate hypotheses deductively from
hypothesis test itself. a theory. This means teasing out
In formulating hypotheses about causation, it is important to keep your focus specific and testable claims that

on the evidence from the cases you examine. As an example, let’s consider what logically follow from the theory and
that can be judged in relation to
we might learn from investigating Nordic countries such as Denmark, Norway,
empirical evidence. Sometimes,
and Sweden. The welfare state is reasonably large and sophisticated in these though, analysts proceed inductively.
countries. We will consider how to move from that basic empirical observation This means thinking about how a
toward hypothesis generation, hypothesis testing, and theory building. Let’s say theory could potentially account for

you read Esping-Andersen’s account (see the “Insights” box on Three Worlds of observable features of a case or set of
cases. But the method of formulating
Welfare Capitalism) and focus on Sweden. You learn that Sweden has a relatively
a hypothesis is less important than
robust welfare state of the “social democratic” variety; according to existing the rigor of efforts to objectively test
theory, this is due to the nature of class coalitions at certain key moments in the that hypothesis.
country’s history. Consider a few options for how one might develop a research
project from this observation, and think about which add the most value.
94 Chapter 4: Political Economy

THINKING Option 1: You discover that a different country Esping-Andersen didn’t consider
(say, Finland) has a robust welfare state that seems consistent with the “Scandi­
COM PARATIVELY
navian” model. You consider the author’s argument (“class coalitions help explain
welfare states”) and seek evidence to test the hypothesis about the role of class
coalitions on this new case of Finland.
Option 2: You study further on Sweden, reading the entirety of Esping-Andersen’s
analysis. You follow the footnotes and bibliographic resources. Through this con­
siderable work, you discover ample confirming evidence for the author’s argument.
You then declare that you have rigorously tested Esping-Andersen’s hypothesis
using the Swedish case.
Option 3: You discover that another country (say, Brazil) has a growing welfare
state, but you notice that a major factor in its creation seems to be a desire to promote
rapid economic growth. You treat this as a hypothesis that could be tested in Sweden
(and other countries) to rival Esping-Andersen’s “class coalitions” hypothesis.
Does any of these options make more or less sense to you as a research agenda?
Each may be a good learning exercise. Certainly option 1 sounds like a good op­
portunity to use a case study to test a hypothesis you have drawn from the aca­
demic literature. Now look at option 2 more carefully, and see what is limited
about it. Are you really “testing the hypothesis”? It sounds as if you generated a
hypothesis based on the case of Sweden, and then proceeded to test that hypoth­
esis using the case o f ... Sweden. You are really using the same evidence to repli­
cate the analysis that Esping-Andersen did. (To be sure, being able to “replicate”
existing studies is important, but option 2 is quite different from rigorously test­
ing a hypothesis or examining a case afresh using new evidence.) To contribute
toward building a theory of the causes of the welfare state, it might be more
helpful to see if hypotheses generated from the Swedish case work in other cases
(option 1). Conversely, you might see if hypotheses generated from other cases
can help explain the Swedish case. This latter possibility leads us to option 3—a
good and promising avenue for research. By looking at Brazil, you might discover
a new factor that seemed to contribute to welfare state development in that coun­
try. This in turn might help in reexamining or rethinking the original Swedish
case, which could help build a better theory of the welfare state overall.
Let’s look at option 3 a bit more. Ask yourself, Would it be fair to say you
“tested the hypothesis” that the desire to promote economic growth leads to the
growth of the welfare state, using Brazil as your case? Not really. This is the same
logic behind what limits option 2: you can’t really say you are testing a hypothesis
using the same evidence from which the hypothesis is generated. If one case study
leads you to a certain argument, that can generate a hypothesis for testing on
future cases. That is different from a true hypothesis test, in which you make a
prediction before knowing the empirical realities of the case.
We want to emphasize here that generating hypotheses can itself be a contri­
bution to the advancement of political science. That is, not every contribution in
the discipline takes the form of a hypothesis test or theory building; it is some­
times useful to make empirical observations that generate hypotheses for future
testing (perhaps helping us redefine our terms as well). One or more well-done
case studies that generate hypotheses for future testing can represent an impor­
tant contribution and step forward.
 Chapter Review 95

Ch ap ter Su m m ary
Concepts States perform a number of key functions in the economy,
Key concepts and measures from political economy include including but not limited to economic management,
gross domestic product (GDP), gross national income (GNI), investment in education and health, and welfare state
inequality and the GINI coefficient, employment, unemploy­ provision.
ment, underemployment, inflation, deflation, hyperinflation,
and fiscal measures. Causes and Effects
• Three main theories of the rise of welfare states emphasize (a)
Types cultural changes, (b) industrial capitalism, and (c) mobilization
• There are two major contrasting perspectives on how politi­ and political action.
cal economy works: one that emphasizes the importance of
free markets, and one that emphasizes the actions and Thinking Comparatively
powers of states in promoting economic growth. Many We considered the Nordic welfare state model in thinking
. scholars argue that both markets and well-coordinated state about how to develop a research agenda.
action are the keys to political economic success.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. Consider the various political economy indicators offered in the development of the welfare state in the United States, and why?
"Types" section of the chapter. Do you think some of these are What, if any, are the special features of welfare state develop­
more relevant than others? If you were “ranking" countries' po­ ment in the United States that need to be explained, and how
litical economies, which of these would take precedence for you well can each theory address these features?
in evaluating how countries are performing? Noting that GDP 4. Many argue that the welfare state is now in crisis. What would
per capita and GDP growth are the most commonly used indi­ each of the theories of the welfare state's emergence suggest
cators, are there any reasons to argue for an alternative indicator, about the likelihood of the survival of welfare states?
on economic, political, or moral grounds? 5. Given that welfare state functions became common in ad­
2. One of the central debates in political economy and develop­ vanced industrial societies in the middle of the twentieth cen­
ment (as seen in the next chapter) is about the relative roles of tury, do you think that these functions ought to be incorporated
the "market" and the "state" in promoting growth and economic into the concept of strong states? In other words, can a contem­
performance. Which of those arguments is the more intuitive to porary state be strong without performing welfare state func­
you? What evidence supports that argument, and what evi­ tions, or does failure to provide welfare benefits make a state
dence have you seen that challenges it? relatively weak by definition?
3. Test the theories of the establishment of welfare states against
your knowledge of U.S. history. Which theory best explains the
 CHAPTER 5

Development

0 The military border between North and South Korea. These two countries vary markedly in their political, economic, and social development. Why
might this be so?
T
he countries of N orth and South Korea are separated by a “Military
Demarcation Line” that is heavily fortified and tense. Yet the peoples of
these two states are separated by more than this: dramatic differences in
health, life expectancy, infant mortality, levels of education, prospects for
advancement, access to information, and the freedom to participate in politi­
cal life. North of the line, indicators of all these good things are very poor,
and below them, astonishingly good. W hat makes this comparison still more
interesting is how recently this profound divergence occurred.
The comparison of North and South Korea is potentially
IN THIS CHAPTER
instructive in its own right, but it is just one example of a general
Concepts 97
situation that interests scholars of comparative politics who
Types 98
focus on development: Some countries are incredibly rich and
Poverty 98
give their citizens high “capability” to achieve the ends they set Social Outcomes and Human
for themselves,1 and others are poor, leaving their citizens with Development 99

far fewer resources and opportunities. The hope of comparative Gender Relations and Racial and Ethnic
Identities 100
political analysts is that we can help explain why, and that in Satisfaction and Happiness 101
doing so we will help citizens and policymakers maximize their Cultural Development 102
own chances. Sustainability 103
North and South Korea are clearly different on various Causes and Effects: Why Does Development
indicators, ranging from economic growth to poverty levels to Happen? 103
Institutions: The Market-State Debate,
citizens’ opportunities. In this chapter, we examine the differ­ Revisited 104
ing ways development can be understood. We begin by look­ Institutions: Beyond the Market-State
ing at the concept of “development,” focusing on the most Debate 106

commonly used definition of the term, which is overall income. Culture and Development 107
Systems and Structures: International
The subsequent section, “Types,” highlights the many other
and Domestic 110
forms and definitions of development, including other eco­
nomic outcomes, more social indicators, and even measures of THINKING COM PARATIVELY

cultural values and ecological sustainability. The “Causes and Explaining the Development of North
and South Korea 114
Effects” section then explores the various theories that seek to
explain why development happens. In the “Thinking Com­ C A S E S IN CON TEXT
paratively” section at the end, we return to this example from India Brazil • Nigeria • China
the two Koreas to illustrate how we might use comparative
case studies to test hypotheses for why development happens.

97
98 Chapter 5: Development

Concepts
development A process by Development is a complex concept, and there is heated disagreement about what
which a society changes or counts as development and what does not. For example, would you say an oil-rich
advances, often measured in terms country such as Saudi Arabia is experiencing development if its economy is growing
of economic growth, but also rapidly but nearly all of the benefits of that growth are going to a small number of
sometimes measured in terms of elites? Would you say that a country is developing if people are not getting wealthier
quality of life, standard of living, but are living longer, healthier lives? What about a country like China, where
access to freedoms and wealth is increasing for many people, and poverty is declining fast, but the environ­
opportunities, or other indicators. ment is being damaged severely? The indicators of development outlined in this
section range from narrow macroeconomic indicators, such as economic growth, to
social indicators, such as cultural development, that are more difficult to measure.
As you read them, consider which best captures for you the idea of development.
The first and most straightforward sort of development to consider is eco­
nomic growth, or increases in a country’s overall level of economic activity.
Beyond growth of the overall economy, development may also be evaluated using
other economic and social indicators, including income inequality, poverty levels,
and the standard of living. We could even define development in political terms,
saying a country is more developed when it becomes more democratic, though we
will leave this topic to the next chapter.
The simplest indicator of a country’s economic development is how much the
economy produces, or how much income its people earn. As noted in chapter 4,
this can be measured using such indicators as gross domestic product (GDP) or
gross national income (GNI). Here we will not discuss all of the various eco­
nomic indicators that could be used to evaluate development, since several were
explored in the “Concepts” section of chapter 4. However, in the next section we
consider some major ways that development has been evaluated in lower-income
countries, beyond the economic indicators already examined. These include
questions of poverty and inequality, such as whether people of different races and
genders have comparable access to economic and social opportunities, and over­
all well-being. We consider social indicators (such as, health and education), and
how or whether development can be compatible with environmental sustainabil­
ity and respect for distinct cultural values in an age of global interactions.

Types
As noted previously, there are many ways of understanding and measuring develop­
ment beyond income per capita, and we examine some of these here. We still con­
sider some economic measures related to how income is distributed in a population.
Yet we also look at other possible ways of understanding development. One is to
poverty The state of being poor,
focus on more social indicators, such as those based on health, education, and other
as measured by low income,

deprivation, lack of access to

measurements of quality of life or standard of living. Another is to think about
whether a society treats different groups equally (such as men and women, or major­
resources, or limited economic
opportunities.
ity and minority ethnic groups). Finally, we will consider the relationship between
development and issues such as environmental sustainability and cultural autonomy.
poverty line A specified
threshold below which individuals Poverty
or groups are judged to be in Poverty is usually measured with respect to an established poverty line, a basic
poverty. level of income needed to maintain a reasonable standard of living in a given
 Types 99

CASE IN CONTEXT

What Explains India's Recent Growth? PAGE 463

India is a country that in recent years has achieved consistently For more on Indian development, see the case study in Part VI,
strong growth but that nevertheless still has a large population p. 463. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
suffering from extreme poverty. In many ways, India's develop­ 1. Why was India's performance so poor for so long, and
ment story has been idiosyncratic, above all because the country why did it finally take off?
became the world's biggest democracy decades before achiev­ 2. Was democracy bad for India's economic development?
ing strong growth. Ordinarily, as we discuss in chapter 6, the 3. What are the prospects for India's poor in the coming
opposite is the case, and economic development precedes years?
democratization.

country. Traditionally, major international agencies such as the World Bank and
the United Nations Development Programme have used about one dollar or
$1.25 per day (per person) as the absolute poverty threshold worldwide, though absolute poverty A conception
in recent years some have turned to a two-dollars-per-day threshold. There has of poverty that involves setting a

also been an effort to expand the criteria for measuring poverty, taking into ac­ certain line below which people

count additional indicators such as access to public services and public goods. will be defined as poor, typically

Poverty may be understood as an income measure, but also as a measure of understood in terms of the inability

whether people have access to health care and education.2 The number of people to purchase a certain set of basic

facing absolute poverty is about one billion worldwide.3 goods or services.

Poverty lines may also be measured by individual countries, and each country
may do so in different ways.4 In the United States, for example, the poverty line
is defined for households and families of different sizes, and is recalculated on a
regular basis to reflect the cost of living. The U.S. poverty line for 2015 is $11,770
for a single person under the age of 65.5However, looking at only the poverty line
does not indicate poverty depth, or how far someone is below the poverty line. It
is simple just to count the number of people living below the line, but a person
with income of $11,769 will be counted the same as someone with $8,000 or less,
even though there is clearly a difference in how deeply someone is in poverty in
the two cases.

Social Outcomes and Human Development

Several indicators of an individual’s overall well-being and standard of living are
not based only on income and macroeconomic performance. They may be termed life expectancy The average age
human capital because they represent the accumulated skills and investments until which members of a society

people have made in their own capacities. Health is perhaps the most fundamen­ (or some group within society) live.

tal aspect of human capital. It can be measured by a number of instruments.

One is life expectancy, or the age to which a given person may expect to live,
infant mortality A major public

depending on the circumstances into which they were born. Another is infant
health indicator, which typically

mortality, often measured as the percentage of children who do not survive to measures the number of infants

per 1,000 born that do not survive

the age of one. Other health measures include: infection and morbidity rates for until the age of one year.
different diseases, and accessibility of health care and health insurance coverage.
Education is a second major aspect of human capital. The most significant mea­ literacy rate The percentage of a
sures are literacy rates and school enrollment and completion. The quality of population who can read.
100 Chapter 5: Development

education is important as well, as the standardized scores of youth on math and

science tests are often compared across countries, for example.
Some analysts who want to define development broadly have aimed to capture
the “standard of living.” These often use some of the indicators just discussed.
One of the most commonly used measures of standard of living around the world
Human Development Index (HDD is the United Nations’ annual Human Development Index (HDI). This brings
A composite measure developed together income with life expectancy and educational measures (literacy and
by the United Nations to provide a school enrollments) in a single index to give a broad view of development and
broad view of annual development well-being.
and well-being around the world, Standards of living often go along with (or are positively correlated with) other
based on income, life expectancy, indicators of development. Yet the evidence suggests that inequality actually in­
and literacy and school creases as income increases at certain stages of economic development, specifically
enrollments. in moving from low-income stages of development (where nearly everyone is
poor) to middle-income stages (where a fraction of the population grows wealth­
ier and the remainder does not see much increase). Conversely, some societies
(such as Cuba and the state of Kerala in India), have aimed to increase access to
education and health without necessarily doing so via increasing the personal in­
comes of their citizens.6 There are many routes to improving standards of living
and reducing poverty, but many countries remain behind. In many African coun­
tries, such as Nigeria, for example, standards of living and human development
remain lower than in wealthier countries (see the “Case in Context” box).

Gender Relations and Racial and Ethnic Identities

In recent years, scholars have begun to break down statistics by groups, and a
leading example is gender. We now recognize that a society with large differences
in life expectancies between men and women, for instance, may be seen as a less
developed society than one where life chances are more equitable. We examine
gender and politics in depth in a later chapter, but note here that gender matters
for development in two major ways: It is both a means to development and one of
the ends of development.7In terms of ends, we might define development to say it
occurs when economic and social opportunities are available to women and men
alike. Regardless of how well a country’s economy does, that society might not be
considered developed if its women are not allowed to own property, or hold jobs
outside the home, or voice their opinions.8In terms of means, gender also matters
because empowering women in particular helps advance other aspects of develop­
ment. Well-known examples include the benefits of extending education and
small business loans (sometimes as little as $25 or less) to women in low-income
countries. These small changes often have the effect of increasing women’s in­
comes, which in turn typically results in households making more resources
available for nutrition, family health care, and children’s education. Indeed, evi­
dence suggests that women, on average, are more likely than men to invest scarce
resources in their families (and, thus, in human capital).
Major differences in development levels of other population groups may also
be an indicator of development (see Table 5.1). If certain racial or ethnic minori­
ties are systematically deprived of the opportunity to participate equally in the
economy, we can argue that development is incomplete. This gap between iden­
tity groups may not always be captured by economic statistics like GDP,
 Types 101

CASE IN CONTEXT

W hy Are Natural Resources Sometimes a Curse?

The Nigerian Case PAGE 518

Nigeria has some of the largest oil deposits in the world. So it

must be a rich country, right? Actually, Nigeria remains one of the
poorest countries in the world. While the Nigerian economy is
one of the most important in Africa, historically it has performed
poorly. Perhaps surprisingly, this may be because of the oil. A
number of scholars have argued that countries like Nigeria suffer
from what is sometimes called the resource curse, as oil or other
high-value commodities can potentially produce corruption, dis­
tort the formation and functioning of key institutions, crowd out
investment in other areas, and affect a country's currency in
negative ways.
For more on Nigerian economic development and the re­
source curse, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 518-519. As you
read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. How has oil helped, and how has it hurt, Nigerian
development?
2. What policies might the Nigerian case suggest to the
leaders of a country that has just discovered large oil
deposits? Natural gas burns as oil is welled in the Niger Delta region in
3. If oil.is so bad, why is Norway not poor like Nigeria? Nigeria. Nigeria is a major oil producer, and yet its population
(Or does this indicate that other factors are involved?) remains among the world's poorest.

inequality, and poverty, and it may go beyond political rights as well. South
Africa under the official racism of apartheid (1948-1994) was one example.
Blacks certainly had lower incomes than whites, and no political rights to speak
of, but they also suffered from separate and inferior systems of education, health
care, and housing. Under apartheid, South Africa had higher average social indi­
cators than most other African countries, but its inequalities were especially
shocking. Unfortunately, however, disparities in development based on discrimi­
nation on the basis of race, ethnicity, and gender are not only found in extreme
cases like apartheid-era South Africa.

Satisfaction and Happiness

For many people, development is really about each person’s satisfaction or happi­
ness in life. Understanding development in these terms recognizes that income is
a means to an end, and not an end in itself. People usually seek higher incomes
because it gives them access to other things they desire, or the opportunity to
consume things they like, such as good food, or better housing, or access to
higher education, or luxury items, or a vacation. The most fundamental concept
in economics for measuring people’s ability to fulfill their preferences is not
102 Chapter 5: Development

table 5.1 Measures of Human Capital

Life Expectancy Infant Mortality Human Development
Country (at Birth) (in years) (per 1,000 live births) Literacy Rate (%) Index (HDD Rank

Brazil 73.9 14 90.4 79

China 75.3 14 95.1 91

France 81.8 4 >99 20

Germany 80.7 4 >99 6

India 66.4 56 62.8 135

Iran 74.0 18 85.0 75

Japan 83.6 3 > 99 17

Mexico 77.5 16 93.5 71

Nigeria 52.5 124 51.1 152

Russia 68.0 10 >99 57

South Korea 81.5 4 >99 15

United Kingdom 80.5 5 >99 14

United States 78.9 7 > 99 5

Source: United Nations Human Development Report 2014.

utility The value that people income, but utility. Utility gives a notion of the value people derive from con-
derive from resources to which suming or having access to that which pleases them. If I like Coca-Cola more
they have access. than Pepsi Cola, I will “derive more utility” from drinking a Coca-Cola, while a
friend who prefers Pepsi to Coke “gets more utility” from a Pepsi. In short, we
care about life satisfaction, quality of life, and happiness.
Happiness comes from more than just consuming goods and services. It may
come from having free time, or social status, or strong ties to family and friends,
or from living a spiritually fulfilling life. Social scientists face major challenges
in trying to measure human happiness, but they continue to make efforts. In
recent years, the mountainous nation of Bhutan (in the Himalayas) has made a
splash internationally by publishing its own measures of “Gross National Happi­
ness.” Increasingly, more countries and more scholars are following suit, and even
China, Canada, France, and the United Kingdom have recently begun to think
about how to measure their peoples’ happiness.

Cultural Development
For many people around the world, development might mean retaining and
deepening one’s own culture. In this view, economic modernization does not
necessarily improve a society: If economic growth brings commercialization and
cultural disintegration, some people(s) will wish to have none of it, and will
 Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 103

prefer to define development as exercising the right to self-determination, living

autonomously from the rest of the world, and enjoying the rich cultural tradi­
tions they hold dear. Perhaps an indigenous group will wish to protect its own
language and folk traditions while avoiding the influences of Hollywood and
“Western values.” For many people, “development” might not even be a positive
word, but might instead signify a push by outsiders—intentional or unintentional—
to undermine local practices.9 Increasingly, many researchers, sensitive to these
concerns, argue that citizens of the countries we study should play a central role
in defining development goals. The desire to protect traditional cultures is not
limited to small and remote indigenous groups, but can also be seen in many
modern nations wrestling with questions of growth and development, such as
France (as seen in the case study on globalization in chapter 16).

Sustainability
Finally, environmental sustainability is an important aspect of development. environmental sustainability
With increasing attention to the issue of climate change, many development The quality that one or another
scholars are attempting to understand development as that which is sustainable. practice has with being compatible
Sustainable development can be defined as development that conserves resources with the long-term health of the
to respect the needs of future generations. Only by stewarding its resources ef­ environment.
fectively and not depleting them too rapidly will any society remain viable over
the long run. In order to incorporate sustainability into development discussions,
some scholars have even proposed replacing GDP with new measures that ac­
count for the use of resources. They note that cutting down a tree increases GDP,
as does polluting, even though these activities may be “using up” a society’s natu­
ral endowments.10 We discuss the concept and the challenge of sustainability in
the concluding chapter. Among the main political challenges in promoting sus­
tainable development are the difficulties of securing collective action between
many countries when each country has incentives to “free ride” on the efforts of
others.

Causes and Effects: Why Does

Development Happen?
To examine the causes of development, we focus mainly on GDP growth per
capita, for two reasons. First, as noted earlier, these measures are the most com­
monly used in studies of development. Second, GDP growth per capita often
goes hand-in-hand with several other indicators of development listed previously.
In particular, countries that grow in terms of GDP per capita often also advance
on other social indicators, with improved health, more education, higher levels of
happiness, and reductions in poverty. O f course, this is not true in all cases, and
rising GDP is not the only determinant of these other indicators, but it is true
quite often. For this reason, and since it is more comprehensive than many of
those other indicators, development scholars often use it when they’re seeking a
single indicator. That said, there can be trade-offs between GDP growth and
other indicators, such as inequality, as we have noted, and GDP/capita certainly
does not capture every dimension of development. These strengths and limita­
tions of the measure should be kept in mind.
104 Chapter 5: Development

The central question here is why economies grow, diversify, and become more
productive and successful. W hat allows countries to essentially liberate people
from their small farming plots to work in cities, factories, law offices, research
labs, banks, and hospitals? Why have people and societies been able to accumu­
late capital that they can use to foster even more productive economic activity?
The answers to these questions are debated extensively, and several theories have
arisen to explain them. We group the focal points of these theories into four
categories:
1. the role of the market and the state in promoting development, a topic we
explored in the previous chapter in the context of “developed” countries;
2. institutions such as legal rules and social norms that shape the behavior of
economic actors;
3. cultural values; and
4. the domestic and international structures that condition development, in­
cluding a country’s place in the international system.

Institutions: The Market-State Debate, Revisited

A leading institutional argument about the causes of development reflects a
major debate in political economy, which we emphasized in chapter 4. The issue
market-led development is the relative merits of market-led development versus state-led development.
An approach to economic According to the pro-market argument, individual decisions of free and inde­
management in which the state pendent economic agents will lead to a more efficient allocation of resources. As
aims to control economic behavior people try to maximize their own gains, the society as a whole becomes better
as little as possible. off. Allowing the market to work freely leads to prosperity.
On the other side of the debate, advocates for state-led approaches argue that
state-led development
development requires an actor capable of coordinating disparate agents, planning
An approach to economic
for the long term, and supplying capital for big development pushes in low-
management in which the state
income countries. The argument goes that the state is uniquely suited to per­
plays a prominent role in
forming this task. This perspective was especially prominent immediately after
coordinating the behavior of
World War II, when Europe was reconstructed and new states emerged from
economic actors and intervening in
colonialism around the globe. Development scholars envisioned a “big push” in
the economy.
development in the world’s poorer countries, where massive state-led investment
would generate a virtuous circle of self-sustaining growth.11
In subsequent years, East Asia was the most rapidly growing region in the
world. Statist scholars argued that the success in that region was due to timely
and constructive state involvement in the economy, not free markets. Begin­
ning with Japan immediately after World War II—and then extending to South
Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere into East and Southeast Asia—the “Asian
Tigers” offered compelling evidence. In these cases, active involvement by
well-organized and capable states helped direct investment to productive enter­
prises. Effective states helped propel these economies to growth rates that
sometimes exceeded 8 percent to 10 percent per year. Similarly, statists might
attribute China’s current growth to a state that maintains a steady hand in the
economy.
State-led approaches to development were popular from the 1950s to the
1970s, but the arguments for market-led development returned to prominence in
the 1980s and 1990s. For several decades after World War II, the state played a
 Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 105

leading role in the economies of many developing countries, from Japan to India
to Brazil to much of Africa. In some countries, this role was inspired or encour­
aged by the apparent economic, military, and technological success of the Soviet
Union in the 1950s and 1960s, and by the easy availability of loans in the 1970s.
In the early 1980s, however, many Latin American countries in particular suf­
fered from economic crises driven by accumulated debts. Less than a decade
later, communism collapsed in Central Europe and the Soviet Union broke apart
(see the country profile on Russia). These events led to a sense in many advanced
capitalist countries that communism and state planning as an economic model
had been discredited.
At this time, many prominent institutions advocated for economic liberaliza­
tion in developing countries, or moves toward free-market economics. Major
proponents of this approach included the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank, based in Washington, D.C. These organizations arranged
loans to many developing countries that faced economic difficulties. The loans
were conditional upon those countries opening up to freer trade and flows of
capital, and often to reductions in the role of the government in the economy. The
1980s and the 1990s were times when many developing countries moved toward
more free-market systems, with the main questions being how far and how fast
these changes would be made.
In more recent years, the debate has shifted once again for a couple of reasons.
First, the turn toward free market economics led to critiques of how the free market
performed. In many countries, reducing the role of the state in the economy was
associated with the losses of formal jobs (or increases in unemployment and under­
employment), a rise in inequality, and even crises such as hyperinflation. Second,
evidence began to accumulate that “state-led” or “state-directed” development had
worked effectively in certain places, namely where the quality and professionalism

How Did China Become an Economic Power? PAGE 420

China's development has been dizzyingly rapid in the last thirty- 2. Is China's recent success in development a simple story of
five years. The country's economic performance was largely the state getting out of the way and letting markets do
quite poor through most of the twentieth century, but after a their work, or is it more complicated?
series of reforms beginning in 1978 and 1979, the Chinese econ­ 3. How might we explain the emergence of the reforms that
omy took off. The country is now often referred to as the "global began in 1978 and 1979? In other words, why did China
factory," and it now rivals the United States for the title of the reform?
world's largest economy. 4. What sorts of challenges does the Chinese economy face
For more on Chinese development, see the case study in in the medium-term future?
Part VI, pp. 420-421. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. What factors— political, institutional, and cultural— likely
contributed to poor growth in China in the years when
Mao Zedong held power?
106 Chapter 5: Development

of the state was high. Thus, a theory emerged that the quality of the state might
matter more than the quantity of the state in determining how an economy devel­
ops. High levels of performance in several East Asian countries over several de­
cades—and by China in the 2000s and 2010s—showed that some of the strongest
performing economies may exhibit relatively high levels of state involvement.
As noted in the previous chapter, the discussion about the role of markets and
states is generally a matter of degree. Even most strong advocates of market-led
development would prefer the existence of a state that is capable of ensuring a
rule of law, enforcing contracts between private actors, and providing law and
order. (For instance, almost no one would favor a situation of stateless “anarchy”
as recently existed in Somalia.) And even strong advocates of state-led develop­
ment frequently acknowledge that free markets can be a very useful feature in
part of the economy. (Most statists would not favor totalitarian state control of all
economic activity, as might be most approximated in North Korea.)
Finally, as you consider this key debate, keep in mind that many scholars of
development will have different outcomes in mind. Many may be focused on
economic growth, while some may be focused on explaining the degree of pov­
erty reduction in a country. Others will look at inequality, still others at human
opportunities more broadly, and yet others at the environmental sustainability or
institution A regularized or
cultural appropriateness of “development.” Consider whether different measures
patterned activity that shapes the
of development might influence one’s evaluation of different development
behavior of individuals and groups,
strategies—and if so, how.
including formal organizations like
the state or political parties, as well
as more informal institutions such
Institutions: Beyond the Market-State Debate
Development takes place over long periods of time, and the state and the market
as norms and values.
are not the only things that make it happen. Other institutions also matter.
new institutionalism The name By institutions, political scientists mean the many features of a society that
given to the turn to institutional shape peoples’ behavior and actions, as discussed in the previous chapter and
theory in the last several decades later chapters. The new institutional framework focuses on a broader set of
in economics, political science, and institutions.
sociology. To use an example, consider the institution of property rights. In societies
where an individual’s right to private property is well established and secure, in­
institutionalism An approach to
dividuals are likely to behave in ways that promote development. On the other
theorizing in comparative politics
hand, if property rights are not secure, development may be hindered. Imagine
and related fields that places
you have a house and a few acres for growing crops. If the government can seize
emphasis on the power of
your house at any time, or if squatters can simply take over your land, then you
institutions to shape the behavior
of individuals..
will be unlikely to invest a lot of money in your house, or in making your land
more productive. Were private property secure, on the other hand, you might be
rational institutionalism likelier to make those investments. And so too might your neighbors. This would
An approach to theorizing in lead to a society that is more economically secure. According to this argument,
comparative politics and related the institution of strong property rights would promote investment because it
fields that places emphasis on the allows individuals to reap the rewards of their investments in the long run.12
power of institutions to shape the The institution-based approach to comparative politics, or institutionalism,
behavior of individuals, one which has several strains. Rational institutionalism holds that political and economic
often focuses on implications of outcomes are functions of individuals’ responses to their institutional environ­
institutions for individuals' strategic ments. Rational institutionalists emphasize economic logics, and many of these
choices. scholars would be found engaging the debate about states and markets
 Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 107

State-Directed Development: Political Power

INSIGHTS and Industrialization in the Global Periphery
by Atul Kohli

tul Kohli works to overcome the "state-market divide" by ex­ business— and notes that where these pull in the same direction,
A plaining successful economic development as a function of development occurs, but where the two horses pull in opposite
both the public sector and private capitalist enterprise. Kohli has directions, the chariot will not move (or may topple). Kohli uses the
argued for the importance of understanding state capacity (as de­ case of Korea to show success and Brazil as a moderate success,
fined in the previous chapter) and the importance of constructive but highlights the African case of Nigeria as a failed economy
state intervention, and places the state prominently in the title of where the state does not work to promote private enterprise.
the book, but not to the exclusion of private actors. He uses the Atul Kohli, State-Directed Development: Political Power and Industrialization in
metaphor of a chariot pulled by two horses— the state and private the Global Periphery. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

mentioned previously. Historical institutionalism also finds that institutions

historical institutionalism An
matter but traces these consequences through time, showing how historical
approach to theorizing that places
changes shape future events. For historical institutionalists, the timing and se­
emphasis on the power of institu­
quencing of events matters, as do specific circumstances that may arise at “critical
tions to shape the behavior of
junctures” in time, when a country may take any number of different paths.13 The
reason historical trajectories are so important is that changes are path dependent: individuals, and how this operates
overtime.
The farther a society goes down a certain path, the less and less likely it is to di­
verge from that path. For example, if a country develops by privileging a number path dependent The name given
of state-linked businesses, it will be hard for the government to change this with­ to historical processes in which
out some sort of crisis. History is “sticky,” and cannot be easily reversed. Histori­ future developments are shaped or
cal institutionalists also tend to focus on how institutions produce collective partially determined by events at
actors and organize interests, in contrast to the individualist tendency of rational previous stages in those processes.
institutionalism. Institutionalists argue that development is shaped by the insti­
tutions in place, by how institutions are created, and by how they evolve over the
long run. The preceding example of property rights could be seen as involving
both rational institutional and historical institutional approaches, and a major
recent work provides another example.

Culture and Development

The approaches just discussed characterize institutional actors as the protago­
nists of development, yet there are other approaches to development that empha­
size deeper features of a society itself—features that reflect commonly held
customs, norms, habits, and values. That is to say, for many trying to understand
development, culture matters. Many scholars are interested in both culture and
institutions as predictors of development, and the links between these factors are
not always clear.

Civil Society, Social Capital, and Trust

A society where people can cooperate and work together is likelier to thrive than
one filled with distrust and lacking organization. One of the earliest and most
prominent modern proponents of this view was Alexis de Tocqueville, in his
classic Democracy in America. Tocqueville attributed America’s economic vibrancy
108 Chapter 5: Development

in part to a variety of cultural characteristics (including hardy frontier mentali­

ties and inventiveness), reserving special mention for the degree to which Ameri­
cans constructed an active civic life, noting famously that “Americans of all ages,
all stations of life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations.”14
Rich associational life—which may itself be a consequence of institutions—can
generate the values and complex structures needed for a diversified economy.15
It is very difficult to imagine a modern economy without complex organiza­
tions, such as corporations or cooperatives, that either are relatively large or have
civil society Public space or zone rich linkages to many other organizations. Researchers find that civil society—
of social life, at least partially the public space or zone of social life—links directly to economic outcomes (see,
autonomous from the state, in e.g., the “Insights” box on Fukuyama’s Trust). Societies with extensive social net­
which individuals are free to works in political and economic life are said to have the virtue of high levels of
engage in deliberation and social social capital, advantages held by virtue of relationships.
movement activity, for example. Social capital can build on itself and help reinforce a society’s development.
It is said to work in several ways. First, density of network ties, as already men­
tioned, may generate trust, or confidence in the reliability or good conduct of
social capital Advantage that
individuals or groups hold by virtue
others. This is because shared ties help people build and maintain reputations,
of their social relationships.
and in dense networks characterized by high transitivity (i.e., the people you
trust The extent to which an know also know each other), people have a lot to lose from behaving in untrust­
individual has confidence in the worthy ways. It is also because in dense networks information tends to flow
reliability or good conduct of rapidly, which has many economic benefits. The notion of “bonding capital” is
others. based on density of ties and the idea that deepening these ties has benefits for the
economy. Another form of social capital is sometimes called “bridging capital,”
which is the set of benefits that come from networks extending out to reach new
people and places.16 Sometimes these benefits are beneficial for the group, such
as when trade between previously disconnected subgroups becomes possible.
Sometimes benefits accrue mainly to the relatively small number of people who
are themselves the “bridges” and who can act and profit as “brokers” (of informa­
tion or contacts, for example).

The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development

INSIGHTS
by Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson) and James A Robinson

T
his article traces differences in economic development structures. Over time, these institutions evolved into colonial
around the world today to the varying historical paths of states and later into independent states in the nineteenth and
different world regions. Colonialism and geography played es­ twentieth centuries. States that were originally designed to ex­
pecially important roles, with the impacts playing out over tract resources tend to continue that way today (with negative
more than a century. Colonizers such as Britain established dif­ consequences), whereas countries actively settled by colonizers
ferent types of states in the different regions of the world. tended to develop into systems more capable of promoting
Where mass settlement was not possible (for reasons of geog­ development. The historical development of the state as an in­
raphy and endemic disease), colonizers set up states that stitution (from decades or centuries ago) still casts a long
worked primarily to extract resources with little investment. shadow over development today.
This happened in tropical Africa, for instance. Places that were
Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson, 'The Colonial Origins of
easier to "settle,” such as America, ended up with stronger state Comparative Development,’ American Economic Review 91 (2001): 1369-1401
 Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 109

Religion
Some argue that religious differences between groups and between nations may
also explain differences in development.17 Theories of this kind gained promi­
nence early in the twentieth century and have remained part of the discourse
about economic and social change ever since. In contemporary development
studies, scholars have attempted to explain the relative success of different world
regions on the basis of religious beliefs. For some time, scholars theorized that
Confucian values hindered the economic performance of East Asian countries,
relative to Europe and the United States. They posited that cultural expectations
of obedience and respect for authority could limit the creativity and entrepre­
neurial spirit that capitalistic growth requires. Paradoxically, as East Asia has
flourished in recent years, scholars have found advantages in Confucian values,
emphasizing how a strong belief in order and authority, respect for the state, and
respect for education may all facilitate growth.
Similarly, some scholars hypothesize that features of Muslim faith may have
hindered development in the Arab world. For instance, the Quran restricts lend­
ing on interest, which may make large investments difficult (though it should be
noted that many modern Islamic states have developed “Islamic bonds” and other
financial instruments). Muslims show high rates of opposition to globalization,
which may imply an unwillingness to participate in the global economy.18
Finally, the degree of religion may matter more than the type of religion. Religious
institutions of many kinds can bind people together and may therefore increase
trust and cooperation, which in turn can lead to positive political, social, and eco­
nomic outcomes. In any event, many arguments linking religion and development
operate through intervening or mediating variables. That is, religious beliefs affect
certain behaviors or institutions that in turn affect economics, perhaps with several
steps in between. This was one of the original lines of thinking pioneered by Max
Weber, a founder of modern sociology and political science, in his book The Protes­
tant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (1958; first published, in German, in 1905.).

Value Systems
Cultural factors that shape development may include values other than those as­
sociated with religious beliefs. Prominent candidates for values that favor devel­
opment are those that allow people to orient their behavior toward the future

Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity

INSIGHTS
by Francis Fukuyama

of their size to increase productivity. Insofar as a division of labor

T
he argument that civil society matters did not exist only for
Tocqueville's nineteenth-century America. Francis Fukuyama and specialization are central to economic expansion, the emer­
argues that economic modernization in many countries around gence of such strong institutions in the high-trust societies ac­
the world has been rooted in the cultivation of trust. Societies celerates growth. Fukuyama thus traces economic development
with high levels of trust have been able to move beyond the ultimately to a fundamentally cultural value.
small, family-owned economic units that dominate low-income Francis Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. New
economies, creating major corporations that can take advantage York: Free Press, 1996.
Chapter 5: Development

A group baptism among Evangelical Christians in El Salvador. Evangelical Christianity is

prominent in Central America and a number of other countries, notably in many parts of the
developing world. Scholars debate religion's relationship with economic development.

rather than toward the present, to engage in long-term planning rather than the
day-to-day. The virtue of thrift, or a propensity to save, can matter here, as suc­
cessful societies are those in which people can defer gratification from today into
the future, in the hopes of using savings to invest and build more wealth. Work
ethic will also be important; this can link back to the religious values but find its
roots elsewhere in a culture.
Individualism is also often considered important, as it may allow those who
accumulate wealth to build with it, rather than feeling compelled to distribute it
to friends, acquaintances, and hangers-on. According to these theories, notions
of individual accountability and responsibility, rationality and pragmatism in
some places contrast with the lack of such progress-promoting virtues in societies
where people spend everything they earn, leaving little upon which to build.

Systems and Structures: Domestic and International

Institutionalist approaches generally hold that development is determined largely
by the actions and decisions of individuals, as shaped by institutions and the in­
centives and constraints they create. Culturalist approaches generally see people’s
behavior in the economy as shaped and constrained by beliefs, values, norms, and
habits. In the case of statist and neoliberal approaches, the domestic forces that
matter are the extent and nature of states and their involvement in the economy.
But there are other approaches as well. Some scholars—most notably Marxists—
have traced economic outcomes to fundamental underlying structures in an
economy, such as the basic form of economic production, and the system of social
classes generated by these forms of production.
 Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 111

Domestic Economic Structures and Class Interests

Several schools of development scholarship emphasize the impediments and
traps confronting societies as they attempt to promote development. In this view,
certain powerful groups may block development by seeking to perpetuate their
own advantages at the expense of the populace at large. Even where the institu­
tions of democracy seem to be functioning well, interest groups or lobbies may
demand special treatment from the government that prevents the reforms needed
for economic growth. Scholars on both the right and the left of the political
spectrum may adopt this view regarding the importance of domestic structures
and vested interests. On the right, some scholars have argued that democracy
itself can undermine capitalism, because in democracies special interests will
often seek preferential treatment from the government.19 The most important
scholar on the left was the intellectual founder of one of the twentieth century’s
most important ideologies: Karl Marx.

International Economic Structures and Class Interests

Karl Marx’s ideas were made the official ideology in the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.),
after that country was created out of the Russian Revolution of 1917. And while
Marx’s ideology was eventually considered a recipe for “socialism in one country”
by the dictator Joseph Stalin, some Marxist schools of thought also foresaw an
internationalized crisis of capitalism. Many early Marxists hoped for a “perma­
nent revolution” around the world, and diagnosed the global inequalities that
capitalism had engendered. (Vladimir Lenin, leader of the Russian Revolution
and the U.S.S.R.’s first head of state, led the charge with a book entitled Imperi­
alism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism)10 Over time, however, many Marxist ap­
proaches in social science shifted from emphasizing prospects for global socialist
revolution to offering critiques of how politics operates within capitalist
economies.
According to Marxian arguments, the structure of the international economy
will place some powerful countries in the favorable position of capitalist accumu­
lation. Meanwhile other countries and world regions are subjected to serving the
role of providing low-wage labor and resources, though a small number of elites
residing in the low-income countries may be complicit with the interests of the
rich countries. For example, a select number of rich Nigerian businesspeople and
politicians may work with the international business community to ensure
capitalist investment in Nigeria, which will result in profits for the international
capitalists and their local “collaborators,” but the Nigerian people as a whole will
not benefit.
Many scholars adopted such perspectives to account for underdevelopment in
the “global south,” the “Third World,” or the “less developed countries.” In the
views of many of these scholars, the international economy has been a zero-sum
game, in which one person’s gain is another person’s loss: In order for some to be dependency A theory that argues
rich, others in the world must be poor.21 One of the leading concepts has been that developing countries cannot
dependency, which holds that low-income countries will remain in a subordi­ simply embrace free trade because
nate economic position relative to wealthy countries, depending on markets in this will lead to ever-increasing
the rich world as a place to sell their low-value goods while importing high-value wealth disparities between them
goods from those rich countries. In its earliest versions, dependency theory held and the advanced economies.
112 Chapter 5: Development

Does the Global Economy Help

or Hurt Developing Nations like Brazil? PAGE 407

Brazil, after having an economic record that was mixed, at best, 1. How might income inequality and economic underde­
since independence, has now recorded dramatic growth for mul­ velopment interact? In the Brazilian case, historically, does
tiple years. Moreover, the country is making rapid progress in re­ one cause the other, are they independent, or are they
lation to two of its traditional scourges: income inequality and mutually reinforcing?
poverty (though much work remains to be done). Surprisingly to 2. Why has the Brazilian economy taken off in recent years?
some, these gains have been made under governments identi­ Are the social programs of the Lula da Silva and Rousseff
fied with the political left (others, of course, are not surprised by governments simply siphoning off economic surplus for
this). Brazil may be finally realizing its ambition to become a other (humanitarian) ends, or can they be thought of
hemispheric power, and perhaps, ultimately, a global power, if it as further investment in the Brazilian economy and its
can sustain this performance. medium- to long-run prospects?
For more on Brazilian development, see the case study
in Part VI, p. 407. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:

that low-income countries faced deteriorating terms of trade relative to the capi­
talist countries at the center of the world economy, which would make the goods
from the dependent countries ever less valuable.22 The theory was revised when it
became clear that some developing countries experienced “partial” development,
moving from the world’s “periphery” to its “semi-periphery.” 23 The revised ver­
sion of dependency theory thus acknowledges that development is possible for
low-income countries, but that their circumstances necessitate the state’s active
involvement in the economy to promote industrialization.24 The early version of
dependency theory that argues that developing countries will always be disad­
vantaged has been discarded, but this revised version of the theory continues to
inform the debate about development today through its discussion of the state’s
role.25

Geography
Another set of structural variables that may condition development is geography.
The location that a country or region inhabits is largely unchangeable, and may
shape economic opportunities. One major geographic factor is whether a country
has access to the sea; landlocked countries rely more on relations with their
neighbors if they want to trade with the rest of the globe, and the distances to
global markets and logistical challenges associated with being landlocked might
f hinder growth.26 By a similar logic, development might be favored in areas with
good natural harbors, or in countries that have oceans as barriers to would-be
attackers. One might say then, that North America was rz\xtive\yfavored by ge­
ography as it grew. More controversially, location in the tropics has long been
posited as a hindrance to development.27 The logics here range from the plausible
 Causes and Effects: Why Does Development Happen? 113

The Modern World System

INSIGHTS
by Immanuel Wallerstein

allerstein developed a theory of international politics in capitalist system, mainly raw materials (including minerals and
W which each place on the globe would fit into a certain role foodstuffs) and cheap labor. Semi-peripheral areas— roughly the
in the global economy. Known as world systems theory, this ap­ "middle-income" countries— would have their own particular
proach broke the world into categories of states: core, periphery, structural role as well, perhaps "allowed" or "encouraged" to in­
and semi-periphery. The core countries constitute the economic dustrialize to a certain degree in order to keep the global system
and technological center, accumulating the preponderance of functioning.
profits from global production. The peripheral areas are those Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System. Berkeley: University of
poor locations destined to supply basic inputs to the world California Press [1974] 2011.

to the blatantly racist; a recent plausible view is presented in the “Insights” box on
the work of Jared Diamond. Geography’s impact on development may not be
constant over time. In other words, geographic factors may prove advantageous
or disadvantageous only when coupled with certain technologies or institutions.
When the World Values Survey, a massive, ongoing project being carried out
by an international network of social scientists, polled over eighty thousand
people in more than eighty countries about the most important issues they face,
the topic of economic growth and development stood out above all others.28 A
strong economy can lead to a better quality of life and greater satisfaction for
most people, while a weak economy can severely restrict social improvements and
make politics more divisive. Since people care so much about this issue, develop­
ment is not exclusively an academic concern. It matters to policymakers and ev­
eryday citizens as well. For instance, imagine you are the top economic official in
a poor African country, and you want to know how best to raise people out of
poverty in your country. Comparing South Korea to Brazil, you may examine
why export-led growth (an economic strategy based on selling natural resources export-led growth A strategy for
or products in foreign markets) seemed to work in South Korea, and import- achieving economic growth
substitution worked for a time in Brazil, and may ask under what conditions each dependent on sending natural
can work.29 Whether a policymaker or a citizen, can you draw practical lessons resources or agricultural or
for your country from development successes and failures? industrial products for sale in fo­
The issue of development involves many substantial questions. Why do some reign markets.
countries advance and grow while others do not? Why do countries grow at some
times and not others? Why does poverty increase or decline? Why does educa­
tion improve, or why do health outcomes decline? Why is inequality on the rise
in some places, and declining in others? These are only a subset of the questions
that may be asked about the topic of economic and social development. Even if
we consider mainly economic growth, as we did through much of this chapter,
scholars debate fiercely about the strongest and most successful explanations.
With the intent of developing your skills as a comparativist, we will not conclude
by saying which answer is “correct.” Instead, we offer two observations.
First, there is likely some truth to each of the arguments we have presented
about why development happens. Markets can help, states can help, institutions
can matter, culture can matter, and international and domestic structures can
114 Chapter 5: Development

Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies

INSIGHTS
by Jared Diamond

J
ared Diamond sought to answer a question once posed to him animal that could not survive in Africa due to endemic parasites.
by a friend from the poor nation of Papua New Guinea: Why do In Eurasia, people could also expand their populations along the
some people have more "cargo" (that is, "stuff”) than others? Dia­ continent's long east-west axis, which allowed migration and
mond found answers in nature and geography. In Africa, the growth, while African peoples were prevented from migrating
poorest continent in the world today, people faced natural disad­ and expanding by the varying climates along the continent's
vantages from their environment. For instance, none of the large north-south axis. Diamond argues that geographic and climatic
resident animals—zebras and rhinos, for example— could be do­ forces led European peoples to develop the powerful societies
mesticated, which held back advances in farming and precluded that colonized and dominated the rest of the world.
the development of African cavalries. In Europe, by contrast, farm­ Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies.
ing and militaries both advanced with the use of the horse, an New York: W. W. Norton, 1997.

matter. It is possible and appropriate to combine elements of these different ap­

proaches—for example, noting that culture, geography, and the role of the state
all affect development. The reason these theories have earned mention in the
chapter is that they have been supported by some evidence in the real world.
Second, as we noted in chapter 2, it is also important to make meaningful argu­
ments that do not simply say that “everything matters.” Rather, through close
examination of empirical evidence in specific case studies, we can find for our­
selves what factors matter under what conditions, and how different factors might
work together. For example, one might discover that both geography and culture
partially shape economic institutions in a particular case, and that these institu­
tions, in turn, both directly and indirectly shape development.
Since development is a process that unfolds continuously over time, an espe­
cially useful comparison can be of the same country at different points in time.
For example, why was the import-substitution model successful in Brazil for a
time, and why did it seem to fail at a later point in time? Using the theories from
this section, you can formulate hypotheses to explain such successes and failures.

THINKING
COM PARATIVELY Explaining the Development of North
and South Korea
t the beginning of this chapter we noted that the neighboring countries of
KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

Most-Similar-Systems A North and South Korea have had radically different experiences with devel­
opment. South Korea went from being one of the poorest countries on earth in
(MSS) Design the late 1950s to one of the richest by the 1990s. It has seen its incomes skyrocket
As noted in the first chapter, one way to
and its economy transform into an industrial powerhouse, while the population
set up a useful comparison is to choose
two cases that are very similar on sev­
has gone from having a majority illiterate and in poverty to one in which less
eral criteria yet different on a key out­ than five percent of people fit in those categories. North Korea, of course, started
come. The comparison of the two in roughly the same position as the south. Yet today, it remains extremely poor,
 Explaining the Development of North and South Korea 115

as noted at the beginning of this chapter. It experiences periodic famines and THINKING
frequently depends on foreign aid that its leadership extorts through creating
COM PARATIVELY
international crises. As shown in the following table, if we use the 2009 esti­
mates, South Korea’s per capita GDP is almost sixteen times North Korea’s— an
astonishing economic divergence. Explaining such differences over time between KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

economically successful and unsuccessful countries is one of the classic questions (continued)
in development studies. In fact, a major recent book in this area {Why Nations Koreas and their differences in eco­
Fail, by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson) addresses this precise diver­ nomic development is an example.
gence between the Koreas and others like it. Choosing two countries that have
much in common allows the analyst
Country Per Capita GDP (CIA World Factbook) to isolate the variables that are likely
North Korea $1,800 (estimate as of 2011) to cause the different outcomes. In
this case, geography and many as­
South Korea $33,200 (estimate as of 2013)
pects of culture are similar, which
Here we walk through how a comparative analyst might try to explain this means these variables are unlikely to
explain the major differences in out­
difference. We would note right away that we don’t aim to offer a definitive
comes. Comparative political scien­
“answer” to this question that focuses on one theory over another, though some tists do not have laboratories to work
might argue that this is a relatively straightforward comparison with an obvious with the way natural scientists do, so
answer, as we note a bit later. We want to emphasize that we use simple thought 'most similar" cases are as close as
experiments here for the sake of simplicity; these are not full hypothesis tests one can get to controlling for many
variables the way one does in a labo­
using substantial amounts of evidence. As you read this section, focus on the logic ratory. In fact, some MSS designs
of hypothesis testing, and the general strategy we use to apply theories to these come from what is called a 'natural
real-world cases. Note that for more definitive results, we would need to consider experiment,' such as when a country
much more evidence and carefully measure each of the variables we consider. is divided into smaller parts and
One reason this is an interesting comparison is that North and South Korea analysts can observe the subsequent
outcomes across the different parts of
are very similar in terms of several variables we might expect to affect develop­ the country. Examples include com­
ment, including culture and geography, but these countries vary dramatically in parisons of East and West Germany
terms of the dependent variable (development). Table 5.2 summarizes some simi­ after the country was partitioned, or
larities and differences between the two cases, noting how much or how little comparisons of India and Pakistan
variation there is on the key variables. after the partition of British India.
Another pair of countries with simi­
South Korea’s political and economic institutions are based much more than larities is the Dominican Republic and
North Korea’s on capitalism and the use of domestic and global markets, as well Haiti, which are located on two halves
as democracy in more recent decades. (In fact, for Acemoglu and Robinson, the of the same island. Of course, in each
comparison of the Koreas is a prime example of the importance of political insti­ of these instances, the two cases will
tutions in shaping economic outcomes. You might see this as the “leading candi­ have developed quite differently over
time. Setting up MSS design is not.
date” theory to explain the divergence, though we would emphasize the logic of enough to definitively demonstrate
considering different theoretical perspectives). In terms of external influences, which variables cause an outcome, as
the country followed a model established by Japan, in two ways. First, Korea was that requires exploring the evidence,
a Japanese colony before World War II, and Japanese colonialism brought eco­ but it can help rule out unlikely
causes of variations in outcomes.
nomic linkages to Japan and a powerful state, along with an emphasis on educat­
ing the workforce.30 Second, Japan’s economic success served as a model in terms
of policy. South Korea’s state adopted a pro-business strategy that included some
state intervention, but with strict rules: Companies receiving state support had to
meet targets for production and exports, or they would be cut off.31 Thus, the
South Korean case was interpreted by some as a constructive form of state inter­
vention, and by others as a country where the state did right by “emulating” the
rules of the market.
116 Chapter 5: Development

table 5.2 Possible Explanations for Variations in Development

SOUTH KOREA AND NORTH KOREA

Variable Case 1: South Korea Case 2: North Korea Extent of Variation

Independent Variables for Hypothesis Testing

Korean heritage (with minority Christian Korean heritage (with negligible

Culture Limited
population) Christian population)

Korean peninsula Korean peninsula

Geography Limited
Coal and mining resources Coal and mining resources

Mixed state/market economy Command economy Communist

Capitalist orientation Influenced by Japan, rule Influenced by China, U.S.S.R.
Economic and Political
United States Inward-looking economy Major
Institutions
Export-led growth for decades Almost no use of markets
Use of markets Democracy (in recent years) Autocracy for decades

Dependent Variable

High development and growth Low development and growth

Development Major
Advanced economy Poor economy, major poverty

Even the East Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and the global economic
crisis that began in 2008 did little to dent South Korea’s long-term achievements.
In fact, South Korea has served as a model for other Asian economies, much as
Japan had served as a model for South Korea.32Indeed, several features of China’s
current economic approach appear to have drawn from South Korea’s experience
in promoting export-led growth. This has had interesting implications for the
different theories mentioned previously: The focus here is on political and eco­
nomic institutions, but there is also renewed interest in cultural theories of devel­
opment because development has spread so convincingly across East Asian
countries in particular.
North Korea differs quite dramatically from South Korea in its political and
economic institutions, while it shares a similar geography and a common cultural
background from the period before the two countries were divided. The country
was pulled into the Soviet orbit after the end of World War II, while South
Korea was aligned with the United States. Eventually, a major conflict broke out,
the Korean War, in which North was supported by China under Mao Zedong
and South Korea was supported by the United States (with numerous American
troops) and its allies. Eventually, the conflict was halted without satisfactory
resolution for either side, and as a result we are left with the two countries, each
of which claims to be the legitimate government of all of Korea. North Korea
still employs a Soviet-style “planned economy.” This means that all key decisions
about production and funding are made by the state, and to the extent that
market forces govern exchange they do so only informally. In essence, the two
countries vary not just in terms of their development histories, but also in terms
of the nature and extent of their states’ involvement in the economy.
 Explaining the Development of North and South Korea 117

How would each of our theories explain the relative economic fortunes of
North and South Korea in recent decades? (See Table 5.3.) Notice that the insti­
tutional arguments are promising for the reasons noted previously. At the same
time, while we note that the cultural arguments might not work at first glance,
that does not mean “culture” is irrelevant. A scholar doing a deeper exploration
of the two countries might find ways to show that political cultures changed over
time between the two countries in ways that affected the economy as well. In
short, both countries maybe culturally “Korean,” but that does not mean they are
identical on that variable: the North Korean political culture is certainly different
from the South Korean political culture after decades of separation and such dif­
ferent experiences.
As you can see here, our thought experiment does not definitively establish
that one of these theories is right, but it demonstrates how we would initially
proceed in applying these general theories of development to the basic outlines of
these two cases. This helps us think about what types of arguments might work
and which might not in explaining variations in outcomes by country.

table 5.3 Hypothesis Testing: North Korea and South Korea

Hypothesis: What Explains Thought Experiment and
Theory Variation? Hypothesis Test Next Steps for Theory

Bring in additional cases and

Different enforcement of
examine these cases further.
Institutions (market property rights and contracts
Promising Consider how to account for South
institutions) South: Strong enforcement
Korea's practice of
North: Weak enforcement
state-led development.

Different qualities of state and Account for why North Korea has
state policy failed with statist strategy. Examine
Institutions (states and
South: High quality (with robust Promising South Korea's mix of state
state policy)
industrial policy) involvement and market forces in
North: Low quality state-led development.

Adapt hypothesis to include values

and habits along with other
Not promising (Despite
Different cultural backgrounds, variables.
some differences, countries
Culture including values, religion, and Develop more complex hypothesis
have similar cultural
habits on how institutions change national
backgrounds)
economic cultures over time, for
example.

Different positions in "world

Somewhat promising but Adapt hypothesis to include world-
system"
incomplete (Positioning in system along with other variables.
South Korea: American and
The World-System the global system likely Develop more complex hypothesis
Japanese influence
mattered by influencing that also draws on institutional
North Korea: Soviet and Chinese
institutions) theories, for example.
influence
118 Chapter 5: Development

C h ap ter Su m m ary
Concepts C a u s e s a n d E ffects
Development is a topic of pressing interest to billions of Using economic growth as an outcome, scholars have
people around the world, and it can be measured in many theorized about many important factors that lead to
different ways. development. An important debate is about whether the
• The most common ways of measuring development are economy should be led by the market or by the state.
economic, most notably the level and growth of per capita The current consensus is that both market and state play
GDP, but also the extent of poverty and economic important roles in a modern economy.
inequality. Institutions such as property rights play key roles in
development and may link to the market and the state.
Types • Culture shapes development as well. It may be manifested
Development can be measured by social indicators (such in levels of trust and social capital, or in norms, ethics, and
as health and education), standards of living, satisfaction cultural tendencies that emerge in different places at
and happiness, equity across societal groups, cultural different points in time.
change, and environmental sustainability. A final category of explanations for development can be
Cases from around the world show that many of the indica­ found in "structural" or "systemic" factors, where the
tors of development positively correlate with one another, backdrop of the world economic and political order can
but not always. either support or hinder economic advancement.
• There is surely some truth in each of these approaches, but
these must be investigated with respect to specific cases.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. The "Causes and Effects" section of this chapter focused on "prove" that development depends on things that change over
growth, but can you use at least one theory from that section to time, like a government's policies?
propose why some developing countries have more or less in­ 4. Many prominent developing countries are (or have been) major
equality (as defined in chapter 4) than others? exporters of oil. Why have the resource-rich countries not ben­
2. The so-called "BRIC" countries— Brazil, Russia, India, and efited from consistent, rapid growth? To what extent are natural
China— all boomed at points in the 2000s. Does this correlation resources beneficial for development, and to what extent are
suggest they are all following similar development patterns? they a "curse"?
Does this timing provide evidence to support one theory about 5. Why do countries go through economic boom and bust cycles
the causes of development more than others? Does it mean in their development? If countries are "most similar" (see
something "global" was causing growth, and not something chapter 2) to themselves, should economic performance be
specific to each country? relatively consistent over time, unless there are major changes in
3. Many countries have more and less successful economic peri­ policy (as was the case in China)?
ods over time. Which of the theories in this chapter does this
fluctuation support? Does it "disprove" any theory based on cul­
ture, because a country's culture is relatively "stable"? Does it
 CHAPTER 6

Democracy and
Democratization

• Aung San Suu Kyi, Myanmar's most famous democracy activist, approaches the lower house ofparliament to begin her term as Leader of the
Opposition in May 2012. Suu Kyi suffered many years ofpersecution and oppression, including nearly two decades of house arrest.
 magine a country where less than half of the population can vote, half have
very limited basic rights, and social roles are allocated on the basis of ethnic
or racial affiliation, so that members of some groups have virtually no rights
and are the property of other people. Imagine still further that elections are
periodically held but that to stand any chance of election one must be from
the elite class, meaning (1) a wealthy landowner; (2) a wealthy businessman;
or (3) a doctor, lawyer, clergyman, or other professional whose social net­
works intersect with those of wealthy landowners or busi­
nessmen. I f we told you that this situation were true of a
IN THIS CHAPTER jj
given developing country, would you consider it fully demo­
Concepts 121
cratic? Probably not, and yet the country we are describing is
Democracy and Democratic Regimes 121
Regime Change and Democratization 124
the United States of America in the years after its founding.
Types 125 Our point is most emphatically not to deny the democratic
Types of Democracy 125 status of that society. It was, at the time, in spite of the condi­
Types of Democratization 129 tions we have just listed, one of the most democratic large-scale
Causes and Effects: What Causes societies the world had ever known. Rather, our point is that
Democratization? 131
deciding whether a given country is democratic is more compli­
Modernization 132
cated than it appears at first glance. Democracy changes over
Culture and Democracy 134
The International System 135
time, meaning that its benchmarks and criteria are moving tar­
Domestic Institutions 136 gets. Moreover, the line between more and less democratic re­
Agents and Actors: The Role of Individuals gimes is somewhat gray
and Groups 137
Most people reading this chapter have lived only in demo­
Combining Arguments and Theories:
Multiple Causes 139 cratic societies. Democracy is, for much of the Anglophone
world, part of the backdrop of politics: It is simply assumed to be
THINKING COM PARATIVELY 1 present (yet, as the preceding example demonstrates, this has
Is American Democracy a Model? 141 not always been the case, and even today there are democratic
C A S E S IN CONTEXT deficits in this world). Where regimes are democratic, individu­
China • Brazil • India • als and groups can freely contest their ideas and try to shape
United States political life, with the winners of fair elections having greater
opportunity to craft their preferred policies and laws through
the democratic process. The losers typically accept the principle
that in a democracy it is possible one will lose a political battle,
a debate, or an election; they continue to support the system or the regime, even if
they oppose the particular government administration of the moment.
In much of the world, however, authoritarianism is the rule, and the very
existence of democracy itself is a fundamental political issue. Only in recent
120
 Concepts 121

decades has the world reached the point where over half of its citizens live under
democracy. Understanding whether a country is democratic is thus a prerequisite
for further discussions about politics, whether we are interested in legislatures
and executives, or the power of interest groups and political parties, or religious
politics and gender politics. W hile the precise definition of democracy is
debated— and many will disagree on which countries are democratic—most po­
litical scientists will concur that prominent countries such as China, Iran, Saudi
Arabia, North Korea, and Cuba are not democracies, and that many more coun­
tries, such as Russia, fall far short of full democratic practice, even if elections are
held on schedule. We discuss authoritarian regimes in the next chapter.
In this chapter, we begin by addressing the concepts of two major catego­
ries of regime type: democracy (or democratic regime) and democratization,
the process through which authoritarian polities become (more) democratic.
We then discuss subtypes of democratic regimes, using a number of our case
studies to exemplify them. Finally, we turn to political science debates about
the causes of democratization and democratic consolidation. W hy do they
happen where they do, in some places and not others? And why do they happen
when they do, at some times and not others? We present several possible ex­
planations. We close with a critical examination of whether the United States
should be treated by political scientists as a model for democracy elsewhere.

Concepts
Democracy is one of the most fundamental concepts in politics, and given its democracy A form of regime
importance, scholars have contested and reworked the concept and causes of de­ associated with "rule by the
mocracy over the years.1 As with many constructive debates in political science people" that signifies rights and
(in contrast with the winner-and-loser, zero-sum dynamics of debates in elec­ liberties for citizens, including
toral politics and campaigns), contestation over the definition is not a disagree­ political rights to participate in
ment to be lamented, but rather an important part of the study of democracy. elections and civil liberties such as
freedom of speech.
Democracy and Democratic Regimes
political rights Rights of indivi­
Despite disagreement over exactly what democracy means, there is broad agree­
duals to participate in political life,
ment on two salient points. First, many political scientists would share an intui­
including the right to political
tive sense of which geographic units in the world are relatively more or less
speech, the right to vote, and the
democratic. Second, even in the midst of some disagreement, political scientists
right to join political associations.
commonly accept definitions of democracy that emphasize two main types of
rights, which we discuss further a bit later in the chapter: political rights to par­ civil rights Rights of individuals to
ticipate in electoral processes, and civil rights and related freedoms. The promi­ participate in civic life, including
nent non-governmental organization Freedom House, which monitors democracy freedoms of assembly, speech,
in countries around the world, explicitly builds both elements into its assessment access to information, and equal
(Map 6.1). Leading works in recent years emphasize the distinction between access to institutions, among
mere electoral democracy and a more genuine democracy that also includes civil others.
122 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

FREEDOM IN THE WORLD 2015

Map 6.1 Democracy in the world, 2015

rights protections. To define democracy, most scholars use what is called a pro­
cedural, or minimal, definition. This approach emphasizes the minimal stan­
dards that a country should have in place—procedures or rules that govern
political life—as contrasted with a variety of substantive issues noted later.2
regime A form or type of govern­ By using the term regime, political scientists are referring to a form or type of
mental system, with an emphasis governmental system, with an emphasis on institutions and rules. The most sig­
on institutions and rules. nificant distinction is between democratic and authoritarian regimes. You can
think of a democratic regime as one with democratic institutions and rules.
democratic regime A regime
Similarly, an authoritarian regime has authoritarian institutions, structures, or
with predominantly democratic
rules. The regime is conceptually distinct from any particular democratic govern­
Institutions, including basic civil
ment. Thus, Iran has had an Islamic Republic as its regime since 1979 but has had
rights and regular, free elections.
several different governments under presidents such as Mohammad Khatami,
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and Hassan Rouhani. The United States has had its
constitutional republic since 1788 but many different governments in its regime.
Note that one’s definition of “democratic regime” depends on one’s definition
of “democracy.” For instance, some might classify Mexico or Nigeria as demo­
cratic regimes because they have relatively free and fair elections and protections
for civil liberties. But others might consider these countries not to be fully demo­
cratic on the grounds that they fail to provide sufficient levels of security and
procedural definition of opportunity for citizens.
democracy A conception of
democracy, contrasted with a subs­ Procedural (M inimal) Definitions of Democracy
tantive definition, that emphasizes Procedural definitions of democracy say that what makes a country democratic
the minimal standards, procedures, is that it follows certain procedures, or rules and methods. Yet most leading
or rules that a country should have procedural definitions of democracy view it as more than just elections every
in place to govern political life. few years; they also include the civil rights and civil liberties that should be
 Concepts 123

guaranteed to every citizen on an ongoing basis. Thus, even when political scien­
tists speak of minimal, or procedural, definitions of what democracy is, they
mean more than elections. Consider the following lists of political rights and
civil liberties, which many political scientists agree are central to democracy3:
Political Rights:
• Elections are free and fair, and most individuals can vote.
• Elections are regularly scheduled or held periodically.
• Elections have multiple political parties, or some choice.
• Elections are open to most any individual to run for office.
Civil Liberties:
• Freedom of speech and expression
• Freedom to access sources of information/freedom of the press
• Freedom of assembly/to join interest groups and parties
Note that all of these are essentially measures of whether certain rules or pro­
cedures are followed. Also, note that the first four of these may be seen as directly
related to electoral processes, and they presume that peaceful transfers of power
do take place in accord with electoral decisions. The latter three are about politi­
cal action outside of the realm of electoral processes and center on the rights of
the public not to be harassed by the state. Important civil liberties can be found
in the U.S. Constitution’s first ten amendments.. Passed together in 1791, this
Bill of Rights set an international standard for civil liberties.
To illustrate the importance of both categories of freedoms, consider a thought
experiment in which a country has regular free and fair elections but allows no
protest, controls the press, and represses free speech. This would be less a true de­
mocracy and more a competitive authoritarian or electoral authoritarian regime.4
Conversely, a system in which people have relative freedoms to voice their griev­
ances but no right to elect their government officials would also be non-democratic.
Only by fulfilling the basic requirements on both counts will a country earn a repu­
tation for democracy.
Other criteria could conceivably be added. For instance, some leading scholars
have proposed adding the following two additional criteria in determining
whether a country is democratic:5
• Democracies are not overruled by an outside power (such as a colonizer).
• Democracies must maintain a clear distinction between civilian and
military rule.
These two additional features further clarify the requirements for a democ­
racy, ruling out the likes of countries that look like democracies internally but
that systematically overrule the will of the populace. These may include locations substantive definition of
such as the so-called “independent” homelands under South Africa’s apartheid
democracy A conception of de­
government before 1994. mocracy, contrasted with a proce­
dural definition, that views a
Substantive Definitions of Democracy polity's democratic status as de­
While procedural definitions long dominated the debates about democracy in pendent on the satisfaction of
political science, recent years have seen an increasing turn to more substantive certain substantive ends, such as
definitions of democracy. This range of definitions examines the notion of dem­ the extension of broad rights or the
ocratic depth and quality, suggesting that democracy is not just about certain reduction of income inequality.
124 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

rule-governed procedures being followed but rather about certain outcomes, in

particular the coordination of a certain kind of collective action. Proponents of a
substantive definition of democracy often argue that countries can always un­
dergo further democratization and that the question of democracy is not re­
stricted to whether countries meet a minimum threshold.
Elements of a substantive definition may include the following:
• Participation, social inclusion, and civil society involvement
• Equity/equality by gender, race, or other groups
■ Accountability (including lack of corruption) and institutional performance
• Public knowledge and awareness
• Poverty, inequality, and other economic outcomes
Obviously, these criteria rarely lend themselves to yes/no evaluations. Even
the world’s most established democracies can always make progress toward
greater democratic depth or quality. In the United States, for instance, the per­
centage of citizens who vote in Congressional elections ranges from about
40 percent in years without a presidential election to about 60 percent in years
when a presidential election is held. This contrasts with much higher voter turn­
out in most of Europe, leading some to suggest that the United States falls short
on certain substantive aspects of democracy. With respect to the economy, the
American political and economic systems from the 1980s to the 2000s were
characterized by higher levels of inequality than Europe (thus suggesting a sub­
stantive shortcoming in the American model relative to the European), but also
generated lower levels of unemployment in most years (thus possibly suggesting
a substantive advantage of the American model over the European).
regime change Any major
Questions of substantive democracy lend themselves to some of the most intrigu­
change of regime type, including
ing research questions in comparative politics. In fact, as the number of democracies
democratization, democratic bre­
in the world has risen in the democratic wave since 1989,6 questions of substantive
akdown, or certain types of autho­
democracy have taken an increasingly important position in comparative politics
ritarian persistence in which one
relative to procedural democracy. O f course, studying procedural democracy and
type of authoritarian regime gives
studying substantive democracy are not mutually exclusive, as a country’s reaching
way to another.
the procedural/minimal threshold may be related to improvements in the substantive
regime type The form of a politi­ elements just listed. For students interested in researching democracy, either or both
cal regime, such as democratic of these definitions may be useful, but it is important to distinguish between them.
versus authoritarian, as well as
subtypes, such as personalistic Regime Change and Democratization
dictatorships or totalitarian The history of democracy and authoritarianism is one of change from one regime
regimes. type to another. Democratization is the process that leads from authoritarian­
ism to democracy, while changes in the opposite direction are commonly called
democratization The process of a
regime becoming more democra­
democratic breakdown (and not “authoritarianization”)7. We discuss the latter
in the next chapter.
tic, including both democratic
Democratization may be seen as a process that a country completes once it
transition and democratic
consolidation.
transitions from authoritarianism to a basic minimum democratic threshold, or it
may be a more indefinite, ongoing process that continues to consolidate even
democratic breakdown The after a country has reached a basic level of political and civil freedoms. Democ­
process through which a democra­ ratization itself can thus be a rich and diverse area for study. Two additional
tic regime partially or completely concepts that are central in the literature on democratization highlight the dif­
loses its democratic status. ferent stages of the process: transition and consolidation.
 Types 125

Transition is the movement from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one. transition The movement from an
This can happen through revolutionary means. For example, the Arab Spring up­ authoritarian regime to a democra­
risings of 2011 might lead to successful democratization, and have clearly taken tic one.
some steps in this direction, but in some respects this democratization seems to
have stalled in a number of the effected countries. Transition can also happen
through more gradual and negotiated means, such as the transition from the
Augusto Pinochet dictatorship to Chilean democracy in 1990.
Consolidation refers to the process through which the new democratic order consolidation The process
becomes institutionalized and therefore more likely to endure. For example, in through which a new democratic
the Chilean case, many thought the election and peaceful transfer of power from order becomes institutionalized
the very popular, left-leaning president Michelle Bachelet to the right-leaning and therefore more likely to
Sebastian Pinera in 2010 and back again to Bachelet in 2014 was a sign of just endure.
how successfully consolidated Chilean democracy was after only two decades.

Types
As noted earlier, not only are there varying ways to define both democracy and
authoritarianism (as we shall see further in the next chapter), but democratic and
authoritarian regimes come in a variety of forms, with major implications for life in
political society. Here we discuss representative versus direct forms of democracy
before moving on to consider major forms or elements of transition to democracy.

Types of Democracy
Democracies—and ideas about democracy—come in multiple forms, with one of
the most important contrasts being that between less direct (or representative)

Chilean presidents Michelle Bachelet and Sebastian Pinera at Pihera's inauguration in 2010.
Many viewed this peaceful, democratic transition from a left-leaning to a rightist president and
back again to Bachelet in 2014 as a sign of the consolidation of Chilean democracy.
126 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

democracy and direct democracy. The heart of the difference lies in the degree
and form of mediation between voters and the state.

Representative Democracy
Much of what we consider democracy is actually a representative form of govern­
constitutional republic A polity ment that is either a constitutional republic or a constitutional monarchy.
without a monarch in which the Democracy, in the original sense of the term, signified direct rule by the people,
basic rules of politics are laid out in through mass assemblies or legislation by direct vote of the masses. Clearly,
a constitution. modern nation-states do not typically govern on this basis, but democracies in­
stead rely on elected representatives who vote for legislation on behalf of the
populace as a whole. This form of government has come to be called representa­
constitutional monarchy Apoli­
tical system in which a monarch
such as a king, queen, or emperor
tive democracy when it meets several criteria that show government is based on
the people.
plays a role as a head of state, but
Foremost among the criteria for being considered a representative democracy
has powers limited by a
is constitutionality, which guarantees rights to citizens. Constitutional rights
constitution.
limit the powers of government and also limit the power of the political majority,
representative democracy A so that those who lose an election need not fear that their rights will be “alien­
conception of democracy in which ated” by the “tyranny of the majority.” The United States is a constitutional re­
politicians and institutions are public, while the United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy in which the
understood to represent the elec­ monarch is little more than a national figurehead and elected officials do the
torate, who nevertheless can cons­ business of governing. Both can be considered representative democracies. We
train their behavior through will refer to representative democracies to identify these modern nation-states
periodic elections and other forms where the population elects representatives democratically and citizens are guar­
of participation. anteed constitutional rights. These regimes are thus characterized by the citi­
zenry having two broad categories of rights, both of which are necessary for a
country to merit being called a democracy: political or electoral rights, and civil
rights or civil liberties.
Political rights relate directly to electoral processes and include what is often
considered the most fundamental of all democratic rights: the freedom to vote in
free and fair elections. Also understood in the definition of political rights are
various features that underpin and extend this simple consideration of electoral
freedom. All citizens who have reached the age of majority (such as eighteen
years) should have the right to vote; the franchise should not be restricted to one
sex, one race, one ethnicity, or one religion. Elections should be held with some
reasonable frequency (and not, say, every fifty years). Citizens should also have
the right to present themselves as candidates for office and should be allowed to
join different political parties in their running for office; they should not be re­
quired to join an official single party. Democracies may differ on many criteria,
multiparty democracy A demo­ but all that are worthy of the name multiparty democracies will fulfill the
cracy in which at least two parties preceding.
compete for power. Civil rights or civil liberties are those that guarantee citizens the ability to
participate in civic life outside of elections. They are coequal with political rights
in determining whether a country is democratic. Some of the key civil rights are
usefully summarized in the First Amendment to the United States Constitu­
tion: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, nor
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of speech or of the
press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances.” All elements here suggest the free­
dom of an individual’s conscience with respect to his/her own beliefs. Freedom
of religion is noted first, in the so-called “Establishment Clause.” Freedom of
speech follows and includes an individual’s right both to speak and to obtain
information from multiple sources of information via access to an independent
press. Freedom of conscience and speech is also linked to the freedom to assert
one’s belief that government should change its laws or policies. Such assertions
may take place through peaceful assemblies, such as rallies or protests, or public
statements.
O f course, democracies differ in both political rights and civil liberties, and
these rights are rarely absolutes. To take the case of the civil liberties surrounding
free speech, the oft-cited example is that “freedom of speech does not give you
the right to yell ‘fire’ in a crowded theater.” More formally, we may consider that
freedom of speech may be bounded by the need to protect others’ freedoms as
well. Hence, even democracies that stand firmly on the principle of free speech
will wrestle with questions of what sorts of speech may be illegal, including libel
and slander, and hate speech or provocations to violence (such as calling for the
assassination of a head of state). The principle of free speech does not stop debates
about whether making campaign contributions should be a form of protected
speech, or whether such contributions may be limited to prevent donors from
buying undue political influence.
Similarly, other civil liberties have reasonable limits that are shaped by inter­
pretation of constitutions and the law. For instance, a democratic free press may
not be allowed to report nuclear secrets that could compromise national security,
and freedom of religion may not extend to allowing murderous cults to engage in
human sacrifice. The right to bear arms, found in the United States Constitu­
tion’s Second Amendment, may be interpreted in various ways, including giving
individuals the right to possess a range of firearms, but it clearly does not give
private citizens the right to possess their own weapons of mass destruction.
Political rights are also shaped differently in different countries. Many of
these variations simply reflect the number of possible ways of crafting democratic
institutions. Elections may come at fixed intervals (maybe every five years, or
every seven), or on a more flexible schedule. Exercising the vote may be manda­
tory or optional. Elected officials may switch parties freely when in office or they
may be required to resign their seat if they change parties.
Some arrangements are touted as democratic but seem to call the process into
question. For instance, many systems with questionable (or worse) democratic
credentials have made the case that all political discourse can be contained
within one single unifying national party, such as China’s Communist Party.8
While this clearly violates the principle of multiparty democracy, it nonetheless
seems clear that some single-party countries are more democratic than others.
An example that shows the complexity of the debate is the African nation of
Uganda from the 1980s to the mid-2000s. There, a generally popular president
maintained that the best system for governance in Africa was “no-party democ­
racy” because in too many African countries political parties tended to reflect
and reinforce volatile ethnic divisions. This argument was plausible but dubious
since the president sat atop the so-called “National Resistance Movement,”
128 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni in a victory parade following his fifth reelection, in 2011.
How democratic is Uganda?

which was not officially a party but represented the state. Without any political
parties, the state itself (and its president) may wield control that looks rather
anti-democratic.
In short, representative democracies include a range of debates about the spe­
cific nature and extent of civil liberties, and there are numerous ways to set up the
political institutions of such systems. As it is often said, not all democracies
follow the American model, or the British model, or any other. They do, how­
ever, share in common the basic features discussed in this section.

Direct Democracy
The challenges of understanding democracy do not end with reaching the demo­
cratic threshold. As noted previously, many of the world’s most powerful democ­
racies today continue to deal with the challenges of deepening democratization.
Among the controversial issues in these polities are some options that may be
seen as taking democracy closer to the people yet sidestepping elected represen-
referendum Apopularvoteona tatives. Referenda (or plebiscites)—in which specific issues are put to popular
specific issue. vote—are prominent here. These feature in individual countries in the European
Union, as well as in American states, most notably California, with its possibili­
ties for citizens to place initiatives and propositions on the statewide ballot, and
to recall elected officials.
 Types 129

The increasing use of referenda, plebiscites, or ballot initiatives may be consid­

ered an increasing use of direct democracy. (At least the votes themselves are direct democracy A conception
direct democracy, though there are questions and debates about which items of democracy that places great
should be placed before the people in these forms, and who should place them emphasis on direct citizen involve­
there.) While democracies may be increasingly using direct democratic initia­ ment in politics, especially invol­
tives, they are not a necessary feature of representative democracy. ving plebiscites and/or citizen
Direct democracy can also take the form of citizen assemblies, community assemblies.
councils, and similar forms of association. Often, proponents of direct democ­
racy also favor representative democratic institutions, seeing these as comple­
mentary. Some people, though, see direct or “participatory” democracy as an
alternative to representative forms.

Types of Democratization
In this section we discuss two different aspects or stages in the process of democ­
ratization. You can think of them as types of democratization, but only in a cer­
tain sense. A fully successful case of democratization will involve both democratic
transition and then the consolidation of the emergent democracy.

Democratic Transitions
Democratic transitions are changes from one regime type (authoritarianism) democratic transition The pro­
to another (democratic rule). In some countries, these may be relatively rapid cess through which a non-demo­
processes, taking only several days. By contrast, some countries go through cratic regime becomes democratic.
long, slow transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy. Brazil in the 1980s
and Mexico in the 1990s are examples of slower-motion transitions, in which it
became increasingly clear over time that the authoritarian system was being
replaced by a democratic regime. Tlie variation in the duration of transitions
was expressed in a statement by historian Timothy Garton Ash. In the midst of
the cascading transitions to democracy in Central Europe in 1989, he described
the events by saying, “in Poland it took ten years, in Hungary it took ten
months, in East Germany it took ten weeks, perhaps in Czechoslovakia it will
take ten days.”9
Transitions are also diverse in their causes and impacts. Some are relatively
controlled by the authoritarians who are on their way out of power, while others
come from the collapse of the previous power structure. In Latin America in the
1980s, many countries (such as Brazil and Chile) had slow transitions to democ­
racy in which the military built in advantages for itself to ensure that its policies
and preferences would influence democratic politics for some time. Other demo­
cratic transitions have happened in more revolutionary fashion in countries rang­
ing from the Philippines to the West African nation of Benin.

Democratic Consolidation
Democratic consolidation is typically a longer-term process than transition.10It democratic consolidation The
may be seen as the process by which democracy and its political and civil rights process through which, after a
become normal or habitual for citizens. The term “consolidation” has been char­ transition from authoritarianism, a
acterized as happening when democracy is “the only game in town.”11 That is, a polity strengthens its democracy.
democracy may be seen as consolidated when there are no major political groups
130 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

advocating for a return to authoritarianism or for the overthrow of the demo­

cratic system. Related to this, consolidation may have happened when the popu­
lace as a whole has rejected the idea of authoritarianism and supports the
democratic regime. Compared with these ideas or values, a more mechanical
indicator of consolidation may be when a country has “turned over” its govern­
ment two or more times; that is, the people who used to govern lose an election
and step aside, and then the people who replaced them eventually lose and step
aside. When and where this happens, it is a good sign that democracy is accepted
by all the major political actors and has become routine.
Consolidation is challenging even in leading democracies. Many countries
that have made the transition to free and fair elections and civil liberties will
face difficulties in guaranteeing these for the citizenry. Even the world’s longest-
standing democracies, such as the United States, have not fulfilled all of the
promises often associated with democracy. Consolidation is a long-term en­
deavor, because delivering full democratic rights to all citizens (and indeed de­
veloping a full notion of who is a citizen) is a historically complex process.
To look at the American example, note that rights may be progressively ex­
tended to more groups (often beginning with relatively wealthy male property
holders and slowly incorporating others) and not offered to everyone at once.
It is also a process that can suffer setbacks as countries fail to consolidate or
revert to authoritarian rule.
For those interested in the minimal, procedural definition of democracy, de­
mocratization may be most associated with transition, a process in which a for­
merly non-democratic (i.e., authoritarian) regime is liberalized and attains
democratic credentials. On the other hand, consolidation may require consider­
ation of how robust a democracy becomes, as well as questions about whether a
country will maintain its basic standards of political and civil rights over time.
For those political scientists interested in understanding broad patterns of levels
of democracy around the world, a transition above a certain threshold may be
sufficient for the purposes of a given study, while those interested in understand­
ing a democracy’s quality and depth may necessarily be examining its process of
consolidation.

CASE IN CONTEXT

Democratic Consolidation in Brazil PAGE 408

For years Brazil alternated between authoritarianism and transi­ For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI, p. 408.
tory attempts at democracy. In recent decades, though, its de­ As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
mocracy has achieved noteworthy consolidation, and few now 1. How does Brazil's recent economic performance relate to
fear a return to Brazilian authoritarianism. Given that Brazil is one its democratic consolidation?
of the world's largest countries, and an increasingly influential 2. How, and to what extent, has Brazilian democracy come
one, this is a very positive development. But how did it happen? to include poorer Brazilians?
And what lessons does Brazil offer to other countries interested
in democratic consolidation?
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 131

Causes and Effects: What Causes

Democratization?
Uncovering what causes and sustains democracy is a central challenge facing
political scientists. Here, we combine the debates about democracy and democ­
ratization to ask why democracy varies both across countries and over time. In
other words, we consider both where democracy happens and when it occurs.
Note that both of these considerations get at the underlying question of why
regime types emerge, consolidate, and shift. While we cannot capture the entire
debate, we highlight five prominent lines of theory:
1. modernization theory, which traces democracy to broad social changes, es­
pecially economic development and the changes that accompany it;12
2. cultural theories, which attribute democratization and democratic consoli­
dation to cultural variables that predispose some countries to democracy
and prevent or hinder democracy in other places;13
3. systemic or structural theories, which situate countries in an international en­
vironment where major powers or global trends may condition whether
democracy emerges or not;14
4. domestic institutional theories, which find that the advent and success of de­
mocracy depend on the forms of political institutions within a country
(such as political parties and interest groups, or the ways branches of gov­
ernment are shaped);15 and
5. agency-based theories, which argue that individual actors, or small groups of
actors, are the drivers of changes in regime types (whether democratic or
authoritarian).16
We consider these five perspectives in turn.
As noted in the previous chapters, different theoretical perspectives are not
entirely mutually exclusive, but they do offer different arguments about political
behavior and what causes it. While good arguments may draw from multiple

Is China Destined for Democracy? PAGE 421

One of the most important questions in contemporary global 1. What would each of the theories from the previous
politics is whether China will democratize in the coming years— chapter predict about the prospect of China's
and, if so, how. In certain respects, since reforms began there in democratization?
the late 1970s after the death of Mao Zedong, we have seen 2. What might major theories of authoritarian persistence
some limited democratization at the local level. But China re­ discussed in this chapter say about this case?
mains an authoritarian state dominated by a single party, and 3. Which of these predictions do you find most plausible,
virtually no political scientists would consider it democratic. and why?
For more on authoritarianism and potential democratization
in China, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 421-422. As you read it,
keep in mind the following questions:
132 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

perspectives, it is important that comparative political scientists understand

both what they are arguing and how they might be arguing against some other
perspective. Fundamentally, arguments are based on efforts to test specific
hypotheses—derived from theories—against empirical evidence.

Modernization
Perhaps the most central debate in modern comparative study of democracy centers
modernization theory A theory on elements of modernization theory. Advocates of a modernization approach
that traces democracy to broad examine the relationship between economic development and democratization.
social changes, especially econo­ W ith respect to the causes of democratization, an extensive literature finds
mic development and the changes changes in economic structure to be a key to democratic change; in these analyses,
that accompany it. economics drives much of politics. Modernization scholars argue that economic
change drove democratization through the emergence of such factors as a middle
class (or bourgeoisie) and a literate population. Urbanization over decades and cen­
turies was key in turning former lords and peasants into small businessmen who
demanded greater political say without being either reactionary or revolutionary.
More recently, the link between modernization and democratization finds new
support (with modifications and revisions) for the idea that democracies become
more stable and secure when they are relatively wealthy.
Conversely, poor countries that lack the stabilizing force of a robust middle
class will tend toward authoritarianism. In the absence of the modernization
process outlined previously, no democratic push can emerge. Societies divided
between a small, wealthy elite and impoverished masses will be prone to

Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics and Some Social

Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development
and Political Legitimacy
by Seymour Martin Upset '

s discussed in this chapter, one of the most consistent find­ of democratic institutions. It does so by trying to specify causal
A ings in comparative politics has been that economic devel­ mechanisms through which growth might be expected to
opment often "goes with” democracy and democratization. In promote democracy. Lipset pointed to numerous potential
other words, having a highly developed economy increases the mechanisms, such as literacy and education, but his main idea
likelihood of stable democracy. Classical theorists drew attention was that economic development leads to the creation of a
to this connection, but the political sociologist Seymour Martin strong middle class, and that this middle class, in turn, pro­
Upset was the first scholar to demonstrate the relationship with motes democratization and democratic stability. If Lipset is
strong empirical evidence, showing that a range of development right, proponents of democracy should be very attentive to
variables correlated with democracy. social and economic factors like increasing income inequality,
Recall from chapter 2 that correlation is not the same as since a decline of the middle class might weaken democratic
causation. The mere fact that there is a relationship between institutions.
two variables does not mean that one necessarily causes the Seymour Martin Upset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics. New York:
other. Maybe democracy causes economic development, after Doubleday and Co., 1960; and "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic
all.17 Modernization theory predicts that causality will move Development and Political Legitimacy." American Political Science Review 53,
from economic development to the creation and consolidation no. 1 (1959): 69-105.
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 133

reactionary, non-inclusive politics dominated by the former, or to revolutionary

mobs where the latter can seize power. Neither group has an interest in leaving
political power to the other. Only economically modernized societies, with
their relatively moderate middle classes, can strike the balance between these
extremes.
Modernization theory includes a variety of different approaches. According to
some versions, the economic and social forces of modernization that shape de­
mocracy do not only occur at one point that triggers a democratic transition.
Rather, economic development may also support the persistence of democracy,
once democracy is established.
Modernization theory faces the challenge that there are exceptions it has
trouble explaining. For example, India is the world’s largest democracy, and it
remains quite poor. Moreover, it democratized well before its recent years of
economic growth. Can modernization theory explain India’s democratic success?
And how can modernization theory explain the fact that democratization often
happens rapidly and in waves?
Different versions of this theory specify different hypothetical mechanisms
linking economic development to democracy. Remember, what we mean by
“causal mechanism” is the process through which something produces something
else, according to a theory.18 Scholars can agree that two variables—like eco­
nomic development and democracy—are related without necessarily agreeing
about how they are linked, as discussed in chapter 2. As we have seen, classic

CASE IN CONTEXT

b Democracy's Success in India:

What Can W e Learn from a Deviant Case? PAGE 464

India is a major anomaly for modernization theories of develop­ 2. What, if anything, does Indian democratization suggest
ment. In essence, the relationship between its political and eco­ about the importance of individual actors, leadership,
nomic development has been the inverse of what modernization and institutional design?
theory would predict. India is the world's second largest society 3. Can you think of a way to "save" modernization theory in
and its largest democracy— consider, therefore, the share that the face of the case of India?
Indian citizens hold in the world's broader democratic popula­
tion. This anomaly has potentially serious implications and
makes the puzzle of Indian democratization all the more
intriguing.
For more on the case of democratization in India, see the
case study in Part VI, p. 464. As you read it, keep in mind the
following questions:
1. What, if anything, does Indian anti-colonial resistance
have to do with the country's democratization?

Indian voters, 2012. India is the world's largest democracy.

134 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

versions of modernization theories of democracy point to the intervening vari­

able of a strong middle class.19 Some more recent versions of modernization
theory suggest a different intervening variable: Economic development might
produce democratic values such as the value of “self-expression.”20 We return to
this issue later in the chapter.

Culture and Democracy

Economic development is just one of many conceivable causes of democratiza­
tion. Other significant contributions have emphasized new factors, especially as
the regional emphasis among democratization theorists has shifted from histori­
cal change in Western Europe to those in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Cul­
tural arguments may be able to provide substantial leverage on understanding
political trajectories in different countries.21
One prominent cultural argument is the “Asian values” argument, as articu­
lated by certain non-democratic leaders in Asia who argued why Asia is not con­
ducive to democracy like the “West” is.22 According to this argument, Asian
cultures value stability and harmonious social relations over individual rights,
and are comfortable with respect for authority and deference to the state. Ac­
cordingly, democracy is not a priority but is secondary to ideas of order, hard
work, and social progress. An additional caveat is in order here: A country’s “cul­
ture” may be defined in many different ways and by different individuals or
groups. The assertion by a Malaysian or Singaporean prime minister (or anyone
else, for that matter) about what his country’s culture is should not be taken as
the definitive word on the subject. Indeed, political cultures may be deliberately
shaped by states and governments—especially in non-democratic countries—for
a number of purposes. Many Malaysians and Singaporeans may differ with the
former prime ministers Lee Kuan-Yew or Mahathir Mohamed about their own
societies’ compatibility with democracy. Not all culturalist arguments are so
transparently self-serving for authoritarian leaders, however. Some scholars have
tried to explain authoritarian persistence in Latin America as a function of al­
leged cultural tendencies toward “corporatism” and “authoritarian centralism.”23
Still others have argued that religion makes a difference in shaping the likeli­
hood that a country will be democratic.24
While arguments like these are significant, political scientists rarely demon­
strate that such-and-such a country or continent is not democratic because of
some fixed cultural element that is static and unchanging, and sophisticated ap­
proaches to cultural explanation do not attempt to do so. To take Africa as an
example, political scientists would rarely rest on an argument such as, “Africa is
not very democratic, because its people don’t want it,” or “Africa has lots of au­
thoritarian rule because people belong to tribes.” Besides sounding judgmental
(in ways that can border on racism, when some wrongly assume Africans are less
capable of sophisticated political calculations), the conception of culture here is
too thin. Cultural scholars recognize that values, norms, and customs are shaped
and reshaped, defined and redefined over time. Culture is dynamic rather than
static. While cultural differences among countries may help explain some conti­
nuities over the course of years, ideas and values are also constantly shifting. For
instance, cultural arguments may note that Latin America was long deemed to
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 135

Democracy in America
INSIGHTS
by Alexis de Tocquevilte I

T
ocqueville's analysis of American democracy is complex and The country had no real hereditary nobility, for example. He also
multi-faceted. Scholars influenced by his work, however, felt that American political institutions at the national level were
have often focused on one of its key aspects. He believed that largely well designed, singling out the country's administrative
the protection of liberal rights and the functioning of democratic de-centralization. Perhaps more important, particularly in New
institutions depended in good measure on mores or values and England, local townships had established political institutions
feelings embedded in the population. In other words, democ­ that depended upon participation. These institutions, Toc­
racy depends partially on “political culture." Above all, he was queville famously wrote, inculcated certain "habits of the heart"
impressed by the degree of participation in democratic politics in those who participated in them, awakening a desire for
he witnessed in the United States: People got involved and deliberation.
seemed to enjoy their involvement. The critical idea here, therefore, is not that some countries are
Tocqueville didn't think of political culture as some unchang­ culturally destined for democratization and others for authori­
ing thing attached to a group. It wasn't that Americans were in­ tarianism, but that social and institutional conditions do influ­
trinsically disposed to democracy. Rather, these tendencies were ence political culture, which can then help constrain politics.
shaped by social and institutional factors. For example, the pat­ Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey Mansfield and Debra
tern of immigration and the nature of inheritance in the United Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002 (first published, in French, in
States had led to relatively higher levels of pre-existing equality: 1835 and 1840).

have male-dominated polities, but may also note the increasing empowerment of
women in many countries in Latin America that may have played a role in the
processes of democratization there, as with the case of the Mothers of the Disap­
peared (Madres de [la] Plaza de Mayo) in Argentina.

The International System

For any country, the prevailing tendencies in the international system are likely
to affect the chance of democracy. To use just the twentieth century as an ex­
ample, it may seem sensible to suggest that the period between the two World
Wars (including the Great Depression), the Cold War, and the post-Cold War
era were three very different time periods with respect to the question of how
widespread democracy would be. Looking at snapshots of the global situation at
certain moments in time can convey the importance of the international
environment.
During the Cold War, for example, the countries of Eastern and Central
Europe (the so-called “Second World”) were obviously kept under authoritarian
rule by the power of the Soviet Union. Less obviously, but just as truly, the poor­
est countries of the “Third World” also languished under dictatorships sponsored
by both the Soviet Union and the United States. In a time period when the major
international powers prioritized security and influence over democratic rights in
Asia, Africa, and Latin America, military leaders found it relatively easy to retain
power over civilians. To use a slightly earlier historical example, colonial rule was
non-democratic. For many of the peoples of the world, the political and eco­
nomic system of the colonial era—when Britain, France, Spain, Portugal, and
136 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

Holland dominated much of the globe—was one of non-democratic rule by dis­

tant powers.
As seen in the examples of post-war Japan and Germany, the international
system can promote democracy as well as hinder it. After the collapse of com­
munism from 1989 to 1991, democratic ideas were transmitted and propagated
around the world. Samuel Huntington’s work, for instance, includes an emphasis
on the “learning” different countries could do from one another, with popula­
tions worldwide witnessing democratization in other countries and, in effect,
concluding that “if they can do it, so can we.”25 The positive “demonstration ef­
fects” of watching neighboring countries change surely helped propel a wave of
democratization that spread globally.
As with the other theories noted earlier, there is actually a variety of possible
versions. There is no question that global patterns of democratization are real.
The important question is what causes those patterns. One possible answer is to
point to common conditions of the sort identified by other theories (e.g., perhaps
waves of democratization are products of shared or global economic develop­
ment). Another is to focus on the structural features of the global system, as in the
example of Soviet and U.S. influence during the Cold War noted previously. A
third approach combines the international system and cultural perspectives, such
as Huntington’s idea of democratic learning and “demonstration effects”26 or in
the notion that certain prestigious ways of organizing politics diffuse globally
and exert cultural influence because they are perceived by “world society” to be
legitimate.27

Domestic Institutions
Whether a democracy is sustained or collapses, whether transitions to or from
democracy happen, and how well a given democracy functions may depend on
the institutions in a given society. To review the concept from earlier chapters, we
mean by institutions those features of a political system that shape the behaviors
of actors. These can include organizations and groups, rules and patterns, and
norms and values. Some arguments about the effects of domestic institutions are
best addressed in later chapters: Does federalism or unitarism work better to hold
countries together (chapter 8);28 do parliamentary and presidential forms of gov­
ernment affect the likelihood of democracy (chapters 9 and 10);29 and so on. But
the possible impacts on democracy are noteworthy here.
To use an example familiar to many students of American history, the first
attempt at self-government in the American colonies was the loose confederation
established by The Articles of Confederation of 1781, and it was a political failure
that imperiled the security of the young post-Revolutionary nation. It was only
with the passage of the Constitution (in 1787 and 1788) that the foundations of
the new nation were secured, owing to a new institutional framework that gave
greater power to the central government. The success of the latter charter (and
the failure of the former) might be attributed not to major economic development
or cultural change in a few short years in the 1780s, but rather to the more endur­
ing design of the formal and legal framework for the union—that is to say, to a
more suitable institutional design.
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 137

The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth C e n t u r y ^ ^

INSIGHTS
by Sam uel Huntington . . . . . .

untington observes that democratization takes place in Another factor was a process of "snowballing," in which de­
H "waves," or historical periods in which lots of societies mocratizing regimes influenced one another through example.
democratize and others in which societies tend more toward Successful democratization in one country shows that democra­
authoritarianism. He identifies three major waves of democrati­ tization is possible elsewhere: It also provides models for how to
zation: from 1828 to 1926, from 1943 to 1962, and from 1974 until achieve the transition. During a democratic wave, demonstration
the 1990s. Between these came “reverse waves" of increasing effects might even present pressure to democratize as authoritar­
authoritarianism. Huntington's interest was in explaining the ian forms come to seem less legitimate.
contemporary "third wave" of democratization. Huntington Perhaps the fundamental question to be asked of theories
pointed to multiple factors, but drew particular attention to two like Huntington's is how much factors like demonstration effects
types of external or systemic factors. One was the role of "exter­ and international system pressures explain. Are they more, less,
nal actors" such as the European Union, the United States, and or equally important to factors internal to democratizing societ­
the Catholic Church under John Paul II in fomenting democrati­ ies, like institutional reforms or economic development? And
zation. For example, the United States changed its policies in how can they explain the variation in patterns of democratiza­
the late 1970s under Jimmy Carter, arguing that a respect for tion across cases?
democracy and human rights needed to be emphasized along­ Samuel Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
side national interests. In the early 1980s under Ronald Reagan, the Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

National Endowment for Democracy was established, designed

to assist global democratization.

Dysfunctional political institutions can also undermine a regime, whether it

is democratic or authoritarian. Chile’s longstanding democracy collapsed in
1973, for many reasons, at least some of which were electoral; in elections in
1970, electoral rules split the center and right parties, allowing leftists to obtain
the presidency with the support of only about one-third of the country. This
likely contributed to some middle-class support for the overthrow of the demo­
cratically elected regime by the military. The Weimar Republic in Germany be­
tween the two World Wars was hobbled by similar institutional issues in the
electoral system, as well as by an unclear division of power between the President
as head of state and the Chancellor as head of government. One might not at­
tribute Germany’s democratic collapse and the rise of Nazi rule to institutional
factors alone, but these surely contributed to dissatisfaction with the democratic
regime that undermined its support. So too can authoritarian regimes fail partly
for lack of functional institutions, as when Mexico’s PRI finally lost power in
2000 after seventy-one years; again, the reasons were numerous, but institutional
factors range from the fragmentation of the leading party, to the development of
opposition at local and state levels, to increasingly competitive elections, to the
increasing recognition of the government’s inability to provide services.

Agents and Actors: The Role of Individuals and Groups

There is little doubt that many political outcomes are ultimately traceable to ac­
tions by major individual decision makers; that is, powerful individuals in
138 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

positions of leadership. The question is whether these decisions are shaped and
conditioned by other factors—such as economic development or institutions—or
must be understood primarily in terms of individual choices.30 A prominent ex­
ample from recent years was from South Africa in the 1990s, where national hero
Nelson Mandela had a prominent role in the process of democratization. Like
other “Founding Fathers” in the United States and elsewhere, Mandela seemed
“uniquely” capable of making difficult decisions and compromises, leaving open
the question about what would have happened in his absence. In the South Afri­
can case, there were many other individuals—both prominent political figures
and lesser-known negotiators—who also had significant individual roles. Can
individuals and groups make democracy happen?
The emphasis on specific individuals and groups tends to be focused more on
specific transitions in certain countries than on broad patterns of democracy
around the world. Analytically, we might expect individuals and other actors to
matter more when the question at hand is about specific changes at a certain
historical moment. Looking broadly at the world map and trying to understand
where democracies are found might naturally lead us to consider broad forces,
such as geography and the large sweep of world history, or perhaps cultures.
Looking more closely at a single country at its particular moment of democrati­
zation might push us in the direction of more “proper names.”31 Much as looking
through a telescope gives a sense of large-scale natural and environmental forces
and looking under a microscope gives a sense of the detailed actions of individual
organisms, so too might looking “cross-nationally” give a sense of broad scope
and looking “within a country at a given moment in time” give a sense of indi­
vidual action.
This approach is about more than just great individuals—the Mahatma
Gandhis, George Washingtons, and Nelson Mandelas of history. Groups and
coalitions matter. For instance, the transitions from the 1970s and 1980s (which
included southern Europe, Latin America, and central-eastern Europe, as well
as some countries elsewhere) highlighted the importance of divisions within au­
thoritarian leadership as a cause of democratization. In particular, some leading
scholars (discussed further in the following “Insights” box on Transitionsfrom Au­
thoritarian Rule: Prospectsfor Democracy) argued that democracy comes about when
splits within an authoritarian regime lead to “softliners.”32These softliners interact
with pragmatists in the opposition to form a powerful coalition for moving toward
democracy. This movement comes at the expense of hardliner authoritarians and
to the disappointment of those “maximalists,” or radicals, in the pro-democracy
movement who oppose any cooperation or negotiation with elements of the au­
thoritarian regime. The bottom line in Table 6.1 pushes democratization.

table 6.1 Actors in Democratic Transition

Authoritarian Regime Pro-Democratic Forces

Extreme Hardliners Maximalists/radicals

Moderate Softliners Minimalists/pragmatists

 Causes and Effects: What Causes Democratization? 139

Important interest groups or pressure groups can exercise their collective

power in ways that facilitate democratization or democratic breakdown. Trade or
labor unions might call a strike and immobilize a country and its economy, help­
ing to bring down a regime. Or business groups or investors may boycott a regime,
refusing to invest and ruining the economy to push politics to the breaking point.
Powerful religious movements and representatives of the clergy might help to
bring down a regime from their positions within their churches, mosques, or
temples. And many other mobilized groups in civil society—from human rights
campaigns, to ethnic solidarity movements, to university students (yes, you), to
revolutionaries—have helped keep regimes in place and helped bring them down.

Com bining Argum ents and Theories: Multiple Causes

It is not always necessary to pick one and only one of the preceding categories to
explain why democratization succeeds or fails. Many scholars of democratization
will acknowledge the importance of multiple causal factors. Arguments can rec­
ognize complex causality (or causal complexity): Most important outcomes, like
democracy, will be the result of multiple factors.
To use just two of the aforementioned perspectives, for instance, cultural
change and economic development can affect one another, and both can condi­
tion democracy. Or, as noted previously, Samuel Huntington documented a
“wave” of democratization in the 1980s and highlighted five causes.33 In addition
to economic modernization came the declining legitimacy of authoritarian regimes,
the role of the Catholic Church, and two external factors: demonstration effects (or
the effect of watching your neighbors become democracies), and greater interna-
tional supportfor democracy from the United States and other large powers.
The argument by Inglehart and Welzel discussed in the “Insights” box in­
corporates elements of more than one theory discussed in this chapter. But,

Transitions from Authoritarian Rule

INSIGHTS
(4 vols.) by Guillemm O'Donnell, Philippe C fbm itter, and Laurence. Whitehead

nlike the accounts produced by modernization theorists, Tran­ see a division in the opposition between "radicals" who want no
U sitions fromAuthoritarian Rule stresses the uncertainty of demo­ compromise with the existing regime and "pragmatists" who are
willing to work with the existing regime if they see the chance for
cratic transitions. According to these scholars, transitions are
extremely complex and indeterminate, meaning that producing a a democratic transition. Successful transitions tend to involve
general theory of transitions is a challenging if not impossible task. collaboration between soft-liners in the authoritarian regime
Nevertheless, they draw some important general conclusions. First, and pragmatists. Critical here is that these soft-liners need to feel
they judge international systemic factors to be important, but less as if they are able to initiate and partially control the process: In
important than the jostling of domestic actors. Second, they stress other words, they are unlikely to cooperate if they expect to be
that the uncertainty in question is above all the uncertainty faced persecuted in the aftermath of a transition. Likewise, the dynam-
by those very domestic actors. In other words, they frame the ques­ ics internal to the opposition is important. Pragmatists must be
tion from the perspective of actors within transitioning societies. able to ensure sufficient buy-in on the part of other opposition
O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead, in their summary of actors such that agreements can be honored.
the project's conclusions, note that governing coalitions in au­ Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, eds.,

thoritarian regimes tend to divide into two camps: "soft-liners" Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (4 vols.). Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins

and “hardliners" (see Table 6.1). At the same time, one tends to University Press, 1986.
140 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy:

INSIGHTS The Human Development Sequence
by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Wetzel

nglehart and Welzel use survey data to analyze the relationship higher valuation of individual-level autonomy and freedom.
I between economic development, cultural tradition, and de­ According to the authors, any society achieving increasing eco­
mocratization in more than eighty countries. nomic development is expected to see increasing “self-expression
The fundamental difference separating their work from values." They find that religious and cultural traditions shape the
earlier modernization theory is that they posit a distinct mecha­ timing and extent of this change, but that economic develop­
nism. Recall that Lipset argued that economic development ment is the cause of the change.
produced democracy fundamentally through creating a vibrant So how do they get to democracy? They find that higher levels
middle class. Inglehart and Welzel think of economic develop­ of self-expression values correlate with democratic institutions.
ment as shaping political institutions through culture, as re­ They presume that the individual's culturally induced demand for
flected in the values and aspirations of individuals. They find that greater autonomy is the source of political-institutional change.
societies with low levels of development tend to have people In other words, Inglehart and Welzel's model looks like this:
who are focused on "survival values." For example, they may
Economic development —>Cultural change —>Democratization
place a lot of stock in family authority, presumably because the
social bonds of the family are critical to survival in the context Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and
of material scarcity. Societies with higher levels of development, Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge:Cambridge
however, show higher levels of "self-expression values," meaning University Press, 2005.

importantly, it does more than simply make a list of all the possible arguments
and say they are all valid. It would not be very analytically powerful to say,
“Democracy comes from a whole range of cultural values, economic moderniza­
tion, and a whole bunch of structures and institutions.” As suggested in chapter 2,
this may be correct, but it is not much of an argument. One can take a stronger
stand by showing how different theories and factors inform one another. Notice
the steps in the chain of logic in the preceding sketch at the end of the Inglehart
and Welzel “Insights” box. To use this example, showing that economic modern­
ization precedes changes to cultural values in a particular sequence is more
powerful than simply listing both and saying, “They both matter.”

CASE IN CONTEXT

Is American Democracy in Trouble? PAGE 562

There is no doubting that the United States has been one of the 1. What are the implications for this Issue of the major theo­
most important and influential democracies in the world. Virtu­ ries of democracy and democratization discussed in this
ally all political scientists continue to regard it as a democracy chapter?
even still. However, some scholars have expressed concerns 2. How does this question relate to procedural versus sub­
about declining levels of public trust and civic association, along stantive definitions of democracy?
with increasing levels of income inequality.34 3. If, indeed, income inequality and declining trust (in insti­
For more on the question of whether American democracy tutions and in others) suggest that we have reason to be
may be in trouble, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 562-563. As concerned, what could be done about it?
you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
 Is American Democracy a Model? 141

Is American Democracy a Model? THINKING

he central question in the study of democratization is why democratization COM PARATIVELY
T happens or does not happen. This necessarily involves an understanding of
the dates and time periods at which democratization may occur. As we noted at KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL
the beginning of this chapter, from an American perspective this may seem like
a relatively straightforward proposition, but this is an illusion. Consider the fol­ Within-Case Analysis
Not all comparison in comparative
lowing multiple-choice question:
politics is about comparing multiple,
distinct cases. That is, sometimes we
In what year did the United States of America achieve democracy? make comparisons and conduct
a. 1776 analyses within cases. Typically, we do
b. 1787 so for different reasons than when we
compare cases. When we compare
c. 1791
multiple cases, we are often trying to
d. 1863 get "leverage" on some key variation.
e. 1920 Within-case analysis, in contrast,
f. 1965 is often used for the purpose of trac­
g. None of the above ing causal processes.35In the case at
hand, we are interested in comparing
At first glance, the most obvious answer might appear to be A, the year of the different junctures in the process of
signing of the Declaration of Independence. Similarly, one may argue that the democratization in the United States.
This is useful precisely because com­
signing of the Constitution in 1787 was the crucial moment, as this established
paring different aspects or stages of
a representative republic. The year 1791 witnessed the ratification of the Bill of that process might reveal a more
Rights, a moment indispensable to democratization if democracy is understood complex and realistic pattern of
to require civil liberties as well as political rights. Although the years at the causality.
founding were pivotal moments in American democracy, these are not the only So, when would you use this?
Ideally, within-case analysis is used in
possible correct answers to the question. The year 1863 saw President Abraham
the context of broader, comparative
Lincoln issue the Emancipation Proclamation, a declaration recognizing that analysis.36A comparative politics
upon the end of the Civil War, America would end slavery, its most conspicuous researcher might use the within-case
and infamous source of “unfreedom.” The year 1920 may be an even less obvious analysis we describe in this section as
date, but one whose consequences for democracy were direct and massive: It is part of a broader comparative project
that looks at long-run democratiza­
the year in which women were first provided with constitutional guarantees of
tion in the United States in compari­
the right to vote. This dramatic extension of voting rights not only enshrined the son with other cases.
principle of universal suffrage but also had the effect of increasing the electorate
by a huge percentage. The year 1965 may seem, to most eyes, to be too recent to
count as part of America’s democratization process, but it is the year of the pas­
sage of the Voting Rights Act, a culminating step in the American process of
guaranteeing the vote to all of its adult citizens.
Yet one may also argue with some validity that “None of the above” is the best
response to the question of when America achieved democracy. This would be true
particularly for those who view the quality and depth of democracy in America
as halting or subpar. Notice here that the criterion is not one that is easily reached
through passage of a law guaranteeing the right to vote. Rather, it depends on the
degree to which individuals exercise their rights and the degree to which each
individual has an equal ability to influence the society’s political life. The differ­
ence here is significant, and most political scientists would agree that it makes
sense to measure democracy both according to a basic threshold and relative to
an ideal. Few political scientists disagree about the importance of the aforemen­
tioned procedural definition of democracy that takes into account basic political
142 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

THINKING rights to vote and the presence of fundamental civil rights. The question is
whether this definition sufficiently covers all of the characteristics of a democ­
COM PARATIVELY
racy. By these criteria, the United States is clearly above an international demo­
cratic threshold, and has been at most of the historical moments discussed
previously, today along with most of the other advanced, industrialized countries
in the world (and a healthy number of lower-income countries).
On the other hand, democracy in the United States has been characterized by
different scholars in less favorable light, according to other plausible criteria: low
voter turnout, low levels of voter knowledge and interest, disproportionate influ­
ence of certain interest groups and lobbies, excessive polarization, and under­
representation of women and minorities in elected office, among other issues.
You may deem some of these to be problematic, or all of them, or none. But for
the purposes of our discussion, does this mean that democratization in the
United States is incomplete? If one adopts a minimalist or procedural definition
of democracy, then by nearly all accounts the United States is a democracy. If one
adopts a substantive definition, however, then the United States has shortcom­
ings, as do all other countries that meet the procedural definition of democracy.
The causes of transitions to democracy are numerous, and the United States is no
exception. Analysts may find that one or more of the broad categories of explanation
account best for democratization. In other words, there may be a need to disaggre­
gate the concept of democratization, which may be a name that we give to a se­
quence of distinct processes. It is not a foregone conclusion that the same factors that
produced initial democratization in the United States are responsible for the end of
slavery or the extension of suffrage. Just the same, we can attempt to explain differ­
ent aspects of stages of democratization via the theories we have considered in this
chapter. Moreover, if different theories are more or less effective at explaining differ­
ent aspects or moments in U.S. democratization, this might tell us something useful
about those theories for broader comparative purposes. For instance, understanding
the extension of suffrage to women and the civil rights achievements of the 1960s
(most notably the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting Rights Act of 1965) may lead
some in the direction of social actors and groups including the women’s suffrage
movement (such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton and the Seneca Falls Convention) and
the leaders of the civil rights movement (such as Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., the
Southern Baptist Convention, and the NAACP). Others may focus on the eco­
nomic and social factors at the time that drove the country toward change. Within-
case findings about this can then be brought back to comparative analysis, as we can
ask whether similar processes are also visible at similar junctures in other cases.
Table 6.2 demonstrates how our different theoretical approaches might be
used to explain a variety of democratizing moments in American history. These
are not definitive statements but are simply illustrative of how scholars in differ­
ent theoretical “schools” or “traditions” might approach the same question. We
choose three different moments since America’s movement toward indepen­
dence: the American Revolution; the Emancipation Proclamation and the aboli­
tion of slavery; and the extension of civil and political rights to women and to
blacks in the twentieth century. Notice the research question and the outcome at
the top, and then consider the cells of the table as possible ways different scholars
might address these questions and explain these outcomes.
 Is American Democracy a Model? 143

table 6 .2Causal Interpretations of American Democracy

and Democratization Across Time Periods
Eighteenth Century Nineteenth Century Twentieth Century

Dependent Emancipation/Abolition of
Independence and Constitution Universal Suffrage
Variable Slavery

Why did American colonists push Why did President Lincoln and Why did unrepresented groups
Research Question for independence and establish a Congress end slavery during/ (women and African Americans)
democratic republic? after Civil War? at last attain voting rights?

Decline of slave-based economy

Modernization Merchants and small businesses of Growing demand for labor
and economic conflict between
(Economic/Social colonial economy seek to establish necessitates greater political
industrial North and agricultural
Change) independence from British Crown inclusion of excluded groups
South

Frontier culture and settler groups Changing perceptions of African

(Puritans, etc.) incompatible with Americans among national elites; Declining tolerance for prejudice
Culture
distant monarchy; local institutions religious culture nurtures on the basis of sex or race
encourage democratic norms abolitionism

International trade and relations

American power and "arsenal
French-British rivalry creates with great power Britain
Structures/Systems of democracy" necessitate full
opportunity for colonists to (including blockade and
(International) domestic inclusion for global
succeed in battle against Crown question of Britain recognizing
leadership
Confederacy)

Fractured thirteen colonies Congressional and constitutional

Evolution of congressional
Institutions attempt loose Articles of impasse between Southern
majority in populous regions
(Domestic) Confederation and learn need for “nullification" and states' rights
of country in favor of change
stronger union under Constitution advocates versus Northerners

Women's suffrage movement

"Founding Fathers" have formative Abolitionists drive political
and civil rights movement
Agency/Actor role in Revolution and shaping debate; extremist groups
central to creating demand
new nation generate reaction
for change

Regarding our earlier point about why you might use within-case analysis,
note that it is perfectly possible that the best explanation of the eighteenth-
century sequence is derived from the theory that focuses on structures/the world
system; that the nineteenth-century sequence is best explained by the theory that
focuses on culture; and the twentieth-century sequence is best explained by
modernization theory. Or some other such combination may be the strongest.
The payolf here is that if we were to find this, it would bring nuance to our gen­
eral theory in a useful way, and we could bring this insight back to comparative
analysis.
144 Chapter 6: Democracy and Democratization

Ch ap te r Su m m ary
Concepts predicts that economic development increases the likeli­
• The word democracy has numerous meanings. hood of democratization.
• One major distinction is between procedural and substan­ • Another theory is that political culture shapes the possibili­
tive definitions of democracy. ties for democracy and democratization, and that some
Regime change can include both the development of de­ political cultures increase the possibility of the establish­
mocracy and also the breakdown of an existing democratic ment and persistence of authoritarian regimes as well.
regime. • Systemic and structural theories say that democratization is
more a function of factors operative at the level of the in­
Types ternational system than things happening within societies.
• Types of democracy include both representative and direct They focus, among other things, on waves of democratiza­
forms. tion and also of democratic breakdown.
Democratization can be thought of in terms of both demo­ Some theories place more emphasis on contingency,
cratic transition and consolidation. agents, and institutional design.

Causes and Effects Thinking Comparatively

Scholars have developed a number of theories to explain We looked at several key sequences in the history of de­
why democratization takes place when and where it does. mocratization in the United States, and we introduced the
Perhaps the most famous is modernization theory, which concept of within-case analysis.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. As we have noted in this chapter, India is somewhat unusual for socialist tradition. More generally, we could say that, since Alexis
having achieved a robust democracy before achieving eco­ de Tocqueville, some have viewed the United States as excep­
nomic modernization. What would modernization, cultural, tional in its longstanding liberal democracy. Critics, of course,
structural, institutional, and actor-centered theories say about have argued that this democracy has been limited and indirect.
this case? Which of these theories do you think could make Recently, we have seen two notable trends that bear on demo­
most sense of the Indian case? Why? cratic practice in the United States: (a) increasing levels of
2. We have noted in this chapter that democracy can take a variety income inequality; and (b) declining public trust in major institu­
of forms, with one major distinction being between "represen­ tions. What, if any, are the implications of these trends for the
tative" and "direct" democracy. But what is the relationship be­ future of American democracy? What would each of the major
tween these forms? Are they ultimately compatible? Do gains in theories of democratization and democratic consolidation say
one involve trade-offs in the other? Think about this question in about these issues?
relation to case examples. 5. Imagine that the leader ofa poor country with low levels of rule
3. In recent years there has been much discussion among politi­ of law and dysfunctional political institutions asks you to help
cians and public intellectuals about whether democracy can be design a new democratic system for their polity. What would
engineered or even imposed. Some think that if the appropriate each of the theories considered in this chapter say about the
conditions are established, democracy can flourish anywhere. possibility of your doing so? Now imagine that you were asked
Others think that societies need to come to democratization to help institutionally engineer increasing democratization in
organically and on their own. What would each of the theories the United States. Ask the same question of this project. Are the
we have considered have to say about this question? implications the same? Different? Why?
4. "American Exceptionalism" has long held that the United States
is different from Europe in that it did not establish a robust
 I n the 1960s, there was a country in Africa called Southern Rhodesia. It was
I a British colony that asserted its independence and was ruled by a white
minority descended from colonial settlers. This country granted few rights to
the black African majority and concentrated economic and political power in
white hands. By the 1970s a resistance movement emerged to overthrow the
white regime, led by a charismatic rebel leader who vowed to bring democ­
racy to the black African majority. After a long struggle, this movement for
democracy finally overthrew the repressive white regime in
IN THIS CHAPTER
1979, and a negotiated settlement with the support of Britain
gave rise to a freer society in 1980. The transition even set in
Concepts 147
Authoritarianism and Authoritarian
motion some much-needed land reform that would reshape
Regimes 147 the terrible inequalities between poor blacks and rich white
Transitions to Authoritarian Regimes 148 farmers, and the new president set to work.
Types 148 The name of the charismatic liberation hero was Robert
Types of Authoritarianism 148
Mugabe, and he renamed the country Zimbabwe. After an
Types of Transition (or Nontransition) to
Authoritarianism 152 initial burst of enthusiasm with Mugabe’s rule (as he invested
Causes and Effects: What Causes in causes such as girls’ education, a policy and idea well ahead
Authoritarian Regimes to Emerge of its time in sub-Saharan Africa), however, things turned
and Persist? 158
quickly. Beginning in the 1980s, his regime was responsible
Historical Institutionalist Theories 159
for massacres of opponents and innocent victims in the
Poverty and Inequality 160
State Weakness and Failure 162 region known as Matabeleland. By the 2000s, he was presid­
Political Culture Theories of Authoritarian ing over a brutal and repressive regime that encouraged so-
Persistence 163 called “war veterans” from the liberation war to occupy
Barriers to Collective Action 164
white-owned farms and frequently kill the owners and
Special Causal Circumstances Surrounding
Hybrid and Semi-authoritarian anyone loyal to them; the fact that many of these alleged
Regimes 163 “war veterans” were just teenagers, and thus born after the
liberation war, was not lost on many observers. In the midst
THINKING COMPARATIVELY
of the killing and disorder, Zimbabwe’s economy collapsed
Why Did Zimbabwe Become and Remain
Authoritarian? 167 into hyperinflation, and the agriculturally rich country once
known as “the bread basket of Africa” came instead to be
C A S E S IN CON TEXT
known as the continent’s basket case. Mugabe is still in
Iran • Russia • Mexico • France
Germany
power as of early 2015, more than thirty years later, and he
presides over a regime that is deeply dependent on him as an
individual. It was not obvious from the start that the story
would turn out this way, but Mugabe is now widely reviled— around the
world and by many Zimbabweans— as one of the most abusive and despotic
146
dictators in Africa.
 Concepts 147

How does this happen? W hat gives rise to such brutal regimes, and what
allows them to persist even as they preside over ruination? W hile the previous
chapter sought to explain democracy and democratization, this chapter turns
the question around to look at authoritarian regimes. These sorts of regimes
were for a long time the majority of all governments. They cast a specter over
the entire twentieth century, and they still exist in many forms today.
® « •

Concepts
In the previous chapter we looked at democratic regimes and transitions to de­
mocracy. In this chapter, we focus on two main concepts: authoritarianism (along
with authoritarian regimes) and authoritarian transitions.

Authoritarianism and Authoritarian Regimes

At first glance, authoritarianism might be viewed simply as the absence of de­ authoritarianism A form of
mocracy as outlined in chapter 6, but the concept is in fact much more nuanced government or regime that is
and complex. It can be thought of as a characteristic of some ideologies (e.g., non-democratic.
fascism and some varieties of socialism) or even as a behavioral tendency, as in
so-called “authoritarian personalities.”1 In general, we characterize an ideology
or behavioral tendency as authoritarian to the extent that it is favorable to hierar­
chy and to closed, concentrated processes of decision making.
Authoritarian regimes are those that exemplify, to one degree or another, this authoritarian regime
authoritarian ideal. While many of us have had the good fortune to grow up in A non-democratic regime.
democratic societies, we should recognize that in many places and times authori­
tarian regimes have been the norm. Indeed, if we were to take a historical view of
political regimes, we would see that most different subtypes (e.g., oligarchies, em­
pires, monarchies, and sultanates) fall into the general authoritarian category.2
While we are interested in modern regimes here, there is still a lot of variation
to explore. Modern authoritarian regimes vary in several respects. One is the
extent to which the regime centers on an individual, as opposed to a ruling elite
clique, junta, or bureaucracy. Personalistic regimes may invoke the names of his­
tory’s greatest villains: Hitler, Stalin, Pol Pot in Cambodia, and even as far back
as Caligula in the Roman Empire. O f course, these personalistic rulers relied on
institutions such as political parties, militaries, or secret police to support their
rule, but their rule was quite different from that of the nondescript generals and
admirals who ruled Brazil or Argentina in the 1970s. Another distinction is the
degree to which the regime expounds an overarching ideology, such as commu­
nism or fascism, as opposed to governing without attempting to socialize the
citizenry in such ways. A third major difference is the extent to which and the
way in which the regime constrains or violates human rights. Most theorists
would recognize all authoritarian regimes in the contemporary world as violating
some basic rights, such as the right to self-determination and basic political free­
doms. However, some authoritarian regimes are willing to leave individuals
alone, in relative freedom, so long as they accept the regime’s authority and stay
away from politics. Others aim to control almost every aspect of their citizens’
148 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

lives. The subtypes of authoritarian regimes described in the “Types” section

express some of these distinctions.

Transitions to Authoritarian Regimes

Regime change is not a one-way street from authoritarianism to democracy; on
the contrary, democracies can break down and collapse, and authoritarian re­
gimes can persist and solidify their rule. Although the end of the twentieth cen­
tury witnessed a wave of democratization in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Asia, and Africa, more recent years have recalled that authoritarianism
persists and even grows in some places.3 Reversion to authoritarianism in demo­
cratic countries has a long history, from the breakdown of the Weimar Republic
and the rise of Nazi Germany in the 1930s to the many coups in Latin America
and Africa in the 1960s and 1970s. Consolidation may stop or be reversed. Tran­
sition may fail, or a country may retransition from democracy back below the
threshold to authoritarianism. Political scientists do not use the word authoritari-
democratic breakdown The anization, but we do examine these processes of democratic breakdown and
transition from a democratic to a authoritarian persistence.4 We also need to consider the various paths to the
non-democratic regime. establishment of hybrid regimes (which combine authoritarian and some demo­
cratic elements).5
authoritarian persistence The
ongoing continuation of an
authoritarian regime, such that Types
democratic transition does not As noted previously, authoritarian regimes vary in important ways. In this sec­
take place. tion, we discuss the key subtypes of authoritarianism, as well as the variable
forms that transitions to authoritarian regimes can take.
hybrid regime A class of regime
that appears to be neither fully Types of Authoritarianism
democratic nor fully authoritarian, Some of the most important types of authoritarian regimes are totalitarian re­
such as electoral authoritarianism, gimes, theocracies, personalistic dictatorships, and bureaucratic-authoritarian
delegative democracy, and illiberal regimes. We discuss each of these in more detail in this section.
democracy.
Totalitarian Regimes
totalitarian regime A form of Totalitarian regimes represent the most notorious form of authoritarian rule,
authoritarian regime that aims to epitomized by the communist and fascist regimes of the twentieth century that
control everything about the lives sent millions of people to their deaths, especially in Nazi Germany and the
of its subject population, such as in Soviet Union, particularly during the years of Joseph Stalin’s leadership. Many
the Soviet Union and Germany would consider today’s North Korea to be another example of a totalitarian
under the Nazis. regime. Totalitarian regimes deny civil rights to citizens and do not hold free and
fair elections, but their manipulations and machinations go far beyond those of
many other authoritarian regimes.
Totalitarianism gets its name from the attempt to overhaul or control the to­
tality of a society, most notably through propagation of an official governing
ideology to which all people are expected to conform.6 Totalitarian regimes will
go to great lengths to preclude freedom of thought and conscience, often using
secret police, spies, and informants to report on suspected dissidents; freedom of
thought is antithetical to the ambitions of totalitarian leadership. There is usually
one official governing party, often led by a dominant figure who is the subject of
hero worship or a cult of personality. State control over the economy is common
and prevents any economic actors from building up a power base that might be
 Types 149

used to challenge the total domination the state has over public life. Many
totalitarian regimes use prisons, work camps, and mass executions in an attempt
to re-educate society and to eliminate supposedly undesirable elements, espe­
cially ethnic minorities. The Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin and Nazi Germany
under Adolf Hitler are the most horrific examples, with each responsible for
millions of deaths in the mid-twentieth century.7To a large extent, the history of
that century was the story of the struggle between liberal democratic regimes and
totalitarian regimes.
Totalitarianism may be a modern phenomenon. There certainly are precedents
for totalitarianism in historical societies, such as ancient Sparta. But for the most
part, the relative weakness of pre-modern states precluded the possibility of true
totalitarian regimes, despite efforts that look quite totalitarian, such as medieval
European states’ efforts to censor literature and to enforce Christian orthodoxy
by force.
Some analysts argue that the concept of totalitarianism was an artifact of
the Cold War, or even a propaganda tool for the liberal-democratic West, used
to demonize the Soviet Union and its allies.8 There is no doubt that totalitari­
anism was most associated with the atrocities committed by both the Nazis
under Hitler and the Soviets. It is important as a concept, however, as it allows
us to describe important variation between forms of authoritarianism that aim
to control everything in the lives of their people and those that allow greater
latitude. Contemporary Russia and Venezuela, for example, while not totali­
tarian states, as some of their critics contend, clearly exhibit a number of
authoritarian features, while contemporary North Korea and even, to some
extent, Cuba go much further in their restrictions on personal freedoms and
might be labeled “totalitarian.” Finally, some scholars argue that totalitarian
regimes are so distinctive in terms of the characteristics we have discussed
here to deserve their own category, rather than to be thought of as a type of
authoritarianism.9

Theocracies
Some authoritarian regimes are closely linked to religions and religious institu­
tions. If religious leaders control an authoritarian state, or if a state imposes very
strict religious restrictions and uses religion as its main mode of legitimation, we
refer to it as a theocratic regime. In the pre-modern world, many if not most theocracy An authoritarian state
states were theocratic, and the monarchies of Western Europe, for example, had controlled by religious leaders, or a
strong theocratic features. Today there are fewer theocratic regimes, but some state with very strict religious res­
stand out as particularly noteworthy, such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. Many states, trictions that uses religion as its
though, continue to involve religion or to impose religious restrictions, a subject main mode of legitimation.
to which we return in chapter 15.

Personalistic Dictatorships
Not all authoritarian regimes are totalitarian or theocratic. Indeed, many con­
temporary authoritarian regimes are not. Some simply allow little role for the
population in political decision-making, but the state does not aim to control personalistic dictatorship
every aspect of their lives. Among more limited authoritarian regimes we find A form of authoritarianism in which
the classic forms of dictatorship that have been particularly common in modern the personality of the dictator is
political history. The terms personalistic dictatorship and the more antiquated highlighted.
150 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

CASE IN CONTEXT

Democratic Features of Authoritarian Systems? The Case of Iran PAGE 475

In 1979, Iran underwent a social revolution that brought a radical For more on authoritarianism and democracy in Iran, see the
and religious government into power. Some regard this govern* case study in Part VI, pp. 475-476. As you read it, keep in mind the
ment as totalitarian, as it imposes strict controls on public expres­ following questions:
sion, religion, and issues of "morality." Religious leaders at the top 1. On what grounds does Iran claim to be democratic? What
of the hierarchy have ultimate control, and thus we would be criteria do social scientists use in judging it not to be so
justified in considering it theocratic. Interestingly, though, in this despite some clearly democratic features?
context Iran still has some quasi-democratic features as well. 2. What are the implications of Iran's totalitarian and theo­
Elections are still periodically held, and they are actually con­ cratic approach for the long-term viability of its regime?
tested, though not always fairly. In short, there is some debate Does totalitarianism help the regime stay in power or
within the Iranian state, but within a rather narrow band policed create vulnerabilities?
by religious authorities, and in a broader context that most
would regard as highly authoritarian.

“sultanism” refer to domination of a political system by a single individual.10This

individual concentrates power and governs as he (or she, but usually he) sees fit.
Autocracy, despotism, dictatorship, or tyranny can be used to express similar
ideas, though some of these terms can sometimes refer to domination by a clique
of more than one leader. As distinct from totalitarian rule, the sultan/autocrat/
despot may not aim to establish an overarching ideology. In other cases, an ideol­
ogy may be promoted but does not come to be implemented to the extent that it
would be in a totalitarian regime. As distinct from theocratic rule, while a per­
sonalistic dictator might support religion, repress religious minorities, and use
religion as a tool of the state, it is the dictator—and not the religious system in
question—that is the highest authority.
The justification for rule in personalistic dictatorships may be based on the
assertion of the public interest, such as the ability to promote economic success,
or the need to combat subversives. Sometimes, dictatorships of this sort are ex­
plicitly framed as temporary. On other occasions, they have been presented as
likely “necessary” for a long time. The idea of “democratic Caesarism” has some­
times been used to justify them, the suggestion being that some societies on the
path to democratization are not yet ready for democracy but, rather, need a strong
leader to help them get ready, or even to maintain order over the longer term.11
Conveniently, though, such self-appointed leaders are often slow to judge the
countries they rule to be actually ready. Some authoritarian rulers of this sort
argue that democracy is not right for all countries, and some hold that a country
needs a strong leader to keep people in line. There have been a number of person­
alistic dictators in Africa, among other regions of the world, and several of them
are unfortunately memorable. They include the tyrants Mobutu Sese Seko of the
former Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), Jean-Bedel Bokassa
of the Central African Republic (who declared himself emperor), and Idi Amin
of Uganda.12
 Types 151

Bureaucratic-Authoritarian Regimes
Personalistic dictatorships and related forms of autocracy shade into a form of
authoritarian regime that became very common in parts of the developing world
in the mid- to late twentieth century: the bureaucratic-authoritarian regime. bureaucratic-authoritarian
These regimes are usually focused less on a single individual than on personalistic regime A type of authoritarian
dictatorships, instead relying on an organized bureaucracy (often, though not regime, common in Latin America
always, the military) to run the country. and elsewhere in the mid- to late
Though less often associated with particular historical figures, such regimes twentieth century, that was
are not necessarily less brutal than personalistic regimes. The Argentine military associated with control of the state
in the 1970s, for example, was infamous for torture and for methods of execution more by a group of elites (often
that included throwing dissenters out of helicopters into the Atlantic Ocean.13 military) than by a single individual
Bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Asia and Latin America used a range of leader.
justifications for assuming rule, including the political impasses and economic
failures of civilian regimes in their countries.14
Like most personalistic dictatorships, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes
tend to be less ideological than totalitarian regimes, or more pragmatic. They can
be right-wing or left-wing, but the fundamental rationale they typically use in
trying to garner legitimacy is the alleged need to establish order or economic
progress. They tell their societies they can achieve full modernity only through a
strong hand and technical administration. Yet these regimes, which were very
common in the 1960s and 1970s, typically viewed their role not as displacing
civilian regimes in order to call new elections, but as governing their countries
for extended periods. In other words, bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes seldom
view themselves as merely brief caretakers.
Some would consider the category of “party dictatorships” to overlap with that
of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes. Lor example, some would argue that the
Mexican government during the period of the Partido Revolucionario Institu-
cional’s (PRI) dominance shaded into bureaucratic authoritarianism (see discus­
sion in the “Case in Context” box titled “Mexico’s ‘Perfect Dictatorship’ and Its
End”). Party dictatorships are distinguished from personalistic dictatorships
most clearly by the fact that it is a party, rather than a single individual, that aims
to hold onto power. In the contemporary world, China might be considered a
good example of this.

Hybrid and Semi-Authoritarian Regimes

Sometimes regimes are hard to classify as either democratic or authoritarian.
Indeed, this seems to be a growing problem. This is especially true after the third
wave of democratization (discussed in the previous chapter), which led to stronger
democratic international norms with which regimes wish to appear compliant.15
Accordingly, regimes developed techniques and learned from one another about
how to appear to comply with these norms while nevertheless remaining in power.
Over the years, the range of variations among different types of regimes has led to
a proliferation of names for regimes that fit somewhere in between full democracy
and complete authoritarianism. Some scholars have urged caution about coming
up with new names, noting that while there are many subtypes of democratic or
authoritarian regimes, we want more than simply “democracy with adjectives.”16
Nonetheless, these terms have resonance and have become prominent.
152 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

illiberal democracy A polity with The notion of illiberal democracy emerges from the many experiences
some democratic features but in where countries have reasonably fair elections but then do little to hold elected
which political and civil rights are leaders to account.17 While these countries are described as democracies,
not all guaranteed or protected. largely due to reasonably fair elections, they may share more in common with
authoritarian regimes. Several regimes in Latin America have been character­
delegative democracy A hybrid ized as delegative democracies,18 while the term electoral authoritarianism
form of regime that is democratic has been used to describe hybrid regimes elsewhere.19 More recently, some of
but involves the electorate these regimes have been labeled as competitive authoritarian, meaning that
"delegating” significant authority to they do allow some political competition but not enough to qualify as fully
a government. democratic.20 Note that these terms are not perfect synonyms. A delegative
democracy is considered at least partially democratic. Competitive authoritari­
electoral authoritarianism
anism blurs the line in this connection, the key idea being that the regime is
A name applied to situations in
not truly democratic but that it exerts control through elections that are at least
which authoritarian regimes
nominally competitive. The incomplete nature of democracy in many hybrid
nominally compete in elections.
regimes was described by the Peruvian scholar Hernando de Soto, who once
competitive authoritarianism discussed politics in his country in the 1980s and 1990s by saying, “every five
A form of government or regime years we elect a dictator.”21
that allows some political
competition but not enough to Types of Transition (or Nontransition) to Authoritarianism
qualify as fully democratic. As mentioned previously, many forms of regime change can end in authori­
tarianism. These include the replacement of one form of authoritarian regime
with another, as well as democratic breakdown and transitions to hybrid re­
gimes. We discuss these here, but first we will take a look at authoritarian
persistence.

Daniel Ortega, president of Nicaragua, as he is sworn into the presidency for his third term, in
2012. Ortega's supporters claim that his policies aim to reduce inequalities and poverty, while
his critics charge that his government is not fully democratic.
 Types 153

A uthoritarian Persistence
Authoritarian persistence is a pressing issue in light of the many non-democratic
regimes in the world today that seem enduring, perhaps including China,
Cuba, North Korea among others. In discussing democratic transition and
consolidation in the previous chapter, we noted that these processes may not
always be completed. Such a case may suggest partial democratization, but the
flip side of the coin is the persistence (and therefore apparent “success”) of an
authoritarian regime. At some level, this distinction may seem to be merely se­
mantic, but we must take care not to assume that all countries are destined to
become democracies in the end.22 Indeed, questions about the persistence of
authoritarianism become more interesting if an authoritarian regime persists
despite predictions that it should not.
Authoritarian regimes have their own characteristics and attributes, which
may contribute to their stability. For instance, the Chinese Communist Party—
which was an economic failure for its first thirty years in power—has very
successfully presided over that country’s decades of economic growth since it
undertook reforms beginning in 1979. This economic success is undoubtedly part
of why the authoritarian regime has endured and democratization has not gained
steam after the brutal crackdown on protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989. In
short, to understand regime types and regime changes, we must recognize that they
depend not only on the details of how a transition goes but also on the features
of authoritarian regimes.
Moreover, it is worth noting that there are at least two main kinds of authori­
tarian persistence. The first is the persistence of a single authoritarian regime, as

Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia PAGE 533

■I
For decades Russia was the center of the Soviet Union, which, like though his ability to hold onto power over the long term remains
virtually every modern state, claimed to be democratic, though to be seen.
in this instance quite dubiously. Then, between 1989 and 1991, For more on Russia as a competitive authoritarian regime, see
the Soviet Union fell apart, more quickly than almost anyone had the case study in Part VI, pp. 533-534. As you read it, keep in mind
anticipated, leading to the emergence of a hybrid regime under the following questions:
Boris Yeltsin. A period of economic and political instability fol­ 1. If Russia is a competitive authoritarian regime rather than
lowed until Vladimir Putin, aided by an oil boom, began to a democracy or a fully authoritarian regime, when did it
impose political order. He did this, in part, by developing a hybrid become one? What does the case suggest about how we
of electoral politics with strong authoritarian features, consid­ can distinguish hybrid from democratic and authoritarian
ered a classic case of competitive authoritarianism.23 The state regimes?
has been used to repress his opponents, and his 2012 re-election 2. How much of Russia's authoritarian character is a function
to the presidency has been denounced by many for its irregulari­ of the state's ability to make use of oil wealth? If there is a
ties and has been the source of much popular protest. Putin prolonged downturn in the market for oil, will the hybrid
could conceivably alternate between holding the presidency regime model be likely to continue to work indefinitely?
and governing indirectly through others in the coming years, Why or why not?
154 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

suggested earlier. Often this persistence is accompanied by major internal

changes to the regime. An example, again, is the rule of the Chinese Communist
Party. Today’s Communist Party embraces very different policies and a different
style of rule than it did, say, under Mao Zedong in the 1960s. Yet the same party
and the same basic state have remained in place, and thus most political scientists
would consider this a case of a single authoritarian regime’s persistence. In other
words, the reforms of Deng Xiaoping and his successors, while radical, did not
constitute an institutional break in regime type, but rather a slower transition
that leaves the regime firmly in the authoritarian category.
Let’s consider a different sort of pattern: the substitution of one authoritarian
regime for another. Whereas the first type of authoritarian persistence that we
considered has no punctuated regime change, this type does. Some authoritarian
regimes give way to other authoritarian regimes, often of very different types.
One example is modern Iran. In 1979, millions of protestors backing the Islamic
Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the longtime ruler, the Shah Reza
Pahlavi, a U.S.-supported authoritarian leader (see extended discussion in the
Country Profile and Case Studies for Iran in Part VI). The result was a very dif­
ferent type of regime: The Islamic Revolution was theocratic (i.e., led by religious
clerics), conservative, and nationalistic, as opposed to the secular, modernizing,
and pro-Western rule of the Shah. Yet both were authoritarian and both opposed
liberal democracy. Indeed, what is particularly interesting about this case is the
question of which of the two authoritarian Iranian regimes in question is less
democratic, a subject Iran scholars debate. From Cuba to China to Ethiopia,
there is a long history of regimes that change in style, type, or ideology, substi­
tuting one flavor of authoritarianism for another.
Authoritarian regimes use a number of techniques and strategies in their ef­
forts to persist. These are sometimes called strategies of “regime maintenance.”
One such strategy is to produce economic benefits for citizens. This can take the
form of efforts to produce growth (as in Singapore or, more recently, China) or in
the form of patronage and clientelism, which involve the state using its own re­
sources to benefit supporters.24 Authoritarian regimes also often use repression.

—
Mexico's "Perfect Dictatorship" and Its End PAGE 505

Mexico was once called "the perfect dictatorship." The PRI, the PRI politician to the presidency, but very few observers think this
party that governed from 1929 to 2000, won every election in signaled a return to the old system.
that period through a combination of inducements and repres- For more on Mexico's regimes, see the case study in Part VI,
sion, and by incorporating most of the major political actors in pp. 505-506. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
society, such as business and labor unions, into a standing rela- 1. What mechanisms and tactics did the PRI use to maintain
tionship with the regime. In 2000, the PRI lost for the first time in its authority and control for so long?
seventy-one years, and Mexico's regime changed. The story was 2. What explains the eventual decline of a party that was
one of the most compelling regime changes of the late twenti- able to govern for so long? What variables or historical
eth century. In 2012 Enrique Pena Nieto was elected, returning a changes contributed to democratization?
This can take the form of using police to stifle protest activities and, in its most
egregious cases, the use of large-scale violence against civilians. Authoritarian
regimes also typically try to limit the access of political opponents to resources
like information, media, and public space. We return to some of these issues in
chapter 12.

Democratic Breakdown
The decline of democratic regimes may be the most iconic type of regime change
leading to authoritarianism. Examples abound, such as the collapse of Germany’s
Weimar Republic in the 1930s leading to the rise of the Nazis (see box on “De­
mocracy and Authoritarianism in Germany”) and the coup d’etat against the
Allende government in Chile in the 1970s that led to the Pinochet dictatorship.
Democratic reversals and returns to authoritarian rule are also diverse in form,
much like democratization and authoritarian persistence. Some countries may
“authoritarianize” (that is, witness a democratic breakdown) in fits and starts,
perhaps with partial losses of freedom and increasingly suspect elections inter­
spersed with moments of continued political participation by the citizenry. One
could argue whether this applies to Russia under Vladimir Putin or Venezuela
under Nicolas Maduro today. Other democratic breakdowns may be abrupt and
dramatic, with a military force overthrowing a democratic regime in a coup, or
an elected ruler declaring a state of emergency and martial law; examples are
numerous in the history of the developing countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin
America.
As is the case with democratization, these democratic breakdowns may also
reverse (in this case with a return to democracy), sometimes indefinitely and
other times only temporarily, or stop somewhere in between democracy and au­
thoritarianism. One democratic breakdown that stopped, for instance, was in
Ukraine in 2004, when hundreds of thousands of citizens took to the streets in
the Orange Revolution to protest a fraudulent and manipulated election. While
Ukraine was a flawed and partial democracy before the Orange Revolution, the
movement undoubtedly prevented further movement in the direction of authori­
tarianism at that time. Sadly, weak institutions contributed to a renewed crisis in
Ukraine in 2014, leading to violence, further weakened institutions, and the loss
of some of the country’s territory to Russia.
Several patterns of democratic decay and collapse are worth special attention.
First, democratic regimes sometimes collapse because voters elect authoritarians.
This may sound surprising. Why would people vote for an authoritarian when
they have democracy? One reason is that they may not know they are voting for
an authoritarian. A political candidate who promises law and order, economic
development, and the end of corruption may give no indication that he or she
intends to close the parliament and the court system and to declare martial law
as means to this end. Another reason is that in some societies where democratic
consolidation is incomplete, democracy may appear to have weaknesses as well as
strengths, and voters might have different trade-offs to calculate than do citizens
in well-institutionalized democracies. Consider a democracy that has produced
painfully poor economic performance, and one in which corruption is rife and
rule of law is only minimally established. Are you sure you would not be tempted
156 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

Orange Revolution Protestors in Ukraine in 2004.

to vote for an authoritarian who promised to end 80 percent annual inflation,

extremely dangerous streets, and an obviously corrupt and thieving class of party
leaders who drained the national treasury and deposited the funds in accounts in
the Cayman Islands? Perhaps you would not (we believe that we would not), but
you can probably understand why some people would.
Second, democratic regimes sometimes collapse because organized actors in
society move against them. Organized labor can strike; middle-class individu­
als can demonstrate, marching, setting up barricades, or banging pots (a form
of protest common in Latin America called the “cacerolazo”); businesses can
withdraw capital; and, perhaps most dangerous, the state bureaucracy itself can
refuse to comply with the orders of civilian leaders. This is most dangerous
when the military, or segments of the military, lose faith in democracy or in the
given democratic regime. W hen this happens, a coup d’etat becomes more
likely. In the view of most analysts, coups d’etat are intrinsically anti-democratic
when brought against democratic regimes. They can, however, issue in different
sorts of outcomes, including democratizing effects. Indeed, coups against au­
thoritarian regimes sometimes happen, and sometimes for the sake of estab­
lishing democracy. Many coups, though, involve the military acting against a
civilian (and often democratic) regime, and substituting an authoritarian regime
in its place.
Third, as we discuss in greater detail in chapter 12, sometimes regime change
takes the form of revolution. These revolutions can in some instances be democ­
ratizing, but in many other instances they actually lead to greater concentration
of power under an authoritarian regime. The history of France in the nineteenth
century, after the French Revolution, shows the ambiguities of such outcomes, as
the country went through both democratizing and dictatorial periods.
 Types 157

Democracy and Authoritarianism in Germany PAGE 450

Germany is a country that has seen a number of major regime For more on this case, see Part VI, pp. 450-451. As you read it,
changes over the course of its modern history. As such, it is a keep in mind the following questions:
sort of laboratory for scholars interested in questions of democ­ 1. Why did Germany see so many transitions in the twenti­
racy, democratization, and democratic breakdown. It has seen eth century?
failed democratic consolidation, emergent authoritarianism, the 2. Does the German case help us understand why transi­
splitting of the country after military defeat, with parallel authori­ tions happen more generally, or is it idiosyncratic?
tarian (East Germany) and democratic (West Germany) polities 3. These transitions occurred back and forth in the same
and, finally, successful reunification with a well-consolidated country. What are this fact's implications for theories
democracy. about why regime change happens?

Transition to Hybrid or Semi-Authoritarian Regime

Hybrid regimes can emerge out of either democratic or authoritarian regimes, as we
discuss in further detail in the “Causes and Effects” section later in the chapter.
Partial democratic breakdown can lead a formerly democratic polity to fall into
semi-authoritarian status. A traditionally authoritarian regime can enter into the
same hybrid status as a result of partial and limited democratization—or else super­
ficial efforts to appear compliant with international norms and expectations. Here
we will sketch a fictitious but roughly representative example of each scenario. Polity
A involves a transition from a more democratic regime to a hybrid regime, and
Polity B involves a transition from a more authoritarian regime to a hybrid regime.
The citizens of Polity A achieved notable democratization several decades
ago, against the odds. Similar countries in their region remained authoritarian or

Authoritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France PAGE 435

We think of France as one of the world's leading democracies, spite of the strong republican tradition that developed after the
and it is. However, for many decades, France dealt with a serious revolution of 1789?
case of authoritarian persistence. Unlike the United Kingdom or For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 435-
the United States, which experienced gradual but steady democ­ 436. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
ratization, France swung sharply between republican and impe­ 1. Why did the French Revolution not lead to uninterrupted
rial forms of government in the nineteenth century. Even in the democracy?
twentieth century, the Vichy government was authoritarian. Of 2. What major features of nineteenth-century French
course, it owed its position to the Nazis' quick military victory over society might have contributed to its cycles of
France, followed by France's collaboration, and should not be authoritarianism?
thought of as having emerged organically from French political 3. What lessons, if any, does nineteenth-century France offer
life. At the same time, it was not without its French supporters. to democratizers of contemporary authoritarian states
France is a good case for the analysis of authoritarian persis­ and to those undergoing slow processes of democratic
tence. Why, after all, did authoritarianism keep coming back in consolidation?
158 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

reverted to authoritarianism in subsequent years, but Polity A remained demo­

cratic. O f course, there were problems. Ongoing poverty and inequality were
major issues. Political parties became bureaucratic and prone more to elite cor­
ruption than to representing the populace. Those parties came to dominate po­
litical life: You could not access state resources or services without going through
the parties. Then, a major regional crisis struck. The country’s debt expanded
dramatically, and as a result it had to make major cuts in public spending. Polity
A’s state could no longer do the kinds of things its citizens expected the state to
do, such as (more or less) effectively policing, providing some minimal health
care and food and housing assistance for the poorest, and managing the business
cycle through effective government spending when times were tough. A political
candidate came along promising to change all of that by throwing the corrupt
elites out of office. Once elected, this leader began to argue that the very institu­
tions of representative democracy were part of the problem because they were
inherently elitist, and that the existing legislature and judiciary were full of
representatives of the old parties. The leader used this argument to justify the
constitutionally questionable transformation of these institutions. Soon, the leg­
islature and judiciary were filled with loyalists of the new leader, as were the
electoral authority and the military. Elections continued, but in many ways the
deck was stacked against the regime’s opponents.
The citizens of Polity B lived for many decades under an authoritarian regime.
That authoritarian regime collapsed, however, and savvy politicians rushed to fill
the ensuing political vacuum. These political entrepreneurs quickly (maybe even
recklessly) embarked on major political and economic reforms, ostensibly creating
a brief and limited democracy. The result was that the publicly owned resources
the state had amassed during its many decades of authoritarianism quickly fell
into the private hands of a small, highly concentrated group. At the same time,
living standards for the majority of the population fell dramatically, and social
problems such as crime and drug addiction soared. Within a few years, a leader
arose promising to restore the country’s glory and the people’s old standard of
living, blaming the new elites for Polity B’s problems. This leader, like the leader
in Polity A, continued to allow regular elections to be held but practiced intimida­
tion of the press, selective prosecution, and occasional fraud to remain in power.
Both Polity A and Polity B underwent transitions to hybrid or semi-authoritarian
regime status. You may call them “Venezuela” and “Russia,” if you like, though
with those two countries, there will be disagreement about whether they are hybrid
or authoritarian regimes.25 The first started from a position of relatively robust de­
mocracy and the second from long-standing authoritarianism. These are only two
of numerous possible patterns through which such regimes can emerge.

Causes and Effects: What

Causes Authoritarian Regimes
to Emerge and Persist?
In this section we consider four major theories of the emergence of authoritarian
regimes: those that focus on class coalitions at critical junctures, those that focus
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to Emerge and Persist? 159

on poverty and inequality, those that focus on weak states, and those that focus
on political culture. We also discuss some special causal circumstances surround­
ing hybrid regimes.

Historical Institutionalist Theories

As discussed in chapter 5, historical institutionalist theories look for critical junc­
tures in which institutional patterns become set.26 In explaining the emergence of
authoritarian regimes, these theories look for junctures where either authoritarian
institutions are formed or coalitions supportive of authoritarian rule are estab­
lished. Why might these events happen at certain key moments in the develop­
ment of a polity? Well, first of all, there are in many societies at many times
certain groups that would be better off without democratization, or believe that
they would be. Such groups might include (1) representatives of organizations who
receive special treatment under an existing authoritarian state—perhaps religious
organizations or, in some circumstances, military actors; (2) economic actors who
want to control the state to use it as a tool against those who wish to redistribute
wealth or to expand economic rights; or (3) individuals or groups who fear that
democratization will lead to the confiscation of their wealth or the reduction of
their privileges—possibly wealthy economic actors such as landlords or business
owners and/or nobles, depending on the circumstances. If elite actors have reason
to fear democratization, they might try to form and maintain nondemocratic in­
stitutions and to assemble a coalition supportive of such institutions.
A historical institutionalist theory tries to explain how institutions get set in
a particular pattern, and then explains subsequent development as a consequence
of the institutional path that has been established. Such a theory would thus
mainly try to explain why authoritarian institutions were established in the first
place. It may further argue that the coalitions of actors supporting the institu­
tional arrangements must remain present to account for the persistence of those
arrangements.27
Let’s imagine another fictitious society. It undergoes a transition from one
type of authoritarian regime—an absolutist monarchy with an agrarian economy
and an economy based on estates—to a more modern dictatorship. The following
actors are present at the transition:
• the existing state, which is authoritarian to the extreme;
• the representatives of the old nobility, who fear revolutionary change,
having read about those ghastly rebellions in France;
• landowners, some of whom are noble and some not, who make their living
from collecting rents from peasants on their land;
• a relatively small but increasingly powerful group of industrial
entrepreneurs;
• a relatively small but growing group of industrial workers;
• a large religious organization that has exerted a monopoly with the support
of the old state; and
• a large mass of peasants.
The old state had bankrupted itself and then had begun imposing heavy taxes
on the rents acquired by agricultural elites (including the dominant church,
160 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

which owns a lot of land). It had also taxed its own exporters heavily, arguing
that manufacturing should serve the interests of the crown by producing goods
for sale only to the king’s subjects. It had cut all military spending. Under such
circumstances, a coalition has formed among four elite groups: landowners, the
military, the church, and the industrial entrepreneurs. While these groups’ inter­
ests are not identical, they all are being hurt by existing policy. If this coalition
brings about regime transition, though, that regime might be authoritarian, be­
cause each of these groups wants to protect its existing privileges. Now let’s
imagine further that this coalition successfully creates new institutions: We
might expect those institutions to endure and for authoritarianism to persist until
some new crisis emerges later in the country’s history. The importance of such
coalitions is central to the classic argument by Barrington Moore about why au­
thoritarian and democratic regimes emerge (see the “Insights” box on The Social
Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy).
Some would argue that Moore’s argument is not really historical institution­
alist because he places so much emphasis on class relations (which, in terms of
the state-society schema discussed in chapter 3, fall on the society side of the
ledger) and democratic or authoritarian outcomes. A key question here is the
extent to which the persistence of a given democratic or authoritarian regime is a
consequence of (1) ongoing class coalitions or (2) institutional inertia. Moore,
despite being criticized for not being sufficiently state-centric,28 seems to have
assumed that once the conditions for democratic or authoritarian regimes are
established they are largely set for the foreseeable future. Some other, rational-
choice institutionalist accounts differ in this respect.

Poverty and Inequality

If we accept modernization theory’s explanation of democratization—that eco­
nomic development causes societies to become more democratic—we would
expect the obverse to be true as well. Economic collapse, increasing poverty, and
increasing income inequality likely predict a turn toward authoritarianism, and
ongoing economic stagnation and poverty likely predict authoritarian persistence.
This theory is intuitive. If you are worried about where your next meal is going
to come from, or how to access health care for your seriously ill children, you are
probably less likely to devote your energy to demanding the right to vote, en­
gaging in political speech, protesting, reading political newspapers, and the like.
As a result, all else being equal, we would expect pressures in poorer societies to
link more directly to the satisfaction of basic economic and social needs than
political liberties. This most emphatically does not mean that poorer people do
not value political rights and liberties, as has sometimes been asserted, but rather
that some needs will tend to strike us as more immediate than others, depending
on our circumstances.29 International survey research that tracks political atti­
tudes supports this finding: As economic development increases, prioritization of
political freedoms tends to increase, whereas in poorer societies, “survival values”
score more highly.30Again, people in poorer societies would, all else being equal,
likely prefer democratic regimes in many instances, but they may be less likely to
successfully press for democratization and/or the maintenance of democratic
institutions.
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to Emerge and Persist? 161

The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy:

INSIGHTS Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World
by Barrington Moore
&
oore is essentially the intellectual grandfather of one vari­ with the small middle class to outcompete peasants, or the
M ety of contemporary historical institutionalism. He offers a
modified Marxist account of why some societies ended up with
middle class might form an alliance with the peasants themselves,
producing a revolution that tends toward authoritarianism. Moore
liberal democratic, fascist, or communist/socialist regimes by the argued that the first scenario tends to produce right-wing authori­
twentieth century, and he finds his answer in the class structures tarianism and the second, left-wing authoritarianism.
of the societies he studied as they made the passage to moder­ Think for a moment about the relationship between Moore's
nity. While Moore's book is nuanced, the key variable he notes is argument and that of S. M. Lipset discussed in the previous chap­
the presence or absence of a "bourgeoisie" or "middle class." If a ter. Each is interested in the presence or absence of the middle
strong middle class was present when a society passed to politi­ class as a key determinant of whether a regime is likely to be
cal modernity, it was likely to end up a liberal democracy. democratic or authoritarian, yet there are important differences
Conversely, countries without a strong and large middle- between their arguments. Can you identify them?
class present during the passage to modernity were likely to Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and
result in coalitions averse to democracy. There are lots of ways Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

that this can happen. An existing agrarian elite might join forces

Economic factors of this sort might matter not just in how they affect citizens’
attitudes but also in how they shape the institutional environment. While his­
torical institutionalists argue that paths are set at critical junctures, determining
long-run outcomes, rational-choice institutionalists are more interested in how
institutions relate to the ongoing interests of groups and individuals in the polity.
Further, rational-choice institutionalists look at how shifting configurations of
interests and institutions change the bargaining positions of those groups and
individuals.
Income inequality, in addition to absolute poverty, is another likely factor
contributing to the establishment of authoritarian regimes. Societies with high
levels of income inequality seem more likely to be authoritarian than those with
low levels of income inequality. The relationship between these variables is com­
plex, however. One source of the association between authoritarianism and in­
equality may be that authoritarian regimes sometimes promote social and
economic inequality in addition to obvious political inequality. In an authoritar­
ian regime, there is not open access to the state.31 Rather, some elites are privil­
eged, and other citizens are excluded from connections and decision-making
power. This discrepancy is clearest in cases where dictators amass property for
themselves and their associates, such as the infamous Somoza family, which held
power in Nicaragua from 1936 to 1979 and came to hold an absurdly high per­
centage of Nicaraguan territory as its personal property.32 If a large segment of
the population has limited access to resources, we would expect that segment to
be less involved in democratic participation or in pressing for democratization.
Income inequality may help favor authoritarianism in another way as well: It
may engender envy and social division of the sort that potential authoritarian
leaders can exploit. Many authoritarian regimes will present themselves as
162 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

INSIGHTS
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson &
democratization. Elites hold power prior to democratization, and

L
ike the arguments discussed in the previous section, Acemo­
glu and Robinson's account of the determinants of regime they can be expected to preserve as much of it as possible. So
type is also “institutionalist," but it falls closer to the rational what determines the pattern of political modernization is the
choice framework. To simplify the argument, Acemoglu and relative situation of elites and the general population. Elites can
Robinson argue that political modernization exhibits one of sev­ choose repression or can try to placate the general population in
eral main paths. The first is mostly unproblematic and steady one of two ways: They can make "pro-citizen" concessions and
democratization, like in the United Kingdom and the United try to run a polity that keeps the population rich and happy, or
States. The second is a see-saw pattern of alteration between they can make the "credible commitment" of institutionalizing
authoritarianism and democracy, as in parts of Latin America. citizen control through democracy. Acemoglu and Robinson
The third is authoritarian persistence based on shared prosperity suggest that they will choose democracy only if they have to and
and relatively good governance. The fourth is authoritarian per­ if they expect that they can hold on to more resources through
sistence based on repression. doing so than through choosing another path. However, if elites
Their game-theoretical approach views institutional arrange­ cannot implement pro-citizen policies, and if democracy is likely
ments as products of different actors pursuing their interests. On to lead to a dramatic decline in their privileges, they are likely to
one hand you have elites, who want to maintain their elite status, choose repression.
which means privileged access to power and other resources. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and
Then you have the general population, which has an interest in Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

avengers of injustice. Populist leaders who tend toward authoritarianism can

claim to represent disenfranchised poor people and can promise to redress visible
inequalities. Interestingly, this seems to be a characteristic of both left- and right-
wing populism.33

State Weakness and Failure

Another theory focuses on state structures, arguing that weak or failing states are
more likely to yield authoritarian politics.34This may be related to economic the­
ories of authoritarianism. While some forms of authoritarianism go with strong
states (e.g., totalitarian forms), many tend to be linked to weak states or to those
shading toward state failure. Even the major totalitarian polities emerged from
states that faced serious difficulties, such as late-Czarist Russia in the 1900s or
Weimar Germany in the 1930s.
As noted in chapters 3 and 4, one of the key features of strong states is that
they are well institutionalized. Well-institutionalized states tend to be less per­
sonalistic and more resistant to the efforts of private actors to co-opt them for
their own gain. “Predatory states” or regimes, however, are those in which one
group in society is able to capture the state and use it for the group’s own bene­
fit.35 In some of the worst cases, the boundary between the private property of
the ruler’s family and that of the state is unclear, and ruling elites use the military
instrumentally against their opponents within society.36 So we seem to have a
kind of paradox. On one hand, well-institutionalized, strong states with high
capacity may be less likely to fall into authoritarianism, but when they do, there
is a higher chance that they will develop totalitarian forms of authoritarianism,
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to Emerge and Persist? 163

which requires a strong state to begin with. Just the same, authoritarianism in
weak states with predatory regimes can be very destructive as well.
O f course, state failure or state weakness can be an independent variable that
causes authoritarianism, but it in turn is caused by something else. State failure
or state weakness happens for a reason, as discussed in earlier chapters. It may be
that low economic development leads to weak states, which in turn leaves a polity
vulnerable to authoritarianism. If this is the case, low economic development can
be thought to indirectly encourage authoritarianism through its impact on state
weakness. In other words, causal sequences like the following simplified model
are possible, with the arrows understood to represent probabilistic causality:
Low economic development —>Weak state —>Authoritarianism

An alternative theory might look like the following, also treating a weak state as
a variable that intervenes between a more distanced cause and authoritarian
politics:
Unstable class coalitions -» Weak/poorly institutionalized state —>Authoritarianism

This theoretical causal sequence rests on the assumption that strong states might
be products of stable class coalitions. If this is true, and if weak states breed au­
thoritarianism, then unstable class coalitions might be thought to indirectly raise
the likelihood of authoritarian outcomes.

Political Culture Theories of Authoritarian Persistence

Other theories of authoritarian regimes hold that the beliefs, norms, and values
of a country’s citizens determine its regime type. The idea here is that people in
societies that are culturally authoritarian are more likely to have and keep au­
thoritarian regimes. Theorists have identified different types of authoritarian cul­
tures, and some argue that certain countries or regions have inherently different
values. Not surprisingly, as noted in chapter 6, authoritarian rulers are sometimes
happy to support this type of argument, such as Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew, who
claimed “Confucian values” were not compatible with “Western” democracy.
Which values are hypothesized to matter depends very much on the theory in
question. Some scholars have argued that certain types of national identity might
be more conducive to authoritarianism than others.37 Others have suggested that
certain countries or cultural regions, like Latin America, have a generalized
“centralist” disposition that increases the likelihood of accepting authoritarian
regimes.38 Others have noted that some societies establish “traditions” of au­
thoritarianism, and that the weight of tradition predicts a higher probability of
future authoritarianism.39 Still others have argued that what matters are not gen­
eral cultural dispositions of this sort but rather the variation, observed through
extensive survey research, in attitudes toward civic participation.40
Even those who are skeptical of the claim that political culture strongly pre­
dicts authoritarianism will often be more receptive to the idea that political-
cultural variables can, under certain circumstances, increase the likelihood that
certain types of authoritarianism will develop. This idea might be clearest in the
case of modern totalitarian regimes. It is very difficult to explain tho path taken
164 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy

INSIGHTS in Five Nations
by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba

lmond and Verba's book is as much a theory of democracy as actors outside of their local groups very little. Subject cultures
A authoritarianism, but here we will draw out its implications for have higher levels of investment and trust in the state than paro­
the study of authoritarian regimes. Almond and Verba base their chial cultures, but they have lower levels of trust than participa­
analysis on survey research that was carried out in five countries: tory cultures, and members of subject cultures are not optimistic
the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and about their chances to influence politics. Members of civic cul­
Mexico. The research was conducted in 1959 and 1960, when tures of participation, though, have high trust in government
Mexico was still an authoritarian system (with the PRI dictatorship) and other actors and also believe themselves to be very capable
and when Germany and Italy had been liberated by the Allies from of shaping political decisions through participation.
the Hitler and Mussolini governments in the relatively recent past. Almond and Verba recognized that institutions also shape
Almond and Verba create a typology of political-cultural ori­ public attitudes, but their work suggested that public disposi­
entations with three main categories: parochial cultures, subject tions and attitudes were important factors in determining
cultures, and civic cultures of participation. Parochial cultures are whether a given regime would be democratic or authoritarian.
characterized by populations that are largely distant from politics Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and
and try to stay out of the government's way, trusting it and other Democracy in Five Nations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.

by Soviet or Nazi totalitarianism without paying some attention to the ideas of

Marxist and fascist thinkers and the ways in which these ideas influenced the
thinking and strategic behavior of key actors in the establishment of those
regimes.

Barriers to Collective Action

Rational-choice and game-theoretical approaches constitute a major alternative
to political culture theories in attempting to explain authoritarian persistence.
Such approaches try to model the rational processes of decision-making in which
citizens and politicians engage.41 They tend to presume that these actors know
their own interests (or preferences) and have imperfect information about the
likely behavior of others. According to these approaches, actors are unlikely to
collective action Action engage in c o lle c tiv e a c tio n unless it becomes rational for them to do so, meaning
undertaken by individuals and the chances of success seem high, their contribution seems important to the de­
groups to pursue their ends in sired outcome, and they are unlikely to face major costs for participating in such
formally or informally coordinated action.42 These approaches constitute alternatives to political cultural theories of
ways, often in pursuit of some authoritarian persistence because they assume that most people want more de­
common or public good such as mocratization (regardless of their culture), but that sometimes there are major
expanded civil rights or sustainable barriers to democratic transition such that it would be irrational for any individ­
use of common resources. ual actor to take the necessary steps to provoke a transition.
Imagine a repressive authoritarian state. It severely restricts rights, grants
decision-making authority to a small elite, authorizes a police agency to use vio­
lence and torture as key tools for stifling dissent, censors media heavily (includ­
ing social media), and reads e-mails and taps the phones of any potential
democratic activists. Let us also assume that the regime’s repression has been
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Authoritarian Regimes to Emerge and Persist? 165

successful to date and that there is no viable resistance at present. Now imagine
that you really want to topple this regime and usher in a democratic replacement.
Unfortunately, you are unlikely to be able to accomplish this change on your
own. You are going to need lots of people to participate in collective action with
you. Now let’s imagine the conversation you might have with your best friend as
you try to convince him or her to help you in the struggle:
YOU: Eh, hey, what do you say we try to topple the authoritarian
state?
FRIEND: ...Umm ...
YOU: Aren’t you tired of this repressive regime?
FRIEND: Um, aren’t they tapping the phones? Let’s talk about this later.
[Later, in a safe place, the conversation resumes:]
YOU: So I was saying, what if we...
FRIEND: Are you crazy? They’ll probably catch us, and if they do, who
knows what they’ll do? Anyway, there’s no way it could work.
In essence, rational-choice theories of authoritarian persistence say that your
friend is right in this scenario, and that authoritarian persistence will likely last
until events change your friend’s calculations, along with the perceptions and
calculations of many others.43 This could happen in a number of ways. For ex­
ample, imagine that the large foreign power that used to bankroll the repressive
state’s security apparatus has made human rights the new centerpiece of its
foreign policy, and has therefore cut off such aid. Or imagine that there is a
change in leadership in the regime, and the new leaders reduce repression.

INSIGHTS
Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East
European Revolution of 1989
by Timur Kuran

falsify their preferences and are the first to make their voices
&
K
uran tries to explain how rapid transitions from authoritarian
rule could take place when previous data indicates support known. If they do so without major repercussions, more people
for the old regime. He is particularly interested in the revolutions begin expressing their true preferences. A cascading pattern
that took place in 1989 in countries like Poland, Czechoslovakia, then develops as it becomes safer for more people to speak out
and East Germany. His key insight is that under certain circum­ against the regime.
stances preference falsification may be quite common. If it is risky Many authoritarian states seem to implicitly understand this,
or socially unacceptable to publicly state your preference for which is why so many of them devote such resources to control­
more democracy, you are unlikely to do so. In such an environ­ ling discourse and public gatherings. Barriers to the collective
ment, people are likely to overstate their support for authoritari­ expression of preferences for democracy are barriers to mobiliza­
anism. This preference falsification is costly: it is psychologically tion against authoritarian regimes.
unpleasant to have to pretend to like things that you do not like. Timur Kuran,"Now Out of Never: The Element o f Surprise in the East European

Some people most opposed to the regime are least willing to Revolution o f 1989." World Politics 44, No. 1 (Oct., 1991): 7-48.
166 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

Or that governance and the economy get so bad your friend feels that he or she
has nothing left to lose. In such circumstances, collective action becomes possi­
ble, and authoritarian persistence is at risk.
These factors can interact with political culture. Part of the information that
a rational actor takes into account is the likely behavior of his or her peers. This
information is largely gleaned from their public expression of their beliefs and
attitudes (the same things students of political culture are studying), and some­
times populations under authoritarian regimes might appear to be more support­
ive of the regime than they really are. We return to these themes in later chapters
on political parties, social movements, and revolutions (chapters 11 and 12).

Special Causal Circumstances Surrounding Hybrid

and Semi-Authoritarian Regimes
As noted earlier, in contemporary politics we have witnessed an increase in the
number of hybrid regimes, a pattern of political change that has given rise to a
good deal of new and productive theorizing. To some extent, explanations for the
emergence of hybrid regimes differ from those for the emergence of more trad­
itional forms of authoritarianism, though we would not want to exaggerate these
differences.
Equally important, if we are interested in transitions from or persistence of
hybrid or semi-authoritarian regimes, we need to be attentive to their special
characteristics.
We should not draw the conclusion that the factors cited earlier to explain the
rise of authoritarian regimes or authoritarian persistence are irrelevant to hybrid
regimes, but we should note that a particularly important variety of hybrid re­
gimes—the competitive authoritarian regimes of recent decades—seem to show
their own, historically specific, causal factors of importance.

INSIGHTS
Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After
the Cold War
by Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way &
L
evitsky and Way are interested in understanding the sorts of to the West, though, two main paths are possible. The first is
transitions that are likely to develop out of'competitive au­ ongoing authoritarianism in the context of a strong state. This
thoritarian" regimes, a term that they have coined to label re­ path is most likely, the authors argue, when (a) the state is strong
gimes that do allow (often problematic) elections alongside at the beginning of the process and (b) the party or other stron­
other non-democratic features. As they note, competitive au­ gest organizational vehicle in the competitive authoritarian en­
thoritarian regimes should not be thought of as transitional: vironment (which is the core of the competitive authoritarian
There is no reason to assume that competitive authoritarian re­ regime) has lots of "organizational power." The second path is
gimes will become democratic or more fully authoritarian. How­ authoritarian persistence with lots of instability and turnover,
ever, certain characteristics do predict the likelihood of which is more likely in the context of a weaker and less
transition from competitive authoritarianism to democracy or stable state.
full-blown autocracy. First, lots of linkages to the West predict a Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid
move toward democratization. If there are not so many linkages Regimes After the Cold War. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010.
 Why Did Zimbabwe Become and Remain Authoritarian? 167

Why Did Zimbabwe Become and Remain THINKING

Authoritarian? COM PARATIVELY
uthoritarian regimes come in many varieties, and they come from many
A different origins. We have emphasized that there is no single thing called
“authoritarianism” that one theory can explain. Rather, authoritarian regimes have
KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOLS

Evidence and
distinct features and exhibit many different types of transitions (and nontransi­
Empirical Critiques
tions). Scholars have developed a number of explanatory models to account for
One reason that many theories con­
these. Some of the main general factors in most cases, though, include (1) histori­ tinue to endure in different areas of
cal relationships between contending groups, (2) the strength and form of exist­ comparative politics is that most of
ing institutions, (3) a country’s level of economic development, (4) political-cultural the majortheories have some empiri­
traditions and tendencies, and (5) the strategic situations and choices of key cal support. This makes it challenging
to determine which theory is the
actors. O f course, as we have seen in other chapters, it is not enough to merely
most accurate. In reality, most theo­
list such contributing factors; we must figure out how such factors interact
ries will not be accurate under all
and which are most important. W hat do you think? And how could we test your circumstances, but rather each will
ideas empirically? explain some outcomes better than
As we noted at the outset of the chapter, modern-day Zimbabwe is an authori­ others. So how do you avoid simply
making "laundry lists" (as noted ear­
tarian regime that is characterized by many of the features we have discussed. It is a
lier) and saying, 'Everything matters'?
“personalist” regime, the population of which is subject to many of the vagaries of au­ In preparing to make theoretical
thoritarianism. It is characterized by repression, a lack of secure political rights, seem­ arguments, it is of course important
ingly arbitrary rule, and so on. Not everywhere in Africa is like this, and Zimbabwe for any particular question to examine
itself has not always been like this, so our research question might be “Why is how the empirical evidence lines up
with the theoretical predictions and
Zimbabwe authoritarian? Why did it become so, and why has it remained so?”
the specific hypotheses you might
We should expect theories of authoritarian rule to be able to account for an offer. One very useful tool can be
authoritarian regime like Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe. Looking at the various evidence that allows you to critique a
causal theories of authoritarianism we can consider how each might propose an particular argument.
explanation for the emergence and/or persistence of the regime. In the section on In aiming to build arguments,
there is one very important miscon­
“Causes and Effects” in this chapter, we have looked at several such theories. We
ception: that the only valuable type
list them in Table 7.1, along with what the theory might explain is the cause of

table 7.1 Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe: Theories, Explanations,

and Examples of Supporting Evidence
Theory Theoretical Explanation Example of Supporting Evidence

Historical Coalitions of powerful political actors Mugabe receives support of the military and key economic
Institutionalist emerge that favor elite domination. actors.

Poorer citizens seek economic security

Poverty and Inequality Mugabe appeals to some poorer citizens as populist.
and allow authoritarian rule.

Weak, poorly institutionalized, predatory Mugabe has engaged in predatory behavior and
State Weakness
state will be authoritarian. undermined institutions.

Cultural values shape the type of

Political Culture Mugabe has worked within bounds of top-down "tribalism."
authoritarian regime that emerges.

Disapproval of the regime is impeded by

Collective Action Mugabe regime creates large numbers of exiles.
repression.
168 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism. We also list in the third column an example of

evidence that we might find supports this theoretical proposition. Note that the
examples of supporting evidence here are not proven but are simply plausible for
this particular case.
Looking at the theoretical prediction and the examples of evidence to support
(continued) the theory, we may see a problem: We can find some plausible evidence to sup­
of evidence is that which supports a port all of these theories! We can go right down the column and come up with
hypothesis or theory. In fact, some of decent evidence. Robert Mugabe’s authoritarian regime has indeed received the
the most valuable evidence is that
support of some key coalition actors, and it has appealed to many of the poor in
which allows you to critique or chal­
lenge one particular argument. This is
a populist fashion, and it is a poorly institutionalized predatory state, and it has
useful especially when you are trying represented itself as a quintessentially African unit resisting Western influence,
to determine the strongest argument and it has seen many hundreds of thousands of its opponents flee the country
among many that have some sup­ rather than risk repression. Indeed, this discussion illustrates something often
porting evidence.
experienced in the study of comparative politics. Sometimes, at a certain stage in
the development of research on a topic or question, we do not know which theory
truly offers the best explanation for a given phenomenon, and multiple explana­
tions seem promising.
Does this mean we are stuck? Or that we should assume that all theories work
equally well and that we should list them all as the answers to our research ques­
tion? No. On the contrary, it is common for many good research questions to
have multiple possible answers. Indeed, it is often a sign of a good question that
it can have many possible answers: It suggests that the question is open-ended,
and not one with a foregone conclusion that is self-evident and therefore uninter­
esting. In the parlance of comparative politics from chapters 1 and 2, a good
theory must be falsifiable, and the fact that multiple possible theories can address
a question is often a sign that the question is well conceived. Furthermore, theo­
ries in comparative politics will not last if they get no empirical support, so we
should not be surprised if more than one theory has evidence working for it. But
the job of the comparativist is to analyze the relative merits of these different
arguments and to find ways to adjudicate among them.
W hat can you do if several different theories each have some evidence going
for them? Our most important tool here is looking for evidence that works against
one theory or another. This disconfirming evidence that allows you to critique
one or more theories can sometimes help identify which theory stands strongest.
In fact, evidence that works against one theory can be just as valuable as an extra
bit of evidence that supports a theory. It may be more valuable, since the implica­
tions of truly disconfirming evidence are stronger than the implications of some
evidence that is simply consistent with a theory.
W hat might be examples of disconfirming evidence for the theories in our
Zimbabwe example? Table 7.2 has the same theories and theoretical explanations
as Table 7.1, except this time we consider evidence that might show that Mugabe
and Zimbabwe do not follow what the different theories predict. Notice that we
can actually come up with at least plausible examples of disconfirming evidence
as well for any of the theories we noted previously.
Here we see examples of how each theory could have some evidence against it,
just as each theory had some evidence for it. Comparativists can use evidence both
to support and to critique different theories as they try to identify which theory is
 Why Did Zimbabwe Become and Remain Authoritarian? 169

strongest. We should be particularly attentive to evidence that would post a strong r THINKING
challenge to a theory. For example, in Table 7.2, the evidence presented for the
.COM PARATIVELY
“political culture” and “collective action” theories might suggest real weaknesses
in their ability to explain Zimbabwe’s authoritarianism. We cannot say, for in­
stance, that traditional Zimbabwean political culture is the source of Mugabe’s
authoritarianism if Zimbabwean political culture is not actually authoritarian.
Likewise, we cannot say that the source of his authoritarianism is that dissidents
cannot organize or speak if, in fact, dissent is widespread and organized.
On the other hand, some theories can be defended in the face of potentially
challenging evidence, either because the evidence is being interpreted wrongly or
the theory has been construed in a limited or wrong way. Imagine proponents of
the historical institutionalist theory trying to make their argument. They might
acknowledge the evidence that Mugabe has alienated many elite economic actors,
and that this has negative implications for the argument attributed to historical
institutionalism in the table: “Coalitions of powerful political actors emerge that
favor elite domination.” They could point out, though, that commercial and
farming elites are not the only important actors among whom coalitions could
form, and that the Zimbabwean state under Mugabe has created a new coalition
of powerful actors from the military and masses of unemployed men. Theories
cannot proceed by being adapted to deal with each individual case, but if a theory
has been misconstrued or its implications not fully built into tested hypotheses,
seemingly disconfirming evidence might still be compatible with the theory.
Authoritarianism remains one of the most analytically and morally pressing
questions in comparative politics today. As it has become clear that democracy
was not simply going to predominate all over the world after the Cold War,
scholars have reengaged with urgency on the question of authoritarian rule. The
types and causes of authoritarianism are numerous and complex, but young
scholars who develop the analytical skills of comparativists will be in a position
to shed real light on these issues in the years to come.

table 7 .2 Authoritarianism in Zimbabwe: Theories, Explanations,

and Examples of Contrary Evidence
Theory Theoretical Explanation Example of Contrary Evidence

Historical Institutionalist Coalitions of powerful political actors Mugabe's economic policy alienated key economic
emerge that favor elite domination. actors, including industry and commercial farmers.

Poverty and Inequality Poorer citizens seek economic security Mugabe is relatively unpopular among peasants and
and allow authoritarian rule. poor urban dwellers.

State Weakness Weak, poorly institutionalized, predatory Zimbabwe's state and Mugabe's party and military have
state will be authoritarian. exhibited considerable capacity in the past.

Political Culture Cultural values shape type of Zimbabwe's deep cultural values have little to do with
authoritarian regime that emerges. tribalism, but instead have deep emphasis on human
rights.

Collective Action Disapproval of the regime is impeded by Zimbabwe's people have been relatively open to
repression. expressing dissatisfaction with the regime.
170 Chapter 7: Authoritarian Regimes and Democratic Breakdown

C h ap ter Su m m ary
Concepts regimes, while democracies too can break down and move
Authoritarianism refers to political systems that are hierar­ toward authoritarianism or hybrid regimes.
chically ordered and have relatively closed decision-making
processes. Causes and Effects
• There are many theories about the causes of authoritarian­
Types ism and its persistence, including theories based on: histori­
• There are many different types of authoritarian regimes, cal institutional factors; poverty and inequality; state
including totalitarian regimes that attempt to control entire weakness; political culture; and impediments to collective
societies through ideology, personalist dictatorships cen­ action.
tered around individual autocrats, and bureaucratic-author­
itarian regimes centered around groups such as the Thinking Comparatively
military. • Theories about the causes of authoritarianism (like theories
• There are also many different possible transitions (or lack of in other areas) may ail find some supporting evidence, and
transitions) between regime types other than democratiza­ a useful strategy forjudging the power of theories for spe­
tion: Authoritarian regimes can persist, they can give way to cific research questions is also to consider how evidence
other authoritarian regimes, or they can turn into hybrid may disconfirm a theory.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. We have discussed in this chapter the distinction often drawn 3. Is authoritarianism simply the opposite of democracy? Is it best
by political scientists between democratic regimes and thought of as an absence of democratic freedoms and rights? Or
"hybrid" or ‘competitive authoritarian" regimes. Where, pre­ is democracy best thought of as an absence of authoritarianism?
cisely, is the line between these sorts of regimes? Consider any Why?
two cases of democratic regimes and try to work out what 4. Identify your preferred theory to account for the persistence of
combination of developments would lead you to reclassify authoritarianism in Zimbabwe, Nazi Germany, or another country
them as "hybrid." of your choosing. Consider yourself a theorist associated with this
2 . We discussed a number of different theories of authoritarian­ preferred theory. Now imagine you have been called in to consult
ism. Note that the historical institutionalist theories, the eco­ with the U.S. State Department about the best way to deal with
nomic theories, and the political culture theories all aim to authoritarian regimes the U.S. deems dangerous, such as North
explain both the emergence and the persistence of authori­ Korea, Syria, or Iran. What would your theory imply as a policy
tarian regimes. Can these theories explain the emergence recommendation for how to deal with authoritarian regimes?
and persistence of hybrid regimes equally well? If so, demon­ 5. Describe some of the incentives that would make an authoritar­
strate how. If not, what sorts of modifications might help ian ruler seek to hang onto power, even when he or she senses
them to do so? the regime is unpopular and performing poorly.
 CHAPTER 8

Constitutions
and Constitutional
Design

• Leaders of the transition from apartheid at the adoption ofSouth Africa's democratic constitution, May 1,1996. From left to right in front row:
F. W. de Klerk (president 1989-1994), Cyril Ramaphosa, Nelson Mandela (president 1994-1999), and Leon Wessels.
 onsider the following passage:

We, the people o f South Africa,

Recognise the injustices of ourpast;
Honour those who sufferedfo r justice andfreedom in our land;
Respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and
Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity.
We therefore, through ourfreely electedrepresentatives, adopt
IN THIS CHAPTER this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to
Concepts 174 Heal the divisions ofthepast and establish a society based on
Constitutions 174 democratic values, socialjustice andfundamental human rights;
Constitutional Design 175 Lay thefoundationsfor a democratic and open society in
Types 176 which government is based on the will o f the people and
Flexible and Rigid Constitutions 177
every citizen is equally protected by law;
Separation of Powers: Judicial Review and
Parliamentary Sovereignty 178 Improve the quality o f life of all citizens and free the
Federalism and Unitarism 180 potential o f each person; and
Authoritarian and Democratic Constitutions 183 Build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its
Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects rightfulplace as a sovereign state in thefamily ofnations.
of Federal Constitutions? 184
May Godprotect ourpeople.
Are Federal Constitutions Good for
Social Stability? 185 Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika. Morena boloka setjhaba sa heso.
Are Federal Constitutions Good for God seen Suid-Afrika. God bless South Africa.
Democratic Rights? 187 Mudzimu fhatutshedza Afurika. Hosi katekisa Afrika.
Are Federal Constitutions Good for the
Economy? 188 This passage is the preamble to the South African constitu­
Judicial Review and Democracy 190 tion passed in 1996, which established the foundational laws
THINKING COM PARATIVELY and was intended to form the basis for democracy in the country,
What Explains the Similarities Between the
after decades of racial discrimination and white-only rule known
Brazilian and South African as apartheid. One of the functions of constitutions can be to ex­
Constitutions? 193
press the values of a society, especially those relating to the unity
C A S E S IN CON TEXT and aspirations of the people. The South African charter was a
United Kingdom • Iran Nigeria . major step in creating a “New South Africa” based on equality
India • United States and respect for the dignity of the country’s peoples (even if it
certainly did not solve all the country’s racial problems with the stroke of a pen).
The preamble addresses this aspiration and notably concludes with an expression
translated into six of the country’s major languages. These aspirations may vary
from place to place: The lengthy introductions to China’s and Iran’s constitutions,
172
 Constitutions and Constitutional Design 173

for example, document the history of the revolutionary movements that gave rise
to the regimes currently in power. The United States too has a famous preamble
in its Constitution of 1787: We the People of the United States, in order toform a more
perfect Union, establishjustice, insure domestic tranquility, providefor the common de­
fence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our
posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitutionfor the United States of America.
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, and most others like it,
also does more than express the country’s ideals in writing. It is a very specific
legal document that creates a design for the country’s formal political institu­
tions, including the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. It also ad­
dresses the division of power between a central government and the provinces
(as they are called in South Africa, which are akin to the states in the U.S.).
W ith regard to judiciaries in particular, the South African constitution estab­
lished a very important power of constitutional interpretation: judicial review.
Judges were given the authority to rule which laws are consistent with the
constitution and which are not. The South African judiciary even ruled on
whether the Constitution itself was constitutional, evaluating the text, deter­
mining what was adequate and proper and what was not. It accepted much of
the text submitted in 1994 but sent the Constitution back to its drafting body,
the Constituent National Assembly, to clarify some issues and rewrite others.
In this chapter, we examine constitutions, the questions of whether and
how they separate power between levels of government, and whether they are
interpreted by judiciaries. We leave the discussion of the constitutional roles
of legislatures and executives to the subsequent two chapters, where we treat
those two branches of government individually. The issues related to consti­
tutions and constitutional interpretation matter because, in most modern so­
cieties, constitutions establish many of the formal organizational features of
the state and thus are keys to understanding politics.
This chapter begins our examination of formal government institutions, institution Social or political

which are the structures and organizations that shape political behavior. The structure or set of practices,
including government
most obvious among these are the branches of government, two of which we
organizations, that shapes the
explore in depth in subsequent chapters (the legislative and executive branches1),
behavior of individuals and groups.
and we also include political parties and interest groups that are a regular part
of political life. Because the very foundation of political institutions is usually
located in constitutions, we focus on these basic charters in this chapter and on
the question of constitutional interpretation. How is political power divided
among different governing institutions? W ho rules on whether a law is consti­
tutional? We take a close look at these issues and discuss both federalism and
judiciaries, which are key elements of what constitutions say and what they do.
174 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

Concepts
We look first at concepts and definitions, outlining what we mean by constitu­
tions, federalism and unitarism, and judiciaries. We then turn to types across
different countries, to show how constitutions, constitutional design, and consti­
tutional interpretation may vary from place to place.

Constitutions
constitution Fundamental and Constitutions are the foundational charters and fundamental laws of most modern
supreme laws, usually written in a states. They elaborate the structure of government and express the founding prin­
charter, that establish the basis of a ciples of the regime. They are usually written documents passed by some sort of
political system and the basis for constitutional convention or constituent assembly that brings together many of a
other laws. country’s leading political figures to hammer out the rules, laws, and structures
needed to establish the basis for political life. This may occur at the founding of a
country, as in the case of the United States, or when a new political regime is estab­
lished, as has happened in France many times with the creation of new republics.
Constitutions have come to symbolize the social contracts that societies make
to “constitute” themselves, in which “the people” confer authority to political
actors in exchange for the establishment of order and a rule of law. The history of
constitutionalism The limitation constitutions links closely to the idea of constitutionalism, or limited govern­
of government through a ment, and is thus part and parcel of the story of the evolution of modern gover­
constitution. nance, and especially the emergence of democracy itself.
As the basic founding laws of a society, constitutions are the set of rules and
norms on which all other laws are based. In the United States, for instance, the

U.M UIU;

French protestors against the constitution of 1958.

 Concepts 175

Constitution is the ultimate point of political reference: Even the president, as

head of state, must act in accordance with its principles. Military enlistees and
new citizens swear an oath of allegiance not to the president or the Congress, but
to uphold and defend the Constitution “against all enemies, foreign and domes­
tic.” In a real sense, the Constitution is the foundation of its entire political system.
In other countries as well, constitutions provide the basis for political unity, defin­
ing who and what the state is. These sets of laws outline the basic structure of the
state and its patterns of governance, noting which branches of government have
which powers and which responsibilities. In many cases, constitutions recognize
or grant the basic rights of a country’s citizens, though these rights are not always
guaranteed in every case. Indeed, even highly authoritarian regimes often make
use of constitutions, regardless of whether rights are infringed in practice.
In most cases, constitutions are written down in a single document that is
subject to change by a process of amendment. They will not attempt to include
the massive amount of statutes or laws that are needed to govern the society and
establish its policies, but will rather outline how these laws and policies are to be
established and who decides on whether they are legitimate. They are, in short,
the law above all other law, and the basis for political life.

Constitutional Design
Constitutional design refers to the features of the constitution that shape the constitutional design Features of
powers of different political institutions. These features vary, though all constitu­ constitutions that shape the basic
tions define the basic structure of government. Constitutional design is impor­ features of the political system,
tant because it gives countries the chance to set up effective institutions. Consider such as separation of powers and
the example of the United States briefly. The founding of the nation after the responsibilities between levels of
American Revolution was mainly the story of writing a constitution that would government and branches of
make one country out of many former colonies. Starting out, it was unclear government.
whether the new nation would survive or would prove vulnerable to disintegra­
tion.2The Constitution, which has lasted to this day, was designed to correct the
deficiencies of the Articles of Confederation, a charter that had left the govern­
ment of the thirteen original colonies operating with little central government
power. One of the central issues in the U.S. Constitution was thus dividing
powers between the central government and the states. The early history of the
American republic was largely about creating a constitution that would allow the
country to come together as a political unit. Indeed, the country’s defining event
of the following century, the American Civil War, was also about the relative
constitutional powers of the states and the central government, specifically re­
garding the issue of slavery and whether states could nullify national laws.
This question of federalism, or the separation of powers among different levels federalism System of government
of government in a country, is often central to constitutional design. Federalism is with constitutional design of sepa­
a political system in which multiple levels of government have some degree of ration of powers between central
autonomy in the same territory. Only in some countries do subnational govern­ government and subnational
ments (such as states, provinces, or regions) have constitutional protection or au­ governments.
thority and a guarantee of autonomy from the central government. These may be
called federal systems. For instance, the fifty states in the United States or the
nine provinces in South Africa have constitutional guarantees of their authority
to govern and establish laws in their respective regions, even as the central
176 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

government also has the right to do so. As the American president (and political
scientist) Woodrow Wilson put it, “The question of the relation of the states to the
federal government is the cardinal question of our constitutional system.”
unitarism System of government By contrast, the absence of federalism is unitary government or unitarism, in
in which central government is which the institutions and branches of the central government effectively wield
predominant and the powers of political power. Most countries in the world are unitary. In these countries, local
subnational governments are governments (such as towns, cities, or villages) will have some authority to shape
limited to those delegated by the local rules, but the laws made by these local governments are subject to central
center. authority. As we shall see, federalism is not necessarily more or less democratic
than unitarism, but its implications for how government works are numerous.
separation of powers The Constitutional design usually also involves establishing a separation of
division of powers in a government powers among distinct branches, each with its own responsibilities and duties.
system between branches of Constitutions frequently begin by establishing a legislative branch responsible
government or between levels of for formulating and passing laws. This may be called a parliament, a congress, or
government. an assembly, or may be given any number of other names, as we examine in the
chapter on legislatures (chapter 8). The executive branch (chapter 9) is the other
portion of the government that is usually elected, at least in democratic regimes,
and the powers and functions of the executive branch are routinely outlined in a
constitution as well. For both of these branches, constitutions will often outline
the procedure by which representatives are chosen, in addition to the powers they
hold and duties they must perform. Constitutions also often address the struc­
ture and power of the judicial branch as well as the structure of the administra­
tive apparatus.3 This delineates the separation of powers between the three
“branches” of government: legislatures, executives, and judiciaries. We discuss
legislatures and executives in full chapters (9 and 10, respectively), though these
are also clearly elements of constitutional design.
judiciary The branch of govern­ Judiciaries are branches of government that have particular importance in
ment responsible for the interpre­ how constitutions are interpreted. The principal duty of the judiciary is to preside
tation of laws in courts. over cases in courts. This implies the power to interpret the laws put into effect
by the other branches of government, but the extent of the judiciary’s power to
interpret (and even strike down) laws varies from one country to another. In
some countries, judiciaries have considerable powers of constitutional interpreta­
tion, while in other countries, they do not rule on whether laws are constitu­
judicial review System of tional. The principal distinction is the strength of judicial review, which refers
constitutional interpretation in to the power of constitutional courts to determine the legality of laws.
which judges rule on the These two features—the extent of federalism and the respective roles of the
constitutionality of laws passed by branches of government—are central to both constitutional design and consti­
legislature and executive. tutional interpretation. For the remainder of this chapter, we discuss variations
in constitutions themselves, as well as the different ways constitutions are de­
signed and interpreted. These variations are considerable, as we will see in the
section that follows.

Types
There are several ways countries differ in how their constitutions are designed
and interpreted. In general, constitutions can be designed to be flexible and easily
changed or rigid and difficult to change. A second issue is how the constitution
is interpreted, and specifically whether the judiciary has the power to interpret
the constitution. A third element is the degree of federalism in a constitution.
Finally, we note that both democratic and authoritarian regimes have constitu­
tions, and these may differ in some ways but may also look quite similar on paper.

Flexible and Rigid Constitutions

One of the central distinctions among different types of constitutions is how easily
they can be changed. Many constitutions are designed to be relatively difficult to
change. Amending them may require supermajorities in each chamber of the legis­
lature (i.e., more than just a simple majority of votes) or approval by a number of the
units of the federation—the states, provinces, or regions. Some constitutions, such
as that of the United States, are even harder to change. An amendment to the U.S.
Constitution requires a two-thirds vote in each of the two houses of Congress, fol­
lowed by approval of three-fourths of the states’ legislatures. It has been amended
only twenty-seven times since its passage, and only seventeen times since 1791.
At the other end of the spectrum are highly flexible constitutions that are easy
to change, at least nominally. The most obvious case is those that can be changed
by a simple majority of the legislature. The Constitution of the United Kingdom
is one of the most flexible, at least according to the law. This is because in the
British system, the Parliament is sovereign: If a majority of the legislature passes
a law, that law is by definition constitutional.
This flexibility relates to another unique feature of the British constitution.
Today, nearly all countries in the world have a single written document (which
can be amended) that defines the parameters of the political system. The princi­
pal exception to the rule of written constitutional charters is the United Kingdom.
The United Kingdom does not have a single constitutional text, but rather several
documents are deemed to have constitutional significance as the country has
developed its political system over the course of many centuries. The major con­
stitutional documents include the Magna Carta of 1215, but also a range of other
laws of great significance and stature, such as the Bill of Rights of 1689, which
emphasized certain limitations on the power of the monarchy, and the Acts of
Settlement of 1701, which established patterns of succession to the throne. In
this sense, it may be said that the United Kingdom has a “written” constitution,
but one that relies on a range of written documents rather than a single one.
W hat is considered constitutional in the United Kingdom is also determined by
acts of Parliament and precedents in common law. This makes the constitution
adaptable as laws and cultural practices change. New Zealand, a former British
colony, similarly relies on a set of major acts of Parliament that established the
constitutional basis for the country’s governance. This does not, however, mean
that the United Kingdom has no constitution; in fact, it has one of the longest
traditions of constitutional government in the world.
Apart from the United Kingdom’s constitution, which is based on many doc­
uments and traditions, and the U.S. Constitution, which is a brief framework
with a handful of amendments over the years, there are many written constitu­
tions that differ in style and form. As societies have grown more complex, con­
stitutions in more recent years have often grown longer and more intricate as they
attempt to balance a range of different interests, institutions, and ideas. The
178 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

South African Constitution, mentioned at the top of the chapter, is an example.

So too is the Brazilian Constitution of 1988, as noted in the concluding “Think­
ing Comparatively” section of this chapter.
Constitutions regularly recognize the rights of citizens or grant rights to the
citizenry. In the case of the U.S. Constitution, many fundamental rights were
actually passed as a set of amendments to the original document, known as the
Bill of Rights. Since then, however, many contemporary constitutions (including
the South African and Brazilian examples) have incorporated significant rights
into the main text from the very beginning, which is likely one cause of constitu­
tions becoming much lengthier over time. That is, articles in the original consti­
tutional texts of many countries specify civil rights and civil liberties, political
rights, and social rights (such as access to certain public services).
O f course, rights may be well protected or disrespected in practice, regardless
of their inclusion in the document. For example, the Brazilian case is one where
constitutional rights and protections have been promised, yet the government
has been unable to deliver in some areas such as public services. In such cases,
the constitutional guarantees may be more aspirational in nature, even in a dem­
ocratic country. We return later in the chapter to the question of constitutional
protections in practice when we look at how constitutions may be somewhat
different for authoritarian systems.

Separation of Powers: Judicial Review

and Parliamentary Sovereignty
In many (but not all) countries, courts have the power to decide some constitu­
tional issues and rule on whether a law passed by the legislature is constitutional.
If constitutional courts find that the law is not consistent with the constitution or
basic laws of a society, they may strike down the law. In these countries, constitu­
tional courts are usually separated from the civil and criminal court systems. In
systems with separation of powers, this is the “check” that the judiciary has on the
legislature. Constitutional courts are not the only type of courts. Local courts are
for local disputes and for claims involving local laws, including arrangements over
property (such as buying and selling houses), issues of marriage and divorce, traf­
fic violations, and some criminal offenses.4 Constitutional courts are reserved for
major constitutional issues about whether a law passed by the government is valid.
The process by which national courts examine the constitutionality of law is
called judicial review. Most constitutions provide for a process of judicial review
in which constitutional courts have judges who rule on the constitutionality of
law. Judicial review is the central political power of the judiciary, and it occurs
when judges examine the constitutionality of a law passed by the legislature. In
countries with judicial review, the constitution is seen as the supreme law of the
land, and it is the role of the courts to verify that laws passed by the legislature
are consistent with the constitution.
Judicial review generally operates with a high court or “supreme court” at the
pinnacle of the judicial system that serves as the final arbiter of constitutional
law. This may be built on top of a system that has “lower courts” in different
states, provinces, or localities around the country.5The high court is composed of
a select number of established jurists or justices. (In the United States, there are
 Types 179

nine justices on the Supreme Court, nominated by the president and approved by
the Senate for life terms.) In systems with judicial review, the decisions of such
courts are often final and can be overturned only by subsequent judicial decisions
or by legislatures amending the constitution itself. This system of constitutional
interpretation by judges is regularly a source of debate and disagreement in the
United States and in other countries, as discussed in the “Causes and Effects”
section later in the chapter.
The most prominent examples of countries without constitutional courts and
judicial review are those where the constitutionality of law is determined by the
parliament. In such cases, the judicial system is composed of courts that rule on
the merits of specific cases in accordance with the laws that exist, without ques­
tioning the legitimacy of those laws. O f course, here too there may be some in­
terpretation of what the laws mean, but the court is not empowered to strike
down or alter laws passed by the legislature. The United Kingdom is the most
noteworthy example. In the United Kingdom there is no high court empowered
to rule on most matters of law; the few minor exceptions relate to the question of
how some powers have been decentralized to the regions of Scotland, Wales, and
Northern Ireland, and this has been true only since 2009.6
Constitutional interpretation in the United Kingdom generally follows parliamentary sovereignty
the doctrine known as parliamentary sovereignty. This means that if the System in which the
legislature—often called the Parliament—passes a law, that law is, by definition, constitutionality of laws passed by
constitutional. The legislating body is the highest political and legal authority in legislature and executive are not
the land. In theory, the British Parliament could easily overturn long-standing subject to constitutional
parts of the British constitution at a moment’s notice. interpretation by judiciary.

Delegates to Brazil's Constituent Assembly celebrate the passage of the country's constitution
in 1988.
180 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

Why has this not happened? Why has there not been massive zigzagging in
terms of what the constitution means, from one election to the next, as new par­
ties take power and lose power? In reality, the British Parliament refrains from
overturning the founding laws of the polity because it follows national norms,
values, customs, and traditions. Much as American political parties would prob­
ably not envision getting rid of major elements of the Constitution, even if they
had the supermajority they would need, so too the British system exhibits consti­
tutional stability from one elected government to the next. It may seem self-
evident that demanding procedures have kept the U.S. Constitution from being
amended more frequently, but the United Kingdom shows that procedure is not
the only determinant of how and when constitutions change. Consensus in the
society matters, as do tradition, habit, custom, and values.

Federalism and Unitarism

The distinction between federal and unitary countries (and countries in between)
is a fundamental difference in the way power is divided in a society. Federal
countries have a system in which power is separated between the central govern­
ment and some subnational governments that are partly autonomous. In unitary
systems, power is located at the center. In unitary states, the center may delegate
certain powers to local, regional, state, or provincial governments, but it retains
the constitutional or legal authority to reverse its decision at virtually any time.

Federalism
The question of ruling large, complex territories is perennial, but the idea of fed­
eralism as a solution came more recently.7 The United States was an early leader
in establishing federalism (along with Switzerland). Led by James Madison, con­
sidered the “Father of the Constitution” and a leading author of The Federalist
Papers, the nation’s founders developed an intricate political compromise de­
signed to satisfy both the larger and smaller of the thirteen original colonies that
came together to create the new nation. As the colonies became states in the
union, the American system reserved considerable rights to those states that the
central government (called the “federal government”) could not infringe on.
They backed up these rights in the form of a Senate where each state was to have
equal representation, regardless of population. This idea of compromise between
central power and regional (or state or provincial) power came to appeal in a
range of contexts. Other countries did not adopt the American system in its en­
tirety, but many saw virtue in the general approach to reconcile national and
subnational interests.
Today, many federal countries around the world have intricate sets of interact­
ing institutions. Originally designed to unify diverse territories while preserving
subnational autonomy, federal institutions now do more than simply offer a way
to ensure that nations do not fall apart: They divide governing power and allow
some laws and policies to vary from place to place within a country, even as some
national laws (and the national constitution) take precedence everywhere inside
the borders.8 Federalism is now seen by some as a strategy to ensure more than
stability and protection, as it may also promote democratic inclusion, as well as
capture the benefits of economic unity. For these reasons, many of the world’s
 Types 181

No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality

in the United Kingdom PAGE 548

The United Kingdom has no single document that counts as its 1. In what ways does the doctrine of parliamentary sover­
written constitution, and it also has no process of judicial review eignty link together the various themes of this chapter: a
to interpret the constitution on most matters. It is the archetypal flexible constitution, federalism versus unitarism, and ju­
case of parliamentary sovereignty. The British constitution is thus dicial review?
one of the most flexible in the world. Yet there is considerable 2. Would this sort of constitution be feasible in a new coun­
continuity in the system: The country has a long-standing set of try today, or is it feasible only in the relatively unique cir­
traditions and values that seems to transmit the meaning of the cumstances of Britain's history?
constitution from one generation to the next. How does this 3. In what ways could one make a case that the U.K. system
system work, and what are its consequences? is more or less democratic than the U.S. system?
See the case study on the United Kingdom in Section VI,
pp. 548-549. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:

largest countries either are federal or have prominent features that resemble
federalism.
Although only about twenty of the nearly two hundred total countries in the
world are considered federal, these twenty countries account for a large portion
of the world’s population. Many of the largest and most populous countries are
federal, including the world’s four most populous countries after China: India,
the United States, Indonesia, and Brazil. Other federal countries include Nigeria,
which has the largest population of any African country, and Pakistan, Russia,
Mexico, and Germany, which are some of the largest countries in their respective
regions of the world. Using a relatively inclusive definition designed to capture
virtually any country that might be considered federal, we have constructed
Map 8.1.
There are debates about whether many of the countries shaded in Map 8.1 are
reliably federal (such as Spain and Pakistan). Several institutional elements and
historical features may suggest otherwise, and federal countries do not always
respect real autonomy for subnational units. Conversely, other countries may
have some federal features yet remain unitary states, as is the case with China,
where provinces have gained economic and political autonomy relative to the
central government in recent years. China shows that some countries can seek
the benefits of decentralized government without necessarily establishing
federalism.
Federal systems may be defined as those where subnational governments have
constitutional guarantees of some power and autonomy in their own jurisdic­
tions, as well as constitutional protections from infringement on the part of the
central government. In practical terms, virtually all federal countries share other
characteristics: an upper legislative chamber defined in the constitution with ter­
ritorial representation for the states/provinces/regions that provides them with
political protection, and full legislative and executive branches at the subnational
182 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

CONTINENT AFRICA ASIA EUROPE NORTH AMERICA SOUTH AMERICA OCEANIA

FEDERAL Comoros India Austria Canada Argentina Australia
COUNTRIES Ethiopia Indonesia Belgium Mexico Brazil Micronesia
Nigeria Malaysia Bosnia & Herzegovina United States Venezuela
South Africa Pakistan Germany
Russia Spain
United Arab Emirates Switzerland

Map 8.1 Federal systems around the world (in yellow).

level.9 While the specific definitions may vary, it is clear that federalism is
intended to ensure representation for the subnational level in national
decision-making.

Unitarism
Most countries in the world are unitary states, in which the central government
is the only level of government specified in the constitutional charter. In unitary
states, power is not constitutionally divided between layers of government but
resides exclusively in the central government. This central government may then
create (or allow for the creation of) more local levels of government, but these
lower levels are dependent on the center and often accountable to the center.
Municipalities, prefectures, counties, or other local governments may elect offi­
cials locally, but these will generally have little power. To use a translation from
the French, the republic is “one and indivisible.” Local governments may be able
to elect officials, but the national government will make most significant policy.
For instance, the center may establish the national school curriculum and may
staff the offices of the health service, with relatively little scope for discretion at
the local level.
 Unitarism is especially prevalent in countries with certain characteristics.
One is small size, as contrasted with the large size of most federal states. Most
countries that are small are also unitary, with the exceptions being a handful of
federal countries composed of a cluster of small islands.10Another tendency is for
unitarism to hold in places where the population is ethnically, linguistically, and
culturally homogeneous. Federalism seems to take root more where populations
are linguistically diverse, as in Belgium and Switzerland, which are divided into
different linguistic communities. Finally, unitarism may vary at least in part on
colonial heritage. For example, former French colonies in Africa have long tended
to follow the highly unitary features of France itself, while former Spanish and
British colonies have varied in their structures.

Authoritarian and Democratic Constitutions

Historically, making government constitutional meant eliminating the divine
right or absolute power of monarchs, such as kings, queens, princes, sultans, or
emperors. Constitutionalism, as established in western Europe progressively over
the centuries, meant preventing such rulers from exercising power in an arbitrary
fashion, and holding them at least partially accountable to the will of at least
some of the people. As the power of monarchs faded in many countries, the
drafting of constitutions became one way to limit the power of government, to
divide and separate power such that a single person or family could no longer
dominate. In parts of Europe, for example, constitutional monarchy was seen as
distinct from divine right monarchy or absolute monarchy, because executive
power came to be derived by a mandate from the consent of the governed.11
Still, not all countries with constitutions exhibit the characteristics of democ­
racy and limited government. In fact, the actors that demanded constitutional­
ism and the end of absolute monarchy were in many cases themselves elites,
nobles, revolutionaries, or military leaders. They were not always interested in
political rights and civil liberties for all, and they did not always represent the
people. For many centuries, the rights established in constitutions were often
restricted to a small subset of the population, such as property-owning males of
a certain racial or ethnic background.12
Even today, not all political systems are perfectly constitutional, nor are all
systems legitimate, fair, and just. Writing down a set of basic laws and rights on
paper does not guarantee that those laws and rights will take effect or be enforced
in practice; some countries that have constitutions fail to protect rights. Authori­
tarian regimes usually have constitutions, even where they deny political rights
and civil liberties to their people. Such regimes may seek to establish their legiti­
macy on the basis of claims made in the constitution. For instance, a revolution­
ary socialist government may draft a constitution holding that the Communist
Party is the sole entity capable of expressing the general will of the people. This
would not seem “democratic” or “constitutional” to the minds of most people
who value individual rights and liberties, but the document itself could nonethe­
less be recognized as a constitution. Other authoritarian regimes may place less
importance on political parties (or may outlaw parties entirely) and instead vest
the ruler(s) with the authority to determine what the population as a whole
requires.13
184 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

Authoritarian constitutions will not typically declare dictatorial rule, how­

ever, and in fact may appear quite progressive in terms of the rights and powers
they list. Even totalitarian regimes may formulate extensive sets of rights in their
constitutions, at least on paper, whether they defend these in practice or not.14In
some instances, authoritarian regimes may even outline some rights that a demo­
cratic constitution may not contemplate. For instance, the constitution of the
Soviet Union established rights such as guarantees of education, access to health
care, housing, and a pension in old age, none of which are listed in the United
States Constitution. Some authoritarian regimes simply continue to govern
under the constitutional charter of a previous democratic regime but will suspend
or override certain elements of the constitution. Military regimes have been
known to establish martial law or states of emergency, which sometimes extend
for long periods of time and during which normal constitutional principles do
not apply. This is often done using the justification that national security requires
exceptional measures.
Some countries also base part of their judicial and legal system on another
authority: official religious law. This tendency is most noteworthy in the Islamic
world, where sharia law plays an important role in many countries, though the
use of religious law is not limited to Muslim countries. Sharia law is based on the
Qur’an (Koran), the Holy Book of Islam, and to a lesser extent on other core Is­
lamic texts. Countries that follow sharia have judges and clerics that rule in con­
junction with their interpretations of the Qur’an. Judiciaries in both Saudi Arabia
and Iran are linked to the state religions, and they rule on the basis of religious
law in many areas. Even interpretations of issues not treated directly in the
Qur’an are reasoned by analogy with reference to the Holy Book or to the words
and deeds (known as the sunnah and the hadith) attributed to the Prophet
Muhammad.
Religious law is not necessarily authoritarian, nor does it characterize all
Muslim countries. For instance, Turkey is a majority Muslim country that is
politically secular. Other countries, such as India and Indonesia, make partial
use of Islamic law, such as applying it in certain kinds of legal cases between
Muslims (such as family law about marriage, divorce, and parenthood between
Muslims). Israel, the United Kingdom, and other countries make provisions for
the use of religious law by Orthodox Jews and others, largely as an option for use
by populations who wish to resolve such matters in religious courts. In fact, one
leading scholar has argued that recent years have seen a rise in “constitutional
theocracy,” in which constitutional law is combined with recognition of an offi­
cial state religion and some use of religious beliefs or texts as a foundation
for law.15

Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects

of Federal Constitutions?
Two essential questions in the study of political institutions are (1) whether a
given design is superior to others and (2) whether the ideal institution depends
on country contexts. Political scientists engage in extensive debate over the
relative merits of different forms of institutions, whose foundations may lie in
 Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal Constitutions? 185

Constitutional Design: Theocracy in Iran PAGE 476

In Iran (and in Saudi Arabia), clerics have considerable power, from a dominant cultural feature and thus reflective of the norms
both at the pinnacle of the political system and at lower levels of of the people. Some may also see it as fitting that different societ­
government. Some analysts may see this power as emerging ies have different systems reflecting cultural differences. For
others, basing law on a single religion (and a single religious text,
as interpreted by clerics) constrains, by definition, the rights and
liberties of those who are not Muslim or otherwise religious.
See the case study on Iran in Part VI, pp. 476-477. As you read
it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. Flow is the judiciary an especially powerful branch of
government in Iran, and what are its powers?
2. Are there checks on the judiciary's power, and if so, what
are they? Or should the country be seen as a case of
"judicial sovereignty" as opposed to parliamentary
sovereignty?
3. Is it possible to conceive of religious law that is compati­
Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran in ble with democracy— and if so, how?— or is separation of
2012. Behind him is a picture of his predecessor and leader of religion and the state a necessary feature of democracy—
the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. and if so, why?

constitutions, as we’ve discussed. We can consider at least three substantial ques­

tions about the consequences of federal constitutions: (1) Are they good for social
stability, (2) Are they good for protecting democratic rights, and (3) Are they
good for the economy? We consider these questions here, as well as whether ju­
dicial review is necessary in protecting rights and upholding the law.

Are Federal Constitutions Good for Social Stability?

To help answer the question of stability, we can start by looking at the origins of
federalism and unitarism in different societies. A long-standing argument held
that federalism was the result of disparate political units coming together for the
purpose of security, with the post-revolutionary United States being the classic
example.16 It may also be, however, that countries go federal in order to hold to­
gether; that is, they may devolve authorities to regions to prevent secession or
division.17 As for unitarism, here too the causes may be found in deep historical
legacies, including efforts by monarchs long ago to consolidate power or to unify
authority. As noted in chapter 3, the modern nation-states of Europe were cre­
ated from the merging of much smaller units such as principalities, as well as the
splintering of large empires.
From one perspective, federalism may be an institution uniquely capable of
holding together a polity. By conferring powers to levels of government below
the national, federalism may give more people a stake in the political system.
If certain regions or groups feel they have greater autonomy, then they may be
186 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance

INSIGHTS
by William Riker

iker's work is one of the leading arguments about what being totally centralized is the system of political parties, which
R causes federal systems to emerge. In his examination of the
creation of federal systems from the American Revolution up to
ensures that some power remains with local actors, due to how
candidates are nominated, among other factors. Despite offering
the 1960s, Riker finds one commonality across diverse cases: Fed­ considerable explanation of the origin and operation of federal­
eralism is the result of a bargain among regional actors and a ism, Riker surprisingly concludes that federalism is an institu­
prospective national government that is driven by external tional arrangement of relatively little significance, noting the
threats. Riker also notes that the American federal system is rela­ fundamental similarities in governance between federal and
tively centralized, because most of the institutions of the na­ unitary states.
tional government do not serve the interests of the states, and William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Boston: Little, Brown, &
the center prevails in most disputes involving the center and the Co., 1964.
states. The exception that keeps American government from

more willing to participate instead of demand independence. Movements de­

manding separatism, secession, or break-up of a country will gain less traction in
countries where these groups have powers reserved to them by a federal constitu­
tion. One such approach has been taken by Ethiopia, where the constitution ac­
tually gives different regional groups the right to secede (though it is unclear how
this would work in practice). The expectation is that by giving autonomy and
power to the ethnic groups, and by offering an out, the constitution will encour­
age compromise and enhance the recognition of the merits of unified govern­
ment. By this logic, federalism enhances stability.
On the flip side, federalism might lead to exacerbating differences and under­
mining stability. By drawing significant lines (almost literally) between different
groups, federal systems may end up encouraging different regions of the country

Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model

INSIGHTS
by Alfred Stepan

tepan offers a corrective to the argument offered by Riker,

S
of representatives. Finally, Stepan notes that some instances of
noting that many instances of federalism in established coun­ federalism are "asymmetrical," with greater powers given to
tries are not the result of “coming together," but of central gov­ some subnational regions than others. In addition to the three
ernments working on "holding together" different groups in a "multinational" countries mentioned previously, Canada also fits
single country. Examples may include India, Belgium, and Spain. this model: Its French-speaking province of Quebec has been
In addition, Stepan notes there are two other ways that federal recognized as a "distinct society" from the other provinces in ma­
countries may be unlike the American model. First, federal sys­ jority Anglophone Canada. In sum, Stepan notes the diversity of
tems may vary in how much power is given to the territorial federal arrangements and argues that all federalism does not
chamber, such as a Senate. Some forms of federalism have pow­ follow the U.S. model.
erful chambers that protect the interests of the states or prov­ Alfred Stepan, ‘Federalism and Democracy: Beyond the U.S. Model.' Journal of
inces by giving voters in some areas a disproportionate number Democracy 10, No. 4 (1999): 19-39.
 Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal Constitutions? 187

Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding

1 Together or Tearing Apart? PAGE 519

Nigeria is one of the most interesting cases in the world for the What is the nature of regional divisions in Nigeria, and
study of how federalism relates to secession and violence. The along what lines are people in the country divided?
country began with three regions around the time of indepen­ In what ways could expanding the number of states be
dence in 1960, and after a civil war broke out among the regions expected to address the challenge of stability and vio­
in the late 1960s, governments have created new states in an at­ lence between regions?
tempt to defuse conflict. Federalism is thus explicitly linked to the To what extent have the attempts to further federalism
question of stability. contributed to reducing conflict, and to what extent can
See the case study on Nigeria in Part VI, pp. 519-520. As you we know how successful it has been?
read it, keep in mind the following questions:

to develop independent identities. This question emerges in Canada, where

Quebec nationalism may have grown as the province’s autonomy has increased.
In other countries with more precarious economies and more fragile societies,
such as Nigeria, ethnic minorities or regions that feel they are being treated un­
fairly by the central government are often critical of the federal system. In some
such cases, they may increase demands for secession or separation, which may
even explode into ethnic violence.

Are Federal Constitutions Good for Democratic Rights?

Federalism may have an impact on democracy in ways similar to those discussed
earlier: Federal institutions may make government more stable and may facilitate
democratic incorporation of the demands of many groups, or federalism may
reinforce divisions. Beyond the question of whether federalism is likely to make
democracy persist, we may also find the question of democratic rights.
Consider a very heated cultural debate, such as abortion in the United States
and many other countries, and how it relates to the question of federalism. The
pro-life position holds that embryos and fetuses are people and therefore have a
right to live (usually starting from the time of conception), implying that the bio­
logical mother may not choose to abort a pregnancy. The pro-choice position
holds that a woman has a right to have control over her own body with respect to
reproduction, and that the government may not dictate to her what she must do
in terms of the decision to terminate a pregnancy.
There are many ethical, moral, and legal aspects to such a debate, but for the
moment we ask only a question about federalism. One perspective on abortion
has been a “states’ rights” perspective, which maintains that different states in the
United States (say, liberal Vermont and conservative Alabama) should be allowed
to have different laws governing abortion, which would reflect the different sets
of values and beliefs of the majorities in each place. This structure would allow
different parts of a federal country to express their own views on rights and would
be consistent with some of the perceived advantages of federalism.
188 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

Now consider another perspective. Whichever side of this debate you may
come down on (pro-life or pro-choice), it is worth asking the following question
with respect to federalism: Should people have different fundamental rights in a
country, depending on where they happen to be born or live? Let’s say that Ver­
mont adopted a more pro-choice set of policies and Alabama a more pro-life set
of policies. If you favor the pro-life argument, should a human embryo or fetus
in Vermont have fewer rights than one in Alabama? Should Vermont be allowed
to adopt its set of policies because of federalism? If you favor the pro-choice argu­
ment, should a woman in Alabama have fewer reproductive rights and less choice
than one in Vermont? Should Alabama be allowed to adopt its set of policies
because of federalism?
It seems clear that different regions (such as states) should be allowed to pass
their own preferred laws and policies to reflect the democratic wishes of their
residents. On the other hand, it seems that some major debates get down to ques­
tions of constitutional rights that may need to apply everywhere in a society. This
question is fundamentally about what is in a constitution and what federalism
should be. The question about democracy and rights under federal constitutions
is not straightforward, as this example shows.

Are Federal Constitutions Good for the Economy?

Federalism may be good or bad for an economy, depending on one’s point of view
and on circumstances. On one hand, some see federalism as generating healthy
competition among states or regions, which can be good for the economy. If state
A sees that businesses are relocating to state B next door (maybe for reasons of
lower taxes or better public services, for example), then state A may do its best to
govern in a way more like state B (say, by lowering taxes or providing better ser­
vices). Such situations will exert a form of positive peer pressure for good economic
policies that will benefit the country over the long run. Federalism, by inducing
economic competitiveness among states, approximates the kind of competition
one sees in a market, which may be good for the economy. O f course, this idea of
healthy competition implies that states will perform differently from one another,
which may lead to significant differences in development and opportunities within
a federal country, as the case of India shows (see the “Case in Context” box).
Along with inducing healthy competition, decentralizing power is theorized
to have another advantage: It can allow people to sort themselves into different
jurisdictions along with other people who share their policy preferences. Let’s say
town X and town Y are side by side. Town X has higher taxes and better-funded
schools, while town Y has lower taxes and less school funding. Maybe a family
with young children in school will wish to live in town X, and a retired couple
with grown children will prefer to live in town Y. Decentralized government can
accommodate both, whereas more centralized government would impose the
same tax rate and the same amount of school funding for both families.18 This
example is more truly a question of decentralization than of federalism, since it
deals with local communities, but the principle also extends to federalism and
the roles of states, regions, or provinces.
In federal systems, the state or provincial level of government often has a great
deal of responsibility in many public services. In the United States, states have a
 Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal Constitutions? 189

Development in India page464

India is one of the world's fast-growing economic powerhouses, 1. What are the positive and negative examples of develop­
but it is also the country in the world with the largest number of ment in India's states, and what lessons does each of
people living in extreme poverty. Some of the dramatic differ­ these offer?
ences in development in India can be understood by looking at 2. What factors can account for the variations in the perfor­
differences across states. Some states have performed very well, mance of Indian states?
while others have performed quite poorly. The country retains a 3. What lessons do you draw from the Indian case about
politics that has a very regional flavor, despite decades of efforts whether federalism might contribute to poverty reduc­
at political centralization. tion or perhaps worsen poverty?
See the case study on India in Part VI, pp. 464-465. As you
read it, keep in mind the following questions:

major role in deciding on issues of health policy and in providing support to the
poor, while local governments have the most significant responsibilities in pri­
mary and secondary education. Public schools are funded primarily from local
taxes, and more Americans participate in local school boards than in any other
type of elective office. In many countries around the world—federal and unitary
alike—local governments commonly oversee such issues as local sanitation, local
roads, and services such as the police, parks, and public lighting.
Although federalism and decentralization have many arguments in their
favor, they can complicate economic performance in many circumstances. In
countries such as Argentina and Brazil, states and provinces have acted irrespon­
sibly, overspending and forcing the central government to bail them out.19 Situa­
tions like this make economic management difficult, because the states know
there is always someone there to bail them out if they overspend; they have a soft
budget constraint rather than a hard budget constraint.21 We often see this

Fiscal Federalism
by Wallace Oates

ates developed a "decentralization theorem" of the advan­ and services they would get in each place.20While central gov­
O tages of decentralized government and federalism under ernments would be needed to provide for truly national needs,
such as defense and a common currency, the decentralized gov­
certain circumstances. First, Oates argued that federalism al­
lowed for local governments that are closer to their constituents ernments would be better equipped to make decisions about
than the central government, and that this allows them to have many local issues. The practice of decentralization raises many
better information about what local residents need or want. issues, including which services are local and which are national,
They can use this information to better provide services. Oates but this theory served as a summary and basis for future debates
also built on the argument that giving local governments the over what should be the responsibility of central versus local or
authority to offer different services would allow people to pick state governments.
and choose where they want to live, based on the mixes of taxes Wallace Oates, Fiscal Federalism. New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972.
190 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

problem in federal countries where states can exercise a lot of leverage over the
national political process through representatives in the legislature, such as sena­
tors.22 In general, federalism can create incentives for politicians to overspend
and be fiscally irresponsible.23
Moreover, federalism can allow for inefficient resource allocation. One exam­
ple may be that the Senates of Brazil and of the United States routinely allocate
monies disproportionately to less populous, more rural states. In issues from farm
policy to national security, smaller states are able to use their leverage in the federal
system to guarantee for themselves certain benefits in the form of government
funds. We cannot draw a firm conclusion, therefore, about whether federalism is
good or bad for the economy (or for stability or democracy); as comparativists
recognize, context and other conditions matter.

Judicial Review and Democracy

Along with the division of power between levels of government implied by the
issue of federalism versus unitarism, another prominent feature of most consti­
tutions is the division of power among branches of government. In particular,
one major question is who is responsible for interpreting the constitution, as
noted earlier in the section on judiciaries. A judiciary with constitutional powers
of review can engage in an interpretation of the laws, and a question for many
observers is whether this is appropriate and to what extent. In the United States,
one of the biggest debates about the judicial system is over judicial activism, a
term that has a negative connotation for many observers.24Judicial activism is a
judicial activism Term used, hot-button issue in the United States, and the phenomenon is also recognized
often pejoratively, to characterize and debated in other countries as well. According to critics, unelected judges
judicial actions that actively and justices may take advantage of the power of judicial review to essentially
reinterpret legislation and thus legislate from the bench, as opposed to situating lawmaking power with the
imply exercising powers typically representatives in the legislature. This practice may take some of the most heated
reserved for the legislative branch. and controversial debates out of the democratic process by removing them from

INSIGHTS
1
Beyond the Fiction of Federalism: Economic Management
in Multi-Tiered Systems
by Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels

odden and Wibbels note that federalism can prove harmful

&
R
national economy at risk. Political parties matter because central
to the economy rather than beneficial to it under certain cir­ government leaders that have political leverage over state-level
cumstances. They argue that whether federalism is good or bad officials can hold them to compliance with what the center
for the economy depends upon other institutions, such as how wishes, while a political party system in which the center has
political parties are structured and how state (or provincial) gov­ little control over state-level actors is more problematic. Each of
ernments obtain their revenues. For example, if state govern­ these scholars continues and develops related arguments in sub­
ments rely on money transferred from the central government sequent books, highlighting political incentives and the need for
for their revenues, they frequently overspend because they can hard budget constraints for states if federalism is to work well.25
pass on the costs of their spending to the center. On the other Jonathan Rodden and Erik Wibbels, "Beyond the Fiction of Federalism:
hand, if state governments get most of their revenues from their Economic Management in Multi-Tiered Systems.'WoM Politics 54, No. 4 (2002):
own taxes, they may spend more responsibly and not put the 494-531.
 Causes and Effects: What Are the Effects of Federal Constitutions?

the arena of elections, public debates, and protests, and placing them in the
arena of lawsuits, legal challenges, and the rulings of a small number of un­
elected judges in robes.
For some, judicial review is crucial to protecting rights and upholding the
law.26 By this argument, judges have the role of interpreting laws to ensure com­
pliance with the letter of the constitution and legal precedent. Proponents of an
active judiciary may argue that courts have often led legislatures (rather than
followed them) in the recognition and expansion of fundamental rights. For this
reason, proponents might argue, a judicial system has the task to interpret laws
and guarantee that they are consistent with rights and obligations laid out in
constitutions. One can witness both sides of this debate, for instance, in the
question of whether judiciaries can and should require that a state offer marriage
benefits to same-sex couples. Judges hold different perspectives on the role of
courts in interpreting constitutions, as is evident in court decisions themselves—
which are authored by judges—or in the writings of those judges and justices.
As a result of the political heat it generates, “judicial activism” is a term sus­
ceptible to unclear definition. For instance, critics of judicial activism in the
United States have often been conservative critics of justices’ rulings on social
and cultural issues, such as the Roe v. Wade decision of 1973, which legalized
abortion, and recent judicial decisions at the state level to expand civil union
benefits and marriage rights to gay couples. However, studies in the 2000s
showed that on the U.S. Supreme Court, the justices who most frequently voted
to overturn Congressional laws were the more conservative members.27 More­
over, several of the rulings listed previously for the United States—including

A ceremony to install the new chief justice in France's Cour de Cassation, the country's highest
judicial body for civil and criminal matters. France shows that not all judiciaries are structured
the same: It has a separate constitutional council (Conseil Constitutionnel) to determine the
constitutionality of laws.
192 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

some widely acclaimed and unanimous rulings—may be seen as activist in retro­

spect. As you consider the case of constitutionality in the United States (see the
“Case in Context” box), you can use your own analysis to determine if any rulings
fall under this definition.
There is one clear way to end judicial activism: End judicial review. This is not
merely a thought experiment or hypothetical exercise. In fact, as noted earlier,
one can look to the United Kingdom as a model. One argument against extensive
use of judicial review is that judiciaries remove contentious issues from the public
arena. According to this argument, debates about the most fundamental issues in
a democracy are fought out by the strongest ideologically committed advocates in
front of unelected judges. These issues are thus examined and decided on by
small groups and powerful individuals, and they may not be reflective of broader
public opinion. Those arguing against judicial activism would often prefer to
have society’s most contentious issues decided in legislatures rather than in
courts. The United Kingdom prevents judicial activism by granting the legisla­
tive branch of government an unambiguously higher power than the judicial
branch. One way to view opposition to judicial activism is to ask about the extent
to which one would sacrifice judicial review. Put another way, judicial review and
some degree of judicial activism are the flip side of the checks and balances be­
tween branches of government.
Most countries with written constitutions do have a constitutional court that
is responsible for judicial review. By some accounts, the power of judiciaries has
increased around the world over time. It should be noted that the debate is not
limited to the United States and United Kingdom but, rather, stretches around
the world. Whether judicial review has been beneficial to democracy remains
open to interpretation.
Whatever its causes, the debate persists between advocates of powerful judi­
cial review processes who argue that judges often lead the law, asserting human
rights that may take a long time to work through legislative channels, and those
who see it as undue interference by unelected judges in major political issues.
Both parliamentary sovereignty and separation of powers are compatible with
democracy; they are simply different ways of understanding how constitutions
should be interpreted.

CASE IN CONTEXT

Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem? PAGE 563

For over two hundred years, the United States has enshrined the 1. What might be some of the challenges and problems of
principle of judicial review of laws. Courts can strike down laws judicial activism?
passed by Congress, if it deems the law to be in violation of the 2. Can you think of circumstances in which judicial activism
Constitution. The tension between the powers of Congress and would be appropriate and desirable?
those of the judiciary are not easily resolved. 3. What sorts of issues should be decided by the judiciary,
See the case study on the United States in Part VI, pp. 563- and what sorts of issues should be decided by elected
564. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions: lawmakers?
 What Explains the Similarities Between the Brazilian and South African Constitutions? 193

INSIGHTS
Toward Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences
of the New Constitutionalism
by Ran Hirschl

irschl observes a move toward powerful judiciaries around coalition of economic leaders, political leaders, and members of
&
H the world in recent decades and asks about the causes and the judiciary can combine to create a constitutional system
consequences of this change. He looks at the causes of greater where challenges to their power can be debated in terms of
judicial power— or "juristocracy," as he calls it— in Canada, Israel, rights to be protected by the judiciary, and thereby removed
New Zealand, and South Africa. For Hirschl, the decision to create from most public political debate. Hirschl argues that a conse­
strong judiciaries comes from strategic calculations made by quence of increasing judicial review is not the progressive expan­
some elites, who believe that their interests will be better pro­ sion of rights, nor enhanced democracy, but rather a protection
tected by judiciaries than by elected officials; that is, they believe of the interests of elites.
that encoding certain principles as constitutional rights will pro­ Ran Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New
tect their dominance. When these elites are under threat, a Constitutionalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007.

THINKING
What Explains the Similarities Between the COM PARATIVELY
Brazilian and South African Constitutions?
ontemporary Brazil and South Africa were quite different places in many
C ways when they both convened constituent assemblies to write new consti­
tutions in the late 1980s (in Brazil) and early 1990s (in South Africa). South
KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

Most-Different-
Africa was emerging from a long history of racial injustice and segregation in the Systems Design
system known as apartheid from 1948 to 1994. Conflict in the society was cen­ As noted in chapters 1 and 2, com­
parison can be based on two cases
tered on the state’s oppression of the black majority, and the responses of black
that are quite different in many ways,
South Africans to that oppression, though violence also erupted among and be­ and not just based on countries that
tween ethnic groups. In South Africa, the transition to democracy in the early are similar in many ways. Countries
1990s took place against the backdrop of attempts to move beyond a racially that are "most different" can make for

charged past, with the white-led National Party and the black-majority African very compelling comparisons where
one finds a common outcome
National Congress (nominally headed by Nelson Mandela) taking the lead roles
between them. Since the commonali­
in negotiation. Brazil, by contrast, had no such legacy of legal, formal discrimi­ ties come from such different cases, it
nation (though it certainly had a long history of “unofficial” racism and discrimi­ can give some confidence that they
nation) in the twentieth century. It was a country coming out of two decades of are attributable to some of the few

military rule, with the military seeking a peaceable exit from power. We might similarities between dissimilar coun­
tries. In some cases, such as the prev­
thus expect them to come up with very different constitutions as their leaders
alence of written constitutions
formed conventions to establish a common framework for governance. discussed in this chapter, the reasons
Yet the two countries’ constitutions share many fundamental similarities. for the common outcome may be
Most obviously, they both are based on a written constitution. Both constitutions that lots of countries follow a similar

expressed aspirational goals for the countries, but more important, they estab­ logic. For the example here, the two
countries of Brazil and South Africa
lished basic political institutions, and the countries featured many similarities in
established constitutions with several
their constitutional designs. Both established constitutional courts that would similar features, including strong
become powerful in interpreting the constitutions. Both also established a
194 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

principle of shared power between the central government and state or provincial
governments; that is, both had a degree of federalism.
Perhaps most noteworthy, however, is the sheer length of the constitutions.
As of its adoption, Brazil’s constitution of 1988 had 245 articles and filled a small
book with all of its provisions. South Africa’s (approved in 1996) had a very simi-
(continued) lar 243 articles, and took on a comparably huge number of issues: It instituted
large numbers of rights beyond the freedoms of speech and liberty, specified
judicial review and institutions to
support federalism. This happened
rules for issues such as funding for political parties, introduced a variety of mu­
despite the fact that the two constitu­ nicipal structures, created a formal role for traditional leaders, established proce­
tions were created on different dures for the division of revenue between the levels of government, and described
continents and in different social the design of the national flag. Here, it can be useful to do a brief glance at an­
circumstances by rather different
other “shadow” case that we don’t explore fully: These constitutions are both
groups of actors. The fact that the
countries are 'most different" in many
extensive, especially when contrasted with an American constitution that fits on
ways yet similar in outcomes makes it just a few pages.
an intriguing pair of cases for hypoth­ Why might such different countries have such similarly extensive constitu­
eses about why constitutions take the tions, with features of judicial review and of federalism? We do not offer defini­
forms they do.
tive statements about why constitutions vary in this way, but illustrate how we
can ask questions about the causes and consequences of institutions.
The reasons for the resulting similarities maybe numerous. We might propose
several hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 could be a matter of historical timing, in that
both countries adopted their constitutions at a similar moment in history; this
may have mattered more than geographic distance between them. Simply put,
constitutions written in an era (like the 1980s and 1990s) may be extensive be­
cause countries have grown compelled to address more sets of rights and issues
when drafting a new constitution (for a “new country”). Perhaps socially complex
societies (whether due to multiethnic identities or complex economic systems, as
both Brazil and South Africa have) require more negotiations between conflict­
ing parties. This may result in extensive constitutions detailing the compromise.
The American constitution in the late 1700s might simply not envision all the
issues that would emerge in modern societies, but those writing constitutions
today may write more thorough contracts. For example, a constitution that re­
ceives input from both men and women of different races, social classes, and
ethnic or linguistic backgrounds may necessarily involve more written agree­
ments than one written by a more homogenous group operating on a shared set
of assumptions.
Other hypotheses might also explain the extensive nature of these two
constitutions. Hypothesis 2 might be less focused on historical background
and more on the powerful actors in the constitution writing process, with an
emphasis on the economic and political interests of the negotiators. The po­
litical parties in South Africa, and the politicians and military in Brazil,
might have thought it necessary to make clear statements about the rights of
all parties in the constitutional convention, with guarantees for both the new
democratic governments and provisions that would provide some protection
to the departing (non-democratic) government. Hypothesis 3 could be that
the cases are not completely independent but are actually linked, in that the
South African and Brazilian constitutions may have been modeled on certain
aspects of other constitutions (whether in Germany or Mexico). Insofar as
 What Explains the Similarities Between the Brazilian and South African Constitutions? 195

countries do not exist in vacuums, the South African and Brazilian constitu­ THINKING
tions may have been modeled in part on experiences elsewhere. If research
COM PARATIVELY
turns up evidence (as is the case) that South African and Brazilian constitu­
tion writers did explicitly look to other constitutions as models when writing
their own, that would provide some support for Hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 might identify other key similarities amid the differences be­
tween the countries, much as was discussed in chapter 1. South Africa and Brazil
may have many differences, but there are also some key political and social simi­
larities that may affect constitutional design. For instance, both are racially and
ethnically diverse, and both have high levels of economic inequality. The consti­
tutions were certainly attentive to potential inequities, which may be construed
as evidence for this hypothesis. They are also relatively large countries with vari­
ous identity groups living in different locations; this may favor a degree of feder­
alism (which itself requires more extensive constitutional language than smaller,
unitary states).
We will not explore the causality in detail, but as with previous chapters we
can simply think about what sort of evidence would support each hypothesis.
Research can help determine which of the preceding hypotheses has the strongest
support from the empirical evidence, and the findings from a specific comparison
of these two cases will then have implications for broader research questions
and other countries. Why do constitutions take similar forms in such different

Pius Langa (left) and Dikgang Moseneke in 2005. Langa was the first black chief justice of
South Africa's constitutional court.
196 Chapter 8: Constitutions and Constitutional Design

THINKING countries? Why do very different countries adopt federalism under disparate cir­
cumstances? These questions can be asked with respect to comparisons across
COM PARATIVELY
many countries. Someone with expertise on the Brazil-South African compari­
son (or a similar comparison) will not have the final word on this for all countries
but can contribute to thinking comparatively about important political questions
such as constitutional design. The comparison can point to fruitful avenues for
further research on the design and interpretation of constitutions. The compara­
tive method we outlined in the beginning chapters and used in the previous
chapters—including its use of the most-similar-systems design and most-different-
systems design—can help us in the area of institutions as well.
O f course, we should note that these two constitutions are not completely
similar. They have many differences that can also be the subject of further re­
search. For one, the Brazilian constitution established a system with a president
elected by popular vote, while in South Africa, the legislative chamber known as
the National Assembly elects the president. The range of questions one could ask
about these constitutions is thus considerable, and the same holds for the other
major institutions explored in this chapter. Much as we can ask questions about
federalism, we might look at seemingly similar countries and ask why one ends
up being federal and the other unitary. Both Germany and Italy formed into
coherent nation-states in the second half of the nineteenth century, and both
have major regional differences internally, so why is one federal and the other
unitary? Or, with regard to judiciaries, why have courts become so significant in
constitutional interpretation even in former British colonies, given that Britain is
the home of parliamentary sovereignty? These sorts of questions serve to show
that institutions can be examined using the same comparative perspective devel­
oped and used in the earlier chapters. The possibilities of comparing institutions
continue as we look at the branches of government in the next chapters.

C h ap ter Su m m ary
Concepts Types
• Constitutions are the basic charters of modern states, • Federal countries are those in which subnational units
and they are written documents in most countries. such as states or provinces have some constitutional
Constitutions lay out the basic framework for government protection and political autonomy from the national
institutions in a country, and they are the foundational government.
laws of that country. • Unitary countries are those in which the central govern­
■• Two of the leading elements of constitutional design ment is sovereign and any subnational administrative
are federalism versus unitarism and the power of the units are subordinate to the national government.
judiciary to review for constitutionality laws passed by • Countries with judicial review have constitutional courts
legislatures. that rule on whether laws passed by the legislature are
 Chapter Review 197

in accordance with the constitution, and these • Federalism has also been linked with improvements in
courts have the power to strike down legislation as economic growth and development, as well as economic
unconstitutional. difficulties.
• Countries with parliamentary sovereignty do not • There is a long-standing debate about whether judicial
have judiciaries that review the constitutionality review contributes to the protection of democratic rights
of legislation. or not.

Causes and Effects Thinking Comparatively

• Federalism has been associated with enhancing national While many countries have written constitutions, these
stability and democracy under some circumstances, and differ in many ways, and it is an open question whether one
with conflict in other cases. country's constitution is suited to other circumstances.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. Imagine the U.S. Constitution were to be lengthened to add one prosperity.” Under what circumstances would you advocate
hundred more articles, like many of the more extensive consti­ that the country adopt a federal structure?
tutions in the world today. What would be the likely content of 4. Why has the U.S. Constitution survived for over two centuries?
these added articles? If the United States hosted a convention to Do you believe it is because of the design of the document
write a new constitution today, do you believe the resulting itself, or because it happened to be implemented in a place with
document would be as brief as that formulated in the 1780s, or a certain history, geography, and cultural backdrop? Framed in a
would the result likely be longer? Why? comparative sense, is the U.S. Constitution simply well suited to
2. What would happen if all copies (yes, including Internet the conditions prevailing in the United States, or would it likely
copies) of the United States Constitution simultaneously dis­ have enjoyed the same longevity elsewhere? Would it only work
appeared? Would the rule of law break down? Or would the in large, heterogeneous societies, or only work in societies with
society remain robust and functional? What does your answer our particular history of "coming together," or only in a society
to this question imply about whether the text itself is of great relatively far removed from most major foreign wars?
import, or social outcomes depend more heavily upon customs 5. The United Kingdom is a country where a wide range of indi­
and culture? vidual rights are respected, much like in other democracies.
3. Imagine a country that has just achieved a ceasefire in a de­ Given that many major rights are well protected, what are the
cades-long civil war. You have been asked by the government to problems with parliamentary sovereignty and a lack of judicial
accompany several constitutional experts to the country to review? Are there any disadvantages of eliminating judicial
advise the new "constituent assembly," whose job it is to write review (and the potential for judicial activism) in well-estab­
a new constitution that will ensure "stability, democracy, and lished democratic societies?
 CHAPTER 9

Legislatures and
Legislative Elections

• Phil Goff, a prominent Labour Party politician in New Zealand, votes in the 2011 elections.
W
hat can New Zealand teach other countries about how to run a democ­
racy? At first glance, the country is so distinctive that one might say
little. The island nation has just over four million people, and its greatest
claim to fame may be its intimidating rugby team or that it was the setting for
The Lord of the Rings movie trilogy. Its capital, Wellington, is the southern­
most of any country on earth. Yet this former British colony has an electoral
system for its legislature that many countries might wish to consider.
New Zealanders actually have two votes in their parlia­
mentary elections. They have one for a specific individual to
IN THIS CHAPTER
represent their district, and one for their most preferred party.
Concepts 200
W hen all the votes are tallied and computed, the winners in
What Legislatures Are 200
each district go to parliament, just as in many countries around What Legislatures Do 201
the world, including the United States. But there is a catch: Types 202
Along with these representatives go a number of additional Unicameral and Bicameral Legislatures 202
members chosen from lists made by the political parties. These Electoral Systems 205

“at-large” members of parliament are allotted to each party in Executive-Legislative Relations 211

a way that makes the overall composition of the parliament Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns
of Representation? 213
proportional to the vote each party received. The idea is to give
Patterns of Representation 213
each New Zealander his or her own representative for the local Electoral Systems and Representation 215
constituency, while making parliament more generally reflec­ Legislative Decision Making and
tive of party preferences in the country as a whole. Representation 218
Executive-Legislative Relations and
New Zealand is not the only country to use this compli­
Representation 220
cated approach to electing its legislature. In fact, the New Zea­
land model drew some inspiration from Germany’s similar THINKING COM PARATIVELY

model, as we discuss later in the chapter. W hether the system is Representation in New Zealand and
Beyond 222
ideal or not depends on how each individual believes representa­
tion and legislatures should work, which we also discuss in this C A S E S IN C O N TEXT
chapter. W hat is certain is that considering the relative merits of United Kingdom • Brazil • Japan
models like New Zealand’s and Germany’s, as contrasted with Germany • United States

other models in countries ranging from the United States to the

United Kingdom to Japan to Brazil, will provide insight into
both representation and the legislatures that are designed to ensure it.
This chapter offers an introduction to the study of legislatures, with spe­
cific attention to the electoral rules and systems that shape them. We discuss
how legislators are elected to represent the citizenry. In the two subsequent
chapters, we elaborate on many aspects of representation and elections.
199
200 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

Chapter 10 discusses the executive branch, but it must be noted that a discus­
sion of executives cannot always be separated from that of legislatures. As a
result, we discuss briefly in this chapter the relationships between legislatures
and executives, but leave to the next chapter the way in which many of the
issues play out in parliamentary and presidential systems. Similarly, in talking
about legislative representation in this chapter, we discuss political parties,
but a fuller treatment of those important institutions is left to chapter 11.

Concepts
Politics is about making laws to govern people, and legislatures are the most
important bodies that shape the process of making and changing laws. Legisla­
tors legislate. While heads of state and heads of government in the executive
branch may be the first individuals that come to mind when we think of politi­
cians, the legislatures of the world are often what we will think of when we view
politics as a whole process of governing.

What Legislatures Are

legislature Assembly or body of Legislatures are deliberative bodies composed of the decision makers who rep­
representatives with the authority resent the population at large. Legislatures make laws and many political deci­
to make laws. sions, especially in democracies, but also even in personalistic dictatorships,
which may rely on legislatures in their efforts to seem legitimate or to create the
appearance of deliberative decision making. Legislatures are where debates take
place about the fundamental values and preferences of voters. They are where
interest groups and lobbyists often turn when they seek to influence the political
process. They are where presidents and prime ministers often start their careers,
and they are also typically the institution in government with the greatest re­
sponsibility for overseeing the conduct of the executive (an institution discussed
in greater detail in the next chapter). In these bodies, legislators are of course
important political figures, being leaders in major debates, whether in actual
face-to-face settings in the legislature itself or through the use of the media.
The rise of legislatures, as opposed to executives, is part and parcel of the story
of the emergence of constitutional and democratic regimes. For centuries, the
history of representative government was the history of elected legislatures in­
creasingly taking political authority from unelected executives. Parliaments, as­
semblies, congresses, and other legislative bodies asserted their rights to represent
the populace, usually critiquing the unaccountable power of monarchs, such as
kings, queens, or emperors. O f course, the earliest legislatures were not truly
representative in most cases. The Parliament that asserted its authority over King
John II of England with the drafting of the Magna Carta in 1215 were not
elected “commoners,” but rather nobles in their own right. The French Estates-
General revealed its inegalitarian character in its basic structure, with separate
meetings for nobles, clergy, and commoners (the “third estate”). Even earlier, in
the republics of ancient Rome, membership in the Senate was generally restricted
to male property-holders or upper-class patricians. In many forms of colonial
rule, as well, legislatures were initially chosen not by the people at large but
rather by an elite subset of the population.
This existence of less-than-democratic legislatures can be found in authoritar­
ian regimes today. In authoritarian systems, legislatures may be selected in a
number of ways that exclude a free and open vote. For instance, the legislature
may be comprised only of a subset of the population, such as being members of a
certain dominant political party. This would be the case in Communist regimes
such as China, where only members of the official Communist Party (or their
close allies) are elected to office in practice. In other authoritarian regimes, legisla­
tors may be appointed by unelected executives. These are legislatures, even if the
quality of representation is suspect.
Despite these non-democratic instances, many countries have moved toward
more democracy over time, with more regular elections and the extension of the
franchise to more people, most notably women, ethnic minorities, and men of
lower social and economic status. Citizens in all contemporary democracies
elect legislators, with the population at large having some choice among mul­
tiple political parties and/or candidates. The ability of those citizens to vote
directly for the executive branch is not universal. While some democratic coun­
tries also have a direct election for the executive (such as a president), many
others have an executive elected by the legislature itself, and that executive is
nominally responsible to the legislature. In these systems, the people vote for
their executives only in an indirect fashion, by choosing a legislature that in
turn selects the executive branch of government. This makes the legislature of
elected representatives the signature element of virtually any democracy.

What Legislatures Do
Representatives generally make law by proposing legislation and then organizing
votes and bringing these to the floor of the legislature. Legislators who propose
or favor a piece of legislation often undertake the necessary compromises and
“horse trading” that enable laws to get passed. The necessary trading and com­
promises may take place among the multiple parties in a governing coalition (as
elaborated on in the chapter on executives) or within parties, as different legisla­
tors make specific demands of one another in exchange for “yea” or “nay” votes.
Depending on the power of party leaders to control the legislators, it may be
necessary to make many concessions to specific legislators.
The specific process of legislation will vary from one legislature to the next.
In some instances, a strong executive cabinet may be comprised of members of the
legislature itself, and the rules governing legislative elections may make passage of
the executive’s favored proposals almost “automatic.” In other circumstances, leg­
islation may have to pass through multiple houses, or may have to work its way
through votes of multiple committees just to get to the “floor” for a vote. Indeed,
in some systems, the legislative process requires both these and more. In the
United States, for instance, proposed legislation must often pass through commit­
tees in each of the two chambers of the legislature, then must pass votes in the
whole body, then through a conference committee that reconciles any differences
between the two chambers’ bills, before going to the president for a signature.
The powers of legislatures are considerable in most democracies. In many coun­
tries, one of the main powers of the legislative branch is the so-called “power of the
202 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

purse.” Legislatures typically have control over government budgets and are empow­
ered to disburse funds to the executive branch and to the administrative agencies, or
to cut ofF funding to certain initiatives that are unpopular or that it deems to be
mismanaged. This power to allocate resources is one of the reasons executives must
be attentive to the needs of legislatures, even in the absence of new laws being passed.
Legislatures often debate as part of the functions of representing the elector­
ate and making legislation, and in doing so they also serve the function of focus­
ing national discussion. Legislatures are where many public debates play out. The
halls of the legislatures are designed for speechmaking, discussion, and debate,
but this does not only happen in the chamber itself. Legislators also engage in
less formal debate by shaping and responding to public opinion in the media and
through interactions with citizens who have requests, complaints, arguments,
suggestions, ideas, and new perspectives. O f course, not all such debate will be
meaningful. Especially in authoritarian regimes, legislative debates may be re­
duced to displays of loyalty to the executive. In North Korea, legislators’ most
apparent role is to serve as an applauding audience for a dictator. In democracies
too, not all legislators clarify and improve political discussion: they may also
obfuscate or muddy the waters of political discussion, or may be beholden to
special interests acting against the public good (though many such examples are
matters of opinion). And they may—perhaps deliberately—spread misinforma­
tion or misleading information. In principle, however, elected legislators at the
national level are expected to be opinion leaders that contribute to national dis­
cussions and propose solutions to public problems.
There are also several overlooked roles of legislatures. One is “socializing” politi­
cians. Legislatures can be a “training ground” for future chief executives, such as
presidents and prime ministers.1 Another role is constituent service: Citizens often
contact their representatives’ offices for assistance with a variety of concerns specific
to local individuals or groups. Last but definitely not least, legislators often try to get
reelected.2 Indeed, some scholars believe that the fundamental force driving legisla­
tive action is the push for electoral success.3 Getting reelected may not be part of the
“job description” of being a legislator, but it is certainly one of the more time-con­
suming aspects of the job in many countries. This may involve extensive campaigning
and fundraising in candidate-centered elections, or working to retain a spot on the
political party’s list of favored representatives in systems where electors vote by party.

Types
Legislative bodies may take a number of forms. They may have one or more houses
or chambers, for example. In addition, the electoral processes that give rise to the
legislators are numerous. Elections may involve voting for specific candidates, for
bicameral legislature Legislature
political parties generally, or both. These different forms of legislatures and legis­
with two chambers, which may
lative elections give rise to different patterns of representation, as we shall see.
have equal or unequal powers.

chamber An assembly or body of Unicameral and Bicameral Legislatures

a legislature, often referring to one Legislatures consist of one or more houses of assembly. Bicameral legislatures—
of two such bodies in a bicameral those with two chambers, or houses—are common in democracies, especially in
legislature. relatively large countries. This is the case in the United States and many nations
 Types 203

Sometimes legislative politics gets heated: Parliamentarians from opposing parties fight in
Taiwan, 2010.

in Latin America, for instance, where congresses consist of two legislative cham­
bers, with each having its own name (such as House of Representatives or Cham­
ber of Deputies). Many other countries exhibit a similar structure, using different
names to signify the two chambers. In bicameral countries, the lower chamber lower chamber In a bicameral
is usually the one whose composition most closely reflects the population at large. legislature, the house that typically
Examples are the House of Representatives in the United States or the House of has a larger number of legislators
Commons in the United Kingdom. The upper chamber is usually smaller in size, than upper chambers, and often
and its composition is often less directly reflective of the population at large; it represents the national vote either
may represent territories such as states or provinces, as in the case of the Senate more proportionally or through
in many countries, or specific groups, such in the House of Lords in the United smaller geographic constituencies.
Kingdom. The lower chamber has greater authority than the “upper chamber” in
upper chamber The chamber in a
many countries. In countries such as Germany, the upper chamber is limited to
bicameral legislature that is usually
voting on certain items that pertain to the states, and in other countries such as
smaller in number of legislators,
the United Kingdom, the upper chamber has even more limited (largely vesti­
often representing larger geogra­
gial) powers. Here again, the United States is a bit of an exception in that its
phic constituencies such as states
upper chamber—the Senate—has at least as much power as the lower chamber.
Unicameral legislatures are quite common in countries with small popula­ or provinces.

tions. For instance, unicameral parliaments are used in Scandinavia and are unicameral legislature
common in sub-Saharan Africa and some parts of the Middle East. Unicameral Legislature with a single chamber.
representation is usually most appropriate in unitary states and in countries that
have relatively homogeneous populations; conversely, unicameral legislatures are
uncommon where there are histories of different regional population groups with
204 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

their own identities, or in which regional minorities may demand special repre­
sentation on the basis of territory. In addition to working in small, unitary de­
mocracies, unicameralism is also common in systems in many authoritarian
regimes where a single political party dominates. In these cases, the governing
regime may seek to minimize the “separation of powers” between national and
regional interests that is implicit in bicameralism, and prefer to channel all politi­
cal demands through a single body dominated by the single party. The world’s
most populous country, China, fits the bill here, as it also has a unicameral legis­
lature, despite its size.
Beyond the basic unicameral or bicameral structure, legislatures vary in an­
other simple way: They have many different names, as noted earlier. For example,
a legislature may be called a congress ox parliament, an assembly, a house, or a cham­
ber. Some of these terms have relatively specific meanings, or are most commonly
used in certain ways to designate whether a legislative body constitutes the entire
legislative branch or merely one part of it. Congresses and parliaments generally
refer to the entirety of a legislative branch, which may include more than one
congress A form of legislature,
chamber. Houses and chambers often refer to one of the component parts of the
typically associated with a presi­
legislature, especially in the many countries with a bicameral (two-chamber) leg­
dential system in which there is a
islature, as noted later. Assemblies may refer to either a legislature as a whole or
separation of powers.
one particular house or chamber within it.
parliament A type of legislature, Congresses and parliaments also have different connotations, as shown in
often associated with systems in Table 9.1. While the distinction is not a hard-and-fast rule, congresses are typi­
which the legislators vote on the cally branches in a system with a separately elected head of government, while
leadership of the executive branch parliaments are often the name used for legislatures that choose their own head
and the formation of a of government. In most congresses, the separately elected head of government—
government. often called a president—does not depend on the congress for his or her position,

table 9.1 Common Attributes of Congresses and Parliaments

Type of Legislature Congress Parliament

Example United States United Kingdom

Head of Government President Prime Minister (or Premier, Chancellor, etc.)

Election of Head of Government Separately elected by voters Selected by Parliament

Independence of Head of Executive does not depend on Executive depends on confidence of Parliament
Government confidence of Congress

Separation vs. Fusion of Powers Separation of powers between Congress Executive fused with Parliament
and executive

Checks vs. Supremacy Checks and balances between branches Parliament supreme by constitution (but see next
in constitution row)

Strong vs. Limited Executive Executive limited by separation and Executive may dominate lawmaking in practice
checks

Bicameral vs. Unicameral Either, but usually bicameral Either

vw. broad w w w .b r o a d

Chloe Smith, Member of Parliament from Norwich (U.K.) and a representative of the
Conservative Party, and John Smith, of the Monster Raving Loony Party, whom she defeated.

but rather is accountable to the populace at large and to the constitution gener­
ally. These are usually systems designed with separations of powers and checks
and balances between the legislative and executive branches. By contrast, parlia­
mentary systems have executives that depend on parliament to legislate and even
to retain their position. While the parliament is often the supreme lawmaking
body, this does not mean the executive is weak: These systems may actually fea­
ture strong executive powers in practice, depending on whether the executive
can control his or her political party and its allies in parliament. We elaborate on
this basic distinction further in chapter 10, when we discuss presidential and
parliamentary executives, and we look at party systems in chapter 11.

Electoral Systems
Different legislative systems vary in how they organize elections. Among the
various options, there are two basic categories of electoral systems used for legis­
latures, and any number of combinations of these two systems. The first is the
district system An electoral
district-based electoral system, and the second is proportional representation.
system in which voters select

D istrict Systems representatives from specific

District systems allocate one or more seats in the legislature to each of a number geographic constituencies.

of districts in the country. These districts are usually territorial, with different constituency A group of voters or
geographic regions representing the different districts. These districts may be a geographic district that legisla­
known as constituencies, and in most such systems, the district will have a single tors or other elected officials
representative. The most common version is the single-member district (SMD). represent.
206 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

single-member district (SMD) Single-member district systems divide up a country into a number of territo­
Electoral system in which voters rial districts, with each district having the right to elect one legislator. This
choose a candidate and the winner person is then expected to represent the interests of that district in the legisla­
is elected by the most votes earned ture. In most circumstances, political parties will run candidates for the seat in
or through winning a runoff vote. the legislature, and those representing major, well-known parties will have an
advantage over those without such a party affiliation. Parties often have consid­
erable discretion in how they choose their own candidates. In some countries,
party leaders may exercise considerable control over who the candidates will be
in each district. Another procedure is openly contested “primary” elections in
which members of the same party run against one another for the party’s nomi­
nation to a seat. While major parties have an advantage in name recognition and
in communicating to voters what their candidates probably believe, “indepen­
dent” candidates may also run if they meet the qualifications for getting their
names on the ballot.4 Ballot access is challenging in some countries but famously
easy for candidates in others, especially for small local elections. Getting on the
ballot is easy in the United Kingdom, for example, where the Monster Raving
Loony Party has become a standby. Consider the SMD system in the United
Kingdom in the “Case in Context” box entitled “The Mother of Parliaments”
(which is not about the Monster Raving Loony Party).
Elections in SMD systems can have different features. A common approach
first-past-the-post Electoral is the first-past-the-post, or “plurality” system, in which the district holds elec­
system in which the candidate tions and the candidate with the most votes wins. This may sound obvious, but
with the most number of votes is note that in such a system, it may be common to have a winner with less than 50
elected, regardless of whether a percent of the vote, if there are many candidates who split up the vote between
majority has been attained. them. This can lead to surprising outcomes in some cases. For instance, consider
an election in a relatively conservative district in which two conservative candi­
dates run along with one liberal one. The liberal may only win 40 percent of the

CASE IN CONTEXT

The Mother of Parliaiments: The United Kingdom

and the Westminstei' Model PAGE 549

The British Parliament is often considered the 'mother of parlia­ 1. What features of the British Parliament seem especially
ments" given its long history and the way it inspired legisla­ "democratic" relative to the American model, and which
tures around the world. It is the most famous example of a less so?
parliamentary system, in which the legislature chooses and has 2. What role does the notion of "parliamentary sovereignty"
constitutional powers over the executive; we explore this leave for the other branches of government, namely the
system further in chapter 10, contrasting it with presidential executive and judiciary? How can the Prime Minister and
systems in countries such as the United States. While the British the executive be powerful when the Parliament itself is
model, known as the "Westminster model," has been emulated sovereign?
often, it has rarely been adopted in its exact form by other 3. What is the effect of the single-member district voting
countries. system on the proportionality of Parliament? Will this
See the case study of the British Parliament in Part VI, type of system be an advantage or a disadvantage for
pp. 549-550. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions: small political parties?
 Types 207

vote but take the election if the two conservatives split the remaining 60 percent.
Accordingly, many SMD systems adopt other electoral rules, with a popular ver­
sion being a runoff system between the top two candidates that ensures that the runoff Electoral system in which
eventual winner will have received a “mandate” by winning a majority of the the top candidates after a first
valid votes cast. round of voting compete in one or
In general, first-past-the-post systems will often disproportionately favor more additional rounds of voting
larger parties that can gain a winning number of votes in many districts, even if until a candidate receives a
these parties cannot win an outright majority of the votes cast. It can also dis­ majority.
favor slightly smaller parties that might get a solid fraction of the vote but not
enough to gain a plurality in many districts. A well-known example of this is
the United Kingdom, where the Conservative and Labour parties have often
won majorities of parliamentary seats without winning a majority of votes cast.
The third-largest party, such as the Liberal Democrats in the 2005 and 2010
elections, usually win a smaller proportion of seats than votes. In the 2010 elec­
tion, neither of the two largest parties won a majority, but in the 2005 election
Labour won a majority of seats (over 55 percent) with a minority of votes in the
country (35 percent), while the Liberal Democrats won only 9.6 percent of the
seats for their 22 percent of the vote (Table 9.2).
Not all district systems are single-member districts. There are also
multi-member districts (MMDs), in which more than one representative is multi-member district (MMD)
elected from each district. These arrangements are less “winner-take-all” because Electoral system in which district
they allow for multiple representatives and also multiple parties to have represen­ constituencies have more than one
tatives in the same district. representative.
What happens in these M M D systems often depends on the size of the dis­
tricts and the number of representatives in each. Imagine if the United States had
a system for its House of Representatives with two representatives in each dis­
trict. Since the Republican and Democratic parties are usually the two leading
parties in each district and are usually fairly close in polling, most reasonable
calculations would result in the two parties each getting one seat in most districts
around the country. But if districts were to have, say, ten representatives, the re­
sults might be significantly different. The two leading parties may split the seats
between them. Or perhaps the two leading parties would each take four seats,
and then a couple of smaller parties—say one on the far left and one on the far
right—would win one seat each. This would change the composition of the leg­
islature, encouraging more small parties to have representatives. Because M M D
divides seats up according to the relative performance of different parties, this
points in the direction of the next broad category of electoral systems: propor­
tional representation.

table 9.2 Results for Top Parties in United Kingdom General Election, 2005

Party Total Votes Percentage of National Vote Number of Seats Percentage of Seats

Labour 9,552,436 35.2 355 55.2

Conservative 8,784,915 32.4 198 30.7

Liberal Democrat 5,985,454 22.0 62 9.6

208 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

Proportional Representation (PR)

Many countries maintain that the most important factor in representation is not
the district or geographic territory one represents, nor having an individual can­
didate to represent certain people, but rather the distribution of seats between
parties. The logic is simple: If party X wins 44 percent of the vote in the country,
party Y 33 percent, party Z 22 percent, and all other parties 1 percent, then party
X should have about 44 percent of the seats in the legislature, party Y about 33
proportional representation (PR) percent, and party Z about 22 percent. Proportional representation (PR) can
In its pure form, an electoral system do a better job than SMD of making this happen.
in which voters choose a preferred Systems featuring an element of PR still face the challenge of allocating seats
party and seats are allocated to once the votes are tallied. There are many ways to allocate seats, but certain rules
parties according to the percen­ are common. First, in many PR systems, a threshold is often required to earn
tage of the vote the party wins. seats in the legislature. This may be 5 percent, for instance. W ith that threshold,
any party with less than 5 percent of the vote would not earn a seat in the legis­
lature because their vote totals were insufficient. This prevents PR systems from
being dominated by lots of small parties—which would make complex coalitions
necessary and likely not be conducive to stability—and can help ensure govern-
ability by restricting power to a handful of substantial parties. Second, the
number of seats for each party cannot perfectly reflect the vote, because there are
always fewer seats than there are voters, and there will be some “remainders.” In
general, the number of votes a party gets is rounded off to a certain number of
seats. For instance, if three parties contest an election for 12 seats, and all the
votes for party A would suggest it earned 6.7 seats, party B earned 3.1 seats, and
party C earned 2.2 seats, then one actual distribution might be 7 seats for party
A, 3 for party B, and 2 for party C. A variety of calculation methods exists for
sorting out the seats from votes in proportional representation systems.5
PR is designed (by definition) to offer proportionality in the vote for different
parties, as we explore further in the “Causes and Effects” section. A leading ex­
ample of a relatively “pure” PR system, albeit one where democracy is very sus­
pect, is now found in Russia. South Africa also uses a model that features the
classic form of PR for its lower house, the National Assembly. However, most
countries using PR do not use it in its purest form. Rather, they blend it with
district-based systems or make other modifications, as discussed in the section
on hybrid systems later in the chapter.
Proportional representation may work in different ways, with different details.
open-list proportional For instance, in the variant of PR known as open-list proportional representation
representation Electoral system (used in Brazil and many European countries), voters choose individual candidates,
in which voters choose a candidate but the candidates’ votes are combined together with the other members of their
but votes are aggregated by party, and then seats are allocated based on the parties’performances. This makes
political party to determine the the legislature proportionally representative, yet the votes for candidates still in­
allocation of seats across parties. fluence which individuals are elected to the legislature: The candidates with the
most votes within their party will have the highest priority for earning a seat. The
system attempts to combine some of the features of PR with the right to vote for
individual candidates (hence, “open list” rather than a “closed list” controlled by
the party). It encourages candidates to seek individual support and can leave par­
ties “less disciplined” than under forms of PR in which the party exerts greater
control over its slate of candidates.
 Types 209

w I ■
Electoral Rules and Party (In)Discipline in Brazil's Legislature PAGE 409

The Chamber of Deputies in the Brazilian Congress uses open-list 1. What do you think might be the reasons behind the
proportional representation.This system allows each voterto select adoption of open-list PR?
a specific candidate, and then attempts to achieve proportionality 2. What are the consequences of this system for political
by aggregating the votes across parties. In Brazil, a consequence parties, and why? Should this result be expected in all
seems to have been weak political parties and a messy legislature, countries with this system?
at least at some moments in time. For years, many scholars consid­ 3. If in fact the Brazilian Congress is becoming more coher­
ered the electoral system to be the key item in Brazil's politics that ent over time, yet the open-list PR system has stayed the
could be changed to improve the quality of governance.6 same, what can explain the change?
See the case study on the Brazilian Congress in Part VI, p. 409.
As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:

Even with the distinction between PR and SMD, and the diversity of rules
and mechanisms for each, there is additional variety in the types of electoral
systems around the world. As suggested previously, many countries attempt to
find a balance between the perceived advantages of PR systems and SMD sys­
tems. We might call these “mixed” or “hybrid” systems.

M ixed or Hybrid
Many countries have sought to balance the advantages of SMD and PR systems,
and have invented a number of seemingly ingenious mechanisms for doing so,
though these generally make the electoral system more complicated. These sys­
tems—which represent a hybrid between the two sets of systems already dis­
cussed—may have individual elected representatives but attempt to retain (or
create) the proportionality among parties that PR systems provide. We return to
the cases of Germany and New Zealand at the end of the chapter, but note here
that it is possible in theory to elect representatives from districts, and then ensure
proportionality of party representation in the legislature, mainly through the ad­
dition of supplemental “at large” seats to the legislature.
Other mechanisms ask voters to do more than choose their preferred candi­
alternative vote Voting system in
date: They ask voters to rank candidates. The electoral system then uses this in­
formation about ranked preferences to determine winners. The alternative vote,
which voters rank candidates and
the votes of low-ranking candida­
also called the instant-runoff vote or preferential vote, is a simple version. All
tes are reallocated until a winner is
votes are counted to see voters’ first choices. If no candidate wins a majority, the
determined.
candidate with the lowest total is eliminated, and the votes for this last place
candidate are redistributed according to those voters’ second-choice picks. single transferable vote (STV)
If there is still no majority, then the candidate with the next-lowest total is elimi­ Electoral system in which voters
nated, and their votes are redistributed as well, and so on until one candidate has rank candidates and the winners'
a majority of the vote. surplus votes are reallocated to
A similar system is the single transferable vote (STV), which is used in some other, lower-ranking candidates
M M D systems where more than one candidate is elected. Under STV, the voter until a slate of representatives is
ranks candidates, just as in the alternative vote. But some winning candidates chosen.
210 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

table 9 .3 Voting Procedures Under Different Electoral Systems

Electoral System Procedure for Voter

Single-Member District (SMD) Choose candidate; top candidate is elected by most votes or runoff.

Proportional Representation (PR) Choose preferred party; seats allocated to parties by vote percent.

Open-List PR Choose candidate; votes aggregated by party for allocation of seats.

Mixed Systems/Hybrid Systems Choose candidate and party (two votes), or other combination of above.

Single Transferable Vote (STV) Rank candidates; winners' surplus votes reallocated until slate chosen.

Alternative Rank candidates; votes of losers reallocated until winner found.

will have more than enough votes to win a seat, with some votes left over. The
“surplus” votes for winning candidates are redistributed to voters’ second choices
(and third choices as necessary, and so on) until a slate of candidates is elected.
Table 9.3 presents voting procedures under different electoral systems.
These ranking systems have a major advantage: They encourage voters to pick
strategic voting Voting in a way their most preferred candidate, thus reducing the need for strategic voting.
that does not reflect a.voter's ideal Under strategic voting, many citizens may not vote for their favorite candidate
preference, so as to prevent a because they fear he/she will not win, preferring instead to vote for a favorite (or
less-desired outcome. a “least bad” option) among those who have a reasonable chance of winning.
Ranking systems are used in Australia, and for some local elections in the United
States. And the applicability of these voting models is not limited to traditional
politics: This vote procedure is also used to select the winners of the Academy
indirect election Electoral system Awards, or Oscars.
in which representatives are Indirect election is also a possibility for choosing legislators, and is used most
chosen by other elected officials, often for the upper chambers of bicameral parliaments. Legislators in the lower
rather than directly by the citizenry chamber (which in reality is the more powerful chamber in most bicameral coun­
at large. tries) choose the members of the upper chamber in some countries. Alternatively,

CASE IN CONTEXT

The Hybrid Electoral System of the Japanese Diet PAGE 491

The Japanese Diet uses a mix of proportional representation and See the case study on the Japanese Diet in Part VI, p. 491. As
single-member constituencies. For much of the period after you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
World War II, the country was dominated by the Liberal Demo­ 1. What might be the reasons for developing a hybrid
cratic Party (LDP), but it now has a more competitive legislature. system such as this?
In the House of Representatives, 300 members are chosen in 2. What would be the expected consequences of this ar­
their districts, and 180 by proportional representation. The upper rangement for the size and success of political parties?
chamber, known as the House of Councillors, is also elected by a 3. Would there be advantages to adopting such a system in
mixture of district-based systems and PR, but with subtly differ­ countries such as the United States that rely exclusively
ent rules. This is a simple example of a hybrid electoral system. on districts?
the members of the upper chamber of legislatures may be chosen by the states/
provinces/regions of a federation. In Germany, for instance, the members of the
Bundesrat, the upper chamber of the legislature, are chosen by Germany’s state
legislatures.
There is a virtually limitless number of conceivable electoral systems around
the world. While certain trends predominate, this small selection of possible
formats serves to illustrate the variety of options. The preferences for one system
over another owes a great deal to national traditions and habits, as well as to the
structure of the polity, to include population size, and the importance of group
identities and the extent of homogeneity in the population. Moreover, they are
presumably “sticky” in the sense that parties and groups that do well within a
given electoral system, and who therefore can potentially block changes, typi­
cally have an interest in preserving the system from which they benefit. For this
reason, one seldom hears calls from the Republican and Democratic parties for
the adoption of an alternative framework.

Executive-Legislative Relations
Legislatures routinely have responsibility for oversight of the executive branch.
A classic example might be legislatures requiring testimony by military leaders
on the conduct of a war, since the military may come under the authority of the
executive branch, yet may be required to report to the legislature. Similar ex­
amples of such legislative oversight can occur in any number of policy areas, with
cabinet ministers and executive officials regularly being required to submit re­
ports and to undergo legislative questioning. This may entail the right to review
executive appointees to major political positions (including those to the judicial
branch in some instances, as well as appointees to some high-ranking executive
offices in the administration). Oversight may also, in especially discordant situa­
tions, result in a motion of censure, in which the legislature sanctions or scolds
the executive for actions it deems inappropriate.
Beyond simply providing oversight, the legislature may be empowered to
remove the executive from office if the executive “loses the confidence” of the
people (or its elected representatives in the legislature). In parliamentary sys­
tems, the relationship between the executive and the legislature is relatively
close, because of the fusion of the two branches of government. The executive
consists of a government elected by the members of the legislature, including a
cabinet of ministers led by a prime minister (or equivalent). In these systems,
the executive is “responsible” to the legislature and relies on the backing of the
legislature for its continuation as a government. This fact confers power to the
legislature to remove the executive from office, according to rules that vary
from country to country. For instance, in many countries, a majority of the
legislature voting “no confidence” in the executive will result in the govern­
ment being disbanded and new elections being called. In Germany, however,
bringing down the government requires a “constructive vote of no confidence,”
in which the vote of no confidence must be accompanied by a specific proposal
for a new government that will take effect upon the completion of the confi­
dence vote.
212 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

The German Bundesrat, which represents German states, or "Lander."

The parliamentary model allows the legislature to remove the government—

making a call for new elections—without necessarily leading to a major consti­
tutional crisis. In presidential systems, the procedure for removing a member of
the executive is usually more elaborate, at least for the highest-ranking officials
in the government. Legislatures can use processes of impeachment (or of de­
manding resignation) to remove the executive from office under relatively strin­
gent conditions. In parliamentary systems, legislatures can remove executives at
most any time for a lack of confidence in governing ability. In presidential sys­
tems, their power to do so is more limited by the fixed term of office given to the
president.

CASE IN CONTEXT

Institutional Design: Germany's Bundestag and Bundesrat PAGE 451

Germany's legislative elections feature yet another wrinkle in the See the case study on the German parliament in Part VI,
mix between district-based systems and PR. The elections for pp. 451-452. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
the Bundestag have constituencies but also aim to ensure overall 1. What are the mechanics of how the size of the Bundestag
proportionality to make the lower chamber reflective of voters' is calculated?
party preferences. The system is known as a mixed-member pro­ 2. Which sorts of political actors in Germany would be ex­
portional system, and it allows (or requires) voters to vote twice: pected to like this system, and which would not?
once for an individual and once for a party. Members of the 3. Does the structure of representation in the Bundesrat
Bundesrat, meanwhile, are selected by assemblies in the states affect the way one views the electoral system in the
(Lander). Bundestag?
 Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 213

Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns

of Representation?
Many heated debates center on the systems that elect legislative representatives.
At question is how representation will be structured, and particularly how votes
are translated into seats. Earlier in the chapter, we outlined the district-based
representation and proportional representation approaches to legislative elections
as well as hybrid forms. In general, district-based systems are more centered on
the election of individual candidates and the latter more centered on the election
of political parties, though we discuss a few caveats to that rule. A question for
further consideration is “Which type of election is more representative?”
This, of course, depends on what “representative” means. When you consider
what it means to have a legislature represent the people, what is essential? Is it
necessary to have a single politician representing your district? If so, how do
those who voted against that politician feel “represented”? Advocates of PR or
party-based elections argue that political systems should come as close as possi­
ble to making sure each person’s vote “counts” in representation. If you wish to
vote for a smallish (but non-trivial) party because that party matches your beliefs,
your vote should not be “wasted” simply because that party does not win a district
seat. Rather, your vote should be reflected in the proportion of seats allocated to
that party in the legislature.

Patterns of Representation
The first challenge with a causal argument about “what types of legislatures are
more representative” is having an understanding of what representation means. representation In legislatures,
In the terms of chapters 1 and 2, we have to define the dependent variable. It may the process by which elected
be that no single, easily quantifiable indicator of “representativeness” exists, but legislators reflect the interests and
this should not stop us from engaging in comparative analysis. In fact, the study preferences of voters in their
of the consequences of different legislative forms is a leading example of how constituencies.
comparativists debate challenging concepts that are difficult to define.

Legislative Politics in Latin America

INSIGHTS
by Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, editors

actually be looking to move to other positions, including such

T
his edited volume looks at Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and
Mexico in comparative perspective. The book makes refer­ state-level positions as governor. Second, legislatures in Latin
ence to the U.S. system, because much of the work on legisla­ America are generally more "reactive” than "proactive," respond­
tures is based on studies of the U.S. Congress, but it explores ing to presidents in different ways. In making these arguments,
how Latin American legislatures work differently from the U.S. the book examines three areas in detail: executive-legislative
system and from one another. Morgenstern and Nacif (and the relations, the internal structure of legislative bodies, and the pro­
numerous authors of the chapters in the book) show that many cess by which policies are made. Through this approach, the au­
assumptions about legislatures are based on study of the U.S. thors develop a more nuanced comparative understanding of
Congress but do not hold in Latin America. First, while many the variables that make legislatures differ.
scholars of Congress assume that getting reelected is an ambi­ Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds. Legislative Politics in Latin America.
tion for Congresspersons, many legislators in Latin America may Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
214 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

The central function of legislatures is to represent citizens; a relatively small

number of legislators represents the population at large, and individual legislators
can never exactly represent the views of each and every citizen, but the process of
election is seen to approximate the idea of “rule by the many.” Electoral represen­
tation may take place on the basis of geography, identity group, or political party.
In many countries, people in local or regional districts may choose one or more
area residents to represent their constituency. In some other countries, specific
seats may be set aside for women (as in the case of local assemblies known as the
panchayati raj in India), racial or ethnic groups, or specific underrepresented
castes or social groups, as is discussed further in chapter 14. Yet not all represen­
tation is based on individual representatives, as PR systems offer representation
by political party, with citizens voting for parties instead of individual candi­
dates. In this case, representatives appointed by the political parties staff the
legislature, voting generally in accordance with the policy directives of the party
as a whole.
Implicit in democratic elections is the fact that many citizens will not agree
with their representatives some of the time. One may vote for a losing party or
candidate, or one may be disappointed with a position taken by a representative
one voted for. This raises the question of whether representatives should follow
the public opinion of their constituents or their own consciences.
Ask yourself if you believe elected legislators should reflect the opinion of the
public that elects them. It may seem obvious that legislators should follow public
opinion. After all, representatives are there to represent the people who elected
them, and can reasonably be expected to reflect the preferences and values of
their voting constituents. Incidentally, while Congresspersons in the United
States exercise some independence from their constituents, one of the best ex­
amples of pure obedience to the majority’s will comes from the United States: It
is the case of the Electoral College, where the states appoint delegates for the
presidential election who are presumed to vote in accordance with the popular
vote in the state that delegated authority to them.

The Concept of Representation

INSIGHTS
by Hannah Pitkin

itkin elaborates the concept of representation that is so cen­

P
general wishes of the electorate or should follow their own
tral to the study of legislatures and legislative politics, and counsel if they find these views incorrect. Rather, the essence of
does so through an examination of the term, its origins in politi­ representation is acting on behalf of others, which implies that
cal theory, and even its etymology. One of the key elements of representatives should habitually be in harmony with the wishes
Pitkin's work is the distinction between representation that en­ of their electors, but are also justified in voting independently
tails following the will of a constituency's voters and representa­ where there are compelling reasons to do so on behalf of that
tion that involves individuals exercising their own discretion same group. The rule for mandate versus independence must be
and judgment once they are elected. Calling this the "mandate- examined on a case-by-case basis.
independence controversy," Pitkin argues that no clear rule can Hannah Pitkin, The Concept of Representation. Berkeley: University of California
be established for whether representatives should follow the Press, 1972.
 Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 215

Contrasting with the argument of following public opinion, however, is an

argument that legislators should be expected to exercise independence, and per­
haps should even “think better” of the whims of the populace. In other words,
voters do not expect to elect unthinking automatons that will do whatever the
majority happens to prefer at any moment in time. Rather than simply being as­
signed to do the majority’s bidding, representatives may be partially chosen for
their thoughtfulness and reason, ability to foresee the consequences of legislative
choices, and for their skill at compromise. They may be expected to exercise dis­
cretion, in other words. They may also be expected to “make the tough choices,”
even if the populace does not favor these.
Clearly, elections are the leading accountability mechanisms for legislators in
democracies. If representatives vote in ways that are too far removed from the
interests and preferences of their constituents, they can expect forceful chal­
lenges from political opponents (whether in other parties or in their own), and
they can probably expect not to win reelection if they get too far “out of line.”
On the other hand, public opinion is fickle, and representatives need to cast
votes not just on what is popular at a given moment in time, but also with a view
toward the future, both at the time of the next election and beyond. As noted in
the preceding “Insights” box, there is no unambiguous answer to whether repre­
sentatives should exercise independence from the voters who elected them, or
should follow those voters’ wishes closely. But the distinction between these two
goes to the heart of the challenging votes that representatives must make on a
regular basis.

Electoral Systems and Representation

Some of the most fundamental questions about representation come from the
electoral systems outlined previously: SMD, PR, and hybrid systems imply dif­
ferent forms of representation. Each has advantages in providing for a certain
form of representation, and each faces challenges in providing representation by
other definitions.
Where legislators are elected in districts, a large portion of the populace may
not have voted for its representative. For instance, in an American district where
a Democrat is elected with 52 percent of the vote versus 48 percent for a Repub­
lican (or vice versa), nearly half of the district may feel it is “not represented” by
the chosen Congressperson. More strikingly, imagine an elected legislator who
wins with less than half the vote. Consider a district with 65 percent of voters
that say they are liberal and 35 percent that consider themselves conservative. Say
the liberals split the vote, with a Democrat getting 33 percent and the Rent Is
Too Damn High Party candidate getting 32 percent. The conservative Republi­
apportionment The process
can candidate squeaks out a win with 35 percent. This means that 65 percent of
by which legislative seats are
the district did not vote for the legislator that represents them, even though this
distributed among geographic
group may agree that they would prefer a liberal. O f course, this can and has
constituencies.
happened in reverse, with liberals winning conservative districts due to splits in
the vote between conservative candidates. districting The process by which
In any electoral system, the question of how to divide up legislative seats is districts or other geographic
crucial, and SMD systems face challenges of apportionment and districting of constituencies are created for the
seats. In lower chambers of most legislatures with district systems, the districts purposes of elections.
216 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

are often expected to be discrete geographic areas, but they are also expected to
have comparable numbers of voters for the lower chambers of most legislatures.
O f course, precise ratios of seats to the population of each district are not possi­
ble. For example, a district with 1,535,000 voters might be expected to have the
same number of representatives as one with 1,536,000 voters. Yet as populations
of different areas change, keeping districts at roughly the same population re­
quires changing boundaries. This leads to processes of redistricting, as described
in the United States “Case in Context” box. One of the challenges of redistrict­
ing is that legislators themselves often have a role in the districting process,
whether directly or through officials they have nominated, and this creates in­
centives for legislators to shape districts that favor them or their party. One con­
gerrymandering Creation of sequence is gerrymandering, in which districts are created in irregular shapes or
districts of irregular shape or com­ of odd composition in order to achieve a desired political outcome. The term has
position in order to achieve a desi­ the negative connotation of being deliberately designed by incumbents to protect
red political result. their advantage, though it should be noted that districting has often sought to
shape boundaries in ways that favor historically underrepresented groups, such as
racial minorities.
malapportionment Apportion­ Malapportionment comes with imbalances in allocating seats to different
ment in which voters are unequally districts. The extent of malapportionment varies tremendously from one country
represented in a legislature, such as to another, but it is generally more common in upper chambers of bicameral
through relatively greater numbers parliaments, which are often designed to protect the territorial interests of states
of legislators per capita for low- or provinces. Malapportionment can be defined as the extent to which a system
-population areas and lesser gives some regions a higher ratio of representatives to voters than others. Would
number of legislators per capita for such countries be anti-democratic? Would this only apply in authoritarian re­
high-population areas. gimes? Not unless you deem the United States to be anti-democratic or authori­
tarian, as it is one of the most striking examples of legislative malapportionment,
at least in the Senate.
States, regions, or provinces are represented in Senates and “upper chambers”
of legislatures. As might be suspected, federalism affects apportionment. Federal
countries that wish to guarantee representation for smaller, less populous regions
will—almost by definition—create seats in the legislature that disproportionately
favor those regions. In Brazil, for example, the smallest state (Roraima) has three
senators for about 400,000 residents, while the largest state (Sao Paulo) also has
three senators, but for over 41 million people. The relevant ratios are that Roraima
has one vote in the Senate for every 133,000 residents, while Sao Paulo has one
vote only for about every 14 million people. Similarly, differences in state repre­
sentation are found in the United States, where Wyoming has one Senator for
approximately every quarter of a million people, while California has a Senator
for about every 18 million residents.
The consequences of apportionment and malapportionment are significant. In
a theoretical sense, the question of apportionment is about nothing less than the
basic principle of “one person, one vote.” Put another way, malapportionment
could be viewed as the degree to which an electoral system deviates from the
“one-person, one-vote” principle: Even if everyone has the right to vote, not ev­
eryone’s vote “counts the same” if seats are malapportioned. It may have arisen for
historical reasons and may be necessary to ensure national unity, but in a very real
 Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 217

sense, one might say that the vote of a resident of a small state counts much more
than the vote of a resident of a large state.
People in Wyoming have more representatives per capita in the Senate than
Californians, and Vermonters more than Texans. Looked at through this lens,
the residents of America’s twenty-five lowest-population states comprise about
16 percent of the population and represent half of the Senate. In theory, these
fifty Senators voting as a bloc could (with a vice presidential tiebreak) stop a
policy favored in states representing 84 percent of the American population.
(This phenomenon is made more striking by the Senate rule known as the fili­
buster, which in theory allows a bloc of only forty-one out of one hundred sena­
tors to stop legislation; see “Case in Context: The United States Congress:
Dysfunctional or Functioning by Design?”)
The advantage of small states in representation may have consequences that
translate into political outcomes as well. The most obvious examples are those
policies that favor low-population regions that are “overrepresented” by malap­
portionment, especially rural regions. In many instances, malapportionment
may serve to prevent or impede implementation of a policy that will favor a ma­
jority of the population. In France, the Senate (Senat) has long been known as the
“agricultural chamber” because it provides an institutional bulwark to protect the
interests of French farmers. The same may be said of farm policy in the United
States. In Brazil, the military created additional new states at the end of authori­
tarian rule in the 1980s, and this was interpreted by some as a deliberate effort to
ensure a larger number of Senators from pro-military regions of the country.
By contrast with SMD, elections in PR systems are often party-centered,
rather than candidate-centered. For proponents of PR, one advantage of these
systems is precisely the emphasis on parties, their platforms, and their policy
proposals, rather than the particular ideas and charisma of individual candidates.
In candidate-based elections, charismatic and/or thoughtful individuals may

CASE IN CONTEXT

The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or Functioning

by Design? PAGE 564

The United States is one of the inspirations for democracies See the case study of the U.S. Congress in Part VI, pp. 564-
around the world, but there are certain aspects of its system that 565. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
stray from the "one-person, one-vote" ideal, at least in terms of 1. If virtually all adults are allowed to vote, then in what
how much representation each person gets per capita. Appor­ sense could one say the U.S. electoral system is less 'one-
tionment in the Senate and the pattern of districting in the person, one-vote" than other possible systems? Is this
House of Representatives are both areas that have been subject characterization fair, and why or why not?
to criticism. The apportionment in the Senate means that resi­ 2. What is it about the U.S. electoral system that favors the
dents of smaller states have more representatives per capita than status quo, whether in terms of policy or in terms of who
residents of larger states. In the House of Representatives, a big gets elected?
question is how decisions are made to shape districts, and how 3. What features of the U.S system, if any, would you alter?
this affects who is likely to be elected.
218 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

communicate well with voters, leading to successful election campaigns, yet

these skills may matter less in the job of legislating and making policy decisions.
Instead, what matters is which party has a majority, or which parties are in the
coalition that makes up the governing majority. By ensuring that the whole of the
legislature reflects the interests or preferences of the whole country, PR entrusts
government to the largest party or leading parties that can make up a governing
coalition. In theory, this can make government more capable of passing laws and
enacting policies that “the people as a whole” want.
PR also tends to support multiple smaller parties, as contrasted with SMD
systems, which favor large parties and accentuate the tendency toward two-party
systems instead of multiparty systems. We explore the impacts of these electoral
systems on party systems in chapter l l . 7
Under SMD, smaller parties may earn a healthy minority of the vote (say,
10-15 percent) in many districts across a country, yet still be largely shut out of
the political process. Let’s say the two largest parties—call them the Liberal and
the Conservative parties—get an average of 40 percent of the vote each, ranging
from about 30 percent to about 50 percent in each district, depending on the
district’s political leanings. Say also that two smaller parties (the Libertarians
and the Greens) get about 10 percent of the vote in every district. Even if the
country had five hundred districts (each with one seat in the legislature), it is very
possible that the Liberals and Conservatives would split all the seats between
themselves, while the Libertarians and Greens would have zero seats under the
district system, because the Liberals and Conservatives would outpoll them in
every single district. Under PR, the Libertarians and Greens would not be shut
out: In a five-hundred-seat legislature, they would each get about fifty seats, re­
flecting their support of 10 percent of the population each. PR would give these
smaller parties leverage in political debate, as they may be able to swing to and
from the larger parties, making the difference between the Liberals or Conserva­
tives having a majority or not.
On the other hand, PR does not provide voters with a single identifiable leg­
islator who “represents them.” This can be troubling for several reasons. First, it
can mean that voters do not know to whom they should direct their demands. It
may be more challenging to participate and feel represented when one must con­
tact an office of a political party, rather than the office of one’s district representa­
tive. This is especially true for voters who voted for a losing party and must go
through a period of government in which they feel it will be very difficult to have
someone who can speak on their behalf. Second, and related to this, PR can
break the geographic link between citizens and their legislators. While political
parties may have local offices and look to attend to local issues, they tend to re­
spond to the overall national constituency in PR systems. By contrast, in district
systems, the adage goes that “all politics is local,” and citizens may feel more
represented when it comes to getting political attention for local issues such as a
need for bridge repair, sanitation, or other local issues.

Legislative Decision Making and Representation

Another source of questions about the quality of representation comes from how
exactly decisions are made within the legislatures. For some time, a particular
 Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 219

Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House

INSIGHTS
by Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins

ox and McCubbins argue that the U.S. House of Representa­ In this model, there is little real debate on policy in the broader
C tives gets things done largely by the majority party operat­ legislature itself, and this is not a model of representation that
ing as a "legislative cartel.” As contrasted with other studies that follows the ideal of a deliberative body of equal representatives.
argue that much of the work of policymaking is determined by Instead, the system is reduced to an intra-party game in which
committees, Cox and McCubbins note that committees are im­ the party leaders are key actors attempting to manage their ma­
portant but not independent of partisan forces. Majority parties jority party vote. Leaders of the parties create the structures that
in the House of Representatives routinely shape rules in ways give rise to powerful committees and control the legislative
that allow them to dominate the legislative process. In addition, agenda.
because the majority party dominates decision making, much Gary Cox and Matthew McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in
of the truly important negotiation goes on within the "cartel." the House. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993.

emphasis was placed not on individual members but on committees and their committee In a legislature, a body
roles.8These organizations can take on the role of “legislatures within the legis­ composed of a group of legislators
latures,” as a select group of parliamentarians or congresspersons shapes a policy convened to perform a certain set
and then presents it to the larger body with the expectation that it will be passed of tasks.
in the larger house. As politics has grown more complex and technical over time,
legislators have tended to specialize in certain committees and defer to their
party colleagues on others. If committees are powerful, then representation is
less about each individual vote in the assembly and more about who is assigned
to what committee and how this sets or shapes the agenda.
Political parties are some of the key actors in legislatures and are often more
important than individuals. In terms of representation, parties are considered
“disciplined” if their members vote together, and less disciplined if their mem­
bers vote differently from the party line. This party line is usually determined by
the way the national party leadership would like the members to vote. Legisla­
tures vary dramatically in the extent to which their parties exhibit discipline.
One of the key factors in determining party discipline is the degree to which
party leaders control the electoral fates of their members.9 Dominance by party
leaders may seem to be “less representative” than systems in which legislators
vote more independently, but many systems—whether SMD, PR, or hybrid—
rely on party discipline to get legislation passed.
Assume for the moment that most politicians would like to get reelected or to
continue their political careers. (While not always true, this shouldn’t sound like
too far-fetched an assumption.) This implies that politicians will be attentive to
the people who nominate and select them. Now notice that who chooses the
nominees and the representatives will differ from one electoral system to the
next. In many party-centered systems, voters select parties and the party itself
chooses who will be the representatives to the parliament. In practice, this gives
a great deal of power to the leaders of the party, who can “set the lists” to deter­
mine who will become a member of the legislature. Where individual party
members depend on party leaders for their nomination, they will typically adhere
to the wishes of the leadership, currying favor with those who set the party list.
220 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

On the other hand, many candidate-centered systems allow voters to choose

party nominees, as is the case with party primary elections in the United States.
In these instances, party leaders’ leverage declines.
Differences in electoral rules should imply variations in the discipline of the
political parties. Electoral systems that give more power to party leaders should
lead to systems where parties vote in a disciplined fashion. Systems that encour­
age candidates to focus on district constituencies should lead to less-disciplined
parties, with more representatives who have an “independent” streak or vote like
“mavericks.” O f course, these representatives will often be bucking the trend of
their parties in order to conform to the preferences of the districts they represent.
Even in such cases, parties have tools that they can use in their efforts to keep
their representatives “in line.” We examine these issues further in chapter 11 on
political parties and party systems, but note its significance here for understand­
ing how legislatures operate.
Legislative decisions may be shaped by committees or by political parties (and
their leaders), but in either instance it is clear that decisions are not simply a func­
tion of adding up the preferences and the single vote cast by each representative.
Other institutions within the legislature shape what issues get on the agenda and
how they are presented to the legislature as a whole. These institutions ensure
that legislatures have “structure” in how decisions are made: This is a different
view of representation than is suggested by public and open debate on the floors
of the voting chamber.

Executive-Legislative Relations and Representation

In most countries today, the power of legislatures and the nature of representa­
executive-legislative relations tion depend heavily on executive-legislative relations. At times, legislatures
The set of relationships between will have considerable powers over executives—some of which are noted in the
the executive and the legislative next chapter, such as “votes of no confidence.” On other occasions, legislatures
branches of government. will be relatively less powerful than executives. The balance of power between
these two branches says a great deal about how politics plays out in any given
country.
Executive-legislative relations are shaped by a number of underlying powers
these institutions have vis-a-vis one another. A national constitution may be the
ultimate source offormalpower for legislatures and executives. Legislatures with
formal powers to recall or bring down the government may see their leverage
over the executive enhanced. This may be expected to make the executive more
accountable to the legislature, and to make it more attentive to the legislature’s
demands. As important as these formal powers arz partisan powers. Where party
leaders in the executive have considerable powers to control the political fates of
their fellow party members, they will be able to influence the so-called “rank-
and-file” members of the legislature. This refers to the party discipline criterion
mentioned previously. Where executives have control over party lists, executives
will have considerable control in executive-legislative relations.
Executive-legislative relations are more complex than simple rules on paper
of who has constitutional power. In many parliamentary democracies, legisla­
tures have the nominal authority to remove the executive at any time with a vote
of “no confidence” in the executive, but this does not necessarily mean that there
 Causes and Effects: What Explains Patterns of Representation? 221

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu applauds with members of his Likud Party. In 2015,
Netanyahu called a parliamentary election more than two years before it was required, in an
attempt to reestablish and manage his governing coalition.

will be constant turnover in the executive branch.10 Similarly, in presidential

systems, where executives are directly elected, there is most often a formally
established balance of powers between the branches, but this can vary from
time to time as the political fortunes of presidents fluctuates. Forms of execu­
tive-legislative relations shape the quality of representation as much as electoral
systems and the internal functioning of legislatures; the exact ways it does so
vary tremendously.

Divided Government
INSIGHTS
by Morris Fiorina

iorina examines the common phenomenon of divided gov­ government. Some are due to circumstances. For example, in
F ernment in the United States' two-party system, in which the United States the declining strength of political parties over
American voters frequently elect an executive of one party and time contributed, as voters became more attentive to individual
a legislature led by the other. For more than a century, Ameri­ candidates than to party labels. But other reasons may be more
cans have often voted against the president's party in midterm purposive or rational, as people may choose to divide govern­
elections— that is, in years when no presidential election is ment, whether consciously or unconsciously. For instance,
held— disrupting unified governments and “checking" presi­ ticket-splitting can make sense for moderate voters concerned
dential authority by supporting the opposing party. More re­ that unified government by either party could be too far left or
cently, years with presidential elections have also seen an right: given this concern, divided government provides for a
increase in ticket-splitting, where voters choose a president of style of "coalition” government that requires cooperation and
one party and a Congressperson of the opposing party at the moderation between the parties.
same time. Several conditions can contribute to divided Morris Fiorina, Divided Government. New York:Macmillan, 1992.
222 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

Comparative Legislatures
INSIGHTS
by Michael Mezey

T
his book offers a typology of legislatures according to two U.S. Congress. The British Parliament, by contrast, is much more
dimensions. The first is whether the legislature has strong or reactive, because the Cabinet and Prime Minister have the
modest policymaking powers, and the second is whether it re­ powerto set most policy in motion. Less-supported legislatures
ceives more or less support from elites and from the society at (as in some developing countries) are vulnerable to being domi­
large. The two dimensions, and the types of legislatures that nated by the executive or other actors, even if they have strong
emerge, can be seen in the following table. powers "on paper." The most precarious situation is for constitu­
tionally weak legislatures that are also ill supported: These are
Less Support More Support marginal. In addition, Mezey shows a fifth category of "minimal
legislatures," which have very limited powers but some support
Strong Powers Vulnerable Active
from elites; these are often found in authoritarian systems such
Modest Powers Marginal Reactive as the former Soviet Union. The key consequence of a given
type is whether the legislature itself is forceful or weak in shap­
Where legislatures are empowered and supported, they can ing policy.
be active in setting the policy agenda; such is the case with the Michael Mezey, Comparative Legislatures. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1979.

Altogether, many factors shape the nature and quality of representation. Elec­
toral systems can give rise to candidate-centered politics, party-centered politics, or
a mix of the two. How legislatures themselves operate then also shapes representa­
tion: Sometimes parties and their leaders wield considerable control, sometimes
certain committees wield power, and sometimes power is more open to all members
of the legislature. Finally, the relationship between the legislature and the executive
gives rise to different patterns of representation. All of these affect representation,
as do many other factors. Representation itself is a hard concept to measure, but it is
at the crux of most comparative questions about how legislatures matter.

THINKING
COM PARATIVELY Representation in New Zealand and Beyond
an any electoral system plausibly claim to have the “best of both worlds”
KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOLS
C when it comes to representing the electorate? The debate between PR and
district-based electoral systems often comes down to one common debate: Is
Hypotheticals and representation choosing a political party and its platform, or voting for a specific
Counterfactuals candidate closest to one’s views? It is likely that an observer will have a “gut
The approach to the question of
reaction” to the advantages of one or the other, while acknowledging that the
representation here is designed to opposing side “has a point.”
stimulate debate on the best model Party-based elections allow the electorate to focus on the issues and platforms
for an electoral system, and whether that most interest them, and then to hold the elected government accountable for
countries might change these. This
acting on such issues. They also give a sense, of course, that the overall represen­
question involves taking political
lessons from one country case, com­
tation in the legislature actually reflects the will of the overall population, rather
paring these with another case, and than the will of specific subsegments of the population. Candidate-centered
then making a proposal based upon elections, on the other hand, give voters the sense that they have one or more
 Representation in New Zealand and Beyond 223

people who represent their interests, and this allows the voters to hold their spec­ THINKING
ified representative accountable for providing services to their constituency. On
COM PARATIVELY
the downside, district-based elections may result in disproportionate influence
for certain parties—especially large parties at the expense of small parties—and
proportional representation elections may sacrifice the identifiability of a specific KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOLS
legislator for a specific constituency. It may seem ideal if a country could have a (continued)
political system that would have both of these characteristics: individual repre­ an expectation of what would
happen if an institution were
sentatives for different districts of the country, and also a legislature whose over­
changed. Of necessity, this means a
all composition reflects the partisan preferences of the country. degree of prediction and speculation,
So an ideal might be a system where each citizen would have a representative but based on inferences. Hypotheti-
for their district, and the overall composition of the legislature could be guaran­ cals are questions designed to get at
teed to be proportional. As noted before, countries such as Germany and New what likely might happen in a scenario
under certain circumstances; notice
Zealand have done this. In fact, New Zealand switched its electoral system by
that the root of the word is the same
national referendum in 1993, and the change brought about a German-style as "hypothesis." Counterfactuals are
model that explicitly intended to bring greater proportionality into what was ways of considering what would have
previously a first-past-the-post system. This makes the country an especially happened in a given case under
compelling case that illustrates how electoral systems change the proportionality different circumstances; an example
might be "what would history have
of seats. In both Germany and New Zealand today, each voter has two votes: a
been like if the American colonies
vote for a candidate to represent the district in the parliament, and then a vote for had lost the Revolutionary War?" Of
one’s preferred party. Voters may vote for their favorite party and the local candi­ course, it cannot be known with
date from the same party, but no one is required to do so: One can “split” the certainty what would have happened
ticket, picking one’s favored candidate and then voting for another party. In each in a certain situation under other
circumstances. In fact, this is why the
district, the candidate with the most votes is elected to the legislature, and there
comparative method— with its most-
are a fixed number of such seats. The electoral commission also tallies all the similar- and most-different-systems
votes for the parties, and figures out how to make the legislature accurately re­ designs— is so helpful. But these
flect the proportion each party received. thought experiments can help us
For example, say the parliament has two hundred seats, of which one hundred think through the implications of
changes in variables such as electoral
are elected from districts and one hundred are available for allocation to the par­
systems.
ties according to the party vote. If the Social Democratic Party won only twenty- Careful analysts will not be cava­
five out of one hundred seats in the districts, but their party vote was 30 percent lier about using hypotheticals and
of the total, the system ensures them about sixty of the total two hundred seats counterfactuals. Predictions and
(30 percent) in the parliament. Meanwhile, the parties that win more seats in the policy recommendations are only
valuable if based on considerable,
constituencies than their party vote are allowed to keep the extra seats they have
careful study and thoughtful consider­
won, and these are called overhang seats. So if the Freedom Party wins twenty- ation of possible consequences. In the
two seats in the districts, but only 10 percent of the overall vote, they are allowed case here, there could be unintended
to keep their twenty-two seats, and are not limited to the twenty that their party consequences of any country switch­
vote would imply. A consequence of this is that the exact number of seats in the ing its electoral system, and it is the
duty of the analyst to think these
legislature is not constant. For example, the lower house of the German legisla­
through. Good comparative analysis
ture (the Bundestag) does not have a fixed number of seats; while the parliament should be based on evidence of
elected in 2009 had 622 legislators, the parliament elected in 2013 has 631. things that have happened, not simply
The intended result is both identifiable representatives for each district and guesses about "what might happen if."
overall PR. A sample of a ballot from such a system can be seen in Figure 9.1, Nonetheless, hypotheticals, counter­
factuals, and thought experiments are
which is from New Zealand. Notice that the candidates in the right-hand column
used all the time by comparativists
represent some of the parties listed in the left-hand column. eager to play out of the logic of how
Why might some argue for countries like the United States to adopt this sort outcomes might be different in coun­
of approach? One major challenge is a willingness to accept a totally new view of tries with different institutions, social
representation as both district-based and proportional, which is not how the structures, and cultures.
224 Chapter 9: Legislatures and Legislative Elections

THINKING " country has operated historically. It would also require accepting that a computer
will make the necessary adjustments to make the legislature proportional. But
COM PARATIVELY
this process and its decision-making criteria would be quite transparent, being
j determined before the elections and visible to any and all observers. If you are
living in a country that does not use this model, how would you attempt to ex­
plain to a German why your country should not change to such a model?
The idea of representation varies from country to country, with different coun­
tries having different patterns of representation and different ways that represen­
tatives are chosen. Ask yourself how and why you might object to the hybrid
electoral system used in Germany and New Zealand (if in fact you do object).
Entertaining these sorts of questions will lead to a deeper understanding of how
legislative institutions work, as well as what is meant by the concept of represen­
tation that is so fundamental to politics.

30001

YOU HAVE 2 VO TES 30001

PA RTY VOTE ELECTO RA TE VO TE
E xp la n a tio n E xp la n a tio n
T h is v o te d e c id e s t h e s h a r e o f s e a t s w h ic h T h is v o te d e c id e s t h e c a n d id a t e w h o w ill b e
e a c h o f t h e p a r t ie s lis te d b e l o w w ill h a v e in e l e c t e d M e m b e r o f P a r lia m e n t f o r th e
P a rlia m e n t. V o te b y p u tt in g a tic k in t h e c irc le AORAKI ELECTORATE.
im m e d i a te ly a f t e r t h e p a r t y y o u c h o o s e . V o te b y p u t t i n g a tic k in t h e c irc le im m e d ia te ly
b e f o r e t h e c a n d id a t e y o u c h o o s e .

Vote for only one candidate

BUSINESS PARTY

UNION PARTY

SOCIAL DEMOCRAT PARTY

HERITAGE PARTY
4§
£/! WORKER'S LEAGUE

49 LIBERTY PARTY

FREE TRADE PARTY

FREEDOM PARTY
JL.
CHATHAM ISLANDS PARTY

Lib jst.-
KOTAHITANGA PARTY

NZ FABIEN PARTY

o NZ SOCIALIST PARTY

TRANSUBSTANTIATION PARTY

Final Directions
1. If y o u spoil th is b allo t paper, re tu rn it to th e officer w h o iilued it a n d a p p ly for a n ew b allo t paper.
2. A fter v o ting, fold th is b allo t p a p e r so th a t its c o n te n ts c a n n o t b e s e e n a n d p la ce it in th e b allo t box
3. You m u st n o t ta k e th is ballot p a p e r o u t o f th e polling place.

Figure 9.1 Sample Ballot from New Zealand.

(Source: New Zealand Electoral Commission)
 Chapter Review 225

C h ap te r Su m m ary
Concepts • There are several different patterns of interaction between
Legislatures are deliberative bodies that are the foundation legislatures and executives.
of modern governments.
Legislatures pass laws and make policy, but they also lead Causes and Effects
public debate and have responsibilities for overseeing the A function of legislatures is representation, which can be
executive, among other functions. conceptualized in different ways, and the nature and
quality of representation are affected by several factors.
Types Electoral systems can result in representation based on
• Legislatures can be bicameral (with two chambers) or uni­ individuals, parties, or some mix of the two.
cameral (one chamber). Legislatures vary in the ways they function internally, and
Legislatures are elected by many different methods, includ­ this too affects how they represent the populace.
ing single-member districts (SMD), proportional represen­ • Executive-legislative relations also affect patterns of
tation (PR), and mixed or hybrid systems. representation.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. Imagine you are the leader of the Monster Raving Loony Party, a broader range of people. Can you convince your interlocutor
small party in the United Kingdom whose manifesto is posted at that the American system is preferable to the European one?
the following link: http://www.loonyparty.com/about/policy- 3. What are the disadvantages, if any, of a system that requires
proposals/. You are a big believer in the cause and are eager to ranking candidates and then calculates winners on the basis of
win some seats in Parliament. Currently, you are at 6 percent in voters' second or third choices?
most opinion polls, but elections are not due for another couple 4. There are several types of legislatures, according to Mezey and
of years. However, the government has called for public com­ to Morgenstern and Nacif (see "Insights Boxes" in this chapter).
ment on a commission considering changing the electoral Can you see advantages in systems that feature "reactive” or
system in the United Kingdom. What would you propose the otherwise weaker legislatures? Could this be a useful pattern of
system should be for House of Commons elections? Consider­ executive-legislative relations? Or are these sorts of legislatures
ing political incentives, what do you expect would be the reac­ simply less desirable than their stronger and more active
tion of Members of Parliament from the three leading parties counterparts?
there: the Conservatives, the Liberal Democrats, and Labour? 5. Would you expect changes in institutional structures (such as a
2. Imagine you are an American, accustomed to (and approving legislature or legislative elections) in a given country to reshape
of) the SMD system for electing congresspersons, and you are the political outcomes and policy decisions, or would these fun­
debating with a European who lives in a system that has always damental outcomes likely be shaped by cultures and other
had PR. This European argues that the PR system offers chances structures and thus be mostly independent of the institutional
to more political actors, saying that this enlivens debate and design? How could you find evidence or arguments to support
forces the legislature to take into account the interests of a your claim?
 CHAPTER 10

Executives

• British Prime Minister David Cameron with Queen Elizabeth in 2015. According to convention, the Queen issues an invitation to him to form a
government, though this is essentially a symbolic gesture. Elections determine who w ill controlparliament.
I nDeclaration
1776, a group of leaders from the thirteen American colonies signed a
of Independence from Great Britain. M ost of the document
listed abuses perpetrated by King George III, Britain’s monarch and head
of state. Following the American Revolution, which ended with indepen­
dence in 1783, the former colonists established a system of government
strikingly different from that of Britain. Known as a republic, the United
States had a written constitution, no monarch, powerful state govern­
ments, and several branches of government that were inde­
pendent and designed to balance one another. The new
IN THIS CHAPTER
republic arranged for an elected president as head of state
Concepts 228
and head of government.
Types 229
Over the next two centuries, as both the United States
Executive Structures: Presidential and
and Great Britain became more mature democracies, the Parliamentary 230
American presidential system and the British parliamentary Formal Powers 232

system became two defining models for how governments Partisan Powers 235
Coalitions 235
could function. W ith its executive branch led by a prime
Informal Powers 240
minister, and a monarch who increasingly became a figure­
Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive
head in a ceremonial position, Britain became the “M other Stability? 240
of Parliaments” around the world. Meanwhile, many other Stable and Unstable Regimes:
countries came to emulate the American system of a presi­ Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and
Democracy 240
dency with checks and balances.
Stable and Unstable Executives: Styles of
In the United States and Great Britain, the executives have Presidential Rule 243
kept their same basic form over time, though their powers have Stable and Unstable Executives: Patterns of
Parliamentary Rule 246
shifted somewhat. Parliament formally retains political power
and sovereignty in Britain, and the prime minister depends on THINKING COM PARATIVELY
retaining the legislature’s confidence, yet the prime minister Beyond the American and British
has considerable political leverage. The American president has Models 247
become more influential over time as the United States has C A S E S IN C O N TEXT
grown, but still remains deeply entrenched in the same basic
France United States Russia
system of checks and balances that endures to this day. The two China Nigeria
countries have been models for other countries for centuries,
and they remain the points of departure today for understand­
ing how executives work.

227
228 Chapter 10: Executives

Concepts
executive The branch of govern­ Executives earn their name because they execute or administer policies and laws.
ment, or the individual(s) at the top In most countries, executives implement and administer the laws passed by leg­
of that branch, that executes or islatures, though in some authoritarian regimes the executive may act without a
administers policies and laws in a functioning legislature. Executives also contribute to the making of law. Legis­
country. latures (as examined in chapter 8) are usually authorized to initiate and pass laws
in representative democracies, but executives play a major role in the public
debate and decision making that leads to new laws. For example, executives may
send budget requests to the legislature, or they may work with legislators to for­
mulate a policy that the executive branch desires.
In most cases, executives have a substantial role in determining which laws
and policies pass. In the United States, for instance, the president usually signs
final bills as they become laws and has the power to veto (disapprove) bills,
though the legislature can override the veto with a strong enough majority. In
parliamentary systems, the executive shapes the agenda of the parliament to
decide which initiatives will come to the floor for debate and also pressures par­
liamentarians to pass its desired policies. The relative power of the executive and
legislative branches is one of the leading issues that determine how political deci­
bureaucracy The organization of
sions are made, and the relationship between the branches is a major theme run­
unelected officials, often conside­
ning through this chapter.
red part of the executive branch,
The executive is the branch of government that runs the government
that implements, executes, and
enforces laws and policies.
bureaucracy, such as the Department of Defense or Department of Education in
the United States, or the Ministry of Health or Ministry of Agriculture in a Eu­
head of state A person with exe­ ropean country. These departments or ministries include large numbers of offi­
cutive functions who is a country's cials and civil servants that work for the executive branch. For this reason, the
symbolic representative, including executive branch is often held to be responsible for the quality of government
elected presidents and unelected actions. When social services improve, executives may successfully claim credit,
monarchs. or when a war policy fails, the executive may take the blame. Legislatures have
their portion of responsibility, since they typically pass the laws authorizing ex­
head of government The top
ecutive action and also expenditures, but executives are responsible for executing
executive official responsible for
the laws on the books.
forming governments and formula­
The executive can also refer to specific individuals who lead this branch of gov­
ting and implementing policies.
ernment. These “chief executives” are heads of state or heads of government. The
prime minister A chief executive distinction between these two—head of state and head of government—is signifi­
in a parliamentary system of cant. In brief, the head of state is a country’s symbolic national representative, while
government. the head of government is responsible for forming governments and formulating
and implementing policies. Prime ministers are examples of heads of government.
president An executive leader
Presidents often combine the powers of head of state and head of government.
that typically combines the func­
tions of head of state and head of
Monarchs such as kings, queens, and emperors are classic examples of heads
of state. Traditional monarchs still wield political influence and power as heads
government, and is not directly
of state in some contemporary societies, such as the sultanates and emirates of
responsible to a legislature.
the Arab world and some small nations such as Swaziland. In Europe, tradi­
monarch A head of state in a tional monarchies persist but are essentially figureheads with only symbolic
monarchy, who usually inherits a power. In some other countries—usually where the nation-state is of more recent
position for life and may have origin, such as India and Israel—a ceremonial president may be the nominal
either substantial political powers head of state, with political power again reserved for the head of government in
or very limited ceremonial powers. the form of a prime minister.
 Types 229

The responsibilities and powers of the executive branch are extensive. By most
measures, the executive could be the most powerful and dominant branch of
government: It commands the bureaucracy and maintains nominal control over
the military, and it is responsible for spending the budget approved to it by the
legislature. In other words, the executive has powers of the pen and the pistol,
and some control over the purse. Indeed, when democracies break down into
authoritarian regimes, a typical result is the dissolution of the legislative branch
and the loss of independence for the judiciary; it is often the executive’s domina­
tion over other branches that distinguishes authoritarianism from the more bal­
anced institutional arrangements of a democracy.
Executive branches of government consist of both a set of elected politicians
and a more permanent bureaucracy or civil service. Elected officials will gener­
ally have discretion to make only a limited number of political appointments to
allies, supporters, and copartisans. Beyond these, most of the bureaucracy is ex­
pected to remain neutral, executing the law regardless of election results. This
ideal is not always upheld in practice, but bureaucrats are generally expected to
implement and administer policies, rather than to promote a political vision of
what government should do.1
As a point of clarification, in many countries the elected executive officials
and high-level political appointees are called the government. This is distinct government In the context of
from the entirety of public institutions in a country. For example, in parliamen­ executives, the set of top elected
tary systems, when a “new government” is formed, this does not mean that the executive officials and high-level
state bureaucracy changes, except perhaps at the highest level. Similarly, in the political appointees that shape and
United States, the word administration can be used to refer to the top elected orient policy; also refers to the
officials in the executive or to the broader bureaucracy that executes policy. broader administrative apparatus
Understanding politics requires understanding how executives are selected. In of the state.
turn, understanding executives depends on understanding legislatures, which we
administration The bureaucracy
discussed in the last chapter. Especially in representative democracies (but also even
of state officials, usually considered
in some authoritarian regimes), executives rely on legislatures or assemblies to pass
part of the executive branch, that
laws that the executive will then implement or “execute.” In this chapter, we begin by
executes policy.
identifying what executives are and what they do. We then discuss the consequences
of different patterns of executives. One of the main distinctions is between presiden­
tial and parliamentary forms of government. We use our cases to examine executives
comparatively and discuss which forms are most likely to support democracy.

Types
There are two basic ways to structure the executive branch of government: presi­
dential and parliamentary systems. The United States is an example of presiden-
tialism, while the United Kingdom an example of parliamentarism. Some
countries, such as France, have executive systems that combine features of presi-
dentialism and parliamentarism, as do some less democratic countries, such as executive-legislative relations
Iran. The relative power of the executive depends upon a range of formal and The set of political relationships
informal powers, including the ability of the chief executive to discipline and between the executive branch of
manage their party and any other parties needed to comprise a governing coali­ government, which executes laws/
tion. Presidential and parliamentary systems thus have different kinds of policies, and the legislative branch,
executive-legislative relations. We discuss these variations throughout this which often has the authority to
section (and a summary view of types can be found in Table 10.1). pass those laws/policies.
230 Chapter 10: Executives

table 10.1 Executive Structures

Form of Executive Features

Presidential President is directly elected by population at large.

President is ceremonial head of state and chief executive.
Legislature is elected independently of executive.

Parliamentary Prime minister is indirectly elected by parliament/legislature.

Prime minister is head of government.
Ceremonial monarch or president may be head of state.

Semi-presidential (hybrid) President is directly elected by population at large.

Prime minister or chief minister is responsible to parliament.
President may have power to appoint prime minister, dissolve
legislature, etc.

Executive Structures: Presidential and Parliamentary

presidentialism A system of Under the executive system known as presidentialism, the populace at large
government in which a president votes in elections for a chief executive, usually called a president, in a nationwide
serves as chief executive, being election.2 This president is usually elected for a fixed term of several years and
independent of the legislature and depends on the voting populace for their position, though the legislature or courts
often combining the functions of may have the power to remove the president in serious cases of criminal behavior,
head of state and head of unconstitutional action, or other impeachable offenses. Most presidential systems
government. in democracies feature direct elections in a nationwide popular vote, with par­
ticular electoral rules varying by country. In many countries (such as Mexico), the
direct election With regard to
top vote-getter among all candidates wins, with or without a majority; in others
executives, an electoral system in
(such as France, as seen in the “Case in Context” box), there is a first round be­
which voters cast a vote directly for
tween all candidates and then a runoff between the top two vote-getters, unless
the head of government or head
one candidate receives an outright majority in the first round. The United States
of state.
is actually an exception in its presidential electoral process, since election depends
on winning a majority of the electoral votes allotted to the various states.
Presidential systems also have legislatures as another “branch” of government,
and the issue of executive-legislative relations is important. In nearly all presidential
systems, both the executive and the legislature are expected to abide by the rules of
a written constitution, though these rules may be flouted by powerful presidents in
less-democratic countries. Each branch of government has certain powers, rights,
and responsibilities, with the legislature generally having the power to make most
law. Presidents have the power to execute these laws, but they cannot make most
laws themselves. They typically have the right to assent to a law proposed by the
legislature, or to veto it; specific rules for what happens in case of a veto vary by
country, but the legislature can often overturn the president’s veto with an ample
majority. The intricate dance that results between the executive and legislature in
trying to get laws passed and instituted is known in the American system as a set of
“checks and balances” between different political actors. Judiciaries also have a role
in this set of checks and balances, as they have some authority to interpret the law
and rule out provisions that conflict with the constitution or legal code. Checks and
balances between independent branches of government may seem the most intuitive
 Types 231

Electing the French President: What Do Runoffs Do? PAGE 436

The French presidential election contrasts with the American presi­ 1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the
dential election. In France, the election is based on the nationwide French runoff system?
vote and usually features two rounds. The first round is between a 2. Might any recent American elections have turned out dif­
large number of candidates, while the second round is a "runoff” be­ ferently if the electoral system were changed to follow
tween the top two candidates from the first round. These electoral the French model?
systems can produce different results because of the ways they en­ 3. Would a change to such a system have any implications
courage or discourage people to vote for compromise candidates. for smaller parties, or would the overall effect be not
See the case study on the French executive in Part VI, much change?
pp. 436-437. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:

way to set up a democracy—at least to many Americans—but it is not the only way,
as we see from parliamentary systems.
Parliamentarism works differently from presidentialism. The first step is an parliamentarism A system of
election of members of parliament (MPs), in which voters vote for a political government in which the head of
party and/or elect a specific representative of a political party from their district. government is elected by and
The second step is where these MPs select an individual as head of government accountable to a parliament or
and chief executive. This is an indirect election, in which most voters never vote legislature.
directly for the individual who becomes head of government. In most cases, each
indirect election With regard to
major party participating in the election has a prominent standard-bearer known
executives, an electoral system in
to the public, so while individuals may not get to vote for this individual, there is
which most voters never cast a
often a leading face associated with the party. The leader of the party that wins
ballot directly for the individual
the most votes is often selected by the parliament as the head of government,
who becomes head of
though not always. Since many parliamentary systems have a quite a few large
government.
parties with none that is large enough to claim a majority of seats, the selection

"The Most Powerful Person in the World"?

Checks on American Presidents PAGE 566

The President of the United States is both the ceremonial head 1. Why might the founders of the American constitution
of state and the titular head of government, as well as the Com- have insisted on checks and balances between the
mander-in-Chief of the nation's armed forces. Presidents are branches of government?
part of a system of checks and balances between executives 2. Are there negative consequences of checks and balances
and the other branches. The nature of these American-style for making laws and making governments work, and are
checks and balances is the subject of much of the study of there examples where these have played out?
executives. 3. Before reading on parliamentarism, can you conceive of
See the case study on the U.S. presidency in Part VI, p. 566. As other ways to protect democracy that would not involve
you read it, keep in mind the following questions: this style of checks and balances?
232 Chapter 10: Executives

of the head of government depends on negotiations between the parties to see

who can form a coalition big enough to govern; we discuss this later in the chap­
ter. W hat heads of government are called in parliamentary systems varies by
country and by language and include prime minister, premier, and chancellor.3
An indirectly elected head of government wields a form of executive power that
isfused with legislative power. The fact that the executive and legislature come out
of the same body gives rise to a different kind of executive-legislative relations
than in presidential systems. On one hand, parliamentary systems often feature a
high degree of party unity, with executives that can count on the “backbench”
legislators in their party to support executive proposals. This is in part because
legislators who do not vote along with the executive may create conditions for “no
confidence” in the government, which can put legislators’ seats at risk, as we dis­
cuss later. On the other hand, executives in parliamentary systems depend on the
continued “confidence” of the legislature, since the legislature selected them and
generally has the power to vote out the government. This is much easier to do in
most parliamentary systems than in presidential systems that require complicated
procedures to impeach presidents or force resignations. Parliamentary systems
thus have back-and-forth exchanges between executives and legislatures, but
“checks and balances” have different meanings than in presidential systems.
Other countries combine features of presidentialism and parliamentarism.
These systems typically feature both a directly elected president as the head of
state and a prime minister chosen separately as the head of government. In these
semi-presidential system A semi-presidential systems, the prime minister and other government ministers
mixed or hybrid system combining or cabinet officials may be appointed by the president, but they are responsible to
aspects of presidentialism and the legislature (or parliament) and can be dismissed by the legislature. France is
parliamentarism. a useful example of this system, as can be seen in the discussion of the political
regime in that country (see Part VI, p. 427).
Many other configurations of executive power are possible besides the preced­
ing three democratic examples. In Iran, for instance, the president may have
some power in executive-legislative relations but is relatively powerless compared
with the religious clerics. Whether the Supreme Leader in Iran is best seen as a
judicial or executive authority (or both) is open to debate, but it shows that many
executives often operate in an intricate web of institutions and cannot simply
formal powers The powers make decisions unilaterally.
possessed by a political actor, such
as a chief executive, as a function of Formal Powers
their constitutional or legal W hat executives can do depends on the formal powers they have, which are usu­
position. ally outlined in a country’s constitutional charter or basic laws. One important
formal power is the ability of some presidents to veto laws passed by the legisla­
veto Anactofexecutivepowerin
ture. Depending on the country, the legislature may be able to override the veto
which an executive rejects a law
with a majority or super-majority of greater than 50 percent. Veto power gives
passed by a legislature.
executives a chance to react to the legislature, but executives may also have more
dissolving the legislature The proactive formal powers.
practice of a chief executive dis­ An example of a proactive executive power is the ability in many countries
banding the legislature, often ac­ to dissolve the legislature. In some countries, this may be exercised only on
companied in a democratic regime rare occasions or perhaps a limited number of times per presidential adminis­
by the calling for new elections. tration, while in others it maybe exercised frequently when the executive deems
it will improve governance or perhaps give the government a larger majority. In
the United Kingdom, for instance, elections must be held at least every five
years, but a prime minister and the government are entitled to call an early
election—sometimes called a “snap election”—at a moment that may be most
advantageous for the governing party. In some countries, this can be a major
advantage to the incumbent, as governments can schedule elections at their
convenience after big boosts of government spending, a phenomenon known as
the political business cycle.4
Other formal powers in some countries include the power to pass certain laws
or orders without the intervention of the legislature. For example, presidents may
have the ability to issue decrees, which are orders that have the power of law de­ decree An executive-made order
spite not being passed through a legislature. These have been used extensively in that has the force of law, despite
more authoritarian regimes to limit political mobilization. Decrees have also been not being passed through a
used by assertive presidents in relatively democratic countries such as Brazil in the legislature.
1990s, when a president sought to halt an economic crisis. These may go into effect
immediately and, in some instances, may only be overturned by restrictive votes in
the legislature or by expiring after a certain period of time. Executives can also
issue executive orders to the bureaucracy that shape the way the bureaucracy executive order An order made
enacts and interprets the law. This can affect whether and how important regula­ by a chief executive or top official
tions are enforced. In some situations, presidents may be empowered to declare a to the bureaucracy that determines
nationwide state of emergency that confers extraordinary powers to the president how the bureaucracy should enact
(and often to the military) to govern with less input from the legislature. The case or interpret the law.
of Russia shows that it is possible to centralize a great deal of decision-making
state of emergency A condition
power in the executive branch, whether as president or as prime minister.
allowed by some constitutions in
It is also important to know what executives cannot do, because all democra­
which guarantees, rights, or
cies (by definition) have numerous checks on executive power. The first and most
provisions are temporarily limited,
obvious restraints on executives are periodic elections for new governments. These
to be justified by emergencies or
ensure that an executive cannot remain in power indefinitely without popular
exceptional circumstances.
support. Second are constitutional limitations on executive power, such as rights
guaranteed to all citizens that the executive may not infringe. Third are separa­
tions of powers. This may include separating powers between levels of govern­
ment, such as between central governments and state and local governments in a
federal system. It also includes the ways the judicial and legislative branches
check executive power and ensure oversight of the executive. Strict term limits term limit Restriction on the
on time in office may also be seen as a restriction on executive powers, as is the number of times or total amount of
case with the American president, who may now serve a maximum of two terms time a political official can serve in
and a total of eight years. a given position.
The other branches of government are responsible for ensuring that executives
do not overstep their limits. Constitutional courts may rule that an executive has
acted unconstitutionally or illegally. Legislatures may have even stronger mecha­
nisms. One is public rebuke, such as the ability to censure or reprimand the ex­
ecutive. Legislatures may also be able to prevent executive action by withholding impeachment A process by
funds from executive agencies. In many instances, the legislature can also remove which a legislature initiates procee­
executives from office. In presidential systems, for example, this can occur after dings to determine whether an
an impeachment process. official, often a top-ranking execu­
In parliamentary systems, the legislature chooses the executives, and the ex­ tive official, should be removed
ecutive formally depends on the support of the legislature to retain office. from office.
234 Chapter 10: Executives

Executives in Russia: Formal and Informal Powers PAGE 534

The dominance of the executive branch in Russia has become in­

creasingly clear in recent years. Centralization has been especially
accentuated under Vladimir Putin, who was president from 2000
to 2008, prime minister from 2008 to 2012, and became president
again in 2012. Putin's role as head of state and head of government
showed that some executives are capable of wielding authority
through formal means and informal means. The powers of the ex­
ecutives have implications for the fate of democracy in Russia.
See the case study on the Russian executive in Part VI,
pp. 534-535. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. What factors give rise to centralization by executives in
countries like Russia?
2. Does the Russian case suggest that semi-presidential sys­
Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev at Putin's inauguration
tems are likely to be unstable?
following the controversial elections of 2012. Even when
3. Does the power of Vladimir Putin say anything generaliz-
Putin was prime minister and Medvedev was president,
able about the relative importance of formal and informal
according to most observers Putin remained in charge.
powers?

The legislature has the power to dismiss the executive if it no longer deems the
vote of no confidence A vote government to be functioning adequately. This mechanism, the vote of no
taken by a legislature that expres­ confidence, makes removing an executive much easier than in a presidential
ses a lack of support for the gover­ system. The vote of no confidence comes in many forms. In its simplest form, a
nment or executive, which, if confidence vote is simply called by members of parliament, and the government
successful, often results in the is voted out if a majority votes no confidence. The head of state then calls new
dissolution of the government and elections for a new government. In Germany, on the other hand, there is a so-
the calling of new legislative called “constructive vote of no confidence,” which is designed to ensure that there
elections. will always be a government in place. There, the legislative majority voting no
confidence in a government simultaneously proposes a new government that will
take its place.
More formal powers for the executive leads to greater influence over legisla­
tures, while more checks on executive powers gives greater authority to legisla­
tures.3 Weaker formal powers may limit executives in their ability to promote
their initiatives or agendas. It is relatively obvious that the ability to veto legisla­
tion enhances a president’s power, for example, or that a legislature that can
easily override a veto weakens the executive’s power. However, as noted before,
formal rules do not fully determine an executive’s power, and it is not always clear
how formal rules themselves matter. For example, Brazil’s president used decrees
a great deal in the 1990s, but most legislation of any significance ultimately had
to be passed through the legislature.
In parliamentary systems, one of the main issues with regard to formal powers
is how confidence votes work. Where they are used, votes of no confidence are
 Types 235

examples of the legislature exerting its control over the executive, but the exis­
tence of votes of no confidence is not proof of legislative power. In fact, legisla­
tures can be powerful even without using confidence votes. Often, the mere
threat of a confidence vote will be enough to force the executive to do the legis­
lature’s bidding. Actual votes of no confidence may rarely come to the floor of the
parliament, and may succeed even more rarely, even where executives are weak.
Parliamentary countries are not all destined to have a merry-go-round of
failed governments that last only a brief time before being voted down in confi­
dence votes. Some countries have notoriously unstable systems while other coun­
tries rarely witness a confidence vote. Because prime ministers usually represent
one of the largest parties in parliament, the executive in a parliamentary system
will often have substantial support in the parliament. Parliamentarians who call
for a no confidence vote place their own careers on the line, since these votes usu­
ally trigger new elections or shake-ups within the party.

Partisan Powers
The formal powers of an executive are not the only factor that determines whether
an executive has leverage over legislation. Formal powers are often less important
than the partisan powers of the executive—that is, the president’s leverage over partisan powers The powers
same-party legislators and over parties in the governing coalition. Chief execu­ accruing to a government official,
tives who can exercise such authority and can thus control the careers of other such as a chief executive, by virtue
politicians will typically be able to pass a great deal of legislation. of the official's leverage or power
The balance of power between the executive and the legislature depends partly over members of a political party.
on whether executive leaders can control the electoral fortunes of legislators. One
of the most important forms of control is over the party’s list of candidates for
elections, as noted in the previous chapter. If the executive leaders can choose
who will be on party’s list of candidates, then those would-be candidates will be
responsive to the needs of the executive. On the other hand, the executive’s par­
tisan powers are lessened if party leaders do not control the electoral fortunes of
copartisans. Where party candidates are chosen by voters in primary elections,
for instance, they will tend to be more loyal to their constituents than to their
party leadership. This may result in legislators who vote against the wishes of
their party leaders in the executive. In some parliamentary systems, a critique is
that party leaders in the executive can “ram legislation through” and get it ap­
proved by a “rubber stamp” parliament. Where executive leaders control the elec­
toral fortunes of legislators and have a strong majority, the executive maybe able
to push its prerogatives through the parliament with ease, knowing that coparti­
sans will support it. By contrast, a critique of certain presidential systems is that
some executives may have too little partisan power and thus difficulty passing
laws, as the case of Brazil shows.

Coalitions
The power of executive leaders also depends on whether a party governs alone or
is part of a coalition of two or more parties. Governing coalitions form among coalition Agroupoftwoormore
parties in the legislature, but they determine the composition of the executive political parties that governs by
and the government, so we consider them in this chapter. Coalitions usually arise sharing executive power and
when there are several major parties in a country and the party that won the most responsibilities.
236 Chapter 10: Executives

China's current political system is authoritarian, with a complex

state administration interweaved with the single dominant
party, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). At present, Xi Jinping
has consolidated power over the party, the presidency, and the
military. How one becomes China's "paramount leader" is a
study in the politics of party and state in China's intricate
system.
See the case study on the Chinese executive in Part VI,
pp. 423-424. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
1. How does a paramount leader consolidate power and
emerge in China's system?
2. Why might an authoritarian regime such as China's re­
quire or desire to have any "checks and balances" be­
Chinese leaders at the opening session of the National
tween different actors?
People's Congress in Beijing in March 2015. In the second row
3. Can we tell if strong top-down authority of paramount
stand five prominent leaders, with President Xi Jinping and
leaders contributed to China’s economic growth, held
Premier Li Keqiang second and third from the left,
China back economically, or both?
respectively.

legislative seats in an election does not have the majority needed to pass legisla­
tion on its own. In parliamentary systems, where the executive depends on the
confidence of the legislature, heads of government frequently need to hold to­
gether a coalition in order not to be voted out of office. This is especially common
under systems of proportional representation (see chapter 9), where small parties
are likelier to emerge and remain in existence. On some occasions, a governing
party may have a majority but choose to form an alliance with another party for
other reasons.6 Coalitions are somewhat less common in presidential systems,
where an election is held for a single chief executive that represents a certain
party. In the United States, for instance, the party winning the presidency typi­
cally holds all the seats in the cabinet. Yet even in presidential countries like
Brazil, presidents sometimes need to form a cabinet that represents various par­
ties in order to have a coalition of parties that can get legislation passed.
In parliamentary systems, the largest party in the legislature has the advan­
cabinet The group of senior
tage in forming a government, and is usually the one from which the head of
officials in the executive branch,
government emerges.7 Parties with fewer seats are the “junior” members of the
including ministers, who advise
coalition but will demand some political reward for agreeing to participate in
government. This comes from cabinet appointments to control ministerial
the head of government or head
of state.
portfolios. By controlling certain ministries, coalition members can reward their
portfolio The set of duties and supporters with ability to shape policy in the area where they control the cabinet
tasks that correspond to a given position and can help some of their top partisans with high-ranking appoint­
ministerial office. ments in the bureaucracy.8
 Types 237

German chancellor Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union (center) talks with then-
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle of the Free Democratic Party (right) and others as they
negotiate to form a governing coalition.

Forming governing coalitions is a political art, especially in countries with

many parties in the legislature. Not all coalitions are based on the largest party
in parliament, for example. If a group of smaller parties gets together, they may
be able to exclude the largest party or parties from the government. This may
happen, for instance, if one extreme party (say, right-wing or left-wing radicals)
gains the largest number of seats, but all other parties combine to prevent them
from holding power. Substantial bargaining will take place over how cabinet
positions will be distributed among the parties. Generally, the more seats a party
wins, the more it can demand in ministerial portfolios and policy concessions.
There are several types of governing coalitions. Consider the following hypo­
thetical example of the country of Santa Gabriela (Table 10.2). There are one
hundred seats in the parliament, and the parties are arrayed along the political
spectrum from far left (XL) and left (L) through the center (C) to right (R) and
far right (XR). Imagine that each seat represents 1 percent of the vote, so that
party R got 27 percent of the vote and therefore twenty-seven seats.9 Many pos­
sible kinds of coalitions can be formed after this election. We give one example

table io.2 Hypothetical Distribution of Seats

in Parliament of Santa Gabriela
Party XL L C R XR

Seats 30 7 21 27 15
238 Chapter 10: Executives

for several types of coalitions, listing the largest party first in each case, and en­
courage you to figure out other possible examples that fit each type of coalition.
W hat different coalitions might form, and which parties might be represented in
the executive branch?
minimum winning coalition A minimum winning coalition has no “surplus” parties beyond those re­
A governing coalition that contains quired to form a government. So, for instance, a coalition of the four parties C,
no surplus parties beyond those R, L, and XR would not be “minimum winning” because parties C, R, and L
required to form a government. could still have more than 50 percent of the seats even without the seats of XR.
However, removing any one of the parties from the C-R-L coalition would give
the coalition less than the 50 percent of seats needed. C-R-L is thus an example
of a minimum winning coalition. There are several other possibilities in this elec­
tion, such as an XL-XR-L coalition. A more restrictive version of a minimum
minimum connected winning winning coalition is minimum connected winning; this arrangement occurs
coalition A minimum winning when all parties in the coalition are “connected” to one another on the political
coalition in which all parties in the spectrum. This prevents the example of the parties XL (far left) and L (left)
coalition are "connected" or adja­ forming a coalition with the party XR (far right), which would be improbable
cent to one another on the political because there is no realistic “connection” linking these parties. There are other
spectrum. parties in between, namely R and C. The logic is to include policy preferences as
a factor in coalition formation. This rules out several minimum winning coali­
tions, but C-R-L is an example of a minimum connected coalition.
minimum size coalition A gover­ The minimum size coalition goes a step further and says the coalition that
ning coalition that is closest to the governs will be that closest to the threshold needed, usually 50 percent plus one
threshold needed to govern, typi­ seat. A coalition that includes only 51 percent of the seats is preferred to a coali­
cally 50 percent of the legislative tion that includes a larger percentage of seats, because the participating parties
seats plus one seat. will maximize their relative power within the coalition by not dispersing power.
There will often be only one possible minimum size coalition, even when there
are many possible “minimum winning coalitions.” In Santa Gabriela, XL-C is
the minimum size coalition.
Other logics can also shape the types of coalition that emerge (Table 10.3).
One logic is to minimize the number of parties involved: two-party coalitions
will be preferred to three- or four-party coalitions, even if the two-party coali­
tion means more seats. Another option is that coalitions should contain the party

table 10 .3 Types of Coalition

Type of Coalition Definition of Coalition Example Seats (#)

Minimum Winning No extra or surplus parties that are not needed to govern XL-X R-L 52

Minimum Connected Winning Minimum winning and parties are connected on policy spectrum C-R-L 55

Minimum Size As close as possible to minimum number of seats needed (often X L-C 51
50 percent)

Minimum Number of Parties10 Fewest number of parties needed to form majority X L-R 57

Median Party" Includes the median party in the middle of the political spectrum XL-C 51

Minimum Range Minimum number of spaces between parties on policy spectrum R-C-XR 63
 Types 239

holding the median seat in parliament or the “middle” parliamentarian on the

political spectrum, because this echoes the will of the “median voter” or average
citizen. In this case, party C is the median party. The median party coalition may
or may not be “minimum winning.” A final type of majority coalition will mini­
mize the range or number of “spaces” on the political spectrum between parties.
Between C and XR, for instance, there are two “spaces” (C to R, and R to XR).
The same is true for L and R, while XL and R would have three spaces. Such
coalitions prefer parties that are not too far apart, but there is no requirement
that parties need to be “connected” or adjacent to one another. In Santa Gabriela,
two spaces is the minimum possible. Sometimes this includes three parties con­
nected to one another, and sometimes two parties with a space in between them.
These coalitions all have a governing majority and all share a logic in which
participating parties attempt to minimize the size or scope of the coalition.
However, there are also two other major possibilities in coalition formation.
A grand coalition may be made up of two or more parties that represent well grand coalition A governing
over half of the electorate, and hold well over half the seats. One motivation for coalition composed of two or more
a grand coalition is national unity among the largest parties in a time of crisis. major parties that hold a superma­
An example was the national unity government in Britain during World War II, jority of legislative seats and repre­
when Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour all joined to support the war effort. sent a supermajority of the
Less dramatically, the “Grand Coalition” from 2005 to 2009 in Germany electorate.
emerged after a closely contested election in which neither party came close to a
majority, but preferred a centrist coalition to another coalition that might have
included parties on the left wing of the political spectrum.
Finally, not all governments necessarily have a majority of the seats in the
legislature. In some parliamentary systems, the largest party (or a group of parties)
may be able to form a government even with less than 50 percent of the seats. This
happens where there are three or more major parties represented in parliament
and no party gains a majority of seats. The government’s ability to remain in
power is tenuous in these cases, lasting until a vote of no confidence occurs or the
next election is held. In Canada from 2008 to 2011, the Conservative government
of Stephen Harper governed with only 46 percent of the seats in Parliament, since
the next largest party was the Liberals (25 percent of seats), followed by two other
parties (the New Democratic Party and a regional Quebec-based party, the Bloc
Quebecois), with whom neither the Conservatives nor the Liberals could form a
majority coalition. The Conservatives formed a government, which fell in 2011
when the other three parties agreed to vote no confidence and call new elections;
the Conservatives then won an outright majority in the ensuing election.
In general, parties and their leaders decide to participate in a coalition because
they prefer to be in government where they can affect policy, rather than in op­
position. Parties often have to compromise in order to join a coalition, and will
prefer to form a government with those parties with which they agree on policy.
In general, parties may prefer not to have a coalition that is very large and has
well above 51 percent of the seats. The reason is relative power. A party that holds
33 percent of the seats (for instance) will have most of the say in a coalition com­
prised of parties representing 55 percent of the seats in parliament but would only
have a smaller fraction of the power in a coalition comprised of parties represent­
ing 70 percent of the seats. This is why we might expect coalitions to be relatively
240 Chapter 10: Executives

table 10 .4 Presidential Powers

Type of Power Definition Examples (Not in All Countries)

Formal Powers Powers assigned to the office of the Dissolve the legislature Issue decrees and executive orders
president by constitutional authority or Veto legislation
by law

Partisan Powers Powers to control decisions and votes of Control lists of candidates for office
legislators and other politicians through Appoint party members to executive office
control of political party Affect career paths of party members

Informal Powers Powers of the president that are not Influence public opinion and public debate
official, but come from informal ability to Campaign for individuals or causes
influence public policy Patronage and clientelism

close to 50 percent of the seats, though it must obviously be above 50 percent in

order to constitute a governing majority.

Informal Powers
Apart from formal and partisan powers, executives can have others that we
informal powers Those powers simply call “informal powers” (see Table 10.4). These include the ability to
possessed by an office holder that influence public debate and public opinion. For instance, if the president of
are not "official" but rather based France wishes to force a public debate on immigration, he may bring up the
on custom, convention, or other issue in speeches and talk about it in the media. In the United States, we know
sources of influence. this as the “bully pulpit of the presidency.” There is nothing in most democratic
constitutions giving the president legal authority to shape public opinion, but
he is clearly free to use the podium and public position to shape politics. Indeed,
one prominent scholar has referred to the most essential power of the American
president as the “power to persuade,” since formal authority alone will not work
to control the legislature or the bureaucracy.12 In many countries, presidents
patronage The use of can also use the government as a source of patronage or for the purposes of
government favors, typically in the clientelism. This means providing jobs or other benefits to supporters, with the
form of employment, to garner executive known as the patron and the recipients of this support known as the
political support. clients. Patron-client politics is generally seen as poor governance, but it is
clearly a power that some presidents have.
clientelism The practice of
exchanging political favors, often in

the form of government employ­ Causes and Effects: What Explains

ment or services, for political

support.
Executive Stability?
One big question in the study of executives has been whether parliamentary
forms of government are better for protecting democracy than presidential forms
of government. While it may come as a surprise to American students, the debate
has generally had presidentialism “on the defensive.” Advocates of parliamentary
forms of government have argued that parliamentarism better protects democ­
racy. They point to evidence from Europe and several former British colonies
around the world. These countries have a long history of parliamentarism and a
stronger record of democracy than many presidential systems.
 Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive Stability? 241

The Presidency in Nigeria: Powers and Limitations PAGE 521

With its tendency for patronage and the need to balance the pre­ 1. Would you consider the Nigerian presidency a strong or
carious relationship between North and South, Nigeria shows that weak institution? Why?
social context greatly affects the environment in which presidents 2. What accounts for the similarities in certain features of
operate, regardless of constitutional powers. Given longstanding the presidency across both military and civilian regimes?
conflicts and challenges to governance in the country, the elec­ 3. What are the intended effects of the new constitutional
tion of the executive in Nigeria takes into account the realities of rule shaping presidential election in a multi-ethnic coun­
ethnic divisions across the different regions of the country. try like Nigeria?
See the case study on the Nigerian executive in Part VI,
p. 521. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:

Stable and Unstable Regimes: Presidentialism,

Parliamentarism, and Democracy
The debate has been whether presidentialism or parliamentarism affects the sta­
bility of democracy, not about whether parliamentarism is preferable to presiden­
tialism in every respect. Presidential systems may have other advantages over
parliamentarism, such as allowing voters to identify clearly with an individual
candidate, giving voters a greater range of electoral choices, and providing the
opportunity to “split a ticket” and cast a vote for one party in legislative elections
and another party in the executive election.
Consider what is likely to happen in each type of system and how it will affect
democracy. According to the argument in favor of parliamentarism, a parliamen­
tary regime makes governments likelier to reach compromise and share power.
There are often multiple parties represented in a parliamentary cabinet. Presiden­
tial regimes, on the other hand, generally have only one party represented in the
cabinet and are less willing to compromise and share power. Moreover, if a par­
liamentary executive becomes unpopular, it can be easily removed by a no confi­
dence vote. This means that a crisis in a particular government does not become
a crisis of the whole political regime, whereas removing an unpopular elected
president from office creates more of a constitutional crisis. (See the “Insights”
box on the work of Juan Linz.)
Yet some scholars disagree that parliamentarism is better for democracy than
presidentialism.13 One critique introduces another factor into the equation: the
political party system. In this critique, the argument is that parliamentary sys­
tems are not necessarily more inclined to power sharing. It depends on how leg­
islators are elected and how many parties end up being represented in parliament.
If a parliamentary system has just a couple of major parties, there will be few
incentives for prime ministers to share power. (See the “Insights” box presenting
Mainwaring and Shugart’s critique.)
Another way to critique the argument in favor of parliamentarism is to exam­
ine specific empirical cases to see why democracy has succeeded in some places and
not others. Parliamentarism has been predominant in Europe and presidentialism
242 Chapter 10: Executives

The Perils of Presidentialism and The Virtues

INSIGHTS of Parliamentarism
by Juan Linz T' T :

J
uan Linz argues that parliamentary systems are better for de­ leads to more power sharing (via coalitions). This helps
mocracy than presidencies, for five reasons: democracy by including more participants in decision
1. Competing vs. Clear Legitimacy. Presidentialism divides making.
power between the legislature and executive, which 4. Presidential vs. Prime Ministerial "Style." Presidencies lead to
makes it unclear who is responsible for public action. Par­ more authoritarian, bombastic style than is found with
liamentarism makes clear that the executive heads the the negotiating tendencies of prime ministers.
government. 5. Outsider vs. Insider Executives. Presidents are likelier to be
2. Fixed vs. Flexible Terms. Presidential systems have rigid outsiders than prime ministers because parliamentary
terms for presidents (such as four years), which makes leaders have been in politics for decades.
changing an unpopular government difficult. Parliamen­ Linz argues that these factors in the long run increase the
tary governments may be replaced at any time upon likelihood that presidential systems will be taken over by
losing the confidence of parliament. authoritarians.
3. Winner-Take-All vs. Power Sharing. Presidentialism allows a
JuanLinz, "The Perils ofPresidentialism."Journal of Democracy 1,No. 109901:51-69;
single party to lead the executive branch. Parliamentarism and'The Virtues of Parliamentarism." Jourr-a of Democracy 1, No. 4 0990): 84-91.

in Latin America and Africa, for example. We can see this by contrasting the
stable democracy of the parliamentary system in the United Kingdom with the
presidential systems of Brazil and Nigeria that have had periods of military rule.
But Europe may have had successful democracies not because of parliamen­
tarism, but rather because it is rich. The less successful histories of democracy in
Brazil and Nigeria may not be because of presidentialism, but because those
countries and others in their regions are lower-income. Close attention to the
empirical cases chosen (the when and where of an argument) can affect our con­
clusions about how and why democracy persists.
To put it another way, remember that correlation is not causation (see
chapter 2): Just because parliamentary Germany is more democratic than Iran
and Iran has an elected president does not mean that parliamentarism causes
Germany’s democracy to succeed or that directly electing a president causes Iran’s
democracy to fail. The challenge is to document cause and effect rather than to
assume it. This means that we need to try to anticipate and control for other,
confounding variables—such as rich versus poor societies—when we look for
causal relationships between outcomes such as parliamentarism and successful
democracy.
The argument in favor of parliamentarism is a model for reasoning through
the consequences of institutional design. Similarly, the response by critics exem­
plifies how thoughtful critiques can use both empirical evidence and theoretical
argumentation to counter prominent theories. The argument that says party sys­
tems matter helps to specify further the conditions under which parliamentarism
and presidentialism work well to support democracy. Both the theory and the
 Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive Stability? 243

Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and Democracy: A

INSIGHTS A Critical Appraisal
by Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugqri

ainwaring and Shugart offer a two-part critique of Linz's and Africa), while parliamentarism prevails in wealthy countries
M argument. The main theoretical critique is that parlia­
mentarism can be just as "winner-take-all" as presidentialism.
in Europe. It may be that wealth is actually causing democracy
in Europe and poverty is causing authoritarianism in Latin
In Britain, for example, a parliamentary executive may in fact America, and presidential or parliamentary government has
have even more power than a presidential executive, if the little to do with these outcomes. Mainwaring and Shugart also
prime minister tightly holds the reins of his/her own party. note that parliamentary systems are more common in small
Where one party governs in a parliamentary system and the countries (and islands) and in countries with a British colonial
executive can dominate the legislature, parliamentary majori­ heritage, and that each of these factors may also increase the
ties are truly "winner-take-all." This article also offers an empiri­ likelihood of democracy.
cal critique that considers other factors. Presidential systems Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Juan Linz, Presidentialism, and
are most common in poorer countries (such as Latin America Democracy: A Critical Appraisal."Comparative Politics 29, No. 4 (1997): 449-471

critique are part of the constructive process of building scientific knowledge

about the world.
In the debate over presidentialism and parliamentarism, it may be useful to
consider examples such as India, which has long been one of the world’s most
surprising democracies: It is a relatively poor country (though growing rapidly),
highly unequal, with more than a billion people from many different religious
and ethnic backgrounds. Its parliamentary system is based on the British model.
Parliamentarism may or may not have contributed to India’s rather successful
democracy, and you can consider the Indian case to test this hypothesis. Has the
parliamentary system resulted in power-sharing rather than “winner-take-all”
politics, for example? Has it resulted in a prime ministerial “style” that is less
centralized than in presidential systems? There is evidence both for and against
the argument that parliamentarism has been a cause of India’s democracy, as you
will begin to see in the following box. Investigating further can allow a full hy­
pothesis test of whether India follows the logic outlined by Juan Linz in the
“Insights” box.

Stable and Unstable Executives:

Styles of Presidential Rule
Looking beyond whether a democratic regime persists, there is also the question
of how executives govern. Popularly elected leaders in a democracy are expected
to work within a society that has rules and other institutions. For example, the
legislature is expected to have some say as well as the president, and the president
is not expected to be above the law. However, chief executives govern in very dif­
ferent ways, and there are some circumstances where elected executives wield
considerable power. In many cases, even if a regime is formally a democracy, the
president may assert more authority and centralize power considerably. One such
244 Chapter 10: Executives

Delegative Democracy
INSIGHTS
by Ci iillermo O'Donnell

'Donnell argues that there is a kind of democracy called del­

O
there are few checks on presidential power and little account­
egative democracy that differs from the normal representa­ ability of the president to other institutions. Courts and legisla­
tive democracy. In delegative democracies, a president is elected tures in particular have relatively little influence. O'Donnell finds
and then proceeds to govern however he or she sees fit. Power is this type of system to have existed in many parts of the develop­
concentrated in the single individual that runs the executive, and ing world, from Latin America to parts of Asia and Africa. The ex­
this executive sees himself/herself as having been delegated istence of delegative democracy highlights the importance of
power fora period of time, rather than seeing himself/herself as executive power in determining the extent and nature of de­
a representative of the people's interests. O'Donnell considers mocracy in a country.
this a kind of democracy, because the president will respect cer­ Guillermo O'Donnell,"Delegative Democracy." Journal of Democracy 5, No. I
tain limits, such as elections and limits on the term of office, but (1994): 55-69.

type of regime is “delegative democracy,” which confers substantial power to

presidents. While the concept of delegative democracy was originally conceived
for Latin American countries, you may consider whether the case of Russia under
Vladimir Putin fits with the model.
Executives influence the economy as well as politics, and they may contribute
either to good or to poor economic performance. Executive powers in the econ­
omy include proposing budgets for the legislature to approve, collecting taxes,
and regulating the economy. Executives also make decisions about staffing key
economic institutions, such as the central bank that controls the money supply.
Finally, the executive in some cases will make major interventions in the econ­
omy. Examples include nationalizing companies or privatizing them, and per­
haps bailing out important industries such as banks in a financial crisis. All
together, these economic responsibilities mean that the executive branch has a
great deal of leverage over the economy.
So how does a strong executive benefit or hurt the economy? One argument is
populism A political approach in that powerful executives can damage the economy through populism, a political
which leaders, often heads of approach in which leaders make appeals to “the people” and seek to develop
government and top executive direct political ties with the masses. With populist approaches, presidents often
branch officials, make direct use the resources of the government to reinforce their personal power, making
appeals to "the people" and seek themselves into the symbolic embodiment of the nation and working to under­
to develop direct political ties mine other institutions. In many cases, such leaders literally hand out money as
with the masses. they go spending large sums of government revenue to help their supporters and
increase their own popularity. This propensity for populism will likely hurt the
economy over the long run, if it results in excessive government spending. In a
similar vein, executives can control patronage, as noted previously (under “Infor­
mal Powers”), and they may use control over government as a way to distribute
favors to certain groups; this too can prove detrimental to the economy in the
long run.14
On the other hand, strong executives may also make for a strong state, which
is often associated with good economic performance, as seen in chapters 3 and 4.
 Causes and Effects: What Explains Executive Stability? 245

Juan and Eva Peron of Argentina in 1951. They are among the most important populist figures in
the history of Latin America.

This may include decisive national leaders such as strong presidents, or strong
bureaucracies in the executive branch. Examples would include ministries and
government economic councils in East Asia that were responsible for major deci­
sions that promoted economic development. To use a contemporary example, it
is difficult to understand China’s recent development without talking about the
importance of decisions made by executive officials and leaders, from the presi­
dent and premier to top officials at the central bank.

Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism

INSIGHTS in Latin America: The Peruvian Case
by Kenneth Roberts

oberts examines the concept of populism, which is often presidents are inclined to hurt the economy in the long run,

R associated with powerful and charismatic presidents, and

argues that its most important characteristic is a leader who
but Roberts notes that populism can be consistent with more
limited spending. In fact, some populist presidents in the
establishes personalistic links with the people. This happens 1990s, including Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Carlos Menem in
when other institutions are weak, and the tendency of popu­ Argentina, and Carlos Andres Perez in Venezuela, imple­
list presidents to individualize power relates to the "delegative mented free market neoliberal reforms (see chapter 4). This
democracy" of O'Donnell noted in a previous box. Historically, suggests to Roberts that populism is less about excessive eco­
populism was most significant in the 1930s and 1940s in Latin nomic spending and more about the chronic weakness of
America, when several charismatic presidents asserted per­ other institutions outside the executive.
sonal power and spent large sums of government money in Kenneth Roberts, "Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin
support for the working classes. This would suggest populist America: The Peruvian Case."Worid Politics 48, No. I (I995):82-II6.
246 Chapter 10: Executives

Stable and Unstable Executives: Patterns

of Parliamentary Rule
A final set of causal questions about executives is what makes their governments
endure or collapse. Most of the preceding “Case in Context” boxes point to rela­
tively stable governments that last from one election to the end of a term of office,
at least in the years from the 1990s to the present. Other countries, however, are
more notorious for executive instability due to coalitions that break down fre­
quently. The case of Italy shows that governments in some countries are unstable
while others endure. Italy has changed prime ministers nearly forty times since
the end of World War II; during that time, the United States has had twelve
presidents, only one of which resigned from office. This means a change of gov­
ernment has happened in Italy more than once every two years, though elections
are only required to be held every five years. The turnover in the executive is even
more dramatic if one counts a government as new every time a cabinet is re­
shuffled to accommodate various parties. By this criterion, Italy has had over
sixty governments since World War II, leaving the average duration of a govern­
ment at just about one year. This gives Italy perhaps the most unstable govern­
ment among advanced democracies, though the constitution and the basic
structure of government have persisted for some time. That is, Italy has seen
unstable governing coalitions in a stable regime.
Despite the frequent turnover of governments, there are some ways in which
Italian politics exhibits continuity. There are not necessarily new faces leading
Italian politics every year or so. In fact, the very first post-war prime minister,
Alcide de Gasperi of the Christian Democrats, led eight different cabinets in his
eight years in office before finally losing the prime minister’s chair. Several prime
ministers, including recent Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, have been in the
post three or more times. Moreover, there have been some time periods when
prime ministers have been relatively secure, including Berlusconi from 2001 to
2006. Nonetheless, many governments have lasted less than a year, and very few
last more than three.
A flip side of instability is the fact that many parliamentary systems are rela­
tively inclusive of different parties and interests. This can be as a result of the
electoral rules that favor multi-party systems (as discussed in chapters 7 and 9),
or because cooperation happens where different groups in society have reasons to
share power and build trust. For example, where countries are divided into dif­
ferent ethnic groups, elites and leaders may attempt to find mechanisms that will
help govern without worsening conflict. However, these incentives are not lim­
ited to divided societies. In many European countries, political parties and inter­
est groups have developed political systems that strive for consensus and inclusion
of major actors in all big government decisions. These mechanisms are sometimes
consociationai Systems that use known as consociationai arrangements, as discussed in the next “Insights” box.
formal mechanisms to coordinate The debate about whether presidentialism or parliamentarism is “better” enters
different groups sharing access to into this discussion of unstable coalitions and consociationai arrangements. Note
power. that in the preceding “Insights” box, the parliamentary systems are quite stable,
while the presidential systems in Colombia and Lebanon have struggled more to
prevent conflict. An argument in favor of parliamentarism holds that the flexible
terms of office mean that a “crisis of government” does not become a “crisis of
 Beyond the American and British Models 247

Consociational Democracy
INSIGHTS
by Arend Lijphart

T
his article shows that there are many ways for different Denmark. Presidential systems can find mechanisms for sharing
groups and parties to share power in the executive branch, power as well as parliamentary systems. At the time of Lijphart's
whether the system is parliamentary or presidential. In societies writing, examples included agreements by the two leading par­
where reaching consensus is a priority and there are many politi­ ties to alternate the presidency in Colombia and between differ­
cal parties, one leading form of power sharing is the grand coali­ ent religious groups to divide executive posts in Lebanon. This
tion cabinet that includes multiple parties. Another way to share idea of consociational democracy suggests that executives
power is for leading political elites to appoint powerful advisory need not be "winner-take-all" if there are other factors that push
councils and committees that reflect the interests of many toward social consensus.
major actors. Efforts such as these have featured in countries in Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy."Wor\d Politics 21, No. 2 (1969):
central and northern Europe, such as Netherlands, Austria, and 207-225.

regime.” That is, a government that fails and falls does not imperil the whole
constitutional system. In a sense, Italy shows that. On the other hand, it is not
clear that such instability in governments is desirable either. Certainly, the fixed
terms of presidential systems at least theoretically provide the possibility that a
government will adapt and respond to unpopular moves in time. Moreover, ex­
treme instability in governments is likely to place many politicians in “permanent
campaign” mode, which may compromise their focus on governing.
O f course, whether a country has stability or instability in its governments
depends on several features of political institutions: political parties and how
they operate; electoral rules; rules about votes of no confidence; and whether
party leaders can “discipline” the members of a party’s rank and file. In addition,
history and social realities contribute to these outcomes, and only further com­
parative research can point to the factors that cause these different outcomes.

THINKING
Beyond the American and British Models COM PARATIVELY
he United Kingdom and the United States are emblematic examples of the
T two basic ways of structuring the executive in a democracy, and the com­
parison of the parliamentary and presidential systems has become a central K E Y M E T H O D O LO G IC A L T O O L

debate in the comparative study of executives. In both of these countries, democ­ Case Selection
racy has persisted for a long time, and indeed both countries have increasingly O n e m ain lesson from the debate
extended the franchise and other democratic rights to more people over time. over presidentialism versus parlia­

These two emblematic cases serve to show that both presidential and parliamen­ m entarism is the im portance o f case
selectio n for com parisons. C ases are
tary systems are compatible with democracy, if social conditions are conducive.
often (but not necessarily) countries
As the chapter suggests, however, looking only at these two cases will tell us that w e select to study, and selecting
little about the variety of types of executives, much less give us a full understand­ the right o nes is key. Th e d isadvan­
ing of the merits of different systems. Apart from executives that follow the two tage s o f presidentialism for d em oc­

basic forms—presidential and parliamentary—there are hybrids and other racy certainly a p pear to be greater in
248 Chapter 10: Executives

THINKING models that combine features of both. From France to India to Switzerland to
Uruguay, countries around the world have a huge variety of executive structures
COM PARATIVELY
beyond the American and British archetypes.
In fact, the United Kingdom and the United States themselves are not static
KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL in how executive power works. The United Kingdom’s form of parliamentarism
(continued) has usually been winner-take-all for the winning party, but a coalition between
countries that are lower-income and two parties governed from 2010 to 2015. Comparative research can help us to
have been democracies for only a
explain how executive power can change over time within a country, and not just
short time, as noted by Mainwaring
in the United Kingdom. Why do some Italian coalition governments last longer
and Shugart in the "Insights" box
earlier in the chapter. To make a than others, if the rules that shape elections of the legislature and the executive
causal argument, it is important to remain the same? Similarly, presidentialism is expected by some to lead to more
understand the background condi­ “winner-takes-all” politics, but these systems also divide and share power in dif­
tions that shape the likelihood of
ferent ways over time. Some American presidents have asserted greater executive
democracy.
control over other branches. Prominent examples include Abraham Lincoln in
Would it be reasonable to com­
pare a low-income presidential coun­ the Civil War and Franklin Delano Roosevelt in World War II. Other presidents
try in Africa with a long-established have followed Congress more. The extent of executive power—and why it varies
parliamentary regime in northern from time to time—is thus an open question even after 230 years in a country
Europe and make inferences about
like the United States. As with parliamentarism, this question is not only for the
how presidentialism affects democ­
American case but also applies in countries such as Nigeria.
racy? Or would a comparison of the
United States and a European coun­ Consider Table 10.5, which includes a basic summary of the executive struc­
try be more appropriate? Conversely, ture for the twelve countries profiled in this book. You will note a diverse array
is the United States a representative of executive structures, with some countries sharing certain features in common.
example of all presidentialist coun­
You may detect patterns in the presidential and parliamentary experiences of the
tries around the world, or is it a
special case? The right selection
countries, and you can select cases for further comparison. The comparative
depends on the specific question method allows researchers to analyze why countries developed the executive
the researcher is asking and the structures they did, or what the consequences of these structures have been. It is
argument one hopes to make. also possible to do a comparison over time within one country, along the lines
Several rules of thumb are useful
suggested previously for the United Kingdom or the United States. Why have
for beginning comparativists in select­
ing cases. The first is to select cases
executive structures changed or remained static over time? This question could
that make possible a comparison on be asked for any number of countries, including France, Iran, Nigeria, or Russia.
the basis of most-similar-systems Considering what you may know about these countries from this table and from
(MSS) or most-different-systems (MDS) other chapters, can you suggest what might be good test cases for studying the
analysis. This choice will help prevent
causes and effects of executive structures?
"selection on the dependent variable,"
in which a researcher looks only at
Selecting the right cases for comparative study can make the difference be­
countries with similar outcomes and tween an effective analysis and a weaker one. While we have referred to the
makes faulty inferences based on United Kingdom and the United States as emblematic examples of parliamentary
limited information.15A second gen­ and presidential systems, the selection of cases for further study only begins with
eral rule is to select cases where the
acknowledging these two models. The best cases to select will depend on the
researcher does not have a precon­
ception or bias that will complicate
question being asked. Considering Table 10.5, a question about why ceremonial
the honest assessment of the presidents have lost some of their powers over time might best be addressed by
evidence. looking at countries such as Germany, India, Japan, or the United Kingdom. On
the other hand, a question about the partisan powers of directly elected presi­
dents might be well suited to a comparison of countries in the Americas, such as
Brazil, Mexico, and/or the United States. A question about the informal powers
of heads of state or chief executives might be able to draw on any number of the
countries in the table. Russia and France might make for a useful analysis of the
causes or consequences of semi-presidential systems.
 Beyond the American and British Models 249

table 10 .5 Com paring Cases r THINKING

.COM PARATIVELY
Case Executive Structure

Brazil Directly elected president chosen by national popular vote. Runoff election
held between top two vote getters if none receives a majority in first round.
President has weak partisan powers, but can issue decrees.

China Executive structure includes president as head of state and chief executive.
Two other top positions— often held by president— are head of the single
(Communist) party and head of military. Premier is head of government in
legislature.

France Semi-presidential system combines presidentialism and parliamentarism.

President is directly elected and appoints prime minister, but this appointment
must be approved by legislature and government depends on confidence of
National Assembly. President has power to dissolve legislature.

Germany Parliamentary system with chancellor as the chief minister chosen by lower
house of parliament (Bundestag), often at the head of a governing coalition of
multiple parties. Ceremonial president has relatively limited powers.

India Parliamentary system in which prime minister is head of government chosen

by lower house of parliament (Lok Sabha) and depends on confidence of this
body. President is also chosen by legislature, but has relatively minor powers.

Iran President is elected and has authority vis-a-vis legislature, but real power lies
with Guardian Council of top clerics and Supreme Leader, also a cleric (ayatollah).
Other councils (Expediency Council, Assembly of Experts) also wield power.

Japan Parliamentary system in which prime minister is head of government chosen

by parliament (Diet), and depends on confidence of lower chamber (House of
Representatives). Emperor is ceremonial head of state.

Mexico President is directly elected by popular vote; top vote-getter wins even if no
majority is attained. No re-election is allowed. For decades up to 2000, presidents
in the dominant PRI party picked successors by "pointing the finger" (dedazo).

Nigeria President is directly elected in national popular vote, separate from legislature.
Prior to 1999, military leaders often led executive after coups. Largest party
prior to 2015 elections (POP) attempted to alternate northern Muslims and
southern Christians in executive posts.

Russia President is directly elected head of state. President appoints prime minister
(chairman) as head of government, subject to approval of the legislature (State
Duma). Vladimir Putin has exerted considerable authority both as president
and as prime minister.

United Prime minister is elected by House of Commons, the lower chamber of

Kingdom Parliament. Executive has strong powers to set agenda and pass legislation,
largely due to partisan powers. Monarch is ceremonial head of state, with no
real political power.

United States Directly elected president chosen by electoral college. Executive powers are
separate from and checked by legislature. President has veto power, but
cannot dissolve legislature. President has relatively weak partisan powers over
legislature.
250 Chapter 10: Executives

THINKING ' Executives do not operate in a vacuum. They are affected by other structures
CO M PARATIVELY, ^ and institutions. The legislative branch of government is a most important ex­
ample, but the institutions of federalism and constitutional authority discussed
in the previous chapters matter as well. Political parties (discussed in the next
chapter) are equally important. Moreover, features of certain executives, such as
populism, are partially shaped by factors that lie beyond political institutions,
such as high income inequality, low levels of public trust, and perhaps even cul­
turally rooted styles of leadership. Much of the discussion in this chapter cannot
be isolated from how legislatures, political parties, and other institutions operate,
and, ultimately, from political society more broadly. The ways all of these features
interact will shape how executives perform.
With the concepts and arguments developed here, you should be able to inves­
tigate other executive structures around the world and form your own hypotheses
and comparative arguments about them. There is much research to be done about
the relative powers of executives in political systems and the consequences of
these. This suggests that executive power will for a long time demand further
study in countries around the world.

Ch ap ter Su m m ary
Concepts • Like many other countries, France, Russia, and China
• Executive branches execute and administer the laws combine some aspects of parliamentarism and some
proposed by legislatures in representative democracies. aspects of presidentialism.
In non-democratic or authoritarian regimes, executives will • Executives have formal powers outlined in the law,
often have a great deal of power. partisan powers that come from influence over a
political party, and other informal powers
Types associated with the prominence and position of the
• Executives can be structured in two main ways— executive.
parliamentary and presidential— though there are also
executives that combine features of both. Causes and Effects
• The United Kingdom is the original and most famous • There is a debate about whether parliamentarism is better
example of a parliamentary system, and the British model for democracy than presidentialism, because
is known as the Westminster model. parliamentarism should lead to fewer outsiders and less
• Presidential regimes predominate in the Americas and in radicalism, and it allows legislatures to remove unpopular
Africa, including in the United States. executives.
 Chapter Review 251

Presidential systems are most prevalent in lower-income Powerful executives have been associated with both
regions and parliamentarism in Europe, so the advantage of centralization and populism, but also with promoting
parliamentarism may be due to other factors. economic development.
Parliamentary systems can operate in many ways and may
have relatively stable or unstable governments.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. Consider the "Insights" boxes on Linz and on Mainwaring and 5. Consider Table 10.2 again. Identify the possible coalitions fol­
Shugart. Note that Mainwaring and Shugart disagree with only lowing the various criteria for coalition formation:
one of Linz's five theoretical arguments against presidentialism. a. Minimum winning
What theoretical arguments can you offer defending presiden­ b. Minimum connected winning
tialism on the other criteria? c. Minimum size
2. Considering the experiences of other countries described in this d. Minimum number of parties
chapter and in Part VI, are there any institutional features you e. Median party
would advocate the United States should adopt? Why? f. Minimum range
3. Do you think populism is possible under parliamentary rule?
Why or why not?
table io.2 Hypothetical Distribution of
4. We reproduce Table 10.2 here. Imagine yourself as the leader of Seats in Parliament of Santa Gabriela
each of the different parties and that you are interested in
having an influence on government policy. What other parties Party XL L C R XR
would you approach in an attempt to form a coalition, and what
Seats 30 7 21 27 15
would be your ideal coalition in each case? Why?
• Communist demonstrators in Russia in 1999. They are carrying a picture of former Communist dictator Joseph Stalin, who led the Soviet
Union from the mid-1920s to 1953. Even years after the fall of the Soviet Union, some hoped for the Communist Party's return to power.
T
hroughout the Cold W ar (1945 to 1991), the United States and the Soviet
Union (or U.S.S.R.) were seen as political opposites in many ways. One
of the key differences was between capitalist and communist economic
systems, of course, but some of the other major differences were in how poli­
tics operated. The United States was a liberal democracy in which different
political parties—mainly the Democrats and Republicans— competed for
votes and in which citizens were free to join different interest groups to
express their beliefs and opinions. The U.S.S.R. was a country
dominated by a single party and state that claimed to be the
IN THIS CHAPTER
sole legitimate representative of all the country’s people.
Concepts 255
In political terms, the United States was a multiparty pluralist
Political Parties 255
democracy, while the U.S.S.R. was a single-party totalitarian Party Systems 255
regime. This was a fundamental difference in the two coun­ interest Groups 256
tries. W hile most Americans believed that the right to free­ Types 257
dom of association and to vote for multiple parties was based Political Parties: Elite, Mass, and Catch-All
Parties 258
on individual rights, the leaders of the Soviet Union argued
Party Systems: Dominant-Party, Two-Party,
that the Communist Party alone—in collaboration with the and Multiparty Systems 259
state— could speak for the rights of workers. Interest Groups: Pluralism and
The U.S.S.R. and its eventual collapse seemed to show Corporatism 264

that single-party rule was illegitimate, as were systems where Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems
Emerge, and What Effects Do They
the state plays a major role in deciding which organizations Have? 267
have a voice in politics. Yet many countries today remain Party Systems and Representation 267
dominated by a single party. As Map 11.1 shows, for example, Interest Groups and Representation 272

the African continent has a large number of countries where

THINKING COM PARATIVELY
a single party has been dominant since the 1990s— and many
Party Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa 275
of these are even full-fledged democracies. The United States
has only two major parties, far fewer than some other democ­ C A S E S IN C O N TEXT
racies in Europe and elsewhere that may have five or six major China Japan • Germany
Russia Mexico
parties represented in the legislature. The number of major
parties in a country thus continues to vary in the post-Cold
W ar world.
Countries today also vary in how the state interacts with interest groups.
Again, the U.S. model—in which different groups compete openly for influ­
ence in a “marketplace of ideas”—is not the only way a democracy can work.
W hile few people openly advocate for Soviet-style authoritarian rule, many
do advocate for much more structured interaction between major interest
253
254 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

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groups and the state than we see in the United States. For example, maybe
major business groups and leading labor unions should have regular access to
the top officials in government. Indeed, many people have argued that incor­
porating the decisions of all major groups into decision making will allow for
more consensus and compromise, and in the end a better democracy. There is,
in short, an ongoing debate about how the interests of citizens should be
brought together and represented. That is the subject of this chapter.
 Concepts 255

Concepts
Most people will never be elected to or even run for public office, yet many will
participate in politics in some way or another, beyond the act of voting. For exam­
ple, many will be active in some type of organization with a political or public goal,
whether to promote some cause or interest or just to support a candidate for public
office. Politics is not exclusively the domain of elected officials and appointed judges
but also depends on citizens organizing and mobilizing to make their voices heard.
In considering institutions in the last several chapters, we have focused on the
branches and structures of government itself: elected legislators and executives, as
well as judges that may be elected or appointed. Yet many of the most important
institutions that shape politics and policymaking in different countries are composed
of groups of individuals who are not necessarily politicians themselves. Citizens do
work in groups to have a profound impact on political life. They support their pre­
ferred candidates for public office and may join a political party to do so, and then
they may volunteer time or contribute money to those parties. They also form interest
groups that share common ideas or goals, and they may volunteer time or contribute
money to those groups as well. In so doing, they bring together people with common
interests in attempts to influence politics, policy, and the lawmaking process.

Political Parties
We consider political parties first because they are closely linked to the institu­ political party A political organi­
tions of government we have examined so far. The main goal of political parties zation that seeks to influence
is the election of their candidates to public office. This goal is not only pragmatic policy, typically by getting candi­
but also ideological (related to ideas, ideals, and beliefs): Parties want their dates and members elected or
elected representatives to make policy decisions the party supports. appointed to public office.
Because elections channel party interests and ideas into the political process,
parties must be responsive to what the electorate wants and demands. Being re­
sponsive does not mean, however, that they simply do or say whatever it takes to
ensure the election of their candidates; rather, they are typically defined by a
particular set of principles, which they try to stand by. Parties must often coordi­
nate large numbers of voters around a common platform, or set of ideas that the
party takes as its basic principles. Platforms help parties distinguish themselves
from other parties in competitive electoral environments. Because parties have a
role in developing political ideas and in gathering voters around these ideas, it is
often said that parties articulate and aggregate political interests.

Party Systems
Countries have different numbers of major political parties, and the different pat­
terns of party politics are called party systems. At one extreme, some authoritarian party system Patterns of party
regimes outlaw political parties entirely, often on the grounds that they divide politics characterized by the
people into factions. Other countries are dominated by a single party, whether be­ number of relevant parties in a
cause voters prefer this party in reasonably free and fair elections, or because the country.
dominant party has systematic advantages, or because other parties are outlawed. In
most full democracies, the citizens’ right to vote for different competing parties is
seen as indispensable. Sometimes the result of exercising this right is a party system
with two major competing parties, and sometimes it is a system with more than two
major parties. We explore these different types in greater detail later in the chapter.
256 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

Interest Groups
The other main type of organization that has a major role in comparative politics
interest groups Organizations is the interest group. These are organizations that make any number of demands
that make demands in the political in the political system on behalf of their constituents and members; such groups
system on behalf of their consti­ often have an active membership that pays dues to participate in and support the
tuents and members. organization. Interest groups generally advocate for some policy position or po­
litical perspective, though they may not always seek to support specific candi­
dates in elections. Like political parties, interest groups may endorse politicians
in the hope of getting support for their causes, may contribute to or support
campaigns, and so on, but they may also focus on petitioning or lobbying politi­
cians to pass certain policies or laws. Interest groups want to see laws and policies
that reflect their interests or views on the issues, so these groups often make
public expressions of their political views.
Examples of interest groups are numerous and show the range of what such
groups are and do. They include organizations of business owners and labor
unions of workers, for instance. In some circumstances, interest groups may be
huge, as confederations of labor unions in some countries may represent a large
fraction of all workers or households. Interest groups can also reflect the interests
of a relatively smaller group of people and may serve different demographic
groups. In the United States, prominent examples include the National Organi­
zation for Women (NOW), which advances causes on behalf of its many

Members of the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo marching in Buenos

Aires, Argentina, in 2003 demand information about family members
who were “disappeared" by the Argentine dictatorship between
1976 and 1983. While many interest groups correspond to economic
interests, the Mothers are an example of an interest group based on
shared commitments and beliefs about the rights of citizens.
 Types 257

members, and the National Rifle Association (NRA), which represents the in­
terests of many gun owners.
Some interest groups advocate on behalf of their members and also provide
certain services or products to their members. For example, the AARP (formerly
the American Association of Retired Persons) estimates that it has between
40 million and 50 million members, mostly senior citizens and people in or ap­
proaching retirement. It advocates on behalf of benefits for seniors, such as Social
Security and Medicare, in addition to providing services such as supplemental
health insurance for its members. The American Automobile Association (AAA)
advocates on behalf of motorists and also provides members with travel discounts
and access to tow truck services. For our purposes, interest groups are broadly
defined but can include any organizations that advocate on behalf of a particular
cause or in favor of certain legislation or policy.
The concept of interest groups is closely linked to the concepts of civil society
and social movements. The first of these, civil society, is made up of many types civil society The set of organiza­
of civic associations and social organizations, including volunteer organizations, tions in civic life outside the state
neighborhood associations, and the like. Many of these are interest groups, through which citizens associate
though some may not take a political stand or advocate for a specific policy posi­ and articulate and advance their
tion, instead preferring to mobilize group members to take action on their own interests; includes civic associa­
for improvement of their community, for instance. In the next chapter, we dis­ tions, interest groups, and
cuss another set of actors and organizations known as social movements, which volunteer organizations.
are often distinct from interest groups in the ways they make their demands and
the conditions under which they operate.
Interest groups and political parties are responsible for the functions of
interest articulation and interest aggregation. Interest articulation is the pro­ interest articulation The process
cess by which individuals and groups express their demands, needs, or wants in by which political actors express
a political system. This is especially associated with interest groups, which pub­ their demands, needs, or wants in a
licly express their viewpoints, though parties do some interest articulation as political system, often through
well. Interest aggregation is especially associated with political parties and is the interest groups.
process by which individuals’ preferences are brought together to make collec­
interest aggregation The process
tive decisions. In most modern countries, it is not possible for those in govern­
by which individuals' preferences
ment to govern by knowing each individual and taking his or her unique
are brought together to make
perspective into account. Rather, governments rely on citizens to express them­
collective decisions, often through
selves collectively through mechanisms such as parties and interest groups.
political parties and the party
Citizens take on the responsibilities of making demands from their government,
system.
and doing so regularly involves the collective action of many people. Contrast
what a single person working alone can achieve in politics with what people
working together can achieve, and you will see the importance of interest
aggregation and collective action.

Types
Political parties can take on a variety of different forms, and political systems can
have different numbers of parties. The number of different examples and types of
interest groups are too numerous to mention, but we can outline how interest
groups work in different countries by looking at something of great political im­
portance: the structures of interest group representation.
258 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

Political Parties: Elite, Mass, and Catch-All Parties

For the average observer, the most distinguishing features of different political
parties are the views they champion. For example, the Democrats and the
Republicans in the United States can be distinguished by the parties’ platforms
on issues ranging from abortion to immigration to health care to taxes. Some
parties are on the left of the economic spectrum, and others are on the right. In
the United Kingdom, for instance, the Labour party has historically been associ­
ated with workers and unions, and the Conservative party is tied to business.
Some parties—such as the “Green Party” in many countries—support environ­
mental groups and are in turn supported by environmentalists. In many countries,
there are parties that represent specific ethnic and racial groups, such as the
Inkatha Freedom Party in South Africa that is strongly identified with the Zulu
people. There are single-issue parties—such as those specifically opposed to
immigration or favoring the legalization of marijuana—and there are even
parties with no identifiable ideology whatsoever. Some obvious distinctions thus
exist between political parties in the people they represent and the basis of
their platforms.
Alongside differences in what the policies parties want, there are differences
in how political parties are structured, an aspect that has changed over time.
By most accounts, political parties first emerged as coalitions between indi­
vidual legislators and politicians who shared common political interests and/or
common beliefs; they formed their parties together to promote these common
elite parties Political parties in interests. These parties were known as elite parties because their membership
which membership and scope and scope were largely restricted to a small number of political elites. By con­
were largely restricted to a small trast, the twentieth century saw massive political mobilization of large num­
number of political elites. bers of citizens in larger parties. Communist and Socialist parties, for example,
emerged as powerful groups in many countries, and they envisioned their
structures as containing millions of workers and laborers who would pay dues,
have membership cards, and become part of a broad movement. These came to
mass parties Parties consisting of be known as mass parties, and they were not restricted to leftist groups but
large numbers of citizens as mem­ became common among both fascists and more democratic groups attempting
bers and that undertake massive to include larger numbers of citizens in party politics. More recently, some
political mobilization. major political parties have shifted to become catch-all parties, which are flex­
catch-all parties Political parties ible on their ideological positions as they aim to attract support from a broad
that are flexible on their ideological range of interest groups and voters.1 Proponents of the catch-all thesis have
positions and aim to attract sup­ argued that when one party becomes successful as a catch-all party, it puts
port from a broad range of interest pressure on other parties to adopt the same approach and become more catch­
groups and voters. all themselves.2
Other categories may exist as well, but this change over time describes many
of the major shifts in the types of parties that exist. For some scholars, however,
the distinctions between elite, mass, and catch-all parties can be overstated, be­
cause all of these types are subject to common problems. One of the leading
critiques of how parties operate—which we explore further in the next chapter,
when we discuss social movements—was made by Robert Michels: It is that they
tend to operate from the top down, having “oligarchical tendencies,” regardless
of their ideology and rhetoric.3
 Types 259

Party Systems: Dominant-Party, Two-Party,

and Multiparty Systems
The many forms and structures of political parties shape the politics of different coun­
tries. But as important as the parties themselves is the party system in which they
operate. How politics plays out in a given country depends on which parties can get
enough seats to have a strong voice and make a difference. A Green Party may be rela­
tively inconsequential in policymaking if it never gains legislative seats because one or
two other parties dominate, but it may affect policy more if it is routinely one of five
or six parties that holds seats and is sought after as a partner in a governing coalition.
The most basic characteristic of party systems is how many major parties can be
expected to compete meaningfully in elections to participate in government. Some
countries have one party that is dominant, others have two, and yet others have
more than two major parties that compete and jockey for position. Countries with
only a single large party can be referred to as dominant-party systems. These occur dominant-party system Party
in both authoritarian and quite democratic countries. Among democracies, South system in which a country contains
Africa is an example of a democratic country with a dominant party, the African only one large political party that
National Congress (ANC). Many authoritarian regimes have dominant-party sys­ predominates politically, often
tems in which the governing party is in charge of politics. One particular type of controlling the legislative and exe­
system with a dominant party is the authoritarian single-party system in which cutive branches of government.
parties besides the dominant one are banned or disallowed. Examples have come
single-party system An authori­
from around the world, including many communist regimes—especially during the
tarian system in which parties
Cold War, but also in countries such as China, North Korea, and Cuba today—as
besides the single dominant party
well as right-wing dictatorships such as Nazi Germany and right-leaning regimes
are banned or disallowed.
in Asia, and many regimes with less clear ideologies in Africa up to the 1990s.4

The 100th anniversary of South Africa's African National Congress Party (ANC) took place in
2012. ANC supporters listen to South African president Jacob Zuma address a crowd gathered
for the anniversary celebrations in Bloemfontein, South Africa.
260 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

Single-party regimes are often authoritarian, but they do have their defenders.
Proponents of single-party regimes may say these are better suited to the needs
of some countries. One such argument has been that liberal democracy is not
equally well adapted to all cultures and regions of the world. This perspective was
associated with, among others, Lee Kuan-Yew, the long-time prime minister of
Singapore. Lee’s argument in favor of single parties was based on a concept of
“Asian values” that were argued to be distinct from “Western values,” as noted in
chapter 6.5 This included an emphasis on community and deference to authority
as opposed to a foremost emphasis on individual rights, and thus a cultural ac­
ceptance of dominant parties that may be most capable of delivering strong eco­
nomic performance. A similar argument has been made more recently by the
Chinese Communist Party.
Another argument has held that multiparty systems can be too divisive. This
has featured prominently among leading parties in ethnically divided countries
in Africa and countries divided along sectarian lines in the Middle East. In the
African country of Uganda, for example, the current president—who has been in
power since 1986—long argued for “no-party” democracy on the grounds that
political parties in Africa would simply split the vote along ethnic lines and give
rise to tribalism or conflict. These lines of argument have been contested by many
scholars, including African and Asian scholars who see the argument for domi­
nant parties or restrictions on multiparty systems as an effort by elites to justify
their own regime’s continuation in power. Nonetheless, these examples feature
prominently in discussions about whether dominant parties are appropriate
or not.
While many single-party systems are not democratic, some democracies have
single dominant parties as well. Examples include several countries in Africa
today, such as South Africa, which is dominated by the African National Con­
gress (ANC). The major distinctions from the authoritarian regimes just dis­
cussed are that voting is relatively free and fair and civil liberties are protected: It
just happens that people elect and continue to re-elect the same party to govern,
even though they could potentially make other choices. Some regimes have made
the case that a single political party can encompass the many political debates in

The Chinese Party System PAGE 424

China is the most influential and important dominant-party 1. How has China's Communist Party developed and main­
system in the world today. The country is authoritarian and func­ tained its dominance?
tions essentially as a single-party system. The various mechanisms 2. What are some of the mechanisms it uses to maintain this
for ensuring the dominance of the Communist Party are useful to system?
understand, especially since the "Communist” in Communist Party 3. Do you find there to be any legitimate justifications for
has changed so dramatically with the many changes in China. single-party rule, and on what does the Chinese Commu­
See the case study on the Chinese party system in Part VI, nist Party base its legitimacy?
pp. 424-425. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
 Types 261

Japan has been ranked as a free country by the independent or­

ganization Freedom House for every year since it began keeping
track of democracy around the world. Yet for most of that period
up to recent years, Japan was dominated by the Liberal Demo­
cratic Party (LDP). How a dominant party could coexist with de­
mocracy was one of the key questions of Japanese politics for
many years.
See the case study on the Japanese party system in Part VI,
pp. 491-492. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. What are the characteristics that distinguish a dominant-
party system from a single-party system?
2. What accounts for the continued victories of the LDP over
so many years? Yukio Hatoyama (center) of the Democratic Party of Japan

3. Does the existence of repeated victories by the same formalizes a coalition in 2009 with the leaders of the People's

party call democracy into question? New Party and the Social Democrats. The agreement ensured
that Hatoyama would become the prime minister and
brought an end to more than fifty years of nearly continuous
rule by the Liberal Democratic Party.

a country, but most observers in Western democracies argue that the right to
choose from different parties (with their advocacy of different policies) is essen­
tial to democratic governance. A characteristic of dominant-party systems is a
lack of competitiveness in national elections and, hence, a relatively certain out­
come of those elections.
To many people living in advanced, industrialized democracies, the
two-party system is more common and familiar than the dominant-party two-party system A political
system. In two-party systems, there is a duopoly of power between two major party system consisting of two
parties that are seen as the main contenders for most major political offices. This significant parties that have a duo­
duopoly usually persists over multiple elections. The two major parties present poly on opportunities to govern.
different platforms, which often correspond to one more liberal and one more
conservative party in terms of economic policy, though this is not always the
main political distinction. Such a model can be seen in the United States with
the Democrats and Republicans, for example, as well as in many other countries
around the world, such as Spain, with its left-leaning Socialist Workers’ Party
(Partido Socialista) and right-leaning People’s Party (Partido Popular). As we
discuss in the “Causes and Effects” section, the way elections work is a major
factor in determining whether a democracy will have a two-party system. In
particular, the presence of single-member districts in legislative elections (as
discussed in chapter 9) contributes to the likelihood of two-party systems for
reasons we explore
262 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

Two-party systems may seem natural and stable to those who have lived their
lives in them, but they are not the most common party system in a democracy.
In fact, most democracies have more than two major parties. The scholar Arend
multiparty system Apolitical Lijphart studied thirty-six long-standing democracies and found that multiparty
party system consisting of more systems with three or more parties were the norm in about half of these coun­
than two significant parties that tries.6 Some multiparty systems have two parties that are strongest year in and
have opportunities to govern. year out, but these compete against a handful of other parties that regularly win
enough seats to influence the outcomes of elections. Whereas in two-party sys­
tems one party or the other will typically win a given election by taking a major­
ity of seats, multiparty systems quite often result in no party winning a majority
because the vote is divided more ways. To recall some of the lessons of chapters 9
and 10, a no-majority win often happens when legislative elections are based on
proportional representation, and it often results in executive branches that func­
tion with a coalition of multiple parties.
Within these different categories—dominant-party, two-party, and multi­
party systems—the specific nature of the party system can still vary from case to
fragmentation (of party case. For instance, a multiparty system can be considered relatively fragmented,
system) Contrasting with concen­ with many small parties, or relatively coherent or concentrated, with a small
tration, the extent to which politi­ number of larger parties.7 Two-party systems may see frequent alternation of
cal power and representation in a power between the two, or may see one party that is stronger and wins more
party system are characterized by often for an extended period. Dominant-party systems may feature different de­
relatively large numbers of relati­ grees of dominance by the leading party, ranging from single-party regimes with
vely small parties. 100 percent of the seats in a legislature to systems where a dominant party wins
elections routinely but narrowly.
concentration (of party
Counting the actual number of parties that matter is more challenging than it
system) Contrasting with frag­
might sound. To determine the nature of a party system, assume one wants to
mentation, the extent to which
consider only relatively serious parties that have a chance of winning a reasonable
political power and representation
number of seats. As a hypothetical example, take the United States House of
in a party system are characterized
Representatives with its 435 members. If 434 were from the Republicans and
by relatively small numbers of
Democrats, while one representative was a member of the Socialist Party or Lib­
relatively large.parties.
ertarian Party, would it be reasonable to call this a multiparty system? Most
would say it would remain a two-party system. W hat about the United Kingdom,

Consensus-Based Politics in Germany PAGE 452

Germany, like many other countries, is a multiparty system in 1. What factors might account for Germany having more
which it is common for a relatively small number of parties to wield than two important parties?
most of the influence. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the 2. What does a multiparty system imply for the quality of
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) have been the major players governance?
there for years, though several other smaller parties have retained 3. Thinking back to chapter 9, what sorts of coalitions
influence and sometimes been in government coalitions. would you expect to emerge in a multiparty system, and
See the case study on the German party system in Part VI, which parties would you expect to enter coalitions
pp. 452-453. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions: together?
 Types 263

where the Conservative and Labour parties have long been the two largest, but
the Liberal Democrats regularly command a substantial fraction of the seats that
is enough to prevent either of the other two from winning a majority? As of 2012,
the Liberal Democrats were in a position where they were a necessary part of the
Conservative-led governing coalition. Is this a two-party or multiparty system?
Could we call it a “two-and-a-half”-party system?
Perhaps surprisingly-, the answer for many political scientists is yes, we can
say a country has “two-and-a-half” major parties. There are a number of metrics
used to measure the effective number of parties, and these are designed to get at effective number of parties
how many major parties of consequence a system contains.8 Another way to look A measure designed to capture the
at this issue is how fractionalized or fragmented a party system is, on a range number of meaningful parties in a
between a perfectly concentrated dominant-party system to a perfectly frag­ party system that weights the
mented system in which each seat goes to a different party.9 number of parties represented by
We will not explore the formulas in great detail here, but a simple example can their size.
illustrate the difference between a more fragmented and a more concentrated
party system. Table 11.1 gives some fictional countries, for which any resem­
blance to actual countries is coincidental. The middle columns reflect the propor­
tion of legislative seats won by each of the five largest parties in descending order.
So PI is the largest party, and P5 is the smallest (if there is a P5; these systems
have different numbers of parties). The formula for the effective number of par­
ties takes the proportion of seats held by each party, squares each one, and adds
these squares together. The result is a fraction, and the calculation then takes the
inverse. So a system with two parties each having 50 percent of the seats would
have l/[(0.50)2 + (0.50)2] = 2 as the effective number of parties. And a system
with three parties each having 33.3 percent of the seats would have l/[(0.333)2 +
(0.333)2 + (0.333)2] = 3 as the effective number of parties. This formula gener­
ates the results in Table 11.1 for less clear-cut cases.
The effective number of parties calculated by this formula should be close
to what one might expect from the proportions of seats won. There is a clear
dominant-party system and a clear two-party system, even if other tiny parties
compete in those two countries. In Duopolia, the two small parties matter more
than the small one in Monopolia because they can tip the balance of power from
PI to P2 or vice-versa. The United Realm looks like it should have about “two-
and-a-half” or three parties: The third-largest is only half as powerful as the two
largest parties, but it is also big enough to tip the balance of power once again.
Fragmentia, meanwhile, has close to five meaningful parties, but we probably
would not think of P3, P4, or P5 as being quite as important as PI or P2. By
contrast, Coalitiastan has two clear leading parties, and it looks more concen­
trated than Fragmentia, so it has a smaller effective number of parties but will party system institutionalization
also require governing coalitions for as long as this distribution of parties stands. The degree to which a party
As a result, it is more than just a two-party system. In fact, P3, P4, and P5 are all system is stable and remains so
important, and either of the big parties would need at least two of them to make over time, as measured by such
a coalition government; the effective number of parties is more than three. characteristics as the persistence of
A final aspect of party systems to consider is party system institutionalization, parties, the stability of their ideolo­
or the extent to which a party system is stable and remains so over time. It has gies, and the degree to which they
several aspects.10 One is the persistence and electoral success of parties over time. are distinct from the specific indivi­
Do parties endure for a long time once they are established, or do they come and duals that lead them.
264 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

table 11.1 Number of Parties

Proportion of Legislative Seats Won (%)

Country PI P2 P3 P4 P5 Effective No. of Parties

People's Republic 99 1 1.02

of Monopolia

United States of 49 48 2 1 2.12

Duopolia

United Realm 40 40 20 2.78

Federation of 27 25 17 16 15 4.71
Fragmentia

Coalitiastan 38 35 9 9 9 3.43

Note: P = Party.

go, with old ones fading away and new parties emerging constantly? A more
volatile party system is less institutionalized. Another aspect is the degree to
which parties have stable ideologies, programs, or platforms. This relates to the
question of whether a party is coherent and cohesive or not.11A final aspect is the
degree to which parties operate as institutions, as opposed to being focused on
certain individuals. Where a party system is more institutionalized, a party’s
name has significance: It is likely to be around and to be associated with a certain
set of ideas. By contrast, in less institutionalized party systems, a party’s name (or
brand) is less meaningful and more often subject to the whims of personalistic
leaders.
Party systems are often more institutionalized in longstanding democracies
and less institutionalized in less-established democracies, but this is not always
the case. In France’s well-established democracy, for example, the main party of
the center-right has gone through many changes in name and structure in recent
years, even as the right has won the presidency regularly for nearly twenty years.
Conversely, other countries, such as Chile and Ghana, developed institutional­
ized party systems soon after becoming democracies in the 1990s.12 Despite
these exceptions, the tendency persists: Substantial breakdowns of party system
institutionalization are more common in fragile democracies, as the case of
Russia showed from the 1990s to the current authoritarian era dominated by
President Vladimir Putin (see the next “Case in Context” box).

Interest Groups: Pluralism and Corporatism

Like political parties, interest groups are distinguished from one another by the
specific ideas they hold as well as by their structure, which varies widely. Apart
from the forms and functions of specific groups, there are also different patterns
of how interest group representation works in politics. The most fundamental
distinction is between countries where interest groups compete openly to influ­
ence government decision making—a pattern known as pluralism—and countries
 Types 265

where there is a formal, established relationship between certain interest groups

and state power—a pattern known as corporatism. The distinctions between the
two forms of interest group representation can be summarized in terms of
whether specific interest groups are identified as having a monopoly on the rep­
resentation of a specific interest; both forms are ideal types, and many countries
have had some mixture of the two forms.
Pluralism reflects the idea that interest groups compete in a “marketplace of pluralism A system of interest
ideas.” Countries that have pluralist politics will often have large numbers of group representation in which
competing groups that strive to affect policy. Under a pure form of pluralism, groups compete openly to in­
none of these groups would have privileged access to the government or receive fluence government decisions and
preferential treatment, even if they would sometimes win and sometimes lose public policy, and in which specific
arguments about what the government should do. groups do not have official prefe­
Under corporatism, on the other hand, certain major groups are designated rential access to decision making.
as representatives of certain interests, and these have a more structured interac­
corporatism A system of interest
tion with the government in power and with the state’s administration (or bu­
group representation in which
reaucracy). Advocates of corporatism sometimes assert that people “naturally”
certain major groups are officially
belong to certain interest groups—such as workers belonging to labor unions and
designated as representatives of
business owners belonging to business organizations—and that organizing on
certain interests, and have a more
this basis is thus important for political representation. Rather than an open
structured interaction with the
competition among all interest groups, corporatist arrangements seek consensus
government in power and with the
based on regular interactions between designated groups and the state. Using the
state's administration.
same root word as corporatism, one way to understand the phenomenon is that
there is “incorporation” of specific interest groups into the decision-making
structures of the state.13
Since many of the major decisions made in politics are about economics and
economic policy, the most important interest groups in corporatist countries are
usually organizations representative of business and those representative of peak organization Top associa­
labor. Business and organized labor confer with the state on issues such as tions, such as labor federations and
wages, benefits, taxes, and policy toward foreign capital and international com­ large business organizations, that
petition. At the national level, the bargaining between groups often involves represent common interests by
peak organizations, which are top-level associations that bring together many bringing together many like-
like-minded organizations. Examples include national labor federations made minded organizations.

Personalism and the Party System in Russia PAGE 535

Russia illustrates the challenge and importance of party system 1. Building on the observations of previous chapters, how
institutionalization. The country has seen some major parties do weak institutions in Russia facilitate the rise of a "strong
come and go while a single individual, Vladimir Putin, has accu­ man" like Putin?
mulated more power. Even in the absence of single-party rule, a 2. What might account for the poorly institutionalized party
poorly institutionalized party system can facilitate authoritarian system in Russia?
tendencies. 3. Which seems to have come first, the weak party system or
See the case study on the Russian party system in Part VI, the personalism of Putin?
pp. 535-536. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
266 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

W ho Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City

INSIGHTS
by Robert Dahl "

ahl's work focuses on one city— New Haven, Connecticut—

D
that predominated differed. Dahl examined decisions about
and documents how different sets of actors and interests urban planning and development and education, as well as nom­
have important roles in governing. It has become one of the inations for public office. While the business sector played a role
foundational descriptions of how pluralism operates. Dahl finds in some aspects of decision making, the popularly elected mayor
that different aspects of policy and political decisions were influ­ and appointed boards wielded significant influence. Dahl's work
enced by quite different groups and not always by the same on the functioning and benefits of pluralism countered the view
elites. The book argues that New Haven's social elite was not the held by others that in a capitalist democracy, a single "power
same as its economic elite, and that the business community was elite" dominates across the many aspects and areas of politics.”
not always the dominant player in decisions. Elected politicians Some critics continue to argue that pluralist accounts understate
wielded considerable power in shaping policy, but they were the extent to which economic elites can shape politics.
also responsive to interest groups and needed to sell their pro­ Robert Dahl, Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City. New
grams to voters at large. Among interest groups, the sets of actors Haven: Yale University Press, 1961.

up of many different unions, or business organizations representing many dif­

ferent companies or industries.
Corporatism has been a major force in contemporary history. In fact, some
have argued that the twentieth century was the “century of corporatism.”15 Over
the course of the twentieth century, corporatism was influential across much of
Europe and Latin America and in many parts of Asia and Africa. The geographic
and historical reach of this phenomenon has led to many variants: Some are more
social and some more pro-market liberal in Europe, while some forms in Latin
American have been more state-led, others more led by labor, and yet others
more inclusive of the peasantry.16 Some analysts have advocated corporatism as a
relatively successful and harmonious way to promote economic growth and de­
velopment, while others have criticized it as favoring specific groups over indi­
vidual rights and lending itself to exclusionary politics. Countries such as Mexico
may provide evidence for either perspective.
It is possible to distinguish between more authoritarian and more democratic
forms of corporatism.17 In quite a few instances, corporatism has overlapped with
dominant-party systems, and a single leading party undertakes the coordination
of different interest groups. This has often been an authoritarian form of corpo­
ratism in which interest-group participation is highly regulated by the state. Ver­
sions of these circumstances can be seen in many single-party countries. Indeed,
corporatism was especially noteworthy for part of the twentieth century as a
strategy by which central governments could co-opt different groups, bringing
them into the political system on terms set by the state or the leading party. In­
corporated groups included workers and unions, business elites, peasants or
farmers, and even students. This featured prominently in Latin American coun­
tries, for instance, where one of the leading examples is Mexico between the late
1930s and 2000 (see the “Case in Context” box).
Corporatism happened under authoritarian regimes and dominant-party re­
gimes in many cases, but it is not limited to dominant- or single-party systems,
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have? 267

_ ,■ . :: .
CASE IN CONTEXT ,
A
__ -- | The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico pageso6

As noted in chapter 6, Mexico was once called “The Perfect Dic­ 1. How are interest group representation and the party
tatorship." Part of the reason for this name was the ability of system related in this case, and how did corporatism
Mexico's PRI party to bring major interest groups under its relate to the ability of the dominant party to retain power?
banner. These included labor, business, and the state bureau­ 2. How was Mexican corporatism distinct from many other
cracy, as well as the armed forces. This broad-based form of cor­ versions of corporatism?
poratism made it very difficult for competitors to defeat the PRI, 3. What were some of the causes of the end of single-party
and the party governed uninterrupted from the 1930s to 2000. dominance, and how do these relate to the corporatism
See the case study on the Mexican party system in Part VI, that prevailed for so long?
pp. 506-507. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:

and in fact has featured prominently in many of Europe’s multiparty systems,

especially in social-democratic countries of northern Europe. This can be seen as
a more democratic form of corporatism. Many of the political systems of north­
ern Europe are consensus based and have been multiparty regimes in which cor­
poratism has played a major role. We now examine the pros and cons of pluralism
and corporatism.

Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems

Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have?
There are many questions about cause and effect in the study of parties, party
systems, and interest groups. Why do different party systems emerge? Why do
some countries have greater party system institutionalization than others? Why
do certain types of parties—such as Communist parties, social democratic par­
ties, conservative pro-business parties, or fascist parties—emerge in some coun­
tries and not others? Why do some interest groups have greater impact in some
places than others? We cannot address all of these here, but we encourage further
research on this range of questions. We will focus on three questions: the causes
of the emergence of party systems, the consequences of party systems on the
quality of representation, and the consequences of different patterns of interest-
group representation.

Party Systems and Representation

Party systems are closely related to how political representation works. In some
senses, party systems are both a consequence of how representation works and a
cause of how representation takes shape. We examine both sides briefly.

W hat Factors Shape Party Systems?

Looking first at what causes different types of party systems to emerge, one main
factor is the type of electoral system, as we discussed in chapter 9. Recall that a
basic distinction among types of electoral systems is between district systems and
268 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

proportional representation systems; in their simplest forms, the former has leg­
islative elections within the geographic subdivisions of a country, while the latter
allocates legislative seats according to the overall proportions of seats parties win
in an election.18 W hat would these different types of systems imply for whether
two-party or multiparty systems will emerge?
In democracies that have single-member district systems, there is a pro­
nounced tendency for two-party systems to emerge and persist, while multiparty
systems are quite common in countries that use proportional representation. For
many analysts, the electoral system itself seems to have an impact on the number
of viable parties that emerge. The logic behind this is intuitive. Proportional
representation, for example, is designed to accurately reflect the overall distribu­
tion of preferences for different parties, and the result is often many different
parties winning legislative seats. District-based representation, by contrast, often
favors relatively large parties that can win a plurality of votes, and tends to result
in fewer seats for small parties. The consequence of district systems as opposed
to proportional representation was most famously associated with Maurice
Duverger (see the “Insights” box on his book Political Parties).
O f course, the electoral system is not the only cause of political party systems.
Geographical, historical, social, and economic factors are also important, and
certain political traditions or political cultures may lend themselves to more con­
centrated party systems or more fragmented systems.19 Africa, for example, was
home to a large number of one-party states in the 1960s to 1980s. The reason
may be seen as geographical, because tendencies persist in certain regions of the
world (with countries sometimes modeling their political systems on those of
their neighbors), or as economic because it applies to countries with certain levels
of income. These tendencies in regions and in individual countries are also his­
torical and social. Again in Africa, the historical context for many one-party
regimes was the struggle for independence and freedom under a leading nation­
alist party, a phenomenon that can still be seen today with dominant parties even

Les Partis Politiques [Political Parties]

INSIGHTS
by hiaurice Duverger

uverger's work in this book and related articles discusses nu­

D
right would therefore work together— to collaborate on selecting
merous features of political parties and party systems, but it candidates and even to merge— in order to compete with party
is most renowned for its establishment of “Duverger's Law.” The on the other side. The left would do this as well, leading to a two-
core result of this finding was that two-party systems tend to party system. By contrast, Duverger finds that proportional repre­
emerge where elections are based on a simple plurality vote. The sentation is conducive to multiparty systems because it
logic is that parties on each side of the political spectrum (left and encourages small parties, and other systems such as runoff elec­
right) will recognize that they cannot afford to split the vote in a tions have effects in between these two extremes. Duverger sug­
plurality system. To use an example, if six parties on the right each gests that this is a virtual law of political life, and is true in so many
got 10 percent of the vote, their combined total would be 60 per­ cases that it is often seen as one of the strongest findings in politi­
cent, but individually they would lose to the Communists if the cal science, though he and others do note occasional exceptions.
Communists had, say, 40 percent of the vote. The parties on the Maurice Duverger, Les Partis Politiques [Political Parties], Paris: A. Colin, 1951.
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have? 269

INSIGHTS
Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis
by Giovanni Sartori

I n a major investigation of the origins, types, and functioning of spectrum, a multiparty system emerges with a relatively small
&
I different political parties, Sartori finds that different political number of parties. By contrast, where people are deeply divided
party systems emerge due to differences in beliefs among and fragmented by ideology, a more fractious multiparty system
groups in society, and not just due to the type of electoral system is likely to emerge. In one-party countries, Sartori sees several
used. He outlines a wide range of types of party systems that can types of party systems that range from totalitarian regimes (like
be classified as one-party systems, two-party systems, and more Nazi Germany or Soviet communism) to more pragmatic domi­
limited and extreme forms of party “pluralism" with three to five nant parties; the "ideological intensity" of the dominant party
or more than five parties. In Sartori's argument, ideological dis­ again matters in the specific party system that takes shape.
tance and "segmentation" between groups is a key variable. Giovanni Sartori, Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. New York:
Where groups in society are rather close together on the political Cambridge University Press, 1976.

in relatively democratic countries such as South Africa and Tanzania. Yet we

must also be careful not to generalize about regions, as we show in the “Thinking
Comparatively” section at the end of the chapter: All continents have mixes of
party systems. Africa has two-party systems and fragmented multiparty systems
as well as dominant-party systems, and the same goes for other continents.
A leading argument linking social and other political factors to the party
system holds that which parties emerge and where parties stand depend largely
on ideology and the beliefs of the citizens. This may sound obvious, but it is quite
distinct from the argument that the electoral rules and other institutions deter­
mine what party systems will look like. Parties often have deep roots in an ideol-
ogy or in a social base, and party systems will be shaped by the parties that
emerge. A prominent example would be Communist parties around the world,
which traditionally have had a strong ideological basis in Marxism and strong
support among members of the working class and labor unions (as well as intel­
lectuals in some cases). The presence and strength of Communist parties on the
left has also had the effect of shaping other parties on the right of the political
spectrum. The link between the working class, Marxist ideology, and Commu­
nist parties shows that party systems are shaped not only by the electoral system,
but also by social realities and political culture. Other examples include Chris­
tian Democratic parties or other parties on the center-right in Europe and the
Americas that are influenced by a degree of social conservatism. A prominent
scholar who has worked on ideology and party systems is Giovanni Sartori.

How Do Party Systems Shape Political Outcomes?

In addition to being caused by various factors, party systems are themselves
causes of political outcomes. In particular, they may shape whether politics are
very moderate or more extreme. For example, one consequence of a two-party
system under many circumstances is the tendency of the major parties to try to median voter The voter who is
attract the hypothetical median voter, or the voter who is theoretically in the theoretically exactly in the middle
middle of the distribution of voters in a certain geographic area. If we assume for of the distribution of voters.
270 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

Political Spectrum

Figure 11.1 Voter Distribution and Political Party Strategy with Median Voter.

the moment that voters in a given district can be put on a spectrum from most
liberal on the left to most conservative on the right, as in Figure 11.1, then the
voter in the exact center is shown by the vertical line. In this example, the Con­
servative party will generally capture the votes to the right of center, and the
Liberal party will capture the votes to the left of center. If both the Liberals and
the Conservatives are strategic and rational, they will each do what they must to
capture the entire half of the electorate that is on their side—plus a little more.
Since the Liberals know that people on the far left are unlikely to vote Conserva­
tive, and the Conservatives know that people on the far right are unlikely to vote
Liberal, the best strategy becomes trying to capture those represented by the
median voter—the person right in the middle. In this case, the median voter is
the swing voter (i.e., one who could go either way), and winning the swing vote
is the key to getting a majority: 50 percent of the vote plus at least one person.
The major parties will therefore propose policies that appeal to the median voter.
Visually, you can think of this as the parties positioning their platforms where
the vertical line is: Both become relatively moderate and centrist.
O f course, parties must try to attract the median voter while still retaining the
votes of the ideologues at their respective ends of the political spectrum. Yet
those more extreme voters on the far left and far right also make their own ratio­
nal calculations. They know that not voting for the large party on their side
(when there are multiple parties on a side) may help tip the election to the other
side. A very conservative voter, for example, has a reason to vote for a moderate
Conservative party if doing so helps prevent the Liberal party from winning in­
stead. This thinking discourages relatively extreme voters from voting for smaller
strategic voting The practice and more extreme parties. Voters thus engage in strategic voting, or voting in
of voting in a way that does not ways that do not reflect their ideal position, in order to prevent outcomes they
reflect one's ideal preference, in think are even worse. Since swing voters are often the deciding factor in winning
order to prevent electoral out­ or losing an election, some analysts suggest that single-member districts and
comes one thinks are worse, two-party systems draw candidates and voters alike toward the middle, in the
such as voting for a second-best direction of the median voter, therefore having a moderating impact on
candidate one thinks can reaso­ representation.
nably win. There are several reasons why a system with two dominant parties might not
lead to moderation, however. In particular, one could imagine that the distribu­
tion of voters does not always look like what is shown in Figure 11.1. Perhaps it
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have? 271

An Economic Theory of Democracy

elections and political parties. In addition to developing the spe­

T
his work by Downs is known especially for its theorizing
about the median voter. The book develops the logic noted cific median voter model, this form of research inspired much of
in this section, in which parties rationally adjust their platforms to the work in rational choice theory. According to this theory, most
appeal to the median voter. Downs does not, however, assume behavior of individuals or groups (such as political parties and
that all politics consists of appealing to the median voter. He interest groups) can be explained by actors attempting to maxi­
notes the limitations to the median voter theorem and the con­ mize their economic or political gains.
ditions under which it will not hold. This work built on research in Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper
economics and political strategy and applied it to the study of Collins, 1957.

looks more like that in Figure 11.2, which is known as a bimodal distribution
because it has two peaks: many voters who are fairly Liberal, and many voters
who are fairly Conservative, but not many in the center or at either extreme. In
this case, the Liberals might try to maximize their vote by offering platforms that
appeal to voters on the left, about where the vertical line is shown. The Conserva­
tives will do the same on the right. If they failed to do this, they would open
themselves up to defeat by another new party that could claim more of the vote
by positioning themselves strategically. For instance, if this country had exactly
one hundred people, and the Liberals went for the center, then another party—
call them the Left Party—could position themselves just to the left of the Liber­
als, and the Conservatives would position themselves just to the right of the
Liberals. The Conservatives would sweep the vote on the right, and the Left
would take the vote to the left. The Liberals would thus be committing political
suicide. More likely is that the Liberals and Conservatives would each go for the

Median voter Median voter Median voter

on the left overall on the right

ife ih

r
L eft Party Liberals Conservatives R ight Party

Political Spectrum

Figure 11.2 Bimodal Voter Distribution.

272 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

vertical line to capture the votes on their respective sides. In this case, a system
with two dominant parties leads to polarization, not moderation.
We return to this example in questions at the end of the chapter. For now,
though, you can imagine how such a political system might develop into a more
competitive multiparty system, as new parties might emerge in an attempt to
position themselves strategically. The key point is that this distribution of voters
within this party system does not result in the two big parties going for the
median voter if the parties are strategic and rational.
There are other reasons, too, why parties might not attempt to appeal to the
median voter. Imagine a case where voters cannot simply be arrayed along a spec­
trum from right to left, and you will see that predicting their voting is much
more complex.20 Since people care about many different issues, such as religious
or moral issues and the economy, it is not always clear what the left and the right
will mean. Finally, it has been observed in the American context, for example,
that there are essentially “safe seats” in many districts because certain parts of the
country are quite liberal or quite conservative; parties as a whole are therefore less
likely to move toward the center, because each legislator responds to his or her
own district’s voters.21
It should be noted that the ways dominant-party and single-party regimes
shape political outcomes is not as straightforward as it might seem; even in these
systems, there are debates about the quality of representation. For over a century,
many communists claimed that only a Communist Party could truly represent
and speak on behalf of workers,22 but the collapse of communism around the
world seemed to discredit this alternative to the multiparty democracy associated
with liberal individualism.23 Similarly, single-party fascist regimes—including
Nazi Germany—led to an association of single-party regimes with authoritarian
and even totalitarian rule. The result was that prominent theories about democ­
racy often assume multiparty competition to be the best form of political repre­
sentation.24 This did not, however, mean that all multiparty systems extend the
principle of competition in the same way in the realm of interest groups. In mul­
tiparty democracies, interest groups may operate in relatively open competition
under pluralism or in a more structured fashion using corporatist arrangements,
as we discuss next.

Interest Groups and Representation

Pluralism and corporatism are each advocated by their respective proponents on
the basis that they provide better and more effective representation. To start with
pluralism, this theory describes how interest groups work in some countries, but
it is also a theory about how interests should operate. Some theorists called “plu-
ralists” openly advocate that this is the best approach for a government system:
The government should listen to the competing arguments laid out by different
social interests and mediate between them. This is closely linked to classical lib­
eral ideas about democratic politics, which hold that government decisions
should be based on respect for individual liberties. In the case of pluralism, an
emphasis is on the equal opportunity for different groups to influence politics,
with guarantees of rights to organize and assemble to petition the government.
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Party Systems Emerge, and What Effects Do They Have? 273

For instance, if workers in a given industry are seeking a nationwide increase in

the minimum wage, but industrial capitalists fear this will harm profits and eco­
nomic growth, it becomes the role of elected representatives to listen to the pop­
ulace, process its demands, and respond accordingly.25
Yet there are also major critiques of the pluralist model. As is the case with
presidentialism and other institutions in previous chapters, the model used in the
United States is not presumed to be the best model for all democracies. The cri­
tique of pluralism can take at least two major forms that relate to interest groups.
The first is that pluralism in essence gets bogged down due to the actions of
special interest groups and is an inefficient way to make good decisions about
effective policy.
One of the main challenges to assumptions about pluralism is the existence of
the collective action problem. People do not necessarily participate in interest collective action The pursuit of
groups for all the beliefs they support. Rather, they consider the benefits of their political or social goals by mem-
own action and the costs of undertaking the action. This is especially true with bersofagroup.
public goods, where if a benefit for a certain person is small, then joining an in­
terest group may not be worth the effort. The same is true if costs to the indi­
vidual of joining the group are high. Achieving a desired result is rarely due to
one more person’s action, so people have an incentive to be free riders: Let others
do the work and hope to participate in the collective reward.
The other critique of pluralism comes from the perspective that corporatism
does a better job at integrating interests and ensuring the structured representa­
tion of major groups in society. The argument draws upon a variety of empirical
examples, ranging from economic growth successes in East Asia to harmonious
social policies in Europe. In terms of economic growth, the likes of Japan and

The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the

Theory of Groups and The Rise and Decline of Nations:
INSIGHTS
Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities
byMancurOlspn

lson's early book, The Logic of Collective Action, is the basis of down economic growth because governments respond to po­
O the field of study in how collective action occurs, as out­ litically powerful actors, rather than to the needs of the economy.
lined previously. The logic of collective action applies to interest One empirical example is striking: The United Kingdom, a victor
groups as well as other actors we discuss in the next chapter. in World War II, did worse economically for several decades than
Rather than assuming people will easily form interest groups to Germany and Japan, which lost the war. Olson attributes this to
press for public demands, Olson noted the free rider dilemma the continuity of special interests in the United Kingdom as con­
and the tendency of interest groups to function better when trasted with the elimination of many of those interests for the
they provide specific benefits for their members. This is a critique defeated countries.
of pluralism in the sense that interest groups cannot be assumed Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
to form to represent diverse interests. Olson extended this cri­ of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965; and The Rise and Decline
of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities. New Haven:
tique in his later work, The Rise and Decline of Nations, in which he
Yale University Press, 1982.
argued that the accumulation of special interests over time slows
274 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

South Korea from the 1950s to 1980s were countries where scholars found that
close linkages between the state and top business organizations (as well as
labor) were important in setting national goals and reaching high levels of eco­
nomic performance.26 Meanwhile, in the context of long-established democra­
cies in Europe, corporatist arrangements were argued to be a political solution
that gave rise to consensus-based decision making. This was reputed to be
useful in reducing social tensions and in ensuring a relative political harmony
between business and labor, since both were regularly integrated into political
decision making.
O f course, corporatism can also have major disadvantages. It does not reflect
an “arms-length” relationship between interest groups and the state. This raises
the question about how the groups that participate in corporatist arrangements
are chosen, and how this representation changes over time. W hat seems like
useful collaboration at certain moments can seem like “crony capitalism” and
favoritism at others. In addition, the structured relationships may favor some of
the institutions that are powerful in the status quo. For example, who is more
truly representative of American industry, Google or General Motors? While
this may seem a minor issue, corporatism may tend to “calcify” relations between
the state and certain actors. If the automobile industry and auto workers have
close relationships with the state for decades, will they combine to support the
General Motors of the world rather than the Googles? While corporatism has
been seen by its proponents as facilitating policymaking, it may also be prone to
make real reform more difficult. The economies of Europe in the 1990s faced a
major challenge to economic growth as reform of labor and business relations
became difficult. In situations where reform is needed, corporatist arrangements
can impede economic adjustments by protecting the status quo for many workers
and businesses.
Corporatism also tends to result in decision making by a relatively small
number of elites, specifically those in government, business, and labor. In a more
severe form, corporatism has been highly exclusionary and authoritarian. The
idea of corporatism even contributed to totalitarian ideologies such as the early
years of German Nazism in the 1930s and the period of Italian Fascism under
Benito Mussolini from the 1920s to the 1940s. For many, this association with
totalitarian regimes discredited corporatism as corporatist arrangements in­
fringed individual rights in favor of groups and the state; totalitarian regimes
provide the worst examples of this. To return to the school of thought favoring
pluralism, James Madison and the authors of The Federalist Papers (1787/1961)
argued that it is natural for people to form different “factions,” and the best way
to prevent any one of these from becoming too powerful and tyrannical was to
encourage these different groups to compete. The debate between pluralism and
corporatism is thus unresolved, with different empirical cases offering different
lessons. Indeed, the debate may not be fully resolved because many countries
feature elements of both models.
 Party Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa 275

Party Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa THINKING

s noted at the beginning of the chapter, different political party systems COMPARATIVELY
A have flourished at different times and in different places around the world.
The United States has been a relatively stable two-party system for decades, while KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL
some countries in Western Europe have often had multiparty regimes, where
parties that perform the best in elections often do not win a majority and thus Comparative Checking
need to make coalitions with other parties to govern. Comparative politics will often be
based on the examination of a small
Meanwhile, single-party and dominant-party regimes have rarely been
number of case studies. This allows
found in Western Europe since the end of World War II, but have been much the analyst to dig into the case in
more common in Asia, the Middle East, occasionally in Latin America, and in depth, but it also has the disadvan­
Eastern Europe under Soviet rule. Africa is a final region of the world that has tage of giving a "small sample size" of
seen many single-party and dominant-party regimes. One may be tempted to just a couple of cases. Unless one uses
quantitative and statistical methods,
reach some relatively straightforward conclusions about what shapes party sys­
one often does not subject the hy­
tems: Poorer regions and developing countries are likelier to have single-party pothesis to full testing across all the
systems. Leaders in Africa and scholars alike have at different times offered possible cases. A danger of this can
justifications and explanations for single-party dominance. The same has held be making inferences too quickly
in countries from Syria to Singapore. One might even hear (or make) argu­ without keeping sight of whether the
argument applies beyond the cases
ments that these regions are culturally or politically unprepared for multiparty
in the study. Ideally, we would like to
democracy. make arguments that apply to more
However, one should not jump to such a conclusion. To take Africa as an ex­ than just the cases we examine. A
ample, the continent also has a number of other types of party systems, from partial solution to this challenge is
multiparty competition in the tiny country of Benin to a stable two-party system comparative checking, or relatively
brief glances at other cases to see if
in Ghana. Moreover, there is a major distinction between the quite democratic
the argument holds up or has obvi­
dominant-party systems in countries like Botswana or South Africa and the ous flaws. This does not mean doing a
more authoritarian dominant-party systems in countries like Cameroon or full study of more and more cases,
Ethiopia. but rather briefly reviewing other
This illustrates the importance of avoiding excessive generalizations that do cases to see if one's conclusions seem
to work at a glance. In layman's terms,
not match up with the evidence. In particular, it is advisable to engage in a bit of
a bit of comparative checking can
“comparative checking” so as not to generalize from one or two cases. Indeed, the help tell if an argument "passes the
particular cases that do not fit the generalization would be useful ones to exam­ sniff test." If so, one has greater confi­
ine further, if they are “deviant cases” as noted in chapters 2 and 5. dence in the argument; if not, the
There are several causes and consequences of different party systems and pat­ comparative check can be useful in
forcing the analyst to revisit the
terns of interest-group representation, and this area is still the subject of consid­
argument to see if it can be modified
erable research and debate. While it seems that electoral institutions do help to make it more applicable to
shape party systems, these systems are also influenced by ideologies, cultures, other cases.
economics, histories, and many other factors. Similar factors also shape how
plural or corporatist is the state’s relationship to interest groups. In turn, the pat­
terns that emerge in party systems and interest group representation affect what
citizens do and how they vote and participate in politics. This chapter has thus
begun to give a bigger role in politics to those citizens who may never consider
themselves politicians. This focus on the actions and behaviors of groups of citi­
zens will continue into our next chapters, where we look at the many ways people
identify politically and express their interests and beliefs through different kinds
of action.
276 Chapter 11: Political Parties, Party Systems, and Interest Groups

C h ap te r Su m m ary
Concepts more structured interactions with the state under
Political parties are organizations that have the aim of corporatism.
nominating candidates and electing representatives to
public office. Causes and Effects
• Political party systems are different patterns in the number Political party systems are shaped by electoral rules as well
of major political parties and in the patterns of party as other factors such as ideology and social and historical
politics. influences.
Interest groups are organizations that advocate for some • The political party system itself also affects politics by
policy perspective or political goal, and they may or may helping to determine whether major parties tend toward
not support specific candidates. the center of the political spectrum or not.
• Pluralism and corporatism have both been argued by their
Types respective advocates to result in stronger democracy.
Political parties have taken forms including elite parties,
mass parties, and contemporary catch-all parties. Thinking Comparatively
• Political party systems can be divided into dominant-party • Certain types of party systems may be more prevalent in
systems, two-party systems, and multiparty systems. some regions of the world, but it is important to engage in
• Interest groups can compete with one another for political comparative checking to avoid over-generalizing.
influence in a system known as pluralism, or they may have

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. Look back at the voter distributions in Figures 11.1 and 11.2. developing greater corporatist arrangements? What are some of
Imagine you are trying to start a third party called the Right Party the advantages that would be expected by advocates of corpo­
to compete with the Liberals and Conservatives in a country that ratism in democratic societies? What would you expect to be
those two parties have dominated politically. You believe that the drawbacks of any such changes?
the Conservatives are too moderate and would ideally like to po­ 4. Thinking backtosomeofthe comparative strategies from previ­
sition yourself as far to the right as possible. Strategically, what ous chapters, how would you determine whether a certain
would be your best position on the political spectrum, keeping country's party system is shaped more by its electoral rules or by
in mind that the height of the peaks in the figures reflects how other factors? Flow can comparison help you answer this ques­
many voters there are on that part of the spectrum? Would your tion, and what sorts of comparisons might you set up to distin­
strategy be different for Figure 11.1 as opposed to Figure 11.2? guish between different causal factors?
2. Building on the last question, now place yourself in the position 5. This chapter has addressed both party systems and interest
of the Conservatives. What would prevent parties from beating groups. Do you find one of these sorts of groups responds to
you? If the Right Party comes along, how could you prevent this the other more? Which set of organizations do you find more
other party from taking your place? What argument would you important in shaping how politics operates and what govern­
make to voters about why they should vote for you rather than ments do? If you were given $100 that you were required to
a party that is farther out on the political spectrum? donate to either a party or interest group, which would you
3. The United States has long been associated with the ideas of donate to, and why?
pluralism. Are there any advantages that could be had from
 CHAPTER 12

Revolutions and
Contention

• Egyptian protestors restrain a tank in early 2011 during the "Arab Spring" uprisings. Throughout much of the Arab world, remarkable changes took
place in this period and have continued since. Where will these revolutions— and their aftermath— lead?
 n late 2010, in a small town in Tunisia, a policewoman insulted a street
I vendor and toppled his produce cart. This would normally have been an
event of limited consequence, but what happened next made history. The
vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, went to the municipal offices to register his
complaint. Rebuffed there, he set himself on fire in the street. He is believed
to have done so to protest his humiliation and his lack of opportunity. His act
galvanized protestors, seeming to indicate to many that “enough is enough”
when it came to poor governance and a lack of social oppor­
tunities. The symbolic tactic of self-immolation would be
IN THIS CHAPTER
repeated in Tunisia and elsewhere. Faced with continuous
Concepts 279
street protests, the Tunisian government—which did not use
What Is "Contention"? 279
Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary
overwhelming force—fell by mid-January, not long after
Contention 279 Bouazizi died of his injuries. By the end of the month, pro­
Types 280 tests had spread to other Arab countries, notably Egypt.
Social Movements 280 There, the state began to make strong efforts to quell pro­
Revolutions 284
tests. On one hand, it repressed protesters, among other
Insurgencies and Civil Wars 287
places in the famous gathering point of Tahrir Square in
Terrorism 287
"Everyday Resistance" 289
Cairo. On the other hand, it became clear that there were
Thinking About Contention: Summary 290 limits to the army’s willingness to repress the population.
Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions By mid-February 2011, the government of Hosni Mubarak
Happen? 291 had fallen. The uprisings then spread to other parts of the
Relative Deprivation 291
Arab world.
Resource Mobilization and Political
Opportunities 292
For years, many analysts and citizens had been skeptical
Rational Choice 294 about democratic opening and regime change in this region,
Cultural or "Framing" Explanations 296 and yet suddenly the air was full of excitement and a sense of
opportunity. Outcomes have varied dramatically. Tunisia
THINKING COM PARATIVELY
and Egypt ousted their old governments largely as a result of
The "Arab Spring" of 2011 298
protests. The former case, so far, seems like a democratic suc­
C A S E S IN CONTEXT cess story. In the latter case, post-revolutionary elections led
Brazil • France Russia China • to Mohammed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood briefly
Iran
holding power, before they were displaced by a military coup
in July, 2013. Libya witnessed a NATO-supported insur­
gency that eventually dislodged the Qaddafi regime. Syria harshly cracked
down on protestors, followed by insurgency, partial state failure, and the de
facto control of some parts of its territory by ISIS. Saudi Arabia has been
mostly quiet. This process and these varied outcomes are in need of
278
 Concepts 279

explanation. W hy is this happening at all? W hy in a “wave”?1 Finally, why

has contention been successful in some places, less successful in others, and
non-existent in still others? Revolutions and related efforts remain an impor­
tant part of the contemporary world, and they are among the most interesting
subjects in comparative politics.

Concepts
Students of comparative politics ask many questions about dramatic events like
social movements and revolutions. Why do some instances of collective action revolution A form of collective
achieve their apparent objectives, while others do not? How do individuals and action in which some large-scale,
groups select different strategies and tactics for the pursuit of their interests? structural change is either
Why are some conflicts “reformist” and others “revolutionary”? Why are some attempted or accomplished.
violent and others peaceful? In shedding light on these and other questions, com­
parative political analysis can help to influence policy choices for governments
and social movement organizers.
Conflict is a near constant of political life, because politics involves disputes
over resources. These include not only material resources, such as housing, food,
consumer goods, and access to services like medical care, but also less tangible
goods like status 2S\Apower? All modern societies distribute resources unequally,
though they vary considerably in the extent and form of this inequality. Politics
can be viewed as an arena in which resources are distributed, and one in which
conflict takes place over how they are distributed. In this chapter we consider
some of the many forms that such conflict takes. Social scientists interested in
studying conflict often refer to it as “contention.”3 They refer to the joint efforts contention The name, most
of individuals to bring about a preferred outcome as “collective action.” associated with scholars like Sidney
Tarrow and Charles Tilly, referring to
What Is "Contention"? the pursuit of collective goods
Conflict can be peaceful or violent, and can happen inside formal institutions or largely outside of formal political
outside of them. In democratic societies, conflict is normally channeled through institutions.
participation in electoral politics, via the institutions discussed in chapters 8
collective action The name given
through 11. For example, people can organize themselves into political parties
by social scientists to joint efforts of
and try to use these parties to gain office and work through the executive or leg­
individuals and groups to bring
islative branches of the state. Constitutions, discussed in chapter 8, can from this
about a shared, preferred outcome.
perspective be viewed as the formal rules in terms of which conflicts in a society
will be resolved. Non-democratic societies also sometimes have formal channels formal institutions Institutions
through which some conflict can be negotiated. For example, local councils or that are governed by formal rules
committees, as well as governmental organizations like the police, might be re­ and typically linked to complex
sponsive to citizen inquiries in some such societies. However, even in democratic organizations like the state or
societies formal politics is sometimes not sufficient to deal with conflicts. corporations.

Revolutionary and Non-Revolutionary Contention social movements Ongoing,

W hat political scientists call “contention” is behavior that occurs mostly out­ organized collective action oriented
side of formal political channels.4 The category includes social movements, toward a goal of social change.
280 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

social revolutions Revolutions social revolutions, insurgencies and civil wars, and even terrorism, as well as
that dramatically change social so-called “everyday forms of resistance,”5 in which people without the resources
structures. needed to organize themselves for ongoing mobilization nevertheless resist
power. Scholars try to understand both the nature of these different sorts of con­
insurgencies Contention with
formalized military conflict.
flict and their causes.
Perhaps the most fundamental difference is between forms of contention
civil wars Sustained military thought of as “revolutionary” and those that are not. Social scientists debate the
conflict between domestic actors. exact definition of revolutions, as we will see, but most agree that they either at­
tempt to or succeed in radically transforming social, political, and economic rela­
terrorism in the context of
tionships. O f course, other forms of contention also involve efforts to make
revolutions or insurgencies, a tactic
used by some participants that
change, but often more gradually or less radically.
involves violence directed at non­
military targets. Types
Not all forms of contention are as transformative as the “great social revolutions”
everyday resistance Efforts to
resist or obstruct authority that are
of France, Russia, and China. As we shall see in this section, scholars have de­
fined several distinct types of revolution according to actors’ aims or accomplish­
not clearly organized over time,
ments, and there are many important but non-revolutionary forms of social
such as work stoppages,
slowdowns, and sabotage.
change.

Social Movements
Social movements are in some ways the most normal of the major forms of con­
civil society A space in society tentious action and are considered a healthy part of civil society, at least in de­
outside of the organization of the mocracies.6 As discussed in chapter 3, “civil society” can mean different things,
state, in which citizens come but the main idea is that modern, democratic polities allow for citizens to come
together and organize themselves. together and debate questions of value and policy, ideally free from state coer­
cion.7 Thus civil society can be found in media sources like newspapers and the
Internet but also in public gatherings and interactions between citizens, and
above all in the social networks that make this kind of deliberation sustainable.
Social movement organizing takes place in this space: That is, social movements
have a kind of autonomy from the state.8
Social movements take place when citizens organize over time in the pursuit of
common purposes. For example, movements have sought the expansion of suf­
frage rights to women or members of minority groups or movements to advance
“pro-life” or “pro-choice” positions. In contrast, regardless of its goals, a sponta­
neous protest like a riot or a mob is not a social movement. Flowever, social
movements might use public demonstrations as a tactic. W hat would make a
string of public demonstrations a social movement, then, would be their common
underlying coordination.9 Some group or connected groups of people, linked via
social networks Structures of social networks, work together on common goals and use protest activity as a
social ties and connections among way of achieving those goals. Other tactics might include community organiz­
individuals. ing, “consciousness-raising,” educational or propagandistic work, and political
lobbying. Since social movement activity is the most “normal” of the major forms
of contentious action, most modern democratic societies have essentially reserved
a place for it alongside formal politics. Former social movement leaders often
enter into formal politics, perhaps most famously Congressman John Lewis, who
was the Chairman of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee in the
 Types 281

A protest by Spanish indignados (or "indignant ones") in 2012. These protests, which some
consider similar to the "Occupy" movement in the United States and elsewhere, were notable in
Spain, among other countries. Analysts note that Spain's very high rate of unemployment
contributed to discontent, especially for youth.

civil rights movement in the 1960s. Increasingly, social movement activity of this
sort is becoming transnational, crossing the boundaries of the nation-state and
taking place in what some call global civil society.10 Think, for example, of pro­
tests against globalization like the World Social Forum, the Occupy Movement,
or the demonstrations of the Spanish indignados (“indignant ones,” including
many unemployed and underemployed Spanish youth). These sorts of protests
often deliberately seek to cross national borders and to protest forces that do so
as well.11
Social movements organize, or coordinate collective action, in many different organization The ongoing
ways. Organizations created to serve the purposes of social movements are called coordination of collective action in
social movement organizations. While we must be careful to remember that the pursuit of common purposes.
movements do not reduce to such organizations, social movement organizations social movement organization
are often very important. Some are more elite-led, and others more grassroots. An organization that has been
For example, the Solidarity movement in the 1980s in Poland that eventually created to help maintain and lead
triumphed over the communists had clear leadership, while social-movement or­ social movement activity overtime.
ganizing against the authoritarian regime in Iran in 2009-2010 was more decen­
tralized, communicating via technology like texting, Twitter, and Facebook, and
even involving activists literally calling to one another from rooftops. Some are
highly unified, meaning that most activists agree and that there is not a lot of
competition between different groups with their own aims. Others are more
factious and divided. W hat seems to be true in most cases is that, for social
movement activity to endure, some organizing must take place, and this often
means that some individuals will be set off from other participants as leaders.
282 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

Brazil has often been considered a country of elite-led transitions 1. Why would Brazilian society have important populations
and non-revolutionary change, but in fact it has generated im­ interested in land reform?
portant examples of contentious action. One of the most inter­ 2. How did Brazilian activists organize to put land reform
esting cases is the Landless Workers Movement, which organized on local and national agendas? What sorts of organiza­
to try to make landownership more equal in this very unequal tional structures did they create to facilitate collective
society.12The movement has had some notable success and has action?
influenced the left-leaning governments of Luiz Inacio Lula da 3. Why might some people be worried about the potential
Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Rousseff (2011-present). co-optation of this movement?
See the case study of the Landless Workers Movement in the
Brazil country materials in Part VI, p. 410. As you read it, keep in
mind the following questions:

Some argue that social movement activity (like party organizing) eventually runs
iron law of oligarchy The idea, up against the “iron law of oligarchy”.13According to this theory, organizational
developed by Robert Michels, that leadership necessarily creates its own interests and every movement creates a new
collective action always produces elite. It is worth noting that these concerns apply not just to social movements
new elites. but also to other forms of contention discussed later.
Imagine that you and your classmates create a social movement. Your goal is to
organize in favor of curricular changes at your university (maybe you don’t want to
have to take comparative politics!). If there is broad consensus among the students,
there are clear and available mechanisms for communication (maybe on social
media), and, most important, if your goals are clear and minimal and do not en­
counter sharp resistance, relatively little organization and complex coordination
will be necessary. But what if the goals are less clear, or can only be accomplished
in stages, or meet with strong resistance by the administration? For example, you
want to take comparative politics but students have a number of conflicting sug­
gestions about how it should be taught. Then the movement will need to achieve
mobilization The engagement of ongoing mobilization. In this instance, some individuals are going to have to
individuals and groups in sustained assume positions of leadership, making decisions about what sorts of statements to
contention. issue, how to frame arguments and goals, and when to call for demonstrations.
Otherwise, individual protest actions will be easily dispersed.
Typically, some individuals form groups and present themselves as strategic
leaders. Once such groups are formed, the groups themselves, as well as the lead­
ers within them, often get a vested interest in the group and the movement.
Perhaps you were relatively unknown before the formation of the social move­
ment but now you have lots of status and a thousand friends (at least on Face-
book). Do you, upon the movement’s accomplishing its goals, really want to go
back to being that kid in the back of the classroom to whom nobody pays atten­
tion? Something of the same applies in “real world” social movements: Leaders
and their organizations often acquire status and power. This does not always lead
to conflict with the movement’s goals, but it can.
 Moreover, in most major social movements, alternative groups claim the
mantle of leadership. This can be seen clearly in the most famous social move­
ment in U.S. history, the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s, in which
there were periods of tension and cooperation between the Southern Christian
Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee (SNCC), as well as pre-existing organizations like the National As­
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) and more “radical”
organizations like the Nation of Islam and the Black Panther Party, which pre­
sented itself as leading a distinct, if related, “Black Power” movement.14 The
point is not that the leaders of these different groups pursued only their own
interests—they were all clearly devoted to the expansion of civil rights, and each
played an important role in the movement’s achievements—but that the interests
of organizations and their leaders matter in social movements.
At the same time, the American civil rights movement offers cautionary evi­
dence against simply associating social movements with their most visible leaders
and leading organizations. Grassroots participation and organization and on-
the-ground improvising were common. To take just one example, the Montgom­
ery Bus Boycott of 1955-1956 depended heavily on the ingenious improvisational
work of hundreds or even thousands of black citizens not identified as social
movement “leaders” in the conventional sense.15While social movement organi­
zation depends on official leaders, it also depends on the initiative of grassroots
activists.

Leaders and activists involved in the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which took place in 1955
and 1956 in Alabama.
284 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

Most important, movements are dependent on ongoing mobilization. A great

deal of work in recent years has been devoted to tracing and explaining different
patterns of mobilization. Two of the most important political scientists in this
area stress several key “mechanisms of mobilization,” including “diffusion, bro­
kerage, and new coordination.”16 This means that when mobilization happens
successfully, it spreads, often “shifting scales” (moving from the local to the state,
national, or global level or else moving in the other direction from more macro
levels to local activism); it involves individuals, groups, and organizations bring­
ing previously disconnected actors together in pursuit of common goals; and it
involves novel efforts on the part of those actors to work together.17We can think
of this as basically an effort to break down some of the elements of what is hap­
pening when a social movement achieves mobilization. An important part of
explaining any social movement is explaining how such steps are traversed.
Social movements shade into other forms of contention. Since social move­
ment activity has been normalized in contemporary democracies,18 it shades into
electoral politics. Social movements also shade into revolutions. We can distin­
guish revolutions from social movements based on differences in goals or in con­
sequences, though there is perhaps no single clear line separating the two
categories. Social movements tend to be viewed as reformist. They aim to make a
society live up to some of its idealized values, or to extend rights associated with
citizenship to groups to which those rights were previously denied. In other
words, social movements aim to affect important social change but not dramatic
structural transformation. Revolutions, in contrast, aim at the latter.19

Revolutions
Most commentators agree that revolutions must be relatively sudden and must
achieve dramatic social and political change. Beyond this, revolutions are chal­
lenging to define.20 They must be transformative, at least in intent, and, depend­
ing on how narrowly we want to define “revolutions,” in their actual consequences.21
Thus, a reform program is not a revolution, though failed reforms can help pro­
duce revolutions.22They must involve, like social movements, some level of popu­
lar mobilization.22. Given the difficulty in defining “revolution,” one common
strategy has been to enumerate types of revolutions. One basic distinction is be­
tween so-called social revolutions and more limited political revolutions.24
Social revolutions transform social and political structures. In other words,
they make major changes in how power and other resources are distributed in
society. For thinkers like Karl Marx, social revolutions more specifically trans­
class structure The ongoing and
form the distribution of material resources among groups. Contentious action,
according to this line of thinking, is only a social revolution if the class structure
patterned relationships between
"classes," typically understood as
is transformed. Thus the Russian Revolution of 1917 would be considered a social
groups of individuals linked
revolution because it used the power of the state to transform the basis of eco­
together by economic interest or
nomic activity, for example, by “nationalizing” industries, redistributing land
activity.
from wealthy landowners to collectives comprised of peasants, and so forth. The
political revolutions Revolutions, same is true of the French Revolution, which essentially destroyed France’s no­
the main effect of which is to alter bility and the social system on which it rested.
political institutions rather than Political revolutions are probably more common than social revolutions.
social and economic structures. A political revolution changes political institutions like the state rather
 Types 285

than transforming social structures like a class system or the basic features of an
economy. It is important to distinguish political revolutions from other kinds of
political change, however. Electoral transference of power between parties or
groups would not be considered a political revolution, because it would not actu­
ally change political structures. For example, when a new president is elected in
the United States, no new constitution is written, and no radical changes to the
structure of government itself are contemplated: The new administration seeks
only to use those structures somewhat differently than its predecessor and, per­
haps, to gradually reshape them. Likewise, incremental changes in political
structures through, say, consecutive constitutional amendments would not be
considered a political revolution, because political revolutions are typically un­
derstood to happen suddenly.
We might also like to distinguish coups d’etat, which often present them­
selves as “revolutions,” from revolutions themselves. For some scholars, what
would distinguish a coup d’etat from a revolution is that the former is elite- coup d'etat The use offeree or
driven (typically by the military and sometimes in alliance with civilian actors), threat offeree, typically by the
whereas revolutions necessarily involve the mobilization of some other important military or a coalition involving the
groups besides elite actors holding formal power. However, sometimes military military, to impose a non-electoral
leaders respond to ongoing public mobilization by staging a coup. In such in­ change of government.
stances, depending on the outcome, scholars are more likely to consider the event
a revolution.26
Other examples of political revolutions might include some of the Latin
American wars of independence in the early nineteenth century and the wave of
anti-Soviet revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s and early
1990s. In these latter cases, far-reaching political transformations took place, and
the satellite states of the Soviet Union were replaced with democratic republics. anti-colonial revolutions
These changes, in turn, gave rise to economic changes that impacted the class Revolutions brought by subjugated
structure in these societies: Most political scientists would still consider these populations against colonial
“political revolutions,” however, since such changes were not direct aims or con­ powers, typically with the purpose
sequences of the revolutions in question. of removing them so that the
A third possible type is anti-colonial revolutions.27 Most of the social and society in guestion can achieve
political revolutions discussed so far in this chapter are made against the state independence.

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The French Revolution PAGE 437
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The French Revolution might be the most iconic and well-studied 1. Why would the French aristocracy help bring about re­
revolution, and leaders of other revolutions have often looked to forms that ended up undermining its group interests?
its history for guidance.25While not all scholars consider it the first 2. Why do some scholars see this as a "bourgeois
modern revolution, most agree that it was seen as novel and that revolution"?
it dramatically influenced and still shapes revolutionary patterns. 3. Flow do causal factors like state weakness, status-order
For more on the French Revolution, see the case study in Part problems, and new, potentially revolutionary, ideologies
VI, pp. 437-438. As you read it, keep in mind the following like nationalism interact in this case?
questions:
286 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

The French Revolution has been a model for many revolutionaries ever since it took place, and it
is a case that has been considered by virtually all theorists of revolution.

and/or the groups controlling the state before the revolution. But sometimes
groups are subject to the domination of powers beyond their own nations
and states. In such cases, those powers are sometimes the ultimate targets of the
revolution. For example, in the middle of the twentieth century numerous anti­
colonial revolutions, typically motivated by nationalism, were made against colo­
nial powers as well as local interests perceived to serve them. Their articulated
goal was the removal of these powers so that the nation could “rule itself” inde­
pendently. Whether anti-colonial revolutions should be considered a type of
political revolution or their own category is open to debate.
The fact that formal colonialism is now relatively rare has not stopped all
Third-World revolutions scholars from treating “Third World Revolutions” as a distinct type.28 Accord­
A concept developed by John ing to such scholars, inequalities in the developing world depend for their en­
Foran holding that revolutions in forcement not just on the states, armies, and police of those states themselves, but
the developing world have special on an international networks of more powerful states (e.g., the United States,
characteristics. Western Europe, Japan, perhaps now China) and international organizations
(e.g., the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund). “Third World Rev­
olutions,” these scholars argue, therefore have distinct dynamics and should be
analyzed separately. Just the same, this category overlaps with the broader dis­
tinction between social and political revolutions. A given case might, for certain
purposes, be classified as both a political revolution and a “Third World” or anti­
colonial one.
subaltern Occupying lower rungs Revolutions may take place “from below” or “from above.” All revolutions
in a hierarchical system. involve elite and subaltern actors (those lower down the social hierarchy or with
 Types 287

less power and status before the revolution), but some are more and some less
elite-driven than others. This distinction is complicated by the fact that, as we
will see in the “Causes and Effects” section, different theories of revolution place
greater or lesser emphasis on elite and popular participation in explaining revolu­
tions. In any case, the categories of revolutions “from below” or “from above” cut
across some of the other types of revolutions discussed in this section. For ex­
ample, India’s anti-colonial resistance included both elite and subaltern actors.

Insurgencies and Civil Wars

Insurgencies can be thought of as enduring, organized, armed actors contesting
the power of the state. Insurgencies in some instances shade into revolutions, and
many insurgencies claim to be making revolutions. Insurgencies also sometimes
look like social movements, and they can often be tied to social movements car­
ried out by civilians. We might distinguish insurgencies from revolutions and
social movements, however, by the degree of formalization of military conflict.29
One notable recent work defines insurgents as “nonstate armed actors that use
violence to reformulate or destroy the foundations of politics in a given coun­
try.”30 Often, conflicts between groups of insurgents or between insurgents and
the state are classified as “civil wars.”
Sometimes it is difficult to distinguish revolutions from the civil conflicts to
which they give rise.31 For example, consider the U.S. Civil War. If it had turned
out differently, it might have been subsequently defined as a political revolution,
even though the goals of the Confederacy were conservative. Consider further
the wars of independence in Latin America in the early nineteenth century.
These were revolutions, though they did not achieve major social-structural
change. They were led at first by civilians who aimed to create independent re­
publics and to make citizens where there was before only the monarchy and its
subjects. However, because Spain used its army to attempt to put down these
revolutions, the conflict took military form. Different actors in these societies
took sides. A number of groups were loyal to the crown and fought against the
revolutionaries, and thus we might even think of these conflicts as “civil wars.”32
Insurgencies might develop when several conditions occur. First, a govern­
ment that oppresses the residents of a given region, class, or group, or one that
otherwise seriously fails to fulfill their expectations, is likely to generate the
desire for insurgent activity. Second, a political system that does not allow for
other avenues for the expression and resolution of grievances increases the likeli­
hood of insurgency. Third, a weak state increases the chances of an insurgency
developing. For an insurgency to endure, neither the insurgents nor the state can
be strong enough to decisively win. Guerrilla tactics are designed to produce just guerrilla tactics Military
this sort of situation.33 This often leads to protracted conflicts spanning years or techniques designed to produce
even decades. ongoing stalemate, usually
employed in situations of
Terrorism asymmetric military capability.
Definitions of terrorism have been controversial. We can define it as broadly as
the use or threat of violence for political ends, or as narrowly as the use of vio­
lence by nonstate actors against civilians for the purpose of reducing civilian
support for one or another official policy. Some would argue that terrorism
288 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

should be seen as a tactic or strategy rather than a distinctive type of contentious

action.34 If we view terrorism in this way, then it really is nothing more than a
potential tool of individuals and groups participating in the other forms of con­
tention discussed in this chapter. Yet terrorism is a concept that appears more
complex upon examination. It necessarily involves violence, or at least the threat
of violence. Definitions of terrorism must all take into account the following
issues: (1) who or what is perpetrating the violence; (2) who or what is the target
of the violence; and (3) the goals, purposes, or consequences of the violence.
Not all definitions give the same answer to each of these questions.
The broadest definitions of terrorism say that it makes no difference who or
what is carrying it out.35 Most important, they accept that states can be terrorist
actors. This was the original meaning of the concept, which derives from descrip­
tions of the violence of the French Revolution.36 States like the former Soviet
Union, Nazi Germany, or Chile under Pinochet (1973-1990), in executing thou­
sands of citizens (or many more in the former two cases) without fair trials, em­
ploying torture, and so forth, were doing essentially the same thing as nonstate
actors like al Qaeda or would-be state actors like the so-called Islamic State (also
known by the acronyms ISIS or ISIL). Narrower definitions seek to exclude
state-led terrorism, or at least to designate a separate category (“state terrorism”)
for it.37 The rationale for this is that the causes of organized violence perpetrated
by a state and by a group of clandestine civilians are likely to be very different
even if, for the victims, the effects are the same.
Broad definitions of terrorism say that the judgment of whether a given case
of violence is terrorism does not depend on the status or identity of its victims.
Narrower definitions tend to exclude violence directed toward certain classes of
victims. For example, some would not consider violence directed at military in­
stallations or at military personnel, particularly in wartime, to be terrorism.38
The question gets a bit fuzzier when we consider other functionaries of the state:
Is violence carried out against the police terrorism? W hat about bombing a gov­
ernment building, such as a post office, when it is closed after working hours?
The narrowest definitions assert that a distinctive feature of terrorism is that its
victims are themselves civilians.39 Broad definitions, again, say that the “pur­
poses” of the violence are unimportant, or that they cannot even be reliably
known.40 Narrower definitions claim that, to be terrorism, violence must be in­
tended to instill fear in a population.41 Still narrower definitions assert that this
intended fear must be part of a calculated strategy to bring about some major
political change.42
As with revolutions, terrorism can be divided into types. For example, some
terrorism— sometimes called “demonstrative terrorism”—seeks to make a show
for publicity purposes, while “destructive terrorism” is oriented more directly
toward coercion.43 The best conceptualization and definition of terrorism de­
pends on the sorts of questions that a scholar is asking. If we are interested in the
question of how terrorism affects civilian victims, we might want to include vio­
lence carried out by both nonstate actors and states in our definition (unless we
have reason to believe that who does the violence makes a difference in how it is
experienced by its victims). If we are interested, though, in explaining common
patterns of civilian-on-civilian violence in places like Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and
 Types 289

Understanding Terror Networks

INSIGHTS
■
by Mark Sageman

esearchers like Marc Sageman take a “social networks" per­

R
the organizations means multiple actions can be carried out si­
spective on these groups, meaning that they look at terrorist multaneously, and that not all participants have full knowledge
linkages as webs of relationships rather than as formal organiza­ of plans or even of the group's structure. Of course this carries
tions or as ideological groups. According to Sageman, at least certain disadvantages for such groups as well, particularly inef­
through the mid-2000s, al Qaeda was part of a "small world net­ ficiency. However, it helps to explain the resilience and endur­
work' characterized by “dense interconnectivity.*,4This contrasts ance of such networks. Some terrorist groups, such as the
sharply with the structure of a formal military organization or Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), have in recent years been
even a typical social movement, which tend to be more fixed in engaged in quasi-state-building activities. The more successful
structure and hierarchical. they are in this regard, the more centralized their organizational
As Sageman suggests, this network structure of many con­ structures will become (if the reason why is not clear, think back
temporary terrorist groups has important implications. Gov­ to chapter 3). As such, it may be that terrorist groups vary signifi­
ernments opposing such groups cannot just take out “the cantly in terms of their organizational and network structures.
leader," whose importance may be mostly symbolic, since Mark Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks. Philadelphia: University of
others can easily take his/her place. The decentralized nature of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

Israel/ Palestine, we might opt for a narrower definition. In such cases we would
probably exclude violence carried out by a state.
Some prominent examples of contemporary terrorism act as “terror networks,”
exhibiting a particular pattern of organization. If we focus our attention on con­
temporary “terror networks” rather than on terrorism as a tactic, we might find
something more comparable to the other types of conflict discussed in this chap­
ter, though most acts of terrorism are not carried out by networks of this sort.
Much of the attention has been on organizations like al Qaeda and related
groups.

"Everyday Resistance"
Some groups resist when they don't have the organizational resources to mobilize
into social movements or revolutions. Banditry and other forms of resistance de­
fined by the broader society as “crime” can often be understood in this way.45
Subaltern groups employ what the political scientist James Scott has called
“weapons of the weak” to practice “everyday resistance.”46 For example, they
might struggle symbolically against inequality by telling stories that challenge
prevailing power relations. They might struggle against it materially by engaging
in tactics like work stoppage, slowdowns, boycotts, or even sabotage (some of
these behaviors can be used as tactics in social movement organizing as well, of
course). As Scott describes such efforts, “they require little or no coordination or
planning; they make use of implicit understandings and informal networks; they
often represent a form of individual self-help; they typically avoid any direct,
symbolic confrontation with authority.”47
Why would some individuals and groups resist inequalities in this way,
rather than through formal political participation or joining social movements
290 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

and revolutions? The short answer is that there are often barriers to participa­
tion in these sorts of activities. Subaltern groups likely to engage in “everyday
resistance” are also likely to be excluded from formal politics. This may because
of an autocratic state or simply a matter of their distance from formal political
life. For example, a centralized authoritarian state might deliberately not extend
any political voice to the rural poor. Or political parties in an established de­
mocracy may discover that there are no gains to be made in catering to margin­
alized constituencies, either because their numbers aren’t sufficient, or they
aren’t perceived to be likely to vote, or no other parties are competing for their
support.
But why wouldn’t such people just join social movements or revolutions?
At first glance, it may seem harder to understand why someone would engage in
“everyday resistance” rather than other forms of contentious politics. Here we
need to step back and think about what makes mobilization possible. In the case
of resistance against totalitarian regimes like the Nazis, the answer is clear:
A repressive state makes organizing too dangerous. But what about other
circumstances?
Let us consider a fictitious (though fairly realistic) scenario. The residents of a
rural region in a developing country live in small villages. Each village family
has its own plot of land. They have traditional privileges to cultivate this land but
no formal property rights, and the villagers share in farming some commonly
held land. Villages are themselves separated by great distances, dangerous roads,
and harsh mountain conditions. The state, aiming to increase agricultural pro­
duction for export, establishes a company that will oversee the cultivation of
non-traditional crops, say, pineapples and bananas. However, rather than orga­
nizing workers into a formal labor force on industrial plantations, this company
keeps workers in their traditional villages, paying them piecemeal for their pro­
duction of bananas and pineapples, and questions their claims to use the land
traditionally allotted to them. The residents of these distinct villages may define
their interests in similar terms: Under ideal circumstances, they might want to
organize to remove the company, or to gain a voice in its decision making, or
simply for higher wages. However, their ability to do so depends on their ability
individualization The treatment to transcend the individualization of their behavior and goals. They need some
of problems as linked to the mechanism of communication through which they can agree about these goals
interests of individuals rather than and coordinate their action. In the circumstances described, this becomes very
as issues of common concern or difficult. Individuals without the resources to resist collectively often resist in the
interest. only ways that they can. If communication between individuals with common
interests is difficult and restricted to the local level, direct resistance and ob­
struction of perceived opponents rather than social movements and revolutions
to dislodge or replace them are likely.

collective behavior A paradigm Thinking About Contention: Summary

for understanding various forms of Scholars have a variety of views on how distinct are these different types of
contention, popular for part of the contentious action. Some decades ago, most of them were placed under the
twentieth century, which general category of collective behavior.48 But now we often try to treat them
emphasized the irrational, social- separately (though, admittedly, many social scientists continue to focus on
psychological dynamics of protest. common features of different types of collective action). For example, some
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen? 291

scholars specialize in explaining social revolutions and others social move­

ments, assuming that these are distinct phenomena with distinct causes. Some
argue, though, that we can treat them as existing on a continuum of contentious
action.49 These phenomena— and their causes—can overlap. We divide them
here—as ideal types—for the sake of clarity, but in reality the lines separating
different forms of contention are not always so clear.50 Moreover, an instance of
collective action can change form, moving, say, from everyday resistance to
social movement organizing to social revolution.

Causes and Effects: Why Do

Revolutions Happen?
There are a number of theories that have been used to explain contentious action.
Here for the sake of clarity we focus on explanations of revolutions specifically.
It is worth noting, however, that each of the explanatory strategies discussed here
have been applied (with differing levels of success) to many of the forms of con­
tentious action discussed previously. As you go over these explanatory theories,
think about how they might be modified and applied to other forms of conflict.
Note that some theories try to explain why revolutions and other forms of con­
tention are attempted and others try to explain why they are successful, a subtle
but important difference.

Relative Deprivation
According to our first theory, relative deprivation can change people’s psychology
and increase the demand for social transformation. This family of theories at­
tempts to explain revolutions as abnormal deviations from a normal status quo.
The theory assumes that societies tend toward a kind of “equilibrium” state in
which conflict is normalized or settled through formal political channels.
However, sometimes certain conditions—for example, rapid economic growth,
efforts to reform the state, or the intervention of a foreign power—produce dis­
equilibrium to which revolution serves as a response. This theory goes by different strain theory A theory suggesting
names (as it has been presented in different forms) such as strain theory;51 the that major social change causes
“collective behavior theory”;52 “social psychological theories”;53 or even the social “strain" or conflict which
Tocqueville effect.54 Most theories of this kind specify a social psychological increases demand for revolution.
mechanism linking changes in the social order to the desire for rapid social
Tocqueville effect The name
transformation. People’s lives are disrupted, this produces tension, and they re­
given by some scholars to
solve that tension through reconstructing society and its political institutions.
Tocqueville's observation that
There are certain surprising things about many revolutions that “disequilib­
changing relative status positions
rium theory” can help to explain. Some major revolutions have taken place
were an important factor in some
during or just after periods of economic growth or some other sort of improve­
groups participating in the French
ment in the lives of one or another group.55 This seems surprising, as we might
Revolution.
intuitively expect groups that are suffering to be more inclined to revolutionary
behavior (and sometimes they are!). However, this theory suggests that dra­ relative deprivation The state of
matic upward and downward mobility raise the possibility of revolutions, be­ having or feeling that one has less
cause they upset established conventions and status-relationships and open up than other members of one's
the possibility of a potentially revolutionary group experiencing relative reference group (including one's
deprivation.56 own group over time).
292 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

You likely are already aware of the Russian Revolution of 1917, than leaders and groups, produce revolution (an idea with which
sometimes called the Bolshevik Revolution, which brought into Lenin did not entirely disagree).
being the Soviet Union. This was one of the most consequential To learn more about this process, see the case study in the
revolutions in history, in part because its success contributed to Russian country profile materials in Part VI, p. 536. As you read it,
the polarization of global politics throughout much of the twen­ keep in mind the following questions:
tieth century. The Russian Revolution is interesting, though, not 1. What were the major factors that increased the probabil­
just because of its consequences, but because of how it stands in ity of revolution in Russia?
relation to revolutionary theory. It was a Marxist revolution that 2. What is a "Leninist party," and how important were Lenin
didn't strictly follow Marx's template, in particular because of in­ and the sort of organization he championed to the revo­
novations made by Russian Marxists, especially Vladimir Lenin. lution's success? More generally, what does the Russian
Among other things, Lenin emphasized that revolution was pos­ case tell us about how much individuals and leaders
sible in Russia even though it had not experienced the most matter?
robust capitalist modernization. He also emphasized that a small 3. Could the Russian Revolution have produced a different
"vanguard” of organizers could lead a revolution, which some outcome, or was Soviet authoritarianism inevitable given
think contradicts Marx's idea that major structural forces, rather the conditions of Russian society at the time?

absolute deprivation A condition

Resource Mobilization and Political Opportunities
of being deprived of resources
Theories of relative deprivation focus on explaining demand for revolution.
below some given threshold, as
By contrast, “resource mobilization” theories assume frequent or even constant
distinguished from relative
demand for social change, often treating it as a consequence of absolute
deprivation.
deprivation rather than relative deprivation. Proponents of this theory argue
political opportunities The that what matters in producing a revolution are political opportunities or events
availability of political options to that allow potential revolutionaries to “mobilize resources.”57 The most
redress grievances.

INSIGHTS
Political Order in Changing Societies and W hy Men Rebel
by .bimuetHuntington arid Jed Gut;

ere we jointly consider two classic works by different politi­ While Huntington placed less emphasis on social psychologi­
&
H cal scientists who shared partially overlapping perspectives. cal aspects of this process, others, like Gurr, focused attention on
Huntington argued that revolution takes place when the devel­ relative deprivation as the linkage between modernization, aspi­
opment of the political system lags behind economic and social ration, and dissent. In other words, revolutions are explained by
modernization. This process creates demands for broader incor­ the social psychology of status differences. Both of these theo­
poration of groups that previously were not involved in political ries owe a good deal to the classic works of Alexis de Tocqueville
life, but institutions are not able to accommodate those de­ and Crane Brinton. Critics of this theory assert that it is overly
mands. As he put it, "ascending or aspiring groups and rigid or general and that it assumes that consensus rather than conflict is
inflexible institutions are the stuff of which revolutions are the normal state of affairs in society.
made."58 Revolutions are most likely when, during moderniza­
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in C hanging Societies. New Haven: Yale
tion, the alienation of a frustrated and growing middle class takes University Press, 1968: and Ted Gurr, Why Men Rebel. Princeton: Princeton
place at the same time as the alienation of the rural poor.59 University Press, 1970.
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen? 293

important political opportunity for revolutions is state breakdown, when a state state breakdown Dramatic
loses its ability to carry out its core functions and to stifle dissent.60 Other politi­ decline in state capacity.
cal opportunities that might facilitate contentious action would include elite con­
flict, military or other coercive forces becoming discontent with the prevailing
order, the opening of a political system, or the creation of new groups or com­
munication technologies that facilitate organizing.61
Another set of resources for would-be revolutionaries are pre-existing pat­
terns of mobilization. If we return to our previous example in the “Everyday
Resistance” discussion, we would say that the villages described there had a low
potential for mobilization. This is why we would expect the villagers to engage in
“everyday resistance” rather than organized strikes, social movement activity, or
revolution. However, some other environments provide patterns of mobilization
that can facilitate organizing and collective action and can thus be thought of as
resources. For example, in a heavily industrialized society, factory workers labor
closely together and may have a history of mobilization via labor union organiz­
ing. In this instance, there is a pre-existing pattern of mobilization, as well as
potential organizational resources, which can be put to new uses.
In an industrial setting, the relevant organizational resources would be the
labor unions themselves. However, organizational resources can take many forms.
W hat is key to all of them is that organizational resources allow some central
coordination, which can be important in early mobilization: It is very difficult for
any given leadership to remain in control of a revolutionary process for long.
Along similar lines, social networks and media access are important resources
facilitating contentious action.
Finally, political opportunity and resource mobilization theorists are inter­
ested in access to material resources. Revolutions, like any other collective behav­
ior, need to be financed. This doesn’t mean that they have formal budgets and
actors responsible for balancing them, of course, but especially in those many
revolutions in which violence is a key tactic, revolutionary actors need access to
weapons, meeting places, and supplies for the combatants.

CASE IN CONTEXT

The Chinese Revolution page42s

In some ways the Chinese Revolution imitated the Russian China country profile materials in Part VI, pp. 425-426. Those
Revolution described in the previous section. Like the Russian questions are the following:
Revolution, it was based on Marxism, and many of its leaders 1. When did the Chinese Revolution begin or end? Was the
hoped to create a world of equality and social harmony. How­ overthrow of the Qing Dynasty in 1911 and the establish­
ever, it evidenced some major differences, perhaps the most ment of the republic its own revolution, or just a part of
important being the centrality of peasant participation (Marx the broader revolution that led to the establishment of
thought that peasants were not revolutionary, but Mao Zedong the (Communist) People's Republic of China in 1949?
felt that in Chinese circumstances the peasants were the most 2. Why did the communists, rather than their opponents,
important revolutionary class). the "nationalists," triumph in the Chinese Revolution?
This revolution raises two key questions that interest us, and Does this case show us that organizational resources and
you can consider them further by looking at the case study in the practices are key to successful revolutions?
294 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

INSIGHTS
States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of
France, Russia, and China
by Theda Skocppl

kocpol's theory is a structuralist theory of revolutions. This

•

mobilization accompanies "state breakdown," successful revolution

&
S means that she aims to explain social revolutions by focusing will take place. Skocpol's emphasis on state breakdown was antici­
on the behavior of social structures (most importantly, states and pated by scholars like Alexis de Tocqueville and Crane Brinton, and
social classes) rather than individuals and their beliefs, goals, and has been carried forward byJackGoldstone and others.
strategies. In concentrating on her three main cases of France, Critics of this theory worry that it is too mechanistic, that it
Russia, and China, Skocpol found two necessary conditions which leaves out human agency, and that it pays little attention to cul­
she argued together cause social revolution. First, state collapse, ture and ideology.62Others suggest that it only applies to a lim­
provoked by foreign conflict, creates the possibility of revolt, divid­ ited range of cases.
ing elites. Second, certain conditions facilitate revolt among the Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of
rural poor. According to this theory, if the potential for peasant France, Russia, and China. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Rational Choice
The rational choice theory of revolutions says that to understand revolutions we
need to understand the conditions under which it becomes rational for people
to engage in collective action.63 Proponents of the rational choice theory of con­
tentious action, including revolution, sometimes present it as a complement to
resource mobilization/political opportunity theory.64 It shares the general as­
sumption that conflict is endemic to society and that individuals rationally pursue
their own interests. However, it pushes these assumptions much further.
This approach focuses on individuals’ rational analysis of costs and benefits for
participation in contentious action. According to this theory, states hold together
when they prevent individuals from making the choice to pursue dissenting in­
terests through alternative organizations.65 When states are successful in doing
this, they hold together because the majority of individuals—even if they do not
like the state or the regime that controls it—judge that it would not be in their
own interests to engage in protest activity or revolution. Indeed, according to this
theory, this is the state of affairs most of the time: It is seldom rational for the
individual to join organized protest activity.
For example, imagine that you are disaffected with life in your society, frus­
trated that you have to take so many courses to get a college degree, irritated that
those who hold power get to decide what will happen in class and can coerce you
into reading certain books (like this one). You meet someone who suggests that
you should join their revolutionary group, which will seek to overturn the aca­
demic hierarchy by force and award PhDs to everyone on the grounds that they
have already learned a lot in the “real world.” For the sake of argument, imagine
that you agree with the beliefs and goals of their group and that you would really
like to see such a social revolution take place (but please don’t contemplate this
too seriously!).66 You have basically two choices: You can join the revolutionary
group or you can choose not to join. There are also two basic possible outcomes:
The revolution might succeed or it might fail. Chances are, your participation
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen?

ta b le 12.1 Is It Rational to Join the Revolution?

Participate Do Not Participate

Revolution Succeeds Share in collective benefits Share in collective benefits

Revolution Fails Face personal costs Face no personal costs

really isn’t going to make the difference. So if you think in purely rational terms
and only of your own interests and goals, you will likely conclude that the right
thing to do is to abstain from joining and to just hope that the revolution suc­
ceeds. If you join and it fails you will likely face sanctions, like jail time or worse.
If you abstain and it fails there will be no cost and no benefit. If you abstain and
it succeeds there will be no cost and all of the benefits. If you join and it succeeds
you will reap these same benefits but will have to bear the costs of risk and par­
ticipation. Table 12.1 illustrates a basic scenario of this sort in which it would be
irrational to join a revolution.
In other words, the rational thing to do is to be a free rider: not join and hope free rider Someone who benefits
others do the job for you. This is how rational choice theory explains the relative from a collective or public good
strength of states and the weakness and infrequency of revolutions despite the without contributing to it.
fact that they believe conflict is endemic to society. Most people make the ratio­
nal choice to not participate in revolutions most of the time, even those people
who have an individual interest in dramatic social change.
Efforts to explain revolution and related activities, from this point of view,
should focus on conditions that alter the rational calculus of interest of potential
revolutionaries, as illustrated in Table 12.2.
If a situation becomes so polarized that there will likely be costs brought to
bear on individuals by both sides (the state and a revolutionary group), this in­
creases the cost of abstention. If this is coupled with a perceived weakness of the
state, this will likely increase the willingness of a number of individuals to join
the revolution. Another example: If the revolution’s success seems fairly likely,
and its current participants can plausibly promise rewards to participants, this
will also likely increase participation.

ta b le 12.2 One Scenario in Which Many Actors May Judge

It Rational to Join the Revolution
Participate Do Not Participate

Revolution Succeeds Share in collective benefits but Share in collective benefits,

also receive personal favors and but no personal favors or
special access to resources special access to resources.
because 1am a "revolutionary."

Revolution Fails Low likelihood of personal costs My group may be targeted for
because the state is weak and so reprisal, so 1may face personal
many people are participating in costs even though 1didn't
the revolution. participate.
296 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

The Rebel's Dilemma

INSIGHTS
by A' '-
" Lichbach

L
ichbach develops Mancur Olson's approach to the "logic of to “increasing the possibility of making a difference," from "in­
collective action” discussed in the last chapter, creating a creasing the possibility of winning" to “lowering costs." The logic
powerful theory of dissent and pioneering the application of of our description of rationalist analyses of revolutionary partici­
collective action theories to revolutions and related forms of pation follows from his work in The Rebel's Dilemma.
contention. According to Lichbach, the analysis of revolutions Critics might charge that this theory makes the unrealistic as­
and other forms of collective action involves discerning the solu­ sumption that human beings are always self-interested and ratio­
tion to collective action problems arrived at in particular cases. nal. Some might also suggest that this approach is insufficiently
In other words, we need to figure out the circumstances under attentive to social structures.
which it would be rational for one or another individual to join in Mark Lichbach, The Rebel's Dilemma. Arm Arbor: University of Michigan Press,
contention. Solutions run the gamut from "increasing benefits" 1995.

Cultural or "Framing" Explanations

Proponents of cultural or “framing” theories argue that previous theories like
resource mobilization or political opportunity theory pay insufficient attention to
variation in how social movement and revolutionary actors think about their par­
ticipation, and the causal impact of differences in how movements’ and revolu­
tions’ targets are “framed.”67 Others argue that contention itself has changed,
becoming more focused on cultural issues like “identity.”68 Many are interested
in “new social movements” like the global feminist movement or movements that
mobilize around ethnic identities, a subject to which we turn in chapter 14.69
framing The way in which a given The core idea of framing is that every type of social action we engage in takes
problem or situation is described place via “discourse” or “stories” that we tell about ourselves, our behavior, and its
and understood, with implications context.70 Participants in all kinds of social behavior aim to construct narratives
for how it might be addressed. that make sense of their behavior in the social environment. Your act of reading
this textbook might be “framed” in relation to a basic narrative about how you are
a student enrolled in a college or university. Your long-term horizon probably
includes some sort of job or advanced study (and hopefully a job after that!). Your
act of reading is likely framed in relation to your role. As a student, you want or
are expected to learn, and your act of reading the text is, at least officially, under­
stood in this light. Note that these “frames” are more or less collective in charac­
ter. In other words, you can reject them privately if you want to, but it is very
difficult to do so publicly—say, by standing up in class and telling your instructor
that you don’t want to learn—without facing consequences.
According to these theories, the same is true in situations of social movements
and revolutions. If you were to stand up in your classroom and declare that you
are starting a social revolution, it is unlikely that this frame would “make sense”
to those around you. More likely, they would have an alternative frame via which
to interpret your outburst: You “are weird” or “have issues.” Even if one thinks
that common interests would suggest that some group, say factory workers,
should organize or even revolt, if the appropriate frames are not in place it is
unlikely that they will be successful. The factory worker in the United States who
stands on the shop floor and declares a social revolution is likely to be greeted
with the same response as our fictional student doing the same in class.
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Revolutions Happen? 297

Iran's Islamic Revolution and "Green Revolution"? PAGE 478

In 1979, many observers were surprised when a revolution swept 1. Was the Iranian Revolution "reactionary"? Is a religious
the Shah out of power in Iran, putting a religious regime in the revolution a contradiction in terms or just unusual when
place of his more secular dictatorship. Many revolutions seem to judged against the background of modern European
be "left wing," which in many people's minds means socialist and revolutions?
secular. Yet here was a conservative revolution that seemed, at 2. What caused the Iranian revolution? How important
least, to be counter-modernizing. Of course, the reality on the were religious ideas? Does the Iranian Revolution en­
ground was more complicated. The coalition that led to the hance the plausibility of cultural/framing theories of
Shah's downfall brought together many actors, from religious revolution?
leaders like the Ayatollah Khomeini to secular Marxists to middle- 3. Why did this revolution take place in Iran but not in
class students. Just the same, the revolution has been taken by other Islamic countries at the time, like Egypt or Saudi
many to call into question existing theories of revolution.71 Arabia?
For more on the Iranian Revolution, see the case study in the
Iran Country Profile materials in Part VI, p. 478. As you read it, keep
in mind the following questions:

So where do frames come from? They are part of culture. Different communi­
ties, practices, and walks of life exhibit shifting “frames” through which social
problems and appropriate responses are constantly interpreted. The idea is the
same, however: Contentious action like revolution can only take place when par­
ticipants have a frame for conceiving of it and talking about it. In many, if not
most, modern social revolutions this language is provided by nationalism.72 Some
scholars have even argued that the very idea of revolution (sometimes called “rev­
olutionism”) is itself a prerequisite for revolutionary activity.73 From this point of
view, revolution cannot take place simply whenever there is inequality, anger, and
frustration. Rather, revolution is only possible when the idea of revolution al­
ready exists as a model for addressing that discontent. Scholars increasingly em­
phasize that ideas about how to protest play an important role in contention.74
Others stress the enduring influence of ideologies, a subject to which we turn in
chapter 15.75 One relatively recent theory of revolutions in the developing world,
along somewhat similar lines, stresses the importance of “political cultures of
opposition.”76
As you approach the close of this chapter, you now know that scholars have a
range of ways in which they conceptualize and explain contention, and that they
do not all agree. In general, though, theories might lead us to expect that several
conditions would increase the likelihood of successful contention:
1. Some pre-existing grievances felt by one or more groups.
2. A weakening in the institutions that repress collective dissent, yet without
sufficient political opening such that disputes can be resolved via formal
political institutions.
3. The emergence of new methods or means of organizing and communication,
whether these be technological (e.g., newspapers, social networking sites,
enhanced transportation) or of some other form (e.g., semi-spontaneous
298 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions

INSIGHTS
by John Foran -

I n a book that aims to explain a large number of revolutions in the necessity of "political cultures of opposition." For a revolu­
I the developing world, Foran brings together several elements tion to take place, the actors involved must be united by a lan­
of many of the theories noted in this section of the chapter. To guage that (1) makes sense of their grievances and (2) channels
these he adds two things. First, he argues that to understand them toward revolutionary activity, rather than quiescence or
revolutions in the developing world we need look beyond just everyday resistance.
the actors in the specific societies in which revolutions are taking Critics of such approaches suggest that "ideas" and “culture"
place. "State breakdown" then becomes the breakdown of the are hard to measure and that it is thus difficult to calculate their
international system's ability to reinforce existing social relations. causal role.
Flowever, Foran avoids what many critics regard as the ex­ John Foran, Taking Power: On the Origins of Third World Revolutions. New York:
cessive structuralism of approaches like Skocpol's by noting Cambridge University Press, 2005.

organizing like the Montgomery Bus Boycott), or else new access to such
means and methods.
4. Sufficient organizing success such that actors perceive some reasonable
chance of further success.
5. The emergence of ways of talking and writing about underlying social
problems that points toward contention rather than quiescence as the
solution.
6. Organizational leadership that maintains the unity of contentious organiz­
ing rather than fracturing contention.
As you know, different theories place greater and lesser emphasis on each of
these factors, and common sense tells us that they all matter. Drawing on the
methods discussed throughout this book so far, think about how we might ad­
vance research from this point, determining with greater precision the relative
weight of each of these factors and the precise ways in which they interact to
produce successful organizing or revolt.

THINKING
COM PARATIVELY The "Arab Spring" of 2011
s discussed at the beginning of this chapter, beginning in Spring 2011 many

KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

A authoritarian governments in North Africa and the Middle East witnessed
a tremendous wave of contention. The protests began in Tunisia and spread
Deviant or quickly to many countries, with the most immediate consequence in Egypt,
Negative Cases where hundreds of thousands of people crowded into Tahrir Square to demand
A "deviant case" is a case that has a
change.
notably different outcome from what This truly momentous development encouraged further protests in other parts
one or another theory might predict. of the Arab world. Major protest action began, among other places, in Yemen,
Such observations, also called "nega­ Libya, and then Syria. In the Libyan case, the dictator Muammar Qaddafi was
tive cases," are useful not because
quite willing to use massive force to repress protestors. Chillingly, authoritarian
 The "Arab Spring" of 2011 299

(continued)
they necessarily invalidate a given
theory but because they allow us to
gain more leverage as we attempt to
test hypotheses. Often they do so by
producing anomalous results that
require re-thinking of original theo­
ries. In this section, be attentive to the
way in which the "negative case" of
A Tunisian man casts a vote in elections in October 2011 made possible by the "Arab Spring.' Saudi Arabia could cause a scholar to
reconsider existing theory.
dictators seem to have learned the lesson that repression is the way to preserve
power. NATO intervened militarily in Libya, ostensibly to protect civilians, but
ultimately to provide material assistance to rebels who eventually dislodged the
Qaddafi regime. The outcomes in other cases have been mixed. The memory of the
Arab Spring still inspires hope in many, but it would be a stretch to say that it
democratized the region. So far, outcomes run the gamut from Tunisia’s seemingly
successful initial transition to democracy to pronounced state weakness in Libya,
considerable repression in Egypt, and major gains for terrorist groups in Syria, not
to mention great loss of life and massive displacement of people from their homes.
W hat would we want a theory of contention to be able to explain about these
events? There are many interesting questions to be answered, but among the most
central we would want to include the following: (1) Why did this wave of conten­
tion emerge? (2) Why were the proponents of regime change successful in Tunisia
and Egypt but not in Syria and only with NATO support in Libya? And, finally,
(3) Why has no significant contention been seen in Saudi Arabia, where a number
of similar conditions can be found? In other words, any theory of what caused the
revolts in Tunisia, Egypt, and elsewhere should be able to account for Saudi
Arabia as a “negative case” in which at least some of the key factors in the other
cases are present but in which the outcome is sharply different. These are not the
only interesting questions one can ask about the Arab Spring revolts and their
aftermath, but here we focus on them, largely restricting our discussion to the
events of 2011.
To work toward establishing hypotheses, let us first think about what our
theories would predict, and then we will briefly consider some of the common
and varying conditions present in our cases. See Table 12.3.
As you can see from this table, not all of the hypotheses generated from these
theories are mutually exclusive. Indeed, you can probably see ways in which they
could be combined. This does not mean that the underlying theories are fully
compatible: certain general theoretical issues cannot be glossed over. For ex­
ample, some versions of rational choice theory says that demand for revolution is
constant, while relative deprivation theory says it varies. Nonetheless, we can
draw on different theories as we attempt to explain the complexities of a series
of cases.
300 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

THINKING A number of factors may have contributed to the emergence of the “Arab
Spring.” Many commentators have noted that demographic pressures produced
COM PARATIVELY j
discontent. These are societies with a comparatively high number of young
adults and few economic opportunities for them. Another clear factor is the
sense of frustration that many in the Arab world feel with their countries’ non-
democratic status, particularly when judged against a world in which democracy
has seemed ascendant for some decades now. Others point to social media, ar­
guing that Twitter and Facebook helped protestors solve collective action prob­
lems, noting that some of the regimes have tried to restrict access to information
technology.
W hat conditions were common in these societies before the wave began?
Islam is the majority religion in all of them. Each began the sequence as an au­
tocracy and, indeed, with a long history of authoritarianism. Each has relatively
high poverty (though this varies in extent from case to case, as we shall see). Yet
there are important variations along these dimensions. Note that the two cases
where contentious action was most successful—Egypt and Tunisia—are not
major oil exporters (Table 12.4).
This might suggest that being an oil exporter potentially thwarts this sort of
contention, perhaps because oil export provides resources for the state to main­
tain legitimacy or even to repress opponents. Obviously, the lack of major gov­
ernment oil revenues is not a sufficient condition for successful contention, given
that Syria also is not a major oil exporter, and its regime has, despite serious op­
position, held onto power. To some extent, though, this is a matter of scale. In
relative terms, the Syrian government, at least in years prior to the conflict, de­
rived considerable resources from oil exports.
Another point of variation concerns the relationship between religion and
politics. While, as noted earlier, they are all majority-Muslim countries, there
are important differences in this regard. Perhaps the sharpest contrast here can

t a b le 12 .3 Contention: Theories, Hypotheses, and Evidence

Moving Toward Hypothesis
What does the theory predict Possible Instance
Theory causes contention? What w ould a case look like if it follow ed the theory?

Relative Deprivation Increased discontent due to declining Demographic and economic trends mean poor job prospects
status of key groups for young adults, who mobilize against regimes they see as
barriers to advancement.

Political 1. Political opening (from democratic re- 1. Low willingness/capacity to repress protests leads to more
Opportunities/ forms or fiscal weakening of the state) successful contention.
Resource Mobilization
2. Pre-existing mobilization capacity 2. More and larger pre-existing political groups leads to more
among key groups contention.

Rational Choice Theory Changes in the strategic situations faced Lack of repression of early protests changes actors' views on
by key actors risks of contention. Weak state responses make victory seem
more likely, producing cascade of participation.

Cultural or "Framing" Changing ideas or cultural change Contention emerges and strengthens as the very idea spreads
Theory before or during the process that radical change is needed (e.g., the "Arab Spring" idea).
 The “Arab Spring" of 2011 301

table 12.4 Net Oil Exports, 2009, Barrels THINKING

Per Day (in Thousands) COM PARATIVELY
Tunisia 5

Egypt -38

Libya 1,525

Syria 117

Saudi Arabia 7,322

Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/countries/index.cfm.

be found between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is essentially a theoc­
racy (though Islam in Saudi Arabia is Sunni Islam, meaning the clergy do not
hold formal power, which is held by the royal family). The regime’s legitimacy is
maintained both by religious arguments and by lavish spending of oil revenues.
Egypt has a long history of Islamic militancy, but for decades it was dominated
by secular nationalists who attempted to marginalize political Islam. Framing
theories of revolution might note that this could advantage the proponents of
contentious action, since religious modes of dissent could likely be more readily
used as a wedge in a society like Egypt than in Saudi Arabia. O f course, this can
also produce problems for revolutionaries. The Arab Spring led the Muslim
Brotherhood to power, but their overreach prompted resistance and their even­
tual fall, and some critics of the current regime suggest that Egypt has returned
to “Mubarak-lite” style governance.
Another issue is the degree of poverty faced by these countries. If the relative
deprivation theory is right, we would expect to find one or another group experi­
encing economically generated discontent. While these issues are complicated,
for the sake of simplicity here we will just look at per capita income (Table 12.5).
Again, for the sake of simplicity, we will take these data to indicate that Tunisia,
Egypt, and Syria are likely to have a high degree of economically induced discon­
tent, Libya a moderate degree, and Saudi Arabia a low degree.77 Finally, if we

table 12.5 2010 Per Capita Income in Selected

Countries (in U.S. dollars)
Country GDP Per Capita (USD)

Tunisia 4,222

Egypt 2,654

Libya 11,321

Syria 2,931

Saudi Arabia 15,836

Source: UN Statistics Division, Social Indicators, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/ products/socind/,accessed on

July 17,2012
302 Chapter 12: Revolutions and Contention

THINKING examine the sequence of contention in these societies, we see an important dif­
ference in the process of contention. In four of the five cases (Egypt, Tunisia,
COM PARATIVELY
Syria, and Libya), strong contentious action developed, but in two of them
(Egypt and Tunisia) the military was unwilling to fully repress the regime’s op­
ponents in the early states of collective action (Table 12.6). This suggests that the
military and its linkage to the existing regime—which we can take to be a func­
tion of state capacity—is critical to outcomes. Focusing on general judgments of
just these variables, we can summarize the cases as shown in Table 12.6.
If we take our negative case—Saudi Arabia—out of the comparison, a clear hy­
pothesis suggests itself: Successful collective action appears to be a function of the
state’s failure to repress. Other features are held constant, with the exception of the
fact that Libya is an oil exporter, which is perhaps relevant only insofar as itfacilitates
the state’s repressive capacity. In other words, factors like economic discontent and
the religious versus secular character of the regime appear to be constants and thus
causally unimportant. This is broadly consistent with our “political opportunity
theory” discussed previously. However, when we bring Saudi Arabia into the com­
parison, this no longer appears to be the case. Rather, Saudi Arabia, where no major
contention has emerged, varies from the other cases in two respects: (1) it is a reli­
gious regime and (2) it does not seem to have witnessed dramatic, economically
generated discontent. In other words, the inclusion of this case makes these factors
relevant, which is critical to the hypotheses suggested by framing and relative depri­
vation approaches. Note that it does not demonstrate their causal force, however.
The purpose of this exercise is to get you thinking about how to make com­
parisons and not to fully explain variation in the “Arab Spring” once and for all.
Indeed, this task will likely take years, both because we need to see how these
processes play out and because scholarship in political science often depends on
many efforts by many scholars to generate and test hypotheses. W hat you can see
here, however, is one way in which we may begin to proceed if we wish to make
sense of emergent patterns in the “Arab Spring.” Note how much case selection
matters. W hat would we conclude if Saudi Arabia weren’t included? Can you
think of other cases that might change our conclusions if we included them? Or
cases that point to causal factors that we have not considered here?

table 12 .6 Contention in the "Arab Spring": Five Cases

Economically State/military willing to
Major oil exporter? Theocratic regime? generated discontent? repress protest?

Tunisia N N Y (high) N

Egypt N N Y (high) N

Libya Y N Y (moderate) Y

Syria N* N Y (high) Y (so far, to the extent possible)

Saudi Arabia Y Y N Y (presumably)

*As stated in the text, the Syrian state has in recent years derived considerable revenues from oil export, even though the country's share in the total international oil
market is small.
 Chapter Review 303

Ch ap te r Su m m ary
Concepts Causes and Effects
• Comparative political analysts are interested in how and why • There are at least four general types of theories of revolu­
conflict sometimes takes place outside of formal institutions. tion, and these theories can, with some modification, be
• There are a number of forms that such conflict takes. We were applied to other forms of contention.
especially attentive to the differences between revolutionary • Theories of "relative deprivation" and "social disequilibrium" try
and non-revolutionary strategies to create change. to explain revolutions through focusing on an increase in the
demand for revolutions. It looks at the impact of moderniza­
Types tion on existing political institutions and social hierarchies. It
Social movements are probably the most common form of suggests that when modernization impacts these hierarchies,
organized conflict in advanced industrial democracies. Social social equilibrium is broken and important groups seek to
movements are commonly regarded as organized collective produce a new equilibrium through revolution.
action in the pursuit of social reforms of one or another kind. • Theories of political opportunities and mobilization try to
Revolutions are perhaps less common in advanced indus­ explain revolutions through focusing on supply of mobilization
trial societies but quite common in modern societies more opportunities rather than demand for revolution. It suggests
generally. Revolutions are usually thought of as producing that new political opportunities, such as state collapse and the
dramatic change rather than mere reforms. presence of useful ways of organizing dissent, matter most.
• Social revolutions change structures like the class system. Collective action theories argue that collective action prob­
• Political revolutions change the state. lems are the main barrier to revolution. When revolutions
Anti-colonial revolutions create newly independent states do take place, the best way to explain them is to show how
after removing colonial powers. collective action problems were solved.
Insurgencies shade into revolutions. We can distinguish them Framing or cultural theory says that other theories must be
by the degree to which insurgencies take protracted military supplemented by a focus on ideology or culture. Material
form, often in the absence of large-scale civilian mobilization. conditions are not enough to produce revolutions. Rather,
• Terrorism can be studied as a tactic employed by participants people need to have ideas that “frame" their grievances in a
in social movements, revolutions, and insurgencies or as a way that suggests that revolution is the legitimate solution.
particular form for the organization of resistance. In the latter
case, much attention is placed on "terror networks.” Thinking Comparatively
• "Everyday resistance" is the name scholars give to the ways that • The "Arab Spring" of 2011 presents a set of interesting and
groups resist and express discontent in the absence of the useful cases for these theories.
resources needed for complex organization and coordination.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. This chapter began and ended with a brief discussion of the 4. All of the major forms of contention discussed in this chapter
"Arab Spring." Based on the theories and concepts discussed are hard to control and to lead. They often lead to unin­
here, why do you think the protests described there have been tended consequences and escape the grasp of those who
successful and others unsuccessful? What do these cases tell us began them. Which types of contention would be most dif­
about contention in general? ficult to lead, and why? Which ones might be a bit easier to
2. The United States is a society in which wealth is unequally distrib­ lead, and why?
uted and a number of groups feel aggrieved. Why is it that there has 5. In this chapter we considered numerous forms of contention, and
not been a strong revolutionary tradition in the United States? What then we focused on explanations of revolution. These explana­
would the theories we have considered say about this question? tions could potentially be applied to some of the other forms of
3. In today's world some groups claim to be making revolutions contention as well. For which forms of contention do you think
through democratic elections. In your view, is this possible? How these explanations would be most successful? And for which do
would this change our definition of revolutions? Does it make sense you think they would face the greatest difficulties? Why?
to broaden our concept so as to include such cases? Why or why not?
 CHAPTER 13

• Rwandan refugees in 1994. This image is disturbing because it took place in the midst of the Rwandan genocide, one of the worst outpourings of
ethno-nationai violence in recentyears. Can comparative political analysis help us to understand and put a stop to such horrific events?
T
he twentieth century witnessed some of the greatest atrocities in human
history, from the Nazi Holocaust to the deaths of millions through vio­
lence, starvation, and famine in China, Cambodia, the Soviet Union, and
Bangladesh, among many other places. As a response to the horrific events in
Nazi Germany in particular, the international community declared that it genocide Efforts to diminish or
would never again allow genocide, the mass murder of people of a particular destroy a people and/or culture.
racial, ethnic, or national group. Although mass killing continued around the
world in subsequent decades, it was only in the late 1990s that
much of the public realized that genocide had not been eradi­
IN THIS CHAPTER
cated (though some observers were aware that it had never
Concepts 306
really disappeared). The genocides in both Rwanda and the
Identity 306
Balkans were well documented, but the international re­ Nationalism and the Nation 306
sponses to these crises were dramatically different. In the Af­ Types 307
rican case, the international community did very little, and Primordialist Approaches 307
peacekeepers stood by as the killing occurred, as their man­ Perennialist Approaches 308

date did not authorize interference. In the European case, Modernist Approaches 308
Types of Nationalism 311
NATO mounted a joint military effort, bombing Serbia and
Causes and Effects: What Causes
forcing an end to formal hostilities, eventually bringing some
Ethno-National Conflict? 313
of the leaders to The Hague for criminal trial.
Now, in the twenty-first century, genocide has continued, THINKING COM PARATIVELY

most notably in Sudan, and the international community has Ending Ethnic and National Violence 321
largely remained divided and confused about how to proceed. C A S E S IN C O N TEXT
To some extent this response may be due to a lack of sufficient
United Kingdom • Mexico • Japan
will. But it may also be due to failure to truly understand vio­ Germany • Nigeria
lence linked to political identities. If this is true, policymakers
may need to begin by understanding the nature and causes of
national and ethno-national identities more generally. Comparative analysis
of political identities and nationalism aims to help us better understand these
issues. W hy do some identity groups engage in violence against others? Is it
mostly related to the identities themselves or to circumstances such as eco­
nomic development or political institutions?
Comparative politics also aims to go beyond questions about violence to
ask about political identities more generally. W hy do modern societies almost
invariably define their populations as nations? W hy do they approach citizen­
ship and national membership differently? W hy do some societies seem to
place so much emphasis on race and ethnicity as a basis for nationalism, and
305
306 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

others seemingly less so? W hat causes collective identities to change? In recent
years, interest in identity and its political consequences has grown. As always,
in this area of research, comparative analysis depends on clearly formulated
concepts.

Concepts
We must begin by clarifying the meaning of the concepts of “identity,” “the
nation,” and “nationalism.”

Identity
identity The social label ascribed W hat is identity? Probably the best way to begin thinking about it is at the level
to an individual or group that of the individual. At the most basic level your identity is your sense of self. You
locates the individual or group in have a sense of who you are and of what makes you special and unique. You also
political society more broadly. participate in attributing identities to others. In other words, as social identity
social identity theory An
theory argues, even our own personal identities are constructed on the basis of
social sources, and the ongoing acts of having an identity and labeling others are
important theory in social
social.’ Every day, we construct symbolic representations of the social world in
psychology that sees personal
which we live and our place in it. Thus our personal identities—our senses of
identities as linked to and partially
ourselves as individuals—are drawn from roles linked to the role and group iden­
derived from group identities
tities (e.g., student or professor, Brazilian or American, woman or man, brother
and roles.
or sister) that our society makes available to us.
The identities that matter most in politics are group identities. Group identi­
ties draw boundaries between in-groups and out-groups, though the way in
which such boundaries are constructed varies a great deal. For example, some­
times group identities are very sharply bounded, and individuals are not allowed
to pass from one group to another.2 In other situations group boundaries are
permeable, and one can choose whether or not to belong to the group in question.
Likewise, certain sorts of identities are compatible, such as being simultaneously
Spanish and Catholic, whereas others are likely to be perceived by some people
as incompatible, such as being simultaneously an anarchist and a fascist.
Identities are cultural, historical, and political. This means that they are created
by human societies and expressed symbolically, that they change over time, and
that they influence and are influenced by the ways that power is distributed in
society. When we study them we should be attentive to how they are constructed
by different individuals and groups, how their forms change over time, and how
different individuals and groups, with varying access to resources, struggle to
identify themselves and one another for their own purposes. In short, identities
are the social labels ascribed to individuals or groups, locating the individual or
group in political society more broadly.

national identity An identity that Nationalism and the Nation

locates one's social position in In this chapter we focus on what might be the most important form of political
relation to national membership. identity in today’s world, national identity. As suggested at the beginning of this
 Types 307

chapter, for some the idea of nationalism conjures up images of stringent restric­ nationalism The view that the
tions on immigration, of discriminatory behavior, and, at its worst, of genocide. world is and should be divided into
And yet while nationalism and national identity can be and sometimes are linked nations that are thought of by
to exclusion and violence, this is not the whole story.3 They are also linked in nationalists as sovereign and
some cases to inclusive citizenship and democracy. Indeed, some scholars think egalitarian.
that modern democracy would not have emerged without nationalism. In gen­
eral, we could start by defining nationalism as the idea that nations should be the
basic units of social and political life. Nations, in turn, are often defined as rela­ nation A group thought of as
tively large groups that think of themselves as equal and sovereign.'1' In other sovereign and equal, typically
words, in modern politics, nations are thought of as the source of the state’s le­ comprised of a large, often
gitimate authority. This is why all modern governments, even authoritarian ones, geographically bounded
claim to speak on behalf of the “people” or “nation.” To reiterate, nationalism is population.
the view that we all have a national identity and that this identity is important.
National identity says that we are members of nations, and that these nations are
sovereign and equal.

Types
Scholars of nationalism typically follow Anthony Smith in dividing theoretical
approaches to the subject into several main groupings: “primordialists,” “peren- primordialism The label applied
nialists,” and “modernists.”5 Primordialists think that all societies have some­ by Anthony Smith to those theories
thing like nationalism, and that the main problem involves explaining why this of national identity that see it as
is so. Perennialists disagree and think that not all societies have nationalism, but continuous with pre-historical
that some pre-modern societies did have it. Modernists take national identity to ("primordial") forms of identity.
be a modern phenomenon, which for most means from the late eighteenth cen­
perennialism The label applied
tury to the present).6 Whether you are a primordialist, a perennialist, or a mod­
by Anthony Smith to those theories
ernist depends on how you conceptualize nationalism and the nation. The major
of national identity that see it as
classifications group theories by the date of national identity’s emergence, and
neither exclusively modern nor
this is really a question of how you define the nation, national identity, and
continuous with pre-historical
nationalism.7
forms of identity.

Primordialist Approaches modernism The label applied by

Primordialists tend to treat national identity as being the same thing as collective Anthony Smith to those theories of
identity more generally. In other words, they think there is not much of a differ­ national identity that see it as
ence between the identities of modern nations and the type of identity found exclusively modern.
among groups as diverse as, say, the pre-Colombian Inca, medieval Europeans,
sociobiology An approach to the
members of traditional Hindu castes, and members of the hunter-gatherer soci­
study of societies that sees human
eties that human beings inhabited for most of our evolutionary history. For pri­
society as governed by the same
mordialists, since collective identity is necessary for societies to function, a form
(evolutionary) principles as animal
of nationalism is a universal feature of human societies.
Some primordialists are devotees of sociobiology or evolutionary psychol-
societies.

ogy.8 These are theories that aim to explain almost all of human behavior and evolutionary psychology An
society in terms of evolutionary theory. These scholars tend to treat national approach to the analysis of human
identity as biologically rooted, and to explain it in relation to its ability to en­ behavior that seeks to explain it
hance the reproductive success of our ancestors. For example, positive in-group almost exclusively on the basis of
sentiment might have helped by enhancing altruistic behavior to perceived in­ evolutionary theory (see also
group members and non-favorable behavior to the out-group. Other scholars Sociobiology).
308 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

treat national identity’s ubiquity as more of a social or cultural imperative than a

consequence of evolutionary processes.9 Because human beings are social crea­
tures they need to form identities. W hat unites all of these theorists is the basic
idea that nations are “primordial units” to which people feel passionately loyal.

Perennialist Approaches
Perennialist approaches say that not all identities are natural and universally
present, but that nationalism is not solely modern. There is great diversity in the
ways that perennialists treat national identity. A number of them see nationalism
as originating in medieval or early modern Europe.10 A common strategy is to
define national identity as present when a single, strongly identified group has its
own territory and language.11Another is to define an ethno-cultural community
as a nation when it has a state that corresponds to it.12 Perennialists then mean to
exclude certain political identities from the category “national” but define the
phenomenon far more inclusively than the modernists. In other words, they do
not treat kinship groups and nations as overlapping or close categories, as many
primordialists would. There are comparatively fewer scholars who defend “peren-
nialism” than “primordialism” or “modernism.”

Modernist Approaches
Most modernists see nationalism as emerging first in Europe in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries and spreading from there, though they differ on the
details. The clearest definitions of nationalism from this perspective focus on
several key aspects of national identity. First, nationalism says that the nation
cannot just be some small elite, but has to correspond to most or all of a society’s
population. Second, it says that society’s members are all equal in some way. Fi­
nally, nationalism says that the nation is sovereign.13 Modernists note that these
features did not apply to most societies and identity groups historically, but that
in the modern world this mode of identity has spread rapidly and is now
dominant.

CASE IN CONTEXT

National Identity in the United Kingdom PAGE 550

English nationalism is often considered one of the first, or per­ For more on the changing face of English/British national
haps the very first, case. Interestingly, though, different scholars identity, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 550-551. As you read it,
see it emerging in different historical moments: medieval times, keep in mind the following questions:
the sixteenth century, the seventeenth century, and even the 1. How is it possible that different scholars date the emer­
early twentieth century. Moreover, English national identity has gence of English nationalism so differently?
co-existed with British national identity, and also with regional 2. How does English nationalism relate to British
identities— to some, also national— like the Scottish, the Welsh, nationalism?
and the Northern Irish. All of this raises questions about how we 3. How does British nationalism relate to the identities of
define and empirically study the nation. Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish Britons?
 Types 309

■ _ CASE IN CONTEXT

# Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity

in Mexico p a g e 507

Many structuralist theories focus on industrial capitalism as a key For more on the case of Mexican nationalism, see the na­
cause. At first glance, structuralist theories focused on capitalism tional identity case study in Part VI, pp. 507-508. As you read it,
seem well prepared to explain the emergence of national iden­ keep in mind the following questions:
tity in Europe, but they sometimes encounter trouble when ap­ 1. Flow would the approaches to nationalism discussed in
plied to developing world societies. Mexico is a case in point. this chapter treat the Mexican case? Which account
One cannot begin to speak of modern industrial capitalism in seems to fit the case best?
Mexico until, at the very earliest, the late nineteenth century, and 2. If we consider Mexico against the background of Latin
many would judge even this too early. Yet nationalism was an America more generally, what light does the comparison
important force in Mexican politics from the early 1800s. shed on this question?

Modernists comprise a large share of scholars studying nationalism and na­

structuralism An approach to
tional identity, and members of this large group disagree about many things.
nationalism studies that sees big,
One major point of disagreement separates those who are more “structuralist”
difficult-to-change parts of society
and those who are more “constructivist.” The basic difference between these two
as determining what really matters
approaches is not too difficult to understand, though there is a large debate in
social science about what these terms mean. Structuralists see big, difficult-to-
about national identity.

change parts of society—such as major features of the economy—as determining constructivism In nationalism
what really matters about national identity. Constructivists emphasize that na­ studies, the view that nations are
tions are symbolic constructs, and so place greater emphasis on the creative ef­ symbolic constructs and so place
forts of individuals and groups to define and redefine their identities. greater emphasis on the creative
An example of a structuralist theory is Ernest Gellner’s linking of industri­ efforts of individuals and groups to
alization to national identity (see “Insights” box).14Gellner argued that national define and redefine their identities.

Nations and Nationalism

INSIGHTS
by Ernest Gellner

ellner argues that industrial capitalism produces nationalism, forth. Likewise, nationalism says that everybody in the nation is
G in part through the instrument of the state. For Gellner, capi­ fundamentally equal, which breaks down hierarchical ties and
talism requires a homogeneous, interchangeable, socially and gives rise to the interchangeability of modern workers. Critics
geographically mobile workforce as well as standardized lan­ worry that the theory doesn't clearly specify "causal mechanisms"
guage. Holding laborers in place by feudal ties or localism will be a through which the effect is produced. Nationalism seems to "go
major barrier to economic development, and capitalism is facili­ with" capitalism, but we need a theory of how capitalism produces
tated by literacy, common language, and a mobile workforce com­ nationalism. If nationalism is created forthe sake of capitalism, who
pensated in wages. Gellner's theory is that these needs lead to are the “agents" who accomplish this, and what are their motiva­
nationalism, because nationalism encourages the social character­ tions and goals? Gellner's answer to this question is that the state
istics that capitalism requires. Nationalism takes a language of "the coordinates the rise and maintenance of national identity, but that
people" and gives it high status. The national state standardizes its it does so because of underlying economic forces.
usage through official documents, the education system, and so Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
310 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity

INSIGHTS
byh I'rdkenUld

reenfeld argues that nationalism is fundamentally cultural serve their interests well. Greenfeld examines this hypothesis
G and needs to be understood as an imaginative response to against a number of cases (including England, France, Russia,
social conditions. To understand nationalism's emergence and Germany, and Japan), finding pronounced status-inconsistency
growth, we must understand why the idea spread that humanity in each case in the key groups that are most central in redefining
is divided into distinct "peoples” who are "sovereign" and "equal." their societies as nations. At the same time, Greenfeld acknowl­
For Greenfeld, the key preconditions for the development of na­ edges the importance of institutions like the state prior to na­
tional identity are problems in stratification systems through tional identity's emergence in helping to shape the type that
which societies hierarchically divide themselves, such as the class develops in any given case. Scholars working with this theory
structure. Elite status-inconsistency— a condition present when also note that political institutions play an important role in
the stratification system breaks down and elites are no longer spreading and preserving national identity.
sure of their status— leads some groups to seek to transform Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
identity, and national identity often seems to such groups to University Press, 1992.

identity and nationalism are useful (or “functional”) for industrializing societies be-
cause they promote social mobility, shared language, and common understandings.
An example of a constructivist theory is Liah Greenfeld’s argument that na­
tional identity is an imaginative response to contradictory public claims about a
group’s status.15Greenfeld emphasizes social psychology, rather than economics,
in analyzing the processes through which national identity emerges and thrives
(see “Insights” box).
These theories reveal just how different such structuralist and constructivist
approaches can be, but simultaneously reveal points of similarity. For example,
the group status-inconsistency that Greenfeld emphasizes may often be due to
“structural” changes in society such as shifting ways of organizing social and
economic class or innovations in the ways that states recruit their staff. In other
words, the fact that such a theory emphasizes social psychology and symbolic
construction does not mean that it ignores structural characteristics of society.

CASE IN CONTEXT

Importing National Identity in Japan? PAGE 493

Japan had a clear civilizational identity for centuries before For more on Japanese nationalism, see the case study in Part VI,
modern nationalism. Indeed, under the Tokugawa regime, the p. 493. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
country turned inward and sharply limited commercial and cul­ 1. What does Japan show us about the relationship
tural contact with the outside world. Yet many scholars think that between nationalism and other key aspects of
it only developed modern national identity in the late nineteenth modernization?
century. One of the most striking things about the case of Japan 2. Are economy-centered, state-centered, or constructivist
is how quickly industrialization and economic growth followed theories best suited to explaining the case of Japanese
the development of national identity.16 nationalism?
Types of Nationalism
As discussed in chapter 1, political scientists can move up and down Sartori’s
ladder of abstraction in searching for more or less general conceptualizations of
nationalism. At the level of greatest generality, scholars might look at the psy­
chological preconditions of collective identity itself. A primordialist perspective
might be useful in this case. At the same time, only modernist conceptualiza­
tions might offer sufficient specificity for asking questions about modern nation­
alism’s emergence, since they are most able to draw clear qualitative distinctions
between national identity and other identities out of which it might grow or that
might otherwise resemble it in certain respects.
In order to ask and answer more specific comparative questions about national
identity and other variables, however, one needs still more specific conceptual­
izations. These typically take the form of typologies of nationalism. Most com­
monly, typologies posit a choice between two main forms of national identity
(see Table 13.1). For part of the twentieth century, the distinction was between
so-called Western nationalism and Eastern nationalism.17 Note that these Western nationalism An
geographical distinctions were largely intended to capture an alleged difference antiquated term for what is now
between the nationalisms characteristic of Eastern and Western Europe. Western often called "civic nationalism"
nationalisms, such of those of France and Britain, it was often alleged, were (see Civic nationalism).
compatible with tolerance, liberal-democratic political institutions, and so forth.
Eastern nationalism An
Eastern ones, however, like those of Germany or Russia, were based on the col­
antiquated term for what is now
lective notion of the “volk,” tended toward xenophobia, and were perhaps inhos­
often called "ethnic nationalism"
pitable to liberal-democratic institutions.18
(see Ethnic nationalism).
Later, this distinction was developed and clarified into a distinction between
civic nationalism and ethnic nationalism.19While different scholars parse these civic nationalism A form of
concepts in slightly different ways, the main issue here is a distinction between nationalism that says that you are a
those societies who treat citizenship as technically open and as not based on eth­ member of the nation if you are a
nicity, and in turn take citizenship as the marker of national membership, and citizen of its state.
those that either have closed conceptions of citizenship (citizenship is and should
ethnic nationalism A form of
be, according to such nationalisms, a biological inheritance) or that do not treat
nationalism that says that you are a
formal citizenship as a true marker of national belonging. France and Germany
member of the nation because of
have been commonly taken as examples of these two kinds of nationalism. One
your ancestry.
might expect that societies characterized by civic nationalism could do a better job
of incorporating immigrant communities and might even be less prone to inter­
state conflict, though this should be thought of as a hypothesis and not a fact.

table 13.1 Traditional Typology of Nationalism

"Western," "Civic," or "Eastern" or "Ethnic"
"Territorial" Nationalisms Nationalisms

France Germany

United Kingdom Russia

United States Central and Eastern Europe

Australia
312 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

Two foreign-born children take their oaths as citizens of the United States in 2011.

Sometimes this basic binary distinction takes on a slightly different form,

such as in the distinction between “territorial” and “ethnic” nationalisms, though
territorial nationalism According there is considerable overlap here with the civic-ethnic distinction.20 Territorial
to some scholars, a type of nationalism is meant to refer to nationalism in which membership corresponds
nationalism that closely resembles to residency in a territory, and civic nationalism to citizenship in a state, but in
civic nationalism, in that the modern world these concepts are closely related.
membership is fundamentally Liah Greenfeld adds a further element to this civic and ethnic typological
determined by where one is born scheme, arguing that while ethnic nationalisms are always “collectivistic,” civic
or where one resides rather than ones can be either collectivistic or individualistic (for examples, see Table 13.2).
one's ancestry. This distinction can be rather difficult to understand.21 The model of individual­
istic nationalism holds that nations are associations of individual persons.

CASE IN CONTEXT

Ethnic Boundaries of the German Nation? PAGE 453

France is often presented as a quintessential "civic" nationalism. 1. Why do many scholars consider German nationalism to
Germany is often juxtaposed to France as the quintessential be ethnic nationalism?
"ethnic" nationalism.22Indeed, some go so far as to try to explain 2. What would researchers have to show in order to demon­
the rise of the Nazis as a function of this ethnic nationalism, a strate that long-standing patterns of Germany identity
much debated and controversial claim. explain German atrocities in the twentieth century? What
For more on nationalism in Germany, see the national iden­ obstacles might such scholars face?
tity case study in Part VI, pp. 453-454. As you read it, keep in mind 3. Has German nationalism changed in the post-World War
the following questions: II years?
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National Conflict? 313

table 13.2 Greenfeld's Expanded Typology of Nationalism

CASE EXAM PLES

Civic Ethnic

Individualistic United States N/A

United Kingdom

Collectivistic France Germany

Japan
Russia

This suggests that, whatever the reality of the political community and the pro­
cesses through which it is formed and maintained, it is conceived of by its mem­
bers as voluntary or associative. Collectivistic nationalism, in contrast, sees the
nation as having a kind of collective agency or will that transcends the agency or
wills of individual members. According to Greenfeld, collectivistic nationalism
increases the likelihood of authoritarianism.
Some critics allege that all such typologies are problematic because they
appear to be linked to value judgments about different societies.23 This concern
deserves serious consideration. Typologies from political science exist to help us
better analyze politics, but they may have other effects. If our categories too
neatly sort the world in ways that make some actors appear to be more (or less)
virtuous than others, we run the risk of creating damaging stereotypes.
Indeed, if the strongest claims made by proponents of typologies of national­
ism and national identity are true—if there are differences between civic and
ethnic nationalisms that have implications for both domestic and international
conflict—it would be hard for many social scientists, as citizens, to avoid making
value judgments about them. But this critique should be a helpful reminder to
us that as social scientists we should remain careful to avoid the projection of our
own values onto the cases we study. Typologies of nationalism remain impor­
tant in the literature, but they are controversial. One reasonable position is that
so long as we treat such typologies as ideal types—and not as totalizing descrip­
tions of specific identity groups—many critics’ concerns lose some of their ur­
gency. If we use categories thoughtfully, we may be less apt to simply label one
country’s nationalism as civic and another’s as ethnic, but rather to see that
strands of nationalism corresponding to both types pervade most polities. Con­
sidering the “civic” and “ethnic” ideal types might then be most useful as we
track change within countries over time, and not only in comparing between
countries.

Causes and Effects: What Causes

Ethno-National Conflict?
Much of the recent interest in nationalism and related forms of political iden­
tity—as noted previously—concerns the widespread perception that national
and ethnic conflict and violence have increased since the end of the Cold War.
314 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

Recent research has shown, however, that the growth of such violence began
decades earlier and that what appeared to be a spurt of such violence in the 1990s
was a continuation of a long-run trend.24 Moreover, most ethnically heteroge­
neous regions see very little intergroup violence.25 Nevertheless, given the extent
and seriousness of such violence—and the hope that policy based upon social
scientific knowledge can help us to reduce it—this is a particularly important
area of research on political identities. There is relatively little theoretical consen­
sus about how to explain ethno-national violence, and indeed what ethnic vio­
lence is.26 We need to clearly conceptualize both “ethnicity” and “violence” (and,
of course, to remember that not all conflict is violent).27
To begin studying such ethno-national conflict, the comparative political
analyst must answer several questions. First, what makes a conflict national or
“ethno-national”? Related to this, does a conflict being “national” or “ethno-
national” matter? In other words, can we understand a conflict better, or predict
its likely course more effectively, if we know that it is linked to nationalism?
Second, what type of conflict do we seek to explain? Third, what is the appropri­
ate level of analysis to address the questions asked—for example, should our

Late Yugoslav president Slobodan Milosevic on trial at the UN

War Crimes Tribunal in 2001.
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National Conflict? 315

cases be distinct societies, localities, examples of group behavior, specific events,

and so forth?
As for the first question, scholars take a variety of views. Some have sug­
gested that there are multiple types of ethno-national identity, and that focus­
ing on these different types might help us to account for variation in probabilities
of violence.28 A primordialist view of ethno-national identity, in contrast, might
assume unchanging, irrational attachments to a given group. In addition, there
are perspectives designated as constructivist (closely consistent with the
“constructivist” view of nationalism discussed earlier) and as instrumentalist, instrumentalism A type of
meaning that the analyst assumes little significant affective attachment to the explanation in social science that
group but rather sees ethnicity as a product of political entrepreneurs seeking to says that you can explain
manipulate populations for the pursuit of their own strategic ends. Finally, a something by showing how its
number of scholars treat ethno-national identity as synonymous with “commu­ development or persistence is in
nal groups” more broadly for their research purposes:29 For such analysts, it the (usually material) interest of
matters little whether a given group defines its boundaries in ethnic, racial, powerful individuals or groups.
religious, or any other sorts of terms, so long as the observable dynamics of
conflict are the same.
Regarding the second question, about what type of conflict we seek to ex­
plain, some scholars have argued for a “disaggregation” of the concept of vio­
lence.30 That is, there is more than one type of violence in need of explanation,
and different kinds of violence might have different causes. The most fundamen­
tal distinction, perhaps, is between violence carried out by or via the state and
violence that takes place between social actors independent of the state. Think of
the difference between state-led efforts at genocide and, say, less centrally orga­
nized conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India. There are good reasons to
suppose that the social and political conditions that underlie state-led genocide
do not fully explain sectarian conflict outside the state, though they do have
much in common. Much literature implicitly focuses on the former type, perhaps
because state-led genocidal efforts have been so lethal, and because they at least
give the appearance of being preventable. However, genocide and other forms of
intergroup violence, like periodic riots, can be analytically distinguished and
likely require different explanatory approaches.31
Others note, importantly, that analysts must be attentive to who the parties to
conflict are, since the “who” has great implications for the “why.”32 Lying behind
such typologies are the analytical imperatives to (1) identify the major groups
involved; (2) analyze their relative size and resources; (3) consider their relation­
ship to the state and the society’s stratification system; (4) take into account how
they “frame” their own identities and those of other groups; and (5) understand
the historical context of their relationships, given that these impact both how
their identities and the potential for conflict are culturally framed and also the
strategic calculations they are likely to make about the behavior of contending
groups.
Ultimately, as with all of comparative political analysis, our goal is to provide
explanations. There are several existing explanatory strategies in this area of re­
search. It is worth noting that many scholars combine bits and pieces of these
different explanatory strategies.
316 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

CASE IN CONTEX
The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War: Nationalism
and Ethno-National Conflict in a Post-Colonial Society PAGE 522

In much of the world, notably in Africa and the Middle East, as well 1. What would each of the major theories of ethno-national
as parts of Asia, European colonial powers created novel borders conflict we consider in this section say about this
and boundaries. When these societies became independent in case? Each would find some supporting evidence. Does
the mid- to late twentieth century, they sometimes experienced one or another theory, though, explain this case more
problems of ethno-national tension and even violence, as groups fully?
without shared histories of long-standing political unification 2. How does ethno-national pluralism intersect with the
struggled over control of their new polities. A good example is resource-rich character of the Nigerian state? Would
Nigeria, where regional ethnic and religious tensions have been conflict be as much of a problem if Nigeria's oil wealth did
an issue since independence. The most extreme expression of not make the stakes so high?
these tensions manifested in the Biafran War (or the Nigerian Civil 3. Given what social-scientific theories of ethno-national
War) of 1967-1970, which caused tremendous loss of life. conflict can show us about this case, what sorts of poli­
For more on ethno-national conflict in Nigeria, see the case cies might mitigate further tensions and violence in
study in Part VI, p. 522. As you read it, keep in mind the following Nigeria?
questions:

Primordial Bonds
You will recall from earlier in the chapter that primordialists tend to believe that
national identity is essentially just another instance of a universal human ten­
dency to form close (or “primordial”) attachment to groups. The basic idea of
primordialist explanations of ethnic conflict is that conflict takes place when
pre-existing groups feel that their group and/or their identity is under threat. For
instance, perhaps “globalization” is causing a group to feel that its identity is
being diluted. Or perhaps members of another group are perceived to be outcom-
peting them for jobs and other resources. Primordialist theories assume that
these groups exist prior to the level of conflict, and that it is people’s “passions”
and “loyalties” that cause the conflict.
Let us consider a stylized example. Imagine a state called Pluria, controlled
by a large group called the Plurals. But there is a region in the country of
Pluria populated by two other groups known as the Alphas (Group A) and the
Betas (Group B). The Alphas and Betas understand themselves (and each
other) to be ethno-national groups. There are few Plurals in the region where
the Alphas and Betas live. Members of group A (the “Alphas”) tend not to
trust members of group B (the “Betas”), and the Betas tend not to trust Alphas.
However, both the Alphas and Betas have lived side by side for several genera­
tions without conflict. However, some Alphas perceive the Betas to have closer
ties to the Plurals, the large group that controls the state. These members of
group A begin to speculate that group B plans to exploit these ties to dominate
them. This perception of threat upsets the cooperative equilibrium that had
been in place. Once group A feels threatened, and some of its members’
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National Conflict?

hostility to group B is noticed by some members of group B, a counter-reaction

among some members of group B develops. Some members of group A then
take this counter-reaction as evidence in support of their prior belief that
group B is opposed to their interests. Such a cycle could spin out of control and
lead to conflict, and scholars have noted many cases that correspond roughly
with this sort of pattern.
Some scholars who are sympathetic to elements of primordialist theories
would argue that primordialist explanations alone are not fully satisfactory, as
they need to be supplemented in order to explain conflict. Indeed, this may even
be true of the stylized example considered in the previous paragraph. Since pri­
mordialist views of ethnic groups and nations seem to assume the permanent
character of these groups and that these types of identities exist in all or virtually
all human societies, they may have trouble explaining why in only certain cases
ethnic conflict takes place. For example, if Hutus and Tutsis, Bosnians and Serbs,
or Indian Hindus and Muslims lived alongside each other for many years, why
did conflict suddenly erupt between them at particular historical junctures? To
answer such questions, primordialists often need to invoke some other explana­
tory element, like economic crisis, political conflict, “modernization,” and so
forth. To this extent, as we have seen in other chapters, scholars may need to
draw on distinct theories, creating a “hybrid” model of conflict to fully explain
many cases.

Cultural Boundaries
Culturalist/constructivist explanations argue that conflict is the result of the
distinct ways in which groups and their boundaries are constructed. In other
words, some ways of drawing boundaries increase the chances that one group
will attack another. At first glance, this theory might seem very similar to the
primordialist theory noted previously. However, it differs in seeing high vari­
ability in the ways that different groups think about and represent themselves
(and others) and sees this variability as key to explaining conflict. Often, such
theories are rooted in accounts of “types” of nationalism like those discussed in
the previous section.
Thus, some argue that ethnic nationalisms exhibit a higher probability of en­
gaging in violence. Others similarly suggest that the likelihood of conflict is in­
creased by “barricaded” identities, which construct sharp distinctions between
in-group and out-group members and depict out-group members as threatening.
This idea can be contrasted with “bounded” identities, which facilitate having
multiple different associations.33 As with primordialist explanations, however,
other factors likely need to be invoked to explain why conflict actually takes place
when it does, and why most “ethnic” or “barricaded” identities are not engaged
in violence most of the time. Nations thought to construct boundaries in ethnic
terms are not constantly at war, and even if it turns out that groups with “barri­
caded identities” are more likely to engage in violence, they are not constantly
doing so, so some other variable must explain why violence emerges when it
does.34 Thus we might see a society constructing exclusive, impermeable bound­
aries as a condition that increases the probability of violence, but not a sufficient
condition in and of itself.
318 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

Material Interests
Instrumentalist explanations make the assumption that people pursue “material”
interests and that concerns like national pride or the dignity or “purity” of the
ethnic group do not really matter much to them. The theory is called “instrumen­
talist” because it says ethno-national identities are just used as “instruments” for
the pursuit of other purposes. Instrumentalists’ explanatory strategy, therefore,
involves hypothesizing that certain conditions in given cases make it politically
expedient for some actors to deliberately foment ethnic boundaries and conflict.
For example, if one group engages in violence toward another, perhaps the un­
derlying reason is that the first group wants access to resources controlled by their
victims. As with other theories noted so far, simple versions of such explanations
taken alone are incomplete, begging questions about how ethnic boundaries
could be useful manipulative tools to begin with if strategic action is paramount.
In other words, if everyone is rational and self-interested, why are some people
ethnic/national chauvinists to begin with? Why does it help politicians’ chances,
in some cases, to play to such sentiments?
One potential solution to this problem is to adopt George Akerlof and Rachel
Kranton’s idea of “identity utility.”35 Economists have long argued that people
seek to maximize their “utility,” or, roughly speaking, their satisfaction from dif­
ferent choices. We can recognize that people derive utility not just from material
things but also from their identities. For example, it might be reasonable to
assume that, on average, people prefer clear, dignified identities that are condu­
cive to self-esteem. Then one can ask about the conditions under which people
would turn to ethno-national chauvinism as they seek those ends. In this view,
identity is thus shaped by preferences about both material and non-material
payoffs.

Rational Calculation
Rational choice explanations—which have much in common with instrumental­
ist approaches—aim to model the strategic calculus of actors in situations of
potential ethnic conflict. W hat distinguishes such approaches from ordinary in­
strumental explanations is (1) their typical use of mathematical models and
(2) their focus on modeling the ability of members of a group to anticipate and
thus make rational choices about how to respond preemptively to the behavior of
members of the other group (and their own). The variables that must be consid­
ered in such models are many, including perceived likelihood of the other group
perpetrating violence, perceived likelihood of victory if conflict breaks out, and
perceived costs associated with avoiding violence. As noted earlier, rational choice
models do not necessarily assume that material factors are central, and thus can
be combined with any of the other perspectives mentioned here. For example,
one could in principle combine a rational choice approach with a constructivist
one, using constructivism to explain the exclusivist preferences of nationalist or
ethnic chauvinist actors, and rationalism to explain the choices they make given
those constructed preferences.
Let us try to imagine how such explanations work (see Table 13.3). It would
not be rational, for example, for you to redefine yourself as the sole member of a
group that nobody has ever heard of: There would be no actual group to offer
 Causes and Effects: What Causes Ethno-National Conflict? 319

Nations, States, and Violence

INSIGHTS
by David Laitin

L
aitin uses a "rational choice' perspective to explain why some "in-group status,” and "out-group status." Group affiliation can
ethnic and national groups attempt to assimilate, why others impact one's income (as one's ethnic status can determine one's
try to secede, and so forth. He notes that most ethnic and na­ career prospects); it can influence one's standing within one's
tional groups get along with little violence, though they may own group, and it can influence one's standing in the other
have grievances with one another, and argues that the rational group. For example, majority groups in some countries may con­
calculation of interest explains why grievances sometimes result demn efforts by others to assimilate to the majority group, while
in violence. The spread of new identities depends on strategic the majority may encourage such efforts in other countries. As­
decisions made by individuals about group affiliation, which in similation, secession, and other options are rational or irrational,
turn are shaped by the decisions of people around them. Indi­ depending on such factors.
viduals make choices about keeping or changing their own David Laitin, Nations, States, and Violence. New York: Oxford University Press,
group affiliations based on three factors: economic benefit, 2007.

ta ble 13.3 Factors Influencing Ethno-National Identity:

A Rational-Choice Approach
Adopt the Majority Reject the Majority Ethno-National
Ethno-National Identity Identity

Few seek Potential rewards if No majority-group membership gains,

assimilation successful, but high risk is but risks of in-group and out-group
present, as potential costs sanctioning minimized,
include both in-group and
out-group sanctioning.

Many seek Likelihood of group No majority-group membership gains,

assimilation sanctioning goes down. and still no risk of in-group and out-group
Rewards are still present but sanctioning,
with fewer potential costs.

benefits, and nobody else would recognize that membership. Likewise, if you
were a member of a minority group in a highly segregated society, trying to as­
similate to the majority identity might not be rational, since you would likely face
resistance from both majority and minority group members. However, as larger
numbers of those around you take the assimilation path, it may become increas­
ingly rational for you to do so (depending, of course, on your preferences).
According to scholars like David Laitin (see “Insights” box), these are the sorts
of factors that shape the likelihood that someone will adopt a given ethno-
national identity.
Somewhere along the line there is a “tipping point” beyond which it becomes
more rational to assimilate than to persist in one’s minority-group affiliation.36
Of course, identification with an ethno-national group in most cases has no con­
nection to violence. But a similar logic to the preceding applies to participation
in secessionist movements. Scholars use this logic to try to predict whether par­
ticipation in such movements will “cascade,” or spread through a group.37
320 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

Social Psychology
Social-psychological explanations come in a variety of forms.38 On one hand,
these approaches focus on common patterns of boundary construction and the
ways in which social categorization structures our perceptions of those around
us. Thus, they partially overlap with cultural constructivism. On the other hand,
many stress the importance of status differences, and feelings of discontent and
envy that these produce, in engendering conflict. The overarching idea, though,
is that collectively held or group feelings and resentments lie behind conflict.39
In general, then, social-psychological theories focus on two things. First is the
interactive process of the formation of group boundaries, the perception that “we
are us” and “they are them.” This relates to both the primordialist and construc­
tivist approaches described previously (approaches that differ from each other
most fundamentally with respect to the question of how such boundaries are
established and how much they vary). The second is the relative social status of
“us” and “them” in this connection. Many theories agree that some status con­
figurations are more dangerous than others, and also that “status dynamics”—
ways in which status systems change—can precipitate conflict. As such,
social-psychological theories of group violence are “demand side” theories,
loosely analogous to the social-psychological theories of collective action dis­
cussed in the previous chapter. In other words, they attempt to explain violence
by assuming that it is a response to an increase in intergroup grievances. These
theories view increased grievances (or the ways structural circumstances, such as
a system of group rankings, can generate resentments) as key to explaining the
likelihood of violence.
O f course, for most research questions, none of these ideal-typical explana­
tions alone will suffice, but thinking through these general explanatory strategies
is a good place to begin as we try to construct hypotheses to explain specific cases
of ethnic conflict.

Ethnic Groups in Conflict

INSIGHTS
by Donald L Horowitz

orowitz's account of ethnic conflict emphasizes (among systems" with just a couple or several major groups. Major con­
H other factors) the social psychology of group resentment.
Horowitz notes that ethnically diverse societies can be ranked or
flict centering on the state is likelier in ethnically centralized sys­
tems than in ethnically dispersed systems. While structural
unranked systems. In a ranked system, at least one ethnic group power relationships between groups matter, the driver of con­
is subordinated to another (as in India's caste system). In un­ flict is social-psychological: group resentment. Groups tend to
ranked systems, ethnicity might correlate with social class, but compare themselves to other groups (a process exacerbated in
one group is not structurally subordinated to another. In ranked many countries by colonialism) and often see themselves as en­
systems, conflict typically takes the form of class warfare or social titled to higher status than other groups. Where differences in
revolution, whereas in unranked systems conflict is often a drive status persist, the potential ingredients for ethnic conflict are
to exclude, expel, or exterminate other groups. Among unranked present.
systems, Horowitz further distinguishes between societies with
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California
many dispersed ethnic groups and those 'ethnically centralized Press, [1985]2000.
 Ending Ethnic and National Violence 321

Ending Ethnic and National Violence THINKING

n this chapter’s “Thinking Comparatively” section, we consider how compara­ COM PARATIVELY
I tive research can influence policy. As noted at the beginning of this chapter,
much of the practical “payoff” of research in this area, it is hoped, is that we may KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL
be able to reduce the probability of inter-group conflict.41 Obviously, policy pre­
scriptions should be strongly influenced by what empirical evidence about con­ Large-N Studies
flict shows us about theoretical explanations. If it seems that constructivist Most of the comparative analysis
discussed in this book involves trying
explanations of violence are correct, we may hope to use policy to influence the
to discern causal sequences in a
formation of ethnic and national boundaries. If rational-choice theories are cor­ relatively small number of cases. This
rect, we can use them to alter the calculus of interests of leaders in potentially approach has great utility. Some­
violent situations, perhaps by making clear that they will face consequences for times, however, we need to compare

their actions if they pursue violence. In general, there are at least four main pro­ lots of cases to make sure that our
conclusions are not artifacts of case
posed strategies for managing conflict suggested by social scientists, and com­
selection or bias.
parative political analysis is being used to assess their reliability. These are open This is exactly what James Fearon
questions. Which of these views do you find most persuasive? W hat sorts of evi­ and David Laitin did.40They noted
dence could help us decide between them? Can you think of additional or supple­ that much research on ethno-national
bias selects cases based on observed
mentary approaches?
incidence o f violence. That research
then finds links to patterns of ethno-
1. Institutional Approaches national identity. But Fearon and
By far the most influential proposal in political science has been that we may be Laitin chose a different tack, looking
able to reduce conflict by structuring institutions differently. There are several at a large sample including many

reasons for the popularity of this approach, among others that (1) political sci­
ence in general in recent years has relied heavily on institutional analysis and
(2) institutions—unlike, say, culture more generally—seem to be relatively ame­
nable to engineering, at least in theory.42 Typically, scholars propose one or
another version of federalism or “consociationalism” as the solution to ethnic consociationalism An institutional
conflict.43 Those who favor federalist solutions can be divided into two groups. approach to managing potential

Some wish to see decentralized political institutions cut across ethnic ties, the conflict in polities with multiple

goal being to reduce the likelihood that leaders of such groups could harness groups, one which involves

political institutions in support of the interest and aims of their group. Others ensuring that each group has

wish to see federation cut along ethnic lines. For example, some policy makers political representation.

proposed a federated structure for Iraq that would have allowed considerable
autonomy for Shiites, Sunni, and Kurds. In situations where formal ethnic feder­
alism is not feasible (for example, if the geographical settlement of different
groups will not allow it), consociationalism calls for other methods for the sys­
tematic representation of ethnic groups as groups in the state.

2. Cultural and Civil Society Approaches

We have already noted that some suggest “peace building” initiatives, or efforts
to foster “positive intergroup contact” as key.44 In an important study, Ashutosh
Varshney argues against excessive reliance upon institutional solutions to inter­
group conflict.45 His analysis of group conflict in India reveals its local character
and its roots in the structure of social networks. Conflict tends to take place in
mostly urban areas and, indeed, in specific urban areas. Varshney’s analysis led to
the conclusion that the major variable that can explain the geographical
322 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

THINKING distribution of conflict in India is the vibrancy of civic life: More specifically, in
urban areas, the presence of civic associations that cut across ethnic lines protects
COM PARATIVELY
against violence, which in India took place disproportionately in areas with low
levels of associational activity. The major policy payoff here would be to find ways
KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL to strengthen non-ethnic associationalism. While in some ways this approach is
(continued) presented as an alternative to institutional strategies, it is better regarded as a
cases of ethno-nationally diverse or complement to such strategies. In other words, we are still talking about efforts
heterogeneous societies. They found to shape organizations rather than directly addressing networks, identities, or
that ethno-national diversity was a
behavior.
poor predictor of inter-group conflict.
This does not mean that ethnicity and
nationalism have nothing to do with 3. Procedural and Judicial Approaches
rates of conflict. Indeed, more recent Some scholars advocate using national and international judicial institutions to
work by Lars-Erik Cederman, Andreas address problems of intergroup violence.47 Rational choice and related forms of
Wimmer, and Brian Min has argued
analysis draw important attention to the fact that the strategic considerations of
that ethnic conflict can be predicted
more successfully when we take into
both perpetrators and victims of violence shape outcomes over time. On one
account the role of the state. This hand, it is important that potential perpetrators of violence have the reasonable
work suggests that the key to explain­ expectation that there will be consequences if they harm others. On the other
ing such conflict is to examine the hand, once a cycle of violence has begun, it is important that at least some who
ways in which access to state power
have ties to such perpetrators do not so fear reprisal as to reach the judgment that
intersects with ethnic and ethno-
national distinctions.46
ending violence would be too risky. Thus, some argue both for the importance of
Large-N studies of this sort— “individualizing responsibility” for the worst atrocities in ethnic conflict and for
which deal with a large number of implementing forgiveness programs of one kind or another.48 The de-escalation
observations— can often help us to of South African conflict serves as a model for many proponents of this view.
distinguish between findings that
only hold for a small number of cases
and those which capture general
4. International-System Approaches
tendencies or relationships. More generally, international pressure can also reduce the violence carried out by
states.49 States and international actors can bring a variety of consequences to
bear on transgressors of international human rights norms, and these may have
an important deterrent effect. Such approaches are most likely to be successful,
many scholars believe, when (1) the claim that other states or the international
community are likely to act seems plausible and (2) the potential perpetrator of
violence is not already isolated internationally, and thus has something to lose.
As you can see, these approaches are linked to the theories of conflict dis­
cussed previously. But how could we further test whether policies derived from
theories will work? One approach would be to experiment with them, but for
both practical and ethical reasons, this is not a real option. Therefore we are
largely dependent on comparing historical evidence from the real world, espe­
cially when it exhibits “natural experiments” that mimic experimental compari­
son. We can test existing theories of conflict through small groups of comparable
case studies or through “large-N” studies. In either of these types of analysis, we
would look for statistical correlations between variables suggested both by theory
and by the observation of intergroup violence.50
As with many of the areas discussed in this book, this is an ongoing research
agenda with lots of questions left to debate and resolve. The hope is that we can
come to more fully understand the ultimate sources of intergroup violence and,
by doing so, the most efficacious ways to reduce or prevent it.
 Chapter Review 323

C h ap ter Su m m ary
Concepts One theory holds that "primordial attachments" are respon­
Comparative political analysts are interested in classifying sible for collective violence. From this point of view, in other
and explaining major political identities. words, explanations of collective violence must account for
• National identity is an important modern political identity the emotional motivation of perpetrators. Such theories
emphasizing popular sovereignty and equality. often suggest that such emotional motivations are en­
coded in our biology, or in any case in our social nature,
Types and threats to national identity (e.g., perceived imminent
• National identities are conceptualized in three major ways violence perpetrated by another group, or fears about
by comparative political analysts; their positions are known cultural dilution in the face of globalization) promptthe
to scholars as "primordialism," “perennialism,” and behavior.
"modernism." • Another theory holds that the nature of the cultural bound­
Primordialists group national identity with collective aries between groups strongly impacts the probability of
identities more generally. For a primordialist, national conflict. Groups that define cultural boundaries as imper­
identity is basically the same thing as tribal, clan, ethnic, meable and essential are, according to this point of view,
or racial identity. more likely to engage in violence.
Perennialists think that nationalism has been around for A third theory holds that material interests are the main
many centuries, but they do not see all collective identities determinant of collective violence. In other words,
as. basically the same. Rather, they focus on one or another according to this theory, when groups claim to be
criterion that makes national identity different from more engaging in violence because of group affiliation they
ancient identities (e.g., a common vernacular, control of a are actually interested in increasing their access to
state). material resources like money, water, food supplies, or
Modernists believe that nationalism is different from the technology.
sorts of political identities that preceded it. Some believe A fourth theory holds that collective violence is best ex­
that modern nationalism began as early as sixteenth-cen­ plained through modeling the rational decision-making
tury England. Many others locate the emergence of na­ processes of group leaders and/or members.
tional identity in the late eighteenth century. • A fifth theory holds that collective violence is the product
Some scholars argue that nationalism comes in different of social-psychological processes that go beyond the ways
types. The most common distinction is between a "civic" or that cultural boundaries are constructed.
liberal" type and an exclusive or "ethnic" type.
Thinking Comparatively
Causes and Effects We thought about major policy proposals for reducing
Scholars have produced a range of theories to explain or eliminating inter-group conflict, and we linked these
ethnic and national violence. We considered five of them in back to our earlier, causal theories of ethno-national
schematic form. violence.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. In the "Causes and Effects" section of this chapter, we consid­ through the linkage and (2) what, if anything, is lost about each
ered five major theories of intergroup/ethno-national conflict. of the theories included in the hybrid.
These theories are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Sketch a 2. This chapter ends with a discussion of policy recommendations
hybrid theory that includes key elements of at least two of the that have been made by political scientists who study ethno-
theories discussed. Make clear (1) what is potentially gained national violence. We noted that they related to theories of
324 Chapter 13: Nationalism and National Identity

ethno-national violence. However, some do not address "root hybrid theory, building on what you have learned from this
causes,” instead focusing on institutional solutions (like conso­ chapter.
ciationalism) to problems that many theories would say are 4. Pick a country you know well. Which of the three major per­
based on primordial, cultural, or material differences. Is this a spectives on the historical origins of nationalism and national
contradiction? Why might someone who believes ethno-national identity discussed in this chapter— primordialism, perennialism,
conflict to have such geneses still prefer institutional solutions? and modernism— do you think would be most useful for the
3. Can the different theories of ethnonational conflict we have analysis of nationalism in this case? Explain the reasons for your
considered in this chapter be combined? Try to construct a selection.
 » mF m

CHAPTER 14

Race, Ethnicity,
and Gender

• Brazilian President Dilma Rousseffin 2015, one of the most prominent female heads ofstate. Does her success indicate that gender discrimination
no longer affects politics? As we shall see, no.
 I ndisadvantaged
recent years, a number of countries have elected members of historically
groups to the highest office. This trend has been especially
notable in the Americas. Latin America, for example, has in the last decade
seen the election of several important women as president: Michele Bachelet
in Chile, Cristina Fernandez in Argentina, and Dilma
Rousseff in Brazil. The Americas have also recently wit­
IN THIS CHAPTER
nessed the election of presidents from other disadvantaged
Concepts 327
social groups, such as Evo Morales in Bolivia, Luiz Inacio
Race and Ethnicity 327
Gender 328
Lula da Silva in Brazil (before Rousseff), and Barack
Sexual Orientation 329 Obama in the United States. Some constituencies greeted
Types 329 these elections as a sign of political empowerment, and
Disentangling Race and Ethnicity 329 most observers would agree that this trend constitutes
Discrimination Based on Race progress. But, as we shall see, it emphatically does not
and Ethnicity 332
mean that race, ethnicity, and gender are no longer sources
Gender Discrimination 333
Empowerment of Women and of political, social, and economic inequality.
Minority Groups 334 Gender continues to strongly shape political representa­
Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence tion, economic position, and social status, thus remaining a
the Political Representation of Women
key and often under-examined feature of comparative poli­
and Minority Groups? 337
Social Movement Mobilization 337 tics. Race and ethnicity matter, too, especially in our global
Political Parties Based on Gender culture in which international migration is so common.1
or Ethnicity 339 Perhaps more than ever before, our societies are racially and
Institutions for Promoting Women's and
Minority Group Representation 341
ethnically diverse (to varying degrees, of course) and increas­
ingly transnational in character, which produces both oppor­
TH IN KIN G COMPARATIVELY tunities and challenges.2In this chapter we consider identities
Indicators of Gender Empowerment 344 linked to gender, race, and ethnicity in relation to efforts to
CASES IN CONTEXT achieve empowerment and political representation.
Iran Japan Brazil Mexico
Despite the importance of gender, race, and ethnicity,
India with some notable exceptions these subjects have often
been minimized in the study of comparative politics.
feminism A social and intellectual
Happily, this tendency has started to change, in part be­
movement that aims to ensure
equal rights for women and men.
cause of feminist and critical race scholarship. In this chapter we first focus
on gaining clarity about the concepts of race, ethnicity, and gender. We then
critical race theory A movement
move on to related concepts such as gender discrimination and gender em­
in social, political, and legal theory
that aims to discern the subtle
powerment. Then we turn our attention to how some women and members
effects of racism and related forms of minority groups have worked to enhance their participation and represen­
of prejudice. tation in formal institutions. As we shall see, while efforts to more fully
326
 Concepts 327

incorporate women and minority groups into formal political processes have
a lot in common, they vary in important ways as well.

Concepts
Social scientists interested in these questions need to first define what we mean
by race, ethnicity, gender, and sexual orientation. Though some of these concepts
are related, they differ in important ways as well.

Race and Ethnicity

As we saw in chapter 13, all human societies construct collective identities,
which vary considerably depending on their context. Among other things, these
identities often involve boundaries between an “in-group” (“us”) and an “out­ boundaries Lines drawn
group” (“them”).3 One strategy for trying to understand various types and in­ symbolically between groups of
stances of collective identity is to focus on the nature of these boundaries. people.
Different types of identities depend on contrasting ways of drawing lines be­
tween groups of people. Identities based on race, ethnicity, and gender draw
race The idea that human beings
are divided into different groups,
these lines in overlapping and yet distinct ways.
often thought of (erroneously) as
We shall untangle the related concepts of race and ethnicity later in the
biological categories.
chapter; for now we will just point to shared features of these categories of iden­
tity. Both suggest that people are divided into such groups, with the bases be­ ethnicity The quality that one
tween groups allegedly established either by biological differences or by culture has by identifying with or being
and tradition. Both treat group membership as important, and both can be ascribed membership in an ethnic
sources of out-group discrimination and in-group pride. Different cases posit group.

gender Culturally constructed

roles or identities one has by virtue
of being ascribed the status of
male or female, to be distinguished
from biological sex.

Whip-toting riot police in South Africa's apartheid state in 1985.

328 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

different sorts of boundaries between ethnic and racial groups, some more per­
meable than others. Unequal relationships between ethnic and racial groups can
be caused and reinforced by formal and legal differences. For example, think of
explicit segregation under “Jim Crow” laws in the southern United States before
the civil rights movement peaked in the 1960s or under South African apartheid.
Alternatively, inequalities can be buttressed by more subtle forms of discrimina­
tion. Finally, as we discuss further in the “types” section below, some people
think of race and ethnicity as biological categories, though most social scientists
reject this idea.4
As discussed in the previous chapter, there is a range of social-scientific views
on the nature of national, ethnic, and racial identities. Some accounts emphasize
constructivism, others instrumentalism, and still others primordialism (see
chapter 13 if you need to review these concepts and theories).

Gender
The first distinction that needs to be drawn here is between gender and sex.5
People often conflate these two ideas, but they are not identical. From the point
of view of social scientists, sex refers to biological differences between people as
linked to reproductive potential. In other words, one’s sex is the more or less
objective quality that one has by virtue of being biologically male or female.
Gender., in contrast, is cultural.6 This means that it is essentially symbolic. One
way to formulate this is to say that gender is the way in which human beings
“make sense” out of sex. For example, think of ideas like “masculinity” and “fem­
ininity.” We may link these ideas to ways of acting and even different sorts of
bodies. For example, in some cultures, maybe being very muscular is masculine,
in others not; in some cultures, femininity and athletic prowess may go hand in
hand, while in others femininity may be linked to perceived physical passivity.
But given all of these differences, we know that ideas about gender (like mascu­
linity and femininity) cannot be reduced to underlying sex differences. Indeed,
some individuals’ experienced gender does not “match” their biological sex in the
transgender An identity in which traditional sense, and some individuals have transgendered identities.
one's gender does not conform to There are many debates among social scientists about the precise relationship
conventional matching with between sex and gender. The dominant view is social constructionism (or social
biological sex. constructivism), which holds that biological sex does not determine gender. From
this point of view, biology is not destiny. Biological determinism, the other end
social construction The process
of the spectrum, asserts that gender is just a reflection of sex. As far as we are
through which socially shared
aware, there are no serious social scientists that are true biological determinists
meanings and definitions are
in this sense. The debate is really between “strong” and “weak” versions of social
established and maintained.
constructionism. The “weak” version holds that gender is indeed culturally con­
biological determinism The view structed but that there may be some biological differences between women and
that a feature of social life, such as men that limit or constrain this construction. For example, perhaps evolution has
gender or ethnicity, is caused by indeed encouraged some different tendencies in how one thinks about hierarchy
underlying biology. or relationships or sexuality itself.7The “strong” version holds that any such ten­
dencies are insignificant or do not exist at all.
In other words, social scientists agree that gender is not determined by biologi­
cal sex. This premise has some important implications. Perhaps most important,
if gender is socially constructed, it can change over time. Gender might have
meant something different in 1950s America than it does today, for example. In
other words, being a woman or a man decades ago was likely experientially dif­
ferent in some respects than it is today (just think of the television show Mad
Men). Note that if biological determinism is true, this change would be impos­
sible. If gender can change over time, this means that (1) activists can try to shape
it, at least to some extent, and (2) social scientists can try to map and explain the
ways in which it has changed. Activities, identities, roles, jobs, even objects in the
world can be seen as “gendered,” and regardless of one’s sex, everyone can partici­
pate in such gendered activities, perform such gendered roles, and exemplify dif­
ferent gendered styles, in varying ways and to different degrees.8

Sexual Orientation
When social scientists speak of sexual orientation in the most narrow sense, they
refer to the fact that different people seek different sorts of sexual partners. His­
torically, in many societies a heterosexual, or “straight,” sexual orientation has
been held up as the standard. People with other orientations, such as gays and
lesbians, were labeled as deviant and, as a result, often faced serious discrimina­
tion. Some scholars refer to this view, which takes heterosexuality as “normal”
and preferred, as “heteronormativity” or “normative heterosexuality.”9
Even today, same-sex relationships are subject to discrimination and are even
illegal in some countries and territories, but social movements have led to de­
criminalization and widespread acceptance in numerous locations. They have
also expanded civil rights in other ways for persons of diverse sexual orientations,
including, in some places, the extension of basic institutions like marriage, and
they have elevated the status of people of diverse sexual orientations. The process
of extending rights and ending discrimination is far from over, and even in coun­
tries where the rights of gay, lesbian, and transgendered persons have been in­
creased the most, discrimination remains a serious issue.10

Types
Different types of disadvantage and discrimination emerge in relation to catego­
ries such as race, ethnicity, and gender. At the same time, these categories may
have different implications for potential empowerment.

Disentangling Race and Ethnicity

As with gender, some people imagine race to be a biological category. Scientifi­
cally, however, this way of thinking is inaccurate. As scholars have emphasized,
there is far greater genetic variation within than between so-called racial groups.11
The socially constructed (and thus non-biological) nature of race becomes even
clearer when we look at the history of racial concepts. Categories such as “white”
or “black” or “Asian” may appear to be stable and thus grounded in human nature,
but they are not. Indeed, to take just one particularly striking example, in the
nineteenth-century United States, Irish immigrants were sometimes defined as
“non-white,” and even today in much of Latin America and other parts of the
world, racial categories are far more fluid and permeable than they are in the
United States.12Further, consider the racial typologies constructed in late-colonial
330 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

Latin America, where elites asserted that some people of mixed-race parentage
fell into categories such as “coyotes,” “wolves,” and “mulattos.”13
We can draw one of two possible conclusions from this set of successive and
inconsistent categorizations. One possibility is that there are distinct and bio­
logically real “races” but that most people have gotten them wrong for most of
history, and that we now know what they really are. The other possibility is that
they have been social constructions all along: in other words, that people have
invented these ideas rather than discovering them in nature. Most scholars draw
the latter conclusion.14
Scholars who study racial identity increasingly speak of certain stages or peri­
racialization The historical ods of racialization and racial formation, meaning times in which social dis­
process through which social tinctions pertaining to the idea of “race” became more pronounced.15 Typically,
relations become interpreted in these processes have to do with one or another group having an interest in closing
terms of racial categories. off competition for status or resources.16 When individuals and groups compete
for social status, they often seek to formally exclude others from competition,
racial formation A concept
making it easier for themselves.17 Race has often been used for this purpose.18For
developed byOmi and Winant
example, Europeans drew distinctions between themselves and “black” individ­
(1994) that describes the process
uals from sub-Saharan Africa for centuries, but when European colonizers of the
through which ideas of race are
Americas sought to enslave those individuals on a mass scale and to exploit in­
constructed and develop over time.
digenous groups, they drew a clearer, “racialized” line between themselves, the
indigenous population, and Africans, trying to justify their different forms of
exploitation.19
In summary, most scholars believe that race is not a real, biological fact but is
instead a social construction. An identity is a “racial” identity when people in a
society think that one or another group is significantly biologically different from
other groups, and view these imagined differences through the race concept. For
this reason it is only a useful category for comparative analysis when we are
studying societies who think about themselves and others in terms of race. In
such cases, we aim to understand (1) how they think about race, (2) how ideas of
race are constructed by different groups, and (3) whose interests are served by
these different constructions. Some important comparative analysis aims to ex­
plain differences between societies’ constructions and uses of race.20
ethnic group A group that The terms “ethnicity” and ethnic group are sometimes used as synonyms of
identifies itself as having strong race, but they are often applied more broadly. An influential conception of ethnic
cultural commonality and a shared groups is as follows: “named units of population with common ancestry myths
sense of long-run history, and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic
sometimes thinking of itself as a territory, and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites.”21 Note that,
kind of kinship group. defined in this way, ethnicity is conceptually broader than race: “Common ances­
try myths” does not necessarily imply that those myths are thought to be biologi­
cal, even if they often are understood to be so. If one chooses this sort of approach,
the concept of “ethnic group” is a broader category of collective identity than
more narrowly defined “national identity” discussed in the previous chapter.22
Yet much work on questions of ethnicity and ethnic identity focuses not on
the long-term past but on the nature of these identities and the roles they play in
the contemporary world. Typically, it conceptualizes ethnicity as an identity that
is not necessarily bound to a state (though states often influence ethnicity in a
variety of ways). For example, Irish Americans, Korean Americans, and African
Americans might be characterized as “ethnic groups,” because while some mem­
bers of these groups feel a sense of cultural belonging, they do not desire to form
their own state as a result. Ethnicity, as such, is perfectly consistent with mem­
bership in a broader civic or multicultural community in which individuals pos­
sess other collective identities besides their ethnicity.23 Sometimes, in-group or
out-group members think of ethnicity in biological terms. In other words, for
some, the concept of ethnicity shades into the concept of race. But thinking of
ethnicity this way is not a definitional feature. More often, social scientists think
of ethnicity as based on cultural commonalities, ranging from common rituals
and practices to common language. In the U.S. context, the national census con­
siders categories such as Hispanic or Latino to be “ethnic” rather than “racial”
categories. This has been somewhat controversial since categories such as Asian
and African American are treated as race.24
Ideas such as ethnicity are constructed in very different ways in different soci­
eties.25 Thus, identities deriving from tribal forms of organization in some parts
the world, those deriving from distinct units in hierarchical stratification systems
in some African societies or in India, and those of “hyphenated Americans”
cannot for all research purposes be treated as instances of the same general phe­
nomenon, yet social scientists will often treat all such identities as “ethnic.” In
modern societies, the following components are likely to be building blocks for
how ethnicity is identified: type of national identity, how the state deals with
questions of citizenship and residency, formal and informal rules of national be­
longing and participation in public life, and the broader stratification system
(which in most modern societies means the class structure).
The contemporary United States is an illustrative example. Its civic identity
has been described as a “melting pot,” but it is not hard to find contradictions of
this idea. Examples include the indigenous population’s forced relocation on very
unfavorable terms, clearly genocidal by today’s standards; slavery and then segre­
gation of African Americans; and discrimination against various waves of im­
migrants from the nineteenth century to the present. While this model of
assimilation has been hotly contested—both by scholars who argue that the
United States has never been a melting pot and by those who argue that it should
not be—the “melting pot” ideal has remained. Others, though, suggest that mul-
ticulturalism is an alternative view.26 Here the core idea is that members of dif­
ferent groups do not need to leave to the side their differences. In a context like
the United States, though, this is still linked to the civic nationalism model, as
the idea is that ethnicity and race-neutral categories like citizenship are still the
basis of rights and participation in politics.
In any case, civic identity in the United States has not meant the denial of
ethnicity, at least in recent decades. Rather, it has allowed for dual and multiple
affiliations, as in the case of so-called “hyphenated Americans.” American cul­
ture has encouraged immigrants and their descendants to hold onto a recon­
structed version of their old national identities, redefined as ethnicity.27 This
cultural aspect has sometimes been a matter of others labeling immigrants and
sometimes one of proud internal identification (or both). Some societies, how­
ever, may seek to force immigrants to give up their traditional identities in order
to assimilate.28 More generally, the state plays a role in the ongoing construction
332 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

of ethnicity, such as by making “official” decisions about how to use ethnic cat­
egories in the census or in laws and judicial decisions involving ethnicity.29 It has
made such decisions in cases involving questions of affirmative action in employ­
ment and in efforts by college and university admissions offices to ensure a di­
verse student body. The state also shapes ethnicity through the way it handles
intergroup conflict, particularly in societies with multiple ethnic groups that
sometimes experience pronounced differences, such as India or Nigeria.

Discrimination Based on Race and Ethnicity

Both ethnicity and race often serve as the basis for discrimination, which can be
both explicit and implicit. In a country like the United States, racial and ethnic
identities have a pronounced impact on one’s prospects for income, assets, educa­
tion, marriage, and incarceration, among other outcomes.30 This impact is per­
haps most notable in relation to assets and wealth, which is partly a legacy of
historical inequalities.31 Some discrimination is explicit and obvious: Almost
everyone recognizes the most virulent forms of racism. But while some people
believe that racial and ethnic discrimination have declined globally—and indeed,
in the United States, surveys show that explicit racism is much less prevalent
than it once was32—members of minority groups continue to experience high
rates of discrimination.33 A lot of inequality based on race and ethnicity is not
audit studies Research carried obvious to most observers.34 In the United States, audit studies (which use field­
out by social scientists to measure work to measure discrimination) confirm that equally qualified applicants with
the extent to which hiring practices names stereotypically linked to some minority groups are less likely to be offered
are discriminatory. job interviews than applicants with stereotypically “white” names.35 In short,
social scientists who study race and ethnicity almost universally agree that even
as explicit racism has declined in societies like the United States, racial and
ethnic disparities remain a serious problem.
Discrimination and its historical legacies take very different forms in different
societies. Since race and ethnicity are socially constructed and because they in­
tersect with other potential bases of cleavage in a variety of ways, there is no one
set pattern of racial and ethnic discrimination. Brazil, for example, is often con­
trasted with the United States on this issue.36 Many have asserted that Brazil
does not face exactly the same problems of racism as the United States, since
there is no sharp color line the Brazilian culture of race and ethnicity. Yet it is
clear to most observers that some groups in Brazil are nevertheless disadvan­
taged, leading to recent efforts at affirmative action and related approaches.
Demographics cause variation in how race and ethnicity are constructed, and
they link to discrimination as well. Societies with a long tradition as destinations
for large-scale immigration can be expected to exhibit different dynamics than
societies that have received little immigration. This observation might help ex­
plain why some countries in Western Europe, such as France, have faced chal­
lenges incorporating immigrant groups in recent years. Polities that presided
over long histories of slavery may exhibit dynamics different from societies with­
out such histories. Cultural traditions and beliefs likely matter as well. Finally,
the principal actors involved vary from case to case. Actors that can be agents of
discrimination include not just the state but other societal institutions, as well as
groups and individuals within the society.
Gender Discrimination
The meaning of gender discrimination may seem fairly obvious. Many people are
explicitly discriminated against on the basis of their gender. For example, a
woman might be denied a job because she is a woman, or her work might be
unpaid, or paid less than the work of an equally qualified man.37 In a number of
countries, as with racial and ethnic discrimination, political action over decades
has resulted in laws offering some protection against discrimination based on
gender and sexual orientation. Yet again, the protection offered does not fully
resolve the problem, and in a number of societies explicit job discrimination re­
mains rampant. Beyond this, other forms of discrimination, perhaps less obvious,
happen in virtually all societies.38While both men and women experience sexual
harassment, women are far more likely to encounter it.39Yet social-scientific data
suggest that—in addition to persistent discrimination of this kind—women are
systematically disadvantaged in somewhat subtler ways as well.
Women are often paid less than men.40 In a number of places, this inequality
is explicit, and it still happens with frequency in advanced industrial and post­
industrial societies like the United States, despite efforts to curb the problem. But
think about ways in which women suffer from pay differentials beyond such ex­
plicit forms of discrimination:
• First, cultural pressures still sometimes emphasize that women bear spe­
cial responsibility for raising children. As a result, “work-life balance”
issues tend to be especially acute for women, and, in just about any field,
taking time off from the workplace means lower pay and slower ascent of
the career ladder.41Women take time off not only to give birth but because
in some cases they feel more pressure than male counterparts to stay home
with children on an ongoing basis.42
• Second, employers often engage in anticipatory discrimination for these
reasons. Women might be less likely to receive promotions—or even op­
portunities to demonstrate they deserve promotions or raises—because of
expectations that their time may be divided between work and family.
• Third, discriminatory attitudes about women’s abilities and competencies
persist. For example, some people still believe, erroneously, that men are
better at math and science and related technical subjects.
• Fourth, on a related note, the labor market itself is gendered.43 Some jobs are
considered by many to be stereotypically or characteristically male, and others
stereotypically or characteristically female. Traditionally, jobs gendered as
female have paid lower wages than those gendered as male. Thus women
could, within these categories, receive “equal pay for equal work” and still,
when we think about the broader society, be paid unfairly in the aggregate.
These are just some examples of mechanisms through which gender discrimi­
nation in the labor market operates. O f course, they play out very differently in
the wide range of contemporary societies.
In addition to pay inequality, women are often systematically disadvantaged
because in many societies, parents invest more in the human capital of their sons
than their daughters.44 In these instances, women are not competing on a level
playing field, as they have fewer resources. This tendency has been greatly
334 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

CASE IN CONTEXT

j Gender in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Politics PAGE 479

Many people think of post-revolutionary Iran as a country where 1. What conditions did women face in Iran before the
discrimination against women is widespread. Indeed, this is ac­ revolution?
curate. However, as is so often the case with this country, the real­ 2. How has the revolution impacted women's position in
ity is more complex than many know. Iranian society is one in Iranian society?
which women— despite structural and institutional obstacles 3. How do some Iranian women resist coercion?
and inequalities— do find ways to assert their agency.
For more on these issues see the case study in Part Vi, p. 479.
As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:

reduced, however, in many advanced industrial and post-industrial societies.

Indeed, in a number of countries, women consistently outperform men in the
educational system.45 Institutions of higher education increasingly have a hard
time achieving gender balance between male and female students, because
women tend to have higher grades and better test scores. In fact, many colleges
and universities may now be practicing so-called “affirmative action” for men.
Beyond serious, ongoing explicit and subtle discrimination in economic life,
women continue to face discrimination in the political sphere in virtually all so­
cieties, though societies vary substantially in the extent to which this is true.46 It
is only over the last century that women have acquired the right to vote in most
countries (including the United States), in some far more recently, and in a few
not at all. And even in countries with long-established traditions of women’s suf­
frage, women politicians rarely occupy top posts at parity with men. As we shall
see later in this chapter, there is much debate about why this is the case and what
its main consequences might be. Women are less likely than men to hold office at
all levels of government. This disparity is perhaps most notable at the upper ech­
elons of the executive branch. Systematic disadvantage of women in politics most
likely reinforces other forms of disadvantage, since research indicates that women
in political office are more likely than men to aim to eradicate discrimination and
related problems.47 Beyond these issues, bear in mind that globally, women are
considerably more likely than men to experience poverty and sexual violence.
We wish to emphasize that while these claims are generally true, the global
population of societies exhibits wide variation in the extent of observable gender
discrimination and inequality. Some countries, such as the Scandinavian societ­
ies of Sweden, Norway, and Finland, stand out as especially progressive, although
even these have not erased gender inequality.48

Empowerment of Women and Minority Groups

empowerment An increase in the Empowerment is the expansion of the socially defined capability of a given
social, political, or economic group.49 The simplest way to think of empowerment is as the opposite of dis-
capabilities of an individual or crimination. That is, you might think about women or minority groups becoming
group' empowered to the extent that they overcome such discrimination. This idea is
 Types 335

Gender Empowerment in Japan? PAGE 493

Centuries ago Japan was noteworthy, among other reasons, be­ 1. On what grounds could someone claim that gender dis­
cause it was sometimes governed by empresses. Yet contempo­ crimination in Japanese politics is relatively high?
rary Japanese politics has been regarded as a case in which 2. What are the major factors that have contributed to this
gender discrimination is high. How and why is this the case? tendency?
For more on the subject see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 493-494. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:

helpful but only partially defines empowerment, which could, in principle,

extend beyond the establishment of parity. We think of empowerment as ex­
panding women’s and minority group members’ capabilities in all spheres of life
that bear on politics.
Empowerment can be economic.50For example, prohibiting or undoing economic
discrimination (such as in the labor market) based on gender, race, or ethnicity is a
form of empowerment. Many agencies encourage economic development—another
form of empowerment—by offering small loans specifically to women.51 Similarly,
many developing world societies, such as Brazil and Mexico, target women with
“conditional cash transfers”; that is, they disburse funds to those who comply with
certain conditions, such as enrolling children in schools.52 In part, this practice rests
on evidence that women are more likely than men to invest such funds in the human

Leymah Gbowee and Tawakkol Karman, who, along with Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, shared the Nobel
Peace Prize in 2011.
336 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

capital of their families (i.e., health and education) rather than in personal con­
sumption. Further, one can think of women’s cooperatives—in which women not
only pool resources but also create political structures that allow them to exert
leadership—as potentially empowering. Government programs that provide ser­
vices such as child care and medical care to women can also be empowering.
Empowerment can also be cultural or symbolic. One example of symbolic
empowerment is a low-status group engaging in collective action to elevate its
status. O f course, status often goes along with economic class and political
power, but we should not assume that it always does so or that it is not indepen­
dently important.53 The lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) move­
ment in the United States and a number of other countries stands out as one that
has aimed to shape the status position of the populations it represents and sup­
ports. One aspect of the movement is working to expand the political representa­
tion of LGBT people. It also seeks to promote positive depictions of LGBT
people, both in the media and in everyday life. This effort has involved lobbying
media as well as more grassroots action such as gay pride parades and related
events. Such actions aim to extend social benefits to in-group members, in addi­
tion to demanding broader social acceptance and elevated status. Symbolic em­
powerment may be an important component in achieving political and economic
empowerment, since politics and economics are ultimately cultural.
Finally, empowerment can be political.54We can think of the women’s move­
ment and the civil rights movement in the United States as empowering, and we
can think of participation in more specific social movement and protest activity
as potentially empowering. Indeed, we would likely judge a movement or activity
successful to the degree that it empowers group members. Political parties that
aim to advance the goals of specific ethnic groups are also potentially empower­
ing (for interesting reasons, as we shall see, political parties that represent women
as a group are relatively rare55). Laws and interventions to ensure political op­
portunities for women and members of minority groups may be empowering as
well. Perhaps most important, we can see empowerment in initiatives that in­
crease women’s and minority group members’ representation in political offices.
On a related note, some scholars interested in women’s empowerment have
focused on “state feminism,” which one political scientist defines as “the advocacy

Gender and Political Representation in Brazil: Where

Has Progress Come From? PAGE 410

Historically, Latin America has been viewed, rightly or wrongly, as 1. What have been the major successes of feminist activism
a region in which women face widespread discrimination. Yet in in Brazil in recent years?
recent years, the women's movement has made notable ad­ 2. Why, according to political scientists, have gender-linked
vances in this region, such as in Brazil. parties not been prominent in Brazil?
For more on the state of women's political empowerment in 3. Why, nevertheless, has the Workers' Party tended to be
Brazil, see the case study on pp. 410-411 in Part VI. As you read it, more favorable to women's empowerment?
keep in mind the following questions:
 Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence the Political Representation of Women and Minority Groups? 337

of women’s movement demands inside the state.”56 This perspective reminds us

that beyond social movement organizing and political competition for elected
office, both elected and appointed office-holders inside the state bureaucracy can
contribute to the empowerment of women and other groups in myriad ways.57
In the “Causes and Effects” section that follows, we focus on political empow­
erment because it is fundamental. Once a group is politically empowered, it has
an expanded capacity to shape agendas. As a result, it can then push for other
forms of empowerment.

Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence

the Political Representation of Women and
Minority Groups?
In this section we consider factors affecting political representation of women
and minority groups. As noted previously, we are narrowing our focus a bit, as we
will pay less attention here to questions of economic and symbolic empower­
ment, though these are not unrelated. We focus on social movement mobiliza­
tion, the creation of political parties based on gender or ethnicity, and institutional
design tools such as quotas. These potential causes of empowerment are not mu­
tually exclusive but rather may go together.

Social Movement Mobilization

Perhaps the most important process through which women and minority groups
can be empowered is through social movement mobilization.58 Indeed, this pro­
cess often underlies the two other main processes we consider in this section:
political parties and policy responses.59As noted in chapter 12, social movements
typically need to develop organizations to maintain their momentum and direc­
tion over an extended period: Political parties are one such type of organization.
The development of a political party out of a social movement is a step in the
institutionalization of that movement’s concerns.60
Social movement mobilization can also be effective in other ways. It can act in
the form of symbolic empowerment to expand the interests of a group. Thus,
social movement activity can aim to transform political culture or popular atti­
tudes about a group, such as LGBT people (as we mentioned earlier). The civil
rights movement in the United States is another clear example here. The move­
ment’s goals were many and included both the political and economic empower­
ment of African Americans, but one of its key aims was breaking down the
symbolic barriers that facilitated many white Americans’ support of or tolerance
for the discriminatory Jim Crow laws. Another example is activism on the part
of minority groups in a number of European societies (such as the Scottish and
Welsh in the United Kingdom and the Catalonians in Spain). These movements
have sought symbolic empowerment in addition to expanded political power.
We looked at major theories of contentious action, including social move­
ments, in chapter 12. One major cluster of social movement theories, prominent
in Europe, claims that these movements have brought concerns of identity to the
foreground in recent decades.61This assertion is debated, however, as some argue
that identity concerns have always been central to social movements.
338 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the

INSIGHTS Resurgence of Identity and Culture
by Joane Nagel

agel's book is an effort to explain a fascinating demographic in empowering groups symbolically, beyond just the expansion
N pattern in the late-twentieth-century United States: the dra­ of economic position and political power.
matic increase in the number of persons claiming an American Joane Nagel, American Indian Ethnic Renewal: Red Power and the Resurgence
Indian or Native American identity. This trend was not a product of Identity and Culture. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

of an increased birthrate but, rather, of more individuals claiming

an identity that they would not have avowed previously. Nagel
finds that, in part, this change was a consequence of social
movement activity. In the civil rights era, a number of factors in­
creased the likelihood of mobilization around an American
Indian identity, and an important movement among persons of
American Indian identity developed. Most notably, a group of
"Red Power" activists seized Alcatraz Island in San Francisco in
1969. But this was only the most visible event in a much more
widely dispersed process, which included additional takeovers,
marches, and many other actions.
According to Nagel, part of what social movement mobiliz­
ing accomplished was a transformation in the status of American
Indian identity. Movement activists redefined this identity from
one that had been given little status in the broader American
society to one seen as a source of pride. Nagel's account of this In 1969, American Indian activists took over Alcatraz Island.
case highlights the importance of social movement organizing This protest activity drew attention to their cause.

The Power of Identity

INSIGHTS
by Manuel Castells

astells considers the importance of identity movements in

C
often oriented toward resisting the network society and global­
the contemporary world. He finds that identity issues ization. Finally, "project identities" look forward rather than back­
prompt a great deal of contemporary social movement activity. ward. They do not aim just to defend existing communities from
The most important social transformations are cultural or cogni­ larger forces but to construct new identities that transform soci­
tive, he argues, since “domination is primarily based on the con­ ety more broadly. Castells' favorite example here is the global
struction of reality in the human mind."62 feminist movement, which he calls the 'movement against patri­
Castells argues that there are three main kinds of political archy." The core idea is that this movement has had success by
identities. These are "legitimizing identities," "resistance identi­ changing women's identities, and that in the process it came to
ties," and "project identities." Legitimizing identities are tied to the reconfigure key social institutions, such as the family. The recon­
nation-state, which Castells believes to be threatened by the rise figuration of these institutions has changed gender identities
of the global "network society." "Resistance identities' are tied to more broadly.
members of communal groups (like some ethnic groups) and are Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity. 2nded. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010.
 Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence the Political Representation of Women and Minority Groups? 339

Whether or not social movement activity focusing on questions of identity is

novel, there is no disputing that it can be an effective strategy for empowering a
group. As noted previously, one way it can work is through helping establish and
support political parties that represent the interests of a group.

Political Parties Based on Gender or Ethnicity

So how do political parties help represent a group’s interests? First, most modern
electoral systems depend on political parties to organize and structure political
competition. As a result of this process, parties bind political representatives
together under common platforms, which can strongly influence votes and thus
political decision-making. This influence varies from case to case, of course, and
not all parties are equally capable of shaping the voting behavior of party mem­
bers. Another reason that parties can matter is that in some political systems
parties exist as either an official (e.g., contemporary China) or de facto (e.g.,
Mexico under the PRI) layer in institutional decision-making processes.
As chapters 9 through 11 show, the nature of the electoral system and how the
legislature and executive are structured also affect the ways in which parties
organized around an ethnic group might exert influence. As we shall see, the
nature of those systems also impacts the probability that an ethnic party will
develop.
However party organization intersects with the formal organizational fea­
tures of the state, parties are useful tools for pursuing group interests. When and
why ethnic parties are formed is a somewhat complicated question. Several vari­
ables probably matter, but in interaction with one another.63 In other words, none
of them alone is likely sufficient to produce ethnic parties.
The first such variable is demographic.64 How racially and ethnically hetero­
geneous is the society in question? This is not to suggest that there is an ideal
level of ethnic heterogeneity for the formation of ethnic political parties, but
that some level of heterogeneity is key. The relative shares of the population di­
vided into each group, as well as the number of groups and the geographical
dispersion of groups, can influence the probability of the formation of ethnic
parties. This demographic variable interacts with several other variables, the
most important of which are likely (1) the society’s culture of ethnic affiliation
more broadly (e.g., how does the culture in general handle ethnic attachment?)
and, equally important, what other bases for political mobilization are available
that might crowd out ethnic party organizing; (2) the nature of political compe­
tition in the society in question; and (3) the historical and structural relation­
ships between ethnic groups.6S
The way a society handles questions of ethnic affiliation more broadly might
also be relevant to ethnic party formation. For example, does the society define
national identity in ethnic terms, or does it view national identity as attached to
citizenship?66 Imagine a society that historically treats national identity in
ethnic terms and where a large ethnic majority comprises this ethno-national
group. We would expect this situation to affect the likelihood that either the
majority group or any minority groups would seek political representation
through parties.
340 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

From Movements to Parties in Latin America

INSIGHTS
by Donna LeeVan Cott , , ■-

an Cott seeks to explain how it came to be that Amerindian Within the institutional factors, Van Cott believes two to be
V social movements in four Latin American countries success­
fully created parties pursuing their interests in the 1990s. Her four
particularly important. First, decentralization and related reforms
(including reserved seats) in some of these countries allowed for
positive cases are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela, and opportunities for new political actors tied to ethnicity-linked or­
she notes that similar results did not take place in Argentina or ganizing. At the same time, the traditional left was weakened in
Peru. This full set of both positive and negative cases allows her the period of the "Washington Consensus," meaning that ideo­
to compare societies in which there are large indigenous popula­ logical space was opened up for new ways to frame resistance
tions (Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru) and those in which there are and to organize politically. In the successful cases, social move­
smaller indigenous populations (Argentina, Colombia, and Ven­ ment activists seized on these opportunities as they created par­
ezuela). This comparison shows that demographic variables ties to pursue their group interests.
alone do not explain the fate of ethnic parties, but rather that Donna Lee Van Cott, From Movements to Parties in Latin America. New York:
demographic variables interact with other factors. There are two Cambridge University Press, 2005.
main factors that Van Cott considers especially important: insti­
tutional factors and social movement activity.

Perhaps equally or even more important, other bases for social cleavage can
crowd out ethnic attachment as a basis for forming political parties.67 This is
sometimes true of social class, for example. Sometimes a strong tradition of
class-based organizing—think of a society in which people are mobilized as
workers or as peasants—might reduce the likelihood of organizing around
ethnicity.
The nature of political competition in a society seems to matter a lot as well.
Ethnic parties seem to be more likely in parliamentary systems in which there is
proportional representation. This is because it is more likely that an ethnic party
could win some seats and play a role in a coalition government in such cases.

CASE IN CONTEXT

W hy Aren't There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico? PAGE 508

Mexico, like many countries, has had a long history of ethnic dis­ 1. Why might one expect to find ethnic parties in Mexico?
crimination. As in the United States, we might expect to find a 2. What major features of Mexican political development
history of political parties forming there on the basis of ethnic might help us account for their absence?
cleavages. Yet again, as in the United States, we find little such 3. How does this interesting case compare with the cases of
history. This outcome, however, seems likely to be due to a differ­ the United States and India (discussed later)?
ent set of conditions, thus facilitating an interesting comparison.
For more on ethnic cleavages and political parties in Mexico,
see the case study in Part VI, pp. 508-509. As you read it, keep in
mind the following questions:
 Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence the Political Representation of Women and Minority Groups? 341

in India page46s

India stands out as a country where some ethnic-group-affiliated 1. What are the basic characteristics of those parties that
parties have seen success. What accounts for this success, and have been successful?
why have others failed? Political scientists in recent years have 2. How and to what extent might knowledge derived from
made advances in accounting for this variation. the case of India be applied to other cases?
For more on this question, see the case study in Part VI, 3. How does the development of ethnic parties in India
pp. 465-466. As you read it, keep in mind the following compare with the cases of the United States and Mexico
questions: (discussed previously)?

Imagine a country in which 10 percent of the population falls into an ethnic

group that has faced some discrimination, and members of this group seek to
influence the political process in order to reduce this discrimination. A party
could help in a system based on proportional representation, because if a high
percentage of group members voted for the party, it could win parliamentary
seats and bargain to join a governing coalition.68 However, if the society has a
first-past-the-post system (i.e., the winning candidate simply needs the most
votes), there is little likelihood that group members would rationally pursue party
organization. The reason is that if the party was perceived to be linked to the
needs of a minority ethnic group, it would have trouble reaching the vote thresh­
old needed to win seats. O f course, depending on how such an electoral system is
structured, a minority ethnic party could achieve reasonable representation
under some conditions. For example, if an ethnic minority is geographically con­
centrated, constituting a majority in some areas, it might be in the minority at
the national level but still capable of winning a number of seats in the
legislature.
Finally, the nature of the historical and structural relationships between
groups, including their relative power, could matter greatly in influencing the
likelihood of ethnic party development. For example, historical discrimination
against a group may motivate them to form a party.
So far in this subsection we have been discussing political parties based on
ethnic group membership. But what about gender? Interestingly, political parties
based on gender are much rarer than parties based on ethnicity. Some scholars
have investigated why this might be (see the “Insights” box on Mala Htun’s work).
In short, several factors curb the formation of a women-only political party.
The main reason may be, however, that women are institutionally linked to men:
Their interests as individuals and as members in other groups are tied in important
ways to the interests of individual men and other members of those other groups.69

Institutions for Promoting Women's

and Minority Group Representation
One goal of many social movements and political parties is institutional design
that will expand a certain group’s political representation. While social movement
342 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

Is Gender like Ethnicity? The Political Representation

INSIGHTS of Identity Groups
byMdaHtun

ala Htun asks us to consider some key differences in the of group difference, whereas gender tends to "crosscut" them.
M ways equitable political representation can be achieved for
women and members of other groups. What she finds is that the
For example, membership in a particular ethnic group might be
related to the position of group members in the class structure,
nature of the group and its position in society matter greatly in whereas women as a group tend to be found across the class
achieving this representation. Gender groups seldom form po­ structure of a given society (however economically empowered
litical parties and, as a result, the preferred method to improve or disempowered they may be as a group). Since ethnic groups
equity for women has tended to be candidate quotas (discussed often "coincide,” they can form parties and then seek reserved
further in the section that follows). In certain circumstances, seats. But since women are a "crosscutting group," they have dif­
however, ethnic groups have had greater success in establishing ficulty organizing via parties that represent the varied interests of
political parties. women as a group.
The logic that Htun uses to explain this outcome is simple Mala Htun, 'Is Gender Like Ethnicity? The Political Representation of Identity
but powerful. Ethnic groups tend to "coincide” with other forms Groups."Perspectives on Politics 2, No. 3 (2004):439-458.

organizing and political party formation can acquire a degree of permanence,

institutional design can potentially shape outcomes independent of the ongoing
efforts of activists. In other words, this approach seeks to turn empowerment into
an automatic feature of the political institutions of a given country. O f course, we
could think of all legislation that is designed to empower women or members of
minority groups as institutional design, since laws are part of the institutional
fabric of the state. But what we have in mind here are efforts to ensure the partici­
pation of women and members of minority groups in formal political office.
The fundamental institutional design feature that has been used is a quota
system, which reserves a certain number of candidacies or seats for members of a
group.70 This system has been implemented in a number of different ways. The
biggest division is between “reserved-seat” systems and “candidate-quota” sys­
tems.71 Reserved-seat systems are what they sound like: systems that reserve a
certain number of seats for members of a particular group. For example, constitu­
tions in some Latin American countries guarantee a specified number of seats for
members of one or another indigenous community. Reserved-seat systems are
the oldest form of quota system, and they tend to have only a limited impact on
the representation of women’s groups.72 This limited impact may be due, in part,
to the politics of implementing them: agreeing to set aside a high percentage of
all seats for members of a particular group may meet with political opposition in
many circumstances.
The other major types of systems are “candidate-quota” systems.73 Here the
idea is to guarantee that a certain number of female candidates—or members of
other groups as the case may be—are running in elections. One major way this
takes places is within political parties. Although gender-based political parties
are relatively rare, political parties may still address issues related to gender, or
they may position themselves to capture the votes of those who favor gender
 ■h I
Causes and Effects: What Factors Influence the Political Representation of Women and Minority Groups? 343

equality. Thus some parties will aim to formally or informally increase the
number of female candidates within the party. When this is done formally, it is a
party-level quota system. For example, a Social Democratic Party in country X
might apply to itself the rule that 30 percent of its candidates for legislative office
will be women. Imagine that they face a Christian Democratic Party as their
main opponent. That party will now have to make a strategic choice: One pos­
sible option among others would be to apply a quota that matches or exceeds that
self-imposed quota on the Social Democrats in order to demonstrate that, despite
other ideological and policy differences, the Christian Democratic Party is pro­
gressive on issues of gender equality.
Party leadership may succeed in self-imposing quotas in systems where pro­
portional representation is the norm, given that party leadership tends to have
more power to select its candidates in such systems. If voters vote for parties
rather than individual candidates, it is easier for the party to impose formal rules
on itself as it selects candidates. How do you think such an approach would work
in the United States, where many candidates are not selected by party leaders but
in primaries where voters choose the party’s nominee? W hat would happen if,
say, the Republican Party leadership decided that it wanted to adopt a 40 percent
quota for female candidates? Unlike in systems with centrally controlled party
lists of candidates, this may be very difficult to achieve.
Another way quota systems can be adopted is through a law or constitution
stating that all parties must meet certain quota thresholds.74 But the adoption
of such a system can be difficult to achieve as well and would require major
changes in how elections are organized in a society such as the United States.
More generally, the likelihood of a country’s developing quota systems that
apply to all parties depends on each party’s calculation of its own electoral
prospects if such reforms are carried out, as well as the parties’ relative power.
If a given party stands to benefit from new arrangements, it can be expected
to support them, but if a party is either strongly ideologically opposed to the
idea or stands to have trouble meeting quota requirements, it is likely to resist
their universal imposition. Scholars debate which quota system is most
effective.75
You can see the complexity of analyzing how, when, and why institutional
design affects the representation of women or members of other groups. Two
things, however, are clear. First, global efforts to expand political representation
of women are clearly increasing, and different quota systems have led to impor­
tant gains. Second, social scientific interest in these issues is increasing as well—
something to keep in mind for your next research project.
More generally, remember that the causes we have considered in this section
are not mutually exclusive explanations of how empowerment takes place. Rather,
these are potential tools for those who seek to empower minority groups, women,
and other groups. In many cases of successful empowerment, these elements
work together. For example, it is possible for social movement organizing to help
produce both political parties and new institutional designs. However, parties
and institutional design also influence the environment in which social move­
ment organizing takes place. There seems to be no standard way in which these
pieces fit together.
344. Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

INSIGHTS
Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate
Selection Reform Worldwide
by Mona Lena Krook

rook has developed an innovative approach to the study of 3. Processes of change differ in quality. The more successful
&
K empowering women through institutional design. She com­ ones are "harmonizing sequences" in which changes
pares a number of cases of more and less successful adoption of build on one another and actors adjust for unintended
reserved seat and candidate quota systems, and she draws the consequences of previous stages, while "disjointed se­
following general conclusions, among others: quences" are less successful.
1. The causal impact of a given variable is not universal, but 4. Many actors with a variety of goals are involved in these
rather depends on interaction effects with other vari­ processes. These actors include, at the very least, state-
ables. Thus there is no "one size fits all" approach to insti­ level actors like politicians, actors in "civil society" like ac­
tutional design in this area. tivists, and "transnational" actors like certain NGOs. It is
2. Institutional design can affect three major arenas, those exceedingly difficult to predict how such actors will
of "systemic," "practical," and "normative" institutions. Dif­ interact.
ferent sorts of institutional design efforts affect these Mona Lena Krook, Quotas for Women in Politics: Gender and Candidate Selec­
arenas in different ways. Not only do formal institutional tion Reform Worldwide. New York: Oxford University Press, 2009.

changes matter, but moral arguments about issues such

as justice and equity do, too.

THINKING Indicators of Gender Empowerment

COMPARATIVELY magine that we wanted to evaluate how well the United Kingdom and some

KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

I of its former colonies are empowering women. We will include Australia,
Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom in this set of
cases. Suppose the idea is to build toward considering a hypothesis about a pos­
Selecting or Creating sible effect of traditional British culture on gender roles in politics and economic
Indicators life. This may sound like a strange idea, but it is not implausible, given that
An indicator is a m easure that indi­ gender is culturally constructed in different ways in different societies. Moreover,
cates the presence, am ount, or
some research suggests that English colonialism had different impacts from
degree o f a variable you are research­
ing. G ood indicators have to w ork
other colonizers on the long-term democratic quality and stability in former
effectively in at least tw o ways. First, colonies.76 For the sake of our thought experiment here, let us just imagine that
they have to be true to the underly­ this research has led us to hypothesize that former English colonies might show
ing con ce pt you are researching. greater political empowerment of women than former Spanish colonies.
Second, they need to be actually
If we want to explore the possibility of testing a hypothesis, we cannot just
measurable, m eaning, am o n g other
things, that any observer using the
spend time in these societies and see how people feel about gender and politics.
indicator will see it in m ore or less the Rather, we need to select specific indicators of gender empowerment that allow
sam e way. A nother w ay to say this is us to measure it in a rigorous way. Otherwise, we will likely project our own
that indicators m ust com prise m ea­ biases onto the social and political realities that we observe. If, though, we can
sures that are both "valid" and
settle on reliable and valid indicators of gender empowerment and if, in turn, we
"reliable."
A useful recent indicator w e have
find that gender empowerment as measured through these indicators is consis­
for s tudying w om en's em pow erm ent tent with our hypothesis, we could work toward testing whether and to what
extent colonial legacy is the operative cause of any observed pattern.
 Indicators of Gender Empowerment 345

One recent indicator of the political empowerment of women was the Gender THINKING
Empowerment Measure, which brings together several more specific indicators
COMPARATIVELY
(see “Key Methodological Tools”). This measure has been used in a number of
United Nations reports in the late 2000s and for many purposes, despite criti­
cism, was considered by many the best single measure of gender empowerment KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL
at that time. (continued)
If we look at Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) ranks for 2009 for the is the GEM, or G end er Em pow erm ent
Measure, w h ich is prom inently fea­
Anglo-colonies in which we are interested (see Table 14.1), we see results that
tured in UN D evelop m en t Reports.
seem consistent with our initial hypothesis. Australia ranks second, Canada
Th e GEM seeks to m easure the extent
fourth, the United States thirteenth, New Zealand twentieth, and the United to w h ich w om en have political and
Kingdom twenty-first. Ranks for former Spanish colonies are not this high, with eco n o m ic control o f their lives and
only Spain being ranked higher than the lowest ranked British zone societies in environm ents in different societies. It
is a com p osite indicator based on
this respect. Should we just conclude that former British colonies are clearly sites
underlying m easures o f w om en's and
of higher levels of political empowerment for women? Not so fast. Since GEM is
men's shares o f (1) political positions,
a composite measure, it captures economic empowerment as well. It may be that (2) prom inent e co n o m ic roles, and (3)
the strong showing of former British settler colonies (relative to former Spanish overall incom e.77 No m easure is per­
colonies) in terms of GEM is a consequence of higher levels of economic devel­ fect, however, an d som e scholars
have criticized the GEM on technical
opment in these societies.
grounds.78 We should also note that it
Let’s try a narrower indicator. Remember that we are fundamentally con­ has no w ay to accou n t for sym b olic
cerned with political empowerment of women in this question. W hat if we look and status-related com p o n e n ts o f
at the percentage of women holding legislative office? This could give us a clearer em pow erm ent.
indication of political empowerment, given that it won’t include information
about the relative economic standing of women, which we may consider to be a
different question (see Table 14.2).
Here, we see a very different pattern. In our set of comparative cases, Bolivia
is on top, and the United States is on the bottom. New Zealand is the only former
British settler colony in the top thirty, and Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Spain, Nica­
ragua, Mexico, and Argentina all outperform all the other former British settler
colonies in our group (as do Costa Rica and El Salvador, though they do not rank
as highly as the other Latin American countries listed in Table 14.2).79

ta b le 14.1 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM) Global

Ranks, Selected Countries
2 Australia
4 Canada
13 United States
15 Spain
20 New Zealand
21 United Kingdom
44 Chile
49 Argentina
50 Uruguay
51 Cuba

{Source: UN Human Development Report, 2009.)

346 Chapter 14: Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

ta b le 14.2 Ranking of Percentage of Women in National

Legislature, Selected Countries
% Seats in Lower/ % Seats in Upper
Rank Country Single House House

2 Bolivia 53.1 47.2

4 Cuba 48.9 N/A

9 Ecuador 41.6 N/A

12 Spain 41.1 33.8

15 Nicaragua 39.1 N/A

17 (tied) Mexico 38 33.6

22 Argentina 36.2 38.9

29 New Zealand 31.4 NA

44 Australia 26.7 38.2

49 Canada 25.2 38.6

57 United Kingdom 22.8 24.1

73 (tied) United States 19.3 20.0

(Source: Interparliamentary Union 2015.)

Does this demonstrate that selected former Spanish colonies have higher
levels of the political empowerment of women than former British colonies? Not
necessarily. Can you think of some of the limitations of this indicator? One would
be that legislative representation is not the only form of representation. Another
might be that empowerment of a group, even political empowerment, likely ex­
tends well beyond having members of that group hold office. Both of these are
concerns about the potential validity of this indicator as a measure of the under­
lying concept we are researching: political empowerment of women. W hat we
see here is that a number of former Spanish colonies have achieved very high levels
of legislative representation of women, outpacing former English settler colonies
by this measure, which is interesting and deserving of comparative exploration.
The bottom line is that there is almost never a perfect indicator. (Indeed, the
United Nations has replaced the GEM with new measures of gender-adjusted
development and gender inequality in recent years, in response to scholarly cri­
tiques.) All choices of indicators involve trade-offs. You must be mindful of these
trade-offs and remember that indicators are only stand-ins for the underlying
concepts you are researching. Indicators and measurements are crucial in under­
standing the extent to which women and ethnic and racial groups are empowered
and active in politics. Conducting careful comparative research can give us
greater insight into questions that matter to us, on issues as profound as our very
identities as people.
 Chapter Review 347

C h ap te r Su m m ary
Concepts historical legacies of earlier forms of discrimination, are
• The meaning of concepts like race and ethnicity varies in clearly visible.
relation to context. While some people think of race and • Discrimination based on gender is also a pervasive feature
sometimes ethnicity as biological, most social scientists of polities. Again, a good deal of progress has been made,
view them as culturally constructed. but gender discrimination remains a problem.
• Gender is distinguished from biological sex, and most • Empowerment can be economic, symbolic, or political.
social scientists think of gender as cultural rather than
biological. Causes and Effects
In recent years a number of societies have grown more • One potential source of empowerment is social movement
pluralistic and tolerant with respect to sexual orientation. mobilization.
Another is political parties, and parties tend to be more
Types viable for ethnic groups seeking empowerment than for
• Race historically has almost always been linked to social gender groups.
actors' beliefs about biology, whereas ethnicity emphasizes • Institutional design strategies like reserved seats and
cultural traditions. The concept of race in particular has quotas can also be used in support of empowerment.
been linked to exploitation.
Discrimination based on both race and ethnicity is a Thinking Comparatively
common feature of many polities, historically and today. • A thought experiment about relative gender empower­
Discrimination has in some societies become more subtle ment in the former colonies of Spain and the United
over time, but its consequences, and the consequences of Kingdom demonstrates the pros and cons of two major
indicators of political empowerment.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. The theme of empowerment is much discussed in this chapter, particular ethnic group. They tell you that their ethnic, gender,
including dimensions of empowerment and ways in which de­ and class status compound each other and that their interests
velopment is conceptualized and measured by social scientists. really are distinct from those of other groups. They would like your
But what is empowerment? Develop your own conceptualiza­ technical assistance as they aim to build a social movement. In
tion and link it back to the discussion in the chapter. What, if particular, they would like your advice about how to "frame" that
anything, is missing? movement. What questions do you ask them, and how do you
2. We discussed political, economic, and cultural or symbolic em­ advise them? How is this case different from organizing around
powerment. How are these dimensions related? Is one more "women's issues" or the interests of a particular ethnic group?
fundamental than the others, and, if so, why? If a group wants to 5. Imagine once more that you are an "empowerment consultant."
improve its position, would it be best advised to begin by focus­ You have been contacted by the representatives of a political
ing on one or another form of empowerment? party that represents the interests of an ethnic group that has
3. Imagine that you have been asked to consult with members of historically faced severe discrimination, one that is largely found
an indigenous group in a hypothetical country that wants to in a particular area of the country and which constitutes about
create a political party. How would you go about your work? 10 percent of the country's population. They tell you that their
What pieces of information would you seek to collect, and why? country is going to write a new constitution and that they have
What major questions would you want answered, and why? a number of delegates in the constitutional assembly. They
How would the answers to these questions impact your want your advice about what sorts of institutional designs they
recommendations? should push for as they aim to protect the interests of their
4. Imagine now that you have been asked to consult with social people. What do you need to know in order to give them
movement activists that represent poor rural women of a advice? How would your answer depend on their answers?
• President Evo Morales of Bolivia in 20)4. Morales is Bolivia's first indigenous president and an advocate ofa left-leaning ideology that some refer to
as "twenty-first-century socialism."
I f you were to walk through downtown Caracas, Venezuela, you might see
I huge banners with pictures of Argentinian Marxist revolutionary Che Gue­
vara and slogans declaring the arrival of “twenty-first-century socialism.”
Supporters of Venezuela’s late president, Hugo Chavez, and his “Bolivarian
Revolution” (named for Venezuelan revolutionary Simon Bolivar) extol the
virtues of the regime. They are conspicuously dressed in red, a color that has
symbolized attachment to socialism and communism since the nineteenth
century. The Chavista government is not alone in its socialist
position, as governments in countries like Bolivia, Ecuador,
IN THIS CHAPTER
and Nicaragua take a similar line.
Concepts 350
Halfway across the globe, if you were to stroll through
Modernity and Modernization 350
Tehran, Iran, you would encounter mostly very different Ideology 351
public symbolism. The Iranian government, which also calls Religion 351
itself “revolutionary,” attempts to garner public support through Secularization, Religion, and Modern
Politics 352
justifying itself in religious terms. Scholars who study rela­
Religious Conflict 353
tionships between religions and the state find that in much
Types 354
of the world, religion is very much involved in the state.1
Modern Ideologies 354
Moreover, survey research shows that much of the world is Modern Forms of Religion in Politics 357
quite religious.2 Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion
I f you had told comparative political analysts in the and Ideology Remain Prevalent
in Modern Politics? 360
1960s that regimes like these would proliferate in the early
Why (and How) Does Modernization Alter
twenty-first century, most would have disagreed sharply. They Religion's Role in Politics? 360
might even have laughed, as they expected modernization to Why Didn't ideology (and History) End? 364
render ideology and religion obsolete. Prominent scholars
TH IN KIN G COMPARATIVELY
declared the “end of ideology,” meaning that major political
Two Lefts in Latin America? 367
programs such as fascism, socialism, and communism had
run their course.3 Virtually all analysts agreed that religion CASES IN CONTEXT
would fade from public life in coming decades.4 Yet both United Kingdom • Russia • France ■
ideology and religion continue to exert a strong influence on Iran • Nigeria

modern politics.
Their persistence has led analysts to ask a series of questions: W hat did
the last generation of theories get wrong? Did they misunderstand modern­
ization? W hat is modernization, anyway? W hat is modernity? How has the
role of religion in modern societies changed as societies have modernized? W hy
haven’t ideologies such as fascism and socialism disappeared? Finally, the
persistence of ideology and religion draws attention to important, perennial
349
350 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

questions of social and political theory concerning the role of ideas in politics.
To what extent do religions and ideologies affect political processes? As you
saw in chapter 5, some analysts argue that certain religious ideas increase the
likelihood of economic development. Related theories, mentioned in chapter 6,
suggest that certain religious ideas promote democratization.5 These are un­
settled questions, and there is a lot of interesting work to be done in this area
of comparative politics.6

Concepts
Both ideology and religion, when considered from the perspective of political
political culture The symbolically science, are examples of what scholars call political culture. This means, essen­
encoded beliefs, values, norms, and tially, that they are different types of representations that people hold about poli­
practices that shape the formal tics and related matters. People have all sorts of beliefs, but ideological and
distribution of power in any given religious beliefs tend to be deeply held and therefore may be highly impactful.
society. This does not mean that religion and ideology are the same thing, of course, as
we discuss in this chapter. Ideologies are explicitly political in their orientation,
whereas religions might have political implications but are broader belief systems
that extend well beyond politics.
Given that our interest is in understanding ideology and religion in modern
politics, and since much analysis concerns the relationship between these phe­
modernity A contested term that nomena and modernity, we start by discussing the concepts of modernity and
refers to a type of society, typically modernization. Note that you have already seen these concepts come up from
one experiencing economic time to time in earlier chapters.
growth and with a relatively strong
state, among other characteristics. Modernity and Modernization
“Modernity” is one of the most important labels in contemporary political life.
modernization The process
Virtually nobody aspires to being “pre-modern.” Rather, modernity constitutes a
through which a society becomes
particular rung in the international status hierarchy, and as such has been a
“more modern," which is typically
moving target for societies aspiring to “modern” status over the last several
understood to mean having an
centuries.7
advanced economy and,
Modernity is a cultural construction; it has its origins in a particular time and
sometimes, a democratic polity.
place.8 In other words, people created the idea of modernity, and like all ideas
that bear on competition for status and power, it served certain interests and did
not serve others. Most fundamentally, the idea of “the modern” helped both mo­
tivate and justify European colonial projects in Africa, the Middle East, and
Asia.9Indeed, this concept was perhaps one of the most formidable tools of those
colonial projects’ “soft power.”10The European powers and some members of the
Westernized classes in the subjugated, colonized populations agreed that such
societies needed modernization. The watchwords of this vision were technical
secularism The ideological efficiency, education, literacy, civilization, and secularism (favoring secular—non­
complex that favors secular (non­ religious—culture). It is not surprising, therefore, that anti-colonial resistance
religious) culture. was, in its first generation, typically carried out using this same conceptual
language:11 Rather than being the agents of modernization, colonizers were
 Concepts 351

re-interpreted as barriers to it. Bound up with the notion, sometimes explicitly

and sometimes implicitly, were the corollaries that modernization was a both a
necessary and an inevitable process.
Transforming ideas like “modernity” and “modernization” into social-scientific
concepts is a difficult task, since we do not want to reproduce the biases implicit
in the original concepts.12 Indeed, some scholars have called for the abandon­
ment of these concepts altogether. For this book we think the concepts are still
worth using, partly because most of the world goes on talking about modernity
and modernization. Political scientists and scholars in related fields generally
mean several things by modernity and modernization, or they focus on several
distinctive features of modern or modernizing societies.13 First, they often char­
acterize modernity by growth-oriented, or capitalist, economies, rather than
stagnant or “traditionalistic” economic systems, in which there is little accumula­
tion of wealth over time. Second, they often characterize modernity by its open
system of stratification, meaning that social position in modern societies is not
fixed at birth: In “modern” societies, according to this view, social mobility is pos­
sible and legitimate. Third, they often characterize the chief political form of mod­
ernity as the modern, bureaucratic state; they see centralization and bureaucratization
of power as hallmarks of modernity. Finally, as noted in chapter 13, some scholars
see national identity as a distinguishing marker of modernity. As we discuss later,
scholars increasingly note that modernization can take a variety of forms.14

Ideology
Most comparative political analysts think of ideologies as highly organized and ideology A systematically
rationalized systems of ideas that directly bear on politics.15 According to this coordinated and cognitively salient
way of thinking, your ideas about your tastes in music, fashion, food, and so forth set of beliefs focused on politics.
are probably not ideological.16 But whether you know it or not, your thinking
about politics is probably shaped by an ideology. This ideology most likely con­
tains ideas about what rights people should have and where these rights come
from, ideas about whether individuals matter more than groups or vice versa,
ideas about how the economy ought to be organized, and ideas about how collec­
tive decisions should be reached. Some people can be considered very ideological,
meaning that they think a lot and very clearly about these things, or even that
they are rigidly devoted to their views about them, but all of us are influenced by
ideologies to some degree.17
Major political ideologies include liberalism, fascism, and socialism, each
of which we discuss further later in the chapter. It is worth noting that these
major political ideologies are largely secular. In other words, they oppose reli­
gion as a basis for organizing politics and present themselves as alternatives to
it. Some scholars have gone so far as to argue that ideologies are like “secular functional definition Definition
religions.”18
that aims to define a given pheno­
menon by what it does.
Religion
Analysts tend to think about religion in two basic, contrasting ways: by using substantive definition
functional definitions and by using substantive definitions.19 Functional defi­ Definition that aims to define a
nitions specify what religion does. They define religion by its ability to foster given phenomenon by what it is
social integration, to give people a sense of order through creating and telling rather than by what it does.
352 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

A line of women waits for a bus in Tehran. Note the religious imagery on the building
behind them.

myths about history and the cosmos, or by its ability to motivate collective action.
If we use a functional definition, we see lots of things—including modern
ideologies—as religion. For certain research purposes, this view may be helpful.
More often, as we have seen throughout this book, when doing comparative
analysis we want to make clear distinctions so that we can locate and explain
variation. Substantive definitions of religion help make this possible. A substan­
tive definition focuses on the content of religious belief or organization, its “sub­
stance” rather than just what it does. For example, a substantive definition might
say, “Religions are systems of belief that grant a prominent place to God.” For
many purposes, though, this particular definition would not be helpful, since a
number of religions (e.g., Buddhism) do not have gods, and many others (e.g.,
animism and Hinduism) have many gods or god-like entities. More commonly,
though, substantive definitions of religion argue that what separates religion
from other aspects of culture is that it gives prominence to some transcendent
force (i.e., one beyond the normal or merely physical human experience).20 This
might be a deity, a goal such as Nirvana, or even the Platonic ideal of “the good.”
Along these lines, some analysts define religion substantively as a cultural
system or network of beliefs and organizations that are oriented toward the tran­
scendent.21 Note that this definition, unlike most functional ones, allows us to
then pose empirical questions about religion’s growth, decline, or changing fea­
secularization The process tures because we can track change about beliefs in the transcendent over time.
through which (according to some
theories) societies become less Secularization, Religion, and Modern Politics
religious as they become more As noted previously, for a number of years comparative analysts thought that re­
modern. ligion would decline in the modern world. They called this idea “secularization”
 Concepts 353

or “secularization theory,” and they came up with a number of reasons for their
prediction.22 Some noticed that as societies modernized, new religious groups
emerged, giving people greater religious choice. For example, in the modern
United States—unlike in, say, medieval France—one can choose from a wide
variety of world religions, and in particular from a huge array of Protestant
Christian denominations. Some scholars thought that this pluralism would
undermine religious belief, because religious people would be less likely to have
their beliefs constantly reinforced by like-minded people around them.23 Others
thought that modernization would cause religion’s decline because of the im­
portance of science and technology in the modern world. According to this point
of view, “rational” explanations would replace “irrational” religious ones, leaving
some people “disenchanted.”24
Scholars have noticed, however, that this theory seems to describe only one
small part of the world: Western Europe.25 Much of the world is very religious,
and some claim that over the longer term societies like the United States have
actually become more religious26 Moreover, since societies with the highest birth
rates tend to be more religious than societies with low birth rates, we may see
continuing increases in global religiosity in coming decades.27
Comparative analysts continue to note some important changes in religion’s
role as societies modernize, however, and the old theories of secularization are
not all wrong. Scholars today do not agree on whether we should call these
changes “secularization,” but they widely agree that we should distinguish be­
tween any change in religious belief itself and changes in religious institutions or
organizations,28 It seems that when societies modernize, religious institutions or
organizations tend to become increasingly differentiated (independent) from the differentiation The process
state, although, as we shall see, the extent of this varies.29 Along similar lines, in through which institutions become
some, but not all, modern societies, religious institutions and organizations become increasingly autonomous from one
privatized.30 This means that they become increasingly independent not just of another, including the reduction or
the state but of the public sphere: They lose their status in support of public other change in the linkages
claims. For example, in societies with a strong tradition of privatizing religion, between religion and other
such as France, efforts by the church to influence major political decisions are institutions.
viewed negatively. Much of the comparative analysis of religion and politics
privatization In the context of the
today involves mapping institutional or organizational changes and then trying
social scientific study of religion,
to explain the different patterns that emerge. For example (as we discuss in more
this refers to the process of
detail in the “Types” and “Causes and Effects” sections), some societies separate
religious practice being confined to
church and state and then organize religions as denominations.31 Some almost
the private sphere.
fully privatize religious institutions and organizations, while others allow the
state to control them. Comparative analysis seeks to explain these variations. public sphere The space in which
public life and deliberation take
Religious Conflict place (as opposed to the "private
Religious conflict is not surprising in a world with major ideological and religious sphere”).
differences, especially as religion’s relationship to politics is in flux.32 Many ana­
lysts assert that religion has served and will continue to serve as a motivator for
international conflict, and we certainly have seen dramatic examples of reli­
giously inspired violence across national boundaries in recent years. Others draw
our attention to cases where pluralism within a polity causes great tension that
leads to violence. Analysis of such cases is often complicated by the fact that
354 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

religious difference tends to go along with other types of difference, such as re­
gional and ethnic identity. As such, many of the theories discussed in chapters 12
and 13 are used to explain religious conflict as well.

Types
In this section we begin by describing and exemplifying the major forms of ideol­
ogy visible in modern politics. We then move on to do the same for the major
patterns of religious involvement in politics.

Modern Ideologies
As noted previously, the main families of modern political ideologies are liberal­
ism, fascism, and socialism. This list is not exhaustive of the ideological universe,
of course, but these are the most important major ideologies that political scien­
tists have analyzed.

Liberalism
liberalism An ideology that Liberalism is probably the most widespread and influential of modern ideolo­
emphasizes individual freedoms, gies. Indeed, it is so widespread that sometimes analysts do not even notice that
representative democracy, and the it is an ideology. Thus scholars who declared that ideologies would disappear in
market economy. modern society often did not include liberalism in this prediction.33
Like all complex ideologies, liberalism takes many forms, and not all of
them are fully consistent. In general, though, the ideology of liberalism holds
that (1) individuals are and should be more important than groups; (2) indi­
viduals’ relationships with the state should be organized through democratic
citizenship; (3) a democratic political system should be representative, and it
should have constitutional limits that protect the rights of individuals; and (4)
free-market capitalism is the best, and for many the most “natural,” way of or­
ganizing the economy.
Our fourth point in the preceding paragraph is a generalization in that differ­
ent variants of liberalism take different stances on the state’s role in the economy.
As noted in the “Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom” case study, many ana­
social democracy An ideological lysts consider social democracy to be a variant of liberalism, though it owes a
movement that favors both great deal to socialism as well: It promotes state management of the economy as
representative democracy with a means to preserve representative democracy. Broadly, liberalism is a contin­
respect for basic individual rights uum, from libertarianism—the view that the state’s involvement in the economy
and state action to promote and social life must be reduced to the minimal necessary level for the mainte­
relative economic and social nance of order—to social democracy.
equality, viewed by some as a We should briefly mention “conservatism” in this context. In early nineteenth-
variety of socialism but by most as century Europe, conservatism was a distinct ideology, one which aimed to re­
a variety of liberalism. strain modernization processes, defend monarchy, and preserve religious
organizations in their traditional positions. We can still today speak of conserva­
libertarianism A form of
tism as a strong cultural tendency in many societies. Indeed, in some societies it
liberalism, strongly opposed to
could still be treated as a distinct ideology. Yet in many societies conservatism
social democracy, that is especially
concerned with minimizing the
has come to constitute a form of liberalism. In the contemporary United States or
role of government.
Western Europe, few conservatives would go so far as to question liberalism’s
emphasis on representative democratic institutions and markets.
 Types 355

CASE IN CONTEXT
Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom PAGE 552
■

The United Kingdom was the birthplace of both orthodox liber­ 1. Are both of these views varieties of liberalism?
alism and Keynesianism, two main views about the state's role in 2. If so, what makes them different from other ideologies,
the economy that are central to modern ideological debate. like socialism or fascism?
Indeed, the society has also had strong social-democratic actors.
For more on liberalism in the United Kingdom, see the case
study in Part VI, p. 552. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:

As we shall see, liberalism is often suspicious of other ideologies. Indeed,

some liberals present Nazism and socialism as more like each other than oppo­
sites. Rather than viewing ideologies on the standard “left-right” continuum,
they see them on a continuum with liberalism at one end and totalitarianism at
the other.

Fascism
The ideology (or family of ideologies) known as fascism as very prominent in fascism An authoritarian ideology
the twentieth century, which saw fascist governments in Spain, Portugal, and associated with regimes like the
Italy, among other places.34 Some analysts also classify National Socialism Nazis and that of Italy's Benito
(the ideology of the German Nazi Party) as fascist, while others see it as a Mussolini, favoring
distinct form given its totalitarian aspirations and more virulent, bizarre form authoritarianism, militarism, and
of racism. right-wing nationalism.
Fascism can be distinguished from liberalism in several ways. First, fascism
does not share liberalism’s respect for the individual. Rather, fascist ideology
holds that the state, as the embodiment of the nation, is most important. In the
paradigmatic case of Italian fascism under Mussolini, fascism was grounded in a
nationalism that sought to recover the “glorious” history of Ancient Rome.
Second, in line with fascism’s lack of concern for the individual, the political
programs associated with it typically do not make much effort to protect the in­
dividual’s rights. Third, fascism is anti-democratic, in that it views an authoritar­
ian protector for the nation (e.g., Franco in twentieth-century Spain) as preferable
to liberal democracy, which it argues can be co-opted by ideologies and actors
hostile to the nation’s interests. Finally, while fascists often embrace capitalist
economics, they typically promote state capitalism, in which the state has control
of production and the use of capital.
Liberals criticize fascism not only for its lack of respect for individual rights
but for the horrific human rights abuses that have been carried out in its name.
Socialists critique it for these reasons as well and often add the critique that, in
their view, fascism is fundamentally about preserving the capitalist economy.
Indeed, some socialists believe that capitalism will inevitably fall back on fascism
as its ultimate defender.
356 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion In Modern Politics

Fascists hold a flag honoring Benito Mussolini, Italy's notorious World War II—era dictator and
ally of Adolf Hitler.

Socialism
socialism An ideology (or family Perhaps the most widely discussed ideology (or family of ideologies) is socialism.
of ideologies) that emphasizes Though there are many forms of socialism, by far the most influential socialist
economic equality as a key goal, to was Karl Marx, though the ideology predated him. Marx constructed his social­
be pursued in large measure ism as a critique of liberalism.
through state action. According to Marx, the freedoms promised by liberalism were illusory.35
For example, Marx said, you might believe you can liberate people by giving
them freedom of speech or religion, but this belief is based on a misunder­
standing of freedom and the ways in which we are unfree. The main problem
in modern society, from this point of view, is not that authoritarian regimes
limit people’s ability to make their own choices, but that our economic system
alienates us. In our ideal state, Marx says, we would experience fulfillment
through labor. But capitalism, which divides our labor via assembly-line manu­
facture and the bureaucratic organization of office work, makes it impossible
for us to find fulfillment in this way (if you have ever seen the movie Office
Space, then you should have a good idea of what he had in mind). Marx further
argued that capitalism impoverishes the majority as it enriches a parasitic mi­
nority. To solve these problems, socialists like Marx argued that revolution is
necessary. The working class must seize the state and use it to take collective
ownership of factories and other elements of the productive process, which are
controlled by “capitalists.” Once this happens, Marx hoped, socialism will
eventually give way to communism, in which there will be no forced division of
labor and, thus, no alienation.
 Types 357

Communist ideology in Practice:

Russia and the Soviet Union PAGE 537

A number of socialist regimes developed in the twentieth cen­ For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI, p. 537.
tury. The Soviet Union might have been the most important of As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
these, if for no other reason than that it exported socialist ideol­ 1. How did Lenin and Stalin change socialism?
ogy and used its influence to produce socialist revolutions in 2. Was the Soviet Union ideologically uniform, or were there
other states, with some success. But what would Marx have ideological struggles within it?
thought of the Soviet Union? Was it consistent with his socialist 3. Does the demise of the Soviet Union "prove socialism
vision? Or did it embody some other form of socialism? wrong"? Why or why not?

These ideas inspired much of the world in the twentieth century, leading to the
establishment of socialist or communist regimes in China, Vietnam, Russia,
Cuba, and many other places. Many socialists, however, became disillusioned
with these regimes. Some saw them as brutal and dehumanizing, with little likeli­
hood of ever producing the promised world, free of alienation. Some of these disil­
lusioned individuals turned to the ideology of liberalism. Within it, a subset
attempted to construct a modified version—social democracy, which (as men­
tioned earlier) aims to preserve representative democracy and the respect for indi­
vidual rights through active state management of the economy. Social democrats
have been some of the most ardent supporters of the welfare state discussed in
chapter 4. Moreover, they are hard to locate within the typology of ideologies we
have developed here. Some would see social democrats as liberals, because of their
emphasis on democratic institutions and freedoms. Others would see them as so­
cialists, since many social democrats emerged from the socialist tradition and
since they tend to favor more state spending than do liberals. Finally, despite the
emergence of social democracy in the twentieth century, there are still numerous
proponents of more traditional socialism in the world, and some have played an
important role in protest against globalization and related phenomena.

Modern Forms of Religion in Politics

Students in the United States are likely quite used to the idea of the “separation
of church and state,” given its prominence in U.S. political institutions and cul­
ture. Yet even in the United States, religion is politically important, and in much
of the world religious and political institutions are intertwined.36 At the organi­
zational level, this involvement can take many forms. Governments often regu­
late religions, stipulating what they can and cannot do. Governments also affect
religious organizations financially. Many governments offer religious organiza­
tions direct financial support. Others give them tax advantages. Finally, numer­
ous societies have established religions, meaning there is an official religion of established religions Religions
the state.37 Yet even in most such cases, we see some level of differentiation be- that are granted official status and
tween religious and political institutions. support by the state.
358 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

Lay and Religious States

Most societies see increasing differentiation of religious and political institu­
tions as they modernize. This does not happen in the same way everywhere,
though there are several common patterns. A prominent one is the “laicist”
pattern, in which the state seeks to completely dominate and privatize reli­
lay state State that establishes a gion.38 The core idea is that public life must be “lay” rather than religious: The
formal separation of religion and state is seen as sharply antagonistic to religious organizations, as if competition
public life. between them were zero-sum. One of the most important examples of this pat­
tern is France (see the “Case in Context” box). In a society exhibiting this pat­
tern, it is not just that the there is a separation between church and state but
that, culturally, religion tends to be considered a matter of private conscience
and nothing more. W hat this means will become clearer later, when we discuss
denominationalism.
We should note that lalcism sometimes goes along with socialism in ideology.
There are liberals who favor a laicist approach—and, indeed, the earliest archi­
tects of laicism in both France and Latin America considered themselves liberals.
However, most modern socialist regimes have been laicist in their approach to
religion, including the Soviet Union, Maoist China, and Cuba since soon after
Castro came to power in 1959.
In societies with laicist systems, there are often minority groups and religious
organizations that favor the inverse set of arrangements: a theocratic state, or at
least one in which a single religion is given support. Moreover, sometimes these
individuals triumph and overturn lay states.
religious state State in which We speak of societies such as Iran as “religious states.” Like lay states, their
religion is a key part of official proponents often view competition between religion and a secular state as zero-
politics, often involving religious sum. The difference is that they favor the religious side. Religious states vary a
establishment, religious lot, and some are more tolerant of minority religions and of secular people than
legitimation of the state, and others. Saudi Arabia, for example, is fairly intolerant. Costa Rica, which takes
restrictions on religious minorities. Roman Catholicism as the state’s official religion, is fairly tolerant of religious
difference.

Public Religions in the Modern World

INSIGHTS
byJose Casanova

J
ose Casanova's Public Religions in the Modern World challenges seem to be a core feature of modernization's impact on religion.
conventional wisdom about secularization and the modern Privatization, however, is an "option," not a necessary feature. In
state. Casanova begins by a close analysis of what other scholars other words, according to Casanova, it is possible for a society to
have meant by secularization. He comes to the conclusion that be both religious and modern, and even for religion to enter into
they have meant three things but have often confused them: a public life in a modern society. Moreover, it is possible for the
reduction in individuals' religious belief and practice; institu­ social position of religion to change, and some societies have
tional differentiation; and religion's "privatization,” or its eviction witnessed religion's de-privatization.
from public life. He places the first of these to the side and exam­ J o s e C a s a n o v a , Public Religions in the M odern World. C h ic a g o : U n iv e rs ity o f
ines differentiation and privatization. Differentiation does indeed C h ic a g o Press, 1994.
 Types 359

France is often presented as the quintessential lay state. Religion

is heavily privatized, and the population is, in comparative terms,
fairly secular in its orientation. These issues have grown more
complex in recent years, as evidenced by controversies over the
use of Muslim symbols and traditional dress in public spaces
in France.
For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 438-439. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
1. How is French secularism different from what is found in
the United States?
2. Why did French secularism develop in the way that it did?
Sisters who were expelled from their school in France in 2003
3. Are recent controversies over Islamic symbols qualita­
for wearing Islamic headscarves. The issue of public use of
tively different from earlier episodes in the history of
religious clothing and symbols has been a source of great
French religious politics?
controversy in France.

Denomi nationalism
Scholars take full denominationalism to be somewhat exceptional. The main denominationalism A system
example of a fully denominational system is the United States. One could argue, or set of beliefs that privileges
though, that societies with growing religious pluralism, such as Brazil, might denominational forms of religious
be moving toward a denominational model. In addition, some societies where organization.
established religions coexist with religious pluralism and high tolerance for reli­
religious pluralism The situation
gious difference share certain characteristics of the denominational model.
in which there are multiple
To fully understand denominationalism, we must first understand the concept
religious organizations within a
of the denomination. If you live in the United States, you are probably used to
hearing religious groups referred to as “denominations,” which are different
given society (the opposite of
religious monopoly)
from “churches” in the traditional sense and “sects.”39 A “church,” as social scien­
tists usually use the term, typically tries to make itself mandatory in a given ter­ denomination A type of religious
ritory and to link itself to the state (in other words, social scientists who study organization, prevalent in the
religion use this word in more restrictive sense than you probably do). A sect, in United States among other places,
contrast, often tries to turn away from the state and from public life, and is typ­ that is voluntary and accepts the
ically defined as a group that removes itself from some other religious organiza­ principle of religious pluralism.
tion. Denominations are in a middle ground between churches and sects,
engaging in public life but respecting pluralism (at least in principle) and con­
sidering membership to be voluntary.40 Thus, a society in which religious differ­
ence is organized denominationally tends to see many different religious groups
and organizations. Unlike in a lai'cist society, however, denominations do not
consider politics to be off limits. In a denominational society such as the United
States, religious leaders of all persuasions routinely make pronouncements about
public life. Majorities in denominational societies consider religious motivations
360 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

Religion and Politics in Iran PAGE 479

Iran is in many ways the polar opposite of France with respect to 1. Why does Iran have a religious state when so many other
religion. Rather than privatizing religion, Iran elevates one religion Islamic societies have secular nationalist states?
and makes it the basis of the state's legitimacy, strongly favoring 2. Is the Iranian religious state a modern state? Why or
it and using it as the basis for law and politics. why not?
For more on this case, see the case study in Part VI, pp. 479-
480. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:

to be appropriate in politics, as long as one or another religious group is not ul­

timately favored by the state, though sometimes this leads to controversy.
Some scholars have viewed denominationalism very positively as offering a
good way to manage religious difference. As a result, there is some discussion
about whether and to what extent it can be exported.41 Views on this matter
depend largely on explanations of denominationalism’s origins. If its origins lie
in institutional design, perhaps it is exportable. If they lie in difhcult-to-change
features of a society, such as levels of religious pluralism and diversity, it would
be harder to export to countries without similar conditions.42 If this is the case,
however, perhaps denominationalism can develop spontaneously in different so­
cieties. We should note that denominationalism often coincides with the ideol­
ogy of liberalism. At the same time, many proponents of liberal ideology are
la'icist and worry that denominationalism can lead to states treating majority re­
ligious groups preferentially. Further, they worry that it may lead to failure to
fully protect the rights of minority religious groups, depending on demographic
factors and disproportionate political influence.

Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion and

Ideology Remain Prevalent in Modern
Politics?
As we have mentioned, neither ideology nor religion has ended, despite some
analysts’ predictions. Religion remains an important part of politics in most of
the world, and while the bipolar order of the Cold War is no more, ideological
difference is still plainly visible. In this section of the chapter, therefore, we
examine causal arguments about the changing role of religion and ideology in
modern politics. We begin with religion and then turn to ideology.

Why (and How) Does Modernization Alter

Religion's Role in Politics?
Virtually all scholars agree that “modernization” changes religion’s role in politics.
They may disagree about the details, but generally, they hold that (1) as societies
modernize, religious organizations tend to be increasingly differentiated from
other organizations, especially the state; (2) as economic development increases,
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion and Ideology Remain Prevalent in Modern Politics? 361

Religious Difference and Conflict in Nigeria:

Disentangling Ethnicity and Religion? PAGE 523

The impact of modernization on religion and public life becomes For more on religious difference in Nigeria, see the case study
especially complicated in situations of religious diversity. The in Part VI, p. 523. As you read it, keep in mind the following
complication increases when religious difference creates tension questions:
and also overlaps with other potential bases of conflict, such as 1. How does the state manage religious difference?
region and ethnicity. This is emphatically the case in Nigeria, 2. How might Nigeria's federal system help?
which has struggled with problems of religious difference, in­ 3. What are the prospects for the development of a denomi­
cluding both inter-religious violence and elite bargaining within national approach to religious difference in Nigeria and
the state about regional, ethnic, and religious representation. other societies that face inter-religious conflict?

religious belief tends to decline somewhat— maybe not as much in more reli­
giously diverse societies, though this is subject to much debate.

M odernization Theory and Secularization

As noted earlier in the chapter, traditional secularization theories hypothesized
that “modernization” would lead to religion’s decline. Most often such theories
did not distinguish between decline in rates of religious belief and practice (mea­
sured through surveys of beliefs or of attendance at religious services) and changes
in religion’s public role. In addition, these theories often focused on particular
features of modernization, such as increasing social mobility, increasing plural­
ism, and the growth of science.
Over the last couple of decades, secularization theories have been heavily
criticized.43Yet some scholars have continued to promote them, often assembling

Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide

INSIGHTS
by Pippa Norris pad Poaald Inglehart

orris and Inglehart test secularization theory against data test their hypothesis by analyzing the relationship between
N drawn from the World Values Survey over a twenty-year increasing human development and levels of religious belief,
period.They hypothesize and argue that societies with high levels and they find much support for it, as increasing human devel­
of human development have more "existential security" and less opment leads to some decline in religiosity in general. How­
need for religion. Their argument is based on several assumptions. ever, they encounter some anomalies, most notably the case
First, they assume that religion's main function is to help people of the United States, which has both high levels of human de­
deal with what they call "existential insecurity." In other words, re­ velopment and high religiosity. They explain this anomaly by
ligion comforts people in the face of suffering and death. They noting the high levels of income inequality in the United
then assume that, as development increases, suffering is de­ States relative to other countries with similar levels of human
creased and death delayed. Life expectancies rise, debilitating ill­ development.
nesses are reduced, and infant and child mortality decline. They P ip p a N o rris a n d R o n a ld In g le h a r t , Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics
suggest that this should lead to a decline in religiosity, and they W orldw ide. N e w Y o rk: C a m b r id g e U n iv e rs ity Press, 2 0 0 4 .
362 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

powerful evidence (see the “Insights” box titled Sacred and Secular: Religion and
Politics Worldwide). The evidence assembled by scholars such as Norris and Ingle-
hart is hard to ignore. That being said, critics of this theory make two arguments
worth consideration. First, it could be that some confounding variable helps ex­
plain religion’s relative decline in some societies. Second, not all scholars are
convinced by Norris and Inglehart’s explanation of why the United States has
high religiosity despite its high level of development. In any case, the controversy
over secularization theory rages on.

The “Religious Economies” Approach

Over the last two decades, many scholars have proclaimed a new paradigm in
the social-scientific analysis of religion.44 This is distinguished from other work
in the field by its heavy reliance on methods derived from economics and ratio­
nal choice theory. Indeed, it is sometimes referred to as the “supply side ap­
proach” to religion.4SWhereas previous theories treated questions of religiosity
as being ultimately about variations in levels of religious demand, the “religious
economies approach” posits that a generic level of religious demand is a con­
stant, and that what explains variation in religiosity is the nature of the religious
market in any given society. As with all markets, the theory further assumes,
monopoly is bad, since competition spurs innovation and the tailoring of specific
(here religious) products to market preferences. Thus the United States, which
has high levels of religious pluralism and no established (monopoly) religion, has
high levels of religious belief. European societies, which generally have low
levels of religious pluralism and, often, established religions, exhibit low religi­
osity. This approach has been hugely influential, aided by the increasingly visible
role of religion in public affairs. Sociologist Rodney Stark went so far as to argue
that the world is itself growing more religious due to increasing religious special­
ization. He claimed that medieval Europe (so often the historical benchmark for

The Political Origins of Religious Liberty

INSIGHTS
by/'rthonyGili 0

ill applies the insights of the religious economies school— So what causes religious toleration? One cause is any inde­
G which emphasizes rational choice theory and economic
models— to the question of why some countries have more reli­
pendent increase in pluralism. If minority religions grow for some
reason, politicians have incentives to treat religions more equally.
gious toleration than others. He argues that "religious firms" seek But Gill also notes that as regimes become more established,
to maximize their "market share." We would expect that domi­ they feel less of a need to pander to majority religions, and reli­
nant religions may ask the state to establish them as official, and gious pluralism will increase if they do not repress religious mi­
smaller religions to seek toleration. Further, we would note that norities. Thus a circular process of toleration and expanding
political leaders often use religion to reinforce their power. If freedom can develop. Gill uses this framework to explain the
most citizens adhere to an established church, which represents comparative fate of religious freedom in the United States, Latin
a religious monopoly, leaders have little incentive to change the America, and Russia and some of its neighbors.
status quo. If the religious landscape features a lot of pluralism, Anthony Gill, The Political Origins of Religious Liberty. New York: Cambridge
they are better off just leaving religion alone. University Press, 2008.
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion and Ideology Remain Prevalent in Modem Politics? 363

religiosity) was not really that religious, because it had high levels of “religious religious monopoly The situation
monopoly.”46 in which one major religion
While the “religious economies approach” has been influential, empirical evi­ dominates the religious landscape
dence on the impact of levels of pluralism is mixed. Some studies have found that within a given society (the
pluralism is linked to increased religiosity, while others have found the opposite, opposite of religious pluralism)
and still others have found no discernible effect.47 Some scholars also criticize the
approach’s rather narrow focus on questions of attendance at religious services or
on self-reported measures of religious belief, rather than on institutional shifts.

Institutional Theories
Much work in the comparative analysis of religion and politics takes a different
tack, focusing on institutions and organizations. These theories aim to explain
how and why religious organizations become differentiated from others, particu­
larly from the state, and why religion becomes privatized.48
The classical sociological approach to these questions viewed societies as com­
plexes of interdependent institutions that function together systemically, meaning
they are connected by ordered networks.49 Traditional forms of this approach
held that societies are functionally integrated, or that linkages between social in­
stitutions depend on their related and overlapping functions. So an institution
such as the state may have as its core functions the preservation of order and the
coordination of collective projects, whereas a religious institution might have as
its core function the creation of societal legitimacy, providing a narrative that
supports the existing social order. Note that in many societies these functions
would overlap: A religious organization such as a church, mosque, or synagogue
might help legitimize the state, which in turn might protect and support the re­
ligious organization.
According to differentiation theories, as societies modernize they generate an
increasing number of interdependent institutions. For example, in a relatively
simple society, socialization could take place via the large, intergenerational
family. But when the process of socialization becomes more complex—for ex­
ample, when it begins to require specialized knowledge that family members do
not have—new institutions must form to serve these new requirements. Thus,
once societies reach a certain level of complexity, there is a need for a separate
educational system. When the complexity increases even more, differentiation
increases within that educational system (e.g., separation of primary, secondary,
and post-secondary education; longer and more complex post-graduate training;
greater field-specific technical training). This differentiation of non-religious in­
stitutions would gradually reduce the scope and autonomy of religious institu­
tions, turning them into one institution among others rather than society’s core
integrating institution.
Such an account raises the question of why some societies might incline
toward greater complexity to begin with. Many, perhaps most, scholars have as­
sumed that increasing complexity (and therefore differentiation) is rooted in eco­
nomic processes. Adam Smith, Emile Durkheim, and Karl Marx—representatives
of very different traditions—all saw increasing division of labor as the motor in
this process. From this general point of view, the source of ongoing differentia­
tion in modern societies is capitalism. Note that this account of why capitalism
364 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

and economic development might lead to secularization is very different from

Norris and Inglehart’s view, discussed earlier in the chapter. Norris and Inglehart
assume that the psychology of the individual actor is the mechanism connecting
development and secularization. Differentiation theories, on the other hand,
typically assume that the mechanism exists at the level of institutions rather than
individual psychology.
Not all theories of differentiation look like this, however. Some are more
actor-centered and suggest that differentiation takes place if and when powerful
individuals and groups want it to take place. For example, some scholars have
argued that the differentiation of religious and educational institutions in the
nineteenth-century United States did not happen simply because of the society’s
increasing complexity. Rather, they argue, it happened because some key, socially
mobile groups benefited from drawing a sharp distinction between science and
religion and from bounding clear institutional turfs for each.50
As you can see, there are a number of competing theories about what happens
to religion in modern societies. Not all of these theories even agree about what is
in need of explanation. In other words, the basic empirical description of the
processes is at issue. Something similar is true, we shall see, of the analysis of
ideology’s role in contemporary politics.

Why Didn't Ideology (and History) End?

Scholarly attention to religion has, to some extent, displaced attention to secular
ideologies in recent years. This trend is probably best explained by current events
and contemporary history: Religion has seemed to matter more in recent political
conflict. In recent years, in particular, there has been resurgence of both the left
and the right around the globe.51 Conservative evangelical Christianity and some
conservative forms of Islam have been influential in a diverse range of societies
(for example, conservative evangelicalism has been influential in the United
States while conservative Islam has been influential in Afghanistan, among other

INSIGHTS
Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion:
The United States, France, and Turkey
by Ahmet Kuru

uru examines the relationship between the state and religion that "ideological path dependence" helps explain the patterns.
&
K in three countries: France, Turkey, and the United States. He The key feature is whether a single, dominant religion is closely
makes a conceptual distinction between "assertive secularism" linked to an authoritarian government before the establishment
and "passive secularism." Assertive secularism is what we have of modern statehood. If so, it is likely that modernizers will em­
called the "lay state." "Passive secularism" means that the state is brace "active secularism.” In France and Turkey, dominant reli­
mostly separated from religion, but religion is tolerated in public gions were perceived to be closely allied with and inseparable
life: in other words, what we have called "denominationalism” in from the enemies of a modern republic. In the United States,
this chapter. Kuru wants to explain why assertive secularism is there was no such clear identification, and secularism took on
dominant in France and Turkey and why passive secularism is the the passive form.
norm in the United States. He notes that ideas and culture matter, Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion: The United States,
arguing that ideas emerge in social and cultural contexts and France, and Turkey. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
 Causes and Effects: Why Do Religion and Ideology Remain Prevalent in Modern Politics? 365

The End of History and the Last Man

INSIGHTS
by Francis Fukuyama

I n this famous, controversial, and sometimes misunderstood ambivalent, suggesting that the end of great ideological struggles
I book, Fukuyama argues that political conflict has been seen may make it harder to find meaning and achieve great things.
as ideological struggle since the beginning of modernity. Many This argument has been the subject of major debates, most no­
different visions of the good life have contended with one tably between its supporters and those of Samuel Huntington's
another, from socialist to religious conservative. Liberalism was "Clash of Civilizations" argument (discussed in a separate "Insights"
only one contender among many, until the fall of the Soviet box). Critics of Fukuyama say he fails to see other sources of divi­
Union de-legitimized socialism. Then, no alternative to liberalism sion and conflict, that the fall of the Soviet Union does not invali­
was left standing, and a consensus emerged about market rela­ date all leftist regimes and ideologies, and that his account is
tions in economics, liberal democracy in politics, and open strati­ teleological, meaning it assumes that history has a particular des­
fication in society. tination, or "end," toward which it is directed.
Many read Fukuyama's thesis as if he were simply arguing Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. New York:
that the “good guys” had won, though his argument is more Free Press, 1992.

countries). In many societies, right-wing actors, both religious and secular, have
attempted to scale back or dismantle the welfare state. On the left, we have seen
some actors turn to social democracy, which is consistent with the arguments
of those who forecast an “end to ideology.” Social democrats and liberals in
general believe that some version of capitalism should be allowed and that liberal-
democratic government is preferable to authoritarianism. Others on the left,
however, seek an ideology that will stridently oppose liberalism, such as “twenty- "twenty-first-century socialism"
first-century socialism.” Ideology of government
Efforts to articulate and foment “twenty-first-century socialism” have been supporters in some contemporary
particularly important. The idea here is to incorporate and respond to criticisms societies (e.g., Venezuela, Bolivia)
made of twentieth-century socialism—for example, that it was anti-democratic, that aims to emphasize the
allowed for the establishment of new oppressive bureaucratic hierarchies, and allegedly more participatory and
that it was often murderous on a mass scale—without throwing out socialism’s democratic features of these
core aspirations. Proponents of twenty-first-century socialism, therefore, tend to governments.
accept the Marxist critique of capitalism as essentially exploitative and alienating
and hope for a utopian future. They suggest that this can be achieved via a form
of political decentralization that they call “participatory democracy.”52
One might be tempted to dismiss this as the utopian thinking of radical politi­
cal activists, but those who have done so have been consistently surprised. As sug­
gested by the chapter opening, in various parts of the developing world—especially
in several Latin American countries in recent years, particularly Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Ecuador, among others—these ideas have captured the imaginations of self­
described revolutionary governments. Nicolas Maduro (and his predecessor, Hugo
Chavez) in Venezuela and Evo Morales in Bolivia, and the many intellectuals and
politicians associated with them, make strident claims that ideological conflict
remains. That their governments constitute an alternative to liberalism cannot be
missed (even if it’s not always precisely clear what that alternative is).
Religious opposition to liberal/secular modernity and alternative ideologies
such as “twenty-first-century socialism” share some things in common and are in
366 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order

INSIGHTS
by Samuel Huntington I

ithin political science, Samuel Huntington was one of attacks of September 11,2001. For many public commentators
W the earliest voices claiming that religion would play an and media figures, Huntington's model of opposed cultural
traditions was a promising explanation. This and similar expla­
important, indeed resurgent, role in contemporary geopoli­
tics. In The Clash of Civilizations, he famously argued that the nations have consequences and profound implications for
world is divided into a set number of distinct "civilizations,' policy. If Islam is by nature anti-democratic and pitted against
and that these civilizations were built around different cul­ "the West," and if civilizations are based on incommensurable
tural traditions and often incompatible values. What would moral and political beliefs, then conflict is largely inevitable,
replace old ideological conflicts between the Soviet Union and preparing for conflict the most prudent policy. But if this
and United States would be a clash between the world's civi­ analysis is incorrect, these implications might be misleading,
lizations, particularly between Islam and "the West." While and such policies possibly even counterproductive.
many critics derided this analysis as simplistic and reduction- Samuel Huntington,The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
istic, it gained wide currency, particularly after the terrorist Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

other ways very different. Contemporary Venezuela and Iran have sometimes
made common cause probably not only because they share some common inter­
ests but because their ideological positions are sufficiently compatible, at least in
the short run. W hat is shared? First and foremost, perhaps, is a clearly articu­
lated opposition to the United States. But beyond this, they share a criticism of
liberal modernity as falsely universalizing a particular kind of experience and
as hiding deeper alienation and exploitation. It is for this reason, in part, that

Multiple Modernities
INSIGHTS
byShm uel N. Eisenstadt

M any scholars have argued that contemporary ideological diffusion (especially, though not exclusively, via colonialism), and
and religious conflict is less about "tradition" versus "mo­ it has been re-framed and re-interpreted wherever it has gone.54
dernity" and more about different "modernities," or different un­ Many scholars have understood the pairing of capitalism in eco­
derstandings of what modernity means. Seemingly conservative nomics and liberal democracy in politics as the core features of
systems such as the contemporary Iranian regime incorporate modernity. These are only forms, however, of the more general
elements of the "modern package." They revise the meaning of phenomenon of growth-oriented economics and political sys­
key terms, however, in relation to their indigenous cultural tradi­ tems. Thus early critical modernities arose in the competing al­
tions and to the goals of those shaping the system: Iran's "de­ ternative ideologies of the twentieth century: communism and
mocracy” may not be Europe's democracy. fascism. From this point of view, the alleged "religious resur­
According to scholars such as Eisenstadt, we can make sense gence" of recent years should be considered another example of
of such cases by recognizing that there are multiple modernities. this process of emergent alternative modernities. While Eisen-
This label recognizes that the modernization processes wit­ stadt's approach shares some common ideas with Huntington's
nessed in the United States and Western Europe are not the only assessment, it differs notably in pointing to common underlying
available models, but rather that modernity might take different features of modern societies.
forms in other cultural contexts. The concept of modernity may
Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, “Multiple Modernities" Daedalus 129, No. 1, Multiple Moder­
have roots in the West, but it was carried globally via processes of nities, (Winter 2000): 1-29.
 Two Lefts in Latin America? 367

Chavez and others like him could compellingly use religious discourse even as he
and the Catholic Church remained in sharp conflict.53
These issues have practical, policy-relevant importance. We can only hope to
come to terms with contemporary international religious and ideological conflict
if we can first understand its sources, and the foremost task here is to examine the
nature and aspirations of regimes that define themselves as in conflict. This the­
oretical perspective should help elucidate the nature of not only “anti-Western”
cultural movements but also “Western modernities” and their often unspoken
assumptions.

THINKING
Two Lefts in Latin America? COM PARATIVELY
ver the past decade, ideological debate has been a key feature of Latin
O American politics. Left-leaning politicians came to occupy virtually every
government in the region in the 2000s (with the exceptions of Colombia and KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

Mexico). Before long, the major ideological debate was not over the “left” versus Using Typologies to
the “right” but, rather, over whether there were “two lefts” in Latin America and, Disaggregate
if so, which was to be preferred.55
Concepts
The reasons for this leftward regional turn were complex, but most likely in­
Typologies serve a variety of pur­
cluded (1) the democratization of much of the region in the “third wave,” dis­ poses in comparative politics, as we
cussed in chapter 6, which opened political systems and empowered populations have seen throughout this book.
to express their preferences; (2) economic problems in the “lost decade” of the Some just serve to clarify thinking.
1980s and the austerity that many governments implemented to address them, Some, called "ideal types," are used in
order to show how empirical cases
yielding a desire for change; and (3) a demonstration effect, as the region’s left­
stray from theoretical expectations.
ward turn may be viewed as a wave. One lens for viewing this trend was the idea Yet here we are interested in how a
of Latin America’s “pink tide.”56 Note that the metaphor seems to suggest a typology might help us disaggregate
hybrid ideology, which softens “red” socialism and communism. There may the concept of a "leftward turn" in
indeed be advantages to using a single, general category of this sort. As we have Latin America. If it serves our pur­
poses, any such typology would allow
stressed throughout this book, the ultimate determinant of whether a category or
us to move beyond viewing that turn
concept works is whether it allows us to gain “leverage” over an empirical ques­ as a single political process, and
tion that we wish to ask. Thus, if we want to understand why Latin America reveal various strands or versions of
turned to the left, in general, in the late 1990s, a concept like the “leftward turn” that process. Such a typology identi­

or the “pink tide” might be sufficient. fies variation, sometimes in the form
of distinct "paths," which we can then
But what if we, like many regional political actors, are interested in asking
seek to explain. See if you think such a
more specific questions that require drawing sharper distinctions?57 What if we typology is useful in this case.
want to note variation within this so-called “pink tide”? Moreover, what if we
think the general trend might hide causal variation? In other words, could it be that
the leftward turn in some Latin American countries has very different characteris­
tics and even responds to some distinct causal factors?
As we have said, virtually every Latin American society in the period in ques­
tion turned to a left-leaning president of one stripe or another, except for Mexico
(which came very close to electing one) and Colombia. It is also worth noting
that Peru elected Alan Garcia, who had in his career been identified with the left
but who was, in relative terms, to the right of his opponent, Ollanta Humala
368 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

THINKING (who was elected president, in turn, in 2011, after moving toward the ideological
center). Chile elected a center-right president, Sebastian Pinera, but then re­
COM PARATIVELY elected ex-president Michelle Bachelet of the Socialist Party.
Two governments in particular have been seen as emblematic of variation
within the region’s leftward turn: Brazil under Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva (and
subsequently Dilma RoussefF) and Venezuela under the Chavistas (first Hugo
Chavez and then, since Chavez’s death, Nicolas Maduro). Typically, the Bachelet
government in Chile, sometimes the Garcia government in Peru, and the Tabare
Vazquez government in Uruguay were regarded as of the same type as Brazil
under Lula da Silva (known popularly as Lula). The Morales government in
Bolivia, the Correa government in Ecuador, and the Ortega government in
Nicaragua were seen as clearly falling into the Chavista camp, whatever differ­
ences were visible between these cases. Finally, the case of Argentina under the
Kirchner and Fernandez governments has been a bit more ambiguous, and some
might debate how to classify the Uruguayan government of Mujica.
On what basis is the distinction between these “two lefts” drawn? On one
hand, the difference seems to be a matter of policy, and on the other, a matter of
ideology. Thus one way to present the typology is by degree of ideological orien­
tation. It would classify along a continuum that looks something like this:

Ideological Pragmatic iff

(e.g., Venezuela, (e.g., Brazil, Chile)

Bolivia, Ecuador)

Viewed this way, the category represented by Brazil would be thought of as

simply being “less ideological” or “more pragmatic” than the category represented
by Venezuela. Why might someone make this argument? Well, for one, Lula’s
rhetoric in earlier organizing and campaigns in Brazil was fairly similar to
Chavez’s rhetoric in Venezuela. Yet they governed very differently. While neither
caused his country to default on debt obligations (as some feared), the Chavista
policy playbook, especially after Chavez’s self-designation as “socialist” in 2005,
in some ways resembled the more traditional left, with its focus on establishing
cooperatives, nationalizing industries, controlling the exchange rate, and dra­
matically increasing public spending (and at the time of this writing, the Venezu­
elan government’s fiscal situation is very poor, and there is a possibility of future
default). Lula’s and RoussefFs policies in Brazil have been far less radical. Indeed,
the main strategy seems to be to allow the market to produce growth, under the
watchful eye of the state, while the state invests heavily in human capital and uses
targeted spending to try to redress extreme poverty (most famously in the Bolsa
Familia conditional cash transfer program). Both governments reduced poverty
and inequality, at least in the first decade of the 21st century, but they did so in
different ways, and analysts foresee very different prospects in terms of the sus­
tainability of their approaches.58
 Two Lefts in Latin America? 369

Another major difference concerns politics and the democratic status of the ,r THINKING
state. The recent governments in Brazil, and those with affinities for them, have \
.COM PARATIVELY
clearly embraced pluralist democracy. These regimes have not been free of cor­
ruption, but they have not tried to force their opponents outside of the political
process. While some commentators would disagree, most would say that a coun­
try like Venezuela has shown less respect for pluralism, in that the regime has
juxtaposed “participatory democracy” to allegedly “bourgeois” and liberal “repre­
sentative democracy,” and in many ways has endeavored to return the country to
authoritarian centralism.59 Again, one way to view the difference is to see the
more moderate pole as being “less ideological” than the radical pole.
Some people would be critical of this idea, however. Remember that liberal­
ism, too, is an ideology. Maybe the juxtaposition of “pragmatism” with “ideol­
ogy” falsely presents state-led development in a capitalist framework and pluralist
democracy as if they were “just practical” or somehow the natural or normal state
of affairs, operative unless a society is polluted by an ideology. From a social
scientific point of view, this position cannot be sustained. Liberalism in both
economics and politics is not a universal or natural feature of political societies
and has roots every bit as ideological as socialism and fascism. Governments like
those of Lula and Rousseff may indeed be “more pragmatic” than those of
Chavez, Maduro, and Morales, of course, but the differences point us toward
constructing a typology that sees these as variations within a broader ideological
field. Some ideologies might favor a more dogmatic relationship to key ideologi­
cal texts than others.
One tempting way to read the contemporary ideological landscape in Latin
America would be to see it as a version of the ideological development that has
been seen in Western Europe and the United States, but adapted to developing
world conditions. Thus the Lula and Rousseff governments seldom endorse full-
scale traditional protectionism, work hard to attract and retain foreign direct
investment, and aim to streamline but generously fund social programs. Brazil
aims not to destroy one class in the alleged interests of another, but to reduce
income inequality in the service of sustainable development. This position con­
trasts sharply, as noted before, with that of the Chavista government, which in
the economic sphere, and especially in discourse, practices a more traditional
leftist approach.60 From this point of view, the political spectrum might resemble
the model on p. 370.
This sort of typology helps us pose important causal questions. One major
question would be why the regimes sort themselves in the way that they do. An­
other would be how and why regimes within countries move between these cat­
egories. For example, Chile moved from “pragmatic leftism” to “traditional
liberalism” with the election of Pinera, but then back to “pragmatic leftism” with
the return of Bachelet. If we tracked changes within countries over time, we
might notice patterns of regimes’ ideological drift. Finally, a typology like this
might help us in posing questions about one of the most interesting areas of re­
search about ideology: To what extent do the ideological predilections of popula­
tions and formal political actors predict policy choices? We have simplified things
here, but if we were to use this typology we might attempt to measure (1) the
ideological content of the discourse of political figures and (2) the ideological
370 Chapter 15: Ideology and Religion in Modern Politics

THINKING T raditional Socialism “Pragmatic Leftism” T raditional Liberalism

COM PARATIVELY

Brazil
(Lula, Rousseff)
Venezuela Mexico
(Chavez, M ad u ro ) (Calderon, Pena Nieto)

Ecuador Uruguay Colombia

(Correa) (Vazquez, Mujica) (Uribe, Santos)

Bolivia Chile Chile

(Morales) (Bachelet) (Pinera)

A rgentina
(K irchner, Fernandez)

orientation of the population (through surveys), and then match them to ideo­
logical regime type.61 This method would potentially allow us to see whether
differences between countries like Brazil and Venezuela spring from different
ideologies, or whether those ideologies are more responsive to structural features
of the society or to leadership decisions made within the state.

C h ap ter Su m m ary
C oncepts Types
Religion and ideology are two major forms that ideas take • The main modern ideologies are liberalism, fascism, and
as they shape politics. socialism. Much of twentieth-century international conflict
Ideology gets defined in lots of ways, but many scholars was interpreted in the light of these ideologies.
see it as systematically organized beliefs about how politics • There is consensus that while religion does not necessarily
and society should be constructed. decline when societies modernize, religion does tend to
Religion, too, gets defined in lots of ways, but many schol­ undergo a process of differentiation. Scholars have tried to
ars see it as a system of beliefs and accompanying organi­ explain this in several ways.
zations that posit a transcendental source of meaning. • There are three main ideal-typical patterns of modern rela­
Scholars used to think that religion and ideology would tionships between religion and politics: lay states, religious
both decline as societies modernize, but it now appears to states, and denominationalism.
most students of comparative politics that they continue to
shape politics in meaningful ways.
 Chapter Review 371

Causes and Effects looking at whether individual-level belief and practice go

• Modernization theory argues that as economic develop­ up or down over time. These scholars have produced a

ment takes place, religious belief and practice will decline. variety of theories to explain why some societies produce
Some very strong evidence has been mustered in support lay states, others religious states, and still others denomin­
of this theory, though there are also some anomalies. ational systems.

• The 'religious economies school" is most interested in the • Strong evidence indicates that religion and ideology
relationship between religious pluralism and religious have not gone away but are, rather, at least as important
belief. According to this theory, the more diverse the factors shaping comparative politics today as they were

offerings in any given religious marketplace, the more decades ago.

religious belief and practice you will find. As with modern­

ization theory, this approach has strong evidence behind it Thinking Comparatively
but also serious anomalies. • The ideological landscape of contemporary Latin America

• Many theorists focus on changing relationships between points to the potential utility of different typologies in

religious organizations and the state rather than just comparative analysis.

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. As has been noted in this chapter, the United States is some­ modernization is always the same basic underlying process,
what unusual in (1) its level of religious belief and practice given though cultural context shapes how it happens. How could we
its development status and (2) the denominational way in design a comparative analysis to judge between these two the­
which it organizes religious difference. How would modern­ ories? Which cases would you select, and why? What questions
ization theory, the religious economies school, and institutional would you ask about them?
analysis approach this feature of the United States? Which of 4. In certain respects, lay states and religious states are mirror
these theories, in your view, is most promising as an explan­ images of each other. One type of state tries to push religion
ation, and why? out of the public square, and the other tries to firmly plant it
2. As noted previously, some prominent actors in Latin America there. Thinking about Ahmet Kuru's argument, analyze the
claim to be making a "revolution* in favor of "twenty-first-century nature of the relationship between these types of states. Why
socialism.” Some of their critics argue that this is no different are they in certain respects so similar? How might we explain
from earlier forms of socialist ideology. What would the "twenty- their differences?
first-century socialists' say in response to this charge? Who do 5. We have seen that liberalism and socialism have been enduring
you think is right, and why? political ideologies. The other major modern political ideology,
3. Proponents of the "multiple modernities" approach think that fascism, has fewer proponents today. Has fascism likely disap­
modernization takes notably distinct paths in different cultural peared? Why or why not? Under what circumstances might
contexts. In contrast, traditional modernization theory says that we expect to witness a resurgence of fascism?
 CHAPTER 16

Comparative
Politics and
International
Relations
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• A poster in Ireland expresses the frustration ofsome Europeans, in Ireland and elsewhere, with fiscal austerity in recentyears.
T
he years between 2009 and 2015 saw major economic upheaval across
Europe as nineteen of the continent’s economies struggled desperately to
save their common currency, the euro. The crisis came after several years in
which eurozone countries (European Union countries whose currency is the
euro) in southern Europe faced high levels of debt. Greece ultimately re­
quired a bailout from European funds— and then a second one in 2012—
sparking fear of contagion, since Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy also
risked defaulting on their debts. As Europe’s largest economy
and the center of the eurozone, Germany sought to hold the
IN THIS CHAPTER
euro together without a massive bailout of the slower-growing
Concepts 375
economies. It pushed for strict controls on spending in the
Issues 376
southern European countries, including requirements for aus­
Globalization and Trade 376
tere budgets that would cut back on generous social programs International Institutions
and old-age pensions. and Integration 380
The complications were numerous: Although Germany called Immigration 382
Environment and Sustainability 384
for austerity in southern European countries, it had benefited
Transnational Networks 387
from exports to those indebted countries, and banks in Germany,
Nuclear Threats and Terrorism 388
France, and abroad risked collapse if the euro fell apart. By
Causes and Effects: What Are the Main
2012, the euro seemed to be hanging on by a precarious political Causes in International Relations? 390
and economic arrangement, one that involved a mix of cooper­ Realism 390

ation and diplomatic fights among Europe’s major allies. Liberalism 393
Constructivism 394
W hile the immediate crisis seems to have passed in 2015,
Marxism 395
there are still concerns that Greece may eventually exit the
euro (in a so-called “Grexit”), thereby calling the entire future THINKING COM PARATIVELY
of the common currency into question. The EU and Levels of Analysis 395
In Europe, recent years have showed the challenges of
C A S E S IN C O NTEXT
reconciling international relations with domestic politics, yet
United States France • Japan
the backdrop for this crisis is decades of remarkable European Iran • India
successes in creating a more unified continent. After the horrors
of World W ar II, Germany and France (along w ith Italy,
Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) led a process de­
signed to bring Europe together economically and politically.
It was clear that Europe wanted to avoid another cataclysmic war, and
the continent’s leaders felt that integration was the solution. The process
began with a common market in coal and steel, which was symbolically
rich in indicating shared sovereignty over the very materials needed for war.
373
374 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

Integration later expanded into a broader common market between these

countries, and the European Community took on new members: the United
Kingdom, Denmark, Spain and Portugal (after these two countries became
democracies), and Greece. Integration then widened and deepened further,
free trade A policy or approach in moving beyond free trade to free movement of peoples across many European
which a government allows foreign borders, increasing the role of the renamed European Union (EU). Along­
goods and services to compete side this process, the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, East and West Germany reuni­
freely with domestic production, as
fied in 1990, and the Cold W ar ended by 1991. The EU ultimately invited
contrasted with protectionism,
which favors domestic production.
in most of the countries of central and eastern Europe, as well as countries in
Scandinavia, and even Mediterranean island nations. It also created the euro
European Union (Elf) The
in 1999 for the majority of its countries, deepening its integration further
political and economic union of
many European states, numbering
even as it expanded to include twenty-eight countries (see Map 16.1).
twenty-eight as of 2015. Yet throughout all of this integration, the countries of the EU have jeal­
ously guarded their sovereignty, and major decisions and treaties must be
approved unanimously. Meanwhile, some countries, such as Norway and
Switzerland, have opted to stay out of the EU altogether.

M V

l AI_
M e m b e rs o f th e E u r o p e a n U n io n

M embers o f eurozone (2015)

M embers o f EU n o t in eurozone
Note: Year listed is when country joined w hat is now
called the European Union (from 1993), or its
predecessors, including the European Coal and Steel
C om m unity (from 1952), European Economic
C om m unity (from 1957), and the European C om m unity
(from 1967).

*West Germany was a mem ber o f the European

C om m unity until 1990, w ith reunified Germany
(including East Germany) being a mem ber thereafter.

'fibfniles

Map 16.1 Members of the European Union.

 Concepts 375

European integration since World W ar II thus offers one of the world’s

greatest contemporary examples of international cooperation, while it also
demonstrates the challenges of this cooperation and the reality that most states
engage in international relations with a view toward their own national inter­
ests. W hether the ambitious and remarkable European project of post-war
unification is in the process of foundering or flourishing, it is important to note
how the comparative politics of different countries interfaces with interna­
tional relations.
® © •

Concepts
Throughout this text, we have examined issues of comparative politics, which
tends to focus on politics within different countries. In some instances, we have
made reference to factors that cross borders, such as revolutions or processes of
democratization that come in waves. Yet we have not focused directly on the
many areas of international relations between countries, including war and international relations The study
peace and economic relationships. In discussing the actions of governments in of relations between countries and
international relations, we are often referring to decisions made in foreign policy. between actors in the international
We consider two main areas under the topic of international relations: inter­ system.
national security and international political economy. International security
foreign policy The set of policies
refers to issues of war and peace between nations and to issues of global security
toward foreign nations made by a
and conflict more broadly. As we discuss herein and have noted previously, these
national government.
include terrorism and terrorist acts committed by nonstate actors. In addition,
civil wars and conflicts may take place within a state and yet involve the relations international security The study
between states. For example, a rebel group that is trying to take over the govern­ of issues of war and peace
ment in one country may seek refuge in a neighboring country. All of these issues between nations and global
of security and conflict fit in the domain of international relations, but they in­ security and conflict more broadly.
tersect with the comparative politics we have discussed throughout this book.
Beyond security studies, the other principal area of study in international rela­
tions is international political economy, which examines how the economic international political economy
relations between countries affect politics and how political relations affect econ­ The study of how the economic
omies. In the modern world, countries trade in goods and services, and money relations between countries affect
flows across borders, often in amounts reaching totals of trillions of dollars a day. politics and how political relations
Comparative politics and international relations intersect on political economy affect economies.
issues when it comes to questions of globalization, international trade, interna­
tional finance, and efforts at integration or cooperation on economic issues.
International relations issues do not always fit neatly in one or the other of the
two main categories we’ve set out here. Consider, for instance, efforts to stop
flows of illegal drugs across borders. Is this a question of international security or
of international political economy? A plausible answer is “both.” Similar argu­
ments could be made for questions of refugees fleeing violence in one country, or
of immigration more generally. Many issues in the twenty-first century are
transnational in that they cross borders. The range of issues linking comparative transnational Issues or institutions
politics and international relations is vast, and we explore them in this chapter. that cross international borders.
376 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

We will briefly examine some of the leading issues where comparative politics
and international relations overlap and affect one another. We look at how do­
mestic politics affects international relations and how transnational issues affect
the politics of different countries. Many of the issues we discuss are some of the
great challenges and opportunities facing nation-states in the twenty-first
century.

Issues
In this chapter, rather than address the “Types” we find in different social and
political categories (such as types of revolutions, or types of development, or
types of party systems), we focus on some of the leading issues in international
relations that relate to comparative politics. These include economic globaliza­
tion, immigration, transnational networks, and the global environment and
sustainability.

Globalization and Trade

globalization The increasing Globalization is one of the major trends in the world, a force shaping not only
interaction, both economic and the economy but many aspects of everyday life. It refers to increasing interaction,
cultural, among peoples and both economic and cultural, between peoples and societies across national bor­
societies across national borders. ders. Perhaps more than any other phenomenon, globalization epitomizes how
international phenomena affect comparative politics. We begin with a discussion
of the economic relations that come with flows of goods, capital, and people
across borders.
W hat crosses borders? First, traded goods do, in the form of imports and ex­
ports. These can include cars or food, minerals or natural resources such as bar­
rels of petroleum, textiles, or toys. Second, services are increasingly transnational.
Examples include the now-famous customer service call centers located in India
that serve a global clientele, or medical tourism that leads some residents of
wealthy countries to seek out lower-priced surgeries in countries such as Thailand
capital A factor of economic or Costa Rica. Third, money (or capital) crosses borders for a number of reasons.
production consisting of Many people and corporations have investments or own properties in other
accumulated wealth or financial countries. Many immigrants living overseas send money home to their families
resources available for investment. or communities as well. And anything imported must be paid for, so money
flows constantly. Finally, people cross borders, whether in search of opportuni­
ties for work or political freedoms, or to flee violence or strife in their home
countries, or for recreation or business. With these transnational flows come
challenges relating to the movements of goods, services, money, and people.
international trade The Turning first to international trade of goods and services, economic interac­
economic exchange of goods, tions between countries have increased significantly in recent years. Many people
services, and capital across in advanced, industrialized countries are aware that an increasing number of
international borders. goods come from overseas, but the extent is still impressive: The clothes on your
back may have been tailored in Bangladesh or Pakistan, the cell phone in your
hand may have been assembled in Brazil or China, with parts from Malaysia,
and the apple you had at lunch may have come from Chile. Increasingly, this is
true of services as well, especially as technology makes it easier and cheaper to
communicate around the world. If you need an x-ray in the middle of the night
 Issues 377

A ship makes its way through the Panama Canal between the Pacific and Atlantic oceans.

in an American hospital, there is a growing chance that the image will be exam­
ined by a technician in Australia, while a call to customer service in Europe may
result in talking with someone in India.
This increase in international trade has given rise to many concerns in wealth­
ier countries about job outsourcing (contracting abroad) and offshoring (basing outsourcing In international trade
some services or processes abroad). In some lower-income countries it has also and business, the practice of an
created enthusiasm about the prospects for growth. As wealthy countries rely on economic actor contracting out to
goods produced in emerging economies, and as emerging economies rely on mar­ other actors, often overseas. (See
kets in wealthy countries, the world economy becomes more interdependent (in offshoring)
that individual economies are dependent on one another) and interconnected.1
offshoring In international trade
The trend of increasing trade has thus given rise to many cliches about globaliza­
and business, the practice of an
tion, some of which may indeed have a grain of truth to them: The world is “flat”
economic actor basing some of
or “shrinking,” we are living in a “global village,” and we have never been closer.2
its services or processes abroad
This is not to say globalization is brand new: By some measures, the end of the
rather than in its domestic market.
nineteenth century, when Great Britain was the leading power, was a time as
(See outsourcing)
globalized as any other time in history up to the last two decades.3 Still, global­
ization is especially pressing today. Countries have increasingly reduced their interdependence A relationship
barriers to trade with one another over recent decades. The importance of global in which two or more actors (such
trade in reshaping countries’ economies is exemplified by the rise of China (see as countries) are mutually depen­
the “Case in Context” box). dent upon one another.
Trade between two or more countries—at least when it is voluntary—is based
on the idea that the countries involved gain some advantage from trading.
378 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

One of the leading principles in international trade and political economy is

comparative advantage In comparative advantage. This principle holds that countries can benefit from
international trade, the idea that trade by specializing in the goods they can produce with the greatest relative
different countries or territories will efficiency, and by trading for goods they produce relatively less efficiently.
have different relative advantages The following is a simple illustration to show the benefits of trade under the
in the production of different principle of comparative advantage. Imagine two countries, Pacifica and Atlan-
goods and services, which forms tica, both of which have working populations that can produce shirts and phones.
the basis for gains from trade. Pacifica is more populous, with 2,000 people to Atlantica’s 500. On the other
hand, it takes somewhat fewer people in Atlantica to produce a shirt or a phone
than it does in Pacifica (see Table 16.1). It takes five Atlanticans to make a shirt
as contrasted with ten Pacificans, and ten Atlanticans to make a phone as con­
trasted with fifty Pacificans. This is not necessarily because the skills of the work­
ers differ by country, but could perhaps be because there are more labor-saving
machines in Atlantica, for example, which allow workers there to produce more
rapidly. If Atlantican labor has advantages that allow it to produce more effi­
ciently, how could these two countries gain from trading with each other?
For simplicity’s sake, say Pacificans are interested only in buying more phones
right now, and Atlanticans are interested only in buying more shirts. The strategy
for each country without trade would lead to forty phones produced and pur­
chased in Pacifica and one hundred shirts in Atlantica:

Pacifica: Have 2,000peopleproduce 40 phones.

Atlantica: Have 500people produce 100 shirts.

But if the two countries can trade, the strategy for each country could be dif­
ferent. If the international price were four shirts to one phone, for example, the
following is possible:

Pacifica: Have 2,000people produce 200 shirts, then trade to

Atlanticafor 50 phones.
Atlantica: Have 500people produce 50 phones, then trade to
Pacificafor 200 shirts.

By specializing in the good they make relatively more efficiently and then
trading, both countries are better off. Pacifica ends up with fifty phones instead
of forty, while Atlantica ends up with two hundred shirts instead of one hundred.

ta b le i6 .i Benefits of Trade Under Comparative Advantage

Labor per Labor per Possibilities with Trade
Country Population Shirt Phone Possibilities Without Trade (Price: 4 Shirts = 1 Phone)

Pacifica 2,000 10 people 50 people Make 200 shirts or 40 phones Make 200 shirts, trade for
50 phones

Atlantica 500 5 people 10 people Make 50 phones or 100 shirts Make 50 phones, trade for
200 shirts
The example would still work even if one country or the other wanted to trade
only some of its product rather than all of it. And this example has two other
noteworthy features. First, shirts require less labor to make than phones in each
of the countries. Comparative advantage does not depend on countries differing
on which product is easier to make than the other. Second, recall that a unit of
labor (that is, a person) in Atlantica is more productive than a person in Pacifica
in making both shirts and phones, perhaps because of the machines they work
with. Atlantica has an “absolute advantage” in both shirts and phones, because
both require less labor in Atlantica than in Pacifica. Yet comparative advantage
still allows trade to benefit both countries, despite Atlantica’s absolute advantage
in both industries. This is the key lesson of comparative advantage, even though
it is counterintuitive for many people.
As for the politics of trade, some groups will clearly benefit from trade while
others will suffer, at least in the short run. Critiques of economic globalization
often focus on those who are disadvantaged by trade and who may be politically
important actors. The economic gains from comparative advantage are in aggre­
gate, and while they may appear good for consumers and some producers, the
benefits are not equal for all producers.
In the preceding example, opening up to trade might actually put workers out
of a job in the Atlantican shirt industry as Atlantica imports shirts from Pacifica,
and in the Pacifican phone industry as Pacifica imports phones from Atlantica.
With exposure to trade, economic actors representing the relatively efficient sec­
tors will benefit, and economic actors representing less efficient sectors may lose
out. Free market economics may claim that these workers can simply move to the
new industry (e.g., Atlanticans would move from making shirts to assembling
phones), but this process is not simple: It can mean periods of unemployment and
require retraining, for example. This change of industry can create economic,
social, and political disruptions and uncertainty. Moreover, the more efficient
phone making gets, the more dependent upon technology (rather than human
labor) its production might become, and it may be that those former shirt makers
in Atlantica end up working in lower-level service jobs, such as warehouse pro­
cessing or retail. Finally, we should note that the process of offshoring produc­
tion, if not adequately regulated or monitored, can result in environmental
damage to the locations where production takes place. It can worsen environ­
mental degradation around the world if production becomes “dirtier” overall by
moving to countries with lower environmental standards.
For example, say that building phones requires a lot of capital investment to
build high-tech factories, while the shirt industry mainly requires labor and lim­
ited investment in some sewing machines. If Atlantica is relatively abundant in
capital investment in the phone industry, and Pacifica is relatively abundant in
labor for making shirts, then Atlantican capital owners will benefit from trade
and Pacifican laborers will benefit.4 Conversely, Atlantican laborers may not ben­
efit as they find themselves competing with laborers in Pacifica, and Pacifican
capital owners may not benefit as they find themselves competing with Atlantican
capital owners. In an even simpler sense, ask yourself this: If you were the leader
of Pacifica, would you want to have your economy based on producing shirts, or
would you prefer to have your country produce higher-value and higher-tech
380 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

goods like mobile phones? The answer to these economic questions often comes
protectionism In international in the form of protectionism, or efforts by governments to protect domestic in­
trade, the practice of a country dustries from foreign competition. The politics and demands of these different
protecting or giving favor to its groups will influence the decisions made by governments. International trade is
own domestic producers. clearly an area where international politics affects the domestic and vice versa.

International Institutions and Integration

Since World War II, countries have increasingly collaborated on economic and
policy matters. This too links comparative politics to international relations be­
cause individual nation-states have made conscious decisions about international
relations that are often based on domestic politics. Collaboration began between
the advanced, industrialized countries and accelerated after the end of the Cold
multilateral In international War. At the multilateral level between many countries (i.e., when three or more
relations, the actions of three or countries participated), cooperation took the form of freer and more open trade
more countries working together. in goods, greater movement of capital and finance, and greater cooperation in
international law to bring some criminals to justice.
Several intergovernmental organizations push for cooperation between
intergovernmental

countries and work toward conflict prevention. The United Nations is the most
organizations (IGOs) The set of
international organizations that
comprehensive global institution. It was designed after World War II to provide
push for cooperation between
a global forum for diplomacy and conflict prevention, and it encompasses a
countries and work for the
number of agencies with missions to enhance security and development; these
prevention or mitigation of
include the development organization UNICEF, the World Health Organization
international conflicts.
(WHO), and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).
United Nations The most Some multilateral institutions have had significant influence in the global
comprehensive global institution, economy and have been the source of much debate. This is especially true of the
which aims to prevent and manage major international financial institutions, namely the International Monetary
conflict and to establish multilateral Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. These two organizations have had leverage in
cooperation on matters of international politics, especially in the 1980s and 1990s. During that period,
international law, economics, and these institutions pressured developing countries to follow a free market model
human development and rather than a model that featured protectionism, investments by the government
well-being. in state-owned enterprises, and greater state intervention in the economy (as
noted in chapter 5). This came to be known as the “Washington Consensus,”
international financial
because it reflected the policy recommendations of the World Bank and IMF,
institutions (IFIs) Multilateral
both of which are based in Washington, D.C., along with the views of the United
institutions, particularly the
States government. The debate about the impacts of these reforms has raged,
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
with advocates saying that these institutions helped developing economies make
and the World Bank, that have
a needed shift to open up to market forces, while critics have argued that the
considerable leverage in
draconian reforms hurt people and economies in developing countries and pre­
international economy.
cipitated financial crises.5
integration In international Apart from these global, multilateral institutions are a range of regional orga­
relations, a process by which nizations. At this level, there is sometimes economic and political integration,
countries agree to collaborate where countries agree to open up their economies to one another and shape
economically or politically, to make common strategies toward other countries outside the regional bloc. There are
some decisions collectively and to many examples, including the North American Free Trade Association
shape common strategies. (NAFTA) and associations for free trade in South America, Pacific Asia, and
regions of Africa, but the standout example is the EU, noted at the beginning of
the chapter.
 Issues 381

How the EU has achieved greater economic and political integration in a

world of sovereign nation-states is one of the great questions of modern political
economy. Over the decades from the 1950s to the present, much of Europe has
transitioned from a region of long-standing suspicions and historical animosities
(such as between France and Germany) to a more closely integrated set of coun­
tries. These share a supranational set of political institutions and interdependent
economies. As noted at the beginning of the chapter, European integration
began as little more than a trade zone involving six countries and a common
market in coal and steel. Yet this cooperation expanded over time to include
more members (see Map 16.1 at the beginning of the chapter), while also deep­
ening its integration. The six original members formed the European Economic
Community that established a common customs union for trade with other
countries. Over time, the members reiterated a push for “ever closer union” be­
tween member countries. Subsequent treaties established the European Union,
and its many member countries agreed to pool their sovereignty on some major
issues. Besides the establishment of the euro, a notable example was the creation
of the Schengen area, which eliminated internal border controls between the
countries of the zone. The area encompasses the various EU countries on the
continent (though not the United Kingdom or Ireland). The European Union
now makes many of its decisions based on qualified majorities, rather than on a
“one country, one vote” principle.
We return to the example of the EU in the “Thinking Comparatively” section
at the end of the chapter, but we note here that integration does not mean that
nation-states have ceased to be important. In fact, even in the EU, major deci­
sions about issues such as foreign policy or taxation require unanimous consent
of the member governments, meaning that each nation-state effectively has a
veto. As one of the world’s most integrated supranational bodies, the EU shows
that most integration is still deeply dependent on the nation-state. At the same
time, globalization and integration have occurred alongside the emergence of many
identities below the level of nation-state, such as ethnic groups and regional

The United States and the World: A Love- Hate

Relationship? PAGE 567

The United States has been a leading nation in world affairs for 1. When has the United States favored greater global inte­
over a century. It has been called the "indispensable nation” due gration, and when has it not done so?
to its dominant military, its economic significance, and its cultural 2. What might explain the historical tendency for isolation­
power. The United States has exerted its power in many ways, ism to recur in the United States?
including major and minor wars, but it has also at times been re­ 3. What challenges are likely to be the most significant for
luctant to engage in foreign entanglements. the United States in the future?
For more on U.S. relations with the world, see the case study
in Part VI, p. 567. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
382 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

groups, in countries from Russia to Ethiopia to Mexico. Thus, even as China has
integrated with the world economy, the Uighur ethnic group in the west of the
country has tried to secure greater autonomy, and even as Spain has integrated with
the EU, the Catalonian and Basque regions have sought guarantees of greater
autonomy from the Spanish central government. Sometimes the groups seeking
autonomy refer to themselves as nations. This combination of integration above
the nation-state level and pressures from ethnic or regional groups below has put
the nation-state under pressure, but it continues to be the central actor in inter­
national relations and comparative politics.

Immigration
Another key area where domestic and international politics intersect is
immigration The movement of immigration, defined as the movement of people to foreign countries. Immigra­
people to foreign countries. tion is clearly an issue of international relations because it involves a country from
which a person leaves (or emigrates) and a country to which the person migrates,
or immigrates. It is also a matter of comparative politics because it regularly be­
comes a major domestic issue in the countries involved.
The details of immigration debates vary from one country to another, but im­
migration patterns can be compared. In many prominent examples, the pattern is
for immigrants to move from lower-income countries with limited economic op­
portunities to wealthier countries. Immigration often induces conflicts or ten­
sions between citizens of the receiving country and the newcomers, whom citizens
often deride, claiming that foreigners harm the job prospects of “natives.” For
example, one of the leading political issues in the United States is the status of
large numbers of migrant workers from Mexico, along with other Latin American
countries to a lesser extent. Immigration is a major issue across Europe as well,
though patterns of immigrants’ countries of origin differ from one European
country to another. In France, many of the tensions are with respect to North
African immigrants and their descendants. In Germany and northern Europe,
there are larger numbers of immigrants from Turkey and the Middle East.
The issues surrounding immigration are numerous, contentious, and often
assimilation The practice of blurred. One major issue is assimilation (being culturally absorbed by or inte­
being integrated into another grated into another culture). Some immigrant groups prefer to merge with the
culture, especially with respect to “mainstream” of society, while others prefer to retain their cultural autonomy.6
immigration. Moreover, there are major debates about how nation-states should accommodate
immigrants. Advocates of assimilation often argue that immigrants must adapt
to the cultural practices and conceptions of liberal values in the countries where
they migrate. Immigrants, however, may wish to retain their own cultural tradi­
tions. They may argue that respect for different traditions is a basic tenet of
modern liberal societies and that assimilation to a dominant culture is not re­
quired. Further, some scholars have claimed that positions in favor of assimila­
tion are often based on misconceptions and simplistic notions about people of
other backgrounds.7
Middle-ground views tend to favor multicultural notions of citizenship pro­
tected by a liberal state. Debates over multiculturalism are common in advanced,
industrialized countries that have substantial numbers of migrants from the de­
veloping countries, and immigration has become a major issue in domestic and
 Issues 383

comparative politics. This is true across the European Union, as well as in the
United States. In fact, German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a splash with a
famous statement in 2010 saying that multiculturalism has “utterly failed.”8
Sometimes immigrant communities are blamed for violent crimes committed
by a handful of their members—a position that most social scientists view as
unjustified. For example, the London bombings of2005 were not reflective of the
actions or beliefs of the Muslim population in Britain, despite arguments to the
contrary. One controversial perspective holds that Britain is now home to “Lon-
donistan,” a foreign population from Pakistan and other Muslim countries that
is unassimilated to Western values such as tolerance and respect for individual
rights, and that this is a threat to Western democracies.9 An opposing perspec­
tive defends multiculturalism and argues that different communities and belief
systems can and should be accommodated within tolerant and open societies.10
While defending multiculturalism and promoting tolerance, some social scien­
tists are interested in exploring the relationship between the reception of immi­
grant groups and the development of extremist attitudes. Do discrimination and
poor economic prospects fuel radicalism?
Distinctions between types of immigrants matter, such as between those who
are documented (have attained legal residence) and those who are undocumented
(and are thus often considered illegal). A related distinction is between immigra­
tion patterns of different lengths of time. Some people leave their countries in
search of temporary work (such as for a single growing season in agriculture),
others seek permanent residence in a new country, and still others seek to become
naturalized citizens of a new country. There are also distinctions between gen­
erations of immigrants: Some groups consider themselves or are ascribed the
status of immigrants even though they were born in the new country. All of these
distinctions are quite important, but these separate types of immigrants are often
considered part of the same debate.
Another issue is the tension between immigrants and descendants of immi­
grants from previous waves of immigration. Many countries—especially, but not

^ i

IL ____|
C A S E IN C O N T E X T

Globalization and Culture in France PAGE 439

As we have noted in previous chapters, France gives us many ex­ 1. In what ways has France been ambivalent about the
amples of how cultural and economic challenges interact when progress of globalization?
questions of immigration arise. France experiences ongoing 2. What might explain why France was once quite favorable
debate about its future in light of integration with the EU and the to globalization but has more recently become uncertain
arrival of growing numbers of immigrants, especially from its about it?
former colonies in North Africa. It also has notable variation in 3. In what ways has France tried to mitigate the perceived
how succeeding generations of immigrants are treated by and downsides of globalization?
respond to French society.
For more on these issues in France, see the case study in Part VI,
pp. 439-440. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
384 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

exclusively, those with civic forms of nationalism, as outlined in chapter 13—

have welcomed immigrants over time but face new challenges with each genera­
tion. Many Americans famously and proudly refer to the United States as a
“nation of immigrants,” while also calling for stricter limits on immigration and
efforts to stop the flow of immigrants and deport those present. Pride in a history
nativism A political attitude that of immigration can thus coexist with nativism, which seeks to protect the inter­
seeks to protect the interests of ests of established groups of residents against the interests of immigrants. This
established groups of residents in a position attempts to portray more recent immigrants as somehow different from
given country against the interests previous waves. Sometimes even scholars make such claims, singling out groups
of more recent immigrants. like Hispanic or Islamic immigrants as being less open to assimilation, less dem­
ocratic, or less capable of economic integration.11 Impartial reviews of the evi­
dence, though, belie such claims.12
Immigration thus brings together issues in the social, economic, and political
domains. The social side involves cultural assimilation and competing concep­
tions of what it means to be part of a nation. Some of the hottest debates on im­
migration are as much about money as they are about identity. On the economic
side, immigration raises issues of competition with native-born workers for jobs
and for some public benefits. The political domain includes aspects of the social
and economic sides but focuses on immigration as a policy issue, which is com­
plicated because immigration is both a transnational and a domestic issue.
We should also note that just as immigration poses challenges, emigration—
leaving a country to live in another—has some important economic implications
brain drain The departure or for the countries left behind. One issue is the brain drain, or the fact that many
emigration of skilled and educated times it is the most skilled and highly educated members of a population who
members of a population, leave. In some of these circumstances, relatively poor countries have invested
especially with reference to heavily in preparing some of their top young people to build their country, only
developing countries in the to see them leave for better opportunities elsewhere. On the flip side, emigrants
international system. are often huge contributors to their home countries through remittances of cash
or resources sent back home to families and friends. Further, some emigrants
remittances Cash or resources
who have left their home countries have gone into exile for political or economic
sent to a home country, often to
reasons, because they are fleeing repression or lack of opportunity. This situation
family and friends, by emigrants.
confronts the home country with the challenge of defining whether and how
such emigrants should be reintegrated into their home societies, if and when they
return. It can apply to short-term migrant workers who leave home temporarily
for work, as well as to exiles who flee their homes indefinitely, leaving their prop­
erty behind.

Environment and Sustainability

Contemporary debates in comparative politics and international relations are
not just about maximizing economic growth but also about the consequences
of that growth around the world. A major worry is that the current consumption
sustainability The notion, of resources and rates of environmental pollution are not sustainable, or capa­
especially used with regard to ble of being sustained for future generations. At the local level, this has become
the environment, that a resource a major issue in rapidly industrializing countries such as China, where environ­
is capable of being sustained mental degradation has worsened dramatically through the pollution of air,
for use or enjoyment by future water, and land. The result has been contamination and disease affecting many
generations. millions of people.
 Issues 385

Environmental degradation accompanies rapid growth in China.

Environmental consequences from industrialization are horrific in many loca­

tions, yet the leading issue with respect to the environment at the global level is
climate change. This is sometimes referred to in terms of global warming, climate change A set of changes
though models of climate change predict a range of effects on the climate. Most to the earth's climate.
climatologists and natural scientists agree that climate change is attributable in
greenhouse gases (GHG)
part to man-made causes, and continue to collect more data that supports this
Emissions of gases such as carbon
hypothesis.13 The extent of humanity’s impact on the climate is debated, but the
dioxide and methane from
prevailing current theory holds that mankind’s effect on the climate has come
mainly through greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Pollutants such as carbon
industrial activity and consumption
of fossil fuels that contributes to
dioxide and methane are emitted into the atmosphere and trap solar energy,
climate change.
warming the planet below, as in a greenhouse. Many of these pollutants come
from fossil fuels used to produce energy, such as petroleum, coal, and natural gas.
This theory is the origin of the call for alternative energy sources, such as solar alternative energy Energy
or wind power. sources, such as solar or wind
Climate change estimates predict that global temperature averages will peak power, that are not derived from
at two or more degrees Celsius above historic averages. This change is predicted fossil fuels.
to bring about other consequences, including melting of glaciers and ice sheets,
rises in sea levels, flooding of coastal lowlands, increased numbers and severity of
386 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

extreme weather events such as hurricanes and avalanches, desertification of

marginal agricultural lands, and extinction of large numbers of animal and plant
species. To the extent these events materialize, they will signify major, costly
disruptions to peoples and societies across the planet. Droughts may lead to
major conflict over food and water. Flooding may actually erase some cities.
Climate change and environmental sustainability present some of the most
fundamental dilemmas in politics. One basic feature of pollution is that it is an
externality An economic externality from economic activity, meaning that the gains and costs from an
phenomenon in which the gains activity do not accrue to the same actor. In the case of polluting, individual com­
and costs from a given activity do panies may gain profits from their production (or countries may grow economi­
not accrue to the same actor. cally from it), with the act of polluting as a by-product, but the costs of that
pollution are passed on to others. Because polluters do not pay the costs to society
associated with pollution, they do not have as much of an incentive to stop it.
This condition represents the collective action problem and the “free rider” prob­
lem outlined in previous chapters. One of the leading discussions about pollution
is on the difficulties of managing resources that are shared among many people
(or countries), when all actors have an incentive to free ride—to maximize their
own benefit while passing the costs of their action onto others.
Climate change is thus more than a scientific challenge: It is also a political
challenge both within and across national borders. Most efforts to halt climate
change involve securing commitments by sovereign nations to reduce their
greenhouse gas emissions over time. These agreements are not easily secured, as
they require cooperation and agreement among large numbers of actors, and be­
cause there is little agreement on which countries should pay the costs of halting
greenhouse gas emissions. In general, large developing countries such as China
and India hold that the developed countries are responsible for most of the emis­
sions to date, and are thus primarily responsible for stopping climate change
while lower-income countries catch up in development. Developed countries
generally respond that climate change was unknown when many of the rich
world’s emissions occurred, and that much of the future damage will come from

INSIGHTS
The Tragedy of the Commons
by Garrett Hardin

arrett Hardin's article is foundational in the study of

&
G
commons are individual, but costs are shared by all. Hardin
common resources, and it has implications for many envi­ notes that this principle also operates with pollution in the at­
ronmental challenges in the world today. The article focuses on mosphere, except that users are not "taking out" natural re­
the challenges of overexploitation of common resources by sources, but rather "putting in" contaminants and thus "using
large and growing populations. Hardin's illustrative example of up" a resource shared by all. Possible ways to address the trag­
the tragedy is a pasture open to all herdsmen and their herds of edy of the commons include assigning private property rights
animals. As each herdsman allows his herds to graze, the pas­ and requiring those who exploit natural resources to pay the
ture is degraded a bit and its resources (grass) are used up, yet costs associated with their use, or through cooperative institu­
each herdsman has an individual incentive to encourage his tions and practices.14
livestock to continue grazing. This situation ultimately leads to a
Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons." Science 162, No. 3859 (1997):
depleted common resource because benefits from using the 1243-1248.
 Issues 387

the developing countries.15 Addressing climate change thus raises many of the
central dilemmas in international politics. There have been successes in commu­
nities around the world in managing common resources, but scaling these efforts
up to international levels through cooperation among nation-states is difficult.16

Transnational Networks
Many of the challenges facing nation-states in contemporary politics come
from nonstate actors, and especially from transnational networks of different transnational network
actors working across borders. Some transnational networks are particularly A network of nonstate actors
worrying because they are criminal or violent, and comparative politics matters working across state borders.
here in part because these networks thrive where states are weak, failed, or col­
lapsed. Since September 11, 2001, the most notorious of these has been al
Qaeda, the Islamic fundamentalist terror group. One of the distinguishing
characteristics of al Qaeda and other terrorist groups like it, as discussed in
chapter 12, is its decentralized structure, and the fact that its ideology spreads
to other like-minded organizations.17 Stopping or defeating the al Qaeda net­
work is thus not as clear-cut as defeating a nation-state in a traditional war.
Similarly, although smuggling and trafficking rings may have hierarchical or­
ganizations, they may be more like networks than like nation-states. The “war
on drugs” and the “war on terrorism” have pitted nation-states against much
more amorphous and flexible enemies that do not have a capital city or even a
fixed base of operations.18
O f course, not all transnational networks are criminal or violent; rather,
globalization has generated a large number of transnational networks designed
to leverage citizens’ political voice. The emergence of transnational advocacy
networks may be a key to facilitating greater governmental response to issues
such as environmental protection and preventing violence against women.19 In
some circumstances, governments may not make needed changes unless pres­
sured to do so by networks of advocates and activists that cross borders. The
success of these networks may be due in part to their flexibility, which allows
them to use strategies that are not available to governments.20 Taking both
terror groups and advocacy networks into account, it is both for better and for

CASE IN CONTEXT

Resource Management in Japan PAGE 494

To illustrate the challenge of managing common resources, we 1. In what way does Japan contribute to the overfishing
can look at the question of overfishing in Japan. This particular problem, and why does it not take action to stop it?
issue shows the difficulty of coordination in situations where 2. To what extent is it "rational” for any one country to limit
each actor would like to maximize its individual benefit, yet ail its own role in depleting common resources?
actors doing so would result in an unfavorable outcome for all. 3. What are some other examples of common resources
For more on environmentalism in Japan, see the case study that are difficult to manage politically?
in Part VI, pp. 494-495. As you read it, keep in mind the following
questions:
388 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

worse that transnational networks affect the politics and societies of countries
around the world.

Nuclear Threats and Terrorism

The classic issues of international relations are those of war, peace, and conflict
among nations. This may seem to be exclusively the domain of international rela­
tions and thus unrelated to comparative politics, but, as we will see in the section
on “Causes and Effects,” there is major debate about the role of domestic politics
and domestic institutions in shaping international relations.
During the Cold War, the central issue in international relations was the war
(or lack thereof) between the major powers: the United States and the Soviet
Union. Weapons that created the possibility for mass casualties in civilian popu­
lations heightened the sense of urgency over war and peace. Some of these weap­
ons are chemical, such as deadly gases and biological weapons that can spread
infectious bacteria, viruses, and other deadly agents through a population. But
the class of weapons that received and continues to receive the most attention is
nuclear weapons, which can create massively destructive explosions capable of
killing millions of people. The only use of nuclear weapons (then called atomic
weapons) has been by the United States in the 1945 bombing of Japan at the end
of World War II.
Nuclear weapons are currently known to be possessed by only a small number
of countries: the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China,
India, Pakistan, and North Korea. Israel is widely assumed to have nuclear weap­
ons but has not declared its nuclear status, and Iran is widely presumed to be
working toward nuclear status. In many cases, countries have argued that devel­
oping nuclear weapons is a deterrent against attacks by other countries; this
probably applies in many cases, such as the U.S.S.R. seeking a deterrent to the
nuclear proliferation The United States, or India seeking a deterrent to China, and Pakistan in turn seek­
expansion of the number of ing a deterrent to India (see the “Case in Context” box, “India in the Twenty-
countries and other actors First Century”). Many current nuclear powers are hoping to prevent further
possessing nuclear technology. nuclear proliferation—the spread of nuclear technology—to other states.

The Five Wars of Globalization

INSIGHTS
by Mokes Naim

aim notes five major "wars" of globalization that pit nation­

N
these networks, for several reasons: These networks are not bound
states against flexible, decentralized criminal networks. Gov­ to certain geographic locations, are quite nimble compared with
ernments are waging wars against criminal activities in the areas of government bureaucracies, and are responding to strong incen­
drug trafficking, arms trafficking, intellectual property theft (or tives supplied by the market. Accordingly, Naim recommends that
piracy), human trafficking (alien smuggling), and money launder­ governments must adapt newer, more flexible international institu­
ing. The criminal networks that mastermind these forms of traffick­ tions to battle these networks, while also preferring regulation of
ing and theft may be involved in more than one such area, and these ills over outright prohibition and criminalization.
trends in these areas of criminality reinforce one another. Nairn
Moists Naim, The Five Wars of Globalization." Foreign Policy 134, No. 1(2003),
notes that nation-states will face considerable difficulty in defeating 28-37.
 Issues 389

K U ii
Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Proliferation PAGE 480

Iran is developing the capacity to enrich and refine nuclear mate­ 1. What might be the American and Iranian arguments
rials. The country is also an enemy of American ally Israel, and its against and for Iran's developing nuclear processing
regime is adversarial to the United States. The American govern­ technology?
ment seeks to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, 2. If we assume Iran will not stage a direct nuclear attack on
though Iran says its nuclear activity is for peaceful purposes. the United States or Israel, in what ways does Iran illus­
For more on nuclear power in Iran, see the case study in trate the risks of proliferation?
Part VI, pp. 480-481. As you read it, keep in mind the following 3. How is nuclear proliferation linked to the prospects for
questions: terrorism?

Terrorism is the other major concern in international security today. The defi­ terrorism The use of violence to
nition of terrorism is greatly contested, as discussed in chapter 12, but in the achieve political ends through
context of international relations for this chapter we may define it roughly as the psychological impacts on a civilian
use of violence to achieve political ends through psychological impacts on a civil­ population.
ian population. It is usually distinguished from acts of war in which militaries
attack one another, but terrorism by this definition could occur during war when
militaries target civilians. Often, terrorism is associated with nonstate actors, nonstate actors In international
but countries such as the United States also declare other countries to be “state relations, actors in international
sponsors of terrorism.”21 politics that are not nation-states;
It has often been said that the world changed on September 11, 2001, when the includes multinational corpora­
Islamic fundamentalist group al Qaeda launched a terrorist attack on the United tions, transnational advocacy
States. The attack killed nearly three thousand Americans in New York’s World groups, and international criminal
Trade Center, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., and on an airliner in Pennsylva­ networks.
nia. This led to a United States response that began to shape the foreign affairs of
the post-9/11 period. Yet terrorism began long before 2001, and movements around
the world have been classified as terrorist organizations. Examples include the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in the United Kingdom and Ireland, whose stated aim

India in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic Politics,

J Identity, and Security page466

It is commonly said that India and Pakistan have the world's "most 1. How do domestic politics and international security inter­
dangerous border.” The reasons for this assertion straddle the act in India and Pakistan?
boundaries of comparative politics and international relations. 2. How do national and religious identity and political insti­
Both countries are nuclear powers, and a range of domestic dif­ tutions affect relations between the countries?
ferences have resulted in long-standing tensions and conflict. 3. Are the issues raised here best seen as issues of interna­
For more on these issues, see the case study in Part VI, tional relations, comparative politics, or both? Why?
pp. 466-467. As you read it, keep in mind the following questions:
390 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

was the end of British presence in Ireland, and separatist groups such as the Basque
group ETA in Spain and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. States often define terror­
ist groups as those seeking to overthrow or replace an existing state structure.
Showing the ambiguities of such definitions, the white apartheid regime in South
Africa deemed the African National Congress a terrorist organization, but it was
seen as a freedom movement by the majority of South Africans and ultimately by
international public opinion. There have also been terror attacks committed in the
United States by American citizens, such as the bombing of the Oklahoma City
federal building in 1995 by Timothy McVeigh, which killed 168 people.
Terrorism is an international issue with significant domestic impacts, and a
domestic issue with significant international impacts. To take one major exam­
ple, the Palestinian group Hamas is deemed a terrorist organization by Israel, the
United States, and the European Union. Yet many Palestinians see it as a move­
ment of freedom fighters seeking to liberate Palestine from Israeli occupation.
Internationally, Hamas is also widely assumed to be supported by Iran and prob­
ably Syria. The actions of Hamas, which include rocket and mortar attacks into
Israel, are central to Israeli domestic politics and to the foreign affairs of the
United States in the Middle East. In turn, the decisions the Israeli government
makes shape the international context of the region.
The issue of terrorism is of particular concern when it overlaps with the capac­
ity for mass destruction, as highlighted by the cases of Iran, India, and Pakistan.
For Iran, a concern is that it may distribute nuclear weapons to surrogate terror
groups for an attack on its enemies, rather than deploy them itself. For India and
Pakistan, a major issue was the black market network led by Pakistani nuclear
head A. CX Khan, which resulted in nuclear technology making its way into the
hands of numerous regimes and organizations. The prospects that a terror group
may get its hands on nuclear devices, whether through state sponsorship or a black
market, is one of the leading concerns in contemporary international relations.

Causes and Effects: What Are the Main

Causes in International Relations?
Several major theories of international security offer different explanations for
conflict and cooperation between states. To illustrate these, we will focus mainly
how these theories work in the area of security, conflict, and peace, rather than
international political economy. We have addressed political economy in several
other chapters (especially 4 and 5) and will return to it in the “Thinking Com­
paratively” section later in the chapter. The major theories we examine in this
section are realism, liberalism, constructivism (which is generally seen as an ap­
proach rather than a theory), and, to a lesser extent, Marxism. We note how
comparative politics fits into (or does not fit into) each of these theories. In each
realism In international relations, a case, we look at the theory and how it explains in general the prevalence of con­
theory that treats states in the flict or peace in international relations.
international system largely as

acting on the basis of national Realism

self-interest, defined often in terms Realism is probably the leading theoretical approach to international relations
of power, survival, and security. today, and the other major theories have emerged more recently as responses or
 Causes and Effects: What Are the Main Causes in international Relations? 391

correctives to realism. From the perspective of comparative politics, realism is

noteworthy for the ways it does not examine the internal politics of nation-states
and finds relatively little room for domestic and comparative politics in interna­
tional relations. The realist literature treats states in the international system
largely as unitary rational actors—those capable of making reasoned decisions unitary rational actor In
on the basis of national self-interest. This model holds that the main determinant international relations theory and
of international action is self-interest, defined often in terms of survival and especially realism, the idea that
security. states act as if they were single
This line of argument dates back to classical realists, most notably Thucydides individuals capable of making
in ancient Greece, Machiavelli in Renaissance Italy, and Thomas Hobbes, author decisions on the basis of rational
of Leviathan, in seventeenth-century England.22These philosophers emphasized calculations about the costs and
how human nature gave rise to conflict and necessitated seeking power in order benefits of different actions.
to achieve security. The leading modern example of realist thinking in inter­
national relations can be found in the work of Kenneth Waltz.23 Waltz’s work
is the foundation for much of contemporary realism and is known as “neorealism”
to distinguish it from the classical realism of political philosophers of earlier
centuries.
The conditions of anarchy and the balance of power are central to realism, but defensive realism A realist theory
realism is a theory that contains many different perspectives. For example, that holds that peace or
defensive realism holds that a lack of conflict and even cooperation can emerge cooperation can emerge under
under specific circumstances, namely when it is easier to defend than to attack specific circumstances, namely
and when states can see clearly what other states’ intentions are.24 On the other when it is easier to defend than to
hand, offensive realism holds that states are never satisfied with the status quo attack and when states can see
(the way things are) and will seek to maximize their power whenever they can, clearly what other states'
striving toward the hegemonic position where possible.25 intentions are.
Some of the work in realism features rational choice theory, discussed in pre­
offensive realism A realist theory
vious chapters (such as the work of Timur Kuran in chapter 12 and David Laitin
that holds that states will seek to
in chapter 13). Rational choice typically involves a formal model of strategic in­
maximize their power whenever
teractions between actors, often by conceiving of these interactions as “games” in
they can.
which the “players” respond rationally to incentives and to the expected actions
of other players, given their incentives. These games give rise to the name game game theory A set of approaches
theory; they are designed to simplify the problem to its essence in order to ana­ to the study of strategic interaction
lyze the actions of the players. between actors, often relying on
The most famous illustration is the prisoner’s dilemma. In this game, one mathematical modeling and
imagines two prisoners being interrogated separately by a jailer. Each prisoner assumptions of the rationality of
can choose whether to rat out his fellow prisoner or not, and what each says af­ different actors.
fects the sentence of both prisoners (see Table 16.2). Each prisoner’s cell in the
prisoner's dilemma (game)
table has two possibilities—to not tell or to rat out the other prisoner—giving
A model of a game in which two
four possible outcomes in the table. These outcomes are known as the
payoff matrix, because they reflect the payoffs the players get depending on their actors would benefit from
cooperation, but each has
choices. The prisoners would be better off if both refused than if both were to rat
individual incentives to defect from
out the other, so we might expect them to cooperate and not tell. Yet the result
cooperation.
will be that both defect and rat each other out. Why?
Consider the situation from the perspective of prisoner 1 (called PI) by look­ payoff matrix In game-theoretic
ing only at P i’s payoffs. If P2 cooperates, PI is better off defecting, because he models, the distribution of payoffs
will go free. If P2 defects, PI is still better off defecting as well, because he gets to players depending on the
five years instead of ten. No matter which strategy P2 chooses, PI is better off choices made.
392 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

Theory of International Politics

by Kenneth Waltz

altz's theory of realism holds that the actions of states the U.S.S.R. Waltz argued that this was the most stable arrange­
*
W can be explained by the structure of the international
system and the distribution of power within it. The central fact
ment. A multipolar system has many powers, such as in Europe
in the nineteenth century and up to World War I. In a unipolar
that shapes the behavior of states is the anarchy of the interna­ system, there is a single power, known as a hegemon. Waltz
tional system, in which there is no sovereign power. Given the argued that the bipolar system would be especially stable be­
anarchic system, the distribution of power within that system cause it enables countries to join with one power or the other
shapes how states act. States behave differently depending on to balance the efforts of the other to reach hegemony. This idea
whether the system has a single great power, two great powers, of the balance ofpower came to be one of the leading premises
or multiple great powers. A bipolar world is one with two great of realism.
powers, such as in the Cold War between the United States and Kenneth Waltz, theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.

defecting; put another way, no matter which row of the payoff matrix PI finds
himself in, he is better off in the “Defect” column. In the terms of game theory,
PI has a dominant strategy to rat out P2. By the same token, no matter what PI
decides, P2 is better off defecting and ratting out PI. So they both go to jail for
5 years, even though they both would have been better off had they cooperated.
In international relations, this logic can be used to model many kinds of
behavior when one state does not know what another is doing. One major illus­
security dilemma Dilemma in tration is the idea of an arms race, and the phenomenon called the security
which each actor in the interna­ dilemma.26 The security dilemma arises in situations where each actor thinks
tional system expects others to that the other actor will be trying to maximize its advantage. Whatever the other
maximize their own security advan­ actor does, a country is better off building up its own arms. So both defect from
tage, and thus builds up power cooperation and produce more arms to protect themselves. Cooperation might
itself, leading to an arms race. be a much better outcome overall than an arms race, but each individual country’s
incentive is to defect from an agreement. Seen from a rationalist perspective, this
is a version of the prisoner’s dilemma.
In rational choice, cooperation between actors is possible under certain circum­
stances, if the payoffs to each actor are best for them individually. This can often
occur through repeated interactions.27 For example, if the prisoner’s dilemma hap­
pens with repeated interactions between the “players,” then many more dynamic
possibilities are opened up as players are able to signal their intentions to one

table 16 .2 The Prisoner's Dilemma

Prisoner 1

Cooperate ("Don't Tell") Defect ("Rat Out")

Cooperate ("Don't Tell") PI gets 1 year, PI goes free,

P2 gets 1 year P2 gets 10 years

Defect ("Rat Out") PI gets 10 years, PI gets 5 years,

P2 goes free P2 gets 5 years
 Causes and Effects: What Are the Main Causes in International Relations? 393

another and to reward or punish one another over time. In addition, some scholars
note that international institutions can be used to create circumstances for coopera­
tion, as we discuss next, under “Liberalism.” Realism is the predominant approach,
or paradigm, in international relations, but liberalism places greater emphasis on
how domestic institutions and politics shape the behavior of states.

Liberalism
The most prominent school of thought to challenge realism in international rela­
tions has been liberalism, which holds that states can have different preferences liberalism In international
and internal structures that lead them to behave in different ways. Liberalism relations, a theory that holds states
pays greater attention to the role of domestic institutions in international rela­ can have different preferences and
tions, and it makes efforts to explain cooperation and peace between some states Internal structures that lead them
while also accounting for conflict in other circumstances. The liberal critique of to behave in different ways,
realism holds that realism is best suited to explaining conflict and a lack of coop­ especially with regard to the
eration, but that it fails to account for more optimistic outcomes. As a leading conduct of states that hold liberal
scholar of liberalism puts it, “[t]he Realist model of international relations, which values of democracy and free
provides a plausible explanation of the general insecurity of states, offers little market commerce.
guidance in explaining the pacification of the liberal world.”28 Liberal scholars
argue that domestic institutions and comparative politics matter more. For ex­
ample, free-market democracies that value individual liberties highly may be ex­
pected to act differently from totalitarian dictatorships. Cooperation and lack of
conflict can emerge when like-minded states interact, when states have incen­
tives to trade and exchange with one another, or when states comply with differ­
ent institutional norms.
There are several strains of liberal thought.29 One, known as “commercial lib­
eralism,” is based on the idea that countries engaged in economic interactions with
one another have more incentive to be peaceful.30 This line of logic dates back to
the eighteenth-century economist Adam Smith. Another strain of liberalism is
“liberal institutionalism,” which argues that international institutions—such as

Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs

INSIGHTS
by Michael Doyle

oyle is a leading contemporary proponent of democratic Not being led simply by dictatorial rulers, liberal regimes delib­
D peace theory, and this book offers his synthesis of liberal erate carefully about war and do not enter it rashly. Second,
theory along with treatments of other theoretical approaches. democracies have an ability to observe one another's political
The treatment of liberalism traces the democratic peace to the processes and intentions rather transparently, and extend to
philosopher Immanuel Kant, who argued a "perpetual peace" one another respect and a presumption of accommodation.
would emerge between liberal republics. Doyle notes that de­ And third, the logic of liberal regimes typically extends over
mocracies regularly go to war, but almost never against other into commercial or economic interests, which adds material
democracies. Thus, democratic peace holds between democra­ reasons to the moral commitments that prevent conflict be­
cies but not between a democracy and an authoritarian tween liberal states.
regime. The reasons for this are numerous. First and foremost,
Michael Doyle, 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs.' Philosophy and Public
in liberal regimes, the voting public must consent to the costs Affairs 12, No. 3 (1983): 205-235; and 'Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,
of war, and decisions to go to war will not be undertaken lightly. Part2.'Philosophy and Public Affairs 12, No. 4 (1983):323-353.
394 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

free trade blocs, international forums, and international financial institutions—

can mitigate the effects of anarchy and make more cooperation possible than real­
democratic peace A phenomenon ists expect.31 One of liberalism’s strongest claims is the existence of a democratic
associated with liberalism that holds peace. This theory seeks to explain why democracies (almost) never go to war with
that democratic countries will rarely one another and have not done so since the first democracies emerged in the
if ever go to war with one another. 1700s.32The reasons for the democratic peace may be numerous (see the “Insights”
box on “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs”), including common values
and the ability of democratic regimes to observe the domestic debates going on
inside other democratic regimes.
Several arguments in international relations focus on the importance of do­
mestic politics. Some of these show how foreign policy decision making does not
come only from a calculation of a state’s interest but also depends on the actors
and interests involved in making the decision. When one looks inside the gov­
ernment to see how a decision is actually being made, the “unitary rational actor”
looks less clear. In addition to the presence of liberal institutions, the organiza­
tional processes for making decisions and the interactions between decision
makers and their advisers may be especially important in the final decisions made
by governments.33

Constructivism
The third leading school of thought in international relations today is
constructivism In international constructivism. Constructivism is an approach arguing that decisions made by
relations, a theory that holds that states need to be understood in their broader, constructed context of social and
decisions made by states need to political interactions. In particular, states will not simply view one another as
be understood in the context of having purely aggressive intentions, even in a state of anarchy. The contexts in
social and political interactions, which states interact may range from competitive to cooperative, and states may
and that behavior is shaped by respond in many different ways.34 One might not necessarily interpret all mili­
norms and values as well as tary exercises by other countries as overtly hostile, for instance, even if they do
narrowly defined interests. heighten the sense of alert. Here, too, comparative politics has some role in shap­
ing international relations: Countries that have reason to trust one another may

INSIGHTS
Social Theory of International Politics
by Ale<under Wendt &
F
or Wendt, the anarchy of the international system does not possible. Beyond this, states sometimes treat one another as
necessarily give rise to states conflicting with one another. "friends," and see themselves on the same team. Conflict is
At the most fundamental level, states may view other states as highly unlikely in these circumstances. Examples may be the
enemies, as rivals, or as friends. Where states expect one an­ United Kingdom and United States, or even contemporary
other to behave as enemies, war and conflict will be common­ France and Germany, which clearly view one another as part­
place. Yet Wendt notes that recent centuries have often seen ners today despite the horrific wars in their pasts. Wendt argues
states treat one another as rivals rather than enemies. In these that states can internalize to different degrees these world­
circumstances, states may compete and will not be at perma­ views, and that these will give rise to different types of politics
nent war; they may develop a culture in which they often between them.
respect one another's sovereignty and do not represent exis­
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
tential threats to one another, though reversions to war are University Press, 1999.
 The EU and Levels of Analysis 395

do so on the basis of histories or cultures that are partly shaped by domestic poli­
tics. One prominent formulation from constructivism holds that anarchy does
not simply lead to conflict, but rather depends on “what states make of it”35 (see
the “Insights” box on Social Theory of International Politics).

Marxism
Prior to the emergence of constructivism, the other alternative explanation to re­
alism and liberalism was Marxism. Marxism wielded considerable influence for Marxism In international relations,
many decades as an explanation for the behavior of actors in the international a theory that emphasizes the role
system. The peak of its appeal came during the Cold War, though new variations of social classes in shaping politics
on Marxist theory have been proposed since. While the end of the Cold War and highlights the role of capitalist
largely removed the prospect of communism as a viable way to address imperialism accumulation as a prime driver in
worldwide, Marxist theory persists in diagnosing how the global political economy international affairs.
functions, and especially who gains and who loses in this system. In general, Marx­
ist theory emphasizes the role of social classes in shaping politics and highlights the
role of capitalist accumulation as a prime driver in international affairs. Many of
the manifestations of Marxism as it relates to international relations theory are in
the area of international political economy, and we treated some of these—such as
dependency and world-systems theory—in chapter 5 on development. Nonethe­
less, there are ways that Marxist analysis relates to questions of violence and con­
flict. Most notably, Vladimir Lenin, the founding leader of the Soviet Union,
theorized that brutal imperialism and domination and exploitation of poor coun­
tries was the logical consequence of capitalism’s international efforts at accumu­
lation.36 This formulation thus took a theory of society, economy, and comparative
politics and scaled it up to the level of international relations.

THINKING
The EU and Levels of Analysis COM PARATIVELY
his chapter has touched on some of the leading issues in international rela­
T tions that relate to comparative politics. The discussion of “Causes and
Effects” highlights how different explanatory models in international relations KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

reflect different perspectives on the importance of domestic politics and institu­ Levels of Analysis
tions on international relations. The range of topics in international relations is In our discussion linking comparative
so vast that it is its own field, and this discussion in a text on comparative politics politics and international relations, we

can only briefly mention a subset of the relevant issues. are considering different levels of
analysis. In one prominent formula­
Yet examining certain topics will reveal many of the key themes that link
tion, international politics can be seen
comparative and international politics. The EU is the world’s quintessential ex­ through the lens of three different
ample of efforts at supranational governance in which countries have given away levels: individual actors, domestic
a degree of real sovereignty. As such, it poses many of the central analytical ques­ political institutions and groups
tions addressed herein. For example, the crisis over the euro that started around within a country, and the interna­
tional system.37Through much of the
2009 and continues up to 2015, brings up a host of dilemmas in international
book, we have discussed the first two
cooperation. How can countries ensure that others do not free ride? Can states trust of these levels of analysis: how indi­
one another to cooperate, or will each behave in its own self-interest? At the viduals and domestic political institu­
same time, there are even more fundamental questions, such as “W hat is Europe?” tions (including groups and cultural
396 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

THINKING
►
COM PARATIVELY j

KEY M ETHODOLOGICAL TOOL

(continued)
norms) affect each other. We have
looked comparatively to develop
causal arguments about a range of
topics: how domestic political groups
shape democratic institutions, how
and why individual people organize
into groups, or how institutions give
individuals incentives to behave in
certain ways. International relations
adds the international system as a
third level of analysis. This level of
analysis again affects the others, and
vice versa. One of the premises of this
discussion is that domestic politics
can affect international relations, and
it has been shown that diplomacy
State employees protest against fiscal cutbacks at the Acropolis in Athens, Greece, in 2010.
and foreign policy are indeed condi­
Given current economic and political difficulties, many wonder what will become of the
tioned on domestic politics.38Con­
versely, the international system will eurozone in the coming years.
affect domestic politics as well.39It is
important to remain aware of the
level of analysis at which your argu­
ment is operating, though there are Is it a political unit that has overcome the challenge of anarchy by creating insti­
often good reasons to consider mul­ tutions? Is it a certain set of peoples, or is it changing definitively due to immi­
tiple levels of analysis as part of your gration, transnational movement of ideas, and the spread of globalization? There
investigation.
are more questions than answers when it comes to complex issues in international
relations, as Europe illustrates. As we note in concluding, this uncertainty is
important from the perspective of research in comparative politics: It means that
the central questions are not resolved, and that research areas and agendas remain
open to the curious and motivated analyst.
The EU also shows that the debates between theoretical perspectives are un­
resolved, as has been the case in our other chapters. The fact of European coop­
eration over sixty years may support the ideas of liberalism and constructivism:
Shared values, norms, and a common political adherence to democratic institu­
tions may have facilitated peace and cooperation. On the other hand, each of the
countries in the EU has valued its own self-interest over integration on many
occasions. This observation might seem to support realist theory, though a vari­
ety of interpretations is possible. While cooperation may support one or more of
these theoretical perspectives, so too can the seeming breakdowns in cooperation
give ammunition to realism, liberalism, constructivism, Marxism, or other theo­
retical frameworks. Here, too, the example of the EU generates major debates
that are not easily resolved except through further contestation of ideas.
The fundamental difference between comparative politics and international
relations is that the former looks primarily at politics within countries while the
latter looks primarily at politics between countries. We have noted in this chapter
 Chapter Review 397

(and in previous chapters) that politics within countries affects politics between THINKING
countries, and vice versa: International forces sometimes shape phenomena such
COM PARATIVELY
as democratization, development, nationalism, and revolutions. The EU shows
how these levels of analysis interact (see the “Key Methodological Tool” discus­ levels of analysis In international
sion in the margin). In the EU, decisions made by the European Central Bank relations, the different levels that
regarding the fate of the euro will have significant effects on politics in Germany can be the context of a study,
and Greece, at the same time that politics in Germany and Greece have major including the individual level, the
effects on the euro and on the decisions of the European Central Bank. Paying nation-state level, and the level of
attention to the different levels of analysis in such situations is useful for develop­ the international system.
ing a clear sense of how comparative politics and international relations each
contribute to the study of politics globally.
We cannot resolve the fundamental issues of comparative politics and interna­
tional relations here, of course. Even a start at doing so requires the combined
efforts of thousands of social scientists and academics, diplomats and statesper-
sons, members of advocacy and activist groups, not to mention millions (or even
billions) of citizens. It requires a collective enterprise in seeking knowledge that is
based both on collaboration and on disagreement and debate. We reiterate that the
domestic politics of countries affects international politics, and that international
politics affects domestic politics as well, and we encourage you to further explore
the major themes of these fields. We hope you will use the tools from this chapter
and the text as a whole to participate in this exploration, making your own contri­
butions to the knowledge that scholars of comparative politics continue to seek.

C h ap ter Su m m ary
Concepts Contemporary realism emphasizes the anarchy of the
• Comparative politics focuses largely on politics within international system and the efforts of each nation-state to
individual countries, while international relations focuses make itself secure in this system, which leads to frequent
on relations between countries. conflict.
• Liberalism emphasizes the effects of political institutions
Issues and domestic politics more than realism, and finds more
• There are a large number of issues that link comparative factors that mitigate the likelihood of conflict.
politics and international relations, including globalization Constructivism emphasizes the social context in which
and trade, international integration immigration, transna­ international interactions happen, and argues that anarchy
tional networks, nuclear and terrorist threats, and the does not necessarily lead to conflict.
question of environmental sustainability.
Thinking Comparatively
Causes and Effects • International relations often operates at a different level
• There are several main schools of thought in international of analysis from comparative politics by looking at the
relations, including realism, liberalism, and constructivism, international system, but the levels of analysis can
while Marxism once featured prominently as well. interact.
398 Chapter 16: Comparative Politics and International Relations

T h in k in g It T h ro u g h
1. We discussed the problem of global climate change in this design impact the likely behavior of different states in the
chapter as a major issue facing the international community. Im­ international system?
agine that you are the head of an international commission 4. The foreign policy doctrine of U.S. President George W. Bush
charged with coming up with a plan to address the problem. from 2001 to 2009 was based on the ideas that the United States
You have been told to prepare three proposals, one based on was an indispensable leader as the world's hegemon, and that it
realist assumptions about international relations, one based on should act unilaterally and preemptively as necessary to prevent
liberal assumptions, and one based on constructivist assump­ threats from arising. It also held that U.S. action should promote
tions. How would your three proposals differ? regime change in favor of democracy in order to enhance
2. Substitute the problem of nuclear proliferation for climate American security. Does this sound like a realist doctrine, a liberal
change in the previous question. How would your three pro­ doctrine, or a constructivist doctrine? Why?
posals differ? Now compare your answers to these questions. 5. The European Union has achieved significant economic inte­
Does theoretical perspective impact these problems of inter­ gration in recent decades, but it still makes many of its major
national politics in the same way across different issues or in decisions by unanimous consent. One of the dilemmas of the
different ways? EU has been the trade-off between "broadening" the Union to
3. Take a main phenomenon discussed in any of the institutional more members and "deepening” the integration among exist­
chapters in this book (chapters 8-11), such as presidentialism vs. ing members. Why might these two goals be seen as potentially
parliamentarism, proportional representation vs. district sys­ contradictory? If you were a government leader in France or
tems, federalism vs. unitarism, or multiparty systems vs. two- Germany, which of these two directions would you want to
party systems. How might these variations in institutional see the EU favor, and why?
O
399

Brazil
PROFILE A ► Introduction
B ra zil has alw ays b e e n o f in te re st to com ­
Key Features of Contemporary Brazil parativ e p o litica l analysts, b u t no w m ore
th a n ever. T he c o u n try has in recen t years
Population: 202,656,788 (estimate, July 2014) achieved considerable econom ic g ro w th and
c o n so lid ated its dem ocracy, a fte r years o f al­
Area: 8,514,877 square kilometers
te ra tio n b e tw e e n d e m o cratic a n d a u th o rita r­
Head of State: Dilma Rousseff (president, 2011-present) ia n ru le in w h ic h th e la tte r w as p re d o m in an t.
It has also exercised m ore global influence
Head of Government: Dilma Rousseff (president, 2011-present)
th a n ever b efo re— a lo n g -sta n d in g am bi­
Capital: Brasilia tio n . S cholars are eager to u n d e rsta n d ho w it
has done so, a n d to p re d ic t th e p a th t h a t it is
Year of Independence: 1822
likely to tak e in th e fu tu re . T here is increas­
Year of Current 1988 in g fa ith th a t th e se positive c h an g es have
Constitution: b e en p la n te d o n solid g ro u n d a n d m ay be
Languages: Portuguese (official), many indigenous su sta in ed , a n d m a n y o th e r c o u n tries are
languages lo o k in g to B ra zil as a society to be em u lated
in term s o f social policy, c itize n p a rticip a ­
GDP per Capita: $11,208 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
tio n , a n d econom ic developm ent.
Human Development 79th (high human development) B razil also stan d s o u t in L a tin A m e ric a
Index Ranking (2014): for several im p o rta n t reasons. F irst, it is th e
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human o nly P o rtu g u e se -sp e a k in g c o u n try in th e
Development Report 2014. re g io n th o u g h its p o p u la tio n com prises a
h e fty c h u n k o f th e to ta l L a tin A m e ric an
p o p u latio n . S econd, it em erg ed from colo­
n ialism as a n in ta c t u n it, d espite its stro n g
re g io n a l tensions, w hereas S p an ish A m e ric a
sp lit u p in to m an y sm aller co u n tries. T h ird ,
a n d re la te d to th is , B ra zil g a in e d its in d e ­
p e n d en c e w ith o u t a w ar, b u t, in essence,

■ Roman Catholicism 64.6%

■ Other Catholicism 0.4%
■ W hite 47.7% ■ Protestant Christianity 22.2%
■ Mixed Race 43.19 ■ Other Christianity 0.7%
■ Black 7.6% ■ Spiritism 2.2%
I Asian 1.1% ■ Other 1.4%
■ Indigenous 0.4% fll None 8.0%
■ Unspecified 0.4%
Ethnic Groups in Brazil Religious Affiliation in Brazil
Source: CIA World Factbook. Source: CIA World Factbook.
400 Brazil
 Profile 401

w ith th e help o f th e P o rtu g u e se royal fam ily. T his a n d su b ­ R ace a n d e th n ic ity are com plicated in B razil (as th ey are
se q u e n t events have led som e to de sc rib e B ra zil as a n o n ­ everywhere!). It is very im p o rta n t to n o t view race a n d e th ­
revolutionary society in w hich gradual change is predom inant. nicity th ro u g h a U .S .-style racial tem plate. In th e trad itio n al
Slavery lasted longer in B razil th a n in m ost societies, a n d it U .S . cu ltu re o f race a n d ethnicity, racial a n d e th n ic categories
entered the tw en tieth cen tu ry w ith an agrarian econom y a n d a are o ften im ag in ed to b e m ore rigid th a n th e y typically are in
highly unequal social order (R o ett 2011; Skidm ore 2010). It Brazil. H ow ever, one does n o t w a n t to fall for w h a t scholars
did, however, have m ore success th a n m any o th er L atin have called th e B razilian “m y th o f racial dem ocracy.” T h at is,
A m erican countries in achieving p a rtial industrialization in social-scientific evidence strongly indicates th a t racial and
the tw en tieth century. e th n ic discrim in atio n do tak e place in B razilian society. O n e
B razil is c h a ra c te riz e d b y p ro n o u n c ed re g io n a l differ­ question w o rth th in k in g a bout is w h e th e r th e B razilian w ay
ences. T he c o u n try is g e o g rap h ica lly enorm ous, a n d se ttle ­ o f “doin g ” e th n ic ity and race m akes addressing th is d iscrim i­
m e n t p a tte rn s a n d econom ic bases in d iffere n t reg io n s v ary n atio n easier o r m ore difficult (see discussion in M a rx 1998).
considerably. T he large cities o f th e so u th e ast, such as Sao In any case, keep in m in d th a t categories like “w h ite ” or
P aulo a n d R io de Ja n e iro , include huge p o p u latio n s a n d are “b lack ” can m ean different th in g s in different societies.
m ore closely lin k e d to th e global econom y, especially Sao In religious term s, B razil rem ains a society o f h ig h vital­
Paulo. W h ile th is area c an be view ed as a “reg io n ,” h isto ri­ ity. T he C atholic C h u rc h is still im p o rta n t to a large share o f
cally th ere w ere tensions between th ese cities, w ith P au listas th e populatio n , and B razil has con trib u ted im p o rta n tly to
a n d residents o f R io som etim es v y in g for n a tio n a l in flu ­ theological developm ents in p a st decades like liberation th e ­
ence. M o re s trik in g c o n tra sts, how ever, are fo u n d b e tw ee n ology a n d th e establishm ent o f ecclesiastical base com m uni­
th is a n d o th e r regions, in clu d in g th e relatively p o o r a n d ties. A t th e sam e tim e, B razil also has one o f th e h ighest rates
isolated A m a z o n ia n reg io n , w here a larg e r A m e rin d ia n o f P ro te stan t adherence in L a tin A m erica. Som e even see
p o p u latio n is p re sen t, a n d th e n o rth e a st, w here som e o f th e P ro te stan t s tre n g th as causally related to C atholic innovation
earliest se ttle m e n t w as estab lish ed o n th e basis o f su g ar cul­ (because o f com petition) in countries like B razil (see G ill
tivation. T his area, to o , re m a in s relatively p o o r w h e n com ­ 1998). P entecostal form s o f P ro testan tism have b een p a rticu ­
p a re d to th e sou th east. larly im p o rta n t, especially a m o n g p oorer populations.

Historical Development
B razil beg an as a quintessentially ag ric u ltu ra l society, w ith w ith h ig h levels o f a d m in istratio n carried out, in p a rt,
early inroads b y b o th D u tc h a n d P o rtu g u ese colonialists (on th ro u g h e xisting social stru c tu re s (M a h o n ey 2010). These
th e colonial p e riod, see Fausto 1999 and Skidm ore 2010). In areas becam e th e “cores” o f th e colonial system w hile agri­
th e end, it becam e th e p rin cip al colonial possession o f th e c u ltu ral p ro d u c tio n for e x p o rt w as largely confined to the
P o rtu g u ese crow n, w h ic h h a d played a crucial role in early colonial “p e rip h e ry ” like A rg e n tin a a n d V enezuela (areas
E u ro p ea n navigation a n d exploration, m u ch o u t o f pro p o r­ w h ic h only m u ch later g rew in prom inence). B razil, interest­
tio n to its influence a n d pow er w ith in E u ro p e otherw ise. ingly, seem s to deviate from th is general regional p a tte rn . In
P rio r to its colonization, B razil w as ho m e to num erous th is respect, perhaps, it m ore closely resem bles early E nglish
A m e rin d ian cultures. T hese w ere fascinating a n d im p o rta n t, colonialism in places like B arbados, w here h ig h ly lucrative
b u t th ey ten d ed to have relatively low levels o f com plex social sugar cultivation w as also practiced, w ith a social stru ctu re
organization, u n lik e th e Inca, M aya, a n d M exica (or A ztecs) based m ostly on slavery.
in different p a rts o f th e S panish E m pire. T his has im plica­ T he e ig h te e n th -c e n tu ry e x p an sio n o f m in in g activities,
tions for th e colonial p o litical a n d social stru c tu re s th a t d e ­ especially in M in a s G e ra is, h a d im p o rta n t im plications for
veloped. T he econom ic m odel th a t developed in colonial th e p o litica l stru c tu re o f th e P o rtu g u e se colonies a n d for
B razil was based fu n d a m e n ta lly o n p lan ta tio n agriculture, B ra z il’s fu tu re . P erh ap s th e m o st im p o rta n t effect w as th e
w ith th e in itial focus in th e n o rth ea st, w here sugar cane was sh ift in re g io n a l elite p o w er a n d in co lonial a d m in istratio n ,
the m ain p ro d u ct for export. L ater in th e colonial p e rio d this as th e n o rth e a st c ity o f S alvador ceased to be th e m a in co­
w as supplem ented b y m ining. I n colonial S panish A m erica, lo n ia l p o rt, w ith R io de J a n e iro ta k in g over th a t role. R io
m in in g ten d e d to “go w ith ” com plex A m e rin d ia n org an iza­ w as also th e cap ital u n til it w as m oved to th e n ew p lan n e d
tio n a n d to produce initially som ew hat “in d ire c t colonialism ” c ity o f B rasilia in 1960.
402 Brazil

Historical Development
Timeline
1500 Portuguese mariner Pedro Alvares Cabral is the first I960 President Juscelino Kubitschek moves capital to
European to explore Brazil. new city of Brasilia.
1500s Portuguese crown attempts to colonize Brazil by 1964 Military overthrows President Joao Goulart in coup
granting Captaincies (Capitanias) to nobles, but few d'etat.
successful outposts are established. 1964-1982 Military rules Brazil in "bureaucratic-authoritarian"
1600s French and Dutch excursions establish inroads style; industrialization deepens.
along Brazil's coast, but depart by mid-1600s. 1982 Massive street protests for direct elections (Diretas
1808 The Portuguese monarchy flees Portugal and Ja!), with trade union leader Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva
establishes residence in Brazil. a prominent figure; democratic elections are held
1821 Portuguese monarchy returns to Portugal. for governors.
1822 Dorn Pedro, a prince and son of Portugal's king, 1985 Presidential election is held;Tancredo Neves is
declares Brazilian independence from Portugal and elected but dies before taking office; Jose Sarney
remains in Brazil as Emperor. becomes president.
1888 Princess Isabel abolishes slavery by decree while 1988 Constitution is passed by Brazil's Constituent
Emperor Dorn Pedro II is away in Europe. Assembly.
1889 The military deposes Emperor Dom Pedro II 1988-1994 Growing inflation problems and economic crisis.
and establishes a republic, now known as the Old 1992 President Fernando Collor (1990-1992) resigns amid
Republic (Republica Velha); constitutional corruption scandal.
democracy is largely limited to land-owning males. 1995-2003 Presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (a
1880s-1920s Economic boom based on agricultural exports sociologist) ends economic crisis, begins to see
(coffee, sugar, etc.) to Europe. economic growth, better social services, and
1930 General Getulio Vargas takes presidency. declining inequality.
1930s Great Depression interrupts world trade, cuts off 2003-2011 Presidency of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, a former
imports and harms the economy; this gives impetus Marxist trade union leader and head of the Worker's
to Brazil's fledgling industrialization in the medium Party (PT); continued economic growth and
term. declines in inequality, as well as an expanding
1937 international role for Brazil.
President Vargas proclaims "New State" (Estado
Novo) along fascist lines. 2011 Dilma Rousseff of the PT becomes Brazil's first
1946 female president.
Brazil returns to democratic rule.
2015 Rousseff begins her second term.
1954 Vargas commits suicide while president (1951-1954),
having been elected some years after his previous
removal.

A s n o te d in th e b rie f in tro d u c tio n , th e tra n s itio n to in ­ b e tw ee n , th e B ra zilia n em p ire w o u ld last u n til th e 1880s.
depen d en ce in B razil w as relatively peaceful. T here h a d in I t w as as such th e o nly m o d e rn em p ire o f sig n ifican t d u ra ­
th e late colonial years b e en a couple o f m in o r rebellions tio n in th e A m ericas. B ra z il’s em p ire w as q u ite conservative
(Fausto 1999), in clu d in g th e w e ll-k n o w n In co n fid en cia in nu m ero u s w ays— th e c ritica l alliance w as b e tw ee n th e
M in e ira , b u t n o th in g th a t rem otely th re a te n e d th e regim e. g o v e rn m e n t, th e C a th o lic C h u rc h , a n d a g ric u ltu ra l elites—
N a p o leo n w as in v ad in g P o rtu g a l, a n d th e royal fam ily, b u t it w as a c o n stitu tio n a l m o n arc h y (R o e tt 2011 2 6 -2 7 ).
u n d e r D o m Joao, m oved th e c o u rt to R io de Ja n e iro a n d O v e r th e course o f th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry th e n a tu re o f
c o n tin u e d to govern fro m th ere . D o m Jo a o re m a in e d th ere B razilian exports c hanged, b u t its key econom ic activity re­
u n til 1821, w h e n a lib e ral revolt b a c k h o m e forced h im to m ain e d th e ex p o rt o f p rim a ry products. C offee w as ascen­
re tu rn to L isbon. A p p ro x im ately a y ear a fte r his re tu rn , his d a n t, a n d o n th e basis o f coffee p ro d u c tio n a n d e x p o rt again
son P edro, w h o h a d b e e n se n t as reg en t, d eclare d in d e p e n ­ th e regional b alance o f pow er a n d status sh ifted a bit, to th e
dence. H e w as soon n a m e d E m p ero r. B e tw ee n th e ru le o f ben efit o f th e Sao P aulo elite. D e p en d en ce o n coffee, th o u g h ,
P e d ro I, th e lo n g ru le o f P e d ro I I , a n d a regency in w as notoriously p roblem atic for L a tin A m e ric a n countries.
 Profile 403

C offee prices h a d a ten d en cy to fluctuate widely, m ean in g p o litica l in sta b ility a n d w e ak in stitu tio n s se rv in g as o b sta­
th a t business w as h a rd to p red ict, a n d som etim es ru in ed cles to developm ent.
farm ers. This also co n trib u ted , w ith o u t d oubt, to th e relative T h e n e x t m a jo r d e v e lo p m e n t in th e p o litic a l h is to ry
w eakness o f th e B razilian state, as it d id to num erous o th e r o f B ra z il w as th e c o u p d ’e ta t t h a t b r o u g h t G e tu lio
states in L a tin A m e ric a involved in th e e x p o rt o f coffee a n d V arg as to p o w e r in 1930. V arg as w a s a p o p u lis t, a n d he
sim ilar goods. Ju s t th e sam e, B razilian politics rem ain ed la rg e ly w o rk e d to u n d e rc u t th e in flu e n c e o f th e re g io n a l
surprisingly stable in th is perio d , a n d th e c o u n try w as n o t o lig a rc h ie s t h a t h a d e x e rte d d is p r o p o rtio n a te in flu e n c e
w racked by th e relentless civil w ars th a t tro u b led its neig h ­ o v e r th e c o u n tr y in th e p re v io u s d e c a d e s, th o u g h h e d id
bors. B razil was involved, th o u g h , in th e m o st infam ous in ­ r e ta in tie s to so m e e lite g ro u p s ( R o e tt 201 1 ; S k id m o re
te rn a tio n a l w a r o f L a tin A m e ric an history, th e “W a r o f th e 2 0 1 0 ). V arg as e n c o u ra g e d in d u s tr ia l m a g n a te s a n d la b o r
T riple A llian ce,” w h ic h p itte d B razil, A rg e n tin a , a n d U ru ­ a lik e , a n d th e l a tte r b e c a m e a n in c re a s in g ly im p o r ta n t
guay again st P arag u ay a n d resulted in th e devastation o f th e fo rce in B ra z ilia n p o litic s in th is p e rio d . V arg as w a s also
latter c o u n try a n d k ille d so m an y o f its m en as to produce a s ta te - b u ild e r a n d a c e n tra liz e r. T h e B ra z ilia n sta te he
u nusual dem ographic problem s. B razil also suffered heavy h e lp e d to d e v elo p w as also o n e w ith m ilita ris tic fe a tu re s .
losses, how ever, a n d experienced fiscal difficulties as a result V arg as b u ilt o n e a rlie r e ffo rts to in c u lc a te s tro n g n a tio n ­
o f its involvem ent. a lism in th e B ra z ilia n p e o p le a n d lin k e d th is n a tio n a l­
A n o th e r im p o rta n t n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry d evelopm ent ism to h is e ffo rts to f u r t h e r in d u s tria liz e a n d m o d e rn iz e
(S kidm ore 2010: 71 -7 2 ) w as th e heavy im p o rta tio n o f a th e c o u n try . B e y o n d n o tin g h is n a tio n a lis m a n d p o p u ­
F re n c h p h ilo so p h ic a l system k n o w n as “p o sitiv ism ” (the lis m , it is h a r d to p in V arg as d o w n id eo lo g ica lly . S om e
slogan o n th e B ra zilia n flag, “O rd e r a n d P ro g ress,” is a h av e v ie w e d h im as h a v in g so m e le f t- w in g te n d e n c ie s,
m ark o f th e influence o f th is philosophy). In a n u tsh ell, a n d m a n y h av e in te r p r e te d h im as to y in g w ith s o m e ­
positivism claim ed th a t h u m a n h isto ry m oves from “reli­ th in g clo se to fa scism . B y th e e n d o f th is p e rio d h e h a d
gious” to “m etap h y sical” to “p ositive” stages as c u ltu re b e ­ b e c o m e d ic ta to r, a n d w h ile B ra z ilia n tro o p s fo u g h t w ith
com es m ore ra tio n a l a n d scientific. T his p h ilo so p h y h a d th e a llie s in W o rld W a r I I , V arg as w as d e p o se d fo llo w ­
g re at appeal to in te lle ctu a ls in places like B razil a n d in g th e e n d o f th e w ar.
M exico, w here it seem ed to offer a d iagnosis o f th e sources I n th e c o m in g y e a rs p o litic a l in s ta b ility c o n tin u e d —
o f th e c o u n try ’s alleg ed “b ack w a rd n e ss” a n d also a tre a t­ V arg as w as e v en b ro u g h t b a c k in 1951, t h o u g h h e k ille d
m en t p rogram : econom ic a n d c u ltu ra l m o d e rn iz a tio n , in ­ h im s e lf in o ffic e r a th e r th a n b e d e p o s e d a g a in in 1 9 5 4 —
c lu d in g th e e stab lish m en t of ra ilro ad s and o th e r b u t a m id s t th e d is o rd e r B ra z il c o n tin u e d w ith a p ro g ra m
in fra s tru c tu re as w ell as th e exp an sio n o f e ducation. O f o f e c o n o m ic n a tio n a lis m a n d im p o r t s u b s titu tin g in d u s ­
course, th e im p licatio n s o f th is view for o ld -fash io n e d con­ tr ia liz a tio n . T h e c o u n tr y ’s re c o rd in th is c o n n e c tio n w as
cepts like “E m p ire ” w ere n o t to o “positive.” P ositivism , sci­ m ix e d . G r o w th w a s ir r e g u la r a n d o fte n slow , a n d i n ­
entism , rep u b lican ism a n d o th e r ideas ab o u t m o d e rn iz a tio n e q u a lity re m a in e d n o to rio u s ly h ig h , b u t th e c o u n tr y h a d
cau g h t o n m ore a n d m ore a m o n g B ra zilia n elites. T he tro u ­ a m o re d iv e rs ifie d in d u s tr ia l b a se th a n d id m a n y o f its
ble w as th a t th e society w as still b a se d o n p la n ta tio n ag ri­ n e ig h b o rs . U n d e r J u s c e lin o K u b its c h e k (1 9 5 6 -1 9 6 0 ), th e
c u ltu re for e x p o rt, a n d th u s im p o rta n t actors w ere op p o sed m o d e r n is t c a p ita l o f B ra silia w as e sta b lish e d . I n 1964,
to fu ll political m o d e rn iz a tio n . A ll b ets w ere off, th o u g h , fo llo w in g a m ilita r y c o u p , th e c o u n try su c c u m b e d to th e
a fte r th e a b o litio n o f slavery in 1888 a n d a fte r P e d ro I I w as w ave o f “b u r e a u c r a tic - a u th o r ita r ia n is m ” t h a t w as to
dep o sed a y ear later. P aradoxically, a n u m b e r o f th e re p u b ­ d o m in a te th e re g io n fo r so m e y e ars ( O ’D o n n e ll 1973;
licans w h o favored th e a b o litio n o f m o n arc h y h a d prev i­ S te p a n 1971).
ously b e e n sta u n ch conservatives, w h ic h seem s to show th e T his m ilita ry re g im e so u g h t to tak e a n active role in
c en tra lity o f in te re st in th e ir calcu latio n s (F austo 1999). sh a p in g th e d ev elo p m en t process a n d d e e p e n in g in d u stria l­
P resum ably, th e y h o p e d to e x ert g re a te r influence in a re ­ iza tio n (O ’D o n n e ll 1973). I t saw B ra z il’s stro n g u n io n s a n d
public. A n d in d ee d , th e republic th a t w as c rea te d w as for d em an d s for w o rk e r a dvantages as factors th a t p revented
m an y years d isp ro p o rtio n a tely responsive to elite in terest. th e acc u m u la tio n o f cap ital n e ed e d to becom e a n advanced,
F ro m th is p o in t on, in c erta in respects, B ra zil sta rte d to in d u stria l society. A ccordingly, it c e n tra liz e d pow er and
resem ble th e m ore ty p ic a l L a tin A m e ric a n p a tte rn , w ith repressed dissidence, m o st n otably a fte r it decreed
404 Brazil

In s titu tio n a l A c t #5 (Ato Institutional No. 5) in 1968, w h ich elections for sta te go v ern o rs in 1982, follow ed b y n a tio n a l
b a n n e d assem bly a n d th e h o ld in g o f u n io n elections. The elections in 1985.
m ilita ry p ro m o te d in d u stria l in v estm e n t fro m fo reig n a n d D e m o c ra tic e le ctio n s re su lte d in a m assive v ic to ry for
dom estic sources in a n a tte m p t to c onvert B ra z il’s in d u stry T a n c re d o N e v es, w h o d e fe a te d th e m ilita ry -b a c k e d c a n ­
from m a k in g th e likes o f tex tiles a n d sugar to m a k in g m ore d id a te con v in cin g ly . N e v es d ie d be fo re a ssu m in g office,
soph isticated pro d u cts like steel a n d autom obiles for con­ h ow ever, lea v in g V ice P re sid e n t Jo se S a rn e y to assum e
su m p tio n in B razil itself. The m ilita ry p a rtia lly succeeded, th e p resid en cy . I n 199 0 , F e rn a n d o C o llo r b e c a m e th e first
p re sid in g over som e d e e p e n in g o f in d u stria liz a tio n th a t d ire c tly e le c te d p re sid e n t o f B ra z il a fte r th e m ilita ry
rep resen ted a su b sta n tia l p o rtio n o f th e “B ra zilia n M ira c le ” re g im e . H is p re sid e n c y w as m a rk e d b y sc a n d als a n d a
o f th e p o st-w a r era (E vans 1979; C a rd o so a n d F a letto fa ile d e co n o m ic p o lic y th a t le d to im p e a c h m e n t in 1992;
1979). U ltim ately , how ever, m a k in g th e necessary invest­ Vice P re s id e n t I ta m a r F ra n c o g o v e rn e d u n til th e n e x t
m en ts re q u ire d m ore a n d m ore state sp e n d in g a n d debt. In e le ctio n s in 1994.
th e lo n g ru n , th e b o rro w in g c u lm in a te d in th e 1980s d e b t T he tw o fo llo w in g p re sid e n ts g o v e rn ed B ra z il fo r tw o
crisis. G ro w in g pressures for p o litica l lib e raliza tio n sig­ te rm s e ach , for a to ta l o f six tee n y ears, a n d th e s e y ears saw
n a le d th e ex h au stio n o f m ilita ry rule. relativ e im p ro v e m e n ts in a d d re ssin g B ra z il’s eco n o m ic
The m ilita ry c o n tro lled th e process o f lib e ra liz a tio n in a n d so c ial c h a lle n g e s (R o e tt 2011). F e rn a n d o H e n riq u e
th e in itia l stages b u t fo u n d its e lf p u sh e d to m ak e g re a te r C a rd o so ’s g o v e rn m e n t (1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 3 ) c o n so lid a te d a n ew
m oves to w a rd fu ll d em o cracy (H a g g a rd a n d K a u fm an e co n o m ic p o lic y — T he Plano Real — to g e th e r w ith a n ew
1995). P o litic al pressu re for d e m o c ra tiz a tio n cam e from c u rre n c y (th e real) th a t b ro u g h t a relativ ely sta b le eco n ­
m an y p o litica l actors. Several p o liticia n s fro m Sao P aulo o m y a n d th e b e g in n in g s o f a d e clin e in in e q u a lity . T his
an d o th e r large states pressed th e reg im e to g ra n t m ore au­ w as fo llo w ed b y tw o te rm s o f L u iz In a c io L u la d a Silva
th o rity to th e states. By th e m id -1 9 8 0 s, m illio n s to o k to ( 2 0 0 3 - 2011), k n o w n sim p ly as L u la . H e w as a fo u n d in g
th e stre ets to d e m a n d electio n s, w ith m an y le d b y trad e m e m b e r o f th e W o rk e rs P a rty (Partido dos Trabalhadores,
u n io n lead er a n d p o litica l h o p e fu l L u iz In a cio L u la da P T ) a n d u n io n le a d e r w h o w as o nce a M a rx is t b u t gov­
Silva. T he p ro tests led to m assive rallies in th e 1980s c all­ e rn e d in a c e n tris t fa sh io n . C u rre n t p re sid e n t D ilm a
in g for “D ire c t E le ctio n s N o w ” (Diretas jd!), w h ic h th e R o u sse ff o f th e P T w as e le cte d in 2 0 1 0 as L u la ’s succes­
business c o m m u n ity in cre asin g ly su p p o rte d . A s th e m ili­ sor. S he n a rro w ly w o n re e le c tio n in 201 4 , d e fe a tin g o p ­
ta ry reg im e re co g n ize d its loss o f pow er, it a g ree d to p o sitio n riv a l A e cio N eves.

Regime and Political Institutions

The executive in B razil’s federal system is d irectly elected, C o n g re ss b e in g c o -p artisan s. E ven th ese c o -p artisan s are
w ith th e vote tally for th e presidency based o n th e n a tio n a l p rim a rily c o n cern ed w ith satisfy in g th e ir ow n c o n stitu e n ­
p o p u la r vote. I f n o can d id ate receives a m ajo rity in th e first cies in th e ir states, a n d n o t w ith pleasin g th e n a tio n a l p a rty
ro u n d , a seco n d -ro u n d ru n o ff election is h e ld b e tw ee n th e leaders. W h ile fo rm al pow ers are u sefu l, m o st p re sid en tial
tw o lea d in g candidates. In b o th ro u n d s, v o tin g is obligatory prerogatives o f significance can be con so lid ated o nly b y ex­
for all citizens, th o u g h th e secret b a llo t gives citizens th e tensive n e g o tia tin g a n d b a rg a in in g w ith o th e r p a rtie s, in d i­
o p p o rtu n ity to “sp o il” th e ir b a llo t o r leave it b lan k . T his v ir­ v id u al legislators, a n d th e state governors a n d c ity m ayors
tu ally g u aran tees th a t th e elected p resid en t w ill have been w h o su p p o rt th ese legislators. T his process ty p ically in ­
voted into office w ith a m ajority m an d ate. T he te rm o f office volves a m ore or less explicit tra d in g o f favors a n d resources
is four years, a n d th e p resid en t is lim ite d to tw o term s. (and o ften o u trig h t co rru p tio n ) th a t m akes it costly to
A c c o rd in g to th e C o n stitu tio n , th e p re sid en t has con­ c h an g e th e status quo.
siderable pow ers, in clu d in g th e a b ility to decree c ertain T he ju d ic ia l p o w er in B razil has as its m o st im p o rta n t
law s for a lim ite d tim e (th irty days), w ith th e so-called in stan c e th e F ed eral Suprem e C o u rt (Supremo Tribunal
“provisional m ea su re ” (medida provisoria). Y et d espite these Federal— S T F ), w h ic h has th e a u th o rity to p ro n o u n c e on
fo rm al pow ers, th e fra g m e n te d n a tu re o f th e p a rty system th e c o n stitu tio n a lity o f law. T he C o n s titu tio n reserves sub­
lim its th e p re sid e n t’s p o w er over th e n a tio n a l legislature. s ta n tia l resp o n sib ilities, fu n c tio n s, a n d resources for th e
T he p re sid en t can o ften c o u n t o n less th a n o n e -th ird o f th e state g o v ern m en ts as w ell.
 Profile 405

Regime and Political Institutions

Regime Federal republic, representative democratic elections

Administrative Divisions Twenty-seven federal units: twenty-six states (estados) + Federal District of Brasilia

Executive Branch President

Selection of Executive Direct election by national popular vote; voting is compulsory; runoff between top two
candidates if none receives 50 percent in the first round

Legislative Branch Bicameral Congress {Congresso Nacional)

Lower chamber: Chamber of Deputies (Camara de Deputados)
Upper chamber: Senate (Senado Federal)

Judicial Branch Federal High Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) has some power of judicial review

Political Party System Multiparty system, with four to five prominent parties leading parties: PT (left/center-left),
PSDB (centrist, technocratic), PMDB (centrist, traditional), Democrats (center-right,
traditional)

Political Culture
In m an y w ays, B ra z ilia n so c iety is re n o w n ed for b rin g in g ra in fo re st for th e ir p rofitable c a ttle ran ch es. A c u ltu ra l ele­
to g e th e r elem ents o f d is tin c t tra d itio n s. In term s o f its m e n t th a t w orks its w ay in to p olitics is th e n o tio n o f jeitinho,
people, B razil has large n u m b ers o f in d ig e n o u s peoples, o r “fin d in g a little way.” T his has a c o n n o ta tio n o f sk illfu l­
people o f A fric a n d e sc en t, a n d d e sc en d a n ts o f m ig ra n ts o f ness a n d cleverness, b u t also o f b e in g c o n n iv in g a n d eva­
E u ro p e a n a n d A sia n o rig in . B ra zilia n politics follow s th e sive. A t its b e st, it m eans crea tiv ity a n d inventiveness,
n a tio n a l tre n d o f b le n d in g a n d c o m b in in g tra d itio n s . w h e th e r in business or in B ra zilia n s’ re n o w n ed abilities in
W h ile u n iq u e , B razil is also lik e m a n y c o u n tries in p ro ­ soccer. A t its w o rst, it c o n trib u tes to p ractices like tax eva­
cesses o f ra p id m o d e rn iz a tio n in th a t it p resen ts a fascin at­ sion, c o rru p tio n , a n d g e ttin g ah ea d a t a n o th e r’s expense.
in g m ix tu re o f th e tra d itio n a l w ith th e te c h n o c ra tic a n d T he blen d o f m o d e rn a n d tra d itio n a l can b e seen am o n g th e
“m o d e rn .” m an y B razilian s w h o w ill co n d em n c o rru p tio n am o n g p o li­
T his com plex c u ltu re can b e seen, for exam ple, in th e tician s, b u t w h o also p rid e them selves in avoiding pay m en t
com b in atio n o f h ig h ly advanced centers o f efficiency in cer­ o f th e ir ta x share.
ta in aspects o f th e state, c o m b in ed w ith o ld -fash io n e d p a ­ B razil has c h an g e d over tim e , a n d o ften for th e better.
tro n ag e -b ased bureaucracies (E vans 1989). Som e d iplom ats O n e exam ple is th e politics b e tw ee n leftists a n d in d u strial
in B ra zil’s F o reig n M in is try a n d econom ists at its C e n tra l capitalists. A s B razil has m oved in to th e tw e n ty -first cen­
B a n k are am o n g th e w o rld ’s b e st, w h ile m an y legislators, tu ry , m ajor po litical forces o n b o th th e left a n d th e rig h t
m in isters, a n d ju d g es (and som e presidents) have b e e n n o ­ have m oderated. T he W o rk ers’ P a rty ( P T ) m oved from rad i­
toriously c o rru p t. B razil is h om e to som e o f th e w o rld ’s cal M a rx ism in th e 1980s to m ore social-dem ocratic policies
m o st advanced in d u strie s— in p e tro leu m ex p lo ratio n , air­ in th e 1990s. T he P T a n d its leader, L u la da Silva, w ere u n ­
c ra ft m a n u fa ctu re , a n d m obile p h o n e assem bly, am o n g acceptable to th e m ilita ry a n d unelectable for m o st m id d le -
o th e r areas— b u t is also h om e to p o v e rty th a t rivals th e class B razilians in to th e 1990s, b u t by th e 2 0 0 2 elections
p o o re st c o u n tries o n e a rth . A s h om e to m o st o f th e th e y h a d becom e m ain stre am . I n fact, L u la w o n election
A m a z o n , B razil is a lead er in global d ebates ab o u t e n v iro n ­ a n d th e n reelection h a n d ily in 2 0 0 6 , e a rn in g th e su p p o rt o f
m en ta l sustainability, w h ile also w in k in g a n d n o d d in g at m an y in th e m id d le class. D u rin g L u la ’s te rm o f office, th e
w e alth y p o litician s w h o chop d o w n h u g e sw ath s o f p ristin e g o v e rn m e n t c o n tin u e d p ro -m a rk e t reform s, m u ch to the
406 Brazil

re lief o f th e business com m unity, w h ile also e x te n d in g m ore B razil is th u s hom e to a b ew ild e rin g a n d so m etim es con­
benefits to th e p o o r (see th e follow ing section, “Political trad ic to ry p o litical cu ltu re. M o d e rn a n d sophisticated, b u t
E cono m y”). M e a n w h ile , th e m ilita ry and o th er conserva­ also tro u b lin g a n d g ritty , it seem s a c o u n try o n th e m ove, yet
tives to u t B ra zil’s dem ocracy, even w h e n it results in the also one so m etim es stu ck in tim e. A lea d in g saying is th a t
election o f p o litical rivals, a n d th e tra d itio n a l oligarchic “B razil is th e c o u n try o f th e fu tu re, a n d alw ays w ill be.”
politicians a n d bosses o f B ra zil’s n o rth e a st have also u p d a te d B razil is m ore d em ocratic, equitable, a n d stable th a n ju s t a
th e ir im age, albeit slowly. F ew revel o penly anym ore in th e couple o f decades ago, b u t m ost B razilians a n d B razilianists
old approach o f ju st delivering “p o rk ” to constituents. w o u ld say it has a long road to travel in its developm ent.

Political Economy
B razil has em erged to b ecom e one o f th e m o st d y n a m ic w o rk a n d in to th e less secure, in fo rm a l econom y o f stre et
econom ies in th e developing w orld, b u t it is also ch ara cte r­ v e n d in g a n d o d d jobs. S oon th ere afte r, excessive go v ern ­
ized b y sh o ck in g in eq u a lities, extrem e poverty, ra m p a n t m e n t sp e n d in g led to h y p e rin flatio n a n d fu rth e r decline.
c o rru p tio n , h ig h costs o f d o in g business, a n d am o n g th e F inally, in th e 1990s, th e c o u n try sta b ilize d u n d e r P resi­
w o rld ’s h ig h e st ta x rates. I t is one o f th e re n o w n ed B R IC d e n t F e rn a n d o H e n riq u e C ard o so (1 9 9 5 -2 0 0 3 ) a n d grew
c ountries th a t are p ro jected by m an y to be econom ic g ian ts im pressively once ag ain in th e years u n d e r P re sid e n t L u iz
o f th e futu re: B razil, R ussia, In d ia , a n d C h in a . W h ile it In acio L u la d a Silva (20 0 3 -2 0 1 1 ).
still faces h u g e difficulties in in te g ra tin g its diverse p o p u la ­ P overty a n d in eq u a lity re m a in B ra zil’s g reatest econom ic
tio n in to th e m o d e rn econom y, B razil has developed d ra ­ challenges. F o r years, B razil w as re p u te d to be th e m o st eco­
m atically from its e x p o rt-o rien te d a g ric u ltu ra l base in th e nom ically u n e q u al society on e a rth , w ith o nly a frac tio n o f
n in e te e n th century, w h e n th e c o u n try w as d o m in a te d by very w ealth y people a n d huge num bers o f people living in
oligarchic p la n ta tio n ow ners w h o e x p o rte d coffee, sugar, p o v erty in ru ra l areas or in u rb a n sh an ty to w n s k n o w n as
a n d o th e r p ro d u c ts to E u ro p e. favelas. A s B razil has g ro w n m eth o d ica lly over th e last
T he c o u n try ’s econom ic h isto ry accounts for m u ch o f decade o r m ore, in eq u a lity has fallen, b u t still rem ains at
w here B razil is today. B razil b e g an to in d u stria liz e in ear­ very h ig h levels. The im provem ents have been helped along by
n e st in th e late n in e te e n th century, a n d th is process acceler­ policy changes, especially new and im proved social program s.
ated th ro u g h th e 1920s, especially in th e so u th and T he governm ents o f C ardoso, L ula, and D ilm a R ousseff
so u th e ast o f th e country. T he G re a t D e p ressio n a n d its col­ (2011-present) have created and expanded innovative social
lapse o f w orld tra d e w as in itially a c atastro p h e for S o u th p rogram s th a t provide m o d est cash benefits to low -incom e
A m e ric a ’s a g ric u ltu ra l-d o m in a te d econom ies, w h o lo st fam ilies th a t have th e ir c h ild ren v accinated a n d stay in
th e ir m arkets a ro u n d th e w orld. B u t th e decline in trad e led school. T his reduces p o v erty w hile also im proving B razil’s
B razil to p roduce m ore o f its ow n in d u stria l goods (such as h u m a n capital for th e n e x t generation.
textiles, cem ent, or processed foods) ra th e r th a n rely in g on In term s o f th e c o n te m p o ra ry econom y, B razil is a m ajor
im p o rts. T his led to m ore advanced in d u stria liz a tio n a n d e x p o rte r again, b u t no w w ith a n even m o re h ig h ly diversi­
th e “B razilian M ira c le ” a fte r W o rld W a r I I (see th e “H is ­ fied econom y. I t featu res su b sta n tia l sectors in a g ric u ltu ra l
torical D e v e lo p m e n t” section at th e b e g in n in g o f th e p ro ­ e x p o rts, m a n u fa c tu rin g , ex tractive in d u stry (such as oil
file). U n d e r b o th dem o cratic ru le (1 9 46-1964) a n d m ilita ry p ro d u c tio n ), a n d services. A t th e sam e tim e , B razil has
ru le (1964-1980s), B razil m oved fro m p ro d u c tio n o f sim ple stru g g led in re ce n t years w ith in fla tio n a n d slow ing g ro w th .
in d u stria l goods to a m u ch m ore intensive econom y th a t F ro m a g ro w th ra te o f ab o u t 7.5 p e rce n t in 2 010, B razil has
p ro d u ced appliances, autom obiles, electronics, p e tro c h e m i­ d e clin ed to u n d e r 3 p e rce n t in re ce n t years, a n d projections
cals, a n d even airplanes. T he in d u stria liz a tio n exten d ed are th a t th is w ill decline to nearly zero in 2015. T he ques­
w e alth to a b ro a d er cro ss-sectio n o f society, c rea tin g an tio n th ere fo re, is w h e th e r B razil w ill be able to consolidate
u rb a n m id d le class o fw o rk e rs, m an ag ers, a n d professionals. its b ro ad ly sh a red econom ic g ain s o f re ce n t years, w h ile in ­
F ro m 1968 to 1973, B ra zil’s G D P h a d a n average g ro w th o f creasin g g ro w th rates overall. T o th e e x te n t it is able to do
m ore th a n 10 p e rce n t a year, b u t econom ic collapse in th e so, it is w ell p o sitio n e d to be one o f th e lea d in g econom ies
1980s led to sh u tte re d factories a n d sen t m illio n s o u t o f o f th e tw e n ty -first century.
 Case Studies 407

CASE STUDIES

Does the Global Economy Help or

Hurt Developing Nations Like Brazil? C H A P T E R 5, PAG E 112

For centuries, Brazil has been one of the the 1930s had ambiguous effects on Brazil. needed to get the government out of the
most important countries to consider on The Great Depression hit Brazil and Latin economy. Major U.S.-based institutions
the question of whether opening up to America hard, as it cut off the trade with pushed a "Washington Consensus" that
the global economy helps or hinders de­ the outside world on which the economy demanded privatization, deregulation,
velopment. Depending on perspective had come to depend; this suggests that and less spending by Latin American gov­
and the moment in history, openness to being deprived of global markets hurt ernments. This set of policies undoubt­
the outside world has helped Brazil ad­ Brazil. On the other hand, Brazil deepened edly contributed to a downturn in the
vance economically and has contributed its industrialization in the wake of Depres­ short term, but whether it created the
to economic challenges; dosing off to the sion as it shifted to domestic production basis for Brazil's longer term success is
global economy seemed both to help for domestic markets; this suggests that subject to debate.
and to hurt as well. Can Brazil help us looking inward actually helped. The ambi­ Most recently, Brazil seems once again
decide under what conditions other de­ guities extend further with the era known to be benefiting from globalization while
veloping countries should open or close as bureaucratic-authoritarian rule under simultaneously being challenged by it. The
themselves off to trade with the advanced the military from 1964 to the 1980s. During country has seen a commodity boom and
economies? this period, Brazil continued to protect do­ rising incomes from exports, but is also
Brazil's earliest interactions with the mestic industry by raising barriers to for­ facing increasing competition from China,
global economy were based on the noto­ eign corporations, but with a caveat; The for example, in a variety of areas. In short,
rious slave trade, which brought slaves government in Brasilia also invited foreign one cannot simply see Brazil's interaction
from west Africa to harvest agricultural corporations to establish factories in Brazil with the global economy as good or evil.
products. Up until the 1880s, Brazil relied and serve the domestic market (Evans Connections to the global economy must
on slave labor. While this period saw some 1979). The deepening of industrialization be seen as partly (but not wholly) respon­
agro-export success, the economic gains that followed might suggest that Brazil sible for many of Brazil's booms and busts
were obviously distributed primarily to benefited from either closing off to foreign alike, and responsible for many opportuni­
the oligarchic elite, and not to workers. capital or opening up to it, depending on ties as well as many inequalities. Nor can
This early pattern formed the basis of Bra­ the interpretation. one look at it just at a single moment in
zil’s tremendous inequality, so the overall The pro-market neoliberal era of the time. The recent era of neoliberalism and
effect on the economy is open to inter­ 1980s and 1990s gave additional fodder free market economics is one period in
pretation. Brazil did continue to grow its for debate about the merits of interna­ which openness shaped the political econ­
economy after slavery was abolished and tional economic linkages. A consensus omy of the country, but a longer historical
up to the 1920s, and it did so in large part emerged in the early 1980s that Brazil's perspective would suggest that this is an
through agricultural exports to industrial­ indebted economy needed to be stabi­ incomplete picture. Linkages to the global
ized countries. lized and reformed, but the consensus economy must be seen more broadly and
As noted in the section on "Political also took on a more assertive form with in historical terms as one of the key ten­
Economy," ties to the global economy in the argument that countries like Brazil sions in Brazilian economic trajectory.
408 Brazil

Democratic Consolidation in Brazil C H A P T E R 6, PA G E 130

Brazil has moved back and forth between the progressive modernization of the the overall growth of the Brazilian econ­
authoritarianism and democracy for economy played a major role in Brazil's omy, which has been stable and solid
much of its existence as an independent political changes (O'Donnell, Schmitter, after decades in which the country was
country. The country was an empire for and Whitehead [1986] 1993; Stepan 1971; known for its massive crises. In terms of
the period from 1822 to 1889, followed by O'Donnell 1973; Evans 1979). government policies, the most famous is
a Republic from 1889 to 1930. Both of The study of democracy in Brazil goes the Bolsa Familia, or Family Allowance.
these had some formal democratic insti­ beyond the question of transition from This program, known as a "conditional
tutions including elected legislatures and one regime type to another. Perhaps the cash transfer," provides direct income
relatively liberal laws that enfranchised most important issues today for those from the government to poor families on
large numbers of people by nineteenth- studying Brazilian politics are about dem­ the condition that they keep their chil­
century standards, but both were in prac­ ocratic consolidation. Since 1988, Brazil's dren in school and keep their vaccinations
tice dominated by landowning elites democracy has achieved some consolida­ up to date. The program predates the Lula
(Graham 1990). The twentieth century tion, with repeated elections that have presidency, but it was dramatically ex­
saw a coup leading to military rule from seen incumbents voted out of office and panded on a nationwide basis under Lula.
1930 to 1945, followed by a democratic the election of Lula da Silva, whose candi­ While economic growth and policies such
republic from 1945 to 1964, which in turn dacy was at one point unacceptable to the as Bolsa Familia may seem to be largely an
fell to another military coup. Brazil's mili­ military. The country has protections for issue of economics, they can also bring
tary regime fell under the category known civil liberties as well, and a return to out­ political change. First, economic growth
as bureaucratic-authoritarian (see chapter right authoritarian rule seems quite un­ and "pro-poor" programs are credited
6) from 1964 to the 1980s. A gradual tran­ likely in the near future. Yet that does not with reducing inequality and poverty in
sition to the current democratic republic mean Brazil has created effective repre­ recent years, and there is some evidence
began in 1982, resulted in a presidential sentation or equal opportunity for all citi­ that low-income Brazilians with access to
election in 1985, and was codified in the zens. The rule of law does not extend some disposable income participated ac­
Brazilian Constitution of 1988. equally to everyone everywhere in Brazil: tively in reelecting Lula (Zucco 2008).
Brazil's numerous experiences with Some areas (both remote rural areas and Second, such social policies suggest gov­
regime change feature prominently in parts of major cities) are almost lawless ernment that directly addresses problems
studies of democratization and demo­ and ruled by criminals, while corruption is facing the poor, which was not always the
cratic breakdown, partly because it is a considerable in the police and in many case under Brazilian democracies that
large and important country in Latin political institutions. Of course, looking at were long considered elite-led. Third, this
America and partly because the histori­ this in comparative perspective, it is possi­ set of changes brings poorer Brazilians
cal evidence can provide support for sev­ ble to say that no country perfectly fulfills into greater contact with state institu­
eral different theories of regime change. the ideal of a consolidated democracy. tions, such as the education and health
There is evidence, for example, that indi­ One of the most interesting transitions systems. This raises the prospect of
vidual groups of political actors played a in recent years has been a set of economic strengthening relations between the
major role in transitions, and that prevail­ and policy changes that have improved state and society at large, which is one
ing ideas in the military shaped its will­ the well-being of the lowest-income measure of what democratic consolida­
ingness to wield authority, but also that people in Brazil. One of these changes is tion is about.
 Case Studies 409

Electoral Rules and Party (In)Discipline

in Brazil's Legislature C H A P T E R 9, P A G E 209

Brazil has a bicameral legislature, like most entitled to thirty seats in the Chamber, One result was a large number of parties
federal systems. The upper chamber, and all of the candidates from the Work­ represented in both chambers, and for a
called the Senate (Senado), is designed to er's Party in Parana together earn one- long time a great deal of “floor crossing,"
represent the states (estados). Three sena­ third of all the votes in the state, then the as deputies moved from party to party
tors represent each state in the Senate, for PT earns ten seats in the Chamber from (call it "party hopping") in an attempt to
a total of eighty-one for the twenty-seven the state of Parana. This makes it a form of jockey for the best position for future
states of the federation, including the proportional representation that reflects elections. It also led party leaders to at­
Federal District that comprises the capital, the votes for different parties. tempt to "bribe" legislators in their party
Brasilia. The lower chamber, known as the But which ten members of the Work­ to secure their votes on important legisla­
Chamber of Deputies (Camara dos Depu- er's Party would be sent to Congress from tion; sometimes this happened with pa­
tados), nominally represents the popula­ Parana in this example? This is determined tronage or "pork" for a legislator's home
tion at large, but in Brazil's federal system, by which candidates received the most district or electoral base, and sometimes
the electoral rules for the Chamber of individual votes. This “open-list" feature the bribes were literal. As Brazilian gover­
Deputies guarantee that even the lower means voters have more say over which nance grew somewhat less chaotic over
chamber takes on a localist flavor. One of candidates go to Congress, as contrasted the period from 1994 to the present, the
the most pressing issues in Brazilian poli­ with conventional PR systems in which problems associated with open-list PR
tics is how members of Congress come to party leaders rank their preferred list of were seen as somewhat less troubling:
represent the interests of certain localities representatives that will go to the legisla­ more legislators stuck with their presi­
over those of the country at large, even ture depending on the party's share of dents and with their parties, though the
though Deputies are not elected in spe­ the vote. Obviously, candidates seeking trends of "party indiscipline" continued.
cific districts. election want their party to garner a lot of Brazil's electoral system offers an illus­
Representatives in the Chamber of seats (since that gives a greater chance of tration of how institutions must be under­
Deputies are elected by an arrangement being elected), but must also gain consid­ stood in relation to one another, and how
known as open-list proportional repre­ erable individual name recognition to diverse institutional arrangements can be.
sentation (or open-list PR). Deputies are separate themselves from the pack. Indi­ In this case, the functioning of the legisla­
elected on a state-wide basis, and not vidual candidates thus prioritize making a ture depends on both electoral systems
from specific local districts. There may be name for themselves in certain cities and (as examined in chapter 9) and party sys­
as many as seventy deputies from a state towns, carving out electoral support, tems (examined in chapter 11). Many ana­
(as in the case of Sao Paulo) and as many while also seeking to join parties that they lysts of Brazil have argued that the way
as 513 deputies in all, with the number think will give them the best shot at elec­ deputies favor their own states leads to
from each state depending on popula­ tion. What they do not necessarily priori­ patronage politics rather than a legisla­
tion. In elections to the Chamber, voters tize is following the wishes of their party's ture that looks out for the national inter­
choose their most preferred candidate leaders. This weakens the cohesion of par­ ests. The debate about consequences is
from a long list of options; that candidate ties and makes those political parties dif­ ongoing, but one common academic
is affiliated with a political party, and there ficult to "discipline." suggestion to reform Brazilian politics has
are many parties in Brazil, both large and Open-list PR thus has certain intuitive been the modification or elimination of
small. The "open-list PR" system allocates advantages, such as combining propor­ open-list PR, with the argument usually
a state's seats in the Chamber of Deputies tionality with votes for individual repre­ favoring more traditional ("closed-list") PR
based on the total number of votes a sentatives, but it has also contributed to that would give party leaders greater le­
party receives in each state from all its problems in governing in a Congress that verage over their rank-and-file members
candidates. Thus, if the state of Parana is was chaotic for many years (Power 2000). in Congress.
410 Brazil

WBBSM wm

Brazil's Landless Movement C H A P T E R 12, PAG E 282

’ ^'^00
As noted already, Brazil has often been been very unlikely without the Landless the MST was somewhat critical of Lula
seen as a society where social change Movement. because of expectations raised by his per­
comes about not through revolutions but The Movement began in the 1970s with ceived ideological affinity with the Move­
through gradual transitions, yet some im­ the main aim of encouraging groups of ac­ ment and also the associations between
portant transformative movements have tivists to occupy and distribute land and to his Political party— the Workers' Party
come out of Brazil. Like the rest of Latin pressure the state to sanction this. Efforts (PT)— and the MST. It will be interesting to
America, Brazil has long been character­ began in the south but spread to various watch the ongoing development of this
ized by high levels of poverty and in­ parts of the country. Social movement social movement during the government
equality. One form of this inequality has theory would predict that organizations of Dilma Rousseff.
been in patterns of land ownership. This is would be needed if this movement were to Why is the Landless Movement consid­
important, of course, because many Bra­ develop. Sure enough, in 1984, a formal or­ ered a social movement rather than a revo­
zilians value social equality and would like ganization, the MST (the Movement of lution? It is important to remember that our
to see fair opportunities for all citizens. It is Landless Rural Workers) was created. categories of contention are "ideal types." It
also important, though, because compar­ The activities of this movement shift may be possible to argue that the Landless
ative analysis shows that high levels of in­ and vary over time (Ondetti 2008). The Movement is revolutionary, since it does
equality are bad for other things that movement first appeared in the 1970s, clearly aim to transform the Brazilian social
people value, like democracy. While Brazil had mixed experience in the 1980s and structure. However, most see it as a social
has not seen land reform on the scale of early 1990s, and then had considerable movement because it does not aim to di­
those produced by major social revolu­ success during the first administration of rectly capture the state and because it is
tions like those of China, Russia, or Cuba, it Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-1999), focused on the specific issue of land reform
has, in recent years, seen notable efforts who implemented a major land reform rather than a total transformation of poli­
to distribute some land to the poor, land program. The movement had renewed tics and society, even though many of its
both privately owned and held by the success under the administration of Luiz activists and supporters do have such
state. This land redistribution would have Inacio Lula da Silva (2003-2011), although hopes for a total transformation.

CASE STUDY
Gender and Political Representation in Brazil:
Where Has Progress Come From? C H A P T E R 14, PAG E 336

Like most modern societies, Brazil has part because understanding the sources were equally unable to vote) and
struggled to provide gender equity. of both progress and failures may help in later authoritarian governments.
Also like most modern societies, it still future organizers and party leaders to 2. The decriminalization of divorce
has a ways to go on this issue. That said, make further progress, both in Brazil in 1977, with reforms in the late
the country has made considerable and elsewhere. 2000s making divorce easier to
progress in recent years, especially since Some of the political successes of the obtain. This is important because
the 1990s, perhaps symbolized by the Brazilian women's movement include the typically women without the right
fact that the country currently has a following: to divorce are more likely to be
female president, Dilma Rousseff. Com­ 1. Women's suffrage in 1932, though stuck in dangerous situations like
parative political analysts ask how and this proved moot in the Estado ongoing domestic violence, and it
why this progress has been made, in Novo (1937-1945, when women is widely held in today's world that
 Case Studies 411

CASE STUDY (continued)

Gender and Political Representation in Brazil:

Where Has Progress Come From? C H A P T E R 14, PAG E 336

people should be free to enter into of candidates at least 30 percent of more female candidates than other par­
and exit relationships consensually. whom are women. ties and has more consistently focused on
3. Creation of the Conselho National 5. Dilma Rousseff's election in 2010. gender issues. Macaulay's analysis sug­
dos Direitos da Mulher (CNDM, gests that this is partially due to the role
Fiona Macaulay (2006: 39) notes that an
The National Council on Women's that female activists and party operatives
interesting feature of recent Brazilian
Rights) in 1985 and the Secretaria have played within the PT.
experience is that advances on gender
Especial de Politicos para as Mulheres Macaulay further points to the fact
issues at the national level have not often
(SEPM) in 2003. This was a conse­ that Brazil has a fairly decentralized fed­
come from the state, but rather from the
quence of important women's eral political system, and that local and
Partido dos Trabalhadores (the party of
movement activism in civil society, state-level reforms have also been benefi­
both Rousseff and Lula da Silva), though
and it essentially coincided with cial to women in some areas (Macaulay
some proposals have come from actors
the re-emergence of Brazilian 2006: 35). The downside of this, of course,
from a variety of parties and even though
democracy. The CNDM has been is that women's rights and their enforce­
gender has not historically been an axis
involved in numerous important ment vary from area to area as well.
of "party system cleavage" in Brazil. This
feminist initiatives (Macaulay Despite substantial progress on issues of
latter point is not especially surprising,
2006:48). gender and politics in Brazil, serious prob­
particularly given that gender-based par­
4. In 1996, the passage of a law lems remain, including limited represen­
ties, unlike ethnicity-based parties, are
proposed by the PT (Workers'Party) tation of women's issues, a higher rate of
rare for reasons discussed in chapter 14
establishing minimal candidate poverty for women than men, and a nota­
(see Htun 2004; Htun and Power 2006).
quotas of 30 percent for both men bly high rate of domestic violence. Many
More interesting is the fact that PT has, in
and women. This means is that would also point to Brazil's strong restric­
comparative terms, nominated many
parties are required to run slates tions on abortion in this connection.

Research Prompts
1. We have noted that Brazil is sometimes considered a "non­ 4. A question is raised in the case study herein about whether the
revolutionary" society in which transitions are gradual. Be this as Brazilian Landless Workers' Movement is a social movement or a
it may, it is demonstrable that Brazil stands out in the Latin revolution. How would you define it based on the description
American context for the degree to which its transition to inde­ offered here? What are the implications of your choice for your
pendence was peaceful. Why might this be? What would major theoretical approach to contention?
theories of revolution say about this, and how might this case (in 5. One of the case studies in this chapter discusses how Brazil has
comparative Latin American perspective) help us to consider moved from a more corporatist to a more pluralist mode of in­
the relative merits of those theories? terest articulation. How and why has this happened? What sorts
2. After decades of mixed performance, Brazil has recently of comparative cases could one select in order to better answer
achieved impressive economic growth. What would the major this question?
theories of development considered in chapter 5 say about this 6. Brazil has alternated between democracy and authoritarianism
case? What can Brazil's experience tell us about those theories? for some time, with a strong authoritarian tradition. More re­
3. Describe the nature of Brazil's electoral system. If this system were cently, it has had notable democratic success. Is this likely to last?
adopted in the United States, what would its consequences for poli­ Why or why not? Be sure to draw both on facts about Brazil and
tics likely be in the short, medium, and long terms? Why must we be on theories of democratic consolidation in your response.
cautious and tentative in asking such hypothetical questions?
412

B China
Introduction
F o r a c om parative p olitics scholar, C h in a
Key Features of Contemporary China is one o f th e m o st fa scin a tin g cou n tries. It
raises nu m ero u s q uestions a n d issues, as w e
Population: 1,355,692,576 (estimate, July 2014) sh all see, ab o u t econom ic d evelopm ent, d e ­

9,596,961 square miles

m ocracy, th e rela tio n sh ip b e tw e e n political
Area:
p a rtie s a n d th e state, a n d th e causes a n d
Head of State: Xi Jinping (president, 2013-present) consequences o f social revolutions, a m o n g

Li Keqiang (premier, 2013-present)

m an y o th ers. W e sh all explore som e o f th ese
Head of Government:
here, a n d you can use th e th eo ries th a t you
Capital: Beijing have a cq u ired in th e th e m a tic ch ap ters o f

Never formally colonized, with the exception of th is b o o k to com pare a n d c o n tra st C h in a

Year of Independence:
Hong Kong, despite European imperial w ith o th e r cases.
involvement in the nineteenth century. People's O f course, a lea d in g issue in th e p olitics
Republic of China established in 1949. o f C h in a is th e q u e stio n o f h o w it has rapidly

1982
becom e th e w o rld ’s seco n d -larg est econom y
Year of Current
Constitution: a n d a m ajor global pow er, ju s t a few sh o rt
d ecades a fte r b e in g c h a ra c te riz e d by ex­
Languages: Mandarin is the majority language. There are
tre m e p o v e rty (th o u g h m an y C h in e se citi­
numerous dialects and minority languages.
zens re m a in very poor). It has done so in a
GDP per Capita: $6,807 (World Bank estimate, 2013) n o n -d e m o c ratic, o n e -p a rty state th a t re ­
stricts m an y basic freedom s. C h in a th u s
Human Development 91st (medium human development)
Index Ranking (2014):
p resen ts a ch allen g e to th e so -c alled “W e s t­
e rn m o d e l” o f p olitics a n d econom ics based
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Development Report 2014.
o n lib e ral dem ocracy a n d free m ark ets. T he
im p licatio n s o f C h in a ’s rise for th e fu tu re are
m assive, b o th w ith in C h in a a n d a ro u n d th e
w orld. W e exam ine th ese issues o f political
econom y a n d th e reg im e in th is profile.
A n o th e r s trik in g th in g ab o u t C h in a
fro m th e p o in t o f view o f p o litica l science is

I Nominally secular/atheist 86-

| Daoist 3-4%
Han Chinese 91.1 Buddhist 3-4%
Other groups 8.51 SK Christian 3—4%
I Muslim 1-2%

Ethnic Groups in China Religious Affiliation in China

Source: CIA World Factbook. Source: CIA World Factbook.
 Profile 413

RUSSIA

KAZAKHSTAN
Harbin

MONGOLIA Sea of
Japan
Shenyang
Urumqi
Qinhuangdao .

™ c B e ijin g * . Dalian
Tianjin

Qingdao

Lanzhou fS Yellow
Zhengzhou Seo
Nanjing ‘ .Sh a n g h a i

Chengdu
Lhasa
- J East China f
tohmaputra Chongqing Sea

Guangzhou TAIWAN
INDIA ■BANG!
J BURMA
Macau
(MYANMAR)
UAOS
PHILIPPINES
HAINAN
DAO

«300 600 Kilometers

600 Miles
414 China

th e degree o f political, econom ic, a n d c u ltu ra l u n ity t h a t it T he p o p u la tio n o f C h in a seem s largely hom ogeneous,
has m an a g ed to achieve d espite its en o rm o u s size (in term s b u t o nly at first glance. O v e r 90 p e rce n t o f th e p o p u latio n
o f b o th g e ography a n d p o p u latio n ) a n d its diversity. C h in a falls in to th e H a n e th n ic category. Y et th e re m a in in g 8.5
is a m o n g th e m o st g e ographically diverse c o u n tries in th e p e rc e n t o f th e p o p u la tio n falls in to nu m ero u s g ro u p s (sm all
w orld. Its la n d m ass encom passes over 9.5 m illio n square in percen tag e term s, because o f C h in a ’s large p o p u latio n ,
m iles. P a rts o f so u th e rn C h in a are tro p ical a n d subtropical, b u t still nu m ero u s in absolute term s). T hese categories in ­
w hereas in th e n o rth w in ters can be q u ite cold. R a in fa ll clude th e M a n c h u (the e th n ic g roup th a t w as d o m in a n t
also varies considerably, b e in g am ple n e ar th e coast a n d d u rin g th e Q in g D y n asty ), T ib e ta n s , M o n g o ls, Z h u a n g ,
m in im a l in th e en o rm o u s G o b i D e se rt. T he w o rld ’s larg e st a n d U ig h u r, am o n g others.
m o u n ta in s— th e H im ala y as— are sh a red b y C h in a , b u t I n term s o f relig io n , C h in a ’s state is officially a th e ist in
o th e r regions are largely flat, a n d th e T u rfa n D ep ressio n c h aracter, ow in g , in p a rt, to th e legacy o f M a rx ism , w h ic h
lies b elo w sea level. C h in a even has rain fo rests in th e south. h olds th a t relig io n is a fo rm o f “false consciousness.” A n ­
C h in a ’s p o p u latio n c u rre n tly stan d s a t a ro u n d 1.4 bil­ o th e r factor is th e sense th a t th e p a st a ctiv ity o f religious
lion, m a k in g it th e larg e st c o u n try in th e w orld in p o p u la ­ m issionaries, especially in th e n in e te e n th century, w as d is­
tio n term s. D e m o g rap h e rs ex p ect C h in e se p o p u latio n ru p tiv e. Ju s t th e sam e, v ib ra n t religious co m m u n itie s
g ro w th to slow in th e c o m in g decades, a n d som e sug g est re m a in in C h in a , a n d relig io n has h isto ric a lly played an
th a t In d ia ’s p o p u latio n w ill overtake C h in a ’s, th o u g h th e im p o rta n t role in social c o n flict (see, in p a rtic u la r, discus­
accuracy o f th is forecast rem ain s to be seen. C h in a ’s d e ­ sion o f th e T a ip in g R e b ellio n la te r in th ese c o u n try m ate ri­
m o g rap h y has h isto rically b e en sh ap ed by state policy. P o p ­ als). T he follow ing c h a rt show s th e percen tag e o f th e
u latio n g ro w th w as p a rtia lly a fu n c tio n o f th e efforts o f th e p o p u la tio n th a t professes allegiance to several m ajor reli­
state to e x p an d p o p u la tio n u n d e r M a o Z ed o n g . I n th e late g ions. S tu d e n ts sh o u ld k eep in m in d th a t som e scholars
1970s, in an effort to slow p o p u la tio n g ro w th , th e “O n e e stim a te h ig h e r levels o f religious b e lie f a n d p ractice th a n
C h ild P olicy” w as established. T his policy im poses p e n a l­ th ese d a ta suggest (see P e w F o ru m 2008).
ties o n fam ilies w ith tw o o r m ore c h ild ren , th o u g h th is rule In sh o rt, C h in a is a large, com plex, hetero g en eo u s soci­
is n o t su pposed to apply to e th n ic m in o ritie s a n d o th e r e ty in w h ic h one m ajor e th n ic g ro u p (H a n C hinese) p re ­
groups u n d e r som e circum stances. O n e m ajor d evelopm ent d o m in ates. T he state is officially secular, b u t u n d e rn e a th
th a t is at lea st p a rtia lly a n u n in te n d e d consequence o f th is th is surface a n u m b e r o f citizens are religious (W e im in g
p olicy is th a t m an y fam ilies have u se d sex-selective abor­ 1999). I t has a v a rie d g eo g rap h y a n d som e s trik in g d e m o ­
tio n a n d in som e cases even in fan ticid e in th e ir efforts to g ra p h ic p a tte rn s. T hese basic featu res fo rm th e c ontext
ensure th a t th e ir o ne c h ild w ill be m ale. A s a re su lt, to d ay ’s th ro u g h w h ic h w e tr y to u n d e rsta n d C h in a ’s political
p o p u latio n in C h in a is u n b a la n ce d in re la tio n to gender. developm ent.

Historical Development
C h in a stan d s o u t am o n g m o st m o d e rn c o u n tries for ho w overview o f th is p e rio d , see S pence 1990; F a irb a n k and
lo n g it has existed as a large-scale a n d m ore o r less un ified G o ld m a n 2006).
civilization. In d e e d , C h in a has b e en a d istin c t geopo litical C h in a in th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry faced in creasin g for­
e n tity for millennia. A s w e sh a ll see, how ever, th is does n o t eig n in te rv en tio n . W e s te rn n a tio n s im p o sed th e ir ow n
m ean th a t it does n o t c h an g e, o r th a t it is n o t c h a n g in g “rig h ts” to tra d e w ith C h in a , u sin g force w h e n necessary.
now. T he b e g in n in g o f th e h isto ry o f Im p e ria l C h in a is con­ T his even in clu d e d B ritish m e rc h a n ts’ in tro d u c tio n (sm ug­
v en tio n ally d a te d a t 2 2 1 bce, an d h isto ria n s have tra c e d th e glin g ) o f o p iu m to th e C h in e se m ark et. W h e n C h in a trie d
sequence o f im p e rial regim es th a t follow ed. T he h isto ry o f to resist, th e y w ere tw ice m ilita rily coerced (in th e 1840s
modern C h in a , how ever, begins in th e late r years o f th e a n d 1850s), a n d am o n g o th e r th in g s H o n g K o n g becam e a
Q in g D y n a s ty (164 4 -1 9 1 2 ). T he Q in g D y n a s ty en tered cro w n colony o f th e B ritish E m p ire . B eyond d ire c t in te rfer­
in to difficulties in th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry due to several key ence o f th is so rt w ith in C h in a proper, E u ro p e a n pow ers
factors: foreign in te rv en tio n , fiscal difficulties, in te rn a l in ­ also in te rfe re d in C h in a ’s tra d itio n a l sphere o f influence,
stability, a n d a c h a n g in g g eo p o litical e n v iro n m en t (for an p a rtic u la rly in so -c alled “F re n c h In d o C h in a .” I t is
 Profile 415

im p o rta n t to u n d e rsta n d th a t C h in a considered itself, n o t cla im e d to b e th e b ro th e r o f Jesus C h r is t a n d w h o w a n ted

w ith o u t evidence, to be one o f th e w o rld ’s g re a t civiliza­ to displace th e Q in g a n d im p o se a q u asi-religious regim e.
tions, a n d th e ir relative w eakness in th e face o f E u ro p e a n T he e n su in g conflict k ille d m an y m illio n s before th e Q in g
pow ers w as e xperienced as h u m ilia tin g . A t th e sam e tim e , ev en tu ally p u t it d ow n. T his w as o n ly th e m o st im p o rta n t o f
th e Q in g D y n a sty fo u n d its e lf in serious fiscal difficulties. a series o f n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry rebellions a g ain st th e Q in g .
I t w as u nable to co n sisten tly raise th e revenues th a t w ere F inally, it is im p o rta n t to note th a t d u rin g th is sam e p e rio d
re q u ire d to p ro te c t its e lf a n d to m a in ta in in te rn a l ord er o f th e late n in e te e n th cen tu ry , C h in a ’s n e ig h b o r Ja p a n u n ­
(F a irb a n k and G o ld m a n 2 0 0 6 :1 8 7 ; Spence 1990). P a rtia lly d e rw e n t d ra m a tic c h an g es a n d b y th e e n d o f th e c en tu ry
as a re su lt, th e c o u n try w itn esse d serious in te rn a l d is tu r­ e m e rg ed as a m ajo r re g io n a l pow er, d e fea tin g C h in a its e lf
bances. A m o n g th ese w ere th e T a ip in g R e b ellio n o f th e in th e Sino-Japanese W a r o f 1 8 9 4 -1 8 9 5 a n d th e n d efeatin g
1850s a n d 1860s, w h ic h w as led by H o n g X iu q u a n , w h o R ussia in th e R usso-Japanese W a r o f 1 9 0 4 -1 9 0 5 .

Historical D evelopm ent

Tim elin e
1644-1912 Qing Dynasty 1937 Japanese invasion of Manchuria (Northeast China)
1839-1842 First Opium War (with Britain) in lead-up to World War II
1842 Treaty of Nanking. Britain takes Hong Kong and 1946-1949 After end of World War II, Civil War between
imposes trading rights for itself. Nationalists and Communists continues.
1850-1873 Taiping (1850-1864), Nien (1853-1868), and Panthay 1949 Communists victorious, Nationalists exiled to
(1855-1873) Rebellions Taiwan.
1856-1860 Second Opium (or "Arrow") War with Britain and 1949 People's Republic of China is proclaimed.
France 1950-1952 Major land reform is carried out.
1860 Convention of Peking imposes humiliating condi­ 1950-1953 Korean War, in which China backed North Korea
tions on China against U.S.-backed South Korea
1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War (China defeated) 1955-1956 Major agricultural collectivization is carried out.
1898 Hundred Days' Reform, ended by coup d'etat 1957 The "Hundred Flowers Campaign" in which dissent
1899-1901 Boxer Rebellion, ended by foreign intervention is encouraged but then punished
(eight foreign powers) 1957,1959 The "Anti-Rightist" Campaigns, in which alleged
1911-1912 Revolution of 1911 enemies of the revolution are repressed
1912 Fall of the Qing Dynasty, foundation of Guomind- 1958-1960 The "Great Leap Forward"— An effort to force in­
ang (GMD or Nationalist Party), establishment of dustrialization and meet often unrealistic produc­
the Republic of China, which then falls into disor­ tion goals. Among other things this produces a
der and civil conflict famine that leads to millions of deaths, some say as
1920-1921 Chinese Communist Party founded many as twenty million or more.
1925 Death of Sun Yat-sen, founder of the Kuomintang 1966-1969 The "Cultural Revolution" and massive political
1926 Chiang Kai-Shek leads "Northern Expedition,” repression, especially in the late 1960s, though
achieving partial political unification. some think this period lasts until Mao's death. The
1931 Japanese invasion of Manchuria government encourages students to root out al­
1934-1935 The "Long March" of the Communists, who face leged enemies of the revolution. Among others,
repression at the hands of the Nationalists. The Deng Xiaoping loses his position, only to be reha­
march facilitates Mao's rise within the group and bilitated in 1974.
the move toward the countryside. 1976 Arrest of the "Gang of Four," prominent Communist
1936 Beginning of the "Anti-Japanese War," which can leaders of the Cultural Revolution
be thought of as the beginning of the Second 1976 Mao Zedong's death
World War in China.
416 China

Timeline (Continued)
1978-1979 Deng Xiaoping consolidates his dominance in the China becomes member of World Trade Organiza­
post-Mao transition. Deng Xiaoping reforms begin, tion (WTO).
which open China to greater private enterprise and 2003 Hu Jintao assumes presidency.
foreign trade and begin to dismantle the collectiv­ 2008 Beijing Olympics are taken by many as a sign of
ization of agriculture, leading to greater agricultural China's ascendancy.
productivity. 2007-2010 China becomes world's second-largest economy,
1989 Tiananmen Square assault by military on protesters largest exporter, largest holder of foreign currency
centerpiece of repression of movement for political reserves, and largest polluter.
reform 2013 Xi Jinping becomes president and Li Keqiang
1993 Jiang Zemin assumes presidency. becomes premier.
1997 China officially takes over Hong Kong from
United Kingdom.

N o t surprisingly, m an y in C h in a w ere n o t pleased by N a tio n a lis ts a lte rn a te d b e tw e e n c o o p e ra tio n w ith a n d c o ­

th is c o n stellatio n o f factors. It is n o t h a rd to see w h y th is led e rcio n o f th e C o m m u n ists. M o re o v er, th e re w as even su s­
to an u p su rg e in C h in ese n a tio n a lism (H a rris o n 2001). ta in e d v io le n t c o n fro n ta tio n within th e G M D in th e late
Som e decided th a t g re a te r o penness to b o th Ja p a n a n d th e 1920s. D u r in g th e lo n g resistan ce to Ja p a n in th e 1930s
W e s t w o u ld be n eed ed , in term s o f b o th tec h n o lo g y a n d a n d 1940s th e re w ere p e rio d s in w h ic h th e N a tio n a lis ts
political ideas. By th e first decade o f th e tw e n tie th century, w ere fo rced to te m p o ra rily c o o p era te w ith th e C o m m u ­
th e Q in g regim e w as em bracing reform s a n d even to y in g n ists, b u t th is d id n ’t last. A fte r th e w ar, th e C o m m u n ists,
w ith c o n stitu tio n a lism . H ow ever, th is w as n o t e n o u g h to u n d e r th e le a d e rsh ip o f M a o Z e d o n g , g ra d u a lly d e fea te d
stop th e g ro w in g d isc o n te n t, a n d a p o litica l revolution (the th e N a tio n a lis ts , w ho r e tre a te d a lo n g w ith C h ia n g
“C h in ese R evolution o f 1911”) to p p le d th e Q in g in 1912. K a i-sh e k to T a iw a n . I n a cc o m p lish in g th is , th e C o m m u ­
T he m o st im p o rta n t leader in th is m ovem ent w as Sun n ists w ere g re a tly a id e d by th e w o rk th e y h a d d o n e in o r­
Y at-sen. g a n iz in g p e a s a n t c o m m u n itie s.
U n fo rtu n a te ly , th is re v o lu tio n d id n o t b rin g ab o u t In 1949, M a o d eclare d th e P eople’s R epublic o f C h in a
stable, c o n s titu tio n a l g o v e rn m e n t (on th is p e rio d , see (P R C ). A t first, th e n ew reg im e w as v ery m u ch in lin e w ith
F a irb a n k a n d G o ld m a n 2 0 0 6 ; S pence 1990). R a th e r, th e C o m m u n is t reg im e in th e S oviet U n io n , b u t over tim e
C h in a d e sc en d e d in to w h a t sch o lars re fe r to as th e p e rio d th e y to o k a d iffere n t course (T eiw es 2010). A key em phasis
o f “W a rlo rd is m ” (S c h o p p a 2010: 4 7 -4 8 ). I n sh o rt, th e ex­ on th e P R C w as to encourage th e collectiv izatio n o f a g ri­
is tin g sta te b ro k e d o w n , a n d local p o w e r b ro k e rs w ere re ­ c u ltu re a n d forced in d u stria liz a tio n . In 1958, M a o d eclared
sponsible for m u ch o f th e o rd e r th a t re m a in e d . I t w as in th e “G re a t L eap F o rw ard .” T his is o ften th o u g h t ab o u t by
th is c o n te x t th a t som e o f th e p o litic a l forces th a t still scholars as one o f th e clearest exam ples o f th e “v o lu n ta rism ”
shape C h in a w ere c rea te d . I n th e 1920s, C h ia n g K ai- o f M a o ist th o u g h t. W h e re a s tra d itio n a l M a rx ism h a d em ­
shek, lea d e r o f th e N a tio n a lis t P a rty (th e G u o m in d a n g or p h a size d th a t u n d e rly in g s tru c tu ra l c o n d itio n s w o u ld d e ­
G M D ), successfully e sta b lish e d c e n tra l p o litic a l o rd e r in te rm in e th e se q u en cin g o f re v o lu tio n ary processes, M a o ism
m u ch o f C h in a . Y et th is v ic to ry w as nev er absolute. The h e ld th a t th ro u g h a g re at act o f th e collective w ill, C h in a
C o m m u n is t P a r ty h a d b e e n e stab lish e d in th e early 1920s, co u ld force m o d e rn iz a tio n . U n fo rtu n ate ly , th e “G re a t L eap
w ith th e e a rlie r g ro u n d w o rk b e in g se t b y th e “M a y F o u rth F o rw a rd ” p ro d u c ed fa m in e ra th e r th a n m o d e rn iz a tio n . T he
M o v e m e n t,” a n d th e N a tio n a lis ts a n d C o m m u n ists ex­ m a in reaso n w as th a t a g ric u ltu ra l collectives felt o bligated
iste d in ten sio n . A t tim e s, th e C o m m u n ists fo llow ed C o ­ to exaggerate th e ir produ ctiv ity , a n d th e state in tu rn d e ­
m in te rn o rd e rs to c o o p era te w ith th e N a tio n a lis ts , a n d at m a n d e d so -c alled excess g ra in p ro d u c tio n (F a irb a n k and
o th e r tim e s n o t. L ik e w ise , C h ia n g K a i-sh e k a n d th e G o ld m a n 2 0 0 6 : 368 -3 7 4 ). M illio n s died.
 Profile 417

Politically, C h in a u n d e r M a o w as a p a r ty d icta to rsh ip , th is c o n n e c tio n . P e rh a p s m o st im p a c tfu lly , th e re g im e

one in w h ic h th e p a rty w as clearly p e rso n ally c o n tro lled by b e g a n to m a k e e c o n o m ic re fo rm s. A t firs t m a n y o f th e se
M a o him self. T he p a r ty a n d th e state w ere o rg a n iz atio n ally w e re c o n c e rn e d w ith a g ric u ltu ra l policy. A g ric u ltu ra l
in te rp e n e tra te d a t every level. W h ile th e re w ere som e m in i­ w o rk e rs w e re a llo w e d to p ro fit in d iv id u a lly (th o u g h m o st
m al “dem o cratic” featu res in te rn a l to th e p a rty a t c erta in la n d w as s till s ta te -o w n e d ), c h a n g in g th e in c e n tiv e
levels, th e p a rty w as u n d e rsto o d to have a m on o p o ly on s tr u c tu r e o f th e a g r ic u ltu r a l eco n o m y , in t u r n p ro d u c in g
g u id in g th e state. T he ra tio n ale for th is w as th a t th e p a rty g re a te r p ro d u c tiv ity . C h in a slow ly a n d stra te g ic a lly
w as said to tru ly re p re se n t th e w orkers, a n d any o th e r party , p riv a tiz e d so m e s ta te firm s, m o v in g to w a rd a m o d e l o f
therefore, w o u ld n ecessarily re p re se n t class enem ies a n d be “m a r k e t so c ia lism .” I t a lso s k illfu lly in c re a s e d its in te ­
on th e w ro n g side o f history. g r a tio n w ith th e g lo b a l econom y. C h in a ’s g r o w th in
M a o was always o n th e lookout for C h in a ’s tu rn away re c e n t d e ca d es h a s b e e n tr u ly a s to n is h in g , w ith h u n d re d s
from revolution. H e th o u g h t th a t revolution needed to be o f m illio n s lifte d o u t o f p o v e rty .
“p e rm a n en t” a n d th a t th e bourgeois “class enem ies” o f th e Politically, th e reform s have b e e n less notew orthy. The
w orkers could be anyw here. F or th is reason he encouraged c en tra l goal seem s to have b e e n th e p re serv a tio n o f th e
self-criticism . In d eed , in th e late 1950s he in itiate d the p o w er o f th e C o m m u n is t P a rty , w h ic h has b e e n q u ite id eo ­
“H u n d re d Flow ers” cam paign (Spence 1990: 569-573). The logically flexible. J u s t th e sam e, th e p a rty c o n tin u e s to d e­
idea w as th a t intellectuals a n d o thers w ould criticize a n d th u s scribe its e lf as M a o ist, a n d , a t least ostensibly, cap italist
im prove th e revolution. H ow ever, M a o w as less th a n satisfied reform s in th e econom ic sphere are p re sen te d as p re p a rin g
w hen his ow n policies b ecam e th e object o f criticism . H e and th e w ay for fu lle r socialism in th e fu tu re . T he reg im e has
others soon denounced these critics as “rightists.” This p h e ­ e x p an d e d th e role th a t citizens can play in local politics,
n o m enon w as even clearer in th e “c u ltu ral revolution” o f the a n d in te rn a l p a rty p olitics are n o lo n g er ju s t th e p ro d u c t o f
late 1960s (Spence 1990: 602-617; F airb an k and G o ld m an th e d e lib e ra tio n o f a single in d iv id u a l— th is b ecam e espe­
2 0 0 6 :3 8 3 -4 0 5 ). M a o trie d to organize a m ovem ent to targ e t c ially clear u n d e r th e lead ersh ip o f Jia n g Z e m in — b u t for
“rightists” and alleged enem ies o f th e revolution, b u t soon the th e m o st p a r t im p o rta n t d ecision m a k in g rem ain s securely
stu d e n t “R ed G u a rd ” g roups escaped his control. M a n y w ere w a lle d o ff from “th e p eople.”
attacked and killed, a n d still others lost th e ir jobs and w ere M a n y e x p ec t th e tw e n ty -first c e n tu ry to be “C h in a ’s
im prisoned or sent to w ork w ith th e peasants in th e c o u n try ­ cen tu ry ,” a n d C h in a h a s recen tly b ecom e th e w o rld ’s sec­
side. P urges touched all levels o f th e society, inclu d in g fu tu re o n d -b ig g e st econom y. H ow ever, as w e discuss h e rein , som e
leader D e n g X iaoping. q u estio n s a n d pressures re m a in . C a n C h in a m a in ta in its
M a o d ie d in 1976, a n d a fte r a b r ie f p e rio d a new , re ­ h ig h level o f econom ic g ro w th w ith o u t th e econom y over­
fo rm is t g e n e ra tio n c am e in to le a d e rs h ip (G ille y 2010). h e a tin g a n d h ig h in fla tio n e ro d in g c itiz e n s’ gains? W ill
D e n g h im s e lf w as th e c e n tra l fig u re h e re . T he n e w le a d ­ C h in a d e m o c ratize , or w ill th e p a r ty c o n tin u e to resist
e rsh ip slow ly a llo w e d so m e lim ite d c ritic is m o f M a o a n d p ressures to allo w this? C a n C h in e se g ro w th be m ade m ore
M a o ism . G re a te r in te lle c tu a l fre e d o m w as a llo w e d , co m p atib le w ith th e ecological in te rests o f th e c o u n try (and
th o u g h th e re w e re s till so m e im p o r ta n t lim ita tio n s in th e w orld)?

Regime and Political Institutions

The c en tra l fe atu re o f th e C h in ese reg im e is th e single­ d o w n to th e local level: v illage-level assem blies choose re p ­
p a rty system , a n d decision m a k in g effectively rests w ith a resen tativ es in towns , w h o select representatives in tu rn to
sm all gro u p o f C o m m u n is t P a rty o f C h in a (C P C ) elites in larg e r counties, a n d th e in d ire c t elections c o n tin u e u p w ard
th e top state o rg a n k n o w n as th e P o litb u ro . T he legislature to th e levels o f prefectures, provinces, a n d finally u p to th e
(N P C ) is elected b y in tric a te system s th a t ensure b o th N P C at th e top. A t each level, th e C P C d o m in a tes a n d
C o m m u n ist P a rty d o m in a n c e a n d to p -d o w n control. I t is ensures th a t o n ly its p a rty m em b ers are selected for the
in d ire c tly elected by low er-level assem blies th a t stre tc h h ig h e r levels o f th e legislature.
418 China

Regim e and Political Institutions

Regime Authoritarian

Powers in Constitution Unitary system; written constitution; officially socialist

Administrative Divisions Twenty-two provinces (and China claims Taiwan as twenty-third)

Five autonomous regions (including Tibet)
Four municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Chongqing)
Two special administrative regions (Hong Kong, Macau)

Executive Branch Three top positions with executive functions:

President of People's Republic of China; Secretary-General of Communist Party; and Chairman of
Central Military Council
Politburo is executive committee of the Communist Party, and includes top leaders of the party
Head of government is the premier, recommended by president and approved by legislature;
leads the State Council that oversees administration

Legislative Branch National People's Congress (NPC); elected in indirect elections from village level up to NPC

Selection of Executive Indirect; president selected by NPC

Judicial Branch Supreme Court elected/appointed by NPC and its committees

Political Party System Single dominant party: Communist Party of China (CPC)

T he executive b ra n c h has several p ro m in e n t positio n s, as “p a ra m o u n t leader.” T he p rem ier, w h o is responsible for th e

e x am in ed f u rth e r in th e box “W h o G o v e rn s C h in a ? ” a n d as o n g o in g o p eratio n s o f th e g o v e rn m e n t a n d for im p le m e n t­
n o te d in th e reg im e c h art. T he p re sid en t is th e fo rm al h e ad in g law s, is n o m in a te d by th e p re sid en t a n d approved b y th e
o f state, w h ile th e sec re tary -g e n era l leads th e C P C . In N P C . T his system ensures th a t policies set by th e P o litb u ro
p ractice, a single p e rso n o ften holds b o th positio n s, along a n d th e executive pass in to law.
w ith th e role o f c o m m a n d er in chief, a n d is k n o w n as th e

Political Culture
Political cultures are com plex a n d m u ltifaceted, located b o th p ie ty to w a rd o n e ’s fa m ily a n d a n ce sto rs (H a r ris o n 2001).
in th e m in d s o f individual m em bers o f society a n d in p u b ­ W h ile m a n y fin d th e s e ideas in trin s ic a lly a p p e a lin g a n d
licly established sym bols and structures. A s such, m ap p in g in te re s tin g , as so c ial sc ien tists w e be lie v e th a t th e y
political culture is a com plex task, above all in a large society b e c a m e in flu e n tia l in p a r t b e ca u se th e C h in e s e im p e ria l
like C h in a. A ty p ical strategy is to focus on im p o rta n t fea­ sta te e m p lo y ed th e m fo r m a n y c e n tu rie s in its efforts to
tures or currents o f a given c o u n try ’s p o litical culture. H ere m a in ta in its le g itim a c y a n d s ta f f itself. Im p e ria l e x a m in a ­
w e briefly focus on tw o o f th e m o st im p o rta n t currents in tio n s b a se d o n C o n fu c ia n is m d e te rm in e d w h o w o u ld be
C h in ese political culture: C o n fu c ia n ism and M aoism . able to h o ld w h ic h official jo b s. T h is e n h a n c e d a n d m a in ­
C o n fu c ia n ism is tra c e d b a c k to C o n fu c iu s , a p h ilo s o ­ ta in e d C o n fu c ia n is m ’s p re stig e in p re -m o d e rn C h in a , as
p h e r w h o lived fro m a ro u n d 551 to 479 b c . F o r th e stu d y it w as a sso c iated w ith b o th th e sta te a n d h ig h social
o f p o litic a l c u ltu re , th e p a rtic u la rs o f h is p h ilo s o p h y are sta tu s.
n o t th e im p o rta n t th in g . R a th e r, w e are in te re s te d in h o w C o n fu c ia n ism is o ften u se d b y th e o rists (som etim es,
g e n e ra lly C o n fu c ia n ideas w e re p ic k e d u p a n d c a rrie d p e rh ap s, fu n c tio n in g as a c u ltu ra l stereotype) w h o e m p h a ­
a lo n g c u ltu ra lly o ver m an y y e ars, a n d w e are in te re s te d in size c u ltu re in th e ir efforts to e xplain several p o litica l a n d
th e c o n se q u en c es o f th e se ideas. C o n fu c ia n is m as e s ta b ­ econom ic p h e n o m e n a observable in C h in a a n d o th e r c o u n ­
lis h e d e m p h a siz e d fo rm a l e d u c a tio n , th e im p o rta n c e o f trie s w ith stro n g C o n fu c ia n h e ritag e , su ch as Ja p a n , K orea,
p u b lic r itu a l, a s tric t code o f e th ic a l re sp o n sib ility , a n d S ingapore, a n d V ietn am . Som e a rg u e, fo r exam ple, th a t
 Profile 419

C o n fu c ia n p o litica l c u ltu re u nderlies a u th o rita ria n p olitics. p u n ish in g w ayw ard elites, se n d in g th e m to w o rk w ith peas­
T his idea w as actively p ro m o te d b y L ee K w an Y ew in S in­ ants for “re -e d u c a tio n .”
g apore, for exam ple. O th e rs , as p o in te d o u t in c h ap ter 4, W h e n w e say th a t M a o ist th o u g h t em phasizes “volun­
have trie d to use C o n fu c ia n c u ltu re to e xplain b o th (1) th e tarism ” w e m ean th a t M a o th o u g h t th a t th ro u g h a g re at act
econom ic u n d erd ev e lo p m e n t e xperienced by C h in a u n til o f w ill a collectivity could “leap” o u t o f th e stru c tu re d deter­
recen tly and (2) its re ce n t g ro w th . m in a tio n o f h isto ry (Joseph 2010a: 141-142). T hus, a people
M a o ism a tte m p te d to replace C o n fu c ia n ism in th e could heroically exceed th e econom ic pro d u ctiv ity o f w hich
sphere o f political c u ltu re, v iew in g th is as necessary to conventional analysis w o u ld expect th e m capable. C ritics
m o d ern iza tio n . F o r th is reason, m an y analysts are suspi­ w ould p o in t to th e disastrous consequences o f th e “G re at
cious o f claim s ab o u t th e c o n te m p o ra ry consequences o f L eap F o rw a rd ” as sho w in g th e dangerousness o f th is idea.
tra d itio n a l C o n fu c ia n ism , since th e y arg u e th a t th e re is I n th e years follow ing M a o ’s d e a th , M a o ism has becom e
little c o n tin u ity b e tw e e n p re -m o d e rn C o n fu c ia n ism a n d m ore o p e n a n d flexible. I t rem ain s, a t least form ally, th e core
c o n tem p o rary C h in ese p o litica l c u ltu re. ideology o f th e state. J u s t th e sam e, som e w o n d er i f M a o ist
M a o ism — in C h in a o ften called “M a o Z e d o n g T h o u g h t” “m a rk e t socialism ” is really socialism — o r M a o ism — a t all.
(Joseph 2010a: 1 3 5 -1 5 0 )— is a v a ria n t o f M a rx ism . A s C o n fu c ia n ism , w h ic h w as officially to have b e en replaced,
such, it em phasizes th e im p o rta n c e o f class stru g g le, sees has b e en g ra d u ally e n d o rsed as w ell by C h in a ’s elites. Som e
h isto ry as th e sto ry o f class explo itatio n , a n d calls for a stu d e n ts o f cu ltu re w o u ld argue th a t th e C o n fu c ia n legacy,
fu tu re in w h ic h th e division o f lab o r a n d associated exploi­ despite M a o ’s o p p o sitio n to it, h a d never really d isappeared
ta tio n w ill b e reversed. H ow ever, M a o m ad e m ajor revi­ in any case. Thus b o th o f th ese key stra n d s o f C h in ese p o ­
sions to previous versions o f M a rx ism . T he tw o m ost litica l c u ltu re re m a in im p o rta n t in to d ay ’s C h in a , as in te l­
im p o rta n t are (1) th e c e n tra lity o f th e p e a sa n try in M a o ist lectuals w o rk to revise aspects o f each th a t are view ed as
th o u g h t a n d (2) M a o ism ’s volu n tarism . in co n siste n t w ith th e m o d e m w o rld (e.g., tra d itio n a l C o n ­
M a rx w as skeptical o f p easan ts as revolutionaries. H e fu cian ism ’s critical stance to w a rd com m erce).
th o u g h t th a t th e y w ere in h e re n tly conservative. I t w as th e A t th e sam e tim e, C h in a has m an y o f th e features o f in ­
u rb a n , in d u stria l w orkers— th e p ro letaria t— th a t w ere m o st d u strialize d societies, a n d a g ro w in g q uestion is h o w m iddle-
fully a lien ated a n d th a t, therefo re, h a d th e g re atest revolu­ class consum ers (especially in c osm opolitan u rb a n areas) w ill
tio n a ry p o ten tial. S cholars have o ften n o te d th e iro n y th a t coexist w ith C o n fu c ia n or M a o ist view s in an increasingly
M a rx ism en d ed u p b e in g m o st successful in places like entrep ren eu rial society. In recent years, m u ch o f C h in a ’s elite
R ussia, C h in a , a n d late r th e so -called “T h ird W o rld ” w here a n d m asses alike have em braced a vision th a t “to becom e rich
an d w h e n in d u stria liz a tio n a n d u rb a n iz a tio n w ere less es­ is glorious.” T he c o u n try has em braced m an y aspects o f capi­
tablished (th o u g h in d u stria l w orkers d id play a n im p o rta n t talism , even as th e g overnm ent tig h tly lim its political rights
role in th e R ussian R evolution). Som e w o u ld argue th a t and intervenes heavily in th e econom y. C h in a ’s political cul­
M a o ism is m ore c o n sisten t w ith w h a t actu ally h a p p en e d in tu re th u s draw s u p o n m ultiple strains o f lo n g stan d in g p h i­
th e tw e n tie th century. M a o e m p h asized th e rev o lu tio n ary losophy “m ade in C h in a ,” even w hile ta k in g o n som e o f th e
p o te n tia l o f p easan ts a n d co n ce n tra ted his o rg a n iz in g c u ltu ral features o f o th er con tem p o rary societies in a n age o f
am o n g th em . He re g ard e d th e m as v irtu o u s, o ften global com m unications a n d exchange.

Political Economy
D e sp ite a lo n g a n d ric h h isto ry a n d c u ltu re , C h in a sp e n t p ro m in e n t ch an g es b e in g o p e n in g a g ric u ltu re a n d in d u stry
cen tu ries in a sta te o f econom ic sta g n a tio n th a t c o n tin u e d to private ow nership.
up to th e 1980s. T h ro u g h th e m id -tw e n tie th c e n tu ry a n d C h in a ’s re ce n t em brace o f g re a te r o p en n ess to m ark e t
M a o ’s C o m m u n ism , C h in a w itn esse d p o v e rty a n d even forces has h a d d ra m a tic effects. In d u s try flo u rish ed , espe­
fam in e o n a m assive scale, b o th o f w h ic h w ere exacerbated cially a lo n g th e coast, as C h in a p u sh e d econom ic g ro w th
by th e policies o f th e C o m m u n is t P a rty leadership. C h in a ’s b a se d o n cheap e x p o rts a n d b e cam e th e “w o rk sh o p o f th e
econom ic m o d el c h a n g e d d ram atically, how ever, a fte r th e w o rld .” A g ric u ltu ra l p ro d u c tiv ity im p ro v ed as w ell, a n d re ­
rise o f D e n g X ia o p in g in 1978. D e n g in s titu te d reform s in fo rce d in d u stria liz a tio n : A s p ro d u c tiv ity im proved in
th a t o p e n ed C h in a up to g re a te r capitalism , w ith th e m o st ru ra l areas, few er p eople w ere n eed e d to p roduce th e sam e
420 China

a m o u n t o f food, a n d m an y ru ra l dw ellers m ig ra ted to u rb a n have b en efited th e m o st fro m C h in a ’s b o o m , alo n g w ith

areas to becom e facto ry w orkers. W ag es w ere (and rem ain) som e cities alo n g m ajor w aterw ays. D e sp ite efforts to d e ­
low by W e s te rn sta n d ard s, b u t o ften re p re se n ted signifi­ velop th e interio r, C h in a still has h ig h levels o f p o v e rty in
cantly increased incom e fro m th a t w h ic h w as available in ru ra l areas. Second, C h in a ’s e n v iro n m en t is d e g rad e d due
ru ra l areas. I t m ay be th a t since th e reform s w ere passed, to p o llu tio n th a t has com e w ith industry. M a n y cities have
m ore th a n half a billion people (often e stim a te d a t 6 0 0 m il­ heavily p o llu te d w a te r supplies a n d aw ful a ir q u a lity from
lion) have com e o u t o f poverty. C h in a has b ecom e th e facto ry em issions a n d th e sh ift fro m bicycles to ever m ore
w o rld ’s lea d in g e x p o rte r a n d seco n d -larg est econom y, based cars fo r tra n s p o rta tio n . T h ird , C h in a faces a dem o g rap h ic
in p a rt o n e x p o rt-led g ro w th in m a n u fa c tu rin g a n d related c h allen g e th a t m an y w e alth y c o u n tries face, b u t even m ore
in v estm en t. I t has gone fro m b e in g one o f th e w o rld ’s so: Its “O n e C h ild ” policy has lim ite d th e b irth rate for
p o o re st c o u n tries to m id d le -in c o m e sta tu s in ju s t th re e m an y years, b u t it also m eans a rap id ly a g in g p o p u latio n
decades. t h a t m ay stru g g le in th e fu tu re to care for its g ro w in g
D e sp ite th e a p p a re n t success o f m ark e t-frie n d ly reform , n u m b e r o f elderly citizens. A fin al m ajor ch allen g e is th e
C h in a is far from p urely c apitalist. T he state co n tin u es to ru le o f law for in te lle c tu a l p roperty, as C h in a has b e en a
play a m ajor role in th e econom y, in c lu d in g in w ays th a t haven for d ig ita l p iracy a n d “rip p in g o ff” p a te n ts a n d copy­
som e global com p etito rs say gives C h in a “u n fa ir adv an ­ rig h ts o f m ajor in te rn a tio n a l com panies. T his is n o t ju s t a
tag e .” F o r in stan ce, C h in a has re q u ire d th a t m ajo r foreign p roblem for D isney, L e v i’s, or th e p h a rm a ce u tic al com pany
investors w ish in g to invest in C h in a m u st p a rtn e r w ith P fizer, b u t also for C h in a ’s am b itio n s to becom e a w orld
C h in ese com panies in “jo in t v e n tu re s.” T his ensures th a t leader in th e resea rc h a n d develo p m en t th a t lead to a m ore
C h in ese com panies ben efit fro m in v estm e n t a n d th e tra n s ­ v a lu e -a d d e d econom y. A t th e sam e tim e , som e w o u ld argue
fer o f skills, k now ledge, a n d technology. T hese a n d o th e r th a t th is w ay o f lo o k in g at th in g s privileges th e p o in t o f
state in te rv en tio n s are in a d d itio n to c o n tro llin g th e c u r­ v iew o f th e w e a lth ie st c o u n tries, a sk in g developing c o u n ­
rency to pro m o te exports. trie s to play b y a d iffere n t set o f rules th a n th e y d id w hile
C h in a ’s p o litica l econom y still has several m ajor c h al­ them selves developing.
lenges. O n e o f th e m o st pressin g for m o st C h in ese is th e C h in a ’s p o litica l econom y is explored fu rth e r in th e fol­
c o n tin u e d p o v e rty o f ru ra l areas, a n d th e re la te d p ro b lem o f lo w in g case s tu d y “H o w D id C h in a B ecom e an E co n o m ic
h ig h a n d g ro w in g inequality. U rb a n areas alo n g th e coast Pow er?”

CASE STUDIES

China is seen today as the greatest chal­ farming) and tried to promote heavy in­ reforms were gradual and strategic: China
lenge to the global economic power of dustry such as steel production. From the didn't open all areas of its economy im­
the United States, yet just over thirty years 1950s to the 1970s, Mao attempted major mediately to international market forces.
ago it was one of the world's poorest economic overhauls in the so-called China seized advantage of growing glo­
countries. This slow development came "Great Leap Forward"— which resulted in balization and adopted an export-led
despite the country's ancient history as a a catastrophic famine— and the so-called growth model based on selling goods to
leader in world trade and technological "Cultural Revolution." In 1978-1979, China the world's wealthiest countries.
innovation. Starting in 1949, the Commu­ began economic reforms under a new The last thirty years have seen spec­
nist Party increased the state's role in the leader, Deng Xiaoping. These reforms fa­ tacular growth of about 10 percent per
economy. Mao and the Communists col­ cilitated private enterprise and gave more year, a rate at which the size of the overall
lectivized agriculture (prohibiting private flexibility to local officials. Critically, the economy doubles about every seven
 Case Studies 421

Become an Economic Power? CHAPTER 5, PAGE 105

years. With growth has come economic very well for countries such as South polluter per capita than China). In addition,
power, but also a rising tide of inequality Korea as they industrialized and modern­ China's development model may have the
(especially between the relatively wealthy ized. It meant people in these Asian coun­ "opposite" challenge of the United States
coastal regions and the rural interior of tries had to defer the chance to consume today. China as a country saves a great
the country) and significant environmen­ as they grew wealthier, sometimes for deal of money and consumes relatively
tal degradation. Recent years have seen a generation. In the end, however, the little, given its size and income. The coun­
some disputes with the United States willingness to save and lend instead of try's earnings depend heavily upon ex­
over trade and the value of the Chinese borrow and consume contributed to de­ ports, as well as on increasing investment
currency, which Washington asserts is un­ velopment. Whether this tendency is a in infrastructure ranging from railroads to
fairly "undervalued" to favor Chinese com­ matter of culture and society, of eco­ coal-fired power stations to apartment
panies by making Chinese goods cheaper nomic policy, or of political regime re­ buildings. While China scolds the United
to Americans and American goods more mains a matter of debate. Some say it States for spending beyond its means and
expensive in China. Others, though, sug­ reflects an "Asian" willingness to defer borrowing too much, others might criti­
gest that China should attempt to shape gratification (or, one could argue, a con­ cize China for an economy that saves, in­
the value of its currency in the pursuit of its temporary Western inability to defer vests, and lends too much.
own interests, and not those of the United gratification). Others suggest that only We can learn from China's successes
States or other countries. This policy, which rather authoritarian regimes can manage and problems to address questions that
in part involves China using the proceeds such approaches. Still others might say it is interest peoples around the world: Why
from sales of exports to buy American gov­ simplya matter of astute economic policy. does rapid economic development
ernment bonds, is controversial. It is seen China's development success has happen? Is China's success evidence that
by some as the United States and other been astounding, but it also has problems. the free market promotes development,
countries "borrowing from China to buy The most conspicuous may be an increas­ or that the state drives development, or
from China." ing challenge of sustainability as China has both, or neither? Is recent economic suc­
Nonetheless, from the perspective of passed the United States to become the cess a consequence of Chinese culture? If
the developing economy, keeping the world's largest polluter in absolute terms so, how do we account for China's long
currency at a low value seemed to work (though the U.S. remains a much larger economic stagnation before 1979?

CASE STUDY
Is China Destined for Democracy? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 131

Is it possible to predict whether countries development leads to democracy might theory is accurate and powerful, it will
will become democracies? Some will say make this argument using existing evi­ often help us to predict future events,
yes and others no, but political scientists dence and building on the moderniza­ even if they are based on readings of the
are generally interested in the predictive tion theory seen in chapter 6. At the same past. The question of whether China will
power of their theories for the future, time, this theorist would also be making a become a democracy presents a useful
even if these theories are based on evi­ theoretical prediction: poor countries that example of how theories make predic­
dence from the past. For instance, a politi­ grow and modernize economically are tions, and how empirical evidence sup­
cal scientist who argues that economic predicted to democratize in the future. If a ports or challenges theories.
422 China

i-fe is?
CASE STUDY (continued)
Is China Destined for Democracy? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 131

Imagine three theorists who are asked polities of East Asia suggests that cultures uncertain. The first two theories have
about the future of China. The first is a in the region accept the importance of the merit of making clear predictions in
modernization theorist, as noted earlier. state authority and may tolerate a lack of advance. They can be falsified for the
What would a modernization theorist pre­ rights as a result; this is sometimes seen as Chinese case if they get it wrong. If we
dict about democracy in China's future, a Confucian heritage, drawing upon the fast-forward thirty years, either the mod­
given China's rapid economic growth? A works of the philosopher Confucius dis­ ernization theorist or the culturalist is
second theorist is a certain kind of cultur- cussed briefly in the "Political Culture” sec­ likely to have been shown wrong, at least
alist who believes that a country's regime tion earlier in the chapter. While not all for this case, and the other theory may
type (whether democratic or authoritar­ culturalists would adopt this perspective, well have some evidence supporting it.
ian) is rooted in deep cultural values. What and this interpretation of Confucianism is The third theory, about leaders, may
would this theorist expect, if China has highly contestable, our hypothetical cultur­ have more difficulty making clear predic­
never had a "political culture” of democ­ alist might say that China's cultural heritage tions about whether China will become a
racy? A third theorist might argue that will work against democratization. democracy at a certain point in time, but
democratization depends on the actions The third theorist may compare transi­ it does make an important theoretical
of specific individuals. Would this theorist tions to democracy in other countries and prediction of its own: If and when China
be able to make predictions about the conclude that these really depended on does democratize, it will be primarily be­
future? the decisions of a small handful of very cause of the leadership and decisions of
Observing China's rapid economic important individuals. The experience of individuals. This too can be falsified, if it is
growth and emergence of an urban South Africa and Presidents Nelson Man­ shown that large groups of people or im­
middle class, the modernization theorist dela and F. W. de Klerk in the early 1990s personal forces drove the outcomes in
might predict that China will move inexo­ might be such an example, as would China more than selected leaders. The
rably toward democracy in the coming many other cases around the world. This theory might say that democratization is
years. As China develops economically theorist would only be able to make more more unexpected in some places than
and urbanizes, a middle class is emerging. ambiguous predictions about China's others. Someone who traces democrati­
Modernization theorists would likely pre­ future, and might conclude that “it de­ zation to economic modernization will
dict that China will follow the path of pends on leaders" more than forces like expect that they can "see democracy
other countries that have developed: economic change or culture; it would coming," even if they cannot pinpoint the
Countries that modernize regularly prog­ thus be difficult for this theorist to predict moment it will occur.
ress toward more rights (such as property in advance how movements toward de­ Consider whether one or more of the
rights) and a middle class more willing to mocracy in China will play out, since "it three hypothetical theorists makes the
use its economic and political power to depends" upon individuals and their most intuitive sense to you. Some empha­
demand and protect these rights. Eco­ choices. size political economy, some emphasize
nomic development leads to democracy, The modernization theorist would culture, and some emphasize individuals,
so if China sees development, democracy likely predict that China is on the road to among other possibilities. Your prefer­
should follow. democracy, and that democracy is all but ence will give you some ideas about what
The culturalist theorist we mentioned inevitable as China grows richer. Our you would predict for China. More gener­
might explain the lack of demand for example of a culturalist would likely be ally, if you find yourself coming back to
democracy in China by deep and long- skeptical about the prospects for democ­ similar kinds of predictions across differ­
lasting tendencies in the population, the racy. And the theorist focusing on leader­ ent chapters, this may give you some in­
political system, or the political culture. ship would probably caution both of the sight into the type of comparativist and
For example, one argument about the others that their predictions are quite thinker you are.
 Case Studies 423

r ! CASE STUDY

W ho Governs China? CHAPTER 10, PAGE 236

Understanding who really leads China prominent, and some of them jockey for who served as "figureheads" in the top
and holds power there requires careful position to be the next generation of three posts and through his predomi­
examination of leadership positions as Chinese leaders. nance among the members of the Polit­
well as the informal influence of different It is common to talk about major peri­ buro and other organs of state and party.
individual politicians and groups. This ods in recent Chinese history that are as­ Paramount leaders have governed and
authoritarian, single-party country has sociated with a single "paramount leader," wielded power in very different ways. Mao
over a billion people and multiple influ­ regardless of these many different official Zedong pushed ambitious economic
ential institutions that feature promi­ leadership posts. The paramount leaders plans and attempts to modernize China in
nently in government, yet power often sometimes have held the official execu­ a very top-down, authoritarian fashion.
comes to be associated with individual tive leadership positions, but not always. These included the so-called Great Leap
leaders. How does this work? As sug­ Recent leaders, including Xi Jinping, have Forward and the Cultural Revolution,
gested previously under the "Regime held the three key offices of head of state, which over the long run were responsible
and Institutions' sections of this country head of the Communist Party, and head of for the famine, stagnation, and repression
profile, China's system formally features the military, and this trifecta can be taken associated with Mao's rule. Deng Xiaoping
three different top executive positions, as a clear indicator of their "paramount” became paramount leader at the end of
plus a head of government called the status. They have been president, party 1978 and remained so into the 1990s.
premier that presides over the legisla­ leader, and commander-in-chief all in one, Deng became known as the leader who
ture. There are also two major councils leaving little doubt about who is the top set China on the path to economic dyna­
that bring together top leaders, one for decision maker. Yet the previous para­ mism with major reforms, but he was also
the state government called the State mount leaders, Mao Zedong (1949-1976) responsible for the violent crackdown in
Council and one for the Communist and Deng Xiaoping (about 1978-1992), Tiananmen Square in 1989. After Deng's
Party known as the Politburo. could be seen as the leaders of their eras passing from the scene, Jiang Zemin, Hu
The three top executive positions are because of their ability to wield influence Jintao, and Xi Jinping continued Commu­
the President of the People's Republic of over party and state institutions in slightly nist Party control with economic reform.
China (the formal head of state), the Sec­ different ways. Mao's control was most All can be seen in different ways as prag­
retary-General of the Communist Party direct: He was the chairman of the various matists who have attempted to increase
(the head of the governing party), and the committees, commissions, and major de­ China's engagement with the world and
Chairman of the Central Military Council cision-making bodies of his era; it is for this further development by engaging more
(the commander-in-chief, as it were). At reason that he is often referred to as people in the process, all while retaining
present, Xi Jinping has consolidated all "Chairman Mao," and not "President Mao." the tight grip of the Communist Party.
three authorities in his person, so there is Deng Xiaoping, by contrast, did not hold The image of Chinese executive lead­
little doubt about who leads the execu­ all of the top positions himself yet there ership is one in which top politicians accu­
tive branch. Meanwhile, to use the terms was also little doubt who the decision mulate power informally within the
of chapter 10, the premier is a head of maker was during his time as paramount Communist Party and interlocking state
government similar to a prime minister; leader. Deng held certain posts as the institutions, often making alliances as
he is appointed by the president and ap­ head of the administration in the State needed with other key players while gain­
proved by the legislature, the National Council, and he presided over the military ing in seniority. In contemporary China, we
People's Congress. Li Keqiang is currently at certain times, but these were not the might say that accumulating power within
in this post. There are also other members true source of his leverage. Rather, he ex­ the party and state has led to the top ex­
of the Politburo that are politically ercised authority through the individuals ecutive positions, rather than the power
424 China

coming from the positions themselves. (National People's Congress), but upon the party will often select its own leader, or the
The presidency has little formal power at­ recommendation of a single candidate by person it wishes to become its leader, to
tached to it, for example, though the presi­ the Politburo, the leading decision-making the position. China's intricate set of gov­
dent is the head of state. Yet becoming organ within the Communist Party. In erning mechanisms makes the Politburo
president is a clear sign of power. The elec­ short, the one candidate selected by the and other leadership organs the leading
tion of the president is dominated by the CPC elites is almost guaranteed to be pres­ sources of executive power in the world's
Communist Party in the legislative branch ident. It may not be surprising that the most populous country.

The Chinese Party System CHAPTER 11, PAGE 260

China is the most influential and impor­ previous decades. It has also happened independents and even some members
tant dominant-party system in the world on an ongoing basis through the use of of other small parties to elect a single del­
today. The country functions essentially as state organs to harass certain opposition egate or two at the local level, it is exceed­
a single-party system, though some other forces that might pose a threat, imprison ingly difficult for enough independents to
parties are nominally allowed. China's prominent dissidents, and control the be elected to get an independent or
Communist Party has held onto power for media (including new media such as member of another party at the next level
over six decades through a combination Google's China-based search engine and up. The well-established, well-resourced
of factors. The various mechanisms for en­ social media). Many of these efforts to Communists are present in every local
suring the dominance of the Communist minimize opposition have been passed election throughout the country and
Party are useful to understand, especially by the National People's Congress (NPC), dominate the indirect elections to higher
since the meaning of "Communist" in but they rely upon the state for levels; this means a virtual single-party
Communist Party has shifted so dramati­ enforcement. state at the national level, with the only
cally with the many changes in China over A second factor is the electoral exceptions being other parties that are
the last several decades. system, which provides built-in advan­ closely "allied” to the Communists and ba­
The first and most obvious factor is tages for the Communist Party. The most sically under Communist control.
the tight linkage between the Commu­ important feature is the indirect election A third set of factors has to do with the
nist Party, the Chinese state bureaucracy, process, by which local councils elect Communist Party's legitimacy, including
and the military. The Communists control members of governing councils at higher its actual performance in government.
the state apparatus and can call on the levels, and so on up to the NPC. For in­ China's economic growth under Commu­
military as needed to protect the regime. stance, national-level legislators are se­ nist Party rule has been superb in recent
Through years of Communist dominance, lected by provincial legislators, who are in years. While it is difficult to get an indepen­
the state and military have contributed turn selected by council members at dent view of Chinese public opinion, even
to single-party rule. This has sometimes lower levels. The result of this indirect international news reports suggest that
taken place with violent repression by the election process is absolute dominance many Chinese are relatively satisfied with
military, as in Tiananmen Square in 1989 for the Communists at the national level government performance and are thus
and in purges by leader Mao Zedong in in Beijing. While it is possible for not pressing for immediate moves toward
 Case Studies 425

The Chinese Party System CHAPTER 11, PAGE 260

a multiparty system. This idea that a gov­ to associate itself with a variety of ideas power, and opposition to foreign (espe­
ernment's legitimacy can be based on that it has used to trumpet the regime's cially Western and Japanese) influence.
economic performance has often been ability to represent the Chinese people. This has flourished through the Commu­
tested in a democracy, and it also seems to These have included the claim that the nist period (even though Communist
have held in some authoritarian and exclu­ Communists can uniquely represent the ideology is traditionally seen as formally
sionary systems (Epstein 1984). Legitimacy working class and peasants, but have also opposed to nationalist sentiment). This
can also be based upon other factors than included touting Chinese nationalism. The cluster of factors shows several ways that
economics. The Chinese Communist Party Chinese Communists have focused on an authoritarian single-party system can
has made significant efforts over the years trumpeting China's greatness and rise to persist even in the presence of elections.

The Chinese Revolution CHAPTER 12, PAGE 293

The case of China allows us to consider problems. This led many to seek the mod­ certainly had consequences for social
two issues of concern to us in the study ernization of both state and society. At structures (just as the successful creation
of contention and revolutions. First, it the same time, the state came to be per­ of a strong republic would have), but
highlights the question considered in ceived as weak, because of those very these consequences were indirect.
the chapter about how to define revolu­ same fiscal difficulties, the trouble it had It was within this context that the rival
tions and even subtypes like "political in maintaining domestic order, and in par­ parties involved in the next stage of the
revolutions" and "social revolutions." ticular its loss in the Sino-Japanese War. revolutionary process developed, the Na­
Second, it focuses attention on the im­ State weakness— sometimes called "state tionalists (heirs to the early republicanism)
portance of mobilization in successful breakdown"— is seen by many scholars as and the Communists (Averill 1998). As the
revolution, a factor highlighted by re­ an essential precursor to revolution. The reader knows from the previous historical
source mobilization and political oppor­ late Qing state responded by implement­ narrative, the Communists were ulti­
tunity theories. Interestingly, the case of ing an ineffectual reform program, a mately triumphant. The most important
China considered alone gives at least factor sometimes stressed by relative de­ factor that scholars have used to explain
some support to all of the theories con­ privation theories of revolution. this difference is their advantage in mobi­
sidered in chapter 12. In 1911 and 1912, contention reached a lization capacity (Skocpol 1979: 252-262).
The reason that China highlights the level most scholars would consider revo­ While the Nationalists were in power,
definitional issue is that the country went lutionary, and yet what took place at that they were often ineffective, and some of
through a long process of social change, time was not a "social revolution" in the their members acquired a reputation for
and it is therefore difficult to precisely sense defined in chapter 12 The funda­ corruption (Schoppa 2010:59), although
date when revolution began. As dis­ mental emphasis was on the transforma­ some recent scholars argue that the
cussed in the preceding historical narra­ tion of political structures: the end of the Nationalists were more capable state-
tive, China saw major changes over the Qing Dynasty and the creation of a repub­ builders than traditional accounts sug­
course of the nineteenth century, includ­ lic. Of course, as our brief historical narra­ gest (see a brief discussion of these and
ing foreign intervention, domestic revolts tive shows us, the republic was weaker related issues in Edmonds 1997). In the
(some of which, like the Taiping Rebellion, than expected and China descended into rural areas controlled by the Communists
were revolutionary in intention), and fiscal the period of "Warlordism." Now this during the conflict, they were focused on
426 China

+ % CASE STUDY (continued)

I The Chinese Revolution CHAPTER 12, PAGE 293

the establishment of peasant organiza­ theories of revolution could point to other was a proponent of "permanent revolution."
tions, indeed, as early as the late 1920s. factors that might help to explain the Indeed, at least ostensibly it is still going on
This strategy— which is linked to Mao­ Communists' success. Cultural or framing today. More realistically, perhaps, we could
ism's emphasis on peasants as revolution­ theories could point to the salience of say that it was carried out in stages during
ary actors, which Marx would have Maoist ideology. Relative deprivation and Mao's rule. Collectivization of agriculture,
rejected— paid enormous dividends in political opportunity theories could point the "Great Leap Forward," and the "Cultural
the 1940s when peasants helped the to the ongoing weakness of the state. Revolution" (Perry 1998) were all key epi­
Communists defeat the Nationalists once Finally, it is important to note that the sodes in the Maoist effort to remake the un­
and for all. Of course, proponents of other Chinese Revolution did not end in 1949. Mao derlying structures of Chinese society.

Research Prompts
1. Consider the discussion of economic development and democ­ Both were intended to be Marxist revolutions, but they exhibited
racy in China that you have read in these country case materials. notable differences. How were these revolutions different, and
Alongside it, review the discussion of these same themes in the how might a social scientist explain their differences?
country case materials on India. Both societies have been "mod­ 4. Compare the overview of Chinese political history with our
ernizing" rapidly in recent decades, but they have done so in overview of Mexican political history in the Mexico country case
very different terms. India first embraced democracy and only materials. Both societies have had long-standing, highly com­
more recently has achieved rapid economic growth. China has plex civilizations stretching back centuries. However, Mexico
achieved dramatic growth, but so far has seen very little democ­ experienced direct colonialism, whereas China's brush with
ratization. What accounts for these different trajectories? Which European imperialism was largely indirect. What are the major
theories can you draw on from the thematic chapters of this implications or consequences of this difference for Chinese and
textbook to explain the variation between these two cases? Mexican political development? How could one use major
How might we empirically test the hypothesis that you theories of comparative politics to begin generating ideas in
generate? response to this question?
2. The case study on democratization in China (which connects to 5. The chapter 11 case study shows that China is governed through
chapter 6 asks you to think about what several major theories of a complex set of political institutions. Compare and contrast this
democratization would predict with respect to the Chinese case with Iran, especially the box on Iran's judiciary. Can you hypoth­
in the coming years. Bring the thought experiment to its conclu­ esize about why authoritarian regimes might have such intricate
sion: Which theory do you find most plausible with respect to sets of governing institutions? Do these compare or contrast
China, and why? How could we get an empirical answer to this with any other countries that have witnessed authoritarian rule
question? in the twentieth century— such as Brazil, Germany, Mexico,
3. Compare the Chinese Revolution to the Russian Revolution, dis­ Nigeria, Japan, or Russia? What selection of cases might best
cussed in the country case materials on the Russian Federation. enable you to test your preliminary hypothesis?
 Profile 429

p a rt because o f a strong cultural trad itio n proscribing such o n ly e stim a te th e re la tiv e sh are o f th e F re n c h p o p u la tio n
questions. The C IA W orld Factbook, th e m ain source w e have w h o are officially M u s lim s. A d h e re n ts o f Isla m p ro bably
used here for data on th e ethnic com position o f the o th er coun­ c o n stitu te so m e w h a t less th a n 10 p e rc e n t o f th e F re n c h
tries considered in th is book, does n o t list estim ated percent­ p o p u la tio n . I n re c e n t years th e re have b e e n m an y q u e s­
ages o f ethnic groups in France. It notes sim ply th a t French tio n s a b o u t th e ir a ssim ila tio n (or d is c rim in a tio n a g a in st
ethnic groups include “C eltic and L atin w ith T eutonic” as w ell th e m , d e p e n d in g o n o n e ’s p o in t o f view ). T he m a jo rity o f
as “Slavic, N o rth A frican, Indochinese, and Basque m inori­ th e F re n c h p o p u la tio n is a t le a st n o m in a lly C a th o lic , b u t,
ties.” O f these groups, th e N o rth A frican m inority— m any as in m u c h o f E u ro p e , m o st in th e n o m in a lly C h r is tia n
from France’s form er colony o f A lgeria— and sub-S aharan c ate g o ry are n o t re g u la r c h u rc h a tte n d e e s. S om e sources
A fricans m ay be th e m ost politically im portant. (e.g., K u ru 2 0 0 9 : 2 4 4 ) e stim a te t h a t ju s t m o re th a n h a lf o f
M a n y in th is g ro u p m ay lis t Isla m as th e ir re lig io n , th e F re n c h p o p u la tio n (55 p e rce n t) a d h e re s fo rm ally to a
th o u g h th e m a jo rity are p ro b ab ly n o n -p ra c tic in g . W e can relig io n .

Historical Development
A s n o ted , F rance has traveled a ro ck y road to p o litica l m o ­ N ap o leo n ’s dem ise, F rance saw th e resto ratio n o f th e old
dernity. In 1789, F ran ce gave us w h a t m an y consider th e B o u rb o n m o n arch y th a t h a d lost pow er in th e g re at revolu­
first m o d e rn revolution (A re n d t 1963; F u re t [1988] 1995), tio n o f 1789. L o u is X V I I I a n d C harles X governed as consti­
dep o sin g th e B o u rb o n m onarchy, e stab lish in g a R epublic, tu tio n a l m onarchs (F u re t 1995: 2 7 0 -2 7 2 ), how ever, even i f
a bolishing th e n o b ility (noblesse), a n d o p p o sin g th e pow er o f th ey a n d som e o f th e ir supporters m ig h t have preferred abso­
th e R o m a n C a th o lic C h u rc h a n d u ltim a te ly rep ressin g it. lutism . I n o th e r w ords, th ere w as no fu ll re tu rn to th e system
T he revolution even c rea te d a n e w calendar, w ith th e b e g in ­ from before th e revolution.
n in g o f th e revolution th e s ta rtin g p o in t fro m w h ic h fu tu re In 1830, C harles X w as replaced by L o u is-P h ilip p e (also a
years w o u ld b e c o unted. T his re volution is discussed f u rth e r B o urbon b u t from th e m ore liberal O rleans b ra n ch o f th e
in a case stu d y late r in th e F ran ce c o u n try m aterials. family) in th e “July R evolution” (see P a rry a n d G ira rd 2002:
A fte r a decade o f radicalization a n d increasing confusion, 55-59). C alled th e “C itiz en K in g ” because o f his stronger and
N apoleon B onaparte to o k pow er (see th e discussion in P a rry m ore consistent su p p o rt for th e “c o n stitu tio n a l” in “c onstitu­
and G ira rd 2002: 7-24). N apoleon w as an early exam ple o f tio n a l m onarchy,” L o u is-P h ilip p e w ould hold th e th ro n e
w h a t m o d ern au th o ritarian ism (w ith lots o f references to “th e u n til 1848, w h en a revolutionary wave shook E urope. In
people” and even plebiscites a n d o th e r elem ents o f dem oc­ F rance, th is b ro u g h t about th e “Second Republic.” By th e end
racy) m ig h t look like. H e fu rth e r spread m o d ern politics o f th e year, L o u is-N apoleon B onaparte w as elected president.
th ro u g h conquest, cen tralizin g political a u th o rity a n d im ­ T he n ephew o f th e form er E m peror, he declared himself
posing N apoleonic law in num erous countries— it still serves E m p e ro r N apoleon I I I in 1851, e n d in g th e Second Republic
as th e basis for law in m u ch o f th e w orld today— a n d also a n d ush erin g in th e Second E m pire. N apoleon I I I w as kn o w n
raising n ationalism in th e resistance he engendered. E ver for encouraging in d u strializatio n a n d econom ic m oderniza­
since th e tim e o f N ap o leo n ’s do m in atio n , people have d e­ tio n , a n d Paris w as redesigned u n d e r his w atch, producing
bated w h e th er his regim e consolidated o r reversed th e revo­ m u ch o f th e in frastru c tu re a n d plan for th e city as it is
lution. T he b est answ er is probably to say th a t it d id b o th . O n k n o w n today (P a rry a n d G ira rd 2002: 6 3 -6 9 ; S chw artz
one h a n d he re -e sta b lish e d order, p ro c la im in g h im s e lf 2011: 6 0 -6 1 ). T his w as also a tim e o f increasing French
em peror, establishing a C o n c o rd at w ith th e C h u rc h , a n d geo-political am bitions, as N apoleon I I I w aged m ilitary cam ­
creating a new “n o bility” th a t w as d istin c t from th e h ered i­ paigns, increased F ren ch colonial activity, a n d invaded
ta ry noblesse o f th e p rio r regim e. O n th e o th e r h a n d , he M exico, in stallin g a m em b er o f th e H a p sb u rg fam ily as E m ­
spread m any o f th e revolution’s achievem ents to th e re st o f pero r M a x im ilia n th ere in th e 1860s. Eventually, though,
E urope a n d beyond. m ilita ry activity w as N apoleon I l l ’s dow nfall. H e w as de­
N apoleon w as once d eposed a fte r m ilita ry defeat a n d sent feated by B ism arck’s P russia in th e F ra nco-P russian W a r
to an island exile, b u t h e escaped a n d briefly resum ed his o f 1870 a n d alm o st im m ediately lost pow er in France. This
efforts before b e in g defeated again at W aterloo. Follow ing tran sitio n m arked th e b e g in n in g o f F rance’s T h ird Republic.
430 France

T he T h ird R epublic— w h ic h w o u ld la st u p u n til W o rld G e rm a n occupiers, th o u g h m ore re ce n t h isto ric a l evidence

W a r I I — is considered by som e to have b e en a F re n c h suggests th a t th e V ichy g o v e rn m e n t played an active role in
“g o ld en age,” th e “B elle E p o q u e ,” as it is o ften called (P a rry decision m a k in g a n d co llab o rated m ore w illin g ly w ith th e
a n d G ira rd 200 2 : 74). I t w as a p e rio d o f g re a t flow ering in N a zis, even p a rtic ip a tin g in th e d e p o rta tio n o f Jew s. A t th e
th e a rts a n d lite ra tu re , b u t it also saw a g re at d e al o f p o liti­ sam e tim e , m an y th o u sa n d s o f F re n c h m en a n d w om en
cal a n d social activ ity a n d controversy, a n d has b e e n seen p a rtic ip a te d actively in th e resistance, as w e ll as in th e Free
by m an y in F ran ce as a p e rio d o f in stab ility . P erh ap s m o st F re n c h , led by C h a rle s D e G aulle.
fam ously, it w itn esse d th e “D re y fu s A ffa ir,” in w h ic h a A fte r th e allied victory, D e G a u lle w o u ld b ecom e presi­
Je w ish officer w as falsely accused o f sp y in g for G erm an y . It d e n t o f th e “F o u rth R epublic.” D u rin g th is p e rio d , F rance
is h a rd to exaggerate ho w im p o rta n t th is ev en t w as for in ­ focused o n re c o n stru c tio n a n d econom ic developm ent, as­
tellec tu a ls a n d p o liticia n s, w h o saw it as a b o u t m ore th a n sisted by th e U n ite d S tates’ M a rsh a ll P lan . D e G a u lle soon
ju s t th e g u ilt o r in n o cen ce o f one m an , b u t ra th e r a b o u t th e le ft pow er, b u t he w as called b a c k in 1958, in th e m id s t o f
n a tu re o f F re n c h c u ltu re a n d iden tity . D re y fu s’s accusers crisis over F re n c h colonial affairs in A lg e ria . T he n ew (and
w ere th o u g h t o f as conservative, even reactio n ary , o ften cu rre n t) c o n stitu tio n w as w ritte n , a n d F ra n c e ’s c o n te m p o ­
C a th o lic, a n d in som e cases a n ti-S e m itic . S om e view ed ra ry “m ix e d p re sid e n tia list” system w as established. F rance
th e m as heirs to th e su p p o rte rs o f m o n arc h y a n d em pire w e n t th ro u g h several decades o f stro n g econom ic p e rfo r­
from previous cen tu ries. D re y fu s’s su p p o rte rs w ere th o u g h t m an ce a n d relative p o litica l stability. In th is sam e p e rio d
o f as secular, a n d o ften socialists. Som e v iew ed th e m as th e F ran ce lo st m o st o f its im p e rial possessions, especially w ith
heirs o f th e R ep u b lican tra d itio n (for m o re o n th e D re y fu s de co lo n iza tio n in A fric a in 1960.
A ffair, see B egley 2 009). A p ro m in e n t fe a tu re o f F ra n c e ’s p o s t-w a r p o litics has
F ran ce w as b a d ly s h a k e n b y W o rld W a r I. L ik e th e re st b e e n th e p ro c ess o f E u ro p e a n in te g ra tio n , w h ic h has
o f th e p a rtic ip a n ts in o th e r c o u n trie s, n e ith e r th e arm y, o fte n b e e n le d b y F ra n c e in ta n d e m w ith d e m o c ra tic
n o r th e p o liticia n s, n o r th e c itize n s fu lly a n tic ip a te d th e G e rm a n y . T h e e arly years o f in te g ra tio n w ere e sp e cially
n a tu re o f tre n c h w a rfa re , w ith its e n o rm o u s loss o f life, d ra m a tic , b e ca u se th e tw o c o u n trie s h a d b e e n th e c e n tra l
terrib le c o n d itio n s, a n d seem in g ly in fin ite stalem ates. b e llig e re n ts in c o n tin e n ta l E u ro p e a n w a rs fro m N a p o le o n
F ran ce w as ev en tu ally a m o n g th e victors, b u t th e c o n flict to H itle r. B e g in n in g in 1950, F ra n c e a n d G e rm a n y —
played a n im p o rta n t role in p ro d u c in g th e n e x t E u ro p e a n a lo n g w ith Italy , B e lg iu m , th e N e th e rla n d s , a n d L u x e m ­
crisis. F ran ce in sisted th a t G e rm a n y pay h u g e in d e m n itie s, b o u rg — a g re e d to free a n d o p e n tra d e in co al a n d steel.
a n d its p re p a ra to ry stra te g y for th e n e x t possible w a r w ith T h is w as seen as e co n o m ic a lly sig n ific a n t, b u t even m ore
G e rm a n y w as b a se d o n its ex periences in W o rld W a r I, im p o r ta n t sy m b o lic a lly a n d p o litica lly , as it m e a n t th e
p re p a rin g a sin g le, su p p o se d ly im p re g n a b le , lin e o f d e ­ tw o c o u n trie s w o u ld b e o p e n ly tr a d in g th e ra w m a te ria ls
fense called th e M a g in o t line. n e e d e d for w ar. F u r th e r in te g ra tio n cam e in 1957, w h e n
T he in d e m n ity im p o sed o n G e rm a n y c o n trib u te d to th e th e T re a ty o f R o m e e x te n d e d th e e co n o m ic c o o p e ra tio n
econom ic a n d social problem s th a t c o n d itio n ed H itle r ’s rise to c rea te a E u ro p e a n E c o n o m ic C o m m u n ity . F u r th e r ex­
to pow er. W h ile H itle r rose in G e rm an y , F ran ce saw a d if­ te n sio n s o f th e E u ro p e a n p ro je c t cam e w ith e x p a n sio n to
fe re n t p a tte rn , m o st notably w ith th e left-w in g “P o p u la r m a n y o th e r c o u n trie s (now tw e n ty -se v e n ), a n d th e d e e p ­
F ro n t” g o v e rn m e n t h e ad e d b y L e o n B lum , w h ic h w as e n in g o f in te g ra tio n th r o u g h free tra d e , free flow s o f la b o r
fo rm ed in 1936 (P a rry a n d G ira rd 2 002: 163-169). The a n d c ap ital, a n d th e c re a tio n o f to d a y ’s c o m m o n currency,
sho rt-liv ed g o v e rn m e n t w as a cco m p an ied by strik e a n d th e eu ro . T he fo rm e r E u ro p e a n C o a l a n d S te el C o m m u ­
lab o r m o b iliza tio n , b u t F ran ce w as h ig h ly p o la riz e d in th is n ity o f 1950 h a s n o w b e co m e th e b ro a d e r a n d d e e p e r
p e rio d , a n d th e P o p u la r F ro n t g o v e rn m e n t w as over by E u ro p e a n U n io n (E U ).
1938. W h e n w a r cam e, G e rm a n y bypassed th e M a g in o t T o d a y F ra n c e is c o n sid e re d to b e , w ith G e rm a n y , one
L in e w ith relative ease. T he F re n c h state collapsed, a n d th e o f th e tw o m o st p o w e rfu l sta te -le v e l acto rs in th e E U . Y et
V ichy G o v e rn m e n t w as established under M a rsh a ll it faces a n u m b e r o f sig n ific a n t q u e stio n s . F ir s t, has its
P h ilip p e P e tain , one o f th e leaders o f th e a rm y th a t h a d ju s t sy ste m o f im m ig ra tio n a n d a ssim ila tio n b ro k e n dow n?
failed so m iserably in sto p p in g th e G e rm a n assault. T his S e c o n d , w h a t w ill h a p p e n to th e F re n c h w e lfa re state? Is
g o v e rn m e n t w as lo n g seen as essentially a p u p p e t o f th e it in n e e d o f re fo rm s, a n d i f so, w h ic h re fo rm s, a n d w ill it
 Profile 431

Historical Development
Tim elin e
800 Charlemagne consolidates rule in much of Western 1870 The Second Empire ends shortly after Napoleon
Europe. Ill's forces are defeated by Prussia (under Bismarck)
1000s-1700s Rivalry between France and Britain through Middle at the Battle of Sedan in September, 1870.
Ages includes numerous wars. 1870-1940 Third Republic
1334-1453 Hundred Years' War between France and Britain 1871 Paris Commune
1643 Louis XIV becomes King of France, rules for over 1894 Conviction of Alfred Dreyfus
70 years. 1906 Dreyfus declared to be innocent
1789 French Revolution begins with the storming of 1914-1918 First World War
Bastille prison; self-proclaimed National Assembly 1936 Short-lived "Popular Front" government
issues Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. 1939-1945 Second World War
1793 The most violent part of the French Revolution 1940-1944 Vichy Government, which collaborates with the Nazis
begins, known as the Reign of Terror; King Louis 1944-1946 After the fall of the Vichy government, a provisional
XVI executed by guillotine. government is in place.
1799 Napoleon's Seizure of Power 1946-1958 Fourth Republic
1804 Napoleon's Coronation as Emperor 1954-1962 War in Algeria, culminating in Algerian indepen­
1812 Russian invasion dence in 1962
1814 Napoleon's defeat and imprisonment 1958-Present Fifth Republic
1815 Napoleon returns, but is soon defeated by British at 1958 Constitution establishes "Mixed Presidentialist"
Battle of Waterloo. system
1814-1830 Bourbon Restoration of Louis XVIII (1814-1824) and 1966 France leaves NATO
Charles X (1824-1830) 1968 Major student protests in Paris (and numerous
1830 July Revolution other countries)
1830-1848 July Monarchy of Louis-Philippe ("Citizen King") 1981 Frangois Mitterrand is elected president (the only
1848-1852 Revolution of 1848 and the Second Republic Socialist elected to this post during the Fifth Re­
1848 Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte elected President of public) and governs until 1995.
the Republic 1995-2007 Presidency of Jacques Chirac
1852 Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte named Emperor 1999 France adopts the euro.
Napoleon III, beginning the "Second Empire" 2007-2012 Presidency of Nicolas Sarkozy
(1852-1870) 2009 France returns to NATO.
1870-1871 Franco-Prussian War, in which France is soundly 2012-present Presidency of Frangois Hollande
defeated

b e p o litic a lly p o ssib le to p ro d u c e th e m ? F in a lly , w h a t w ill c o n te m p o ra ry F ra n c e is th e d e g re e to w h ic h m a n y o f

F ra n c e ’s role b e in th e E u ro p e o f th e fu tu re , g iv e n th e th e s e d ecisio n s w ill b e ta k e n a t a E u ro p e a n level. I t
e n o rm o u s q u e stio n s t h a t th e E U n o w faces as it stru g g le s sh o u ld b e n o te d , th o u g h , t h a t F ra n c e (lik e o th e r c o u n ­
to c o o rd in a te re g io n -w id e m o n e ta ry p o lic y w ith s ta te - trie s in th e E U ) h a s a n a tio n a l v e to o n m o st im p o r ta n t
level fiscal policy? O n e o f th e in tr ig u in g fa cts a b o u t m a tte rs .

Regime and Political Institutions

France has a semi-presidential system o f governm ent, also th e form er th e h e ad o f state a n d th e la tte r th e h ead o f govern­
called a presidential-parliamentary system . T his hybrid has m ent. P residential elections are follow ed by elections to the
b o th a directly elected president a n d a prim e m inister, w ith legislature, a fte r w h ic h th e president nom inates a prim e
432 France

m inister to ru n th e governm ent. H ow ever, prim e m inisters N a tio n a l A sse m b ly tak e s th e lead o n m o st leg islativ e d e ­
serve at th e discretion o f th e legislature, a n d th e low er house b a te s a n d leg isla tio n . A so p h istic a te d sy stem o f checks
(the Assemblee Nationale, or N a tio n a l A ssem bly) m ay force a n d b a la n c e s in clu d e s th e p re s id e n t’s a b ility to dissolve
resignation o f th e g overnm ent at any tim e by a sim ple m ajor­ th e le g isla tu re a n d c all n e w e le ctio n s, b u t n o m o re th a n
ity voting for censure. In practice, th is has m ean t th a t the o nce in any giv en year. By c o n v en tio n , th e p rim e m in iste r
president appoints a p rim e m in ister only after consulting th e h a s g re a te r p o w e r over d o m estic p o litics a n d th e p re sid e n t
leader o f th e largest p a rty in th e legislature to determ in e th e m o re p o w e r over fo reig n affairs, b u t th e s e lin e s can be
latter’s wishes. b lu rre d , e sp e cially w h e n th e p re sid e n t a n d th e legislative
T he u p p e r legislative c h a m b e r, th e S e n a te , has n early m a jo rity are fro m d iffe re n t p a rtie s , a s itu a tio n k n o w n as
c o -e q u a l p o w ers w ith th e N a tio n a l A ssem bly, b u t th e cohabitation.

Regime and Political Institutions

Regime Republic, democratic

Administrative Twenty-seven regions (of which twenty-two are in "metropolitan France" and five are overseas); smaller
Divisions divisions are departments, arrondissements, cantons, and communes

Executive Branch Semi-presidential; president and prime minister

Selection of Executive Direct election of president, in two rounds, with second-round runoff between top two candidates,
appointed prime minister

Legislative Branch Bicameral

Lower chamber: National Assembly (Assemblee Nationale)
Upper chamber: Senate (Senat)

Judicial Branch Several top authorities: Court of Cassation (Courde cassation) as court of final appeal for individuals; appointed
Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel) has authority to rule laws unconstitutional and invalid

Political Party System Multiparty system with several parties in Parliament, generally with one large party on the center-right
(currently the Union for a Popular Movement, UMP) and the Socialist Party on the center-left; also the
National Front (far right), Communist Party (far left), and other moderate and fringe parties

F in a lly , a ju d ic ia l b o d y k n o w n as th e C o n s titu tio n a l c o m p o s e d o f n in e m e m b e rs , th r e e e a c h a p p o in te d by th e

C o u n c il h a s th e p o w e r to re v ie w m a jo r law s b e fo re th e ir p re s id e n t a n d th e le a d e rs o f th e tw o le g isla tiv e h o u se s,
p a ssa g e a n d c a n ru le th e m u n c o n s titu tio n a l a n d th u s as w e ll as a ll fo rm e r F re n c h p re s id e n ts n o t a ctiv ely i n ­
in v a lid ; th is c o u n c il m ay also h e a r a p p e a ls to law s a n d vo lv ed in p o litic s .
s im ila rly ru le o n c o n s titu tio n a lity . T h e C o u n c il is

Political Culture
Probably th e m o st d istin c tiv e fe atu re o f F re n c h p o litica l le ft to d ay favor th e d ire c t assault o n th e c h u rc h th a t m any
c u ltu re is th e h isto ric a l relatio n sh ip b e tw e e n a left-w in g , e ig h te e n th - a n d n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry rev olutionaries did,
secularist, rep u b lican ism a n d a m ore conservative a n d less a n d th e F re n c h rig h t is no lo n g er royalist. M o reo v er, b o th
e g alita ria n altern ativ e, o fte n associated w ith R o m a n C a ­ tra d itio n s have favored p o litica l c en tralism , a n d som e
tholicism . W e do n o t w ish to c aricatu re th e d istin c tio n b e ­ w o u ld say a u th o rita ria n cen tralism . N ev erth eless, here
tw e en th ese tw o stra n d s o f F re n c h p o litica l c u ltu re. follow id ea l-ty p ica l sketches o f th e tw o trad itio n s.
T hey have each c h an g e d a g o o d d eal over tim e , as has th e B o th rig h t- a n d left-w in g th o u g h t in F rance h a d origins
relatio n sh ip b e tw ee n th e m . F o r exam ple, few o n th e F re n c h a m o n g th e e ig h te e n th -c e n tu ry philosophes, a n d th e very
 Profile 433

designations “le ft” a n d rig h t” em erged in th e F re n c h R evo­ c o n ce p tio n o f th e F re n c h n a tio n developed, suspicious o f
lution. F ro m th e b e g in n in g , th e F re n c h left radically o p ­ “c o sm o p o litan ism ” a n d o fte n a n ti-S e m itic . T h o u g h m ost
posed hierarchy a n d royalty, p ro m o tin g dem ocracy a n d scholars th in k th is w as c o n fin ed to a m in o rity , it becam e
republicanism as alternatives. V iew ing th e R o m an C a th o lic im p o rta n t b y th e early years o f th e tw e n tie th cen tu ry . T his
C h u rc h as lin k e d to royal politics a n d th e n o b ility (and tra d itio n m ay have w itn e sse d its m o st ex tre m e expression
in d eed b ein g th e “F irs t E sta te ” p rio r to th e R evolution), and in th e c o lla b o ra tin g V ichy re g im e d u rin g W o rld W a r II. It
n o tin g its substantial control over lan d , schooling, a n d m uch lives o n in th e N a tio n a l F ro n t p a r ty o f J e a n -M a rie L e P en
law m aking, a radical left aim ed to elim in ate th ese “regres­ (now r u n b y h is d a u g h te r, M a rin e L e P en), a x enophobic
sive” social actors. T his tra d itio n w as largely critical o f N a ­ p a rty w h ic h is above all p re o cc u p ie d w ith im m ig ra tio n ,
poleon as w ell as th e Second E m p ire o f N ap o leo n II I esp ecially im m ig ra tio n b y M u slim s, w h ile also h a v in g a
(1852-1870). O v e r th e course o f th e n in e te e n th century, h isto ry o f a n ti-S e m itism . T his g ro u p w as for m an y years
m any o f its p roponents tu rn e d to socialism a n d com m unism . p o litica lly m arg in a l; th o u g h th e elder L e P e n d id fin ish in
W h ile b y th e m id d le o f th e tw e n tie th c en tu ry it w as clear seco n d place in th e p re sid e n tia l elections o f 2 0 0 2 , th e vast
th a t com m unism on th e Soviet m odel w as n o t a viable o p tio n m ajo rity v o ted a g a in st h im . M a rin e le P e n d id w ell in th e
for F rance, th e com m unists w ere im p o rta n t in th e resistance first ro u n d o f th e 2 0 1 2 electio n s, how ever, a n d , in d ee d ,
again st H itle r. M a n y com m unists w ere seen as n a tio n a l N ic h o la s S ark o zy m oved to th e rig h t o n im m ig ra tio n
heroes o f th e R esistance, a n d aspects o f c o m m u n ist ideology issues in th e fin al ro u n d in a n effo rt to a ttr a c t h e r su p p o rt­
rem ain ed p o p u lar w ith in tellectu als a n d th e w o rk in g classes. ers. (M a n y c o m m e n ta to rs view ed th is m ove as a strategic
A fte r th e w ar, th e larger F ren ch left favored social d em oc­ m ista k e , c o n trib u tin g to H o lla n d e ’s 2 0 1 2 victory.) P erhaps
racy a n d h elped to c o n stru c t th e F ren ch w elfare state. even m o re su rp risin g , th e N a tio n a l F ro n t d id v e ry w ell
T he rig h t-w in g tr a d itio n is also q u ite h e te ro g e n e o u s in th e 2 0 1 4 E U P a rlia m e n t electio n s, sh o c k in g m an y o b ­
a n d h a s also c h a n g e d o ver tim e . S o m e o f th e su p p o rte rs servers, b o th in F ra n c e a n d in te rn atio n ally . I t is w o rth
o f th e r e s to ra tio n m o n a rc h ie s o f L o u is X V I I I a n d C h a rle s n o tin g , th o u g h , th a t th is w as n o t a specifically F re n c h
X w ere o u t- a n d -o u t ro y a lists, b u t even th e y w ere re la ­ d e v elo p m en t; rig h t-w in g p a rtie s d id very w ell in th e 2014
tiv e ly few. I n th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry th e F re n c h rig h t E u ro p e a n p a rlia m e n ta ry elections m o re generally.
favored m a in ta in in g a n d even e x p a n d in g th e p riv ile g e s o f O v e r th e years F re n c h p o litica l c u ltu re has developed a
th e C a th o lic C h u rc h . S u p p o rte rs in c lu d e d n o t o n ly th e stro n g c en te r th a t b u ild s o n a co m p ro m ise b e tw ee n th e tw o
re m n a n ts o f th e o ld n o b ility b u t also w e a lth y in d u s tria l­ tra d itio n s n o te d here. H isto rically , b o th th e socialists and
ists. M o re th a n a n y th in g , th e y fav o red th e m a in te n a n c e th e le a d in g rig h t-o f-c e n te r p a rtie s have su p p o rte d m a in ­
o f so c ial o rder. ta in in g th e w elfare state, sta tu s q u o in term s o f c h u rc h -
O v e r th e course o f th e late n in e te e n th cen tu ry , as is d is­ sta te relations, th o u g h th e y disag ree ab o u t som e o f th e
cussed f u r th e r in th e n a tio n a lism case study, a n “e th n ic ” details.

Political Economy
F rance has one o f th e w o rld ’s m o st advanced econom ies, h ig h e r taxes th a n c itizen s in c o u n tries w ith less generous
a n d has for som e tim e . M e a su re d in term s o f th e H u m a n w elfare states: In d e e d , g o v e rn m e n t revenues a m o u n t to
D e v elo p m en t In d e x , its c itizen s live in one o f th e tw e n ty nearly 50 p e rce n t o f G D P .
b e st-o ff econom ies in th e w orld. T he F re n c h econom y is T he F re n c h econom y has h isto rically priv ileg ed an im ­
a m o n g th e te n larg e st in th e w orld (in th e to p five w h e n p o r ta n t role fo r th e state, th ro u g h re g u la tio n , g o v e rn m e n t
m easu red sim ply by incom e, a n d to p te n w h e n m ea su re d in o w n ersh ip o f firm s, a n d re d istrib u tiv e efforts. I n recent
term s o f w h a t th a t incom e can buy), a n d it has one o f th e years, as societies w ith w elfare states e n te red in to a p e rio d
h ig h e st G D P s p e r capita in th e w orld. M o reo v er, citizens o f “re tre n c h m e n t” fo llo w in g th e econom ic crises o f th e
ben efit from relatively generous w elfare state benefits th a t 1970s, th e re w ere som e efforts to scale b a ck th is state in ­
are discussed f u rth e r a b it late r in th is section. T hey also pay volvem ent, p a rtic u la rly under conservative presidents
434 France

Jacques C h ira c a n d N icolas Sarkozy. T he state has p a rtia lly nu m ero u s c itizen s a n d c a p tu rin g a large share o f th e G D P .
d ivested its e lf fro m som e o f its h o ld in g s, th o u g h it has h a d M oreover, state services c o n tin u e to b e fairly generous in
a b it m ore tro u b le freein g its e lf fro m w elfare oblig atio n s c om parative term s. C o m p ara tiv e analysts have iden tified
an d d e re g u la tin g th e lab o r m a rk e t, as it has faced public several reasons for th is. F irst, th e re is th e F re n c h tra d itio n
resistance w h en it has a tte m p te d to do so. o f sta tism th a t w e have m en tio n ed . S econd, w h ile th e
T he F re n c h econom y in som e w ays is a ty p ic a l “p o s tin ­ m o d e rn F re n c h w elfare state h a d roots in th e le ftist F ro n t
d u stria l” econom y. N o te th a t th is does n o t m ea n th a t th ere P o p u la ire allian ce in th e late 1930s, it is im p o rta n t to note
is no in d u stry , b u t ra th e r th a t services are d o m in a n t. t h a t som e im p o rta n t featu res o f th e F re n c h w elfare state
In d e e d , in d u stry accounts for 18.7 p e rce n t o f G D P . A g ri­ w ere created, e x p an d ed , a n d m a in ta in e d precisely by con­
c u ltu re o nly accounts fo r 1.9 p e rce n t, w ith services ac­ servatives. I n th e F if th R epublic, D e G a u lle estab lish ed a
c o u n tin g for a fu ll 79.4 p e rce n t o f G D P (2013 e stim ate, p e r lo n g tra d itio n o f conservative electo ral success. In d e e d ,
C IA W o rld Factbook). w h ile in th e U n ite d K in g d o m a n d th e U n ite d States th e
F rance has relatively low incom e in eq u ality , n e ar th e av­ 1980s saw a tta ck s o n th e w elfare state as conservative p a r­
erage for e urozone cou n tries. Its G in i in d ex is 31.7 (W o rld tie s re tu rn e d to pow er, in F ran ce th e S ocialists fin ally to o k
B a n k 2013 estim ate), w here 0 w o u ld m ea n p e rfe c t e q u ality p o w er in 1981 w h e n F ra n fo is M itte ra n d w as elected (1 9 8 1 -
a n d 100 w o u ld m ea n pe rfe c t inequality. T o p u t th is in p e r­ 1995). T hus, o n one h a n d , th e conservatives w ere iden tified
spective, th e U n ite d States has a G in i in d ex o f over 4 0, and w ith th e w elfare state, a n d o n th e other, d u rin g th e m o m e n t
som e c o u n tries have figures a ro u n d 70! F ran ce also has w h e n th e rig h t w as a tte m p tin g to d ism an tle aspects o f th e
relatively low poverty. H isto rica lly it has suffered from rela­ w elfare state in o th e r cou n tries, th e le ft held pow er in
tively h ig h levels o f u n e m p lo y m en t, w h ic h som e analysts F rance.
have a ttrib u te d to th e rig id ity o f its h ig h ly re g u la te d lab o r A n o th e r key fe a tu re o f th e F re n c h w e lfare sta te th a t
m arket. Som e w o u ld a rgue th a t th is is a fu n c tio n o f th e m ay help to p re clu d e a tta c k s o n it is th a t (1) m a n y o f its
F re n c h sta te ’s o n g o in g involvem ent in th e econom y. H o w ­ b en efits are n o t ra d ic ally re d istrib u tiv e (E sp in g -A n d e rs o n
ever, o th e r advanced econom ies have, sadly, “c au g h t u p ” 1990: 2 7 ) a n d (2) a sig n ific a n t p o rtio n o f sta te revenues
w ith F rance in u n em p lo y m en t. Som e, n otably its n eig h b o r com e fro m a c o n su m p tio n ta x called a V a lu e-A d d e d T ax
to th e so u th , S pain, have far m ore serious u n em p lo y m en t (or V A T, sim ila r to sta te -lev e l sales taxes fo u n d in th e
problem s. U n ite d States). W h y w o u ld th is m atter? A c c o rd in g to
The F re n c h w elfare state has b e e n re silie n t in th e face o f som e sch o lars (P ra sa d 2 0 0 6 ), c o n su m p tio n taxes are less
efforts to roll it b a ck (P ra sa d 2006). I t h as, as n o te d previ­ lik ely to b e perceiv ed as u n fa ir b y p o litic a l o p p o n e n ts o f
ously, seen considerable p riv atiza tio n , a n d th ere have b e en th e w elfare sta te , a n d th u s less lik ely to g e n era te stro n g
pushes to w a rd d e reg u latio n , b u t th e state co n tin u es to play o p p o sitio n .
a n enorm ous role in th e F re n c h econom y, em ploying

Within the comparative European context seventeenth century as "strong" in the competitors. For this reason many histori-
France is thought of as having historically twenty-first-century world, in its time it ans have thought of the French state of
had a strong state. While we would was more unified and it more consistently Louis XIV as serving as the epitome of
not recognize the French state of the controlled its territory than many of its European absolutism. It is perhaps as a
 Case Studies 435

CASE STUDY (continued)

The State in France CHAPTER 3, PAGE 59

■■■■■■■■■■■■■■Hi
result of this strong absolutist state that Plan contributed to reconstruction. The thirty-five-hour work week and by estab­
the modern French state has been so cen­ program was successful: France achieved lishing strong protections against layoffs
tralist. The French Revolution had a well- solid growth and marked improvements and firings. The state directly employs a
institutionalized, if fiscally unsound, state in the standard of living in the three de­ relatively large proportion of the workforce,
to transform, and in the post-revolution­ cades from about 1945 to about 1975, totaling 5.4 million workers and over 20
ary years the state was expanded, with known as the trente glorieuses ("glorious percent of the total workforce as of the end
new layers of administration added. Over thirty”). of 2014 (DGAFP Annual Report 2014). It has
the course of the nineteenth century, Under recent president Nicolas Sar- also provided generous stipends to the un­
the state's reach and dominance over kozy there was great debate about the employed. Perhaps as a result, France has
local society increased slowly but surely role that the state would continue to play often struggled with higher levels of un­
(Weber 1976). in the economy. On one hand, there is the employment than some other developed
The French economy has featured a question of whether future economic countries. Former president Sarkozy has
prominent role for the state for many competitiveness can co-exist with the tried to overturn some of these regulations
years, especially when contrasted with general support of workers' rights that but was stymied by public protests.
Great Britain and the United States. This state regulation makes possible. On the As is discussed further in the case
has been true at least since the time of other hand, there is the ongoing question study on French nationalism, the French
Jean-Baptiste Coibert, a seventeenth- of the state's ability to make economic state has historically played a critical role
century economic thinker. France was policy. Monetary policy is already carried in French national consciousness. Citizen­
one of the earliest of economic modern­ out at the EU level, and there is now some ship, understood as a kind of relationship
izers and was a great economic power in talk of the centralization of European fiscal that an individual has with the state, has
the eighteenth century. The modern policy as well, though it is too early to tell historically been key to French national
French economy with its significant state whether this will take place. identity (Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1992).
involvement— known as dirigisme— is a Heir to a revolutionary tradition that This is reinforced by the strongly central­
product of the immediate aftermath of figures prominently in its national con­ ist institutional structure of the French
the Second World War. President Charles sciousness, the French state has often state. Loyalty is owed to the central state
de Gaulle nationalized key industries and aimed to present itself as the defender of as the institutional embodiment of the
used the state to promote recovery from "the people," including workers.The French nation, and not to other identities or insti­
the damage of the war, while American state has heavily regulated the labor tutions that mediate between citizens
aid in the form of the post-war Marshall market, for example by implementing a and the state.

Authoritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France c h a p t e r 7, page 157

Nobody doubts France's democratic cre­ forces everywhere (even if it did not im­ democracy. If France, of all countries, en­
dentials. In the late twentieth and early mediately culminate in a democracy). countered such difficulties, should we
twenty-first centuries, it is among the Indeed, it is precisely because of the expect anything less for today's democra-
world's leading democracies. Moreover, country's democratic achievements that tizers? In short, the French case under­
its 1789 revolution was and remains a it is worth reflecting on the challenges scores the difficulty of democratic
source of inspiration to pro-democracy that France faced in institutionalizing its consolidation.
436 France

CASE STUDY (continued)

Authoritar
ritarian Persistence in Nineteenth-Century France CHAPTER 7, PAGE 157

We will not repeat the sequence de­ instability, and considerable authoritarian Another approach might emphasize
scribed in the "Historical Development" persistence. Why did these occur? One the legacies of inequalities themselves:
section of the country profile. It is enough hypothesis might be the collapse of the The revolution aimed to abolish the nobil­
to note that the revolution, which de­ existing order. Perhaps the elimination ity, but of course privilege lived on, and
posed the monarchy, passed through a of well-established, if flawed, political both old and new social elites and the
republican period, to the “terror," and models left the political arena too open to church did what they could to protect
eventually to Napoleon's rule, which was contestation. Indeed, if the monarchy their interests as they saw them (for one
despotic by any modern definition. This could be abolished, was anything beyond variation of this argument, see Marx [1852]
was followed by the restoration of the question, negotiation, or dispute? 2007). If it was clear to such actors that
previous monarchy, and then the "July Another idea comes from Alexis de their opponents meant for their elimina­
Monarchy" of the "Citizen-King," Louis- Tocqueville, the great observer of both tion, this would have major implications
Philippe, and finally by the Second Repub­ American and French society. As we saw for their strategic decisions. The same is
lic (1848-1852). The Second Empire (of elsewhere in this book, he found much true of their opponents.
Napoleon III) lasted from 1852 until 1870, to admire about the participatory- Think about how a rational-choice ap­
when, following France's defeat in the democratic habits and decentralization proach (e.g., that of Lichbach 1995, or
Franco-Prussian war, the "Third Republic" of American politics. In contrast, he Kuran 1991) might model the situation in
began (for an authoritative overview of thought that a key problem in France was which these actors found themselves
this period, see Furet [1988] 1995). Indeed, the lack of these habits (because institu­ and how such an approach might try to
even in the twentieth century France saw tions had not encouraged them), along­ explain the sequence of unstable politics
considerable conflict between democratic side a centralized state and a revolution found in nineteenth-century France. Then
and authoritarian tendencies, finally put that had awakened a passionate distrust think about the implications of the French
to rest in the post-World War II period. of all inequalities without providing op­ case for contemporary democratizers.
In short, French political history in the portunities for French citizens to develop Can we compare such cases over time?
nineteenth century presents us with a democratic freedoms (see Tocqueville And, if so, are there any limits on our abil­
range of political and social models, [1856] 2002, esp. pp. 310-311). ity to do so?

i i i i

| | Electing the French President: W hat Do Runoffs Do?

I_______I CHAPTER 10, PAGE 231

In France in 2002, most voters were allows citizens to vote for their most pre­ with the first-round vote split between
shocked as the results came in for the first ferred candidate in the first round, then many candidates on the left, the Socialist
round of presidential voting. In this first vote for an "electable" candidate in the performed poorly and came in third with
round of French elections, the nationwide second round. Typically, the runoff had 16 percent behind center-right candidate
popular vote is tallied for the many candi­ amounted to a showdown between the Jacques Chirac (just under 20 percent)
dates, and a candidate is elected only if he leading candidate of the center-right and the far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le
or she secures an outright majority, which (often called the "Gaullist" candidate after Pen, leader of the National Front, who
is uncommon. In the absence of a major­ French war hero and later president tookjust under 17 percent of the vote. The
ity, the top two candidates have a runoff Charles de Gaulle) and the candidate of runoff came down to the right versus the
to determine the winner. This system the center-left Socialist Party. But in 2002, far right.
 Case Studies 437

CASE STUDY (continued)

Electing the French President: What Do Runoffs Do? c h a p t e r 10, p a g e 231

For some, Le Pen's first-round success proponents of the system can argue that it For these reasons, runoffs are cur­
served as a condemnation of the French performed exactly as intended: It allowed rently used in elections in a large number
practice of having elections with a "runoff" French voters to express their initial prefer­ of countries, including for parliamentary
between the top two candidates: It gave a ence, then weeded out the more extreme districts in France itself. The runoff
huge platform and political spotlight to a candidate. It also signaled the frustration of features frequently in elections in Latin
candidate on the fringe (though the Na­ voters with the Socialist Party, which al­ America and Africa, where presidential­
tional Front has done surprisingly well in lowed that party to reshape its platform for ism is common. In these countries, there
subsequent elections). What happened the future, rather than simply resting on its are particular historical and social rea­
next had the opposite effect, though it was laurels as the presumptive leader of the sons that can make the runoff appealing.
predictable: Jacques Chirac won 82 percent left. As importantly, the runoff ensured In Chile in 1970, the Marxist Salvador Al-
of the vote in the runoff, and Le Pen won that the individual elected president ulti­ lende was confirmed president by Con­
less than 18 percent. Chirac thus took nearly mately received more than 50 percent of gress after receiving less than 37 percent
all of the vote that had gone to all other the votes in a presidential election. That is, of the vote; three years later, a military
candidates in the first round and won the the president ends up with a clear mandate coup to overthrow the elected president
presidency overwhelmingly, and Le Pen of over half of French voters electing him resulted in nearly two decades of brutal
barely increased his tally at all despite the or her. This contrasts with the American dictatorship. And in Africa, presidential
elimination of all other candidates. Turnout model, for example, in which it is relatively elections can result in voting along
also increased in the second round, despite common for presidents to win the presi­ ethnic lines in the first round, but broader
the fact that Chirac's win was near-certain, dency with less than 50 percent of the coalition building across ethnic lines to
as French voters turned out overwhelm­ popular vote. It should also be noted that win in the second round. It is worth con­
ingly (while also taking to the streets in pro­ voter turnout is much higher in French sidering how history might have been
test) to vote against Le Pen. elections than in the United States and different— and whether violence and de­
This raises the issue of whether runoffs many other countries, at about 80 percent mocracy would be affected— if a French-
are good or bad for representation and de­ in most presidential elections and 60 per­ style runoff system had existed in Chile in
mocracy. While anomalies such as the Le cent in parliamentary elections (Interna­ 1970 or did not exist in some African
Pen result can emerge in the first round, tional IDEA 2011). countries today.

U .ii; t ■

I1I The French Revolution CHAPTER 12, PAGE 285

i

The French Revolution took place amid status of the nobility, however, was American Revolution), faced major fiscal
major structural problems in eighteenth- weakened by the ongoing efforts of the difficulties (Doyle 2003). Indeed, by the
century French society (Furet 1995; centralizing, absolutist crown. As the late eighteenth century it was nearly
Doyle 2003). In this period France, like monarchy and its state grew stronger, bankrupt. Meanwhile, periodic problems
much of early modern Europe, remained the nobility felt increasingly marginal­ in food distribution and rural poverty en­
an “estate society," divided into three ized. At the same time, the French sured that much of France's rural popula­
groups: a nobility with special privileges, absolutist state, largely through its in­ tion felt discontent. Finally, the spread of
the clergy, and commoners. The social volvement in foreign wars (especially the the Enlightenment and of nationalism
438 France

provided the bases for an intellectual cri­ along with some clergy, and not "popular" since, for example, he declared himself
tique of the old regime (Greenfeld 1992; actors). emperor. But on the other hand he can be
Bell 2001). Reform quickly devolved into a novel viewed as a revolutionary whose mission
The revolution began as a series of form of collective behavior that was sur­ was to spread the French Revolution to
efforts to reform the French state. The prising even to its most central partici­ the rest of Europe, through an imperial
crown called an "Assembly of Notables,” pants and those who attempted to lead war.
but the assembly declared that the Es­ and control it. Street actions began, and What struck so many contemporaries
tates General, which had not met since mobs attacked the Bastille prison on was the Revolution's destructive nature. It
the early seventeenth century, needed to July 14,1789, wishing to destroy a reviled seemed intent upon an eradication of the
be called. When the Estates General con­ symbol of the arbitrary authority of the old society, and the replacement of all of its
vened, it was divided in the customary monarch to imprison opponents at will. forms by new, “revolutionary” ones. This
manner into the three estates mentioned By 1792, the monarchy had fallen amidst included the creation of a new, revolution­
previously. However, before long, politics increasing violence— much perpetrated ary calendar, the efforts to destroy the
and propaganda forced representatives of by mobs known as the "sans culottes"— Church and its teachings, the war on the
the first two estates to join the latter one, opening a period known as the "Terror," in nobility, the destruction of many architec­
the core idea being that the French nation which perceived enemies of the revolu­ tural sites, and so forth. The French revolu­
shouldn't be divided by estates, since all tion were murdered in large numbers. tion subsequently became the model for
of its members should be equal. The third Robespierre was a key figure in this period, many later revolutionaries and its ideals in­
estate was the nation, as Sieyes declared perpetrating the paranoid violence that spirational for nationalists and republicans
(Furet 1995:45-51). In other words, the Es­ ultimately consumed him. This was fol­ everywhere. At the same time, it surprised
tates General was reinterpreted as being lowed by a period of relaxation known as nearly everyone involved, and those who
something like a modern, national legisla­ the "Thermidorian reaction” and, finally, attempted to control it quickly learned that
ture (though the leaders of the Estates by the rise of Napoleon. On one hand they had helped to unleash social forces
General remained bourgeois and nobles, Napoleon appears a conservative figure, beyond their ability to lead (Arendt 1963).

Religion and Secularism in France CHAPTER 15, PAGE 359

France is the society most closely associ­ conscience and practice to Protestants. rose, a theological position known as
ated with the idea of lai'cite, though one France's Catholicism was central to its Jansenism, and a political theory known
encounters it prominently in a number of early modern identity. as Regalism, helped the king to exert
other societies as well, including parts of Most scholars see French secularism greater control over the church. Despite
Latin America (Blancarte 2008). France as having its origins in the eighteenth these tensions, after the French Revolu­
was historically a Catholic society. For a century. Religion and politics had been tion began in 1789, republicans and rev­
time, there had been a relatively large closely linked in continental Europe for a olutionaries identified the church with
Protestant minority (the "Huguenots') but long time, but the church and the state the “old regime" (Kuru 2009) and thus
they were repressed and most fled after had experienced considerable tension at repressed it, murdering many priests.
1685, when Louis XIV revoked the Edict certain points in the history of their rela­ The French Revolutionary regime tried
of Nantes that had granted freedom of tionship. As the French absolutist state to create its own, secular religion, and to
 Case Studies 439

replace religious symbols with its own, time French Catholicism (along with 2007). Opponents of traditionally Islamic
secular ones. This was changed by other, minority religions) was "privatized" symbolism in public have drawn on
Napoleon, who concluded an agree­ (on privatization, see Casanova 1994). In long-standing national mythology about
ment (known as a 'concordat") with the today's France the view that the Catholic la'iciti, though their critics suggest that
church, but even then the state domi­ Church should have an expanded rule in this is a cover for unspoken ethnic dis­
nated the church, and the church never politics is marginal. crimination. The fundamental conflict
returned to its former powers. Subse­ In recent years this has been linked to has concerned not whether members of
quent French history witnessed multiple great controversy, particularly because religious groups should be able to prac­
struggles between monarchy/empire immigration has notably increased the tice their religion, but whether they
and democratic republicanism (Furet Islamic share of the French population. should be able to engage in religious ex­
1995), with the former being more Great debates have been held over pression (including clothing) in public
closely associated with a pro-Church po­ whether religious garb (in particular, the institutions. It is worth further noting that
sition. Democratic republicanism was Muslim hijab) can be worn in schools and to some extent this issue cuts across the
eventually triumphant, though, and over other public organizational spaces (Scott French political spectrum.

Globalization and Culture in France CHAPTER 16, PAGE 383

& 5 ^ s IS?

France's relationship with globalization than being a net exporter of cultural back centuries. In the early modern
has been complex. In the late nineteenth forms, it began to import them. France period, royal ministers exhorted nobles to
century, France was a lead "globalizer." If continued to be influential in global cul­ engage in commerce, but many rejected
you travel in the developing world today, ture, especially in its former colonies, but this idea, convinced that commerce
you may learn that the architecture built in many ways its leading position was would "disparage" (deroger) nobility (Furet
in the nineteenth century had a marked overtaken by the United States. Globaliza­ 1995 Greenfeld 2001). Important early so­
French influence; this is a visible indicator tion has taken on new forms and grown, cialist works, many of which predated and
of French influence at one point in time. with new media and new patterns of anticipated Marx, developed in France.
French ideas were extraordinarily influen­ communication, and the influence of In the late eighteenth century, Rousseau
tial around the globe in this period, at American ideas and culture has spread. and others developed the critique that
least in more cosmopolitan social sectors One indicator of this rise of "Anglo-Saxon" modern social relations are corrupting;
in many societies. Especially influential culture has been the replacement of this later found expression on both left
was the idea of positivism, that science French, which was long the language of and right, and in both radical democratic
and reason could contribute to the bet­ diplomacy, with English as the dominant movements and with more extreme op­
terment of society. In the late nineteenth language in international affairs. Less for­ position to capitalism and democracy.
century, the culture with the broadest mally, but perhaps more consequentially, Within the French economy itself, there
global reach was almost certainly French, cultural forces from Hollywood to hip hop has often been an emphasis on crafts­
though the British Empire ensured global have reshaped French film, literature, manship and small-scale production. At
expansiveness for British culture as well. music, and the arts. the same time, France in the twentieth
In the twentieth century, though, French ambivalence about globaliza­ century did establish major corporations,
France grew more ambivalent about glo­ tion also reflects economic ideas, espe­ but often did so with state support; ex­
balization. Perhaps this is because rather cially about global capitalism. This dates amples of major French companies that
440 France

---------- ,
i CASE STUDY (continued)

■ I Globalization and Culture in France ch apter i e , p a g e 383

were state-owned or nationalized at one members of the French public, and Bove responded to the fiscal crises in Greece and
time include the car company Renault, is a well-known figure in France, though Italy, and worries over Portugal and Spain
the oil giant Total, and several major banks his popularity has its limits; when he later as well. France also retains major global
and utilities. ran for president, he received less than 2 linkages to former colonies, particularly in
A common refrain in France has been percent of the vote. On the other hand, he North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. North
the need to develop in a 'French way," re­ is not a typical "French farmer." His parents African migrants— especially from Algeria
sisting Americanization and globalization. were university researchers, and he spent and Morocco— constitute an important
Economically, this is linked to common part of his childhood in California. In group in French society, one which pushes
tropes in French culture: Societies fully im­ any case, some took his stance to be a the boundaries of cultural change, given
mersed in global capitalism "live to work," fairly extreme expression of a common that some members of that group are per­
whereas some French citizens would sentiment. ceived to be less than receptive to tradi­
argue that the French "work to live." While ambivalent about some aspects tional French notions of laicite (see the
France has thus been somewhat skeptical of globalization, France has also been a key Introduction and the “Religion and Secu­
of multinational businesses and of the mover of deeper integration in continental larism” box for more information on this).
consequences of international trade Europe in the period since World War II. It Together, these debates about eco­
agreements, and it has even tried to limit has sought to develop strong economic nomics and cultural identity suggest a
the spread and use of English words in ties to Germany and other economies society that has conflicting and perhaps
French business. This is not simply a while developing in a way that relies heav­ contradictory views about the desirability
matter of the French government, but im­ ily on elements of free markets yet contin­ of globalization; in this, France shares
portant segments of the citizenry as well. ues to guarantee an active role for the state many challenges with other countries—
One example is Jose Bove, an activist and in the economy. It has been a strong sup­ including the United States— that grapple
"farmer" who destroyed a McDonald's porter of the European Union, and in 2011 with the tough issues of how to respond
restaurant under construction in 1999. France, along with Germany, exercised a as nations in an international twenty-first
This action was well received by many considerable influence over how the EU century.

Research Prompts
1. France has runoff elections, and the United States does not. including the privatization of a number of formerly state-owned
What are the major consequences of this difference? Would you enterprises. How do you explain its staying power? Will it likely
expect the consequences of this difference to play out in the remain strong in the future?
same way in a wider range of comparative cases? Why or 5. The United Kingdom has a fairly small extreme, xenophobic
why not? right wing (represented by the British National Party),
2. France is a society that has had many revolutions, and one in whereas in France this group has been a bit larger (though
which revolution has become a key idea in the culture. Brazil is a the National Front still represents a minority of French citi­
society that, despite promoting social change in important, zens, with its presidential candidate, Marine Le Pen, winning
novel, and influential ways, has largely been free of revolutions nearly 18 percent of the first-round vote in 2012, and the
as such. Can you explain this difference? party doing very well in 2014 EU parliamentary elections). Is
3. The French state captures a considerably larger share of its GDP this difference a function of different ideas of nationhood,
as revenue than other countries. Why might this be? different historical experiences, different patterns of decline
4. The French welfare state has survived "retrenchment" more suc­ of traditional left-wing parties, different political institutions,
cessfully than a number of others, despite some changes, or something else?
 R B IR

441

B Germany
Introduction
Germany is a country of enduring interest to
Key Features of Contemporary Germany political scientists for a number of reasons. Its
historical state-building process draws atten­
Population: 80,996,685 (estimate, July 2014) tion, both because of the early success of
Area: 357,022 square kilometers
Prussian state-builders and because of the
relatively late development of the unified
Head of State: Joachim Gauck (president, 2012-present) German state (1871), after years of decentral­
Head of Government: Angela Merkel (chancellor, 2005-present)
ization and nationalist aspiration. Germany is
also of interest because of its development tra­
Capital: Berlin jectory, as it achieved relatively rapid industri­
Year of Independence: Unification achieved in 1871; re-unification in
alization and economic growth in the mid- to
1990 late nineteenth century, and came to be per­
haps the preeminent European power shortly
Year of Current Constitution: 1949
after its political unification. The country, as
Languages: German we will see, is frequently cited as a prototypi­
cal case of ethnic nationalism, meaning that
GDP per Capita: $46,260 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
boundaries between Germans and others are
Human Development Index 6th (very high human development) typically understood in ethnic terms rather
Ranking (2014): than as a function of citizenship. As such,
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Germany is frequently contrasted with
Development Report 2014. France, and a robust social-scientific litera­
ture seeks to explain this difference. More­
over, there are major debates about whether
German culture is changing or has changed
in this connection.

I German 91.5
Turkish 2.4% Protestant Christianity 34%
Other 6.1% Roman Catholicism 34%
Islam 3.7%
Other religion or
Ethnic Groups in Germany non-affiliated 28.7%
Note that most of those in the "other" category are from or descend
from citizens ofother European societies, including Russia. Religious Affiliation in Germany
Source: CIA World Factbook. Source: CIA World Factbook.
442 Germany

SWEDEN

Rostock
Lubeck
Wilhelmshavei
^Bremerhaven* Hambur9

ETHERLANDS
Bremen

Hannover
Berlin

Magdeburg POLAND

- Duisburg
• c
• Essen
Leipzig
Dusseldorf
Kassel
Dresden
<
i^ i? Cologn
BELGIUM

• Frankfurt
Wiesbaden*

CZECH REPUBLIC
Saarbrucken • Mannheim
Nuremberg

• Karlsruhe
• Stuttgart Danube.

FRANCE

Munich
AUSTRIA

0 30 60 Kilometers

SLOVENIA
 427

D France
PROFILE Introduction
F ran ce has h isto ric a lly b e en situ ate d a t th e
Key Features of Contemporary France c en ter o f W e s te rn E u ro p e. T his is tru e n o t
o n ly g e o g rap h ica lly b u t in term s o f F ran ce’s
Population: 66,259,012 (estimate, July 2014) id e n tity a n d c u ltu re. A t le a st since C h a r­
Area: 643,801 square kilometers lem ag n e u n ite d sig n ifican t p o rtio n s o f W e st­
ern E u ro p e in th e e ig h th a n d n in th cen tu ries,
Head of State: Frangois Hollande (president, 2012-present) p re se n tin g h im s e lf as h e ir to th e R o m an

Head of Government: Manuel Vails (prime minister, 2014-present) E m p ire , m an y have considered F ran ce th e
c en tra l c arrier o f E u ro p e a n civilization.
Capital: Paris G e o g ra p h ic a lly , F ra n c e e x te n d s from

Year of Independence: France was never formally colonized. Many date th e E n g lis h C h a n n e l in th e n o r th to th e
the consolidation of the French state to the era M e d ite rra n e a n in th e so u th . T he P y ren ees
of Louis XIV (1643-1715) and the birth of d iv id e it fro m S p a in (and th e tin y m o u n ta in
modern France to the French Revolution c o u n try o f A n d o rra ) in th e so u th w e st, and
of 1789.
it sh a res its e a s te rn b o rd e r w ith B e lg iu m ,
Year of Current 1958 L u x e m b o u rg , G e rm a n y , S w itz e rla n d , a n d
Constitution: Italy . I n a d d itio n to its m o u n ta in o u s areas
( b o th th e P y re n e e s a n d th e A lp s as w e ll as
Languages: French
th e sm a lle r J u ra a n d M a s s if C e n tra l), it has
GDP per Capita: $42,503 (estimate, 2013) g o o d fa rm la n d , b e in g m o st fa m o u s for th e
p ro d u c tio n o f g ra p e s a n d cereals. F re n c h
Human Development 20th (very high human development)
Index Ranking (2014): a g ric u ltu re has h isto ric a lly ex celled in th e
p ro d u c tio n o f w in e , cheese, a n d o th e r item s
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Development Report 2014. c o n sid e re d b y in te r n a tio n a l c o n su m ers to
b e lu x u rio u s.
T o d a y ’s F ra n c e is in te re s tin g to scholars o f com parative
politics for n u m ero u s reasons. F irs t, w h ile som e people
te n d to th in k o f E u ro p e a n societies as c o n sisten tly stable
a n d e v id e n cin g co n sisten t, p rogressive d ev elo p m en t over
tim e , F ra n c e ’s passage to p o litic a l m o d e rn ity w as e x tra o r­
d in a rily rocky. I t also p layed o u t in strik in g fa sh io n th e
c o n tra st b e tw e e n d e m o c ra tic -re p u b lic a n a n d a u th o rita ria n
c e n tra list form s o f p o litics, s e ttlin g o n a “m ix e d p resid en -
I Roman Catholicism 83-889 tia lis t” system in th e F if th R ep u b lic (w hich still goes on
Protestant Christianity 2% today) th a t c o n tin u e s to stim u la te m u c h deb ate. F rance

Judaism 1% also show ed us w h a t c o n flict b e tw e e n civic rep u b lican ism

a n d a m o n o p o listic c h u rc h co u ld lo o k lik e , p io n e e rin g a
I Islam 5-10% c e rta in k in d o f secu larism , o fte n called laicite.
I Unaffiliated 4% It is difficult to estim ate th e relative share o f th e population
com prised by different ethnic groups in France. T his is because
R e lig io u s A ffiliatio n in Fran ce France places restrictions o n national statistical surveys th a t
Source: CIA World Factbook. docum ent th e ethnic and racial identities o f respondents, in
428 France

IRELAND

English Channel Lin* BELGIUM Q

Cherbourg W '
GERMANY
# Le Havre
; r {
•Rouen
Bres

'hk Paris

Orleans
Nantes Tours

Dijon

Bay of
Biscay
F R A N C E -LAUS.
SWITZERLAND
.'1 r: . CJ
ly0n J
7 \ Saint-Etienne •
h •
Bordeaux
Grenoble ITALY

Toulouse

Montpellier •

Marseille*
Toulon
 Profile 443

G e rm a n y is also o f in te re s t as a society th a t has w it­ b e tw e e n E a s t a n d W e s t G e rm a n y a fte r W o rld W a r I I. P re ­

nessed rapid a n d c o n seq u en tial p o litica l tran sitio n s. It has viously, m u ch o f its lo n g -ru n h isto ry o f p o litica l d isu n ity
seen a u th o rita ria n ism (w ith som e d e m o cratic features) caused th e re g io n to b e d o m in a te d b y P ru ssia in th e east
u n d e r B ism arck a n d K aiser W ilh e lm I I , a n d th e n d e m o c ra ­ a n d A u s tria (today n o t a p a rt o f G e rm an y ) in th e south,
tiz a tio n in th e w ake o f W o rld W a r I. D e m o c ra tic consoli­ w ith sm a lle r states in th e w est. R eligious v a ria tio n exacer­
d a tio n , how ever, failed in th a t p e rio d , a n d th e W e im a r b a te d subregional differences, w ith so u th e rn p a rts o f th e
R epublic collapsed by 1933. T he c o u n try th e n w itn essed G e rm a n re g io n h a v in g larg e C a th o lic p o p u la tio n s (in
th e rise o f a to ta lita ria n regim e. F inally, a fte r G e rm a n y ’s A u s tria a n d B avaria, for exam ple) a n d w ith th e n o rth
defeat in W o rld W a r I I , it has seen th e successful consoli­ te n d in g to w a rd P ro te stan tism . A s is th e case in m uch o f
d a tio n o f a rep resen tativ e dem ocracy, in itially in th e W e s t W e s te rn E u ro p e, G e rm a n society h as seen n o tew o rth y sec­
b u t c o n tin u in g in all o f G e rm a n y w ith re -u n ific a tio n a fte r u la riz a tio n . T he m ajo rity o f th e c o u n try is still nom in ally
th e collapse o f Soviet pow er. In d e e d , m an y see p o te n tia l C h ristia n , b u t rates o f c h u rc h a tte n d an c e are low. T here is a
lessons in th e success o f th is d e m o cratic c onsolidation. sm all M u slim p o p u latio n , m an y o f w h o m are o f T u rk ish d e ­
T oday G e rm a n y is a E u ro p e a n a n d global leader, w ith ro ­ scent. M o re generally, th e q u e stio n o f ho w im m ig ra n ts w ill
b u stly d em o cratic p olitics, a stro n g econom y (a h ig h ly a d ­ be in co rp o ra te d in to G e rm a n society rem ain s an im p o rta n t
v anced one th a t has m an a g ed to m a in ta in stre n g th in th e issue o f som e in te rest to scholars. D e sp ite secularizing
e x p o rt o f m a n u fa c tu re d goods), a n d a re tu rn to in te rn a ­ tren d s, religion still m atters in G e rm a n y (see discussion in
tio n a l influence. F e tze r a n d Soper 2 005).
G e rm a n y ’s g eo g rap h y has h isto ric a lly b e en sh ap ed
by p o litica l division, m o st n o tab ly in th e forced sep aratio n

Historical Development
G e rm a n y ’s m o d e rn h isto ry is e x tra o rd in a rily com plex, w ith b o th A u s tria a n d P ru ssia e x e rtin g leadership. T he
o w in g in p a r t to th e m a n y p o litic a l u n its th a t c o m p o sed p e rio d o f th e co n fed e ratio n w as one o f m o d e rn iz a tio n a n d
th e state. In d e e d , u n til 1871 th e re w as no “G e rm a n y ” in its a tte n d a n t u n c e rta in tie s a n d conflicts: G e rm a n y beg an
th e sense o f a single n a tio n -sta te , b u t ra th e r a com plex in d u stria liz a tio n , w h ile m o d e rn lib erals a n d trad itio n a lists
c o n fig u ra tio n o f sm a lle r states a n d p rin c ip a litie s as w e ll as squabbled. T here w ere p e rio d s o f stre e t c o n te n tio n , m ost
free to w n s. P ru ssia sto o d o u t as a stro n g early sta te a g a in st n o tab ly in 1848, a y e ar in w h ic h m a n y E u ro p e a n c o u n tries
th is b a ck g ro u n d . M o re o v er, it is n o t th a t th e re w as a clear ex p erien ced a tte m p te d revolutions. M o re g e n era lly in th is
an d reco g n izab le “G e r m a n n a tio n ” th a t w as sim ply aw ait­ p e rio d , in te lle ctu a ls a n d a rtists d eveloped ideas o f G e rm a n
in g p o litic a l u n ific a tio n (B erg er 2 0 0 4 ). In d e e d , as h is to ri­ n a tio n h o o d , a n d m an y h o p e d to see th e m m ad e in to a re al­
ans p o in t ou t, m an y re sid en ts o f P ru ssia d id n o t sp e a k ity (B erg er 2 0 0 4 ; G re e n fe ld 1992). C o n flic t b e tw e e n these
G e rm a n , n u m ero u s Sw iss d id (and still do), a n d th e re w as co n te n d ers for d o m in a n c e o f th e co n fed e ratio n issued in th e
little consensus a b o u t w h a t exactly q u a lified o n e as a A u s tro -P ru ssia n W a r (1866), in w h ic h A u s tria w as de­
G e rm a n (K itch e n 2 0 0 6 :9 ; B e rg er 2 0 0 4 ). A t th e sam e tim e , feated. T he G e rm a n C o n fe d e ra tio n w as rep laced by a
a vague sense o f G e rm a n id e n tity h a d develo p ed over th e sm a lle r c o n fed e ratio n , led b y P ru ssia a n d exclu d in g A u stria
course o f th e e ig h te e n th cen tu ry . A t first, th is id e n tity w as a n d p a rts o f S o u th e rn G erm any.
very “c o sm o p o lita n ” a n d focused o n th e id ea o f G e rm a n y T he G e rm a n state w o u ld achieve u n ific atio n in th e w ake
as a c u ltu ra l c o m m u n ity (G re en fe ld 1992; B e rg er 20 0 4 ). o f P ru ssia ’s defeat o f F ra n c e in th e F ra n c o -P ru ssia n W ar,
H ow ever, th e N a p o leo n ic invasions tra n s fo rm e d G e rm a n sealed a t th e B a ttle o f S e d a n in 1871, w h ic h led to th e fall
id en tity , le a d in g to efforts to define G e rm a n n e ss against o f N a p o le o n I I I (for a g o o d overview o f th is p e rio d , see
w h a t F re n c h c iv iliz atio n w as ta k e n to re p re se n t (K itch e n K itch e n 2006). T he u n ite d G e rm a n y — w h ic h excluded
2 0 0 6 ; G re e n fe ld 1992). A u s tria — w as o rg a n iz e d as an E m p ire , referred to as th e
I n th e p o st-N a p o leo n ic years, asp iran ts to a G e rm a n “ Second R eich.” O tto v o n B ism arck, a P ru ssia n “Ju n k e r”
n a tio n -sta te w o u ld have to m ak e do w ith a loose co n fed era­ w h o is considered th e a rc h ite c t o f u n ifie d G e rm an y , and
tio n o f ex istin g u n its, estab lish ed a t th e C o n g re ss o f V ienna, w h o h a d led P ru ssia a n d th e N o r th G e rm a n F ed eratio n in
444 Germany

th e years prior, w as n a m e d chancellor, a p o st th a t he w ould (“o ld ” versus “n ew ” liberals, a n d so fo rth ). B ism arck gov­
hold u n til 1890. e rn e d largely as a conservative b u t m ad e use o f som e ideas
B ism arck is im p o rta n t n o t ju s t because o f G e rm a n y ’s fro m th e m o d era te left. P erh ap s m o st im p o rta n t is th e es­
u n ific atio n a n d th e w ay in w h ic h G e rm a n y ’s u n ific atio n in ­ ta b lish m e n t o f in cip ien t w elfare state fu n c tio n s— disability,
fluenced E u ro p e a n p o w er politics— follo w in g th e F ra n c o - u n e m p lo y m en t, a n d h e a lth in su ra n ce , as w ell as p ensions—
P ru ssian W a r G e rm a n y em erged as E u ro p e ’s c en tral in th e 1880s (E sp in g -A n d e rse n 1990: 24), to be ex p an d ed
pow er— b u t also because o f th e w ay h e m a n a g ed dom estic in th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry (M a res 2001: 6 0 -6 3 ; H e n tsc h e l
politics. G e rm a n y w as d ivided b e tw e e n conservatives w h o 2 0 0 8 : 7 9 3 -8 0 1 ). T hese p ro g ram s w ere n o t as generous as
su p p o rte d m onarchy, liberals, a n d socialists a n d social la te r w elfare sta te p ro g ram s w o u ld be, n o r as generous as
dem ocrats. P o litical p a rtie s a n d in te lle c tu a l groups p ro lif­ th e social dem o crats w a n ted . T he G e rm a n im p e ria l state
e rated , a n d th ere w ere m an y subtypes o f th ese categories also e x te n d ed suffrage to all m ales.

Historical D evelopm ent

Tim elin e
1648 Treaty of Westphalia signals rise of modern nation­ groups. Germany invades and occupies much of
state system; present-day Germany governed by western Europe, bombs Britain extensively, and
many principalities. invades Russia, but ultimately retreats. Retreat from
1815 End of Napoleonic Wars; Congress of Vienna Russia in 1943 and D-Day in 1944 (Allied invasion
gives rise to loose Germanic Confederation led by of occupied France) signal beginning of the end
Prussia (present-day northern Germany) and ofThird Reich.
Austria. 1945 Allies (including Soviet Union, Great Britain, United
1834 Establishment of the Zollverein (Customs Union) in States, France) take Berlin.Third Reich Falls; Hitler
the Confederation commits suicide. Soviets occupy East Germany;
1848 Revolutionary upheaval in Europe, including in Americans, British, and French occupy West
German states Germany.
1864 German-Danish War over Schleswig-Holstein 1945-1989 Germany divided into Communist East Germany
1866 Led by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck, Prussia and democratic/capitalist West Germany; major
defeats powerful Austria in Austro-Prussian War. repression in East Germany.
1870 Prussia defeats France in Franco-Prussian War. 1948 Berlin Airlift
1871 Unification of Germany under Prussian leadership 1950 Treaty of Rome begins integration in western
1914-1918 World War I. Germany joins Austria-Hungary and Europe of European Community, with West
Ottoman Empire as Central Powers vs. Great Britain, Germany and France leading.
France, and Russia as Allies; United States enters 1961 Berlin Wall raised overnight by Soviets and East
war on side of Allies in 1916. German regime.
1918 Armistice ends World War I, with Great Britain and 1989 Fall of the Berlin Wall signals end of Communism.
France demanding reparations from Germany and 1990 Reunification of East and West Germany as
demilitarization of Rheinland. Federal Republic of Germany (Helmut Kohl,
1919-1933 Weimar Republic presides over hyperinflation and chancellor)
Great Depression. 1980s-1990s European integration accelerates (Single European
Hitler elected chancellor as head of National Act, 1987; Maastricht Treaty, 1992 through 1999).
Socialist (Nazi) Party, establishes "Third Reich." 2002 Euro begins circulating as new currency, with
Germany invades Poland; Great Britain and France Deutschmark phased out.
declare war on Germany. 2005 Angela Merkel becomes Germany's first female
1939-1945 World War II. The Holocaust, led by Adolf Hitler chancellor.
and the Nazi Party, results in the extermination 2011-2015 Countries in the eurozone face the need for finan­
of 6 million Jews as well as members of many other cial bailouts, which are resisted in Germany.
 Profile 445

In econom ic term s, la te -n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry G e rm a n y b it m ore th a n a decade, c ollapsing as th e N a zis ascended to

saw c o n tin u e d in d u stria liz a tio n a n d g ro w th . T he c o u n try pow er.
cam e to rival B rita in in m an y respects (K itch e n 2006). Its S om e o f th e m ajor problem s w ere consequences o f th e
econom y w as p a rtic u la rly s tro n g in som e areas, lik e c h em i­ T re a ty o f V ersailles, w h ic h en d ed W o rld W a r I. D e sp ite th e
cal eng in eerin g . Its research u n iversities w ere im p o rta n t as o bjections o f som e i f its allies, F ran ce in sisted o n disabling
w ell, a n d w ere em u la te d elsew here, in c lu d in g in th e U n ite d in d e m n itie s for G e rm a n y to pay indefinitely. T his c o n d itio n
States. g e n era te d d isc o n te n t a n d p rovoked re se n tm e n t am o n g th e
In term s o f fo reig n policy, th e state ru sh e d to com pete G e rm a n p o p u la tio n th a t w o u ld late r feed in to critiques o f
w ith m ore estab lish ed co lonial pow ers in th e “scram ble for th e W e im a r R ep u b lic’s lib e ral order, a n d it also w eak en ed
A frica ,” th o u g h G e rm a n y never successfully e stab lish e d a th e sta te ’s econom ic p o sitio n (F u lb ro o k 1990: 163-164).
large colonial system (K itch e n 2 0 0 6 : 168-169). B ism arck, T he s itu a tio n w as e x ac erb a ted w h e n th e g lo b a l d e p res­
hav in g a lie n ated F ran ce n o t ju s t th ro u g h d e fea tin g th e m in sio n sp re ad to G e rm a n y (Jam es 2 0 0 9 ). S o c ie ty p o la riz e d
th e F ra n c o -P ru ssia n W a r b u t in ta k in g A lsa c e -L o rra in e as p o litica lly , a n d in s titu tio n a l a lte ra tio n s to th e W e im a r
p a rt o f th e peace se ttle m e n t, essentially b u ilt his foreign R e p u b lic c o u ld n o t h elp . T he N a z i p a r ty d id w e ll in th e
policy a ro u n d m a n ip u la tin g alliances such th a t F rance 1930 a n d 1932 leg islativ e e le ctio n s, a n d H itle r cam e in
w o u ld b e u n a b le to m a k e c o m m o n cause w ith R u ssia, seco n d , w ith a p p ro x im a te ly 37 p e rc e n t in th e p re sid e n tia l
A u s tria , a n d /o r th e U n ite d K in g d o m a g a in s t th e n e w e le ctio n s o f 1932 (K itc h e n 2 0 0 6 : 2 49, 251). I n 1933 H itle r
G e rm a n state. P erhaps surprisingly, h e w as able to do so w as a p p o in te d c h an c ello r, th e p o sitio n fro m w h ic h he
w ith success, th o u g h h isto ria n s te n d to see th e se ttle m e n t w o u ld d ism a n tle th e W e im a r o rd e r a n d , w ith it, G e rm a n
o f th e F ra n c o -P ru ssia n W a r a n d th e su b seq u en t d iplom acy dem ocracy.
o f b in d in g alliances as c ritica l to th e d ev elo p m en t o f th e T his b rin g s o u r sh o rt n arrativ e to th e in fam o u s p e rio d o f
F irst W o rld W ar. th e N a z i P a rty ’s d o m in an ce o f G erm any. U n d e r H itle r, the
L ea d ersh ip w as less capable follow ing B ism arc k ’s d e ­ N azis quick ly m oved to u n d e rm in e th e ru le o f law a n d th e
p a rtu re from office in 1890 (K itch e n 2 0 0 6 ). A fte r a Serbian e x istin g c o n stitu tio n a l order. T hey d id so b o th th ro u g h
n a tio n a list lin k e d to som e figures in th e S erbian go v ern ­ fo rm al in stitu tio n a l m eans (e.g., th e “E n a b lin g L aw ” o f
m en t killed A rc h d u k e F ra n z F e rd in an d o f A u stria , w a r 1933) a n d inform ally, such as d u rin g th e “n ig h t o f th e long
began, and G e rm an y jo in ed A u stria (D avies 1996: 875-895). k nives” in w h ic h th e N azis p u rg e d political elites (F u lb ro o k
Russia backed Serbia, a n d F rance a n d th e U n ited K ingdom 1 9 9 0 :1 7 8 -1 8 7 ). G e rm a n y becam e a to ta lita ria n police state.
allied w ith Russia. T he U n ite d States w o u ld soon jo in th e M o s t a la rm in g o f all, th e a n ti-S e m itism th a t h a d b een
allies as w ell. W o rld W a r I w as a b ru tal conflict, in w hich p re sen t in G e rm a n y for years (K itch e n 2 0 0 6 :1 3 3 -1 3 8 ), a n d
tren ch w arfare w as p re d o m in an t. W h ile som e foresaw th e b e en a p ro m in e n t p a r t o f H itle r’s rh e to ric, cam e fully out
im plications o f new m ilita ry technology a n d strategy, m any in to th e lig h t o f day (F u lb ro o k 1 9 9 0 :1 9 6 -2 0 3 ). Jew ish id en ­
o f th e com batants a n d citizens o n b o th sides w ere shocked by tity w as legally defined, a n d a series o f d isc rim in ato ry laws
th e tragedy o f w ebs o f alliances a n d concerns over natio n al w ere p assed, w h ic h increasingly circu m scrib ed G e rm a n
ho nor leading to years sp en t in th e m ud, w ith m illions o f Jew s’ m o v em en t w ith in th e society. V iolence a g ain st Jew s
deaths in a w ar th a t w as basically a t a stalem ate for m u ch o f becam e increasingly co m m o n , notably th e m ass violence o f
its duratio n (W eber 1972: 363-370). Its global consequences th e K rista lln a c h t o f 1938. E ven m ore chillingly, th e regim e
w ere far-reaching. A s w e shall see, it c h an g e d G e rm a n poli­ aim e d to sequester Jew s in c o n ce n tra tio n cam ps w ith u lti­
tics forever, b u t it also produced th e circum stances o f th e m ately g e n o cid al p u rp o ses. H isto ria n s estim a te th a t aro u n d
R ussian R evolution, w h ic h led to th e fo rm atio n o f th e Soviet 6 m illio n Jew s w ere m u rd ere d b y th e N azis. T his religious
U nion. m in o rity suffered m ore th a n m o st, b u t o th e r groups, such as
G e rm a n y ’s defeat m e a n t th e e n d o f th e E m p ire . A new, Poles, Soviet C itiz en s, G ypsies, hom osexuals, a n d even
rep u b lican g o v e rn m e n t w as form ed. T he n ew fo rm o f th e som e C h ristia n religious actors, as w ell as political activists
G e rm a n state, k n o w n as th e W e im a r R epublic because its op p o sed to th e N azis, w ere also oppressed a n d m u rd ere d in
c o n stitu tio n w as estab lish ed in th e c ity o f W e im a r, w as g re at num bers.
h a m p e re d fro m th e s ta rt by a series o f difficulties (F u lb ro o k H itle r ’s foreig n policy w as e x p an sio n a ry (F u lb ro o k
1990: 155). D e sp ite g re at h o p es, it w o u ld o n ly survive for a 1990: 187-195), a n d G e rm a n y ’s te rrito ria l am b itio n s led to
446 Germany

th e S econd W o rld W ar. G e rm a n y to o k C zech o slo v ak ia in re m a in as such to d ay in u n ifie d G erm any). U n lik e in th e
1938 a fte r th e fam ous a tte m p t b y N e v ille C h a m b e rla in to W e im a r R epublic (K itch e n 20 0 6 ), p o st-w a r G e rm a n y w as
“appease” H itle r at M u n ic h . In 1939 G e rm a n y invaded n o t d a m a g ed by relentless conflict b e tw e e n sm all parties.
P oland, a n d W o rld W a r I I b eg an . A t first th e Soviet U n io n M oreover, key leaders o f b o th p a rties, lik e K o n rad A d e n au e r
w as n o t p a r t o f th e h o stilitie s, S ta lin a n d H itle r hav in g (a C h ris tia n D e m o cra t) a n d W illy B ra n d t (a S ocial D e m o ­
signed a n o n -ag g ressio n p act, b u t th e N azis h a d no in te n ­ crat), p layed key roles in th e o n g o in g d e m o c ratic consoli­
tio n o f lo n g -te rm coexistence w ith a m ajor socialist pow er d a tio n o f W e s t G erm an y . T he E a s t G e rm a n state, perhaps
(K itch e n 2 006: 2 9 7 -2 9 8 , 3 0 1 -3 0 4 ). W h ile F rance quickly o w in g to its statu s as a satellite, w as ju d g e d by m o st to be
fell to G e rm an y , th e c o lla b o ra tin g V ichy reg im e p u t in less successful, w ith p o o r econom ic p e rfo rm an ce over m an y
place, B rita in a n d later th e Soviet U n io n fo u g h t persis­ years.
tently. T hey w ere jo in e d by th e U n ite d S tates a fte r Ja p a n ’s A s p a r t o f th e w ave o f revolutions th a t sw ept C e n tra l
a tta c k o n P earl H a rb o r in D e ce m b er o f 1941. I t to o k u n til a n d E a s te rn E u ro p e a n d b ro u g h t th e Soviet U n io n to an
1945, b u t th e A llie s w ere e v e n tu a lly tr iu m p h a n t, a n d e nd, th e B erlin W a ll fell in 1989, a n d E a s t a n d W e s t
G e rm a n y w as p a rtia lly d estro y ed in th e process. G e rm a n y w ere u n ifie d in 1990. E a s t G e rm an y , o w in g to
T he e ffo rt to re c o n stru c t G e rm a n y — econom ically, p o ­ decades sp e n t as a c o m m a n d econom y a n d w ith political
litically, a n d socially— w as d a u n tin g . T he S oviet U n io n su b o rd in a tio n to th e Soviet U n io n , h a d a low er level o f so­
h a d o c cu p ied th e e aste rn p o rtio n o f th e c o u n try w h ile th e cioeconom ic d evelopm ent. T he re u n ifica tio n o f G e rm a n y
U n ite d K in g d o m , F ra n c e, a n d th e U n ite d S tates occu p ied re su lte d in m ajor tran sfers o f resources fro m w e st to east.
th e w est. T hese w o u ld b eco m e tw o d is tin c t sta te s, th e D e sp ite th e fa c t th a t th is has p a rtia lly re d re sse d th e im ­
F e d e ral R epublic o f G e rm a n y (W e st G e rm an y ) a n d th e b a la n ce s in e co n o m ic d e v elo p m en t, differences are still
G e rm a n D e m o c ra tic R e p u b lic (E a s t G e rm an y ). W e s t visible.
G e rm a n y em b raced lib e ral d e m o c rac y a n d a m ix e d eco n ­ T h ro u g h o u t re ce n t decades, G e rm a n y has b e e n a leader
om y, w ith stro n g su p p o rt for so cial d e m o c rac y a n d a re la ­ in th e c rea tio n a n d exp an sio n o f th e E u ro p e a n U n io n . I t
tively ro b u st w elfare state. E a s t G e rm a n y b ecam e a w as a n in itia to r o f th e pro ject o f E u ro p e a n in te g ratio n , b e ­
satellite sta te o f th e S oviet U n io n . E c o n o m ic re c o n stru c ­ g in n in g in th e 1950s w ith free tra d e in coal a n d steel, a n d
tio n o f W e s t G e rm a n y w as g re a tly a id e d b y fu n d s fro m th e th e n m o v in g to a c o m m o n m ark e t, c o m m o n tra d e policies,
U n ite d S tates in th e form o f th e M a rs h a ll P la n (D avies a n d u ltim a te ly to a c o m m o n c u rre n c y a n d o p en borders
1996: 1080). w ith in p a rts o f th e c o n tin e n t. W h ile th e process o f
C u ltu ra l re co n stru c tio n w as p e rh ap s ju s t as co m p li­ E u ro p e a n in te g ra tio n has b e e n rem arkable, th e reg io n has
cated, i f n o t m ore so. Successive g en eratio n s o f G e rm a n s fallen o n m ore d ifficult tim es even as G e rm a n y has b o o m ed
h a d to redefine th e ir id e n tity a fte r th e h isto ric a l crim es o f econom ically. T his has p u t th e E u ro u n d e r pressure, w ith
th e N azis (see discussion in 0 1 ic k 2 0 0 5 ), try in g to re h ab ili­ G e rm a n s b e in g faced w ith a dilem m a: T he c o u n try is hesi­
tate a sense o f G e rm a n -n e ss th a t w as n o t im p lica ted a n d ta n t to b a il o u t c o u n tries facin g financial difficulties in th e
th a t w o u ld n o t be likely to issue in a re tu rn to m ilita n t xe­ e u ro zo n e, b u t it also is th e key player th a t m u st d o so i f th e
nophobia. A g a in st th e skeptics, W e s t G e rm a n y h a d success eu ro zo n e is to h o ld to g eth e r. I n sh o rt, re ce n t e conom ic tu r ­
in b u ild in g a largely to le ran t, fu n c tio n a l, dem o cratic soci­ b ulence has c o n firm ed w h a t G e rm a n y ’s tu m u ltu o u s h isto ry
ety, one th a t has largely b e e n econom ically successful to has u n d e rlin ed : T he c o u n try has em erged as c o n te m p o ra ry
b o o t. A stable p a rty system developed (D avies 1996: 1074), E u ro p e ’s m o st im p o rta n t pow er, th o u g h th ere is d isc o m fo rt
w ith th e C h ristia n D e m o cra tic U n io n P a rty a n d th e Social w ith th is role am o n g som e G e rm a n s a n d som e outside o f
D e m o cra tic P a rty b e in g th e m o st im p o rta n t (and th e y G erm any.

Regime and Political Institutions

The head o f governm ent in th e Federal Republic o f G erm any’s study on pages 451-452) after legislative elections. Since no
parliam entary system is the chancellor, a position com parable single p a rty is usually able to attain a m ajority o f seats in the
to a prim e m inister. The chancellor is selected by th e lower B undestag, G erm any’s chancellor regularly governs at the head
house o f the legislature, the B undestag (see the chapter 9 case o f a coalition o f tw o or m ore parties. T he chancellor him self/
herself is alm ost always either from th e C h ristian D em ocratic exam ples like G e rh ard Schroder or W illy Brandt). The chan­
U nion P a rty (C D U , an example being current chancellor cellor’s pow er is lim ited by G erm any’s federalism , w hich em ­
A ngela M erkel, or, in earlier years, H e lm u t K ohl or K onrad powers representatives o f th e states (Lander) in the upper
A denauer) or the Social D em ocratic P a rty (SP D , w ith house (Bundesrat) to vote on all legislation affecting th e states.

Regime and Political Institutions

Regime Democratically elected federal republic

Administrative Divisions 16 Lander (states)

Executive Branch Chancellor (head of government)

President (head of state, ceremonial)

Selection of Executive Selected by Bundestag

Legislative Branch Bicameral

Lower chamber: Bundestag; members elected by mixed system of districts, proportional
representation
Upper chamber: Bundesrat; members selected by Lander (state) governments

Judicial Branch Constitutional Court with powers of judicial review

Political Party System Multiparty, with frequent coalitions

Main parties: CDU (center-right), SPD (center-left), Greens (left), Liberals (right), Left. Of these, the CDU
and the SPD have historically been predominant.

T h o u g h lim ite d b y c o alitio n p olitics a n d federalism , E u ro p e a n U n io n . In p a rtic u la r, th e E u ro p e a n C e n tra l

chancellors a n d th e ir c abinets can rely o n considerable B a n k is a E u ro p e -w id e in s titu tio n th a t presides over th e
p a rty d iscipline to pass legislation (see th e c h a p te r 11 case c o m m o n c u rren cy k n o w n as th e E u ro , b u t it is located in
stu d y o n pages 4 5 2 -4 5 3 ). I n a d d itio n , G e rm a n y is arguably F r a n k fu rt a n d is seen as sh a p e d b y G e rm a n econom ic po li­
th e c en tra l player in E u ro p e , a n d its g o v e rn m e n t has a cies. (See c h a p te r 16 for a lo n g er discussion o f th e E u ro p e a n
m ajor role in sh a p in g th e actio n s a n d policies o f th e b ro ad er U nion.)

Political Culture
M u c h a tte n tio n has b e en focused o n n a tio n a lism as a key In d e e d , th is has p erh ap s b e e n the c en tra l q u e stio n o f
featu re o f G e rm a n p o litica l c u ltu re , w ith considerable p re ­ G e rm a n p o litica l c u ltu re since th e Second W o rld W ar. The
o ccupation, very un d erstan d ab ly , w ith th e N a z i reg im e o f p o litica l rig h t in G e rm a n y w as so d e -le g itim a te d by associ­
th e 1930s a n d 1940s. A w hole in d u stry o f sch o larsh ip at­ atio n w ith th e N a zis as to re n d e r a conservative n atio n alism
tem p ts to u n p a c k th e rela tio n sh ip b e tw e e n th a t reg im e a n d alm o st im possible. T he c en ter-rig h t (led b y A d e n au e r a n d
th e lo n g -ru n G e rm a n p o litic a l-c u ltu ra l tra d itio n (see, for th e C h ris tia n D em o crats) w as d o m in a n t in th e early years,
exam ple, discussion in G re en fe ld 1992; G o ld h a g e n 1996; b u t th is w as n o t a rig h t-w in g ideological g ro u p b u t ra th e r a
B ro w n in g 1992; as w ell as in B erg er 20 0 4 ). P recisely b e ­ m o d erate regim e th a t focused o n re co n stru c tio n a n d stabi­
cause th is im p o rta n t conversation has received so m u ch at­ liz a tio n o f th e society (K itch e n 200 6 : 3 1 6 -3 4 5 ; D avies
te n tio n , w e focus less c en trally o n it here. 1996: 1072). L ater, th e S ocial D e m o cra ts w o u ld have g re at
R a th e r, w e w ill note th a t a key aspect o f G e rm a n p o liti­ success, p a rtic u la rly d u rin g th e ch an cello rsh ip o f W illy
cal cu ltu re — b o th E a s t a n d W e s t before re -u n ific a tio n — B ra n d t, u n d e r w hose lead ersh ip G e rm a n y aim e d to b o th
has cen tered o n h o w G e rm a n id e n tity can b e re c o n stitu te d m a in ta in its alliances w ith th e o th e r W e s te rn dem ocracies
follow ing th a t sham eful episode in th e n a tio n ’s history. a n d achieve a p a rtia l ra p p ro c h e m e n t w ith th e Soviet U n io n
448 Germany

(K itch en 200 6 : 3 5 4 -3 6 1 ; D avies 1996: 1114). M o re gen er­ T h ere is a n o th e r re la te d q u e stio n o f p o litic a l c u ltu re
ally, b o th p a rties have stu c k to a relatively safe p o sitio n in a n d G e rm a n y ’s a d a p ta tio n to th e p o st-w a r w orld. T his is
su p p o rt o f th e w elfare state. In sh o rt, G e rm a n y ’s experi­ th e role o f G e rm a n y as th e p rim e m over in E u ro p e a n u n i­
ences w ith political in sta b ility in th e W e im a r years and fication. M u c h o f th e p o litic a l in n o v a tio n o f th e p e rio d
w ith to ta lita ria n ism in th e 1930s a n d 1940s seem to have a fte r 1945 in E u ro p e has com e w ith th e crea tio n o f new
led th e c o u n try to b e h e alth ily w a ry o f rad ical p o larizatio n . su p e r-n a tio n a l in stitu tio n s at th e E u ro p e a n level. G e rm a n y
O n th e o th e r h a n d , G e rm a n y has som etim es b e e n a t th e a n d F ra n c e have b e e n th e p illars o f th is lo n g e x p erim e n t
fo refront o f efforts to e x p erim e n t w ith d ire c t dem ocracy fro m th e b e g in n in g , a lo n g w ith Ita ly a n d th e sm aller
a n d related ideas. F or exam ple, a n u m b er o f its states, p a r­ B en elu x c o u n tries o f B elg iu m , th e N e th e rla n d s , a n d
ticu larly B avaria, sta n d o u t for th e ir fre q u e n t use o f refer­ L u x em b o u rg . A t its o rig in s, th e E u ro p e a n U n io n (w hich
enda. Perhaps m ore quixotically, a n u m b e r o f G e rm a n w as k n o w n previously b y d iffere n t n am es such as th e
localities have issued local currencies, a t least som e o f th em E u ro p e a n C o m m u n ity ) w as w id ely seen as a n effo rt by
h o p in g to resist excess “co m m o d ific atio n ” a n d to re ta in th e c o n tin e n ta l pow ers to p re clu d e fu tu re w a rs th ro u g h
local c o n tro l o f econom ic processes by d o in g so. F inally, th e econom ic, social, a n d p o litica l co o p era tio n . A s o f 2015,
G re e n p a rty has done w ell in G e rm a n y (indeed, G e rm a n y m a n y c o m m e n ta to rs are le ft w o n d e rin g a b o u t th e fu tu re o f
has h a d a s tro n g e n v iro n m en ta l m ovem ent m ore generally), th is in itia tiv e , due to fin an c ia l p roblem s in a n u m b e r o f
a n o th e r exam ple o f innovative, b ro ad ly so cial-d em o cratic e u ro zo n e c o u n tries.
tendencies.

Political Economy
G e rm a n y is by m o st c o u n ts th e w o rld ’s fifth -la rg e st econ­ investm ents o f m o d erate size, th e G e rm a n experience w as
omy, c o m in g b e h in d o nly th e U n ite d States, C h in a , Jap an , m ore based in in v estm en t fro m m ajor sources o f capital,
a n d I n d ia (on th e basis o f p u rc h asin g pow er). T he in d u stria l such as in d u stria l inv estm en t b an k s a n d th e state its e lf
pow erhouse w as th e w o rld ’s larg e st e x p o rte r for som e years, (K u rth 1979), th o u g h scholars debate th e extent to w hich
before ced in g th a t h o n o r to C h in a m ore recently. By v irtu e state involvem ent w as a factor (H e n tsch e l 200 8 : 753).
o f its size a n d p ro m in en ce, G e rm a n y is th e en g in e o f th e G e rm a n y ’s ab ility to catch u p to th e likes o f B rita in even led
E u ro p e a n U n io n , th e w o rld ’s larg e st econom ic free trad e to th e d evelopm ent o f theories th a t th ere could be “a dvan­
area, w h ic h has a co m bined econom y so m ew h at larg e r th a n tages to back w ard n ess,” as relatively less developed countries
th a t o f th e U n ite d States. T he c o u n try ’s econom ic m odel w ould create th e large in stitu tio n s needed to p u sh develop­
contains m an y free m ark e t elem ents, b u t also featu res an m e n t forw ard a n d leapfrog th e leader (G e rsc h en k ro n 1962).
active state role in in v estm e n t, in b u ild in g h u m a n capital, By th e early tw e n tie th century, G e rm a n y w as one o f th e
a n d in p ro v id in g su p p o rt for th e v u lnerable. E co n o m ic d e ­ w o rld ’s in d u stria l a n d econom ic leaders. T he tw e n tie th cen­
c isio n -m a k in g since W o rld W a r I I has p rio ritiz e d consen­ tu ry b ro u g h t m assive upheaval, especially a fte r G e rm a n y ’s
sus b e tw ee n m ajor econom ic actors, in c lu d in g co rp o ratio n s, d e fe a t in W o rld W a r I. A f te r th e w a r, G e rm a n y w e n t
lab o r u n io n s, a n d th e state. A t th e sam e tim e , it has show n th ro u g h th e h o rro rs o f th e G re a t D epression, d u rin g w hich
less w illin g n e ss to engage in K eynesian counter-cyclical th e c o u n try suffered h yperinflation.
sp e n d in g (A llen 1989) th a n o th e r m ajo r advanced in d u s­ T his sequence o f events c o n trib u te d to th e rise o f th e
tria l societies, re m a in in g fiscally cautious. N azis a n d A d o lf H itle r; W o rld W a r I I th e n b ro u g h t d e ­
The h isto ry o f th e G e rm a n econom y is one o f th e m o st stru c tio n to m u ch o f E u ro p e, a n d u ltim ate ly to G e rm a n y
in trig u in g a n d m o st closely stu d ie d in th e area o f develop­ itself. F ro m 1945 to 1990, th e c o u n try w as split in to th e
m en t. A t th e tim e o f th e n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry In d u stria l cap italist W e s t a n d th e C o m m u n ist E ast, w ith th e la tte r
R evolution, G e rm a n y fell b e h in d G re a t B rita in as th e lead ­ fa llin g far b e h in d W e s t G e rm a n y econom ically. W e st
in g econom ic pow er, b u t soon g rew p o w e rfu l by d eveloping G e rm a n y w as q u ite successful a fte r th e w ar, as w as Jap an ,
a steel industry, heav y in d u stry , a n d railroads. In c o n tra st w h ic h led to th e th e o ry th a t th e loss in th e w a r h a d elim i­
w ith a B ritish econom ic m o d el th a t w as relatively free - n a te d th e m an y “special in te rests” in politics th a t com plicate
trad e a n d fre e -m a rk e t o rien ted a n d based on private reform ; th is w o u ld e xplain success relative to v ictors such as
 Case Studies 449

th e U n ite d K in g d o m a n d th e U n ite d States (O lso n 1984). n o rth e rn E u ro p e in te rm s o f p ro d u c tiv ity . T his situ atio n
A fte r th e fall o f th e B erlin W a ll signified th e e n d o f th e has ra ised th e p ro sp e c t th a t som e c o u n tries m ig h t n e e d to
C o ld W a r in 1989, G e rm a n y reu n ified in 1990 a n d re su m ed d ro p th e e u ro as a c u rre n c y to re g a in th e ir c o m p e titiv e ­
its place as one o f th e w o rld ’s lea d in g econom ies. ness. F ro m th e p e rsp ec tiv e o f m an y G e rm a n s, th e ir so u th ­
P e r estim ates for 201 3 , 30 p e rce n t o f G e rm a n y ’s G D P e rn n e ig h b o rs have liv e d b e y o n d th e ir m ea n s for years
com es fro m in d u stria l p ro d u c tio n , 69 p e rce n t com es from (d raw in g s u p p o rt fro m econom ies su c h as G e rm a n y ’s) a n d
th e service sector, a n d only 0.8 p e rc e n t com es fro m th e ag­ no w m u st m ak e th e p a in fu l a d ju stm e n ts n ecessary to com ­
ric u ltu ra l secto r (C IA W o rld F actbook). G e rm a n y ’s u n e m ­ p ete. H o w ev er, G e rm a n y to o has d e p e n d e d o n e co n o m i­
plo y m en t rate w as e stim a te d a t 5.3 p e rce n t (C IA W o rld cally viable so u th e rn n e ig h b o rs, b o th as m ark e ts fo r its
F ac tb o o k 2013), w h ic h is q u ite low b y E u ro p e a n sta n d ard s, e x p o rts a n d as d e stin a tio n s fo r a g o o d d e al o f th e c ap ital in
especially since th e econom ic crisis th a t b e g an in 2 0 0 8 . its b a n k in g sector. P e rsp e ctiv es c ritic a l o f G e rm a n y have
G e rm a n y ’s g in i in d ex is 30 .6 , acco rd in g to W o rld B a n k es­ h e ld th a t it is fo rcin g o th e r E u ro p e a n c o u n tries to c u t
tim a te s, w h ich m akes th e G e rm a n incom e d istrib u tio n p u b lic services and red u ce w ages (p erh ap s because
fairly e g alita ria n by com parative stan d ard s. G e rm a n s are c o n ce rn ed a b o u t in fla tio n ), even th o u g h
B e g in n in g in 2011, a b ig q u e stio n for G e rm a n y ’s eco n ­ G e rm a n y h a s re lie d o n th e re st o f E u ro p e as w ell. T his
om y has b e e n w h e th e r th e e u ro zo n e w ill h o ld to g eth e r. situ a tio n show s th e in te rd e p e n d e n c e o f in te rn a tio n a l eco n ­
T he q u e stio n has a risen as several so u th e rn E u ro p e a n o m ies in th e p re se n t day, a n d e sp ecially in E u ro p e . A s o f
econom ies (m o st n o tab ly G re ec e , b u t also S p a in a n d P o r­ 2 0 1 5 , deb ates a b o u t th e e u ro z o n e ’s fu tu re c o n tin u e , w ith
tu g a l, a m o n g o th ers) have lag g e d b e h in d G e rm a n y a n d G e rm a n y p la y in g a le a d in g role.

CASESTUDIES
IH I

The German State: Unification and Welfare CHAPTER 4, PAGE 87

The story of the unification of the German Prussia and Austria (first the remnant of So why did the state finally develop?
state is a complex one for the major the Holy Roman Empire): Rather than a Arguments could be made in support of
theories of state formation considered single German center of power there each of the major theories of state forma­
in chapter 3. Judged against European were two, and neither was sufficiently tion considered in chapter 3. Proponents
benchmarks, the German state devel­ strong to decisively vanquish or incorpo­ of the cultural theory might point to
oped late (1871), though Prussia devel­ rate the other. Still others would focus on the prior development of German na­
oped a strong state in the eighteenth local traditions of dependence in smaller tionalism (discussed further in the case
century (Anderson 1974). The question of states like Bavaria, and pressure from study "Ethnic Boundaries of the German
why Germany was so late to modern other powers (to take just one example, Nation?”). Its emergence among some
state-building is a difficult one to answer, after the Hanoverian succession the Brit­ German elites predated unification by
and in part will depend on which theory ish Crown was eager to ensure that Ha­ about a century, though even at unifica­
of state formation one finds most plausi­ nover remained their possession and was tion not all residents of the German state
ble. Most would agree that at certain criti­ not swallowed up). Some would argue would be committed German national­
cal junctures (e.g., the aftermath of the that the very question is confused: With ists. Given that national identity demands
Protestant Reformation) divisions be­ something like state formation, perhaps that the nation be sovereign, and given
tween small-scale political and cultural we should not ask why it didn't happen the challenges inherent in exercising such
units were reinforced. Others would likely when and where it didn't but why it did sovereignty without a unified state, pro­
place emphasis on the rivalry between happen when and where it did. ponents of this theory would suggest that
450 Germany

C A S E S T U D Y (co n tin u ed )

The German State: Unification and Welfare CHAPTER 4, PAGE 87

it explains state formation by pointing to a "state system." Tendencies toward orga­ have considered a brilliant political move,
the collective motive to form a state. The nizational imitation might be taken to ex­ Bismarck co-opted some social demo­
Bellicist theory would focus on war plain the rise of the German state. Think a cratic demands by authorizing a system of
making, noting the centrality of interstate bit about how one might try to gain some social insurance (Esping-Andersen 1990:
conflict to the rise of Prussia and to its empirical leverage in testing these theo­ 24; Flentschel 2008: 793). This was no
eventual displacement of Austria. They ries of German state formation. twentieth-century welfare state, but it did
would further stress that Prussia's defeat Germany is also of interest because— provide disability and health care insur­
of France was the decisive element in es­ despite its later problems— it was one of ance as well as retirement benefits. Some
tablishing the formation of a broader the first states to move toward welfare would argue that the German Empire's
German state. Economic theories of the functions. Flere Bismarck was again impor­ early welfare state construction was criti­
state would focus on efforts by Friedrich tant. Bismarck was a junker (junkers were cal to the success of its state formation.
List and others to industrialize Germany. often relatively poor but proud nobles One question you might ask is why wel­
From this point of view, we should be at­ from eastern Germany who traced their fare state construction was so closely
tentive to the fact that one of the earlier noble status back to the medieval period), linked to state formation more generally
organizations that produced some unity and members of his social class tended in this case. Come back to this case study
was the Zollverein (Flentschel 2008: 762), to be quite conservative. Conservatives when you have finished reading all of
which managed customs on trade within strongly opposed the socialist and social chapter 3 (if you have not already finished
Germany. Finally, diffusion and systems democratic activists, like Marx (exiled to that chapter), and think about the implica­
theories would point to the fact that, from England) and Lasalle, who were active or tions of each theory of welfare state for­
at least 1648 on, Europe was governed by influential in the period. In what some mation you find there.

n
. ' .T

Democracy and Authoritarianism in Germany CHAPTER 7, PAGE 157

Many people know of German Nazism ongoing democratic status of contem­ Weimar Republic, but it would be for
(1933-1945) as the epitome of twentieth- porary Germany. naught (for more on this fascinating
century totalitarianism, with its denial of In the German Empire after unifica­ period, see the essays in McEliigott 2009).
basic human rights and its culmination tion there were democratic elements, Serious economic problems, resulting
in the atrocities of the Flolocaust. But it is most notably that suffrage was extended from both the Treaty of Versailles and, later,
important to consider German history in to all males for voting in legislative elec­ the Great Depression, compounded the
the twentieth century as a set of shifts tions. Yet few would describe this system existent political polarization of German
between democratic and authoritarian as "democratic," since the chancellor society. Political parties proliferated, and
rule. In other words, Nazism is not the (Bismarck until 1890) and the Kaiser despite institutional changes meant to
whole story in Germany. This is a country (Wilhelm I and II) held disproportionate quell disorder, Hitler and the Nazis would
that has seen oscillations between de­ power. After the collapse of this system eventually take power. It is unclear how
mocracy and democratic breakdown, as a result of the First World War, the long and in what form the Nazi regime
culminating in democratic consolida­ country embarked upon an experiment would have lasted if it were not for the
tion over the last fifty years such that with a democratic republic. Great effort Second World War, but in any case military
virtually no observers worry about the was expended on the constitution of this defeat brought the Nazi era to a close. This
 Case Studies 451

CASE STUDY (continued)

||g|
Democracy and Authoritarianism in Germany CHAPTER 7, PAGE 157

led to an externally imposed transition in War (Schmidt 2008: 58-59) and (2) the repudiation that democracy's legitimacy
East and West Germany. successful re-unification of Germany and was high (indeed, in general, the defeat of
Here, as discussed in the Germany the continuation of the country's robust the axis powers was linked to a global wave
country profile, Germany's political history democracy in the face of re-unification. of democratic prestige).
bifurcates until 1990. During the Cold War, The case of West German democratiza­ The case of unification is a bit more
Germany was divided into a democratic tion is fairly singular. In other words, the useful for comparative analysis, if for no
West Germany and a Communist East degree to which it can serve as a model for other reason than not all of the aforemen­
Germany. Thus the eastern part of today's other regimes seeking to make a demo­ tioned conditions apply to the case. So far
Germany experienced both of the twenti­ cratic transition is limited. First of all, the at least, the unified Germany has defied
eth century's most infamous forms of totali­ authoritarian regime fell because it was de­ fears that it would come to dominate
tarian rule: Nazism and Soviet Communism. feated by foreign powers. Second, those Europe or revert to the authoritarian im­
The two most important stories here, from powers helped to shape the transition, pulses that surfaced at various points in
the perspective of democratization theory, both in political and especially in economic the country's history. Indeed, to most ob­
are (1) the re-establishment of democracy terms. Third, the nature of the authoritarian servers, the unified Germany appears to be
in West Germany after the Second World regime demanded such thoroughgoing a highly stable and successful democracy.

Institutional Design: Germany's Bundestag

and Bundesrat c h a p t e r 9 , p a g e 212

There are many ways to structure legisla­ candidate from the district and one for at-large seats to make its overall represen­
tures, and the German model is an intrigu­ a preferred party; this is similar to the tation in the parliament proportional to its
ing one for other countries. Germany is a New Zealand example, also discussed in support. This gives the proportionality in
federal country in which the sixteen states chapter 9. The district-based vote for a the legislature associated with PR, even
(Lander) have considerable authority, and candidate means that each geographic while giving each constituency its own
it has a bicameral legislature with a cham­ constituency in Germany has its own rep­ representative as in district systems. All
ber known as the Bundesrat to represent resentative, just like in district systems members of the Bundestag vote to elect a
the states. The country also has a blend of elsewhere in the world. But the party vote chancellor as the head of government.
different electoral systems for its lower is tallied to ensure that the overall distri­ The legislature also has another inno­
house, known as the Bundestag. The bution of seats in the Bundestag reflects vation: a modified version of the vote of
mixed system is a case of careful institu­ the partisan preferences of the country as no confidence. As with other parliamen­
tional engineering that incorporates a whole. After all the district representa­ tary systems, Germany's chancellor and
many different features. tives are calculated, the party vote is used government can be dismissed by a vote of
In the Bundestag, the electoral system to add "at-large" seats as necessary to the no confidence, but the form is known as a
features elements of both district-based Bundestag. For example, a party that gets "constructive vote of no confidence." The
representation and proportional repre­ 24 percent of the overall party vote but twist in Germany is that those proposing
sentation (PR). At each election, every only earns 18 percent of the district seats to bring down the government must si­
German has two votes: one for a preferred would be "compensated” with additional multaneously present and support a new
452 Germany

CASE STUDY (continued)

■
Institutional Design: Germany's Bundestag
and Bundesrat CHA PTER 9, PAGE 212

governmental majority coalition that will limits, the amount of legislation deemed In combination, the various aspects of
go into effect. This prevents opposition to affect the states is considerable, which the German political system are intended
parties from reducing the government to gives the Bundesrat substantial authority. to balance and distribute power in several
permanent gridlock by bringing down On issues that do not have special bearing ways. The party vote has the effect of en­
governments without being able to pro­ on the states, the Bundesrat can still suring that the most successful parties
pose a viable governing alternative. review legislation and offer objections, have a mandate to govern, while the con­
Germany also has features that pro­ which can be overturned by the stituency vote allows each geographic
tect the sixteen states in the federal Bundestag. area to be represented by its preferred
system, mainly through the Bundesrat. In addition to these legislative ar­ candidate. The constructive vote of no
The members of the Bundesrat are ap­ rangements, Germany has a ceremonial confidence allows for an unpopular gov­
pointed by the respective state govern­ president, who has relatively few powers ernment to be overturned while also plac­
ments to represent the interests of that beyond those of a figurehead. Germany's ing a premium on governability. Finally,
state. Each state's delegation to this upper presidential selection is undertaken by a the delicate balance of powers between
chamber must vote as a bloc, otherwise body that brings together the elected the Bundestag and Bundesrat is designed
its votes are not counted. With regard to legislators of the Bundestag along with to ensure that federalism is protected, but
powers, the Bundesrat has the right to representatives of Germany's sixteen so are the prerogatives of the parliamen­
vote on any matter that materially affects Lander. The president is deemed to be im­ tary majority. This set of institutional de­
the sixteen Lander, including matters of partial, and nominees are typically se­ signs shows that there is a nearly endless
budgets and administration. While the lected for their reputation for being variety of possible models for structuring
powers thus have some constitutional non-partisan. political systems.

Consensus-Based Politics in Germany CHAPTER 11, PAGE 262

Germany is a country that exhibits many several other smaller parties have retained represented, and governments have gen­
of the features of consensus-based poli­ influence and sometimes been in govern­ erally required a coalition of two or more
tics. Through two main mechanisms high­ ment coalitions. The second is that parties. There have been coalitions made
lighted in chapter 11, Germany's politics German politics has featured a form of up of parties on the left and coalitions
typically includes multiple political per­ corporatism that institutionalizes cooper­ comprised of parties on the right, as well
spectives in the government (Lijphart ation between major interest groups. as a "Grand Coalition" that brought to­
1999). The first is the multiparty parlia­ The factors contributing to the multi­ gether the country’s two leading parties
mentary system, which relies often on party system relate to the electoral for several years. All of these cases have
coalitions to form governments, even system noted in the preceding box. While necessitated political bargaining be­
though it is common for certain leading some larger parties tend to do well in the tween governing parties, and some dis­
parties to wield most of the influence. The district elections, the smaller parties ben­ tribution of cabinet seats. German
Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the efit from the proportional representation governments have been relatively stable
Christian Democratic Union (CDU) have seats in the Bundestag. German legisla­ since World War II, with many govern­
been the major players for years, though tures have recently had five or six parties ments seeing out their terms of office,
 Case Studies 453

CASE STUDY (continued)

Consensus-Based Politics in Germany CHAPTER 11, PAGE 262

and the country has had a relatively small including countries such as the Nether­ systems in countries like Germany: an em­
number of chancellors. lands, Austria, and the countries of Scan­ phasis on consensus that tends to accom­
Germany is also a case of consensus dinavia (Siaroff 1999). It has been argued modate a range of actors in decision
formation in political negotiation be­ that German corporatism is of a special making. This contrasts with more majori-
tween interest groups. That is, Germany character insofar as it also includes a tarian rule in countries such as the United
has a form of corporatism. Corporatist ar­ fourth actor: the major banks that finance Kingdom, where governments often con­
rangements bring together labor, busi­ investment (Siaroff 1999, citing Hicks sist of a single party and relations be­
ness, and government to make decisions 1988). This inclusion of the banks as major tween governments and interest groups
about the economy and wages, regard­ corporatist actors is seen as distinct from are more arms-length. Whether this has
less of who is in government. This can the more "social democratic" corporatism contributed to social stability in Germany
moderate the economic consequences seen in other parts of northern Europe since World War II— through the partition
of political shifts from left to right, since where labor may have a stronger voice and reunification of the country and its
the same actors are expected to bargain relative to capital. emergence as the economic powerhouse
with one another on a sustained basis. There is a unifying theme that links of the Eurozone— is a topic for further
This is common in northern Europe, multiparty systems and corporatist consideration.

Ethnic Boundaries of the German Nation? CHAPTER 13, PAGE 312

As noted in chapter 13, France is often “ressentiment" against the French, and ethnic nationalism is more of a "cultural
taken to exemplify the "civic" nationalist that as a result it was defined against nationalism," suggesting that not all Ger­
tradition, while Germany is frequently French notions of national membership mans have historically divided themselves
held up as the clearest example of the as linked to citizenship and related En­ from others on the basis of racial ideas,
"ethnic" tradition (Brubaker 1992; Green- lightenment ideals (Greenfeld 1992). but adherence to cultural traditions. Just
feld 1992; Berger 2004). This can mean dif­ Others have noted that German national the same, most would acknowledge that
ferent things, but at a minimum it identity developed in the context of po­ at key points in German history ethnic
suggests that the "symbolic boundaries" litical divisions: The boundaries of the ter­ boundaries have come to the fore. With
(Barth 1969, Lamont and Molnar 2002) ritorial state could not serve as the regard to the second issue, the major
that tend to be used when German na­ boundaries of membership, since there controversy concerns the relationship
tionalists speak about their identity have was no German territorial state at the cru­ between German ethnic nationalism
often emphasized ascriptive characteris­ cial moment of the formation of the na­ and the Nazi atrocities. Some scholars
tics imagined to be biological or tional identity (Brubaker 1992). (Greenfeld 1992; Goldhagen 1996) argue
quasi-biological. Few dispute that German nationalism that there is a direct linkage between the
The national identity that developed has historically drawn ethnic boundaries. ethnic nationalism formed in the nine­
in Germany in the early nineteenth cen­ Rather, debates center on several related teenth century and the Holocaust and
tury spread in the context of French domi­ issues about the extent to which this has that a majority of German citizens were
nation of German territories under been the case and its main implications complicit in these acts. Others, though,
Napoleon (Kitchen 2006). Some scholars (Berger 2004). With regard to the first wish to emphasize a narrative about a
have argued that it was characterized by issue, some assert that what appears to be more heterogeneous German culture of
454 Germany

CASE STUDY (continued)

Ethnic Boundaries of the German Nation? CHAPTER 13, PAGE 312

identity, one that has historically included laws have undergone some partial, liber­ to this case. What sorts of features of
not just xenophobia but alternative alizing reforms. German identity would those focused on
strands emphasizing liberal tolerance. Think about how each of the major cultural boundaries point to? How might
Analysts continue to debate these issues, theories of ethno-national conflict and vio­ proponents of instrumentalist and social-
and in recent years German citizenship lence discussed in chapter 13 would apply psychological theories approach this case?

Research Prompts
1. What would major theories of democratization and democratic claims be reconciled? To what extent is either or both of these
consolidation say about the pattern of authoritarianism and de­ claims true?
mocracy that Germany witnessed in the late nineteenth and 4. What are the pros and cons of the institutional structure of
twentieth centuries? What are the implications of the German Germany's government? Besides the fact that it seems compli­
case for those theories? cated at first glance, what is the strongest argument you can
2. As discussed in several of the case studies, Germany has often make against the German two-vote system, which combines
been considered a prototypical case of ethnic nationalism and, district-based elections with overall proportionality in the
moreover, its nationalism has often been causally linked to its Bundestag? What is the strongest argument that you can make
twentieth-century totalitarian regime. Design a comparative for it?
analysis— drawing on several cases— that would allow us to ex­ 5. Germany was in certain respects a "late modernizer" within the
amine this claim. Is yours an MSS or MDS design? Why? European context. In particular, it is noteworthy that the country
3. Some argue that Germany is a case of state-led development. only achieved political unification in 1871. Situating Germany in
Others argue that market forces have played a central role in its comparative European context, analyze the main conse­
Germany's historical economic performance. How can these quences of this modernization pattern.
 455

<§f
India
Introduction
In d ia is th e w o rld ’s la rg e st dem ocracy, a n d a
Key Features of Contemporary India s u rp ris in g o n e b y m o s t a cc o u n ts. I t is a
d iverse so c ie ty o f o ver one b illio n p e o p le ,
Population: 1,236,344,631 (estimate, July 2014) d iv id e d in to d iffe re n t m ajo r re lig io n s, la n ­

Area: 3,287,263 square kilometers g uages, a n d social g ro u p s (see th e ch arts

th a t follow ). T his d iv ersity w as p erh ap s even
Head of State: Pranab Mukherjee (president, 2012-present) m ore strik in g u n d e r B ritish co lonial rule

Head of Government: Narendra Modi (prime minister, 2014-present) p rio r to 1947, as B ritish In d ia also c o n ta in ed
b o th p re sen t-d a y P a k ista n a n d B angladesh,
Capital: New Delhi tw o M u s lim -m a jo rity c o u n tries th a t to ­

Year of Independence: 1947 g e th e r com b in e for over 325 m illio n people

today, m ore th a n th e U n ite d States. P rio r to
Year of Current Constitution: 1950 colonialism , In d ia w as largely d e ce n tra liz ed ,

Languages: English, Hindi; other major languages include w ith th e te rrito ry b e in g ru le d b y m an y re ­

Bengali, Tamil, Urdu g io n al o r local princes. T he crea tio n o f the
In d ia n n a tio n -sta te as w e k n o w it to d ay w as
GDP per Capita: $1,499 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
p a r t a n d parcel o f th e process o f In d ia n
Human Development Index 135th (medium human development) d eco lo n izatio n .
Ranking (2014): M u c h o f th e c o u n try w as c h ara cte riz ed
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human for c en tu rie s by a rig id caste system th a t
Development Report 2014. s tra tifie d th e p o p u la tio n b y p ro fessio n s
a n d b y social sta n d in g . A lo n g th ese m any

Hinduism 80.5%
| Indo-Aryan 72% Islam 13.4%
Dravidian 25% Christianity 2.3%
Other 3% Sikhism 1.9%
Other 1.8%

Ethnic Groups in India Religious Affiliation in India

Note that while the CIA World Factbook includes only three main Note that Hinduism is used as an umbrella term to cover a wide range
groups, which are really language families that overlap with of religious groups with different traditions, practices, and beliefs.
ethnicity, these categories include many smaller groups. Note, too, Many of these groups would reject the characterization ofbeing
that caste distinctions in India are sometimes treated as similar to Hindu. In constitutional terms, even well-established groups such as
ethnic distinctions. Jains and Buddhists are nominally considered Hindu.
Source: CIA World Factbook. Source: CIA World Factbook.
456 India
 Profile 457

sources o f div ersity a n d p o te n tia l c onflict, In d ia w as one o f tec h n o lo g ic al in n o v atio n , e n g in e e rin g prow ess, a n d e n tre ­
th e p o o re st c o u n tries o n e a rth th ro u g h o u t th e tw e n tie th p re n e u ria l spirit. I t has g ro w n ra p id ly in recen t years and
century. I t is a source o f in sp iratio n to m an y t h a t In d ia has h as becom e a global lead er in technology, science a n d e n ­
re ta in e d its dem o cracy for a lm o st a ll o f its tw o -th ird s o f a g in e e rin g , a n d th e service in d u stry . I t is likely to becom e
ce n tu ry o f in d ep e n d en c e , d espite th e ravages o f p o v e rty and th e w o rld ’s m o st p o p u lo u s n a tio n in th e n e x t decades, a n d
h u n g er, social inequality, a n d a m u ltitu d e o f c u ltu re s a n d i f m u c h o f th a t p o p u la tio n can com e o u t o f p o v e rty a n d in to
beliefs densely p ack e d in to th e S o u th A sia n su b co n tin en t. th e m id d le class, it w ill, alo n g w ith C h in a , becom e one o f
E ven w ith its m an y social p roblem s, In d ia to d a y is likely th e le a d in g global pow ers as th e tw e n ty -first c e n tu ry
to be seen as a th riv in g h u b o f th e fu tu re , re n o w n ed for progresses.

Historical Development
In d ia is h o m e to som e o f th e w o rld ’s m o st h is to ric civ ili­ c e n tu ry a n d laste d u p to 1947. In d ia w as g ra d u ally colo­
z a tio n s a n d is th e so u rce o f sev eral o f th e w o rld ’s g re a t n iz e d b y m an y E u ro p e a n pow ers over several cen tu ries,
re lig io n s, m o st n o ta b ly H in d u is m , w h ic h re m a in s its m a ­ th o u g h over tim e B ritish co lo n ialism cam e to dom in ate.
jo r ity re lig io n , a n d B u d d h ism , w h ic h c o n tin u e s to have a S m all p o rtio n s o f th e coast w ere first ta k e n by P o rtu g a l,
tre m e n d o u s in flu e n ce in n u m e ro u s E a s t a n d S o u th e a s t a n d th e n in th e se v e n te en th a n d e ig h te e n th cen tu ries
A s ia n c o u n trie s , th o u g h it is o f less im p o rta n c e in c o n ­ F re n c h a n d E n g lish com panies progressively colonized
te m p o ra ry In d ia . T he c o u n try ’s re c o rd e d h is to r y d a te s m u c h o f th e su b c o n tin e n t. B ritish co lo n ial ru le d id n o t
b a c k m ille n n ia a n d c o n siste d fo r c e n tu rie s o f a ra n g e o f b e g in w ith o u trig h t co n q u est, b u t ra th e r w ith th e e stab lish ­
e m p ires, sm a ll sta te s, a n d p rin c ip a litie s . I t w as fo r m a n y m e n t o f tra d in g p o sts u n d e r th e B ritish E a s t In d ia C o m ­
c e n tu rie s a c ro ssro a d s o f p e o p le s, w h e re c u ltu re s cam e p a n y (on th e E a s t In d ia C o m p a n y a n d th e g ro w th o f
to g e th e r a n d n e w o nes w ere c re a te d , a n d w h e re tra d e n e t­ colonialism , see M e tc a lf a n d M e t c a lf 2006). T he C o m p an y
w o rk s lin k e d to g e th e r. In d ia ’s p a s t involves som e o f r e ­ h a d a c h a rte r fro m th e B ritish m o n arc h to estab lish a m o n ­
co rd ed h is to ry ’s m o st c o m p e llin g c h a ra c te rs , in c lu d in g opoly tra d e in In d ia , for p ro d u c ts th a t in clu d e d c o tto n and
th e e m p e ro r A s h o k a , w h o in th e fo u r d e ca d es be fo re h is silk, tea, a n d opium : In d e e d , th e se sam e B ritish in terests
d e a th in 2 3 2 b c e n o m in a lly u n ite d m u c h o f th e re g io n forced C h in e se a u th o ritie s to o p en th e ir m ark e ts to o pium
k n o w n as th e In d ia n “s u b c o n tin e n t” a n d o r d a in e d a leg al sales in th e n in e te e n th cen tu ry , w h ic h led to d ru g ad d ic tio n
code t h a t e m p h a siz e d s e c ta ria n a n d e th n ic to le ra n c e in an d d e sta b iliz in g a n d h u m ilia tin g in te rn a tio n a l conflicts
th e h e te ro g e n e o u s te rrito ry . T he s u b c o n tin e n t w itn e s se d for th e Q in g D y n a sty . G iv e n th e rich n e ss o f trad e , B ritish
G re e k in v ad e rs fro m th e w e st u n d e r A le x a n d e r th e G re a t In d ia cam e to b e seen as th e c ro w n jew el o f all E u ro p e a n
a n d T u rk ic ra id e rs fro m th e n o r th . T u rk s e sta b lish e d colonial possessions. I t ev en tu ally e ncom passed p resen t-
states in n o r th In d ia b y th e early 1 2 0 0 s. T he re g io n w as day In d ia , P a k ista n , a n d B an g la d esh a n d becam e c en tra l to
s e ttle d b y M u s lim s, as w e ll as H in d u s a n d B u d d h ists, th e aim s a n d asp iratio n s o f th e B ritish E m p ire .
a n d w as c rissc ro sse d b y m e rc h a n ts as it b e c a m e a lin c h p in A fte r e ig h te e n th -c e n tu ry c o n flict b e tw e e n E n g la n d and
o f th e spice tra d e t h a t c o n n e c te d E a s t a n d W e s t. M a n y o f F rance, th e B ritish E a s t In d ia C o m p a n y g a in e d colonial
s o u th A s ia ’s M u s lim s to d a y a re d e s c e n d a n ts o f th o se w h o c o n tro l over m u ch o f to d ay ’s In d ia , P a k ista n , a n d B an g la­
c o n v erted to Isla m a t th is tim e . M u c h o f In d ia w as th e n d esh. B ritish co lo n ialism g ra d u ally b e cam e m ore d ire c t and
u n ite d u n d e r th e M u g h a l E m p ire u p to th e 1700s. T he in te n se over tim e . I t m e t w ith resistance a t various po in ts,
M u g h a l re ig n w as a n im p o rta n t c e n tra liz in g p e rio d a n d b u t succeeded in p a r t th ro u g h p lay in g various In d ia n actors
h e lp e d to crea te w h a t w e k n o w to d a y as m o d e rn In d ia , a g a in st each o th er. T he m o st serious n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry re ­
b u t th e su b c o n tin e n t re m a in e d a diverse a n d h e te ro g e ­ sistance a g a in st th e B ritish w as th e revolt o f 1857-1859
n eous e m p ire u n d e r th e M u g h a ls , a n d n o t a m o d e rn (som etim es called th e “S epoy R e b ellio n ”), a fte r w h ic h th e
n a tio n -sta te . B ritish state to o k over c o n tro l fro m th e E a s t In d ia C o m ­
D esp ite its exceedingly ric h p rio r h istory, th e fo rm atio n p an y a n d ru le d In d ia directly. S cholars debate w h e th er, to
o f m o d e rn In d ia is o ften seen as b e g in n in g w ith th e advent w h a t e x te n t, a n d ho w th e em p ire tru ly served B rita in ’s eco­
o f E u ro p e a n co lonial rule, w h ic h b e g an in th e sev en teen th n o m ic in te rests (B a la k rish n a n 2010), b u t th e re is little
458 India

Historical Development
Timeline
-1600s Territory today encompassed by India was, by the 1964 Death of Jawaharlal Nehru
fifteenth century, home to large numbers of em­ 1966 Indira Gandhi (daughter of Nehru and no relation
pires, states, and religious traditions, including to Mahatma Gandhi) becomes prime minister, and
Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism. continues most policies set by Nehru.
1498 Portuguese explorer Vasco da Gama reaches India 1971 India and Pakistan go to war over East Pakistan;
and the Portuguese establish a small state by 1505. former East Pakistan separates from West Pakistan
1600s British East India Company begins trading in India and becomes Bangladesh.
and eventually consolidates control over most of 1974 India explodes a nuclear device.
the subcontinent, prevailing over French and 1975-1977 "The Emergency": martial law under Indira Gandhi,
Dutch competition. who rules by decree and imprisons opposition
1857 Major rebellion against rule of the British East India leaders.
Company 1977 Congress Party loses power for the first time.
1858 Britain asserts direct crown control over most India, 1979 Indira Gandhi returns as prime minister.
and rules parts of India indirectly through 'Princely 1984 Indira Gandhi is assassinated by her Sikh body­
States” of local nobles. guards; riots ensue in which several thousand
1915-1930S Mohandas Gandhi becomes leader of the Indian members of the Sikh minority are killed; Rajiv
National Congress and leads protests against Gandhi (Indira's son) becomes prime minister.
British rule, demanding home rule and eventually 1989 Protests increase in Kashmir, a Muslim majority area
independence. administered by India on the border between India
1919 Massacre of several hundreds of unarmed Indians and Pakistan.
at Amritsar by British troops under General 1991 Rajiv Gandhi is assassinated by militants seeking a
Reginald Dyer separate homeland for Sri Lankan Tamils and angry
1930s-1940s Anti-colonial movement accelerates with mass at India's intervention in the conflict.
strikes and mobilizations, led by Gandhi and 1991 Pro-market economic reforms begin under finance
Jawaharlal Nehru of the Congress Party, and minister Manmohan Singh (later prime minister),
Muhammad Ali Jinnah of the Muslim League. under pressure from the International Monetary
1947 Independence and partition of British India into Fund and the World Bank.
India and Pakistan (with Pakistan including East 1992 Hindu nationalists destroy a mosque in Ayodhya
Pakistan, or present-day Bangladesh); tensions and that is of historical importance to some Muslims,
conflict emerge between Hindus and Muslims over but also is in a location sacred to some Hindus.
partition, culminating in war and massive refugee 1996 Atal Bihari Vajpayee becomes prime minister as
flows of Indian Muslims to Pakistan and Pakistani head of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata
Hindus to India. Party (BJP); governs only briefly, but returns from
1948 Mohandas Gandhi is assassinated by Hindu funda­ 1998 to 2004.
mentalist who rejected Gandhi's calls for peace 2000s India's economy booms, with growth rates
between Hindus and Muslims. occasionally reaching near 8 percent.
1950 India ends its symbolic links to Great Britain with 2004 Congress Party voted back into power with
adoption of new constitution that establishes a Manmohan Singh as prime minister.
republic; India's "princely states" are incorporated 2008 Islamist militants from Pakistan stage simultaneous
into the nation's states and territories. terror attacks in Mumbai.
1962 War with China centered on a border dispute. 2014 Narendra Modi of the BJP elected Prime Minister.
 Profile 459

d o u b t th a t it e n h a n c e d B rita in ’s in te rn a tio n a l sta n d in g , In d ia n politics in th e first decades a fte r ind ep en d en ce

p ow er p o sitio n , a n d sense o f p restig e, a n d m an y a rgue th a t w as d o m in a te d b y th e In d ia n C o n g re ss P arty. A s In d ia ’s
it “d e in d u s tria liz e d ” In d ia (e.g., A lle n 2011). T here is also first p rim e m in ister, N e h ru led th e c o u n try fro m 1947 to his
no d o u b t th a t it w as n o t desired b y m o st o f th e subjugated d e a th in 1964. H is g o v e rn m e n ts d eveloped m an y lastin g
p o p u latio n a n d th a t it w as a strik in g ly “illib e ra l” set o f in ­ featu res o f th e In d ia n state a n d econom y, m o st notab ly cre­
stitu tio n s for such a self-consciously “lib e ra l” society to a tin g a v e ry active a n d in te rv e n tio n is t state. W h ile som e
adopt. econom ic p ro d u c tio n re m a in e d in private h a n d s, th e state
In th e early tw e n tie th century, In d ia n resistance to B ritish o w n e d m an y large en te rp rises a n d re g u la te d th e econom y
ru le grew , w ith th e In d ia n C o n g re ss P a rty le a d in g th e a n ti­ heavily. A c en tra l P la n n in g C o m m issio n w as task ed w ith
colonial m ovem ent. Its key lea d er w as M o h a n d a s G a n d h i o rg a n iz in g th e econom y, a n d th e g o v e rn m e n t p ro ceed ed on
(often k n o w n as M a h a tm a , or “g re a t so u l”), w h o le d peace­ th e basis o f Five-Y ear P la n s m o d ele d o n S oviet p lan n in g . In
fu l d e m o n s tra tio n s , m a rc h e s , a n d p ro te s ts d e m a n d in g th is m ix ed econom y, In d ia achieved som e m o d est g ro w th
h o m e ru le . G a n d h i ’s m e th o d s p io n e e re d n o n -v io le n t a n d d eveloped stro n g e d u ca tio n a l p ro g ram s in science a n d
resistance—- later used b y th e likes o f M a rtin L u th e r K in g in e n g in e erin g , w h ile also w o rk in g to im prove ag ricu ltu re.
th e U n ite d States— a n d w ere k n o w n in In d ia as satyagraha. H ow ever, th e sta tist ap p ro ach also le n t its e lf to c o rru p tio n
G a n d h i’s ch arism atic appeal to m an y m illions o f In d ia n s a n d inefficiency, given th e n e e d o f businesses to secure p e r­
w as e n h an c ed b y his decisions to e at a n d dress sim ply, m its a n d licenses from a d m in istra to rs a n d bureaucrats.
ra th e r th a n follo w in g th e ex p ectatio n s o f B ritish c u ltu re In d ira G a n d h i ascended to th e role o f p rim e m in iste r in
(and, in p a rt, due to religious reasons). T he o th e r m a in p o l­ 1966 a n d g o verned for over a decade. She largely follow ed
itic al leader o f C o n g re ss w as Ja w a h arla l N e h ru ; also m a k in g th e policies set in place b y h e r fa th e r, Ja w a h arla l N e h ru ,
com m on cause w ith th e m in th e e v en tu al d em an d s for in ­ a n d b u ilt u p o n th ese w ith efforts to increase a g ric u ltu ra l
dependence w as M u h a m m a d A li Jin n a h o f th e M u slim p ro d u c tio n in ru ra l areas. O n th e in te rn a tio n a l fro n t, h e r
L eague. g o v e rn m e n t s u p p o rte d resid en ts o f E a s t P a k ista n w h o m ili­
G a n d h i, N e h ru , a n d Jin n a h pressed for In d ia n in d e ­ ta te d for in d ep e n d en c e fro m P a k ista n in 1971; th is led to a
pendence from B ritain , a n d th e m ove to d ecolonization ac­ w a r w ith P a k is ta n th a t re su lte d in th e in d ep e n d en c e o f E a st
celerated a fter W o rld W ar II, but as independence P a k ista n as th e n ew n a tio n o f B an g lad esh . In d ira a n d her
approached Jin n a h a n d th e M u slim L ea g u e insisted o n a follow ers w ere accused o f electo ral frau d in th e 1971 elec­
p a rtitio n o f In d ia w ith an in d ep e n d en t state for M uslim s. tio n b y a n increasingly restive o p p o sitio n , a n d in response
(B ritish colonialism , o f course played a critical histo rical role th e g o v e rn m e n t d e clare d m a rtia l law in 1975. K n o w n as
in exacerbating such divisions.) O n A u g u st 15, 1947, In d ia “T he E m ergency,” th is p e rio d laste d nearly tw o years u n til
b ecam e in d e p e n d e n t, b u t h a d split in to a m a jo rity -H in d u 1977, a n d can be seen as th e o nly p e rio d in w h ic h d em oc­
In d ia a n d m a jo rity -M u slim P a k ista n . P a k ista n in clu d e d racy suffered a se tb ac k in in d e p e n d e n t In d ia . T he E m e r­
W e s t P a k ista n (present-day P akistan) a n d E a s t P a k istan gen cy u ltim a te ly en d ed in 1977, a n d c o stin g th e C ongress
(present-day B angladesh), w h ic h w ere on opposite sides o f P a rty c o n tro l o f th e g o v e rn m e n t for th e first tim e , as th e
In d ia. I f com bined, th ese th re e countries to d ay (In d ia, P a k i­ J a n a ta P a rty (u n d er P rim e M in is te r M o ra rji D esai) to o k
stan, a n d B angladesh) w ould have a to ta l o f over 1.5 b illion over th e g o v e rn m e n t u n til 1980. In d ira G a n d h i a n d th e
people, a n d w ould easily be th e m o st populous n a tio n on C o n g re ss r e tu rn e d to p o w e r in 1980, a n d th e p rim e m in ­
e arth . A s it is, th e ir actu al division has b e en consequential, ister h e rs e lf w as a ssa ssin a ted by h e r b o d y g u a rd s— o f th e
w ith conflict b e tw ee n In d ia a n d P a k ista n b e in g a m ajor S ik h m in o rity — in 1984. T his re su lte d in d ead ly a n ti-S ik h
source o f instability. T he 1947 p a rtitio n led to th o u sa n d s o f rio ts. In th e m e a n tim e , th e p o s t o f p rim e m in iste r passed
deaths a n d m illions o f refugees as H in d u s left P a k ista n for to R ajiv G a n d h i, I n d ira ’s son a n d th e n e x t g e n era tio n o f
In d ia a n d M u slim s left In d ia for P a k istan (b o th groups o ften th e “N e h r u - G a n d h i d y n a sty ” in th e C o n g re ss P a rty . R ajiv
w a lk in g o n foot), w ith conflicts a n d m assacres b e tw ee n th e h im s e lf w as assassinated by a Sri L a n k a n T a m il se p a ra tist
groups occu rrin g in th e process. T ensions c o n tin u ed a fter in 1991.
th e assassination of G andhi in 1948 by a H in d u T h ro u g h th e 1990s a n d 2 0 0 0 s, In d ia has w itn esse d sev­
fu n d a m e n ta list w h o objected to G a n d h i’s efforts to reconcile eral sources o f violence a n d instability. T he m o st im p o rta n t
an d prom ote tolerance b e tw ee n H in d u s a n d M uslim s. in te rn a tio n a l c o n flict has b e e n w ith P a k ista n , especially as
460 India

th e tw o n u c le ar-a rm ed pow ers c o n te st th e d isp u te d region a d d itio n to th ese conflicts b e tw ee n M u slim s a n d H in d u s,

alo n g th e ir sh a red border. T he In d ia n -a d m in iste re d p rov­ In d ia has also w itn esse d insurgencies by ra d ic al leftists
ince o f Ja m m u a n d K a sh m ir has a M u s lim m ajority, m u ch k n o w n as N a x alites, w h o are in sp ired b y M a o ist d o ctrin e.
o f w h ic h w ishes to com e u n d e r P a k ista n i sovereignty, w ith V iolence also tak es o n various d aily form s th a t a m o u n t to
a n o th e r c o n tin g e n t a dvocating in d ep e n d en c e . C o n flic t m ore d e ath s, b u t a p p ea r less in th e new s: In d ia has h ig h
eru p ts sporadically, a n d w as m o st tense w h e n th e tw o c o u n ­ levels o f social violence a g ain st w o m en , w ith d ead ly abuse
tries teste d nu clear devices in a sta n d o ff in 1998. S e c ta ria n re m a in in g c o m m o n . A n in c re a s in g p h e n o m e n o n is sex-
conflict has a dom estic co m p o n e n t as w ell, w ith conflicts selective a bortion, w hich has resulted in m any “m issing girls.”
o n g o in g b e tw ee n In d ia n H in d u s a n d th e sig n ifican t m i­ In d ia has b e en led b y refo rm ist governm ents a n d prim e
n o rity o f In d ia n M u slim s. A m o st d ra m a tic conflict cam e m in isters in recen t years, a n d a m id m an y u n c ertain tie s has
w h e n m obs o f H in d u n a tio n a lists d em o lish ed a holy em erged econom ically in th e last tw o decades, as discussed
M u slim m osque b y h a n d in A yodhya in 1992, o n th e in th e “P o litical E co n o m y ” section late r in th e chapter.
gro u n d s th a t it h a d b e en b u ilt o n th e site o f a tem p le m ark ­ P rim e M in is te r M a n m o h a n S ingh (a S ikh, a n d th e first
in g th e b irth p la ce o f th e H in d u d iv in ity R am a. T ensions n o n -H in d u to h old th e post) governed fro m 2 0 0 4 to 2014
m o u n te d fu rth e r w h e n th e B haratiy a Ja n a ta P a rty (BJP) a n d w as fo rm erly th e fin an ce m in is te r th a t in itia te d im ­
governed in th e p e rio d from 1998 to 2 0 0 4 , as th e p a rty p ro ­ p o r ta n t e co n o m ic refo rm s in 1991. I n 201 4 , N a re n d a
m o ted H in d u n a tio n a list ideals w h ile a tte m p tin g to c o u rt M o d i o f th e B JP w as elected . S om e eco n o m ic analysts
som e M u slim a n d C h ris tia n voters. T he p a rty m a in ta in e d re sp o n d e d to his e le c tio n w ith e n th u sia sm , g iv en th e e co ­
th a t H in d u sh o u ld be In d ia ’s le a d in g c u ltu ra l id e n tity and n o m ic successes in th e sta te o f G u ja ra t u n d e r his w atch .
should be fostered b y state in stitu tio n s. I n d ia is s till rife w ith e x tre m e p o v e rty a n d s ta rtlin g in ­
Violence a n d conflict c o n tin u e in c o n te m p o ra ry In d ia. e q u ality , b u t it is in cre asin g ly v iew ed as a w o rld eco n o m ic
In 2 0 0 8 , th e in te rn a tio n a l a n d dom estic aspects o f In d ia ’s le a d e r a n d o n e o f th e keys to th e eco n o m y o f th e tw e n ty -
sectarian divide cam e to g e th e r trag ica lly w h e n co o rd in a te d first cen tu ry . A s th e w o rld ’s la rg e st d e m o c rac y a n d a
b om b in g s a n d suicide attack s o n p ro m in e n t sites in th e m e ­ h ig h ly h e te ro g e n e o u s c o u n try , it faces m assive c h allen g e s,
tro p o lis M u m b a i resu lted in several h u n d re d d e ath s. In b u t o p p o rtu n itie s as w ell.

Regime and Political Institutions

In d ia is a federal p a rliam e n ta ry system w ith tw o cham bers O th e r b ranches a n d pow ers o f go v ern m en t also have
o f parliam en t, th e low er house called th e L o k Sabha (w ith roles. In d ia has a form al, w ritte n co n stitu tio n a n d a Suprem e
about 550 m em bers, th o u g h th e n u m b er varies), a n d th e C o u r t responsible for decid in g o n th e c o n stitu tio n a lity o f
up p er house k n o w n as th e R ajya Sabha (w ith n o m ore th a n law. A s a federal system , im p o rta n t p a rts o f In d ia n law are
250 m em bers), w h ic h represents th e states. T he L o k Sabha m ade at th e state level. States have th e ir ow n H ig h C o u rts
has th e g reater pow ers o f th e tw o: I t elects th e p rim e m in is­ (w ith som e states g ro u p in g to g eth e r to share a H ig h C o u rt)
te r and can vote o u t th e g overnm ent w ith a vote o f no confi­ a n d th e ir ow n legislatures a n d executives. T he state assem ­
dence; th e g o v ern m en t is th u s accountable to th e L o k Sabha. blies select m o st o f th e m em bers o f th e n a tio n a l R ajya
The L o k Sabha also is th e final au th o rity on “m oney bills” S abha. T he p re sid en t is largely cerem o n ial b u t m u st assent
reg ard in g tax atio n and sp en d in g appropriations. In som e to p a rlia m e n ta ry bills for th ese to becom e law. O ccasio n ­
cases, a g overnm ent m in iste r introduces legislation in th e ally, th e p re sid en t m ay offer an ob jectio n to a b ill a n d send
L o k Sabha, w hile in o th e r cases individual m em bers o f the it b a ck to th e leg islatu re, b u t i f it passes a second tim e , th e
L o k Sabha introduce bills. E xcept for m oney bills, th e Rajya p re sid en t is c o n stitu tio n a lly re q u ire d to assent. O n very
Sabha has a role a fte r bills pass th e low er cham ber. I f the rare occasions, th e p re sid en t m ay exercise a “p o c k e t veto ”
Rajya Sabha votes ag ain st a bill, a jo in t co m m ittee o f th e tw o b y n e ith e r a sse n tin g to a b ill n o r re tu rn in g it to th e p a rlia ­
houses is form ed, w ith a m ajority prevailing. Since th e L o k m en t. O n m o st occasions, p resid en ts a ssen t to th e w ishes o f
Sabha is m ore num erous, it h as th e advantage in such votes. p a rliam e n t.
 Profile 461

Regime and Political Institutions

Regime Federal representative democracy; parliamentary system

Administrative Divisions Twenty-nine states and seven union territories

Executive Branch Prime minister as head of government (in Parliament)

President with largely ceremonial powers

Selection of Executive Prime minister selected by Parliament

President elected by electoral college of Parliament and state legislators

Legislative Branch Bicameral Parliament

Lower chamber: Lok Sabha (House of the People)
Upper chamber: Rajya Sabha (Council of States)

Judicial Branch Supreme Court of India

Political Party System Multiparty system, with two major parties leading coalitions at national level: Indian Congress
Party (United Progressive Alliance) and Bharatiya Janata Party (National Democratic Alliance)

Political Culture
T here are a n u m b e r o f n o te w o rth y features o f In d ia ’s p o lit­ ad v en t o f B ritish co lo n ial ru le, som e re ce n t h isto ria n s (e.g.,
ical c u ltu re, several o f w h ic h are discussed in d e ta il in th e D irk s, 2001) have a rg u e d th a t caste as w e k n o w it w as at
case stu d ies th a t follow . W e w ill tr y to single o u t a n d briefly least p a rtia lly a fu n c tio n o f c olonialists h a v in g used such
c o m m e n t o n th ese here. P erh ap s th e m o st sin g u la r featu re d istin c tio n s to aid in su b ju g a tin g a n d ru lin g In d ia. W h a t­
o f In d ia n p o litica l c u ltu re is its diversity. In d ia is a strik ­ ever th e h isto ric a l sources, caste d istin c tio n s have b e e n im ­
ingly h eterogeneous a n d c u ltu ra lly com plex society. A s dis­ p o rta n t featu res o f c o n te m p o ra ry In d ia n p olitics, w ith
cussed previously, it is th e p o in t o f o rig in for tw o o f th e p o litica l p a rtie s so m etim es co in c id in g w ith castes (see case
m o st im p o rta n t w orld religions: H in d u is m a n d B u d d h ism . stu d y o n “E th n ic ity a n d P o litic al P a rtie s in In d ia ”), a n d
T he la tte r is n o w p ra ctic e d b y a very sm all m in o rity o f th e w ith som e groups b e in g favored over others.
In d ia n p o p u la tio n , b u t In d ia has a n en o rm o u s M u slim A n o th e r n o ta b le fe a tu re o f m o d e rn In d ia n p o litica l
p o p u latio n a n d notable S ik h a n d C h ris tia n p o p u latio n s, as c u ltu re — w h ic h exists in te n s io n w ith th e prev io u sly n o te d
w ell as o th e r religions like Ja in ism . I n d ia is sim ilarly a c h a ra c te ris tic — is In d ia ’s d em ocracy. A s is d isc u sse d in
c o u n try o f g re a t e th n ic diversity, a n d re g io n a l id en titie s m o re d e ta il in a case study, “D e m o c ra c y ’s Success in
v a ry considerably as w ell. R eligious, e th n ic , a n d g e o g rap h i­ In d ia ,” I n d ia is n o ta b le fo r b e in g th e w o rld ’s la rg e st d e m ­
cal categories overlap, b u t th e y are n o t identical. ocracy, a n d it a ch iev e d th is w e ll b e fo re its re c e n t g a in s in
In d ia is also a society th a t has ex h ib ited a h ig h d egree o f eco n o m ic d e v elo p m en t. In d e e d , th e c o u n try re m a in s re la ­
in eq u a lity a n d stratificatio n . T his c an be m ea su re d in term s tiv ely p o o r a n d y e t has larg e ly b e e n a d e m o c ra tic success.
o f incom e, for exam ple, as In d ia has relatively h ig h incom e T h is is a n im p o rta n t p h e n o m e n o n in m a n y w ays. In d ia n s
inequality, b u t c u ltu ra l sources o f in e q u a lity are also n o t­ tr e a t p o litic a l a n d civil lib e rtie s as rig h ts a n d e n title ­
able. T he m o st con tro v ersial h as b e e n th a t o f caste. C a ste is m e n ts, a n d th is h a s g iv en rise to so c ial m o v em e n ts a n d
a source o f controversy b o th in In d ia p ro p e r a n d am o n g p ro te s ts , a lte rn a tio n s in g o v e rn m e n t, a n d a w id e ra n g e o f
scholars. I t is c ontroversial am o n g scholars because it used p o litic a l p a rtie s , in c lu d in g im p o r ta n t c o m m u n ist p a rtie s
to be a sserted th a t caste w as a lo n g -sta n d in g tra d itio n o f b e in g e le c te d to r u n so m e sta te s (and p e rfo rm in g q u ite
In d ia n c u ltu re (D u m o n t [1966] 1981). W h ile m o st h isto r­ w e ll b y m a n y m ea su re s in th e fa m o u s case o f th e sta te o f
ians a rgue th a t caste h a d fe a tu re d in In d ia n life before th e K erala).
462 India

In d ia is k n o w n for its re m a rk ab le c o n tra d ic tio n s w h e n th e I n d ia n state h as b e e n c h a ra c te riz e d b y m assive a m o u n ts

it com es to h o w th e p o litica l c u ltu re in te rac ts w ith th e o f c o rru p tio n , w ith b rib es b e in g e x p ec te d fro m th e low est
econom y. T he c o u n try has tre m e n d o u s e n tre p re n e u ria l official u p th e c h a in to h ig h e r ra n k in g superiors. T he re su lt
energy, y e t also w as k n o w n fo r decades as h a v in g a h id e ­ h as b e e n a sta te th a t has te c h n ic a l c o m p e ten c e a t th e top,
b o u n d state. T he state its e lf is also c o n tra d ic to ry . The b u t h isto ric a lly has fa iled to deliver n e e d e d services to th e
c o u n try has a fam ously stro n g a d m in is tra tio n a n d civil ben eficiaries in th e p o p u la tio n . T his c o n tra d ic to ry n a tu re
service, in th e sense th a t to p -ra n k in g officials are accom ­ o f th e p o litic a l c u ltu re plays a role th e p e rsisten c e o f ex­
p lish ed , w e ll-e d u ca ted , a n d a d m ire d . O n th e o th e r h a n d , tre m e poverty.

Political Economy
In d ia ’s p o litica l econom y is seem ingly a stu d y in co n trasts, p e r year. T h is is even m ore im pressive giv en th a t p o p u la ­
as is th e case w ith m an y developing co u n tries. T he c o u n ­ tio n g ro w th h a s slow ed in th e c o u n try to closer to 1 p e r­
tr y ’s econom ic h isto ry has w itn esse d a co m b in a tio n o f stag ­ c en t, m e a n in g th e g ro w th p e r capita has accelerated. F ro m
na tio n , m o d est g ro w th , a n d m ore recen t success. U n d e r an e conom y th a t w as h id e b o u n d a n d ra th e r inefficient,
state p la n n in g a n d sta te -led develo p m en t fo r m u ch o f its m o d e rn e n te rp rise h a s e m e rg ed in v a rio u s fo rm s, ra n g in g
p o st-in d ep e n d en c e p e rio d fro m th e 1940s th ro u g h th e fro m som e o f th e m o st successful m u ltin a tio n a ls in th e
1980s, In d ia h a d a m id d lin g level o f econom ic success w o rld (such as th e T a ta con g lo m erate) to re m a rk ab ly in ­
(K ohli 2004). Y et it w as clear th a t th e challenges re m a in e d novative sm a ll-sc ale e n te rp rises p o p p in g up as survival
as o f th e 1990s. O n e o f th e key features o f th e In d ia n p o lit­ stra te g ies in d irt-flo o r h o m es in th e M u m b a i slum o f
ical econom y w as n o te d earlier: th e use o f extensive g o v ern ­ D h a ra v i. M u c h o f In d ia ’s g ro w th h a s com e in th e diverse
m en t p lan n in g , in te rv en tio n , a n d re g u la tio n . A lea d in g service sector, n o t o n ly in m a n u fa c tu rin g . D e sp ite th is ,
m an ifestatio n o f th is w as w h a t cam e to be k n o w n as th e a g ric u ltu re still em ploys a b o u t h a l f o f all In d ia n s , o fte n in
“license raj,” o r th e com plex system o f re g u la tio n s— o ften th e fo rm o f sm a ll-sc ale o r subsistence a g ric u ltu re on
in th e fo rm o f re q u ire d licenses a n d p e rm its— th a t b u si­ fa m ily plots.
nesses n e ed e d to follow. T his system w as n o m in a lly su p ­ O f c o u rse, th e b o o m in th e G D P g r o w th ra te does n o t
po sed to ensure c o o rd in a tio n , p la n n in g , a n d p ro tec tio n s for im p ly th a t I n d ia ’s e co n o m ic p ro b lem s are solved. A le a d ­
w orkers, b u t it cam e to re p re se n t b u reau cratic inefficiency in g fe a tu re to n o te in In d ia is h ig h levels o f ex tre m e
th a t stifled innovation. p o v e rty , p re v a le n t in r u ra l a n d u rb a n areas a lik e . T he
By th e 1990s, th e In d ia n state w as seen as increasingly c o u n try s id e , w h e re la n d is re la tiv e ly scarce giv en th e
m eddlesom e, d y sfu n ctio n al, c o rru p t, a n d m u ch in n e ed o f p o p u la tio n d e n sity , re m a in s h o m e to som e o f th e w o rld ’s
reform . A s one lea d in g sch o lar o f In d ia p u t it, th e state was m o st c h ro n ic situ a tio n s o f m a ln u tritio n a n d u n d e rn o u r ­
“h ig h ly c en tralize d a n d in te rv en tio n ist, a n d yet seem [ed] ish m e n t. D e sp ite th e d e ca d es since th e e n d o f p rin c e ly
pow erless” (K ohli 1990: 8). A m ajor response cam e in 1991 title s a n d th e a b o litio n o f caste d is c rim in a tio n , th e re are
w ith a set o f reform s th a t o p e n ed up In d ia ’s econom y som e­ p o w e rfu l la n d e d e lites t h a t c o n tro l m u c h o f th e w e a lth ,
w h a t a n d b e g an to d ism an tle th e license raj. W h ile In d ia w h ile in co m e s fo r th e p o o r are tin y a n d fra g ile . E q u a lly
d id n o t u n d e rta k e any m assive tra n sitio n to free -m ark e t s tr ik in g ju x ta p o s itio n s are fo u n d in th e m assive a n d
principles, th e c h an g es w ere sig n ifican t by In d ia n sta n ­ g ro w in g in e q u a litie s in In d ia ’s m ajo r cities. M u m b a i has
dards. T he ch an g e coincided w ith th e end o f th e C o ld W ar, b e co m e a classic exam ple o f th is , b e in g a c e n te r b o th o f
w h e n th e Soviet U n io n collapsed, h a v in g once b e en th e th e a fo re m e n tio n e d c o rp o ra te b o o m — w ith h ig h -e n d real
c o m m an d econom y m o d el th a t In d ia (w hile re m a in in g e sta te a n d a w e a lth y fin a n c ia l d is tric t— a n d th e over­
dem ocratic) h a d so u g h t to follow. c ro w d ed slum s (M e h ta 2 0 0 4 ). R e g a rd le ss o f in n o v a tio n
In d ia ’s g ro w th soon accelerated, th o u g h th is is n o t at­ a n d e n tre p re n e u rsh ip , w o rk a m o n g th e u rb a n p o o r re ­
trib u ta b le to th e reform s alone (see box “W h a t E x p la in s m a in s larg e ly in th e in fo rm a l secto r, w ith no b en efits,
In d ia ’s R e c e n t G ro w th ? ”). T he c o u n try has g ro w n ra p id ly m u c h u n c e rta in ty , a n d o fte n h a z a rd o u s w o rk in g a n d
in th e y ears a fte r 2 0 0 2 , av erag in g in th e ra n g e o f 8 p e rc e n t liv in g c o n d itio n s.
 Case Studies 463

CHAPTER 5, PAGE 99

For many years after its independence could have more closed patterns of deci­ growth as the remedy and others saying
from Britain in 1947, India achieved rela­ sion making (Kohli 2004). that only growth coupled with better
tively slow growth on the order of about 4 India's recent growth has also been governance, improved agricultural per­
percent per year. Growth was hindered by very interesting as a contrast to other formance, and more effective investment
extensive regulations and the license raj" developing countries, especially China. in human capital will work (Sen 2000;
that required many licenses and approvals While China has achieved much of its Balakrishnan 2010).
to conduct business. Under this system, rapid growth on the basis of investment As for the causes of the boom, a
state policy often favored the well con­ in manufacturing, India has seen exten­ common argument is that the liberaliza­
nected rather than making decisions sive growth in services as well and has tion of the economy after 1991 was the
based on economic rationality and effi­ boomed in part due to the growing con­ key factor. This can certainly be supported
ciency. Economic improvements have sumption of its middle class, as opposed by the timing of the boom, which began
been more dramatic in recent years, and to investment for exports to foreign coun­ after the reforms had taken root, though
this change has followed the implemen­ tries. While India and China have highly critics could argue that the boom did not
tation of pro-market economic reforms in skilled professional sectors, a difference is happen immediately following the re­
1991 at the direction of Manmohan Singh, in the caricature of each development forms. Policy reform is not the only factor,
who at the time was finance minister and model: China is the "world's workshop," however. Careful attention should be paid
later served as Prime Minister. But what is making plastic toys and simple electron­ to the deeper historical origins of the con­
India's development path, and does ics on the factory floor, while India is the temporary Indian economy. In particular,
openness to the market alone explain its world's "back office," home to many "call the long emphasis on education under
recent success? centers" that provide customer service Nehru in such areas as science and tech­
There are a number of distinctive fea­ and other support, as well as engineering, nology has likely paid important divi­
tures of India's development. One is that computing, and other services (see Fried­ dends in subsequent decades as the
India established a robust democracy man 2005 for a popular version of this ar­ beneficiaries of investments in education
before achieving a modern economy, gument). The reality is much more have entered the labor force (see Kohli
whereas many theories lead us to expect nuanced, but the distinction illustrates 2004). The favorable international context
the opposite sequence. This makes India a some features of the respective paths. has also mattered, including technologi­
very interesting case for scholars who An additional striking feature of Indian cal advances in telecommunications and
want to study how politics shapes eco­ development is that high levels of ex­ information sharing that facilitated off­
nomic performance. India's state action treme poverty still accompany its growth shoring of service jobs to India's booming
has long been shaped by the govern­ over the last two decades. While poverty technology sector (Friedman 2005). In
ment's need to respond to the expecta­ has been reduced, hundreds of millions other words, while market reforms may
tions of important economic actors and are still extremely poor in India, living on have been a component of India's chang­
the populace at large, which makes it dif­ less than a dollar a day. Scholars debate ing economic fortunes, the correlation
ferent from development initiatives at­ why extreme poverty persists in the between the two is not the same as proof
tempted by authoritarian regimes that country, with many stressing more of causation.
464 India

Democracy's Success in India: What Can W e Learn

from a Deviant Case? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 133

How does modernization theory account decide that this anomaly disproves or re­ economic development facilitates democ­
for low-income democracies such as futes modernization theory, and turn to ratization and democratic consolidation?
India? As discussed in chapter 6, modern­ some other theory of democratization. Why would this be different? Because the
ization theory predicts that economic de­ For example, we could turn to institu­ theory would now say that it is unlikely that
velopment will lead to democratization tional theories of democratization as an India could successfully democratize with­
and democratic consolidation. Indeed, alternative. Perhaps something about the out first achieving a higher level of eco­
this relationship generally holds. More parliamentary form of government rather nomic development, but not that it is
often than not, increasing economic de­ than presidential government contrib­ impossible. A more flexible theory of mod­
velopment increases the probability that uted to India's rather successful democ­ ernization might be compatible with in­
any given society will have democratic racy (as is discussed in chapter 10); one cluding insights from other theories. For
politics. India, however, poses a major could consider the Indian case to test this example, perhaps modernization theory
anomaly for some versions of moderniza­ hypothesis. For example, has the parlia­ could be linked to institutional theories,
tion theory. Given that India's population mentary system with its multiparty like the one on parliamentarism men­
is approximately one-seventh of the coalitions and governments that are ac­ tioned previously. Maybe parliamentarism
world's population, this anomaly is not countable to the legislature resulted in is particularly called for as a form of institu­
easily dismissed. more power-sharing and less "winner- tional design when the society in question
Why does India constitute an anomaly take-all" politics? Has it resulted in a prime has a relatively low level of economic de­
or "deviant case" for modernization ministerial "style" that is less centralized velopment. We are speculating here for the
theory? India only recently began to see than in presidential systems? There is evi­ sake of argument, and not proposing this
notable economic development, and for dence both for and against the argument theory; India's history of development and
most of the twentieth century the coun­ that parliamentarism has been a cause of democracy does not and cannot prove this
try was profoundly poor. Modernization India's democratic success. assertion. Rather, it might suggest this hy­
would lead us to suspect authoritarian Another alternative, though, would be pothesis, which we could then test
governance under these conditions. Yet to use a deviant case like India's democracy through the examination of other well-
after decolonization India defied pessi­ to amend or clarify the nature of the origi­ selected cases. In general, deviant cases
mists and built the world's largest democ­ nal theory. What if modernization theory is are useful. We should be pleased when we
racy, one which has now endured for not making the law-like generalization that find them, as they help us to critically
decades. There are several conclusions development leads inevitably to democra­ assess existing theories, modifying or re­
that one could draw from this. We could tization, but rather a "weaker" claim that jecting them as appropriate.

ism and Differences in Development in India CHAPTER 8, PAGE 189

One of the main advantages of federalism competition with one another, while also Brazil can have different policies in differ­
is purported to be its impact on economic ensuring that government decisions ent states, each adapted to local needs
and social development. As noted in about taxes and services are "closer to the and demands. Yet this key advantage of
chapter 8 federal systems may allow dif­ people," and thus more responsive. A federalism and decentralized government
ferent states to engage in healthy country like India, the United States, or is also one of its disadvantages: Allowing
 Case Studies 465

Differences in Development in India c h a p t e r s , p a g e is p

states to do things differently can mean without rapid economic growth, but the worse performers, or "bad” for devel­
some may do better and some worse rather through strategic interventions in opment because they allow the worse-
than others. providing public services made by the performing states to fall behind? There is
India has highly varying levels of devel­ Communist Party that governed in the no simple answer to this question. One
opment and economic well-being, and state (Sen 2000). In West Bengal as well, thing that is certain is that poorly gov­
some of the variations are by state. In surprising achievements happened in erned states do not always automatically
recent years, federalism has been comple­ rural areas as Communists with few links adopt models as demonstrated by well-
mented by decentralization to a more local to the landed elite were able to reach out governed states. Politics, history, and
level, as major reforms transferred signifi­ to the poor in the countrywide and incor­ other institutions shape policy responses,
cant development responsibilities from porate them into politics (Kohli 1989). Yet and do not always easily allow the "right"
the central government to local institu­ other states— such as the poor states of policy to be chosen (see Kohli 1989,
tions, a system of decentralization known Bihar and Orissa— have lagged behind Mullen 2011). The states that are poorly
as the panchayat raj. For comparativists considerably. In terms of India's economic governed often remain that way, to the
studying a country as huge and complex boom, advances have been clearest in detriment of their populations, regardless
as India, a comparison across states or some of the areas where high-tech indus­ of being able to observe better perfor­
across local communities can be as fruitful tries and firms have clustered, such as mance in other places. On the other hand,
as efforts to compare India to another around the metropolitan cities of Delhi federalism and decentralization can be
country (Kohli 1990, Mullen 2011, e.g.). and Mumbai, as well as Bengaluru (for­ seen as providing opportunities for those
Some Indian states have witnessed merly Bangalore) in the state of Karnataka states with healthier institutions and po­
very high performance, with some of the and Flyderabad in the state of Andhra litical cultures to be able to benefit their
best outcomes found in relatively unlikely Pradesh. own populations, even if governance
places. The state of Kerala, for example, Are federalism and decentralization of elsewhere in the country is poor. The pros
was renowned for a period of time as a power thus "good" for development be­ and cons of federalism are thus both on
place where significant improvements in cause they allow the better-performing display in highly uneven political econo­
development indicators were realized states to get ahead and set the model for mies like India.

Ethnicity and Political Parties in India CHAPTER 14, PAGE 341

Indian society was historically divided instrument of colonial rule and in doing linkage to the class structure is more
into "castes," and many have viewed these so universalized and rigidified it. Depend­ direct than the general correlation be­
divisions as long-standing (e.g., Dumont ing on how one defines ethnic groups, tween class and status-group that we find
1981), though more recently some histori­ populations defined as castes can be in some other societies). It is also debat­
ans have argued that the caste "system" as thought of as falling into this category. able whether the FHindu nationalist party
such only developed during the period of The question is a bit complicated, since Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) should be
British colonialism (Dirks 2001). The pro­ caste groups are understood to form considered an ethnic party: It is ostensibly
ponents of the latter view are not saying bases in the society's stratification system, organized around religion, but ethnic and
that caste did not exist before colonialism, rather than culturally distinct groups that religious differences are often closely
but rather that the British used it as an exist side by side (in other words, caste's associated.
466 India

CASE STUDY (continued)

Ethnicity and Political Parties in India CHAPTER 14, PAGE 341

The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) stands political competition and political parties chance of actually winning a share of
out for its relative success in recent years. are, at least in part, vehicles through power. Again, the presumption is that it
It has done reasonably well, capturing which groups aim to capture those spoils. would be irrational to cast one's vote for
double digits in some national votes. This Chandra's basic contention is that a party that stands no reasonable chance
party aims to represent low-caste individ­ parties will be successful at capturing a of winning (just ask Ralph Nader, the
uals. Kanchan Chandra (2004), in an im­ high percentage of the vote of the ethnic American presidential candidate in 2000).
portant book on the subject, refers to group or groups they claim to represent This is, of course, a function of (1) the
these groups as the "scheduled castes" when two criteria are met. The first is that relative size of the group or coalition of
rather than the "untouchables," a label the internal party structure must allow groups in question; (2) the perceived like­
you might have heard but one that is con­ members of the group in question to lihood that members of those groups
sidered offensive by many. Chandra seeks move up within the party.This is because will vote for the party; and (3) the nature
to develop a general theory of the success potential voters need to be able to see of the electoral system. As you think
of ethnic parties based largely on the that group members will actually be able about Chandra's approach to the analysis
analysis of the BSP. This theory is limited to to hold some power and, presumably, of ethnic parties, consider how well it
"patronage democracies" in which the access spoils. The second major criterion might explain other cases mentioned in
spoils of the state are the main objects of is that the party must stand a reasonable chapter 14.

CASE STUDY

India in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic Politics,

Identity, and Security CHAPTER 16, PAGE 389

In India, domestic and international poli­ India's long and contested border tense and is clouded by the prospect of
tics are deeply intertwined. This is true on with Pakistan is often called the "world's nuclear standoff or even possible use of
questions of security, as well as in the most dangerous border.” It has been a nuclear weapons. In 1998, Pakistan's test­
economy. Especially important is the source of conflict for more than sixty ing of an atomic device resulted in India
country's relationship with neigh-boring years, since the partition of India at inde­ testing its own devices just days later;
Pakistan and how this reflects relations pendence in 1947; that division left mil­ both tests were widely seen as provoca­
between Indians domestically. The chal­ lions of Muslims in India and millions of tive signals to the opposite country.
lenge of India-Pakistan relations affects Hindus in Pakistan that wanted to change Indeed, the development of nuclear
questions of nationhood, identity, vio­ their nationhood and generated flows of weapons in Pakistan was fueled in large
lence, and government in India; in short, refugees across the borders in both direc­ measure by historical animosity toward
international relations affect most every­ tions. Religious differences, both within India, which was a nuclear power as of the
thing addressed in the chapters of this India and between the two countries, 1970s. The fact that both have nuclear
book. On the flip side, India's domestic have been important ever since. One of weapons heightens the stakes of war and
politics also affects its international rela­ the most contentious points has long peace in the region.
tions. Comparative politics and interna­ been the disputed region of Kashmir, Relations between the countries affect
tional relations may be two subfields of which is claimed by Pakistan but currently the domestic politics of each in many ways.
political science, but they are not totally administered by India. The border be­ To consider just India here, a key issue in
separable. tween Pakistan and India is notoriously domestic politics is, of course, how to
 Case Studies 467

CASE STUDY (continued)

India in the Twenty-First Century: Domestic Politics,

Identity, and Security CHAPTER 16, PAGE 389

handle relations with Pakistan. But this is there has been relatively little recrimination Osama bin Laden, who was found living
more than just a policy issue: It enters into against Indian Muslims generally. India has very close to a major Pakistani military acad­
the many topics we have discussed an estimated 160 million Muslims, which is emy. Yet a common analysis is that Pakistan
throughout the chapters of this book. For a minority of the country's population is primarily concerned about its relationship
example, the very question of Indian na­ but still represents over 10 percent of the with India, and dedicates its security and
tionhood and identity, the political party world's Muslims and the third-largest intelligence forces toward India rather than
system, and the resulting policymaking in Muslim population in the world, after Indo­ toward Afghanistan and al Qaeda.
the Indian parliament have been affected nesia and Pakistan (Pew Forum 2009). The Pakistani and Muslim questions
by the question of Islam and the resulting This international relationship between should not suggest that Islam is a "prob­
rise of Hindu nationalist sentiment. This the two nuclear powers also affects the do­ lem" that drives Indian politics. India has
was at the origin of some of the popularity mestic politics of other countries around persisted for over six decades as a democ­
of the Hindu nationalist BJP, which gov­ the globe. The United States, for instance, racy with basic rights for all, and most In­
erned from 1998 to 2004, though the party debates its relationship with Pakistan, dians of different religions live peacefully
addresses issues other than Hindu nation­ which seems a necessary yet challenging alongside one another. The country also
alism. Distrust between groups is fed by one. There is distrust between the coun­ has many other hot issues of identity and
such events as the 2008 bombings in the tries, with the United States accusing nationhood, such as traditional social seg­
metropolis of Mumbai by Pakistani mili­ Pakistan of a duplicitous intelligence and regation by class or caste, for example.
tants, though it should be noted that most security services that seek to harbor Islamic The relevance of the Pakistan and Muslim
Hindus and Muslims in India live side by fundamentalist terror groups rather than questions simply illustrates how interna­
side peacefully; indeed, many Muslim hunt them down; the most obvious exam­ tional factors feed into domestic politics,
groups spoke out against the attacks and ple came after the death of al Qaeda leader and vice versa.

Research Prompts
1. As a low-income democracy, India is seen as a deviant case for 4. If relations between India and Pakistan are deeply rooted in iden­
modernization theory when it comes to democratization. What tity issues and history, what are the implications for policy-making
comparative analyses could you set up to test hypotheses about that might contribute to peace going forward? Are there any fac­
the reasons behind India's democratic success? Would yqu prefer tors that can be changed (unlike the demographics and history of
another low-income democracy elsewhere, such as Ghana in the countries) that can contribute to a more optimistic outcome?
Africa? Or a low-income country neighboring India that shares a 5. The end of British colonialism in India was led by remarkable his­
region and some history but is not democratic, such as Pakistan? torical figures such as Mahatma Gandhi, who was seen as a na­
What would be the merits of your research design? tional hero. Yet independent India (while democratic) was neither
2. Do a brief search of the literature to find two or more states of India peaceful nor just: It has witnessed significant sectarian violence,
to compare on the question of economic development. What do political assassinations, ongoing social inequalities, and state cor­
you find are some of the main factors that emerge to account for ruption. Does this imply that the efforts of individuals such as
why certain states have done better or worse than others? Gandhi are ultimately unable to transform the quality of govern­
3. India has developed economically at a much faster rate since ance, and that politics depends more upon cultures and struc­
making economic reforms beginning in 1991. What is the best tures that individuals cannot change? If not, why was someone
argument you can make that India's economic boom of the last like Gandhi unable to create lasting change in these areas? If so,
two decades has been based on something other than this set of on the other hand, how can one account for the decolonization
reforms? What is the evidence you have to make this other claim? of India itself without reference to individuals and their actions?
468

Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)

PROFILE Introduction
Ir a n is o f in te re s t to m a n y p o litic a l analysts
Key Features of Contemporary Iran b e ca u se o f its re v o lu tio n a ry re g im e a n d
b e ca u se o f its fo re ig n policy. M a n y in te r­
Population: 80,840,713 (estimate, July 2014)
n a tio n a l re la tio n s th in k e r s see I r a n as p o ­
Area: 1,648,195 square kilometers te n tia lly th re a te n in g to th e W e s t, a n d in
p a rtic u la r to A m e ric a n p o lic y in th e M id d le
Head of State: Ali Hosseini Khamenei (Supreme Leader,
E a s t, as w e ll as to Israel. G iv e n th a t in 1979
1989-present)
I r a n w itn e s s e d a re v o lu tio n a g a in s t a n au ­
Head of Government: Hassan Rouhani (president, 2013-present) th o r ita r ia n re g im e b a c k e d b y th e U n ite d
S ta te s, y ie ld in g a s tro n g ly re lig io u s, a n ti-
Capital: Tehran
A m e ric a n re g im e , a n d giv en f u rth e r th a t
Year of Independence: The Islamic Republic was founded in 1979, th e U n ite d S tates has b a ck e d a u th o rita ria n
but Iran was never fully colonized and had g o v e rn m e n ts in o th e r Isla m ic so c ie tie s in
been a distinct geopolitical entity in a variety
a n e ffo rt to p re v e n t g o v e rn m e n ts lik e t h a t
of forms for centuries.
in I r a n fro m ta k in g p o w e r th e re , m u c h a t­
Year of Current Constitution: 1979 te n tio n h a s b e e n fo c u se d o n e x p la in in g
c o n te m p o ra ry I ra n ia n p o litics. A n d in d e e d
Languages: Persian is the majority language. Other
th e s e are im p o rta n t c o n sid era tio n s. H o w ­
important languages include Turkic, Azeri,
Kurdish, and Luri, among others. ever, it is im p o r ta n t th a t w e n o t th in k o f
Ir a n solely in te rm s o f th e fo reig n p o licy in ­
GDP per Capita: $4,763 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
te re sts o f th e W e s t. R a th e r, w e, as c o m p a r­
Human Development Index 75th (high human development) ative p o litic a l a n aly sts, n e e d to tre a t it like
Ranking (2014): a n y o th e r case, p o sin g e m p iric a l q u e stio n s

Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human a b o u t w h y th e c o u n tr y ’s p o litic s h a s th e
Development Report 2014. fe atu res th a t it does.

I Persian 61 °A
■Azeri 16%
M Kurd 10%
I Lur 6% Shi’a Islam 8
I Baloch 2% Sunni Islam '
I Arab 2% Other 2%
M Turkmen 2!
SI Other 1%
Ethnic Groups in Iran Religious Affiliation in Iran
Source: CIA World Factbook. Source: CIA World Factbook.
 Profile 469

KAZAKHSTAN j UZBEKISTAN
GEORGIA

ARMENIA
Caspian Sea
TURKMENISTAN

• Tabriz
• o

Now Sh ah r•

Mashhad
★ Tehran

Kermanshah

Esfahan
Birjand
• Dezful

• Ahvaz
Abadan

Shiraz Kerman

Zahedan 1
• Bushehr

SAUDI Asaluyeh Bandar Abbas

ARABIA
Persian
PAKISTAN
Chabahar j
Gulf

Gulf o f Oman

OMAN

0 110 220 Kilometers

0 110 220 Miles

470 Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)

T he “revolutionary” character o f th e reg im e is its e lf a revolution in ideological term s. I n c e rta in respects it is very
source o f considerable in terest. W h ile in som e respects th e conservative, a n d it o ften is d escrib ed as such. Y et secular
Ira n ia n revolution resem bled o th e r m ajor revolutions, it M a rx is ts w e re p a r t o f th e re v o lu tio n a ry c o a litio n th a t
differed from m an y in t h a t it d id n o t clearly lean to w a rd th e h e lp e d to b rin g d o w n th e S h a h , a n d even to d ay th e re are
p o litica l left, th o u g h som e elem ents in th e re volutionary featu res o f th e Ira n ia n g o v e rn m e n t th a t are left-leaning.
coalitio n d id (P arsa 2 0 0 0 ; K u rz m a n 2 0 0 4 ; S a leh i-Isfa h an i T h u s, I r a n h a s th e p o te n tia l to u n s e ttle so m e o f o u r p re ­
2 0 0 9 : 3 2 -3 3 ). In d e e d , it is h a rd to p lace th e I r a n ia n c onceived n o tio n s ab o u t ho w p olitics w orks.

Historical Development
Ir a n has a long a n d fa scin a tin g history, d a tin g b a ck to th e In 1921, R e za K h a n h elped to org an ize a coup d ’etat,
g re at P ersian E m p ire (and earlier). H e re w e are in te rested w ith Sayyid Z iya a l-D in T ab atab ai em erg in g as P rim e
in its co n te m p o ra ry history, w h ic h m eans th a t w e n e ed to M in is te r a n d R eza K h a n as M in iste r o f W a r (K eddie [1991]
b e g in w ith th e tw e n tie th century. O u r g o a l is to u n d e r­ 200 8 : 2 1 0 -2 1 2 ; H a m b ly [1991] 2008b: 219 -2 2 1 ). R eza
sta n d h o w Ira n developed such th a t th e Islam ic R evolution K h a n w o u ld becom e P rim e M in iste r h im s e lf in 1923 a n d
could tak e place in 1979. th e n , in 1925, becom e th e c o u n try ’s m o n arc h (H a m b ly
I t is c ritic a l to u n d e r s ta n d t h a t w h ile I r a n h a d n o t 2008b: 2 2 4 -2 2 5 ), as R eza S h a h P ahlavi, in a u g u ra tin g th e
b e e n fo rm a lly c o lo n iz e d , it h a d b e e n a t th e m erc y o f tw o P ah lav i D y n asty , w h ic h w o u ld last u n til 1979. R eza S hah,
im p e ria l p o w e rs, G r e a t B rita in a n d R u ssia (a n d la te r th e like his son a n d successor, M o h a m m a d R eza S h a h (often
S o v ie t U n io n ), fo r so m e y e ars (H a m b ly [1991] 2 0 0 8 a , referred to sim ply as “th e S h a h ”), w as secular, W e s te rn iz ­
[1991] 2 0 0 8 b ). T his w e a k e n e d th e Q a ja r D y n a s ty , w h ic h ing, a n d m o d e rn iz in g in o rien tatio n . N o ta b le projects in ­
h a d h e ld p o w e r sin ce 1795 in a m o n a rc h ic a l sy stem . c luded th e estab lish m en t o f a W este rn -sty le legal system ,
Ir a n w as larg e ly a tr a d itio n a l re lig io u s so c ie ty in w h ic h th e expansion o f th e state bureaucracy, a n d th e creation o f
S h a r i’a law w as p r a c tic e d , a n d th e c le rg y e x erc ised som e th e T ra n s -Ira n ia n Railway. R e za S h a h also trie d to force his
sta te -lik e fu n c tio n s (K e d d ie [1991] 2 0 0 8 : 179), b u t subjects to w e ar W e s te rn clo th in g , am o n g o th e r sym bolic
W e s te rn -d e riv e d ideas o f n a tio n a lis m a n d m o d e rn iz a tio n m an d ates (H a m b ly [1991] 200 8 b : 2 2 5 -2 2 6 , 2 3 0 -2 3 2 ).
h a d b e g u n to seep in to th e c o u n try b y th e la te n in e te e n th T he S h a h estab lish ed close ties w ith G e rm a n y in th e
c e n tu r y (M o a d d e l 2 0 0 5 ). I n 1 9 0 5 -1 9 0 6 c o n te n tio u s 1930s (H a m b ly [1991] 200 8 b : 2 4 1 -2 4 3 ). W h ile th is m ay
a ctio n forced th e Q a ja r to a d o p t a c o n stitu tio n a l m o n arc h y have ow ed m ore to in te re st (achieving a c o u n te rw e ig h t to
(K e d d ie [1991] 2 0 0 8 : 2 0 2 -2 0 3 ). T h is is n o t to say th a t th e Soviet U n io n a n d th e U n ite d K ingdom ) th a n to id eo ­
th e Q a ja r re g im e w as h a p p y a b o u t su c h a d e v e lo p m e n t logical affinity, th e association w o u ld late r prove p ro b lem ­
(K e d d ie [1991] 2 0 0 8 : 2 0 5 - 2 0 7 ) , a n d th e S h a h in 1908 atic for h im . D u rin g th e S econd W o rld W a r, he a tte m p ted
a tte m p te d to c irc u m v e n t c o n s titu tio n a lity b u t w as fo rced to m a in ta in fo rm al n e u tra lity , b u t th e A llie s w o u ld n o t
fro m office. H e w o u ld m a k e a fa ile d a tte m p te d to r e ­ accept th is, in p a r t because th e y w a n te d to use th e T ran s-
e sta b lish h is a u th o rity tw o y e ars late r. T he t u r n to c o n ­ Ira n ia n R ailw ay to sen d supplies to R ussia. A s a result,
s titu tio n a l m o n a rc h y d id n o t, h o w e v er, m a k e th e B ritis h S oviet a n d B ritish tro o p s occupied th e country, a n d in 1941
a n d R u ssia n s a n y less lik e ly to in te rv e n e in I r a n , a n d in th e S h a h resigned. T his p laced his son, M o h a m m a d R eza
1907 a t th e A n g lo -R u s s ia n C o n v e n tio n th e y h a d e sse n ­ S h a h , o n th e th ro n e . N o t b e in g fo rm ally associated w ith his
tia lly a g re e d to d iv id e th e c o u n try in to z o n e s w h e re one fa th e r’s lin k s to G erm an y , th e n ew S h a h could w e a th e r th e
o r th e o th e r p o w e r w o u ld e x e rt p r e d o m in a n t in flu e n ce dip lo m atic a n d p o litica l storm s. A fte r som e years, th e S hah
(K eddie [1991] 2 0 0 8 : 205). F o re ig n in te rv e n tio n c o n tin u e d w o u ld be k n o w n as a stro n g ly a u th o rita ria n ru le r w h o used
d u rin g th e F ir s t W o rld W a r. A f te r th e w a r, th e g o v e rn ­ system atic v iolence to q uell oppo sitio n .
m e n t m a d e a n a g re e m e n t w ith th e U n ite d K in g d o m th a t A crisis w o u ld develop in th e early 1950s a fte r M o h a m ­
w o u ld h ave e x p a n d e d t h a t c o u n try ’s in flu e n c e in I r a n , m ad M o sa d d e q becam e P rim e M in is te r (H a m b ly [1991]
b u t th e a g re e m e n t w a s n o t im p le m e n te d a n d its c o n te n ts 2 0 0 8 a : 251 -2 6 3 ). M o sa d d e q , am o n g o th e r th in g s , so u g h t
g e n e ra te d d is c o n te n t w h e n th e y b e c a m e p u b lic (H a m b ly to n a tio n a liz e Ir a n ’s oil in d u stry (as h a d b e e n done, for ex­
[1991] 2 0 0 8 b : 2 1 5 -2 1 7 ). am ple, b y M ex ico w ith its o w n som e years earlier). A coup
 Profile 471

Historical D evelopm ent

Tim eline
1795-1925 Qajar Dynasty 1963 The "White Revolution" is announced, and includes
1906 Constitutional monarchy established after the a number of reforms such as agrarian reform and
“Constitutional Revolution” women's suffrage.
1907 Anglo-Russian Convention, used to justify English 1963 Exile of Ayatollah Khomeini
and Russian spheres of influence within Iran and 1973 Spike in global oil prices benefits Iran in the short
periodic intervention term.
1908 Mohammad Ali Shah tries to undo the constitu­ 1978-1979 Increasing social conflict, Iranian Revolution,
tional order but is forced from power. and the return of Ayatollah Khomeini; the Shah
1919 Anglo-lranian Agreement, never implemented, but departs Iran.
upon becoming public generates considerable 1979 Foundation of Islamic Republic, by the end of the
discontent year religious leaders had come to dominate, and a
1921 Reza Khan becomes Minister of War after helping new constitution was passed.
to bring a coup which places Seyyed Zia'eedin 1979 Beginning of Iranian hostage crisis
Tabatabaee as Prime Minister (still under the Qajar 1980 Abolhassan Bani Sadr is elected as president, but is
Dynasty). impeached the following year.
1923 Reza Khan (later to be Reza Shah) becomes Prime 1980-1989 Iran—Iraq War
Minister. 1981 Release of American hostages shortly after Ronald
1923 Ahmad Shah leaves the country, showing Qajar Reagan takes office
Dynasty's weakness. 1981 Bani Sadr forced from power by Khomeini, further
1923 Major political reforms cementing the position of religious leaders in the
1925 Reza Shah Pahlavi becomes monarch (beginning revolutionary regime
of Pahlavi Dynasty) 1981 Mohammad-Ali Rajai elected president but killed
1925-1926 Establishment of European-style legal system within a month; Ali Khamenei, future Supreme
1938 Completion of Trans-Iranian railway Leader, assumes the presidency.
1941 Reza Shah resigns following the country's occupa­ 1988 Iran Air flight 655 is shot down accidentally by the
tion by the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union United States, killing 290 passengers and crew
(part of World War II), leaving Mohammed Reza members.
Shah in power. 1989 Death of Ayatollah Khomeini; rise of Ayatollah
1942 Formal alliance is formed between Iran, the United Khamenei; election of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to
Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in the struggle the presidency
against the Nazis. 1997 Election of Mohammad Khatami to the presidency
1944 Death of Reza Shah (perceived as more liberal, raising hopes of reform
1951-1953 Tumultuous period in which the elected govern­ in both Iran and the West)
ment of Mohammad Mosaddeq holds power, in­ 2005 Election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presi­
cluding efforts to nationalize the Iranian oil industry dency (perceived as a hard-liner, dampening
1953 Coup d'etat, with backing from Britain and the United hopes for reform)
States, brings down the Mosaddeq government. 2009 Ahmadinejad's reelection, apparently fraudulent,
1954 Settlement of the oil industry question, with favor­ provokes major protests.
able terms for multinational corporations 2013 Hassan Rouhani is elected president.

d ’eta t w as lau n c h ed , w ith su p p o rt fro m b o th th e U n ite d h a p p e n e d h a d fo reig n in te rv e n tio n n o t b ro u g h t d o w n th is

K in g d o m a n d th e U n ite d States, w h o w a n te d to ensure g o v e rn m e n t (H a m b ly [1991] 2 0 0 8 a : 254), b u t it is conceiv­
co n tin u e d W e s te rn co n tro l over Ira n ia n n a tu ra l resources able th a t M o sa d d e q co u ld have b u ilt o n successful n a tio n ­
(K eddie [1991] 2 0 0 8 ). T here is no te llin g w h a t w o u ld have a liz a tio n to e x p an d Ira n ia n d e m o c ratiza tio n . I n any case,
472 Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)

th is w as n o t to b e, a n d th e S h a h ’s a u th o rita ria n g o v e rn m e n t capable o f unifying diverse revolutionary elem ents (A rjom and
n eg o tia te d generous term s for m u ltin a tio n a ls involved in 2009). Secular M arxists were im p o rtan t in th e opposition to
th e e x tra ctio n o f Ira n ia n oil, such th a t n a tio n a liz a tio n th e S h a h ’s regim e, and over tim e th e m iddle class g ot on board
w o u ld n o t d ra m a tic ally im p in g e o n th e in te rests o f th e oil as well. A s often happens in revolutions, various groups likely
com panies (H a m b ly [1991] 200 8 a: 265). felt th a t they w ould be able to control th e process, and the secu­
T he S h a h ’s reg im e w as basically a n a u th o rita ria n devel- lar allies o f the clergy undoubtedly did n ot envision th e regim e
o p m en ta list state (F o ra n 2005: 7 5 -8 1 ). M o h a m m a d R eza th a t em erged. Scholars w ho are interested in the role o f culture
S h ah , in a series o f econom ic plans, aim e d to c o n tin u e th e in explaining revolutions often point to this case, draw ing at­
process o f in d u stria liz a tio n a n d m o d e rn iz a tio n th a t h a d tention to the im portance o f Twelver S hi’ism in Iran, w hich
b e en sta rte d u n d e r h is father, u sin g o il revenues as a p rin c i­ facilitated th e rise o f the clergy to political leadership, particu­
p a l source o f fu n d in g . I n th is he w as fairly successful: Ira n larly on K hom eini’s interpretation o f the nature o f sacred au­
m o d e rn iz e d so m ew h at rapidly, b u ilt a notable m id d le class th o rity (A rjom and 2 0 0 9 :1 6 -3 5 ). The clergy’s consolidation o f
w ith a co sm o p o litan o rien tatio n , a n d estab lish ed a notable th eir pow er only took place over th e first couple o f years o f the
h ig h e r ed u catio n in fra s tru c tu re . In p o litica l term s, th e regim e, d uring and after the conflict w ith B ani Sadr. E ven in
S h a h w as largely regressive, th o u g h he w as w illin g to m ake th e constitutional order th a t was established, w hich places u lti­
reform s w h e n he th o u g h t th is w o u ld e n h an c e h is positio n . m ate authority w ith the clergy (discussed fu rth er in th e case
T hus th e “W h ite R evolution” o f 1963 d istrib u te d lan d , ex­ studies th a t follow), some dem ocratic forms are present, w ith
te n d e d suffrage (m ost notab ly to w om en), a n d m ad e a elections held for the presidency and the parliam ent.
n u m b er o f o th e r reform s (H a m b ly [1991] 200 8 a: 2 7 9 -2 8 3 ). I t w o u ld n o t be a n ex aggeration to say th a t th e Ira n ia n
T his should n o t b e u n d e rsto o d as p u re ly ben ev o len t la r­ R ev o lu tio n sh o ck ed th e w orld. W h a t to m ake o f a revolu­
gesse, how ever: T he S h a h faced civil d isc o n te n t a n d p ro ­ tio n a ry reg im e th a t w as rad ically a n ti-W e ste rn b u t n o t also
tests, a n d his “W h ite R evolution” w as acco m p an ied by secu lar a n d so cialist o n th e m odel o f C h in a a n d th e Soviet
efforts to repress his critics. F o r exam ple, th e A yatollah U nion? A t th e very least, th is d ra m a tic ally com plicated th e
K h o m ein i, a p ro m in e n t cleric, w as forced to leave th e c o u n ­ m o d e rn iz a tio n n arrativ es th a t u n d e rla y b o th Soviet and
try in 1963. M o re generally, th e S h a h ’s state w as h ig h ly W e s te rn c ap italist d evelopm ent. W h e n A m e ric a n hostages
repressive, a n d th e secu rity forces (the SA VAK ) w ere n o to ­ w ere ta k e n b y re v o lu tio n ary sy m p a th iz ers, th is d id little to
rious for to rtu rin g a n d m u rd e rin g dissidents (F o ra n 2005: ease th e shock. A n effort to rescue th e m a u th o riz e d by
77; H a m b ly [1991] 200 8 a: 2 9 0 -2 9 1 ). I t is w o rth fu rth e r Jim m y C a rte r w as unsuccessful, a n d th e y w o u ld o nly b e re ­
em p h asizin g th a t th is reg im e w as su p p o rte d b y W e s te rn leased a fte r R o n a ld R e ag a n to o k office.
pow ers like th e U n ite d K in g d o m a n d th e U n ite d States, D u rin g th e p o st-re v o lu tio n ary era w e could divide Ira ­
largely because o f C o ld W a r concerns. In d e e d , w h e n P re si­ n ia n p re sid en tial politics in to five m ain periods. T he first is
d e n t Jim m y C a rte r b eg an to em phasize h u m a n rig h ts as a th e in sta b ility o f th e early years. T he second is th e p e rio d o f
m ajo r c riterio n in U .S . fo reig n policy in th e late 1970s, th is K h a m e n e i’s presidency d u rin g w h ic h clerical a u th o rity w as
h e lp e d to w e ak en th e S h a h ’s p o sitio n (F o ra n 2005: 78; c onsolidated a n d th e w a r w ith Ira q to o k place. T he th ird is
K u rz m an 2 0 0 4 : 2 2 -2 3 ). T his o c cu rre d d u rin g a n econom ic th e p e rio d o f R a fsa n ja n i’s presidency, a fte r 1989, d u rin g
d o w n tu rn , fu rth e r w e ak e n in g th e S hah. w h ic h , as A rjo m a n d notes (2009: 7), th e system o f “dual
Just the sam e, the revolution took m any by surprise. A c­ leadership” b e tw ee n th e Suprem e L ea d er a n d th e president
cording to C harles K urzm an, it was “unthinkable,” b o th in the fully developed. R a fsa n ja n i’s presidency is also notable for
sense th a t few predicted it and because social-scientific theories efforts to re b u ild th e Ira n ia n econom y, w h ic h in clu d e d som e
have had som e difficulty in accounting for it (K urzm an 2004). capitalist reform s. The fo u rth period encom passes M o h am m ad
I t is im portant to em phasize th a t in 1978 and 1979 actors K h a tam i’s reform ist presidency b eginning in 1997, w hich
dem anding change spanned the political spectrum and th e re­ raised hopes for m any th a t th e regim e w ould liberalize. Finally,
ligious-secular divide: I t was by no m eans obvious to all th a t a th e 2005 election o f M a h m o u d A h m adinejad opened a period
conservative religious regim e w ould emerge victorious from the o f conservative retrenchm ent.
Iranian Revolution, at least initially, though it is also clear th a t Som e e x p ected th a t re v o lu tio n ary I ra n w o u ld n o t
the religious com ponent o f th e revolution was absolutely central last, p a rtic u la rly g iven in te rn a tio n a l pressures th a t it faced,
to its success, as K hom eini was the one actor w ho seemed in c lu d in g th e I r a n - I r a q W a r (1 9 8 0 -1 9 8 9 ) b u t also th e
 Profile 473

c o u n try ’s relative dip lo m atic isolation. Y et th e reg im e con­ ab ro ad felt th a t th e reg im e m ig h t be o p e n in g to g re ater d e ­
solidated its co n tro l a n d it has re m a in e d in p o w er since. T he m o cra tiz a tio n , b u t th ese h opes w ere d ash e d a fte r th e elec­
tra n sitio n a fte r K h o m e in i’s d e a th in 1989 w as p a rtic u la rly tio n o f A h m a d in e ja d in 200 5 . A h m a d in e ja d w as b o th a
im p o rta n t. A rjo m a n d (2009) describes w h a t follow ed, in h a rd lin e r and a p o p u lis t w hose d e m a g o g u ery appealed to
th e lan g u ag e o f M a x W eb e r, as th e “ro u tin iz a tio n ” o r “in ­ m an y o f Ira n ’s w orse off. J u s t th e sam e, h e faced opposition,
stitu tio n a liz a tio n ” o f th e “ch arism atic a u th o rity ” o f K h o ­ a n d his re -e le c tio n in 2 0 0 9 w as d e n o u n ce d by m an y as
m ein i, m ea n in g th a t th e re volution h a d to face th e classic frau d u le n t. T his le d to m ajo r p ro tests a g ain st th e reg im e, in
problem o f g o in g o n w ith o u t its m y stical lead er a n d tu rn in g th e so -c alled “G re e n R ev o lu tio n ” (discussed fu rth e r in a
th e revolution in to so m e th in g th a t d id n o t d e p e n d o n th a t case stu d y la te r in th e chapter), su p p o rte d by m an y p ro m i­
leader. M a jo r c o n stitu tio n a l reform s rem oved th e office o f n e n t fo rm er leaders. A g a in , it seem ed for a tim e like the
P rim e M in iste r, m a k in g th e system m ore p re sid en tialist, reg im e m ig h t n e ed to m ak e m ajor concessions, b u t th e use
a n d in m an y ways th e reform s also solidified th e c lergy’s o f force b ro u g h t th e p ro tests to a h a lt. Som e have seen th e
pow er a n d authority. Sayyed A li K h a m en e i to o k over as th e 2013 electio n o f H a ss a n R o u h a n i as sig n a lin g a p a rtia l
new S uprem e L ead er, a p o st he still holds a t th e tim e o f th is m ove b a c k to w a rd th e center, a n d som e are h o p e fu l a bout
w ritin g . W ith th e electio n o f th e relatively lib e ral M o h a m ­ his electio n le a d in g to a p o te n tia l th a w in g o f I r a n ia n -
m ad K h a ta m i in 1997, som e observers b o th in Ira n a n d W e s te rn relations.

Regime and Political Institutions

Ira n ’s p o lic y m ak in g process is v ery com plex, as b o th elected im p o rta n t pow ers. T hey can approve or reject candidates for
and n o n -elected officials play m ajor roles in se ttin g policy. th e presidency, for p a rliam e n t, a n d for m in iste ria l positions.
T he regim e has a dual n a tu re , as th e elected features o f a T hey c an also veto legislation m ade by th e M ajlis i f th ey
republic m ix w ith th e in stitu tio n s o f th eo c ratic ru le by deem it n o t to fit w ith Islam ic law o r th e Ira n ia n C o n stitu ­
M u slim clerics. O n one h a n d , Ir a n is a p re sid en tial system tion. F inally, th e Suprem e L e a d e r is p erhaps th e cen tral
w ith a pop u larly elected p re sid en t th a t governs w ith th e figure in Ira n ia n politics. H e too is a cleric (a h ig h -ra n k in g
cabinet. T he p a rliam e n t, k n o w n as th e M ajlis, is also elected, ayatollah), a n d he app o in ts h a lf o f th e m em bers o f th e
a n d it exerts som e checks o n p resid en tial pow er. H ow ever, G u a rd ia n C o u n c il, as w ell as th e h e a d o f th e jud iciary ; th e
a n o th e r im p o rta n t p o lic y m ak in g b o d y is th e G u a rd ia n S uprem e L ea d er also in d ire ctly controls w h o is eligible for
C o u n c il, a gro u p o f tw elve clerics th a t have a range o f th e o th e r six posts in th e G u a rd ia n C o u n c il, since th e head

Regim e and Political Institutions

Regime Theocratic state, but with some features of presidential and parliamentary democracy

Administrative Divisions Unitary state; thirty provinces + capital province of Tehran

Executive Branch President and cabinet, but with a number of executive functions held by the Supreme Leader
(non-elected) and the Guardian Council

Selection of Executive Election from within a set of candidates approved by the Guardian Council

Legislative Branch Elected Parliament, called the Majlis. The Guardian Council can veto legislation.

Judicial Branch Politicized judiciary controlled by religious conservatives, with Islamic law the basis of the system.
Supreme Court and Judicial High Council are top bodies.

Political Party System Multiparty system but with restrictions

474 Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)

o f th e ju d ic iary n o m in ates th ese for c onsideration b y th e E x p ed ien c y C o u n c il advises th e Suprem e L eader, a n d an

M ajlis. T he Suprem e L eader, n o t th e presid en t, has au th o r­ A ssem bly o f E x p e rts is em pow ered to elect th e Suprem e
ity over th e m ilitary. M oreover, th e Suprem e L ea d er m u st L ea d e r a fte r his predecessor dies, resigns, or is incapaci­
officially affirm th e election o f th e president. M a n y com ­ tate d ; th e A ssem bly o f E x p e rts is n o m in a lly em pow ered to
m en tato rs th u s conclude th a t pow er lies u ltim ate ly w ith th e review th e S uprem e L eader, b u t has n o t done so in practice,
clergy a n d n o t w ith th e m ore “d em o cratic” bodies in Ira n , p erhaps in p a rt because its c o m position is in d ire ctly con­
th o u g h th ese elected b odies are n o t m ere p u ppets. Finally, tro lle d b y th e Suprem e L eader. T hese arra n g e m e n ts are dis­
th ere are a d d itio n al consultative bodies in Iran : A n cussed in m ore d e ta il in th e case studies th a t follow.

Political Culture
O n e featu re o f Ira n ia n po litical c u ltu re is th e e x te n t to ch an g e to th e sam e extent. A s a result, p o o re r a n d m ore
w h ic h religiosity, ideological o rien tatio n , p o litica l tra d i­ ru ra l actors re m a in e d m ore religious a n d tra d itio n a l in
tio n a lism , a n d w orldview c o rre sp o n d to p o sitio n in th e Ira ­ th e ir o rie n ta tio n (as, in d ee d , p o o re r a n d m ore ru ra l p o p u la ­
n ia n class stru c tu re . O f course, c u ltu ra l o rien tatio n tio n s te n d to d o in general). T his difference lives o n in con­
everyw here is lin k e d to social class, as g en eratio n s o f soci­ te m p o ra ry Ira n , th o u g h w e w o u ld n o t w ish to exaggerate it.
ologists have show n, b u t th is ten d s to b e very p ro n o u n c ed R e la ted to th is is th e c h ara cte r o f Ira n ia n n a tio n a lism .
in cou n tries like Ira n . P a rt o f th is has to do w ith th e fact I n m any, a n d p e rh ap s m ost, c o u n tries, n a tio n a lism has a
t h a t Ira n , lik e its neighbor, T urkey, w e n t th ro u g h a n effort secu lar c h a ra c te r (G re en fe ld 1992), p e rh ap s because th e
at W e s te rn iz a tio n a n d m o d e rn iz a tio n “fro m above.” R eza id ea o f th e sovereign a u th o rity o f th e p eople has th e p o te n ­
S h a h in Ira n , a n d K em al A ta tu rk in T urkey, each a tte m p te d tia l to u n d e rc u t religious o rg a n iz atio n s. T his w as c ertain ly
to n o t o nly m o d e rn iz e th e econom y, th e state bureaucracy, tru e in Ir a n u n d e r th e S h a h , a n d even earlier, w here a secu­
a n d th e in fra s tru c tu re o f th e ir c o u n tries, b u t to W e ste rn iz e la r b ra n d o f n a tio n a list discourse w as u se d as a n alternative
th e ir p o p u latio n s culturally. T his m ea n t, in p a rt, accep tin g to Isla m (M o a d d e l 20 0 5 ). I n th is re sp ec t I ra n w as sim ilar
a p a rtic u la r W e s te rn con cep tio n o f w h a t m o d e rn ity is, one to m an y o f th e A ra b states— such as Ira q , E g y p t, a n d Syria,
th a t privileges th e secular. B o th regim es a tte m p te d to am o n g o th e rs— w h ic h also saw secu lar n a tio n a lism ju x ta ­
im pose a W e s te rn c u ltu ra l p ro g ra m as a so rt o f to ta l w ay o f p o se d to Islam . Y et I ra n saw th e em ergence o f an a lte rn a ­
life, re g u la tin g , for exam ple, th e c lo th in g o f th e ir p o p u la ­ tive, religious n a tio n a lism , w h ic h d efined its e lf against th is
tions (as a n u m b e r o f o th e r cou n tries, s ta rtin g a t least w ith secu lar n a tio n a lism (Juergensm eyer 1993). T his alternative
R ussia u n d e r P e ter th e G re a t, h a d done). In b o th c o u n tries, n a tio n a lism co u ld p re se n t its e lf as au th e n tic ally Islam ic and
th is p ro g ram w as m o st successful a m o n g th o se groups th a t co u ld p re sen t its se c u la rist alternative as a foreign im p o rt,
b enefited m o st fro m m o d ern iza tio n . I t is n o t su rp risin g possibly even colonial. In d e e d , c u ltu rally one sees a sim ila r
th a t m id d le-class p ersons in Ira n w o u ld b e m ore likely to p h e n o m e n o n in th e A ra b states, b u t by a n d large w ith less
ad o p t a W e s te rn c u ltu ra l style, b o th because o f th e benefits p o litica l success, as secu lar n a tio n a list regim es have held on
th e y derived a n d because in stitu tio n s in w h ic h th e y w ere u n til recen tly in m an y o f th e m . I n states w here “A ra b
em b ed d ed , such as th e universities a n d th e state b u re a u ­ S p rin g ” revolutions have b e e n successful, w e still do n o t
cracy, rein fo rced th is style. T hose g roups th a t b e n efite d less, k n o w w h a t k in d o f g o v e rn m e n t w ill u ltim ate ly em erge. In
th o u g h , a n d w h ic h w ere less o rg a n iz atio n ally w e d d ed to a any case, religious n a tio n a lism o f th is so rt has b e e n and
W e s te rn iz e d c u ltu ra l style, d id n o t u n d e rg o th e sam e re m a in s a n im p o rta n t featu re o f Ira n ia n p o litica l cu ltu re.

Political Economy
O n e o f th e m o st s trik in g featu res o f th e Ira n ia n R evolution recovering to around pre-revolutionary levels (Salehi-Isfahani
a n d its a fte rm a th is th e d am ag e th a t w as done to th e econ­ 2009: 6 -7 ). P a rt o f th is has to do w ith th e fact th a t Ira n is a
omy. E co n o m ic g ro w th d ro p p e d d ra m a tic ally in th e years m ajor oil p ro d u c er a n d th e in te rn a tio n a l oil m a rk e t h it all
a fte r 1979, w ith G D P p e r capita d ro p p in g by SO p e rce n t oil ex p o rters h a rd in th e 1980s, w ith low er c o m m o d ity
over th e rev o lu tio n ary re g im e ’s first decade before g ra d u ally prices in g e n era l c o n trib u tin g to th e d e b t w oes o f m u ch o f
 Case Studies 475

th e developing w o rld in th a t p e rio d . A s S a leh i-Isfa h an i F o r th e oil th a t stays in th e co u n try , th e g o v e rn m e n t has

notes (2009: 7), b a d p olicy a n d th e lo n g -sta n d in g w a r w ith p ro v id ed m assive subsidies for en erg y c o n su m p tio n th a t
Ira q also played m ajor roles in th e c o u n try ’s p o o r econom ic w ere d eclare d to be in th e range o f $100 b illio n p e r y ear up
p e rfo rm an ce in th is p e rio d . N o t surprisingly, w h e n H a s h - to 2010. T hese subsidies a m o u n t to over $1,0 0 0 p e r p erson,
e m i-R a fsan ja n i w as elected in 1989, h e e m b a rk ed o n eco­ w h ic h is e stim a te d b y th e In te rn a tio n a l M o n e ta ry F u n d to
nom ic reform s (A rjo m an d 2009: 5 6 -5 8 ), in c lu d in g be g re ater th a n th e average incom e in m an y households.
p riv atiza tio n o f som e en te rp rises— th o u g h th ese w ere m in ­ T he c o u n try ’s oil d ep en d e n ce is visible i f w e lo o k a t various
im al, a n d public secto r e m p lo y m en t re m a in e d h ig h — a n d econom ic sectors’ share o f G D P : A s o f 2011, agricu ltu re
changes m ade to fin an cial m ark ets. E co n o m ic p erfo rm an ce stan d s a t 10.6 p e rce n t, w ith services a n d in d u s try each at
in th e 1990s w as m ixed, b u t w ith th e oil b o o m o f th e 2 0 0 0 s ab o u t 45 p ercen t, o f w h ic h a notable share is oil related
Ira n achieved notable g ro w th a n d acco m p an y in g im prove­ (C IA W o rld F actbook). I n a d d itio n to th e pro b lem o f oil
m en ts in w e ll-b e in g (S a leh i-Isfa h an i 2 0 0 9 : 8). d ep en d en ce a n d q u estio n s o f th e “resource cu rse” discussed
T he m o st im p o rta n t p ro b lem th a t Ir a n faces, lik e th a t in th e N ig e ria case, Ir a n ’s b ro a d e r econom y has b e e n d a m ­
o f o th e r oil p ro d u cers, is m a n a g in g to achieve su stain ab le aged b y san ctio n s. In 2015 th e c o u n try ’s c u rre n c y (the rial)
g ro w th w h ile easin g its o w n d e p en d e n ce o n oil. Ir a n w as w as w o rth o nly ab o u t o n e -th ird in d o lla r term s o f w h a t it
th e w o rld ’s th ird -la rg e s t oil e x p o rte r u n til recently, p ro ­ w as w o rth in 2012.
d u c in g over 4 m illio n b a rre ls p e r day a n d e x p o rtin g m ore F inally, lik e m an y d eveloping c o u n tries (and som e “d e ­
th a n 2 .5 m illio n (C IA W o rld F actb o o k ). H o w ev er, th is ve lo p e d ” c o u n tries, n o tab ly S pain), Ira n has a gro w in g
c h a n g e d d ra m a tic a lly a fte r 2011, w h e n th e U n ite d S tates pro b lem w ith y o u th u n e m p lo y m en t. T he c o u n try ’s general
a n d E u ro p e a n c o u n tries p laced sa n c tio n s o n I r a n fo r th e u n e m p lo y m en t ra te as o f 2013 sto o d a t a n e stim a te d 16 p e r­
c o u n try ’s c o n tin u e d efforts to develop a n u c le ar p ro g ram . cen t (C IA W o rld F actb o o k ), w ith y o u th a n d y o u n g adult
'This m ove d isru p te d a n d slow ed Ir a n ia n p ro d u c tio n , a n d u n e m p lo y m en t considered to b e n o tab ly hig h er. T hese fig­
th e c o u n try ’s e x p o rts fell b y o n e -h a lf. T he U .S . D e p a rt­ ures are a cc o rd in g to th e Ira n ia n g o v e rn m e n t, a n d th e y m ay
m e n t o f e n e rg y n o w ra te s th e c o u n try as o n ly th e fo u r­ u n d e rsta te th e tru e d egree o f u n e m p lo y m e n t in th e country.
te e n th larg e st e x p o rte r in th e w orld, a n d w ith d e c lin in g S tro n g e r g ro w th w o u ld , o f course, reduce th ese num bers
o u tp u t. E v en so, I r a n ’s d e p en d e n ce o n oil is su ch th a t p e ­ som e (the Ira n ia n econom y s h ra n k in 2013), b u t th e re is
tro le u m accounts for 80 p e rc e n t o f e x p o rts (C IA W o rld c lear evidence th a t u n e m p lo y m e n t has becom e a stru c tu ra l
F actbook). p a r t o f I ra n ’s econom y.

Systems?
CHAPTER 7, PAGE ISO

We saw in chapter 6 that democracy and that have some democratic features but more authoritarian over time as one set of
democratization are “moving targets" in which retain strong authoritarian charac­ actors becomes adept at manipulating in­
the sense that standards and critical teristics as well? We saw in the chapter that stitutions to maintain and augment their
thresholds for democratic practice change one example of this can be found in the political interest. For the most authoritar­
over time. The United States of America in so-called "hybrid" or "competitive authori­ ian of such regimes, democratic competi­
1800, for example, would not be judged tarian" regimes that scholars have dis­ tion becomes a farce that can be used to
very democratic in today's world, though cussed in recent years, such as Venezuela. try to shore up the regime's legitimacy, but
at the time it was one of the democratic In these instances, the following pattern is the underlying logic of the system is nearly
pioneers. So what do we make of countries common: A democratic system becomes fully authoritarian.
476 Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)

CASE STUDY (continued)

. __________

Democratic Features of Authoritarian Systems?

The Case of Iran CHAPTER 7, PAGE 150

Iran, though, is a different sort of case. Voters also have the ability to indirectly of dual sovereignty of the people and a
While very few commentators would shape clerical rule. This is done through deity, with the latter (whose will, again, can
regard the current Iranian regime as demo­ two institutional mechanisms. First, the only be discerned by religious elites) exert­
cratic, it has some clear democratic features, elected Majlis can exert some influence ing ultimate authority. This set of arrange­
and it is possible to argue that it is as demo­ over who is appointed to the Guardian ments is itself a function of the conflictual
cratic as the dictatorship of the Shah that Council. Second, the Assembly of Experts nature of the process that produced the
preceded it (which had the support, inci­ is actually an elected body. However, there current regime. Some clerical actors were
dentally, of the Western democracies). As is a catch. Only clergy can run in elections and are proponents of theocracy. Some
noted in the preceding text, Iran does have for this Assembly. Just the same, the elec­ other actors are proponents of popular
an elected president and an elected legis­ torate can indirectly exert some influence sovereignty. The result is a sort of hybrid.
lature, the Majlis. Religious leadership can through this mechanism. Of course, com­ Many other states had historical peri­
restrict individuals from running for these plex systems of indirect influence produce ods in which sovereignty was blurred in
positions (and from serving in the Cabinet collective action problems for individuals this way. Prominent examples might be
as well), and it does so with regularity. seeking to make far-reaching changes. England in the seventeenth century and
However, Iranian voters are nevertheless So it does little good to characterize Japan after the Meiji Restoration, among
often faced with real choices in these elec­ the Iranian regime as just a dictatorship many others. This could be taken to give
tions. The reform movement associated (Arjomand 2009: 4) or as "medieval." It optimism to those who hope for a more
with Mohammad Khatami, elected in 1997, seems to be something else. Culturally, at democratic Iran. However, we should not
discussed in the “Historical Development" the root of this lies a conflict over the assume without further evidence that
section earlier in the chapter, gives clear nature of sovereignty. Traditional, religious mixed sovereignty is a stage on a progres­
indication of this, as does the shift that regimes historically have insisted that sov­ sive, linear development. The fact that
came with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's elec­ ereignty was divine, and thus could only popular sovereignty and fully constitu­
tion in 2005. However, subsequent events be discerned or exercised by religiously tional governance came to triumph in
make clear that not only do existing institu­ legitimated authorities. Most modern much of the world does not mean this will
tions work to limit and even exclude change, democratic states— even constitutional necessarily take place in Iran. In the mean­
but that institutional norms can be violated monarchies— tend to view sovereignty as time, we can only conclude, with Arjomand
if necessary to preserve the status quo. vested in the people (this change owed (2009: 6), that "theocratic government,
Widespread perceptions of fraud in the 2009 greatly to the global spread of national participatory democracy, and populist
re-election of Ahmadinejad led to protests identity). The institutional structure of the social justice" exist in tension in Iran's
that the regime quelled with violence. Iranian state, though, seems to imply a sort post-revolutionary regime.

CASE STUDY

Constitutional Design: Theocracy in Iran CHAPTER 8, PAGE 185

In Iran, Muslim clerics have very impor­ government as well. In this country emblematic of the idea of "theocracy,"
tant roles in constitutional interpreta­ where powerful clerics act as judges or rule by a religious hierarchy. To under­
tion at the pinnacle of the political who interpret the constitution, the style stand how this Islamic Republic works in
system, and indeed at lower levels of of government has been seen as practice requires an understanding of
 Case Studies 477

Constitutional Design: Theocracy in Iran CHAPTER 8, PAGE 185

the mix of “Islamist" and "republican" im­ by clerics whose powers are judicial in made its imprint. The former president
plicit in the name. nature, but they also have characteristics Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005-2013)
Iran's governing structure was noted of legislative or executive power. The was a fiery conservative who adopted a
earlier in the "Regime and Political Insti­ checks on the judiciary are more indirect strongly anti-American and anti-Israel for­
tutions" section, but we review certain and come with appointment of new cler­ eign policy that distinguished his govern­
aspects here that illustrate how the ics to the posts by political leaders. In a ment from that of the current president,
power of religious clerics operates. Iran sense, this is similar to life appointments Hassan Rouhani, who, as noted earlier, is
has an elected president and an elected to constitutional courts in other countries: seen as somewhat more reformist. Former
legislature (Majlis), but both are quite Interpreters of the constitution in coun­ president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani
weak in certain aspects due to Iran's tries such as the United States are ap­ (1989-1997), seen as a more mainstream
power structure. At the pinnacle of the pointed to life terms by the elected conservative by Iranian standards, contin­
political system, above the president, is branches and are thus supposed to be ues to wield influence as head of the Expe­
the Supreme Leader, a cleric who is con­ free from political pressures. In Iran, how­ diency Council and chairman of the
stitutionally empowered to ensure that ever, those who do the appointing are not Assembly of Experts, two bodies noted
Iran is governed in accordance with the elected by conventional democratic previously.
principles of the Islamic Revolution. This means, which makes the notion of "checks Iran is a challenging case that can help
head cleric appoints the judiciary (which and balances" more challenging to observers define the boundaries of what
enforces Islamic Shari'a law) and the lead­ interpret. is a democracy and what is not, especially
ers of the major media outlets, and has The power of Supreme Leaders has when it comes to the power of unelected
the authority to veto presidential candi­ shaped modern Iran. Ayatollah Ali Khame­ officials and the nature of who chooses
dates and/or remove elected presidents. nei has been Supreme Leader since 1989 political leaders and how. From one per­
This rule by religious leaders is but­ and is the successor to Ayatollah Ruhollah spective, Islamic countries may plausibly
tressed by the Guardian Council of Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic Revo­ have different political legal systems than
twelve clerics, the final authority on most lution that took power in 1979. Both of countries whose founders were of Euro­
matters. It has considerable powers, in­ these Supreme Leaders have adhered to a pean origin and still have some features of
cluding a right to veto any law passed by strict interpretation of Shia' Islam and a a constitutional republic or a democracy.
the Majlis and the power to approve or conservative political stance that has re­ From another, basing law on religious
veto any candidate for the presidency or sisted political reforms. Examples have in­ texts interpreted by clerics will by defini­
legislature. It thus has more extensive cluded pushes for a strict adherence to tion constrain rights and liberties to an
powers than most constitutional courts Islamic law, a conservative dress code for extent that democracy is not possible. In
or supreme courts. women, and intolerance of critiques of Iran the judiciary seems to be an espe­
The clerics of the Guardian Council are the electoral process. cially powerful branch of government,
not directly elected. Instead, six of them While the theocratic elements of the but the clerics also seem to have powers
are appointed by the Supreme Leader Iranian regime are prominent, we must that go beyond those of a typical judicial
and six are selected by the Majlis, though not overlook the aspects of Iran's politics branch. There is much to interpret in the
the six chosen by the latter method are that are more "republican"— that is, that question of whether Iran is a theocracy, a
also subject to nomination by the judi­ relate to elected officials. While elected of­ republic, or both, and whether it is domi­
ciary. In effect, elected politicians and the ficials are circumscribed by the power of nated by the judiciary, the executive, or
policies they make are subject to review the clerics, each elected government has both.
478 Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)

Iran's Islamic Revolution and "Green Revolution"? CHAPTER 12, PAGE 297

In 1979 many observers were surprised Ever since the revolution, the Iranian less authoritarian, more democratic
by the Iranian Revolution. A coalition of regime has been hard to classify. On one system. After some hesitation, the state
actors including secular Marxists, stu­ hand, it attempts to use the state's oil used considerable force to repress these
dents, everyday people, and especially re­ wealth to address social issues, and lead­ rallies, killing some of the protesters
ligious readers like the Ayatollah Khomeini ers like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad form al­ and making it clear that further protests
and their followers successfully deposed liances with leaders of the international would be met with greater violence.
the Shah who had governed for decades. left, like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. On Leaders of the opposition— and some
They then implemented an Islamic revolu­ the other hand, the regime is staunchly foreigners alleged to be in league with
tionary regime. This case has fascinated conservative, restricting behaviors it re­ them— were arrested. Resistance to the
scholars of revolution. It seems to prob- gards as immoral and upholding reli­ regime went underground, and so far, at
lematize structuralist accounts of revolu­ gious law, thus appearing to many to be least, no "Green Revolution" has taken
tion, and scholars who seek to explain it reactionary. As has been noted, a reli­ place. Scholars are still trying to sort out
have emphasized charismatic leadership gious council is the country's ultimate all of the reasons why the revolt was, ulti­
(Arjomand 2009) and cultural or ideologi­ authority. Despite the successful con­ mately unsuccessful.
cal frames (Foran 2005:80-87; Parsa 2000) solidation of the revolution and the au­ Some would stress the continued
alongside structural factors. Indeed, one thoritarian nature of the regime it strength of the Iranian state, arguing that
major theorist argues that social science produced, post- revolutionary Iran has so long as a state is willing to violently re­
simply cannot satisfactorily explain the witnessed contention. Over the three press protests and is capable of doing so,
Iranian Revolution (Kurzman 2004). It begs decades in which this regime has held proponents of social change have little
for comparison with other societies in the power, more moderate "reformers" like hope. Others argue that the lack of con­
Muslim world where secular authoritarian Mohammad Khatami have struggled crete international support doomed the
dictatorships did not see successful Is­ against more radical figures like Ahma­ protesters. Still others suggest that the
lamic revolutions (the comparison with dinejad. Reformers have pushed for protesters were only one among several
Egypt, which became a center of Islamist more pluralism, greater freedoms, and major groups in the society and that the
ideology, is perhaps the most instructive). less hostile relationships with the West. regime still has many supporters. Two key
Scholars have considered a number of po­ In the 1990s it looked like they might recent factors that add to the complicated
tential explanatory factors in this connec­ succeed, but they have since met with prospects for collective action are the
tion, one of the most promising being the persistent setbacks. 2013 election of the more reformist Rou-
potential political role of the clergy in In June of 2009 Ahmadinejad was re­ hani and the drop in global oil prices. If
Shi'ism, whereas Sunni Islam has a tradi­ elected as president of Iran. His re-election the latter continues indefinitely this could
tion of separation between religious and was denounced as fraudulent by observ­ put pressure on the regime. The successes
political leaders. Just the same, this is not a ers both internationally and in Iran. Pro­ and failures of revolutions and social
total explanation, since Sunni Islam is cer­ testers engaged in a series of massive movements such as those in Iran are the
tainly compatible with regimes that legiti­ street rallies, famously organizing them­ subject of major debates, and indeed in
mate themselves in religious terms and selves, in part, via new social media like the wake of the "Arab Spring," a process
enforce religious law, with Saudi Arabia Twitter and Facebook. Some began to the Iranian regime has found worrisome,
being just one notable contemporary speak optimistically of these protests as a interest in these questions has only
example. "Green Revolution" that would usher in a increased.
 Case Studies 479

CASE STUDY

Gender in Post-Revolutionary Iranian Politics CHAPTER 14, PAGE 334

Iranian society is notorious for gender other main components of the index— of men (Hausmann et al. 2010: 165). Mir-
inequality. It was hardly an egalitarian are also poor, though not as bad as the Hosseini further points to more gender-
society in this respect before the 1979 first two (Hausmann, Tyson, and Zahidi centered and even feminist trends in some
revolution, and for most of the post­ 2010: 164-165). Moreover, feminist activ­ areas of intellectual, cultural, and institu­
revolutionary period religious elites have ists have been repressed (Haeri 2009: tional life under the post-revolutionary
favored policies and views that many 125-126). regime, such as changes in divorce laws
would consider discriminatory. The con­ At the same time, some scholars have after 1992 and even the appointment of
sequence and legacies of this show up argued that the picture is more compli­ some female judges (1999:7-8). Moreover,
clearly in the quantitative data. In terms of cated than these data suggest. Ziba Mir- Shahla Haeri (2009) stresses an incipient
women's political representation in the Hosseini (1999) has argued that in some women's movement in Iran, suggesting
legislature, Iran is near the bottom, ranked areas women's participation in public life that expanding women's participation
134th internationally with 3.1 percent of has improved, notably in the educational helped to fuel the reform agenda during
seats in the Majlis held by women (Inter­ system, and particularly in universities. the Khatami presidency and that women
parliamentary Union 2015). Similarly, its Mir-Hosseini (1999: 7) points out that this continue to organize.
global Gender Empowerment Measure may even be a function of religious tradi­ Nobody would argue that the post­
rank has the country in the 103rd position. tionalism in a certain sense, since "the en­ revolutionary regime in Iran is a feminist
The World Economic Forum's Gender Gap forcement of hejab became a catalyst... one, just as no proponent of liberal de­
Index ranks Iran 123rd (out of 134). The by making public space morally correct in mocracy would argue that Iran in 2015 is a
country scores particularly badly in terms the eyes of traditionalist families, it legiti­ democratic society. However, scholars
of "economic participation and opportu­ mated women's public presence." In remind us that beneath repressive sur­
nity" and "political empowerment." Iran's recent years, females are near parity with faces, women and others work to expand
performance in terms of gender equality/ males in terms of primary and secondary women's rights in even the most difficult
inequality in the areas of “educational at­ educational enrollment, and women's en­ of circumstances.
tainment" and "health and survival"— the rollment in tertiary education exceeds that

CASE STUDY

Religion and Politics in Iran CHAPTER 15, PAGE 360

Iran is a very interesting case to contrast threat. In short, the Shah's regime aimed to In many Muslim-majority countries,
with France with respect to the question of conduct itself in accord with Western- these secular-nationalist regimes were
religion and politics. Like much of the Is­ derived notions of secular modernity (and, met with religiously organized resistance
lamic world, Iran saw the rise of a twentieth- indeed, with the concrete backing of West­ (Juergensmeyer 1993), though in most of
century regime that embraced secular ern powers). In this it was roughly parallel to the Islamic world this resistance was not
nationalism. The Shah's regime constructed modernization in many predominantly successful in its ultimate objective of
historical memories about the great Persian Sunni parts of the Islamic World: In places taking power. In Iran, this resistance was
civilization of the past and tried to marginal­ like Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, secular nationalist successful, and a religious regime cap­
ize Islam. The government of the Shah re­ regimes predominated (for comparative tured the state in the revolution of 1979.
pressed religious leaders it considered a discussion, see Moaddel 2005). Comparative analysts have debated the
480 Iran (Islamic Republic of Iran)

CASE STUDY (continued)

Religion and Politics in Iran CHAPTER 15, PAGE 360

best explanation for the success of reli­ for successful revolution— analysts be­ typically consider key to modernity. But
gious actors in Iran, but one of the most lieve that it helps us to understand why the state is understood to be legitimated
convincing theories is that Shi'a, rather successful religious revolution might have in religious terms and to ultimately serve
than Sunni, Islam is dominant in Iran, and been more likely in Iran. religious ends. As discussed in chapter 15
the clergy is historically more powerful The revolution produced a religious a number of scholars now argue that
and independent in Shi'a Islam, facilitating state that is nevertheless modern. Con­ Western secular modernity is only one of
their serving as political actors in the revo­ temporary Iran is a highly differentiated a number of possible varieties. Modern
lution. While this is not a total explana­ society with extensive enrollment in Iran is a case in point. While some media
tion— the presence of a strong clergy is higher education, a complex state, and depictions present it as a “backward" soci­
not a necessary and sufficient condition many of the other features we would ety, this is potentially deceiving.

and the Politics of Nuclear Proliferation CHAPTER 16, PAGE 389

Iran has a foreign policy that puts it in the leading dilemmas in international who have nuclear weapons yet seek to
conflict with that of the United States, and relations. deny others the right to develop them.
the two countries have been in heated For those hoping to prevent nuclear Other actors— especially the United
diplomatic conflict for years over Iran's proliferation, one of the central chal­ States and Israel— have sought to compel
“nuclear ambitions" and its apparent lenges is preventing new countries from Iran to cease its advancement toward
desire to develop a nuclear weapon. One attaining nuclear weapons when they nuclear status. They have threatened
leading American concern is that Iran will may have real incentives to develop them. and implemented economic sanctions
target its regional neighbor Israel, a key Why would a country wish to have nu­ against Iran. This may have some effect,
American ally in the volatile Middle East. clear weapons? One simple answer of but it may also be of limited consequence
Along with the United States, several long standing in international relations if the countries already had limited eco­
other countries also hope to prevent Iran theory is that the country thinks it will be nomic interactions, and it may end up
from developing nuclear weapons tech­ more secure with nuclear weapons than it hurting the population at large rather
nology. Iran claims to be developing its was without them. Applied to the case of than the government. Attempts at "smart
nuclear technology for peaceful purposes Iran, it may believe it can deter an Ameri­ sanctions" that target a country's leader­
and as an energy source, but international can or Israeli attack if Iran has a nuclear ship (and their bank accounts and ability
observers are skeptical of this claim and weapon it can use in retaliation. There to travel, for example) are an alternative,
have urged Iran to stop processing radio­ may also be domestic reasons for building but most sanctions are only effective if
active material for nuclear fuel. The coun­ nuclear weapons, such as if the public, the they are supported by all major countries
try is thus at the forefront of contemporary military, and the energy industry push for in the region and in the world economy.
debates about foreign policy and the it, for example (Sagan 1996). In normative In 2012, other countries ranging from
question of nuclear proliferation, and thus terms, those seeking nuclear technology those of the EU to India placed growing
serves as a useful illustration of some of also note a double standard among those pressure on Iran. More directly, countries
 Case Studies 481

Iran and the Politics of Nuclear Proliferation CHAPTER 16, PAGE 389

such as Israel and the United States can the United States, Iran, and other interna­ felt the need to do so as well. Similarly, with
threaten military action against Iran, but tional actors reached a tentative agreement Israel widely presumed to be a nuclear
this has major consequences for the at­ to establish an inspections system. Of power, Iran may feel it requires the weapons
tacking country, including loss of life, risk course, if a country gains such preferential due to the security dilemma it faces.
of retaliation, and economic and political treatment from attempts to build nuclear The resolution of the Iranian nuclear
costs to the government. On the other weapons, then this provides an incentive issue is uncertain, but the nature of these
hand, inaction may see Iran move ever to pursue the technology. Another dilemma considerations illustrates some of the les­
closer to nuclear status. In other words, is that nuclear proliferation among some sons of game theory, which is used to un­
there is no clear and obvious solution countries makes other countries feel they derstand the decisions made by actors
among the options to punish a country require nuclear weapons. For example, when they are in strategic interaction
seeking nuclear weapons. when China acquired a nuclear weapon, with one another: The decisions of each
Major powers could offer incentives to this furthered India's incentives to "get the actor are shaped by their incentives and
Iran to give up its program, and as of 2015, bomb," and when India did so, then Pakistan by what the other actors do.

Research Prompts
1. Do some background reading on the Iranian revolution and on To what extent do you judge contemporary Iran to be a demo­
Egypt, and compare Iranian society in politics on the eve of the cratic society? What does Iran suggest about the general rela­
revolution to the society and politics of Egypt in the same tionship between authoritarianism and democracy in modern
period. Can you come up with a theory of why a revolution took societies?
place in Iran but not in Egypt at that time? How might you go 4. Iran is a major oil producer and exporter. How do you think this
about testing your theory? Now bring Turkey into the mix. has impacted Iran's political history in recent decades? Did
2. Compare the "Green Revolution” in Iran to the Arab Spring Iran's status as an oil producer increase the likelihood of a revo­
movements discussed in the "Thinking Comparatively" section lution taking place against the Shah or reduce that likelihood?
at the end of chapter 12. How does this case fit into the com­ And has it been an aid ora hindrance in the efforts of the revo­
parative framework discussed there? lutionary and post-revolutionary regime to consolidate its
3. Chapter 6 on democracy and regimes discusses the conceptual­ gains?
ization of democracy and democratization at great length. 5. Is Iran a traditional society or a modern society? Or does the
As discussed here, Iran is a complex case in this connection. country give us reason to question this binary pair?
482

Japan
PROFILE Introduction
Japan has long been a country of interest to
Key Features of Contemporary Ja pan comparative political analysts working on
modernization processes. This is because
Population: 127,103,388 (estimate, 2014)
Japan was, in many ways, the first non-
Area: 377,915 sq km Western society to “modernize,” in the sense
of developing a growth-oriented, industrial
Head of State: Emperor Akihito (1989-present)
economy, a modern state, a modern national
Head of Government: Shinzo Abe (prime minister, 2012-present) identity, and system of social stratification
based predominantly on economic class rather
Capital: Tokyo
than ascriptive status-group membership.
Year of Independence: Never formally colonized, though occupied Japan’s culture had been largely insular—as a
by the Allies after World War II matter of official policy—for several centu­
ries until the middle of the nineteenth cen­
Year of Current Constitution: 1947
tury. However, in the closing decades of the
Languages: Japanese nineteenth century and throughout the first
part of the twentieth century it achieved
GDP per Capita: $38,634 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
dramatic social transformation, becoming a
Human Development Index 17th (very high human development) modern state almost overnight. Scholars
Ranking (2014): have long been intrigued by this pattern. On
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human one hand it is intrinsically interesting from
Development Report 2014.
an intellectual point of view. On the other
hand, many have hoped that Japan would
hold the key to development that other na­
tions could follow. Indeed, many of the
“Asian Tigers” that achieved economic mod­
ernization in recent decades took several
pages from Japan’s playbook.

Shintoism 83.9%
■ Japanese 98.5%
Buddhism 71.4%
Korean 0.5%
Chinese 0.4% Other 7.8%
I Other 0.6% Christianity 2%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Ethnic Groups in Japan
Source: CIA World Factbook Religious Affiliation in Japan
Note that according to these data the m ajority of the Japanese population
adheres to both Shintoism and Buddhism, exceeding 100percent.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
 Profile 483

HOKKAIDO

- ..s '
CHINA ;"V
/ NORTH
S ’’ PACIFIC
■y NORTH OCEAN
Yellow
Sea
HONSHU

Yellow
Sea

SHIKOKU

KYUSHU

East China o ^
Sea

•o
Q BONIN
*
Philippine ISLANDS
SENKAKU- 0 K IN A m f Sea
SHOTO '

, 0 VOLCANO
DAITO- ISLANDS
Q <'J ^ SHOTO

0 170 340 Kilometers

1 « , * >
0 170 340 Miles
 Ja p a n ’s g eo g rap h y o nly adds to th e in te re st o f th is case. n o te th a t th e Japanese n a tio n ten d s to define its b o u n d a rie s
Ja p a n is n o t especially reso u rce-rich , a n d its la n d is n o t in e th n ic ra th e r th a n civic term s. In th e religious field,
a b u n d a n t relative to its m o d e rn p o p u latio n . A s such, w h e n som e caution is in o rd e r w h e n c o m p a rin g Ja p a n (like C h in a)
th e Japanese econom y m o d e rn iz e d , th e state lo o k ed abroad to som e o f o u r o th e r cases. W e s te rn p o p u latio n s te n d to
in its search for n a tu ra l resources, one o f th e p rin cip al fac­ view religious affiliation as m u tu a lly exclusive. N o t all
tors lea d in g to th e c o u n try ’s disastrous involvem ent in th e E a s te rn relig io n s necessarily see th in g s th is w ay (th o u g h
S econd W o rld W a r (N a k a m u ra [1988] 200 8 : 485). Ja p a n is som e do, a n d th ere are religious clashes in A sia n cou n tries
sm all in relative term s, a series o f m o stly m o u n ta in o u s is­ as w ell). H ow ever, religions like B u d d h ism , S h in to ism , or
lands. T his im p a c te d th e c o u n try ’s early develo p m en t in C o n fu c ia n ism can so m etim es coexist w ith o th ers even in
im p o rta n t w ays, h elp in g to p ro te c t it from c o n sta n t th re a t th e allegiance o f a single in d iv id u a l because th ese religions
o fin v asio n (G o rd o n 2 0 0 9 :3 - 4 ) a n d a id in g in th e T okugaw a have m ore ritu a listic ra th e r th a n creed al tendencies (th o u g h
efforts to m a in ta in c u ltu ra l isolation. I t has also m e a n t th a t w e w o u ld n o t w ish to exaggerate th e e x te n t o f th is differ­
Ja p a n has faced u n iq u e problem s w ith la n d scarcity as its ence in tendency). I n o th e r w ords, som e varieties o f th ese
p o p u latio n has grow n. religions are less focused o n th e c o n te n t o f theo lo g ical
Ja p a n is largely e th n ic ally hom o g en eo u s, th o u g h n o t e n ­ b e lie f th a n o n a series o f values a n d p ractices. T hus you w ill
tire ly so. A cco rd in g to th e C I A W o rld F actb o o k , 98.5 p e r­ notice in th e religious affiliation c h a rt th a t, a ccording to at
cen t o f th e p o p u latio n is e th n ic ally Japanese. P erh ap s n o t least one source, m ajorities o f th e Jap an ese p o p u latio n
surprisingly, m o st stu d e n ts o f Japanese n a tio n a l id e n tity claim affiliation w ith b o th B u d d h ism a n d S hintoism .

Historical Development
Ja p a n w as governed from th e b e g in n in g o f th e sev en teen th it to o p e n to trad e . F o r a w hile it resisted, b u t d espite th e
c en tu ry u n til 1868 by th e T o k u g aw a reg im e, som etim es re ­ c o u n try ’s p ro u d m a rtia l tra d itio n s , it w as clear w h e n C o m ­
ferred to as th e T okugaw a sh o g u n ate. T his w as an o ligar­ m o d o re M a tth e w P e rry sailed in to Japanese w aters in 1853
ch ical system in w h ic h th e u p p e r n o b ility (or D aim yo) a n d 1854 th a t Ja p a n could n o t m atc h th e W e s t’s m ilita ry
d isplaced th e e m p e ro r a n d g o verned th ro u g h a m ilita ry te c h n o lo g y (G o rd o n 2 0 0 9 : 4 9 -5 0 ). T he T o k u g aw a gov­
lead er (shogun) a n d his state (k n o w n as th e B akufu). A e rn m e n t re lu c ta n tly a n d slow ly o p e n e d to W e s te rn tra d e .
c h aracteristic featu re o f T okugaw a Ja p a n w as its closedness T h is w as d a m a g in g to th e ir in terests in several w ays. F irst,
to th e re st o f th e w orld, a n d to th e W e s t in p a rticu la r. g re a te r o penness m e a n t m ore access to n ew ideas, like
T okugaw a Ja p a n w as a n essentially a g ric u ltu ra l society dem ocracy, c o n stitu tio n a l m onarchy, and n a tio n a lism
w ith a large p e a sa n t class, a relatively large m ilita ry n o b ility (G re en fe ld 2001). S econd, th ese ideas seem ed to be lin k e d
(the S am urai), a n d a sm aller u p p e r n o b ility (the afo rem en ­ to capacities th a t th e Japanese state lacked. F inally, c ap itu ­
tio n e d D aim yo). The relatio n sh ip s b e tw e e n th ese groups la tin g to W e s te rn d em an d s su g g ested w eakness, w h ic h is
w ere superficially sim ila r to th e feudal a rra n g e m e n ts th a t alw ays b a d fo r a state b u t w as likely especially so for a state
prevailed in m edieval E u ro p e. A s in feudal E u ro p e , com ­ for w h o m th e m ilita ry n o b ility w as so im p o rta n t. I t d id n o t
m erce w as n o t a h ig h ly re g ard e d a ctiv ity a n d w as essentially tak e lo n g for d isc o n te n t to spread. A s c u ltu ra l o r fram in g
to le rate d as necessary: P ain s w ere ta k e n to avoid tra d in g th e o rists o f revolution w o u ld n o te, th e to p p le d e m p e ro r re ­
w ith o th e r societies. S ta tu s d istin c tio n s w ere rig id a n d m ain e d as a n a lte rn a te object o f loyalty to th o se dissatisfied
lin k e d to differences in p o litica l a n d p e rso n a l rights. w ith th e T o k u g aw a regim e. R a d ic alize d a n d tra d itio n a l
T his all b e g an to ch an g e b y th e m id d le o f th e n in e te e n th actors alike cam e to see th e em p e ro r as a p o te n tia lly u n ify ­
c e n tu ry (G o rd o n 200 9 : 22). E u ro p e a n pow ers h a d ex­ in g figure. F o r th e tra d itio n a lists, th e r e tu rn to a state based
p a n d e d th e ir colonial a dventures in A sia. In d ia w as b e co m ­ o n th e em p e ro r w as p re sen te d as a “re sto ratio n ,” in th is in ­
in g m ore fo rm ally co lo n ized th a n ever before, a n d foreign stance th e “M e iji R e sto ratio n ” o f 1868. T he n e x t several
pow ers in te rv en e d decisively in C h in a , in p a rtic u la r d u rin g decades w ere so m ew h at tu m u ltu o u s, as th e n e w reg im e u n ­
th e tw o “o p iu m w ars.” E u ro p e a n societies so u g h t sources o f raveled J a p a n ’s sem i-feu d al system (G o rd o n 2 0 0 9 : 6 2 -6 4 )
m aterials b u t also m ark ets for th e sale o f th e ir goods. W h ile a n d b e g an b u ild in g a m o d e rn state. T here w as a m ark ed
Ja p a n w as n o t c olonized, foreign pow ers b e g an to pressure tu r n to w a rd W e s te rn le a rn in g , a n d a g ro w in g p u sh for
 Profile 485

m ore p o p u la r responsiveness o n th e p a r t o f th e g o v e rn ­ d e clare d th e e m p e ro r to b e u ltim ate ly sovereign (M ita n i

m en t. T he M eiji c o n stitu tio n w as passed in 1889. By [1988] 2 0 0 8 : 59). S u b seq u e n t d e m o c ra tiz a tio n w as y e t to
m o d e rn sta n d ard s, th is w as n o t an especially dem o cratic com e, a n d un iv ersal suffrage (in clu d in g th e vote for w om en)
d o c u m e n t, w ith o nly a tin y fra c tio n o f th e p o p u la tio n eli­ w o u ld n o t be estab lish ed u n til a fte r W o rld W a r II.
gible to vote (G o rd o n 2 0 0 9 : 91, 125) a n d given th a t it

Historical Development
Tim eline
1600-1868 Tokugawa regime 1941-1945 War in the Pacific, with Japan fighting U.S. and
1853 Commodore Perry (from the United States) arrives, other Allies on islands, atolls, and in regions from
demanding that Japan open itself to trade with the Philippines to near Japanese coastline.
the West. 1945 The United States drops atomic bombs on
1867-1868 Meiji Restoration, which is ostensibly conservative Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Japan surrenders.
but which will produce a program of moderniza­ 1947 Constitution of 1947 is proclaimed, re-establishing
tion and Westernization. democracy, and including women's suffrage.
1870-1873 Major reforms 1953-1970S "Japanese Miracle," a period of dramatic economic
1877 Satsuma revolt expansion
1889 Meiji Constitution, which establishes constitutional 1991-2001 Economic crisis and the “Lost Decade"
monarchy and limited parliamentary system 1993-1994 LDP briefly loses power but remains the largest
1890 Elections held under the Meiji Constitution party in Diet; coalition government initiates elec­
1894-1895 Sino-Japanese War; Japan occupies Taiwan by 1895. toral reforms.
1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War 1995 Aum Shinrikyo cult/terror organization releases
1910 Japan colonizes Korea, signifying expansionist deadly sarin gas in Tokyo subway; thirteen people
phase of Japanese Empire are killed and many more are injured or
1914-1918 Japan is a combatant in the First World War, allied incapacitated.
with Britain, France, the United States, and Russia. 2009 LDP loses control of government as DPJ wins gen­
1923 Japan suffers the deadliest earthquake in its history. eral election.
1931 Japan invades Manchuria on Chinese mainland, 2011 Massive earthquake and resulting tsunami results
establishes Manchukuo government. in over 15,000 deaths and reactor meltdowns at the
1937-1941 Second Sino-Japanese War Fukushima nuclear power plant.
1941 Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor begins Japan's 2012 Shinzo Abe elected Prime Minister as LDP regains
involvement in the Second World War, on the side control of government.
of Axis powers Germany and Italy.

Ja p a n w e n t th ro u g h m an y strik in g changes in th e p e rio d R ussia (1 9 0 4 -1 9 0 5 ) a n d later claim ed K orea as colony

from th e 1880s to th e Second W o rld W ar, m o d e rn iz in g its (1910), am o n g m an y o th e r islands a n d territories. I n a m atter
econom y, society, a n d state. T he c o u n try tran sfo rm e d its o f decades th e c o u n try m oved from b e in g a p re d o m in an tly
social stru c tu re b y d o in g away w ith sam urai statu s differ­ a g ric u ltu ra l society to b e in g one o f th e w o rld ’s m ajor eco­
ences a n d b u ilt a m o d e rn sta te (G o rd o n 2 0 0 9 : 6 4 - 6 6 ) . I t n om ic a n d m ilita ry pow ers.
also b e g a n to achieve ra p id e co n o m ic d e v e lo p m e n t A d istin g u ish in g fe atu re o f th is process w as th e stro n g
(C raw co u r 2 008: 3 8 6 -3 8 7 ) d u rin g a n d a fte r th e F irst role th a t th e state played in a llo c atin g capital for productive
W o rld W ar. I n th e sam e p e rio d , fro m 1890 to 1910, Ja p a n use as it in d u stria liz e d . T he state o w n e d o r c o n tro lled m any
b eg an to flex its m ilita ry m uscle o u tw a rd in A sia. I t first firm s, a n d th e state lin k e d its e lf to priv ate firm s th a t re ­
w o n a m ajor w a r again st C h in a (1894-1895) a n d claim ed ceived state assistance in accessing cap ital a n d in o th e r ways
p resen t-d ay T aiw a n as a colony. It th e n w o n a w a r w ith (C raw co u r 2 0 0 8 : 414). In som e areas, like heavy industry,
486 Japan

th e state m a in ta in e d its involvem ent for strategic reasons early 1960s, th e g o v e rn m e n t relaxed re g u la tio n s o n foreign
even th o u g h it to o k decades to achieve p ro fita b ility (C raw - trad e , w h ic h h e lp e d Japanese e x p o rts in th e ir su b seq u en t
cour 200 8 : 4 2 2 , 435). T he state also played an im p o rta n t b o o m (K osai 200 8 : 5 2 2 -5 2 7 ).
role in th e d evelopm ent o f railw ays, Japanese sh ip p in g , a n d D e m o c ra tiz a tio n p rogressed alo n g w ith econom ic
o th e r in fra s tru c tu ra l developm ents (C raw cour 2 0 0 8 : 3 9 3 - g ro w th in th e years d u rin g a n d a fte r th e A llie d o ccupation,
399) as w ell as th ro u g h c rea tin g a system o f co m m ercial law w ith a series o f n ew c o n stitu tio n a l g u a ran tee s in th e consti­
(G o rd o n 200 9 : 95), a factor th a t in stitu tio n a l econom ists tu tio n o f 1947 (F u k u i [1998] 200 8 : 156). T his ow ed b o th to
w ould em phasize (e.g., N o r th 1990). T he Japanese econom y th e o c cu p a tio n a u th o ritie s in sistin g o n d e m o c ratiza tio n and
to o k o ff d u rin g W o rld W a r I because Jap an ese producers to Japanese efforts. Ja p a n ’s d e m o c ratiza tio n over th is p e rio d
for e x p o rt could tak e ad vantage o f th e d isru p tio n o f exist­ also m ay be due to th e Japanese econom ic success o f th e
in g supply c h ain s to access m arkets. E co n o m ic h isto ria n s p o st-w a r years: A s a n u m b e r o f th eo ries in c h a p te r 6 w o u ld
consider Japanese econom ic p erfo rm a n ce to have b e en suggest, stro n g econom ic g ro w th a n d th e em ergence a n d
stro n g in relative term s th ro u g h o u t n o t ju s t th e 1920s b u t d ev elo p m en t o f a m id d le class, w h ic h clearly to o k place in
also th e 1930s, th o u g h th e c o u n try d id experience freq u e n t p o st-w a r Ja p a n (F u k u i [1998] 2 008: 204), are associated
fin an cial crises, a n d th e effects o f th e G re a t D ep ressio n w ith d e m o cratic conso lid atio n . O n e la s tin g a sp ect o f th e
w ere notable (N a k a m u ra [1988] 2008). peace w as a c o n stitu tio n a l c o m m itm e n t n o t to deploy its
Japanese econom ic a n d m ilita ry expansion to o k place m ilita ry overseas.
u n d e r a n increasingly aggressive, m ilita ristic , a n d n a tio n a l­ P o st-w ar Ja p a n becam e a dem ocracy, albeit one w ith a
istic regim e. Ja p a n in vaded M a n c h u ria o n th e C h in ese notable lim ita tio n : I t w as d o m in a te d b y a single p a rty , th e
m a in la n d in 1931 a n d a tte m p te d to establish c o n tro l o f L ib e ra l D e m o c ra tic P a rty o f Ja p a n (L D P ) fo r m o st o f th e
m uch o f th e Pacific in sub seq u en t years. W h e n W o rld W a r p o st-w a r p e rio d . T he L D P ’s h eg em o n y is a b it m ore com ­
II cam e about, Ja p a n allied w ith N a z i G e rm a n y a n d fascist plex th a n it appears at first glance, a n d th is w as n o t sim ply
Italy. I n 1941, Ja p a n ’s a tta c k o n P e a rl H a rb o r, H a w a ii, a sin g le -p a rty system . D u rin g th e early years a fte r A llie d
b ro u g h t th e U n ite d States in to th e w a r th a t h a d b e g u n in o c c u p a tio n , a m u ltip a rty sy ste m d e v elo p ed , b u t b y th e
1939. A fte r m ore th a n th re e years o f to ta l w a r fo u g h t across 1960s th e L D P h a d co m e to w in m a jo rity g o v e rn m e n ts
th e Pacific O c ea n , A m e ric an forces closed in on Ja p a n and consistently. Ja p a n w as still tec h n ica lly a p lu ralistic and
p re p are d for invasion. In 1945, how ever, A m e ric a n forces com petitive p o litica l e n v iro n m en t, b u t th e L D P m an ag ed
established a ir suprem acy over Ja p a n a n d fireb o m b ed T okyo to defeat its (socialist a n d other) o p p o n e n ts a n d to reg u larly
a n d o th e r J a p a n e se c ities, le a v in g h u n d re d s o f th o u s a n d s w in legislative m ajorities, th u s n o t n e e d in g to form c oali­
d ead . P re s id e n t H a r r y T r u m a n th e n a u th o riz e d th e tio n s. M a n y co m m e n ta to rs a n d c itizen s felt th a t th is re ­
d ro p p in g o f tw o a to m ic b o m b s o n th e J a p a n e se c ities o f duced responsiveness to c itizen concerns. A system developed
H iro s h im a a n d N a g asak i on A u g u s t 6 a n d 9, 1945. Ja p a n in w h ic h rep resentatives established local ties a n d w o rk ed to
su rre n d ere d six days later. e n h an c e th e in terests o f local constituencies, o rg a n iz e d
A fte r th e trag ed ies o f W o rld W a r II, Ja p a n b e g an eco­ p a rtia lly th ro u g h exclusive sets o f social n e tw o rk s called
nom ic and p o litica l re co n stru c tio n u n d e r A m e ric an -le d koenkai (K ab ash im a a n d Steel 2010: 3 - 4 , 15-17). T his w as,
A llie d m ilita ry occu p atio n u n til 1952. A la s tin g im p a c t o f m an y analysts believe, rein fo rced by Ja p a n ’s electoral
p o st-w a r re co n stru c tio n w as th e b e g in n in g o f Ja p a n ’s re ­ system , as discussed in th e c h a p te r 11 case study. I n Ja p a n ’s
m arkable econom ic perfo rm an ce; it is e stim a te d th a t th e system , voters v o ted for o ne in d iv id u a l w ith in a d istric t, b u t
Japan ese econom y g re w a t th e trem en d o u s rate o f a lm o st 10 o ften m u ltip le L D P c an d id ates w ere ru n n in g w ith in th e
p e rce n t p e r y e ar b e tw e e n 1945 a n d 1973 (K osai 2 0 0 8 : 494). d istric t. T o differen tiate them selves fro m o th e r L D P c an d i­
A g a in , th e state played a large role in th e econom y: A s d ates, p o liticia n s so m etim es tu rn e d to p e rso n al n e tw orks
Ja p a n recovered fro m th e w ar, th e g o v e rn m e n t strategically a n d even c o rru p tio n (K ab ash im a a n d Steel 2010: 15-17).
su p p o rted th e re d ev elo p m en t o f th e coal a n d steel in d u s­ T his led to com plex fa ctio n a lism a n d divisions w ith in th e
tries, u tiliz in g th e so -called “p rio rity p ro d u c tio n m e th o d ” L D P . W h ile th e L D P e x erted n e a r h eg em o n y for decades,
(K osai 2 008: 5 0 0 —501). T he state, in co o p era tio n w ith p ri­ th e y occasionally h a d to form c o alitio n g o v ern m en ts as
vate en terp rise, later im p le m e n ted “ra tio n a liz a tio n p lan s” w ell, a n d th e D e m o cra tic P a rty o f Ja p a n (D JP ) in p a rtic u la r
for key in d u strie s (K osai 2 0 0 8 : 516-518). B e g in n in g in th e re m a in e d a n electo ral adversary.
 Profile 487

B e g in n in g in th e late 1980s, it becam e clear th a t th e A n o th e r fa cto r in th e L D P ’s lo n g d o m in a n c e w as th e

L D P ’s g rip o n p o w er w as w eak e n in g , a n d it h a d to form fra g m e n ta tio n o f th e o p p o sitio n , b u t th is w as finally over­
coalitions to govern in th e 1990s as m an y voters becam e com e w h e n th e D J P to o k over th e g o v e rn m e n t a fte r a re ­
d ise n ch a n te d w ith p a rtie s m ore g en erally (L eB lan c 1999: so u n d in g w in in elections in 200 9 . F ro m th e p o in t o f view
5). T he p a rty fell o u t o f p o w er briefly in 1 9 9 3 -1 9 9 4 , th o u g h o f som e d e m o c ratic th e o rists, a lte rn a tio n in pow er c o n sti­
it re m a in e d th e larg e st p a rty in th e D ie t. D u r in g th e 1990s, tu te s a n advance, as it suggests th e p o ssib ility o f increased
difficulties a n d fru stra tio n s m o u n te d as th e c o u n try e x p eri­ p lu ralism a n d co m p e titio n . I n 2 0 1 2 , th e L D P re tu rn e d to
enced financial crisis a n d a p ro lo n g ed p e rio d o f sta g n atio n . p o w er a n d , as o f th is w ritin g , it has re m a in e d th e re since,
Som e have sug g ested t h a t th is e n d ed th e im p licit b a rg a in in th o u g h lik e w ith th e P R I in M ex ico few seem to ex p ect it
Ja p a n ’s p o st-w a r dem ocracy, in w h ic h th e L D P go v ern ­ to re tu rn to th e level o f d o m in a n c e it once exerted.
m en ts w ere c o n tin u a lly re tu rn e d to p o w er in exchange for
su stain ed econom ic g ro w th .

Regime and Political Institutions

Ja p a n has a p a rlia m e n ta ry system w ith a c erem o n ial e m ­ n a tu re o f th e Jap an ese electo ral system (K a b ash im a and
peror. T he bicam eral p a rlia m e n t has a low er c h a m b e r in Steel 2010: 1 5 -1 7 ), th e L D P d id n o t n e ed to be fully re ­
w h ic h 3 0 0 o f 4 8 0 seats are elected by d istric t con stitu en cies sponsive to th e w ishes o f th e electorate. R a th e r, th e state
a n d th e re m a in in g seats are elected by p ro p o rtio n a l re p re ­ w as a place in w h ic h p o litica l elites w o rk e d w ith th e b u si­
sen tatio n in d iffere n t “b lo ck s” o r reg io n s o f th e country. ness c o m m u n ity to m an ag e Japanese econom ic p e rfo rm ­
T he u p p e r c h am b er h as m o st o f its m em b ers elected in th e ir ance. F ollow ing th e rise o f coalition g overnm ents, th o u g h ,
respective p refectu res, w ith a re m a in d e r v o ted in b y p ro ­ a n d acceleratin g th ro u g h th e D J P ’s re ce n t successes, w e
p o rtio n a l re p re se n tatio n as w ell. T he H o u se o f R e p resen ta ­ may b e seeing an increase in responsiveness to citizens
tives is th e m ore p o w e rfu l body, b e in g able to o verrule th e (K abashim a and Steel 2010). O n one h a n d , com m entators
H o u se o f C o u n c illo rs o n b u d g e t a n d finance m a tte rs, a n d note a decline in public tru st o f political parties. O n the
override th e H o u se o f C o u n c illo rs w ith a tw o -th ird s m a ­ o th er h a n d , a n u m b er o f po p u latio n segm ents are involved in
jo rity on o th e r m atters. I n th e late tw e n tie th century, p e r­ civil society. A ll else bein g equal, political activity am ong
haps th e m o st d istin g u ish in g fe atu re o f th e p o lic y m ak in g th e c itizen ry a n d plu ralist com petition betw een parties
process in Ja p a n w as th e d o m in a n c e o f th e L D P . B ecause o f could be expected to increase accountability.
th e e x te n t o f th is d o m in a n c e, a n d p e rh ap s because o f th e

Regime and Political Institutions

Regime Constitutional monarchy (parliamentary democracy with ceremonial emperor)

Administrative Divisions Centralized, unitary government; forty-seven prefectures

Executive Branch Prime minister and cabinet

Selection of Executive Selected by Parliament, ceremonially appointed by emperor

Legislative Branch Bicameral parliament (Diet)

Lower chamber: House of Representatives
Upper chamber: House of Councillors

Judicial Branch The Japanese Supreme Court (which has fourteen Justices and one Chief Justice)
is the ultimate judicial authority in the country.

Political Party System Multiparty system. Dominated by the LDP for decades, though the DJP governed
2009-2012; political environment is one of pluralistic competition, with the LDP
and the DJP as the two strongest contenders.
488 Japan

Political Culture
Scholars in te rested in Japanese p o litica l (and econom ic) t h a n in m a n y o th e r c o u n trie s , b u t la b o r h a s a re la tiv e ly
c u ltu re have e m p h asized a n u m b e r o f th em e s, b u t p erh ap s w e a k p o s itio n v is-a -v is c o rp o ra tio n s : W o rk e rs have diffi­
th e m o st d istin c tiv e one is th e allegedly collectivistic a n d c u lty e sta b lis h in g in d u s try -w id e o rg a n iz a tio n s a n d d e ­
eg alita ria n c h ara cte r o f Japanese beliefs a n d practices m a n d in g c h a n g e , r a th e r th a n p u rs u in g in s titu tio n a lly
(K unio 20 0 6 ), p a rticu la rly w ith re g ard to th e ir m an ifest­ s tr u c tu r e d n e g o tia tio n . T h is w as a t le a st p a rtia lly a p ro d ­
a tio n in Japanese economic culture. Ja p a n has relatively low u c t o f th e L D P ’s p o lic y o f re d u c in g u n io n s tr e n g th
levels o f incom e in e q u a lity (K osai 2 0 0 8 : 512). Som e assert (M a n o w 2 0 0 1 : 44). I n a d d itio n , s tro n g c u ltu r a l n o rm s o f
th a t th is m ig h t be p a rtia lly due to th e c u ltu ra l fo u n d atio n s e m p lo y m e n t s e c u rity a n d re la tiv e e q u ity m ig h t im p a c t
o f business m an a g em e n t in Ja p a n . Y o shihara K u n io goes so th e c o m p e titiv e n e ss o f J a p a n e se firm s over th e lo n g h a u l.
far as to add alleged c u ltu ra l o rien tatio n s to w ard m ate ria l­ M o re o v e r, th e a lle g ed c o lle c tiv ism a n d “te a m o rie n ta ­
ism , savings, h ig h v alu atio n o f e d u catio n al a tta in m e n t, a n d t io n ” o f J a p a n e se firm s m ay b e a fa c to r in th e n o ta b ly
a stro n g w o rk e th ic as key co m p o n en ts o f Japanese eco­ h ig h ra te s o f d is c rim in a tio n a g a in s t w o m e n (in c lu d in g
nom ic c u ltu re (2006: 83), even as h e stresses th e in s titu ­ la c k o f e q u a l p a rtic ip a tio n in th e b e n efits o f e m p lo y m e n t
tio n a l d im ensions o f Ja p a n ’s econom ic p e rfo rm a n ce as w ell. a n d se x u a l h a ra ss m e n t) t h a t ex ists in Ja p a n e se w o rk ­
I t sh o u ld be n o ted , how ever, th a t th ese low levels o f in ­ places. F in a lly , th e c u ltu re o f Ja p a n e se firm s h a s so m e ­
eq u ality a n d h ig h savings are m o st n o te w o rth y in th e p o st­ tim e s b e e n se e n as a h in d ra n c e , re q u ir in g re fo rm . T he
w a r era, a n d n o t as tru e for earlier periods. firm s t h a t d e v e lo p e d in th e e arly y e ars o f Ja p a n e se in d u s ­
M u c h has b e e n m ad e o f Ja p a n ese c o rp o ra te g o v e rn ­ tr ia liz a tio n — th e zaibatsu — w ere h ig h ly c o n c e n tra te d
ance as a lens in to Ja p a n e se c u ltu re . Ja p a n ese firm s seem a n d m o n o p o listic (G o rd o n 2 0 0 9 : 9 6 -9 7 ). T h ey w o u ld
to d iffer fro m W e s te rn firm s in k e y re sp ec ts. M a jo r J a p a ­ la te r b e p a r tia lly b ro k e n u p in th e p o s t-w a r y e ars, b u t
nese in d u s tria l firm s have re la tio n s h ip s w ith th e ir (espe­ la rg e c o n g lo m e ra te s k n o w n as keiretsu p e rsiste d , w ith a n
cially m ale) em ployees th a t m an y d efin e as p a te rn a listic , e x am p le b e in g M its u b is h i. C e n te re d a ro u n d h u g e b a n k s,
p ro v id in g extensive b e n efits a n d n e arly g u a ra n te e in g life ­ th e s e w ere a n in te g ra l p a r t o f p o s t-w a r in d u s tr ia liz a tio n ,
tim e e m p lo y m en t fo r g o o d c o n d u c t. T he n o tio n th a t a ll b u t th e y la te r c am e to sy m b o liz e th e p o s s ib ility o f c rony
are p a r t o f a “te a m ” o r even a “fa m ily ” is re la tiv e ly stro n g . c a p ita lis m , w ith c o z y re la tio n s h ip s b e tw e e n e co n o m ic
Ja p a n is a m a rk e t econom y, b u t th e te n d e n c y to c h an g e a n d p o litic a l elites.
jo b s over th e co u rse o f o n e ’s life tim e th a t h a s b eco m e These aspects o f econom ic c u ltu re — w ith a n em phasis
co m m o n in places lik e th e U n ite d S ta te s has n o t h it Ja p a n o n c o n tin u ity a n d o u tw a rd collective h a rm o n y — can be
to th e sam e e x te n t. W ith in Ja p a n ese firm s, o n e te n d s to seen reflected in p olitics m ore narro w ly defined. T he L D P
see a stro n g sense o f so lid arity , w h ile s ta tu s differen ces are go v ern ed w ith o u t in te rru p tio n for decades a n d a tte m p te d
m itig a te d b y c u ltu ra l n o rm s th a t d isc o u rag e m assive to re p re se n t Ja p a n ’s diverse in te rests, b u t th e p a rty w as also
in co m e in e q u a lity w ith in th e firm . I n a ty p ic a l c o rp o ra ­ d iv id ed b y fierce in te rn a l factio n alism t h a t c o n trib u te d sub­
tio n in th e U n ite d S tates, th e sa laries o f executives d w a r f sta n tia lly to its e v en tu al do w n fall, as p a rty m em bers d is­
th o se o f e n try -lev e l em ployees, b u t in Ja p a n , th e ra tio o f ag reed over h o w to re sp o n d to c o n stitu e n t d em an d s a n d
executive to e n try -lev e l em ployee sa laries te n d s to be n o t­ needs. F o r m ore o n vario u s aspects o f Ja p a n ’s ric h political
ably low er. c u ltu re — in c lu d in g th e L D P , th e state, a n d g e n d e r issues—
O f c o u rse, th is is n o t a p e rfe c t sy stem . R e la tio n s b e ­ see th e m ore d e ta ile d c o u n try case stu d ies late r in th ese
tw e e n w o rk e rs a n d m a n a g e m e n t m ay b e less c o n flic tu a l c o u n try m aterials.

Political Economy
So far in th is c o u n try profile, w e have discussed th e lo n g - c o n te m p o ra ry state o f Japanese p o litica l econom y. Ja p a n , as
ru n d evelopm ent h isto ry o f Ja p a n , a n d w e discuss th e sta te ’s w e have n o ted , w as th e first n o n -W e ste rn society to develop
role in th e Jap an ese econom y in th e follow ing case study. su sta in ed econom ic g ro w th , in m an y w ays e stab lish in g
H e re , in c o n tra st, w e w ill focus o n recen t h isto ry a n d th e a p a th th a t has b e e n follow ed, w ith v a ria tio n s, by th e
 Profile 489

so-called A sia n tig ers (e.g., S o u th K orea, S ingapore) an d , p olicy th a t low ers in te re s t rates; it w as h o p e d th a t th is
m ore recently, even C h in a . T his it d id , in p a rt, th ro u g h w o u ld e ncourage c onsum ers to sp e n d a fte r m an y years o f
state c o o rd in a tio n . T his does n o t m ea n a Soviet-style com ­ sta g n a tio n (and th a t th is w o u ld h e lp fu lly raise prices after
m a n d econom y, b u t ra th e r th e state stra te g ica lly favoring m a n y years o f p rice d eclin es th a t h a d disco u rag ed sp e n d ­
c erta in sectors a n d h e lp in g to c o o rd in a te th e d e p lo y m e n t o f ing). A b e also p ro m ised stru c tu ra l reform s th a t w o u ld en ­
c apital for pro d u ctiv e purposes: in o th e r w ords, state man­ c ourage easier h irin g a n d firin g , th e re b y m a k in g th e labor
agement o f th e econom y b u t n o t large-scale state ownership. m a rk e t m ore flexible. In d ica to rs have b e e n m ixed: The
The Jap an ese state h a d a h isto ry o f w o rk in g w ell w ith th e Jap an ese sto c k m a rk e t m ore th a n do u b led fro m th e tim e
large, in d u stry -sp a n n in g c o rp o ra tio n s th a t w ere so im p o r­ A b e to o k office to early 2015, b u t g ro w th has b e e n w obbly
ta n t to Japanese g ro w th in th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry (see E vans a n d th e c o u n try ’s d e b t has c o n tin u e d to increase to very
1989). h ig h levels.
Ja p a n w as one o f th e w o rld ’s g re at econom ic success sto ­ D e sp ite som e co n ce rn s a b o u t Ja p a n ese eco n o m ic p e r­
ries o f th e tw e n tie th century. W h ile econom ic d evelo p m en t fo rm a n c e in re c e n t years, th e c o u n try ’s b asic econom ic
p ick e d u p d u rin g th e in te rw a r p e rio d , it w as e sp ecially in d ic a to rs are s till so u n d . A c c o rd in g to th e C I A W o rld
follow ing re co n stru c tio n a n d A m e ric a n o c cu p a tio n a fte r F a c tb o o k , th e c o u n try ’s u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te sto o d a t an
W o rld W a r I I th a t Ja p a n b u ilt m ajor global en terp rises a n d env iab le 4.1 p e rc e n t in 2 0 1 3 . ( I t sh o u ld b e n o te d th a t th e
becam e a n e x p o rt pow erh o u se, w ith exam ples o f lea d in g u n e m p lo y m e n t ra te is c a lc u la te d o n th e basis o f th e
firm s in clu d in g T o y o ta a n d H o n d a in th e au tom obile in ­ n u m b e r o f p e o p le in th e la b o r force as th e d e n o m in a to r, so
d u stry a n d Sony a n d T o sh ib a in electronics. T he tra d itio n Ja p a n ’s larg e elderly p o p u la tio n t h a t is o u t o f th e lab o r
o f stro n g g ro w th slow ed b y th e 1980s a n d w e n t in to crisis force m ay a ffe c t th is n u m b er.) G D P p e r c ap ita sto o d at
in th e early 1990s. T he causes o f th e crisis w ere com plex, $ 3 8 ,6 3 4 a cc o rd in g to th e W o rld B a n k , a n d in te rm s o f
b u t th e y in clu d e d an o verheated real estate m a rk e t th a t col­ H u m a n D e v e lo p m e n t in d ic a to rs Ja p a n is a m o n g th e
lapsed a n d serious problem s sp re ad in g th ro u g h o u t th e fi­ g lo b a l leaders. T he Ja p a n e se eco n o m y acco m p lish es th is
n an cial system (m uch like in th e U n ite d States in 2008). w h ile m a in ta in in g a level o f in co m e in e q u a lity su b s ta n ­
T he g o v e rn m e n t re sp o n d ed very slowly a n d o nly “b a ile d tia lly b e tte r th a n t h a t fo u n d in th e U n ite d S ta te s a n d com ­
o u t” th e b a n k in g sy stem to w a rd th e e n d o f th e decade. p a rab le to th a t o f th e W e s te rn E u ro p e a n w elfare states
Ja p a n ’s econom y has never com pletely recovered. A n u m b e r (th o u g h th e s e sta te s slig h tly o u tp e rfo rm J a p a n in te rm s o f
o f analysts have concerns to d ay a b o u t Jap an ese c o m p e ti­ th is in d ic a to r ).I ts g in i level sto o d a t 32.1 in 2 0 1 3 , m a k in g
tiveness a n d th e c o m p e titio n p o se d by C h in a a n d o th e r it c o m p a rab le to m a n y w e s te rn E u ro p e a n c o u n trie s a n d
c o u n tries to Ja p a n ’s p o sitio n as a p re e m in e n t econom ic g iv in g it a m a rk e d ly lo w e r level o f in e q u a lity th a n th e
pow er. N otably, in th is case, th e co n cern also e xtends to U n ite d S tates.
geopolitics, a n d C h in a ’s in cre asin g a m b itio n s in th e Pacific Ja p a n w as fam ous fo r its m a n u fa c tu rin g for ex p o rt,
R im m ay be e x p ected to com e a t th e expense o f Ja p a n ’s w h ic h sto o d a t th e h e a rt o f th e “Jap an ese M ira c le ” th a t ra n
influence. fro m th e 1950s to th e 1970s, b u t to d a y services are p re ­
I n 2014 a n d 201 5 , th e re has b e e n considerable d ebate d o m in a n t, a cc o u n tin g for 71.6 p e rc e n t o f G D P in 2011,
over th e c o u n try ’s c u rre n t econom ic policy o f P rim e M in is ­ w ith in d u stry a c c o u n tin g for 27.3 p e rce n t a n d a g ric u ltu re
te r S h in z o A b e . A fte r nearly tw o decades o f low g ro w th , 1.2 percent.
A b e p ro m ised a set o f d ra m a tic policies (com m only referred
to as “A b e n o m ic s”) to ju m p s ta r t th e econom y. T hese in ­ The economic indicators in this section are drawn from the CIA
cluded in creased g o v e rn m e n t sp e n d in g a n d loose m o n e ta ry World Factbook.
490 Japan

CASE STUDIES

CHAPTER 4, PAGE 84

As noted in the "Historical Develop­ planning and even in operating enter­ Japan's rapid economic growth made
ment" section at the beginning of this prises. One of the leading institutions in possible a distribution of the gains that
profile, Japan has shown remarkable the Japanese government was the Minis­ kept most actors satisfied: Pay increases
economic performance since the late try of International Trade and Industry were possible while firms remained
nineteenth century. It has done so, many (MITI), which took on major roles in plan­ profitable.
scholars believe, because of the adroit ning and coordination of the economy, At the same time, the paternalistic fea­
way in which the state has managed in a style has been termed "plan-ratio­ tures of Japanese firms and their ten­
economic development. As noted ear­ nal" development (Johnson 1982). This dency to provide lifetime employment
lier, Japanese economic development Japanese model of the developmental likely reduced potential welfare costs for
began shortly after efforts to create a state was subsequently emulated by the state. This links to issues of gender and
modern state, one which quickly ex­ other "East Asian tigers" such as Korea, politics discussed in the next case study:
panded its tax base and, among other Singapore, and Taiwan. In other words, the Paternalism extended to expectations for
things, invested in human capital by en­ Japanese state remained relatively lean, families in providing care for children and
suring that a high and growing percent­ and did not promote growth through others, and this often means women's
age of the population received at least widespread state ownership, but rather it unpaid labor (Kabashima and Steel 2010:
elementary education (Gordon 2009: aimed to help to shape the economic en­ 19) as families in the "private sphere"
67-68, 70). vironment in a way that would be good take on a relatively important role in the
The Japanese state did not achieve for Japanese businesses. provision of "welfare" service (Esping-
this by establishing a Soviet-style com­ In achieving this balance, it was likely Anderson 1997:181).
mand economy. Rather, it worked as a co­ aided by the fact that labor unions tend to In the 1970s the Japanese state aimed
ordinating agent (Hall and Soskice 2001) be specific to firms in Japanese culture to take on more welfare functions (Kosai
that could help the economy avoid a (think of them as vertically integrated 2008: 536), as discussed earlier, in the
series of problems, such as the lack of within firms) rather than tied to classes of "Political Economy' section. Some have
capital, the establishment of basic infra­ workers as such as in other societies (think argued that Japan evidences a distinct
structure, the development of heavy in­ of these as horizontally integrated, cut­ type of welfare state formation, but the
dustry, and other achievements that ting across firms) (Hall and Soskice 2001: most important analyst of welfare states,
might have been more difficult without 34-35). This likely reduced pressure for Esping-Anderson (1997), argues that the
coordinated effort. As one historian state expansion because it reduced the Japanese welfare state is a "hybrid" of con­
puts it, "in its macroeconomic policy likelihood of class-based organizing. At servative and liberal approaches to wel­
the [Japanese] government followed the the same time, it is worth remembering, fare state formation and functioning. It
principle of balanced budgets, but at the as noted in the "Political Culture" section, combines low levels of social spending
same time in its micro-economic or sec­ that government policies influenced with state policies to maintain full em­
torial policy, it followed government union weakness: The LDP, which was ployment, strong cultural expectations of
interventionist principles, by providing strongly opposed to robust union organi­ family provision, and company-based
special tax measures for and fiscal invest­ zation, reduced freedom to organize and (that is, private-sector) provision of social
ment in particular industries" (Kosai 2008: strike and required arbitration in case of insurance (there is a public system, but it
535). The state remained a major player in labor disputes (Manow 2001: 44). Finally, is supplementary).
 Case Studies 491

_
• The Hybrid Electoral System of the Japanese Diet CHAPTER 9, PAGE 210

Japan's parliament, called the Diet, is bi­ introduce proportionality into the (LDP), for reasons seen later, in the box for
cameral, having been established in its system. The House of Councillors is the chapter 11 (Cox 1996). The LDP attempted
current form by the Constitution of 1947, upper chamber, with 152 members se­ on multiple occasions to move toward sin­
which was crafted under the American oc­ lected from Japan's forty-seven prefec­ gle-member districts, which would give it
cupation that followed Japan's surrender tures, while an additional 100 members even larger majorities, but opposition par­
in World War II. Yet electoral procedures are directly elected at a national level (in ties successfully resisted these changes.
for the Diet have changed, most substan­ a single nationwide district). The legisla­ The reformed system finally came
tially in the electoral reform of 1994 that tive chambers are not symmetric in their about in 1994. At that time, the LDP had at
dramatically altered Japanese politics. The powers, as the House of Representatives last lost governing power, though it re­
Diet is now elected by a hybrid system has the authority to overrule the House mained the largest party in parliament.
that includes features of both district- of Councillors and also selects the prime The reform of 1994 was intended to
based and proportional representation. minister. Most laws gain approval from change a party system that had for a long
The lower (and more powerful) both chambers to pass, but a two-thirds time been characterized by individual
chamber in Japan is called the House of majority in the House of Representatives politicians cultivating support from local
Representatives and was modeled in part can pass legislation even over the nega­ networks; this system was to be replaced
on the American chamber of the same tive vote of the House of Councillors. with one in which parties would take
name and in part on the British House of The system is notable not only for its more programmatic stances (Horiuchi
Commons. Currently, this lower house is hybrid structure but also for how it re­ and Saito 2003: 672). Another conse­
comprised of 480 representatives elected formed a previous system. From 1947 to quence of the 1994 reform was to reduce
by a system that mixes single-member 1994, the electoral system consisted of the power of rural areas, which had been
districts (like the U.S. House of Represen­ districts that would elect three to five rep­ overrepresented for decades, and give
tatives) with proportional representation resentatives, according to whichever can­ more equal representation to urban areas.
(more common in continental European didates received the most individual votes. Over the long run, the effects of the
democracies). Of the 480 representatives, The old electoral system for the House of reform seemed to contribute to the even­
300 win seats in specific district elec­ Representatives, called the "single non- tual defeat of the LDP and the rise of the
tions, and an additional 180 are chosen transferable vote" (SNTV) system, has been Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which
based on party lists in eleven different argued to be more proportional than ma- held a clear majority of more than three
regional blocks around the country. All joritarian systems with single-member dis­ hundred seats in the House of Represen­
representation thus has a territorial com­ tricts, but in Japan it seemed to favor the tatives between 2009 and 2012.
ponent, though the 180 seats attempt to long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party

How Did Japan's Dominant Party Win for So Long? c h a p t e r 11, p a g e 26 i

Japan has been ranked as a "Free" country Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The LDP parties to participate, though the LDP
by the independent organization Free­ governed from 1955 to 2009, except for a rarely faced serious party competition.
dom House for every year since it began brief interlude in 1993-1994, and has The country had the free elections ex­
keeping track of democracy around the again governed since 2012. Throughout pected of a multiparty democracy, and
world. Yet for most of that period up to the long period of its dominance, the was not a single-party state, but it had
recent years, Japan was dominated by the system legally allowed and enabled other one party that dominated elections. How
492 Japan

CASE STUDY (continued)

How Did J i' s Dominant Party Win for So Long? CHAPTER 11, PAGE 261

a dominant party— albeit one riddled United Kingdom, in which special interest win a large proportion of seats by distrib­
with factionalism— coexisted with de­ groups survived the war and continued uting benefits to local constituencies (Cox
mocracy was one of the key questions of their demands when the war ended, Japan 1996). In addition to the koenkai and the
Japanese politics. What accounts for the had a new political system, a reconstruct­ patronage that helped the LDP, the elect­
continued victories of the LDP over so ing economy, and a rapidly changing soci­ oral system also disproportionately fa­
many years? ety (Olson 1984). This relationship between vored rural areas, where the LDP had
There are several possible explanations government and business was presumed its strongest base. Finally, the electoral
for this. One could be based on interest healthy for a time, but as Japan went system fragmented the opposition, such
group representation in Japan, as well as through the "lost decade" of the 1990s that the LDP commanded majorities in
economic performance. Japan's LDP pre­ with little growth and evidence accumu­ the seats in the Diet even when it was un­
sided over a form of corporatism that may lating that the country's economic bubble popular and failed to gain a majority of
have helped the party continue its victo­ had burst, the constructive engagement votes (Scheiner 2006). In this context, the
ries, not least due to economic achieve­ between state and business was recast as LDP became a powerful machine without
ments for several decades up to the 1980s. "crony capitalism," a system of favors to in­ being ideologically coherent, and its flex­
During most of the LDP's rule, the govern­ siders that caught up with Japan in the ibility seemed to allow it to coopt or incor­
ment reached out to business as well as long run. This coincided with the LDP's in­ porate other actors that emerged from
other interest groups as it made its deci­ creasing weakness. other parties.
sions about planning and guiding certain There are also several arguments relat­ Electoral reform in 1994 eventually
aspects of the economy (Evans 1989). ing to the electoral system, the internal gave an opening to other parties. One ar­
Japan had weli-structured relationships workings of the LDP, and Japan's unique gument that purports to explain both the
between government policymakers and political culture. As noted in the previous persistence and the fall of the LDP thus
economic stakeholders; companies could case study, Japan long had an electoral finds that the LDP benefited from the
expect to give input to the policy process, system for the House of Representatives electoral system for many years, but that
and some would receive advantages to based on a single, non-transferable vote the party's decline was assured as other
boost production, but these would only (SNTV), in which LDP politicians often parties adapted to the new electoral
persist as long as performance was good. competed against one another for the system. In this logic, the LDP's ability to
Government leaders kept very close ties to seats within a certain constituency. (This hang on for another decade and more
top business executives, and thus they system is still used for the upper chamber, after 1994 was attributable in part to the
knew what business required to build and but has now been replaced in the lower particularly charismatic Prime Minister Ju­
expand; it seems many of these ties went house.) A key feature of the LDP years was nichiro Koizumi (Krauss and Pekkanen
back to personal relationships at the highly factionalism inside the party: While the 2011). The LDP's resurgence since 2012,
prestigious Tokyo University Faculty of Law party presented a common banner, it was however, may cast this interpretation into
(Evans 1989). Despite this close relation­ riddled with internal divisions often cen­ doubt.
ship, the LDP government also had some tered around individual leaders or small There are other possible explanations
"autonomy" from the corporations and groups of politicians. In this system, LDP besides the preceding ones for the LDP's
conglomerates; government did not incumbents benefited from the mobiliza­ long hegemony. In general, it can be said
simply do the corporations' bidding. A tion by informal “support groups" from that any number of the variables seen in
result was economic success, which may certain neighborhoods or communities in previous chapters— from development
have favored the LDP's dominance. Per­ the constituencies. These groups were and the role of the state to the function­
haps surprisingly, some scholars have even known as koenkai, and they supported fa­ ing of electoral systems in the legisla­
argued that Japan's loss in World War II was vored politicians in the expectation of fa­ ture— can be posited to contribute to the
part of the reason for this more coopera­ voritism in return. Since the LDP had the dominant-party system that governed
tive arrangement; by contrast with the advantages of incumbency it was able to Japan for half a century.
 Case Studies 493

Importing National Identity in Japan? CHAPTER 13, PAGE 310

Japan— much like China— had a strong would an identity like this spread? Who In any case, by the close of the nine­
sense of identity and civilizational unique­ would gain from it? teenth century a significant portion of
ness for centuries. Indeed, there is much Scholars who are interested in explain­ Japanese society thought of that society
that resembles modern nationalism in the ing Japan's turn to nationalism can focus in national terms. Moreover, there was a
Tokugawa regime's hostility to foreign in­ on several different types of interests. First, strong sense that the nation needed to
fluence and sense of Japanese cultural some note that nationalism provided a assert itself internationally, as it did in both
superiority. However, most scholars of language that articulates a critique of the the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-
national identity do not see Tokugawa Tokugawa regime, and that demanded a Japanese War, before adopting a still
Japan as a national society (Greenfeld response to the military and economic su­ more expansive policy in the twentieth
2001; Gordon 2009: 51), because however periority of foreign powers. Second, some century, culminating in its involvement in
salient Japanese identity was, it was not note that nationalism served the interest of the Second World War. After Japan's
tied to the idea of the Japanese as a sov­ the Meiji state in inculcating national senti­ defeat in that conflict, Japanese national­
ereign and equal people. Rather, estate- ment in its citizens: As elsewhere, the state ism has found less militaristic expression,
based divisions were of critical importance, endeavored to use nationalism to influence with a strong focus on economic compe­
with a huge gap between the nobility and the behavior of its citizens (Gordon 2009: tition as an avenue for the realization of
commoners, and political authority was 135-137). Third, some emphasize the the nation's status.
not seen as a reflection of the will of any importance of the status-inconsistency of So, did Japan (and other countries)
unified "nation." elite groups— in particular the large class of really "import" national identity? It seems
Nationalism as such, therefore, was samurai— a variable that has been linked to clear that the general concept of national
imported to Japan (Doak 2006; Greenfeld the importation of national identity in nu­ identity, linked to popular sovereignty
2001). It happened in the nineteenth cen­ merous other cases (Greenfeld 2001). Note and idealized equality of membership, did
tury, during and after the opening of the that the first two explanatory strategies diffuse globally over recent decades and
society to the West. It is worth noting that focus on the relationship between national centuries, and in this sense the idea of the
nationalism as a type of identity spread identity and the state while the latter one nation was imported to Japan. But what
globally in this way into virtually all of to­ focuses more on what's happening within Japanese citizens made with this identity
day's societies: In other words, Japan is society, outside of the state. See if you can is a different story: Japanese nationalism
not unusual in this respect, though it is an find ways in which these explanatory strat­ was fashioned in the mold shaped by its
exemplary case of this phenomenon. Why egies could be blended together. members, like every other nation.

Gender Empowerment in Japan? CHAPTER 14, PAGE 335

Historically, women's participation in What scholars have uncovered has recent years, its Gender Empowerment
Japanese politics has received little em­ largely not been good. Japan stands out, Measure rank was fifty-seventh globally
phasis, both in popular discussion and in when compared to its peers in terms of in 2009 (UN Human Development
the academic literature, in part because socioeconomic development, for the Report 2009). In terms of women's
of discrimination and in part because relatively low political empowerment of legislative representation, Japan recently
of the (male) elite-centeredness of much women. For example, despite having the stood at 113th (Inter-Parliamentary
work in political science (LeBlanc 1999). world's eighth-highest level of HDI in Union 2015).
494 japan

Gender Empowerment in Japan? CHAPTER 14, PAGE 335

Similar trends have been visible in miss the ways in which women can mobi­ political empowerment is a component
subnational representative bodies. As lize a "housewife" identity and build on of the index. In terms of two of the other
Sherry L. Martin (2008: 125) puts it, "the social networks to pursue their chosen four components (equity in education
extent of women's underrepresentation ends. This is not to say that women and and health) Japan does very well in
in elected offices makes Japan an outlier men have achieved political equality in comparative terms, but in terms of fair
in comparative studies of women and Japan (or elsewhere, for that matter), but economic opportunity, it fares poorly, in­
politics." However, she notes that great that there is more to Japanese women's cluding in terms of equal pay for equal
progress has been made in the last several political participation (and women's par­ work and participation in the work force
years. While women's share of seats in ticipation in politics in other societies as (Hausmann et al. 2010:174-175). This is, of
both the Diet and local political bodies well) than can be revealed through a tra­ course, of concern to women and others
remains low, it has been growing. This is ditional political science lens. who are opposed to inequality. But the
likely owed to both institutional changes Beyond questions of political repre­ ramifications of gender discrimination
and reforms since the 1990s and women's sentation, it is worth noting that Japan extend beyond such concerns. Indeed,
increasing civii society activism. stands out as a country where gender dis­ some evidence indicates that Japanese
The political ethnographer Robin LeB- crimination in employment and everyday economic performance suffers notably
lanc (1999) has emphasized that Japanese life is quite high (Hausmann, Tyson, and because of gender inequity, with one anal­
women do have agency, and that narra­ Zahidi 2010). Japan's Gender Gap Index ysis estimating a 16 percent loss in GDP as
tives about their participation in political ranks it ninety-fourth globally. To some a result of such discrimination (Hausmann
life that are focused on elite politics often extent this is a function of the fact that etal. 2010:30).

Resource Management in Japan CHAPTER 16, PAGE 387

There are two highly symbolic illustra­ have been associated with global climate have significant authority, and the world's
tions from Japan that show the challenge change. A lack of attention to this sovereign nations have little incentive
of environmental sustainability and the common pool resource will make every­ to give up their powers to some world
importance of the "tragedy of the com­ one worse off. In a similar sense, the government. Certain states— especially
mons" discussed in chapter 16. One is the oceans have a fish stock upon which smaller or weaker states— may be com­
fishing of the world's oceans, and the many countries rely, yet there is dear evi­ pelled to behave in certain ways by
other is the question of climate change. dence of overfishing and a lack of coordi­ threats of war, economic sanctions, or
Many situations involving the global envi­ nation or adequate provision for diplomatic pressure, but in international
ronment are situations where multiple sustainability over the long run. relations terms, the system has an anar­
countries draw upon resources that are One aspect of the challenge arises chic structure in which each state is sover­
used by all, and the earth's atmosphere from the lack of a clear governing author­ eign. This gives rise to the collective
and its oceans are two leading examples. ity for these international common pool action problems at the international level.
The atmosphere has an ability to hold resources. There is no overarching world Japan is one of world's great offenders
carbon dioxide and other greenhouse government to require states to behave in when it comes to overfishing the oceans,
gasses, but growing levels of pollutants certain ways; the United Nations does not though by no means the only one.
 ■

Case Studies 495

El CASE STUDY (continued)

Resource Management in Japan

Japanese fishing (and whaling) has been

thus one of the clearest illustrations of
cases of extinction and endangerment of
species, the example shows how quickly
CHAPTER 16, PAGE 387

countries to reduce global emissions to

levels below those from 1990. Yet the
how the tragedy of the commons oper­ irreversible change can occur when re­ Kyoto Protocol faced challenges from the
ates. The example of Atlantic bluefin tuna sources begin to decline. start. The United States was the world's
is illustrative. Japanese consume as much Another issue links Japan symbolically largest polluter when its congress rejected
as three-fourths of all the Atlantic bluefin to the question of sustainability, though it the protocol. Meanwhile, major develop­
tuna caught in the world, eating it mostly is hardly a "Japanese issue” alone. This is ing countries were not required to reduce
raw as sashimi (Blair 2010). The stock of the the Kyoto Protocol, an international agree­ emissions under the agreement, though
fish is severely depleted, and there is a risk ment to address the issue of climate China is now the world's largest polluter.
that it will be fished to extinction; this de­ change. The protocol was agreed to in the More recently, Russia and Japan itself de­
pletion happened especially after the Japanese city of Kyoto in 1997 and subse­ clined to sign onto future reductions,
1970s, when bluefin tuna consumption quently was ratified by legislatures of the while Canada pulled out of the protocol at
took off in Japan (Kolbert 2010). Yet Japan many countries that signed it, with the ex­ the end of 2011. As with overfishing, the
celebrated when an international body ception of the United States. It was de­ lack of collective action is indicative of the
opted not to prohibit international trade signed as a global response to climate challenges present in issues of interna­
in the species (Kolbert 2010). As with other change that would commit all signatory tional environmental protection.

Research Prompts
1. Compare the modernization paths of China and Japan. In what main factors that influence types of single-party dominance in
ways are they similar, and in what ways are they different (in more and less democratic societies?
terms of both politics and economics)? Using theories from 3. Compare long-run economic development in the United King­
chapters 3-7 (and, possibly, chapters 12 and 13 as well), develop dom, Germany, and Japan. Be especially attentive to the role of
hypotheses to explain the variation that you noted in response the state in these cases. How do the cases contrast? What are
to the first part of this prompt. the implications of your comparison for the theory that state
2. Compare the period of LDP hegemony in Japan to the experi­ involvement is bad for economic development?
ence of Mexico under the PRI. How did each party cement its 4. In chapter 15 we introduced the concept of "multiple moderni­
control? To what extent did the nature of single-party domi­ ties" that scholars like S. M. Eisenstadt have developed. Japan is
nance vary? What similar and different causes lay behind single­ often regarded as a Western-style modernizer. Is Japanese
party dominance? Then bring China into the comparison. What modernity "Western," or does it have its own distinct
might this comparison suggest about what seem to be the characteristics?
0 Mexico
PROFILE Introduction
M exico is a c o u n try th a t receives a g re at deal
Key Features of Contemporary Mexico o f a tte n tio n from p o litical scientists for n u ­
m erous reasons. O n e o f th e m o st im p o rta n t
Population: 120,286,655 (estimate, July 2014)
is th a t it is a large c o u n try b o rd e rin g on a cul­
Area: 1,964,375 square kilometers tu ra lly very differen t one w ith a c o n tra stin g
po litical a n d econom ic h isto ry (C am p 2007:
Head of State: Enrique Pena Nieto (president, 2012-present)
1-9), th u s fa cilitatin g com parisons. A n o th e r
Head of Government: Enrique Pena Nieto (president, 2012-present) is th a t its econom ic a n d p olitical h istories are
fascin atin g a n d set up m an y o th e r p o ten tial
Capital: Mexico City
com parisons th a t allow us to g a in som e
Year of Independence: Often cited as 1810, when the movement for leverage over a n u m b er o f th eo ries o f com ­
independence began, but actual p arative politics. I n econom ic term s, it has
independence was established in 1821. a lte rn a ted b e tw ee n perio d s o f g ro w th and
sta g n atio n , a n d th e state’s econom ic policy
Year of Current Constitution: 1917
has sh ifted on num erous occasions over th e
Languages: Spanish; Nahuatl; Mayan; other Amerindian decades. Since 1994 it has b e en econom ically
languages.
in te g rate d w ith th e re st o f N o rth A m e ric a via
GDP per Capita: $10,307 (World Bank estimate, 2013) th e N o r th A m e ric a n Free T rad e A g re em e n t,
a n d has m ore generally increased its global
Human Development Index 71st (high human development)
econom ic in te g ratio n in re ce n t years. A lo n g
Ranking (2014):
w ith B razil, it has h a d m oderate success in
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
recen t decades in estab lish in g a diversified
Development Report 2014.
in d u stria l base. Y et severe p o v erty is a p ersis­
te n t problem , a n d econom ic difficulties are
lin k e d to serious political challenges.
I n po litical term s, M exico has occasion­
ally b een th o u g h t o f as h a v in g a stro n g state,
since th e state has o ften b e en in te rv en tio n ist

| Mestizo 60% | Roman Catholicism 76.5%

Amerindian 31 Protestant Christianity 6.3%
W hite 9% ■ Other 0.3%
I Other 1% H Not specified 13.8%
I No religion 3.1%
Ethnic Groups in Mexico Religious Affiliation in Mexico
Source: CIA World Factbook. Note that we have included Jehovah's Witnesses (1.1%) in the "Protestant
Christianity" category.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Profile 497
498 Mexico

in M exico’s history. I n term s relative to th e re st o f L a tin p o ssibility o f a M e x ica n “failed state” o n th e U .S. b o rd e r (for
A m e ric a a t th e tim e, th e decades o f la te -n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry a m ore reasonable view , see O ’N e il 2009). T hese issues are
dom inance by P orfirio D ia z , called th e “P orfiriato,” saw discussed in m ore d e ta il in th e c h ap ter 3 case study.
fairly stro n g developm ent (M o rn e r 1993:6), in w h ic h th e Perhaps th ese challen g es sh o u ld n o t b e su rp risin g w h e n
state en couraged foreign capital to b u ild railro ad s a n d to w e consider (1) th a t m o d e rn M exico is geo g rap h ically d i­
tran sfo rm th e countryside, p ro m o tin g a m ore com m ercial verse; (2) th a t it is a h ig h ly u n e q u a l so ciety w ith consider­
a g ric u ltu ra l m odel a n d b e g in n in g to establish in d u stria l ac­ able h e te ro g en e ity a n d c u ltu ra l diversity; a n d (3) th a t it
tiv ity in th e cities (M ey er a n d S h erm an 1987: 4 3 1 -4 7 9 ; em erged fro m a h ig h ly conffictual a n d u n e q u al p ost-colonial
K rauze 1997: 218). L ikew ise, th e state th a t em erged from so ciety in w h ic h m u ltip le exogenous shocks d isru p te d th e
th e M ex ican R evolution (w hich b e g an in 1910), a fte r seri­ tra d itio n a l social stru c tu re . I n term s o f g e o g rap h ica l a n d
ous in stab ility a n d aro u n d one m illio n death s, w as a state c u ltu ra l diversity, th e sh a rp e st c o n tra st is b e tw e e n th e
th a t cam e to intervene actively in th e econom y, for exam ple drier, n o rth e rn p o rtio n o f th e country, w h ic h is th e center
in M exico’s early n a tio n a liza tio n o f oil (1938). T he p o st­ o f m o st in d u stria l activity, a n d th e so u th e rn p o rtio n o f th e
revolutionary regim e also a cted strongly a g ain st th e R o m an co u n try , w h ic h has a tro p ic al clim ate a n d is po o rer, w ith a
C a th o lic C h u rc h , d ram atically re d u cin g its capacity to act larg er in d ig en o u s p opulation. E xogenous shocks to M ex ican
in politics (B lancarte 1992). So, o n one h a n d , a t key periods d ev elo p m en t in clu d e d nu m ero u s foreign in te rv en tio n s th a t
in its h isto ry th e M e x ica n state appears to be strong. O n th e b o th c h a n g e d do m estic p olitics a n d , in th e m o st extrem e
o th e r h a n d , how ever, w e m u st consider th a t th e state w as for in stan c e o f w a r w ith th e U n ite d States in th e 1840s, led to
m any decades pro n e to in stab ility a n d irre g u la r transfers o f m assive loss o f territo ry . T o th is lis t w e co u ld a d d th e
pow er, th a t even in th e years o f relative sta b ility pro m o ted im p a c t o f fo reig n capital d u rin g th e P o rfiriato a n d th e
b y th e In stitu tio n a l R evolutionary P a rty ’s (Partido Revolu- social dislo catio n e xperienced b y th e ru ra l, largely in d ig e ­
cionario Institutional, or P R I) dom in an ce for m u ch o f the nous p o p u la tio n , a n d it is n o t h a rd to u n d e rsta n d w h y im ­
tw e n tie th century, a u th o ritarian ism w as th e n o rm (M exico p o rta n t g ro u p s o f ru ra l p o o r w ere w illin g to follow leaders
in m o st o f th a t p e rio d w as, as w e shall see, a v a ria tio n o n th e like P a n c h o V illa a n d E m ilia n o Z a p a ta d u rin g th e M ex ican
“p a rty dictato rsh ip ” m odel), a n d th a t in very recen t years th e R evolution (W o m a c k 1968; K n ig h t 1990a). T h a t revolu­
c o u n try has stru g g led w ith serious problem s o f o rg a n iz ed tio n , lik e th e events th a t caused it, w o u ld prove to b e a d e ­
crim e a n d d ru g trafficking, p ro m p tin g som e analysts to sta b ilizin g force, even as a n e w o rd er em erged th a t claim ed
w o rry (som ew hat hyperbolically, w e th in k ) ab o u t th e to govern in its nam e.

Historical Development
M exico w as arguably th e m o st im p o rta n t o f S pain’s colonies in th e area aro u n d to d ay ’s P eru , for th e sam e reasons (in th is
in th e “N e w W o rld ” (T hom as 1993). T his w as m ain ly due to case, th e In c a civilization w as th e relevant one). T hus b o th
its econom ic value, w h ich h a d tw o m ain sources. F irst, it M ex ico a n d P e ru fam ously becam e “cores” o f th e Spanish
h a d m in in g w e alth , a n d S pain w as a m erc an tilist pow er, colonial system , w hile areas like th e S o u th e rn C o n e (today’s
m ea n in g th a t it view ed th e m ax im iz atio n o f hold in g s o f A rg e n tin a a n d C hile), V enezuela, a n d p a rts o f C e n tra l
gold a n d silver (“b u llio n ”) as fu n d a m e n ta l to state p ow er and A m e ric a re m a in e d “p e rip h e ra l” to th a t system u n til th e clos­
th e key m easure o f econom ic p erform ance. S econd, M exico in g years o f S panish colonialism (H a lp e rin D o n g h i 1993).
ha d a large, com plex A m e rin d ia n civilization before th e ar­ B eing a colonial core m eant th a t th e central pow er paid lots
rival o f E u ro p ean s (in fact it h a d num erous indigenous o f attention to M exican society (M ahoney 2010). C olonial
groups and cultures, perhaps m o st notably th e M ay a in th e M exico h a d m ore colonial bureaucracy th a n peripheral re­
S outh, th o u g h th e ir com plex society h a d en tered in to d e­ gions, and it h a d a m ore complex social structure, in p a rt b e­
cline som e tim e before E u ro p ea n contact, a n d th e em pire o f cause o f the society’s relative cultural diversity b u t in large
th e M exica, o ften called th e “A z tecs,” centered in today’s m easure because the am ount o f w ealth generated b y m ining,
M exico City). T his m e a n t th a t state-like stru c tu re s could be and thus th e rents th a t could be siphoned o ff by m ultiple actors,
b u ilt “on to p o f” th e e xisting p o litical a n d social in stitu tio n s facilitated this. Perhaps n o t surprisingly, its efforts to achieve
in th e society (M a h o n ey 2010). T his w as sim ilarly th e case independence follow ed a p a th th a t differed in certain key
 Profile 499

respects from th e p a tte rn w itnessed in m ore peripheral areas. In all o f L atin A m erica, politics in the nineteenth century was
I n places like Buenos A ires and Caracas, local elites tended to divided b etw een conservatives a n d liberals, b u t the conserva­
be strong supporters o f independence (L ynch 1973). In places tives w ere b o th stronger and m ore conservative in M exico th a n
like M exico, such elites w ere less sure, and th e first stages o f in m any o th er places (on n in eteen th -cen tu ry M exican conser­
th e revolt against Spain cam e out o f the M exican periphery. vatism , see K rauze 1997). Perhaps m ost im portant, M exican
Indeed, M exico only becam e independent w hen a liberal revolt conservatives helped th e R o m an C atholic C h u rch m aintain
in Spain caused some M exican conservatives, m ost notably th ro u g h o u t a good p ortio n o f th e n in eteen th -cen tu ry strength
A ugustin de Iturbide, to change sides, favoring a conservative and privileges th a t were alm ost w ith o u t parallel in th e region,
governm ent at hom e versus a liberal governm ent from E urope tw o o f th e m ost im p o rta n t being th e C h u rc h ’s enorm ous land-
(M eyer and Sherm an 1987: 2 9 4 -3 0 8 ; A n n a 1998). A t first, holding a n d th e fact th a t it w as allow ed to operate a parallel
M exico tried an im perial system, w ith Iturbide th e emperor. legal system th ro u g h w hich its clergy could be tried (L ynch
This lasted only a m atter o f m onths before th e country becam e 1986: G ill 2008). This ongoing polarization was an im p o rtan t
a republic. The im p o rt o f this, for com parative politics, is th a t factor in th e W a r o f th e R eform in th e 1850s and the revolu­
this process b o th indicates and reinforced a strong traditional­ tio n begin n in g after 1910, as w ell as th e subsequent C ristero
ist or conservative strain in th e politics o f independent M exico. R ebellion in th e 1920s.

Historical Development
T im elin e
1810 “Grito of Dolores" marks beginning of indepen­ 1913-1914 Presidency of Victorino Huerta, which begins with
dence movement. a coup d'etat and the murder of Madero
1821 Plan of Iguala and its “Three Guarantees" and the 1914-1920 Presidency of Venustiano Carranza, proponent of
establishment of Mexican independence 'constitutionalism"
1833-1834 Valentin Gomez Farias attempts anti-clerical and 1920-1924 Presidency of Alvaro Obregon
other reforms. Santa Anna displaces Gomez Farias, 1924-1928 Presidency of Plutarco Elias Calles, who creates the
prompting a period of conservative rule. party that later becomes the PRI
1836 Independence of Texas 1926-1929 Cristero Rebellion
1838-1839 The "Pastry War' (French invasion) 1928-1934 Period in which Calles dominates but does not
1846-1848 U.S. War with Mexico, which leads to the United States hold the presidency
seizing a considerable portion of Mexican national 1929 Founding of PRI (at the time called the PNR)
territory, including much of present-day Arizona, 1934-1940 Presidency of Lazaro Cardenas, which includes nation­
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah alization of oil in 1938 as well as major agrarian reforms
1853 Gadsen Purchase transfers more Mexican land to 1968 Major student protests quelled with violence.
the United States. 1988-1994 Presidency of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, known for
1855 Ley Juarez introduces anti-clerical reforms. its liberal economic reforms
1856 Ley Lerdo forces alienation of Church Lands. 1994- North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA)
1857 Liberal constitution of 1857 enters into effect.
1858-1861 War of the Reform 1994 Beginning of Zapatista National Liberation Army
1862 European intervention, led by France EZLN activities under Subcomandante Marcos
1864-1867 Rule by Emperor Maximilian, imposed by French 1994-2000 Presidency of Ernesto Zedillo
forces 1994 Peso crisis, resolved with major aid from the United
1867 Return to liberal government, under Juarez States under Bill Clinton
1876-1911 The Porfiriato, during which Porfirio Diaz domi­ 2000 Election of Vicente Fox of PAN signals the end of
nates Mexican politics PRI hegemony in Mexico, and progress for Mexican
1910 Diaz "defeats" Madero in a fraudulent election that democracy.
is the opening scene of the Mexican Revolution. 2006-2012 Presidency of Felipe Calderon
1911-1913 Presidency of Francisco Madero 2012-present Presidency of Enrique Peha Nieto
500 Mexico

I n th e early years o f th e rep u b lic, M e x ico d escen d ed ro ll b a ck th e reform s a n d o th erw ise p u rsu e th e policies th a t
in to w h a t scholars call “c au d illism o ,” w h ic h esse n tia lly h is conservative su p p o rters w o u ld have lik ed . A s a result,
m eans ru le b y s tro n g m en . You w ill re co g n ize fro m c h a p te r he soon h a d relatively little backing. A s lo n g as F re n c h
3 th a t th is w o u ld b e a sy m p to m o f relative sta te w eakness: tro o p s re m a in e d in M ex ico , he w as able to resist Ju a re z ’s
T he M e x ica n state w as a t le a st p a rtia lly a vehicle fo r th e resistance m ovem ent. B u t a fte r th e close o f th e A m e ric an
p u rsu it o f th e priv ate in te re s t o f a “p re d a to ry ” elite ra th e r C iv il W ar, w ith th e U n ite d S tates se n d in g tro o p s to th e
th a n a n o rg a n iz a tio n in w h ic h ru le o f law, e q u al access, M e x ica n b o rd e r a n d th re a te n in g in te rv e n tio n in favor o f
a n d in s titu tio n a l leg itim a cy w ere e stab lish e d . W h ile th e Ju a re z a n d th e liberals, F re n c h tro o p s w ith d rew , a n d M a x i­
in s titu tio n a l tra p p in g s o f a lib e ra l re p u b lic w ere in place, m ilia n ’s reg im e en d ed soon th ereafter.
th e h older o f th e presidency u ltim ately answ ered to a m ilita ry T his m e a n t a (b rief) r e tu r n to lib e ral, c iv ilian g o v e rn ­
elite, a n d in M ex ico th is m e a n t A n to n io L o p e z de S a n ta m en t. H o w ev er, in 1871 P o rfirio D ia z ra n o n a c am p a ig n
A n n a . S a n ta A n n a fam ously sw itc h ed sides in M e x ica n o f “n o re -e le c tio n .” H a v in g lo st, h e b e g a n a revolt w h ic h
politics, a lte rn a tin g b e tw e e n th e conservatives a n d th e lib ­ c u lm in a te d in h is ta k in g p o w e r in 1876. In c e rta in re ­
erals (M e y er a n d S h e rm an 1987; B a za n t 1985: 4 3 6 -4 4 4 ), sp ects, th is sig n a le d a r e tu r n to c au d illism o , as he w o u ld
so m etim es a ssu m in g th e p re sid en c y h im self, b u t even th e n g o v ern , th o u g h n o t alw ays fo rm ally h o ld in g office, u n til
o fte n v a ca tin g th e office to re tire to h is priv ate estate w hile 1910. H o w ev er, som e im p o rta n t differences sep arate th e
a desig n ee h a n d le d th e g o v e rn m e n t’s d a y -to -d a y affairs. “P o rfiria to ” fro m th e style o f ru le develo p ed b y S a n ta
H is a u th o rity re sted esse n tia lly o n his re p u ta tio n as a g re a t A n n a in th e first h a lf o f th e cen tu ry . F irs t, D ia z a im e d to
w a rrio r a n d his a b ility to e stab lish a p riv ate a rm y to o ut- use his p o w e r to force th e m o d e rn iz a tio n o f th e c o u n try (as
c o m p ete p o te n tia l do m estic rivals. O f course, th e re is one h e a n d his advisers u n d e rsto o d th is process). A s in B razil,
easy w ay to lose leg itim a cy in a system o f th is so rt, w h ic h “p o sitiv ism ” p layed a key role in fo rm in g M e x ic a n ideas o f
is to fail in m ilita ry term s. S a n ta A n n a lo st p o w e r a fte r p ro g ress a n d m o d e rn iz a tio n (C a m p 2007: 3 6 -3 8 ). D ia z
th e un su ccessfu l effo rt to stop th e d e c la ra tio n o f th e c o u rte d fo reig n in v e stm e n t a n d p re sid ed over som e g ro w th
in d e p e n d e n t R ep u b lic o f T exas. H e w o u ld te m p o ra rily in m a n u fa c tu rin g , th e c o n stru c tio n o f a n o tab le system o f
g a in it b a ck a fte r heroic service a g a in st th e F re n c h in th e ra ilro a d s, a n d th e tra n s fo rm a tio n o f a g ric u ltu re (M e y er
“p a stry w ar,” a n d th e n lose p o w e r a g ain in su b seq u e n t a n d S h e rm a n 1987: 4 3 1 -4 7 9 ; K ra u ze 1997). A ll o f th ese
years, g a in in g it a g ain d u rin g th e U .S . invasion o f M ex ico , d e v e lo p m e n ts w o u ld h ave im p o r ta n t im p lic a tio n s for
a n d lo sin g p o w e r for g o o d in 1855, w h e n th e R evo lu tio n su b seq u e n t p o litics, as th e y p ro d u c ed som e d islo ca tio n
o f A y u tla (1 8 5 4 -1 8 5 5 ) b ro u g h t th e lib e rals to p o w er a n d u p s e t tr a d itio n a l w ays o f d o in g th in g s . P e rh a p s
(H a m n e tt 1994). a g ric u ltu ra l ch an g e s w ere th e m o st im p o rta n t, because
A fte r so m an y years o f p o litica l in sta b ility a n d p ro tec ­ th e y b ro k e u p tra d itio n a l local la n d o w n e rsh ip p a tte rn s
tio n o f conservative in terests, th e liberals w ere eager to d ra ­ a n d h e lp e d to c o n ce n tra te la n d in th e h a n d s o f a sm all elite
m atically rem ake M e x ica n p olitics (K rau ze 1997 :1 5 7 -1 5 9 ). (C a m p 200 7 : 38), a n d in tro d u c e d w ag e lab o r as th e basis
T his th e y a tte m p te d to do in th e C o n s titu tio n o f 1857 and o f th e r u ra l e conom y in a t lea st som e areas. A s m an y schol­
in tw o m ajor reform s, k n o w n as th e L ey Ju a re z a n d th e L ey ars have p o in te d o u t, th is , a n d social in e q u a lity m ore
L erd o (after th e ir authors). T hese law s e x p an d e d civilian g enerally, w o u ld play a m ajor role in th e d isc o n te n t th a t
p ow er over th e clergy a n d forced th e C h u rc h to sell its m as­ fu e le d th e M e x ic a n rev o lu tio n b e g in n in g in 1910 (C a m p
sive p ro p erties. H ow ever, th e C h u rc h ’s conservative allies 2 007: 42; K n ig h t 1990a). In p a rtic u la r, E m ilia n o Z a p a ta ’s
w ere u n w illin g to accept th e n e w order, a n d a m ajo r civil in s u rg e n c y w as fo c u se d , above a ll, o n la n d o w n e rs h ip
w ar, k n o w n as th e W a r o f th e R efo rm (1858-1861), broke (W o m a c k 1968).
o u t ( H a m n e tt 1994). E v en tu ally th e republic w as able to T he revolution h a d as its proxim ate cause th e revolt o f
d efend its e lf a g ain st conservative in su rg en ts. A t th e sam e F rancisco M a d e ro , w h o h a d ru n a g ain st D ia z a n d lo st in a
tim e , M e x ica n conservatives, led by J u a n A lm o n te , success­ fra u d u le n t electio n (for a definitive acco u n t o f th e revolu­
fu lly convinced N a p o leo n I I I to invade F ran ce a n d to tio n , see K n ig h t 1990a, 1990b). M a d e ro w as essentially a
im pose a E u ro p e a n m o n arc h , A rc h d u k e M a x im ilia n , as n o rth e rn elite a n d a liberal. H e w as soon jo in e d in his ef­
E m p e ro r o f M ex ico (M e y er a n d S h e rm an 1987: 3 9 1 -4 0 1 ). fo rts by d is tin c t social g roups, th e m o st im p o rta n t o f w h ic h
Ironically, M a x im ilia n h a d lib eral sym pathies a n d d id n o t w ere led by F rancisco (“P a n c h o ”) V illa in th e n o rth and
 Profile 501

Z ap a ta . Ideologically, th ese groups w e n t w e ll b e yond a u th o rita ria n p o litics in M ex ico w as so clearly d o m in a te d

M a d e ro ’s liberalism : T h o u g h h isto ria n s d isagree a bout b y one p o litic a l p a rty , th e P R I . T he m o st obvious sim ila r­
w h a t exactly th e y sto o d for, it is ag reed th a t th e y so u g h t to ity w o u ld b e th e t u r n to im p o rt su b s titu tio n as a d evelop­
redress problem s o f econom ic in e q u a lity a n d n o t ju s t p o liti­ m e n t strategy. In M e x ico , for a tim e a t least, m an y ju d g e d
cal issues. S cholars d isagree a b o u t w h e n , precisely, th e th is a p p ro ac h to b e successful, y ie ld in g th e so -c alled
revolution en d ed , a n d w e c a n n o t trace here a ll o f its tw ists “M e x ic a n m ira c le ” (B a sa n ez 2 0 0 6 : 2 9 7 ) o f m e d iu m -te rm
a n d tu rn s. N o te , th o u g h , th a t M a d e ro g o v ern ed u n til he su s ta in e d eco n o m ic g ro w th . E co n o m ically , th o u g h , th e
w as assassinated b y V ictoriano H u e rta in 1913. H u e r ta w as c o u n try e n te re d in to crisis— lik e m o st o f L a tin A m e ric a —
in tu rn displaced by V enustiano C a rra n z a in 1914. It w as in th e 1980s. By th e early 1990s, P re sid e n t S alinas de G o r-
u n d e r C a rra n z a th a t th e re v o lu tio n ary c o n stitu tio n o f 1917 ta r i in tro d u c e d im p o rta n t lib e ra l e co n o m ic reform s.
w as passed. C a rra n z a w as forced o u t in a revolt in 1920 led S ch o lars d eb ate th e re la tio n sh ip b e tw e e n th e se reform s
b y A lv aro O b re g o n , a n d O b re g o n w o u ld h im s e lf assum e a n d th e su b seq u e n t eco n o m ic tu rb u le n c e , in c lu d in g th e
th e presidency. Several years later, O b re g o n w o u ld b e fol­ p e so crisis o f 1994. A lso in th e early 1990s, M ex ico w it­
low ed b y P lu tarc o E lias C a lle s, w h o w o u ld fo u n d th e p a rty ne sse d th e b e g in n in g o f an in su rg e n c y in th e so u th e rn
th a t w o u ld becom e th e P R I a n d w h o w o u ld d o m in a te sta te o f C h ia p a s, p ro te s tin g lib e ral reform s a n d “g lo b aliza ­
M ex ican politics— b o th d ire c tly a n d in d ire c tly (K rau ze tio n ” m ore generally. In la te r years, M e x ic o ’s c itizen s
1997: 4 0 4 -4 3 7 )— u n til L az aro C a rd en a s w as elected in b e cam e m o re a n d m ore in te re ste d in b re a k in g th e P R I ’s
1934. E lias C alles is b e s t k n o w n fo r c o n so lid a tin g th e stra n g le h o ld o n p ow er. T he N a tio n a l A c tio n P a rty (Partido
system o f P R I -p a rty d o m in a n c e th a t w o u ld en d u re u n til Action National, or P A N ) successfully w o n th e presidency
2 0 0 0 a n d for p re sid in g over th e p e rio d o f th e C ristero w ith V icente Fox in 2 0 0 0 . P A N is a c e n te r-rig h t p a rty th a t
R ebellion, a m ajor civil w a r in w h ic h in su rg e n ts aim ed , u n ­ ten d s to b e less a n ti-c le ric a l th a n th e P R I (in d eed , th e
successfully, to d efen d th e R o m a n C a th o lic C h u rc h fro m C a th o lic C h u rc h p layed a role in M e x ic a n d e m o c ra tiz a ­
th e sta te ’s alleged d e p red a tio n s (B lan c arte 1992). C ard en a s tio n , as it d id elsew here d u rin g “th ird w ave” d e m o c ra tiz a ­
is b e st re m em b ered for his p o p u lis t po litics, for his role in tio n ). I t has also c o n tin u e d w ith e co n o m ic lib e raliza tio n .
fu rth e r solid ify in g M e x ica n co rp o ra tism , for th e n a tio n a l­ Fox w as succeeded b y P re sid e n t F elip e C a ld e ro n . C a ld e ro n
iza tio n o f M e x ica n oil, a n d for his efforts at a g ra ria n reform h a d som e success b u t faced d ifficulties g e n e ra te d by his ef­
(K rauze 1997: 4 3 8 -4 8 0 ). fo rts to c o n tro l d ru g g a n g activity, e sp e cially in b o rd e r
T here is m u ch to d e b ate a b o u t th e e x te n t to w h ic h th is states. I n som e areas, th e sta te ’s a b ility to e x ert its W e b e ­
b ro a d e r process w as revolutionary. I t clearly g e n e ra te d ria n “m o n o p o ly o n th e le g itim a te use o f force” w as to ta lly
som e im p o rta n t ch an g e s in p o litics, social life, a n d even c alled in to q u e stio n . P R I c a n d id a te E n riq u e P e n a N ie to
religion. Y et th e re g im e th a t it e n d e d u p p ro d u c in g by w o n th e 2 0 1 2 p re sid e n tia l e le ctio n s. O n e k e y q u e stio n o f
th e m id d le o f th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry lo o k ed in c e rta in M e x ic a n p o litics c o n cern s w h e th e r th e P R I has com e to
ways lik e th o se fo u n d in m an y o th e r L a tin A m e ric a n soci­ fu lly a ccep t p lu ra list d e m o c rac y o r if, u p o n r e ta k in g pow er,
eties at th e tim e . T he m o st obvious d ifference w as th a t it w ill a g a in a im to m o n o p o liz e it.

Regime and Political Institutions

M e x ico ’s p o litic a l sy stem is stro n g ly p re sid e n tia list, w h ic h leg isla tio n is p ro p o se d b y th e executive in M ex ico
th o u g h it has b e co m e less so in re c e n t years as m u ltip a rty h a s b e e n sig n ific a n t (C a m p 200 7 : 181-182). C a m p notes
c o m p e titio n has b eco m e a re a lity (C a m p 2 007: 181-183). tw o a d d itio n a l sources o f th e le g isla tu re ’s relative w eak­
I n th e y ears o f P R I d o m in a n c e th is w as h ig h lig h te d b y th e ness (2007: 187-188). F irs t, re p re se n tativ es c a n n o t be re ­
e x tra o rd in a ry p o w e r th a t th e p re sid e n t h a d b o th w ith in ele cte d im m e d ia te ly a f te r se rv in g a te rm . S eco n d , th e
th e in s titu tio n a l fra m e w o rk o f th e sta te and w ith in th e re se a rc h s ta ff o f th e le g isla tu re is sm a ll a n d p o o rly fu n d e d ,
p a rty . T he executive b ra n c h plays a c ritic a l role n o t ju s t in w h e rea s th e executive’s sta ff is ro b u st.
th e a d m in is tra tio n o f th e sta te b u t also in c o n ce iv in g a n d T he ju d ic ia l system has also suffered h isto rically from
p ro p o sin g leg isla tio n . In d e e d , h isto ric a lly , th e e x te n t to relative w eak n ess a n d lac k o f in d ep e n d en c e , th o u g h th is
502 Mexico

Regime and Political Institutions

Regime Federal republic, democratic (more fully so in recent years, especially since PAN victory in
2000 presidential election)

Administrative Divisions Thirty-one states as well as the Federal District of Mexico City

Executive Branch President

Selection of Executive President is elected by popular vote. Note that presidential selection has changed notably in
recent years (see case study box later in these country materials).

Legislative Branch Bicameral Congress

Lower chamber: Chamber of Deputies (Cdmara de Diputados)
Upper chamber: Senate (Senado)

Judicial Branch Supreme Court of Justice, composed of eleven justices (one the "president" of the supreme
court). Justices are nominated by the executive and approved by the legislature.

Political Party System Multiparty system, though for much of the twentieth century Mexican politics was
completely dominated by the PRI. The PAN broke this monopoly in 2000 but as of this
writing a PRI member again holds the presidency.

has ch an g e d so m ew h at in th e w ake o f reform s p assed in th e in 2 0 0 0 , th e re has b e en g re ater c om petitiveness in th e elec-

1990s (C am p 2007: 189-192). A fte r th e defeat o f th e P R I to ra l system .

Political Culture
M exico is a c o u n try w here scholars have focused a g o o d less d e m o cratic c u ltu ra l o rie n ta tio n th a n th e p o p u latio n s o f
deal o f a tte n tio n o n q uestions o f p o litica l c u ltu re. C lassic o th e r cou n tries. T his so rt o f a rg u m e n t has g e n era te d a
accounts o f th e “c u ltu re o f p o v e rty ” b y a n th ro p o lo g ists ro b u st d eb ate in th e social sciences a n d in policy debates
(L ew is 1961) a n d o f th e “civic c u ltu re ” b y p o litica l scientists ab o u t th e rela tio n sh ip b e tw e e n c u ltu re, poverty, a n d d e ­
(A lm o n d a n d V erba 1963) looked at M exico as a p ro m in e n t m o cracy m ore generally.
case. T hese accounts ten d e d to view M exico in negative L e t us focus o n th e p o litica l c u ltu re exam ple for a
term s, o r to tre a t its c u ltu re as problem atic o r as c o n trib u t­ m o m en t. T h a t A lm o n d a n d V erba’s d a ta show ed less d e m o ­
in g to perceived econom ic or political deficits. Thus L ew is cratic a ttitu d e s a n d o rien tatio n s (as th e y w ere defin in g
aim ed to explain m u ltig en e ratio n al p o v e rty in th e T epito th em ) is clear. T his is n o t th e source o f any controversy
n eig h b o rh o o d o f M exico C ity (th o u g h g e n era liz in g a bout am o n g social scientists. W h e re th e a rg u m e n t gets m ore
persons in p o v e rty m ore generally), a rg u in g th a t it w as com plex is w h e n causal claim s are m ad e ab o u t th e re la tio n ­
tra n s m itte d th ro u g h c u ltu ra l tra its like a u th o rita ria n ism , a ship b e tw e e n th ese values a n d p o litica l outcom es. A lm o n d
ten d en cy to w ard in te rp e rso n a l violence, m isogyny, and a n d V erba’s stu d y w as c o n d u cted a t th e h e ig h t o f th e P R I
p o o r e d u ca tio n (it is im p o rta n t to note here th a t L ew is w as p a r ty d o m in a n c e in M exico. Som e scholars w a n t to argue
n o t c la im in g th a t M ex ican s possessed th ese traits m ore t h a t p o litica l c u ltu re “tric k les up” a n d stru c tu re s in s titu ­
th a n o th e r p opulations). A lm o n d a n d V erba, in c o n trast, tio n s (In g le h a rt a n d W elze l 2005). O th e rs w a n t to argue
relied o n m ore representative surveys o f a sam ple o f th e t h a t p o litica l in stitu tio n s pro d u ce c u ltu res. So fro m one
M ex ican p o p u la tio n as th e y c o m p a red M e x ica n po litical p o in t o f view , M e x ica n a u th o rita ria n ism w as a resp o n se to
a ttitu d e s a n d o rien tatio n s to th o se held in o th e r cou n tries a m ore a u th o rita ria n p o litica l c u ltu re. F ro m a n o th e r p o in t
like E n g la n d , G erm an y , Italy, a n d th e U n ite d States. T heir o f view , th e observed c u ltu ra l ten d en cies in th a t p e rio d
g e n era l conclusion w as th a t th e M e x ica n p o p u la tio n h a d a w ere reasonable a d ap tatio n s to a n a u th o rita ria n political
 Profile 503

env iro n m en t. N o te th a t th is is a g e n era l debate in W h ile th is is a g o o d strategy, as is o ften th e case th e

com parative politics a n d th a t M ex ico is ju s t one p a rtic u ­ e m p irica l d a ta do n o t im m e d ia tely resolve th e conflict b e ­
larly in te re stin g case in th is c o n n ectio n . tw e e n th ese rival th eo ries, as th e re is evidence to su p p o rt
C a n you th in k o f w ays in w h ic h w e m ig h t b e able to b o th view s. I t is p re tty h a rd to e xplain th e M e x ica n tra n s i­
m ak e p ro g ress o n th is d e b ate r a th e r th a n h a v in g eac h side tio n w ith o u t focu sin g o n in te rn a l p a r ty dynam ics in th e
re p ea te d ly a sse rt its th e o re tic a l p o in t o f view ? O n e stra t­ P R I, o rg a n iz in g in th e P A N , a n d th e crises a n d econom ic
egy w o u ld be to focus o n M e x ic o ’s d e m o c ra tic tra n s itio n . dislo catio n s o f th e 1980s a n d 1990s th a t u n d e rc u t one o f
I f th e first th e o ry is r ig h t, it sh o u ld have b e e n d riv en th e P R I ’s m ain p illars o f legitim acy. O n th e o th e r h a n d ,
larg ely b y c u ltu ra l c h an g e . T h a t is, M e x ic a n p o litic a l c u l­ th e re is evidence (C am p 2 0 0 7 ) th a t M e x ica n p o litica l cul­
tu re sh o u ld have b e co m e m o re “d e m o c ra tic ,” w ith in s titu ­ tu re in th is p e rio d c h an g e d notab ly (sim ply sp e a k in g , b e ­
tio n a l c h an g e a n d fo rm a l d e m o c ra tiz a tio n fo llow ing. I f c o m in g m ore dem ocratic), in one a cco u n t “c onverging” a b it
th e second th e o ry is r ig h t, w e w o u ld e x p e c t e lite b a rg a in ­ w ith th e p o litica l c u ltu res o f C a n a d a a n d th e U n ite d States,
in g a n d in s titu tio n a l c h a n g e to com e first, w ith c u ltu ra l ju s t as M e x ica n econom ic c u ltu re n otably sh ifte d th ro u g h
ch an g es to follow , i f a t all. m o d e rn iz a tio n (B asanez 2006).

Political Economy
M exico is a n im p o rta n t e m e rg in g econom y, increasingly how ever. W h a t th is m eans is th a t m an y M ex ican s d o n o t
in te g rate d w ith th e b ro a d e r g lo b al econom y. Its econom ic have satisfactorily re m u n e rativ e jo b s, a n d a large p ercentage
h isto ry has b e en m ix ed , a lte rn a tin g b e tw e e n p e rio d s o f (aro u n d a q u a rte r o f th e lab o r force) w orks in th e in fo rm a l
g ro w th a n d crisis. A s d iscu ssed previously, it w as, in econom y. T h is is v ery c o m m o n in th e d eveloping w orld, a n d
econom ic as w ell as p o litica l term s, one o f S p a in ’s m o st it is w o rth k e ep in g in m in d because it im p acts th e e x te n t to
im p o rta n t colonial possessions. I n th e n in e te e n th century, w h ic h u n e m p lo y m en t rates in d eveloped a n d developing
p olitical in sta b ility caused econom ic problem s, since a p re ­ societies are co m parable m easures. M ex ico does con tin u e
dictable p o litica l a n d econ om ic e n v iro n m e n t is necessary to suffer fro m h ig h incom e in eq u ality . Its g in i coefficient
for investors a n d o th e r econom ic actors to act optim ally. In sta n d s a t 48.9 (W o rld B a n k 2013 estim ate). T his is som e­
th e later n in e te e n th century, m o d e rn econom ic in fra s tru c ­ w h a t w orse th a n th e g in i coefficient for th e U n ite d States,
tu re w as b u ilt d u rin g th e P o rfiriato , b u t th e social d isloca­ its e lf k n o w n as a c o u n try w ith relatively h ig h incom e
tio n s caused in p a r t b y th is process yielded late r instability. inequality.
T he M e x ica n R evolution u sh e red in a n o th e r p e rio d o f in ­ T he M e x ic a n sta te h a s h isto ric a lly p layed a n im p o rta n t
sta b ility w h ic h likely h e ld econom ic p erfo rm a n ce back, role in e co n o m ic m a n a g e m e n t. A s n o te d previously,
th o u g h it is arguable th a t th e fru its o f develo p m en t in sub­ d u rin g th e P o rfiria to th e sta te e n d eav o red to a ttra c t a n d
seq u en t years w ere so m e w h a t m ore e quitable as a re su lt o f p ro te c t c ap ital. Its role in th e eco n o m y g re w a fte r th e revo­
th is process. F inally, as in m u ch o f L a tin A m e ric a a n d th e lu tio n a n d u n d e r th e P R I (C a m p 2007: 45), p a rtic u la rly
re st o f th e developing w orld, M ex ico tu rn e d to im p o rt sub­ b e g in n in g in th e 1930s a n d 1940s. M e x ico p ra c tic e d sta te -
stitu tio n as its develo p m en t stra te g y in th e m id d le o f th e le d d e v elo p m en t, n a tio n a liz in g e n te rp rises lik e oil (creat­
tw e n tie th century. T his set o f policies coincided w ith fairly in g th e g ia n t P E M E X firm ) as w e ll as ra ilro a d s, e n g ag in g
con sisten t a n d stro n g econom ic g ro w th for several decades, in la n d re fo rm (w h ich g e n e ra lly te n d e d to w a rd th e d is tri­
th o u g h even a t th e e n d o f th is process M ex ico w as le ft w ith b u tio n o f re la tiv e ly sm a ll la n d h o ld in g s), a n d a d o p tin g a
h ig h in e q u a lity a n d notable poverty. stra te g y o f im p o rt- s u b s titu tin g in d u s tria liz a tio n , p ro te c t­
T oday’s M e x ica n econom y is d o m in a te d b y services (60 in g d o m estic in d u strie s. I t in v este d h e av ily in in fra s tru c ­
p e rce n t o f G D P ) a n d in d u stry (37 percent), w ith ag ric u l­ tu re as w ell. T his w as th e p e rio d o f th e “M e x ic a n m ira c le ”
tu re a cc o u n tin g for u n d e r 4 p e rc e n t o f G D P (2013 e sti­ (B a sa n ez 2 0 0 6 : 2 9 7 ) w h ic h p ro d u c e d ste ad y g ro w th , rela­
m ates, C I A W o rld F actbook). U n e m p lo y m e n t is a t least tiv ely lo w in fla tio n , a n d ra p id in d u stria liz a tio n . U n fo rtu ­
fo rm ally q u ite low a t p resen t, e stim a te d a t 4.9 p e rc e n t (2013 nately, M e x ico su ffered , a lo n g w ith th e re st o f L a tin
estim ate, C I A W o rld F actbook). A s th e C I A W o rld F act­ A m e ric a , fro m th e d e b t crisis o f th e 1980s, re la te d h e re to
b o o k notes, M exico has a h ig h ra te o f underemployment, th e d ra m a tic d e c lin e in oil rev en u es w h ic h , a lo n g w ith
504 Mexico

o th e r factors, e x acerb ated th e sta te ’s difficulties in p a y in g eco n o m y h a s also seen th e g ro w th o f ag rib u sin e ss in re ce n t
its d ebts. C o n se q u e n tly , th e c o u n try faced serious eco ­ years. M e x ico has com e to be m ore in te g ra te d w ith th e
nom ic difficu lties— in c lu d in g a n in cre ase in p o v e rty a n d g lo b al econom y, p a rtic u la rly th ro u g h N A F T A (w hich
th e ex p an sio n o f th e in fo rm a l e conom y— a n d M ex ico cam e in to effect in 1994) a im in g to b o lste r g ro w th th ro u g h
slow ly tu rn e d to w a rd re fo rm . M ex ico fo llow ed p re sc rip ­ in d u s tria l e x p o rts. T his stra te g y has p ro d u c e d g a in s,
tio n s to p riv atize a n u m b e r o f in d u strie s, in c lu d in g b a n k s th o u g h it h a s also le ft th e c o u n try v u ln e ra b le to g lo b al
th a t h a d u n d e rg o n e em erg en cy n a tio n a liz a tio n in 1982, eco n o m ic forces, in c lu d in g th e peso crisis o f 1994 a n d th e
th o u g h th e sta te c o n tin u e s to o w n P E M E X , C F E (a m ajor c o u n try ’s serious ex p o su re to th e g lo b al econom ic crisis
p o w er com pany), a n d o th e r e n te rp rises. T he M e x ica n b e g in n in g in 2 0 0 8 .

CASESTUDIES

The Mexican State and Rule of Law CHAPTER 3, PAGE 56

As discussed in chapter 3, one of the dis­ police, and the judicial system) to curb cannot or will not enforce the law in cer­
tinguishing features of modern states (in criminal activity. Some areas of Mexico, it tain areas, dramatically reducing the cost
addition to their relative autonomy, bureau­ is alleged, largely lie outside of the state's (in terms of risk) for illicit activity. Finally,
cratic mode of organization, and so forth) real jurisdiction. In some towns in parts of illicit groups must have the resources nec­
is that they have established the rule oflaw. the country, drug gangs essentially exer­ essary to seek their chosen ends, and
This means that, at least ideal-typically, a cise state-like functions, resolving disputes these resources can be both material and
fully functioning modern state (1) has and maintaining order of a certain sort. organizational. Material resources include
a legal-rational framework for resolving How could we explain the presence both guns, which in the case of Mexico
conflict; (2) enforces that framework trans­ and influence of powerful criminal organi­ are often trafficked from the United
parently; and (3) enforces it equally, rather zations that make a mockery of the state's States, where there is little gun control,
than privileging one or another set of 'monopoly on the legitimate use of and money, again from the United States,
actors based on network ties or some force"? Several basic factors are likely deci­ as it is estimated that cross-border drug
other sort of affiliation. sive. First, there must be gains to be made trade sends between $15 billion and $25
The Mexican state has done this at above those made in licit activity for an billion to Mexico each year (O'Neil 2009:
various times in its history with varying important segment of people. Otherwise, 70). Organizational resources include the
degrees of success. As Morner (1993: 6) there would be little incentive to engage ongoing existence of criminal gangs, as
notes, the state was relatively weak after in illicit activity. This would suggest that well as their established ties, via corrup­
independence and then grew in strength continued economic development would tion, to state actors.
during the Porfiriato, entering a period of help to reduce organized, nonstate vio­ Interestingly, a number of commenta­
weakness during the revolution and its lence (of course, organized nonstate vio­ tors have tied the escalation in Mexican
immediate aftermath before gaining ca­ lence makes economic development drug violence to reform. Some of this has
pacity again in the middle of the twenti­ more difficult to achieve). Second, the to do with the fact that the PRI historically
eth century. In very recent years there has risks must not be so high as to discourage sometimes worked with criminal net­
been a great deal of concern in Mexico a large number of criminals from partici­ works rather than aiming to squash them
and abroad, particularly in the United pating in illicit activity. In contemporary (O'Neil 2009:65). Moreover, at lower levels
States, about increasing levels of violence, Mexico, as in many parts of the develop­ of the organizational structure of the
drug trafficking, ongoing corruption, and ing world, the risks that state enforcement state, police corruption was common
the seeming inability or unwillingness of poses to criminals is relatively low be­ under the PRI (Davis 2006), and remains
components of the Mexican state (army, cause of high rates of impunity. The state so. Where and when the PAN came to
 Case Studies 505

Rule of Law CHAPTER 3, PAGE 56

hold office, linkages between the PRI and Mexico rose dramatically in response to since reform and democratization have
drug traffickers were broken, producing changing patterns of U.S. enforcement been so closely linked). Indeed, the rise in
non-institutional (and thus often violent) (O'Neil 2009:66; Davis 2006:62). Of course, crime witnessed in Latin America from
responses (O'Neil 2009: 65). In essence, this necessarily bolstered the position of the 1980s on does roughly mirror the pat­
whereas the PRI had allowed the contin­ Mexican illicit organizations. Thus at the tern of regional democratization. Could it
ued existence of illicit organizations but same time, Mexican criminal organiza­ be, as some authors have asked, that de­
had co-opted them and used them for tions had greater profits, more autonomy, mocratization and rule of law don't always
their purposes, after the emergence of and a reason to become more indepen­ go hand in hand? Others (Magaloni and
democratic pluralism, these organizations dent. Then the Mexican government at­ Zepeda 2004) have looked at economic
faced higher risks and thus sought new tempted to stamp them out. At this point data, though, and argued that while de­
techniques to maintain and protect their the organizations had little choice but to mocratization seems the culprit, its near
autonomy and interests. Exogenous fac­ fight back. simultaneity with rising crime is largely
tors were important as well, including U.S. It is worth noting that some of the coincidental, and that the most important
efforts to restrict the flow of trafficking in same commentators have seen link­ variables associated with rising crime are
the Caribbean region. If the costs of one ages between Mexican democratization income inequality and economic difficul­
path get too high, traffickers will look for (O'Neil 2009; Davis 2006) and rising crime ties. This is an ongoing debate in the field.
another path, and trafficking through in Mexico (this is perhaps not surprising

Urn
m CASE STUDY
Mexico's "Perfect Dictatorship" and Its End CHAPTER 7, PAGE 154

In Mexico in 2000, a remarkable thing hap­ the successful incorporation of many di­ events. In particular, the government's le­
pened to the Partido Revolucionario Institu­ verse interest groups into the party's gov­ gitimacy suffered when it presided over
tional (the PRI): It lost. The PRI ruled Mexico erning structure; we note this later, in the major economic turmoil in 1982. In that
from 1929 to 2000, a period of seventy-one box on chapter 11, where we discuss cor­ year, Mexico hit a debt crisis that left it
years that equaled the amount of time the poratism under the PRI. In addition, PRI unable to pay back foreign debt, and this
Communist Party ruled the former Soviet rule included many "sticks," though op­ signaled the end of the "Mexican Miracle”
Union. Throughout that time, the PRI held pression was not constant and not always of growth that it had achieved for several
elections, and it routinely won them. The overt. The most dramatic event came in decades. During the 1980s, support from
party's dominance was so complete that a 1968, when the government cracked peasants and labor unions began to shift
leading Latin American intellectual, the Pe­ down on student protesters in a plaza in to opposition parties, including the PRD
ruvian Nobel Prize-winning novelist Mario Mexico City in what came to be known as and the PAN. Around this time, opposition
Vargas Llosa, called Mexico "The Perfect the Night of Tlatelolco (Krauze 1997: 717— parties first built their political base by
Dictatorship.” How did the PRI dominate for 726). Official figures at the time were that winning elections in Mexico's states and
so long, and conversely, why did this finally four people were killed, but other esti­ cities, with numerous governors being
come to an end? mates were much higher, ranging as high elected from other parties from 1989
The PRI's electoral invincibility was as 3,000. through the 1990s. As this happened, it
built on several pillars, and including both The PRI's eventual decline was accel­ became costlier and more difficult for the
"carrots" and "sticks."The “carrots" included erated by a range of factors and by several PRI to rig a national election just as the
 5
506 Mexico

Mexico's "Perfect Dictatorship" and Its End CHAPTER 7, PAGE 154

economic crisis depleted the govern­ than-subtle tactics to win the 1988 presi­ ballots from this 1988 election were later
ment's resources (Levy and Bruhn 2006). dential election. In that year, the party- burned, but the result contributed fur­
Even less political events seemed to con­ controlled electoral council infamously ther to the collapsing legitimacy of the
tribute further to the PRI's decline. A major announced that all of its computers party.
earthquake in Mexico City in 1985 was tragically crashed just when it appeared The PRI managed to hold on for one
handled with incompetence by the gov­ the popular opposition candidate Cu­ more election in 1994, but lost the presi­
ernment, yet other non-governmental auhtemoc Cardenas of the PRD party dency at last in 2000 (for more detail on
organizations responded effectively, (and son of PRI founder Lazaro Cardenas) the transition, see the essays in Middle-
which undermined the PRI's claim that it would win the presidential election. brook 2004). It returned to power with
alone was capable of addressing public When the computers turned back on, PRI the 2012 election of Enrique Pena Nieto,
needs (Haber 2006:74-76). nominee Carlos Salinas de Gortari mirac­ but many observers would argue that it
The declining legitimacy of the PRI ulously found himself with an insur­ will not (and perhaps does not aim to) re­
came to a head when it used less- mountable lead over Cardenas. The cover its traditional form of dominance.

The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico c h a p t e r 11, page 26 /

As noted previously, Mexico was once yet Mexico's corporatism developed a pro-business state investment (Levy and
called "The Perfect Dictatorship." Part of symbiotic relationship for the interest Bruhn 2006:84). In return for this set of poli­
the reason for this name was the ability of groups and the governing party. The labor cies that favored the broad array of interest
Mexico's PRI party to bring major interest movement was represented mainly by the groups, Mexico's unions and business lead­
groups under its banner. This included Confederation of Mexican Workers (CTM), ers were expected to turn out the vote for
labor, business, the state bureaucracy, as which received state sponsorship and the PRI. This state corporatism worked in
well as the peasantry. At the same time, the whose leadership maintained close rela­ different ways in other countries in Latin
PRI successfully marginalized from politics tions with the political leadership of the America, as well as in Europe, due to the
the military and the church, two other PRI. A similar relationship emerged be­ long-standing dominant party system.
major forces in Latin America that could tween the PRI and the National Peasant However, the PRI eventually lost its
threaten the basis for rule (Stevens 1977: Confederation (CNC). In the cases of labor control in Mexico. Some of these reasons
253). The broad-based form of corporatism and peasant groups alike, organizations were highlighted in the chapter 7 case
that took in Mexico's major institutions that joined the government-sponsored study, but an important component of
made it very difficult for competitors to confederation received particular eco­ the end of the dominant party system
defeat the PRI, and the party governed un­ nomic benefits (such as wages or subsi­ was the decline of the PRI's corporatist
interrupted from the 1930s to 2000. dies) that unaffiliated groups did not (see strategy. Over time, pressures on the PRI
The PRI in Mexico managed the repre­ Levy and Bruhn 2006: 73-83). Meanwhile, increased, partly due to faltering eco­
sentation of different interest groups by business groups were more formally inde­ nomic performance, especially after the
incorporating these various forces into pendent from the PRI, but they received debt crisis of the early 1980s. When the
the dominant party's decision-making considerable support from the party in the PRI lost its ability to command support
structures. Under most circumstances, it form of policies and preferential treatment, from peasants, laborers, and business, it
would be challenging for a single party to such as subsidies, tax breaks, loans, pro­ lost not just voters but also the institu­
be the party of both labor and business, tections from foreign competition, and tional underpinnings of its rule.
 Case Studies 507

CASE STUDY (continued)

The PRI and Corporatism in Mexico CHAPTER 11, PAGE 267

Key moments in Mexico's political 1982 and based in part on the discovery economic model emphasizing markets
economy came in the 1970s, when busi­ of new oil reserves. Increased govern­ and free trade. This in turn alienated the
ness groups grew disenchanted with ment spending and indebtedness re­ other part of the PRI's political base—
the increasingly populist strategies em­ sulted in a debt crisis in 1982, during labor and peasants— and signaled the
ployed by presidents Luis Echevarria and which Mexico devalued the peso and beginning of the end of the party's tradi­
Jose Lopez Portillo from the 1970s to moved much more toward a neoliberal tional form of dominance.

Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity

in Mexico CHAPTER 13, PAGE 309

As you saw in chapter 13, one major referring to Mexico in several passages as Mexican industrialization does not get
theory of nationalism holds that it is a "La nation." (The Plan de Iguala is available underway in any meaningful sense until
product of industrial capitalism. Recall online via Rice University.) In short, there is the Porfiriato, it is essentially impossible
that this theory is functionalist in that it no doubt that nationalism was present in to argue that industrial capitalism pre­
takes nationalism and national identity to the country during the independence cedes and therefore causes the spread
emerge because industrial capitalism struggles and even a few years before. of national identity in this case. Some
needs it, or at least needs some functional This does not mean, by any stretch, might argue that an agriculture- and
equivalent, to do so. The idea here is that that national identity had established "he­ mining-based commercial capitalism
nationalism's emphasis on equality and gemony" in Mexico in this period. In other was tied to the development of national­
the importance of vernacular language, as words, it does not follow from the fact ism in Mexico, but this is a different argu­
well as the inherent similarity and frater­ that official documents used national lan­ ment and would require considerable
nity between co-nationals from different guage (1) that all Mexicans thought of evidence.
localities, helps to break down barriers to themselves as members of the nation or Does this mean that we should throw
geographic and social mobility, and that (2) that those who did all had the same out arguments about industrial capitalism
an industrial economy with its urbaniza­ idea of the nation (Anna 1998). Some causing national identity to emerge or that
tion, shift to wage labor, and so forth elites in the early independence years this case refutes them categorically? Not
cannot function if cultural barriers pre­ likely continued to try to hold on to the necessarily. First of all, Mexico may turn out
vent it. This argument, as noted in the sort of identity that had predominated in to be exceptional in this regard, and a
chapter, is plausible. the colonial period. Many subaltern per­ scholar cannot know until he/she exam­
However, when applied to the em­ sons likely thought of themselves in terms ines other cases. In other words, maybe
pirical case of Mexico it becomes diffi­ of predominantly local identities, though industrial capitalism giving rise to national­
cult to sustain. Mexico begins to see at careful research by historians has shown ism as seen in Ernest Gellner's theory is a
least some of its residents acquiring that some subaltern actors did quickly common path but not the only possible
national consciousness in the years after begin to make use of national identities to one. Second, even if industrial capitalism
and around 1810. Even the Plan of Iguala make political claims on elites in Latin did not cause national identity's emer­
(1821), in many ways a conservative docu­ America once these became available gence, it still played an important role in
ment, uses the language of nationalism, (Mallon 1995). In any case, given that the story of nationalism in Mexico. It's just
508 Mexico

CASE STUDY (continued)

# Industrialization, Modernity, and National Identity
CHAPTER 13, PAGE 309

that its main role in this connection comes industrial order (given that urban workers, both industrial workers and peasants. Pro­
later, when nationalism is an important along with agricultural workers, are among ponents of this industrial-capitalism-cen­
ideology in the twentieth century, for ex­ the most important corporate groups). tered theory of national identity might be
ample, during the administration of Lazaro Indeed, populist politicians like Cardenas able to reconstruct a more modest version
Cardenas. Nationalism is closely linked to (and like Gaitan in Colombia, and, more re­ of the theory by focusing on this later junc­
Cardenas's populist rhetoric and his corpo­ cently, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, at least ture. However, in doing so they will be fo­
ratist mode of interest mediation (see the until 2005) used nationalism rather than cusing on something causally downstream
preceding case study discussion), which orthodox Marxism as the language from the actual emergence of Mexican
itself is closely linked to the emergent through which they aimed to mobilize nationalism.

W hy Aren't There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico? CHAPTER 14, PAGE 340

Mexico had a complex indigenous popu­ characteristic X had been present in Mexi­ facilitate some freedom in self-identifica­
lation— indeed, one of the great human can society, ethnic parties would have tion. In addition to the fact that the cul­
civilizations— prior to European contact. developed.” tural boundary between the categories
In subsequent years people of European What sorts of features might have en­ "indigenous" and "mestizo” is permeable
descent have on average fared better in couraged the formation of ethnicity- (as is, to a more limited extent, the bound­
Mexico than persons of indigenous de­ based parties in Mexico? Among others, ary between "mestizo" and "white"), the
scent, even though the majority of the we might expect (1) salient and imperme­ very predominance of mestizos in the so­
Mexican population is of mestizo back­ able boundaries between ethnic groups; ciety undercuts the likelihood of a party
ground and the next largest group is of (2) the lack of other frameworks for mobi­ linked to mestizo or indigenous identity.
predominantly Amerindian ancestry. lization of the subaltern population; and Moreover, other frameworks— frame­
Given the country's history of inequality (3) the opening of political space within works that preclude mobilization around
and ethnic discrimination, why have in­ which such parties could form and have specific ethnic identities— have been sa­
digenous groups not organized via ethnic some prospect of electoral success (since, lient in Mexican political history. Mexican
political parties in Mexico? from certain points of view, party organi­ national identity, at least since the early
This sort of question cannot be an­ zation is irrational if it cannot lead to in­ twentieth century, has been marked by
swered definitively, because it is asking, in creasing a group's power). the idea of ethnic mixing, most notably in
essence, about a counter-factual. In other Historically, in Mexico, these condi­ Jose Vasconcelos's ([1925] 1997) famous
words, logically, the question is indistin­ tions tended not to apply. While in­ idea of the "cosmic race," produced by the
guishable from the question "What would equality has been a pervasive feature of mixing of persons of African, indigenous,
have caused ethnic political parties to Mexican society and while ethnicity and European descent. Mexican immi­
have formed in Mexico?" The best way has been a major dimension of inequality, grants in the United States will sometimes
to provisionally answer such a question is the boundaries between ethnic groups use the word "raza" to refer to their iden­
to generate potential causes that plau­ have historically been fluid (Camp tity as Mexican or Chicano/a. In addition
sibly would have increased the probabil­ 2007: 26). The majority of the country, as to this sort of national frame, Mexico's
ity of the formation of such parties, but noted before, is of mestizo background revolutionary tradition tended to frame
there is clearly no formula such that "if (Krauze 1997; Camp 2007:81), which could dissent in relation to class. Thus Zapata's
 Case Studies 509

CASE STUDY (continued)

____ W hy Aren't There Major Ethnic Parties in Mexico? CHAPTER 14, PAGE 340

insurgency during the Revolution, which which conditions likely did not favor in numerous ways (Flernandez Navarro
included many mestizo and indigenous ethnic mobilization as the basis for party and Carlsen 2004), and it is always pos­
actors, largely privileged a peasant or affiliation. This should be obvious with sible that more influential ethnic parties
rural laborer identity rather than an indig­ respect to the PRI. The other two major will emerge in the future. Factors that
enous identity as such. Further, the cor­ parties (the PRO, a leftist party composed might contribute to this possibility could
poratist mode of interest mediation of a splinter group formerly of the PRI and include the much-documented role of
developed under the PRI (particularly a coalition of communists and socialists, international NGOs in helping to orga­
under Cardenas), likely cut against ethnic and PAN, which is a center-right party nize ethnicity-based political mobilization,
affiliation, because it again organized with affinities for Christian Democratic the modeling effects of such organization
people in relation to their economic ac­ parties) did not concentrate supporters in other parts of Latin America in recent
tivity rather than their ethnic status. Fi­ of a particular ethnic group at their years, and the ongoing effects of political
nally, major political ideologies like founding or in subsequent history. The opening and democratic consolidation in
Marxism and liberalism tend to oppose political closure characteristic of Mexico Mexico. One might expect this sort of
ethnic mobilization: To the extent that during the years of the PRI's dominance outcome to be more likely in areas like
these were historically operative in also did little to increase the likelihood of Chiapas, where a larger portion of the
Mexico, they likely mitigated any poten­ the establishment of ethnicity-based po­ population is indigenous; where historical
tial for ethnic mobilization via political litical parties. discrimination, inequality, and poverty
parties. Does this all mean that ethnicity is un­ have been especially high; and where the
Finally, Mexican parties were estab­ important in Mexican politics? Not at all. EZLN ("Zapatista") insurgency has been
lished at certain critical junctures in Indigenous communities have mobilized based.

Research Prompts
1. The "Mexican Miracle" was achieved, in part, through policies of 3. Do a little outside research to compare the development of na­
import substitution. In more recent years, the country has taken tional identity in Mexico to other cases (good choices for com­
a more market-friendly approach. What would our theories of parison might be Argentina, Chile, Colombia, and Venezuela).
development from Chapters 4 and 5 say about this sequence? What, if anything, is distinctive about the Mexican case?
2. Think about the years of the PRI's dominance in Mexico. The 4. In the preceding case study on "Why Aren't There Major Ethnic
regime was clearly authoritarian, but it had some democratic Parties in Mexico?” you learned that Mexico's political parties
elements. Flow would you classify it in terms of the ideas of de­ have not been organized predominantly along the lines of eth­
mocracy and authoritarianism discussed in chapters 6 and 7? As nicity. Do some research and find a Latin American case where
you conduct research, what do you find other scholars saying ethnicity has been a key basis of political organizing. What ac­
about this issue? counts for the difference?
D Nigeria
PROFILE Introduction
Nigeria is the largest country in Africa and
Key Features of Contemporary Nigeria has been subject to enduring interest among
political scientists for several reasons. Of
Population: 177,155,754 (estimate, July 2014)
these, the two most important are that (1) it
Area: 923,768 square kilometers is a prominent example of the perils of oil
dependence (Karl 1997) and (2) it has been
Head of State: Muhammadu Buhari (president,
the site of considerable inter-ethnic conflict.
2015-present)
Indeed, these issues, discussed herein, are
Head of Government: Muhammadu Buhari (president, not unrelated. Also related are the relative
2015-present) weakness of Nigerian institutions, develop­
Capital: Abuja
ment problems the society has faced, and the
lessons that Nigeria might offer about how
Year of Independence: 1960 political modernization can take place in a
Year of Current Constitution: 1999
post-colonial society.
Yet Nigeria is much more than this. A
Languages: English (official), Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, country of great cultural diversity, Nigeria
many others
has provided the world with Nobel laureates
GDP per Capita: $3,006 (World Bank estimate, 2013) and other artists, writers, and musicians. It
is the largest society in Africa, and many be­
Human Development Index 152nd (low human development)
lieve that if it can overcome its history of
Ranking (2014):
underdevelopment and ethnic conflict, it
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Developmen t Report 2014.
would have great potential. Indeed, though
there are many concerns, the country has
been democratic for well over a decade, a
source of considerable optimism.

I Hausa and Fulani 29%

Yoruba 2 1%

Igbo/Ibo 18%

H Ijaw 10%
Islam 50%
I Kanuri 4%
Christianity 40%
I Ibibio 3.5%
Animism/traditional beliefs I
I T iv 2.5%

Unspecified/other 12%

Ethnic Groups in Nigeria Religious Affiliation in Nigeria (estimates)

Note that the Nigerian population includes hundreds o fethnic Source: CIA World Factbook.
groups, but these are the most numerous.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
Profile 511

100 A 200 Miles

"N
 H BBBM

512 Nigeria

N igeria’s diversity encom passes b o th religious a n d e th n ic term s, th e so ciety is diverse as w ell, w ith ab o u t h a lf th e
difference. In term s o f e th n ic ity , th e re are m an y groups, p o p u la tio n p ra ctic in g Islam , a bout 4 0 p e rce n t a d h e rin g to
th o u g h th e m o st p ro m in e n t are th e H a u sa a n d F u la n i in th e C h ris tia n ity , a n d th e re m a in d e r m o stly p r a c tic in g tr a d i­
n o rth a n d th e Y oruba a n d th e Igbo in th e south. In religious tio n a l A fric a n religions.

Historical Development
Before B ritish co lonial ru le, N ig e ria h a d a v a rie ty o f differ­ k n o w n as in d ire c t ru le (Falola a n d H e a to n 200 8 : 110-116;
e n t in d ig e n o u s state stru c tu re s (F alola a n d H e a to n 2008). L an g e 2 0 0 9 ; D o rw a rd 1986: 4 0 2 -4 0 4 ), because th e B ritish
I n n o rth e rn N ig e ria , w here Isla m h a d m ad e its w ay from d id n o t send large n u m b ers o f forces to occupy N ig e ria , b u t
A rabia centuries earlier, there were relatively w ell-established ra th e r so u g h t to e x ert a u th o rity b y u sin g in d ig e n o u s leaders
states. A m o n g th e large p o p u latio n o f th e H a u sa -F u la n i as in te rm ed iarie s w ith local pop u latio n s; in a perversion o f
e th n ic g ro u p s— w h ic h to d ay are th e la rg e st e th n ic g ro u p in in d ig e n o u s A fric a n form s o f ru le, th is o ften involved th e
N ig eria— th ere w ere ra th e r larg e a n d m ilita rily capable a p p o in tm e n t o f v illage chiefs a n d o th e r c u sto m a ry leaders
u n its . In th e s o u th , w h e re th e Y o ru b a a n d Ig b o p e o p le s by th e B ritish a d m in istra tiv e auth o rities. T he system served
p re d o m in a te in th e so u th w e st a n d so u th e ast, respectively, th e in te rests o f th e colonizers, b u t it set th e tone fo r a long
people g enerally lived in sm aller p o litica l gro u p s such as ru n o f u n a cc o u n ta b le g o v e rn m e n t across m u ch o f A fric a
villages or clusters o f villages. (cf. M a m d a n i 1996). By th e tim e o f th e F irs t W o rld W ar,
In te ra c tio n w ith E u ro p e a n d th e global econom y to o k th e C o m m issio n e r F re d e ric k L u g a rd h a d estab lish ed a
shape th ro u g h early explorations b y E u ro p e a n s a n d th e es­ fo rm o f in d ire c t ru le over nearly all o f p re sen t-d a y N igeria.
ta b lish m e n t o f th e slave trad e alo n g th e coast o f W e s t H e u n ifie d th e n o rth e rn a n d so u th e rn colonies in to a single
A frica , in clu d in g N ig eria. T he P o rtu g u e se w ere th e first to p o litica l u n it, w h ic h fo rm ed th e basis for to d a y ’s n a tio n ­
establish a tra d in g p o st in th e late 1400s, a n d several o th e r state, w ith its large size a n d its conflicts b e tw e e n regions.
countries w ere later involved along th e N ig e ria n coast. A fte r A s W o rld W a r II cam e to a n end, th e E u ro p e a n p ow ers
e stab lish in g a u th o rity th ro u g h a co m b in a tio n o f m ilita ry h a d in c re a s in g d iffic u lty ju s tif y in g th e i r c o lo n iz a tio n in
in tim id a tio n a n d b a rg a in in g w ith local g ro u p s, E u ro p e a n m o ra l, e co n o m ic , o r p o litic a l te rm s. N a tio n a lis ts g a in e d
p o w e rs e s ta b lish e d a tra d e in w h ic h slaves w e re ta k e n to in p ro m in e n c e in m o st o f th e c o lo n ie s (see d isc u ssio n in
th e A m ericas. W illia m s 1984 a n d Falola a n d H e a to n 200 8 : 13 6 -1 5 7 ),
T he B ritis h u ltim a te ly b e c a m e th e p rin c ip a l force in em p o w ered in p a rt b y th e ir lea rn in g s in E u ro p e a n d th e
N ig eria w h e n in th e 1800s th e E u ro p e a n pow ers u n d e rto o k in creasin g re co g n itio n o f th e c o n trib u tio n s A frica n s h a d
w h a t cam e to be k n o w n as th e “S cram ble for A frica .” T he m ad e in th e w ar. O n e o f N ig e ria ’s le a d in g n a tio n a lists w as
scram ble w as largely a lan d grab a n d a g eo p o litical co n test N n a m d i A z ik iw e, w hose w ritin g s first becam e k n o w n in
b e tw e e n G re a t B rita in , F ra n c e , P o rtu g a l, a n d B e lg iu m , th e 1930s. By th e 1950s, it w as clear th a t co lonialism in
w h o sta k ed th e ir claim s to d o m in a te m o st o f th e te rrito ry A fric a w as o n its la s t legs.
on th e c o n tin e n t; G e rm a n y c la im e d several te rrito rie s as N ig e ria achieved in d ep e n d en c e fro m G re a t B rita in in
w ell, a n d S p ain played a lesser role, w ith Italy sta k in g 1960, alongside m an y n e ig h b o rin g c o u n tries w h o achieved
claim s o nly in th e early tw e n tie th century. T hese pow ers in d ep e n d en c e from F rance th a t sam e year. I t re m a in e d a
m e t a t th e B erlin C o n feren ce in 1 8 8 4 -1 8 8 5 a n d d iv id ed th e d o m in io n o f th e U n ite d K in g d o m u n til 1963, m e a n in g it
c o n tin e n t in to colonial states. M a n y o f th e B ritish colonies re m a in e d p a r t o f th e B ritish C o m m o n w e a lth a n d n o m i­
w ere in so u th e rn a n d e aste rn A frica , b u t N ig e ria w as th e n a lly considered th e B ritish m o n arc h as a cerem o n ial head
la rg e st a n d m o st im p o rta n t colony in w e ste rn A frica. o f state w h ile re ta in in g p o litica l in d ep e n d en c e a n d self-
O v e r th e course o f th e late n in e te e n th a n d early tw e n ti­ ru le. T he first p o st-in d ep e n d en c e g o v e rn m e n t follow ed a
e th c en tu rie s, B rita in increased th e e x te n t a n d d e p th o f its B ritish -sty le p a rlia m e n ta ry system , b u t N ig e ria becam e a
co lo n izatio n o f N ig e ria , slow ly a sse rtin g a u th o rity over th e fed eral republic in 1963, w ith th e a fo re m en tio n ed N n a m d i
vast lan d . T his h a p p e n e d th ro u g h a c o m b in a tio n o f m ilita ry A z ik iw e as presid en t. T he p rin cip le o f federalism w as in sti­
subjugation a n d n e g o tia tio n w ith N ig e ria n leaders w illin g tu te d , a n d th e g o v e rn in g system d iv id e d pow er b e tw ee n
to collaborate w ith th e B ritish . T he system cam e to be th e th re e regions o f N ig eria: th e N o r th e rn re g io n , a n d th e
 ■ B K |g H j

Profile 513

Historical Development
Tim elin e
1500s-1800s Period of slave trade along the coast of West Africa, 1995 Abacha regime executes political activist and
including Nigeria; slaves are taken to the Americas. author Ken Saro-Wiwa.
1800s- Period of initial establishment of British colonies in 1998 Abacha dies suddenly in office, followed soon after
present-day Nigeria; Sokoto Caliphate governs by the sudden and suspicious death of civilian rival
many of the Hausa-Fulani groups in the north; Moshood Abiola.
smaller groups govern among Yoruba, Igbo, other 1999 Nigeria returns to civilian rule under former general
groups in the south. Olusegun Obasanjo.
1850S-1900 Increasing colonization of Nigeria by Great Britain 2003 Obasanjo is reelected for a second term.
1900-1919 Era of Lord Frederick Lugard, British administrator 2007 Umaru Yar'Adua is elected president but is in grave
who establishes indirect rule using traditional health for most of his presidency.
authorities as intermediaries, and unifies colonies 2008-2011 Tensions worsen between northern Muslims and
of Nigeria southern Christians.
1960 independence from Great Britain 2010 As many as one thousand people are killed in
1966 Military coup overthrows civilian government. clashes between Christians and Muslims in the city
1966-1975 Presidency of military leader Yakubu Gowon of Jos and elsewhere in central Nigeria.
1967-1970 Biafra War 2010 Yar'Adua dies of natural causes; Vice President
1976 Assassination of military leader Murtala Goodluck Jonathan becomes president.
Mohammed (president, 1975-1976) 2011 Goodluck Jonathan is elected to full presidential
1979 Military leader Olusegun Obasanjo (1976-1979) term.
turns power over to civilian Shehu Shagari. 2011-2015 Increased terrorist activity by Islamist extremist
1983 Military takes control again under group Boko Haram, including deadly bombing
Gen. Muhammadu Buhari. of a UN compound in Abuja, kidnapping of
1985-1993 Presidency of military leader Ibrahim Babangida; schoolgirls, and massacres in several towns across
human rights abuses worsen. northern Nigeria.
1993 Military holds elections, but annuls them after 2015 Muhammadu Buhari, a former military dictator, is
apparent victory of businessman Moshood Abiola. elected president, defeating incumbent Goodluck
1993-1998 Presidency of Gen. Sani Abacha; corruption and Jonathan.
human rights abuses reach their worst levels, with
regular torture and execution of dissidents.

W e s te rn a n d E a s te rn regions in th e so u th e rn h a lf o f th e In 1967, th e N ig e ria n C ivil W a r (also k n o w n as th e B iafra

country. W ar) b ro k e o u t, p ittin g th e E a s te rn re g io n a n d its Ig b o
E th n ic a n d re g io n a l tensions em erg ed early on, as th e m ajo rity again st th e federal g o v e rn m e n t (Falola a n d H e a to n
po pulous n o rth cam e to d o m in a te th e p a rlia m e n t in vote 2008: 175-180). T he conflict w as over autonom y, w ith the
split a lm o st p u re ly alo n g re g io n a l a n d e th n ic lin es, a n d th is Ig b o seeking to establish th e in d ep e n d en t state o f B iafra, but
resu lted in a coup b y elem ents o f th e m ilita ry fro m th e Ig b o th e h o stility w as lubricated b y oil. M u c h o f N igeria’s oil is
e th n ic ity in th e E a s te rn region. T he coup cam e to be k n o w n fo und in th e sou th east, a n d th e Ig b o in th e region argued
as th e “Ig b o coup.” T his c h a ra c te riz a tio n h as b e e n d isp u ted , th a t m ore o f th e resource should be tu rn e d in to local devel­
b u t th e n am e stu c k a n d sig n aled th e in cre asin g a lie n a tio n o p m e n t, r a th e r t h a n b e in g r e d is trib u te d to o th e r p a rts o f
o f th e Ig b o fro m th e n o rth e rn H a u sa -F u la n i as w ell as th e N ig e ria . T h e fe d e ra l g o v e rn m e n t, m e a n w h ile , w a n te d to
w estern Yoruba. T hough the eventual m ilitary leader chosen re ta in th e u n io n b u t also th e resources th a t oil guaranteed.
as presid en t, Y akubu G o w o n , w as fro m c en tra l N ig e ria a n d A fte r th re e years o f bloody conflict in w h ic h over one m illio n
w as seen as a com prom ise selection, th e tensions b e tw ee n people died— m ostly o n th e Ig b o side— th e federal g overn­
Igbos a n d o th e r groups w orsened. m en t w o n th e w ar, a n d N ig eria rem ain ed a single country.
514 Nigeria

T he 1970s saw a n o th e r succession o f m ilita ry rulers, cra fte d a c ro ss-e th n ic coalition. O b a sa n jo re m a in e d rela­
w ith p ow er passing to p residents M u rta la M o h a m m e d (a tively p o p u la r in N ig e ria ’s c h allen g in g p o litica l e n v iro n ­
n o rth ern e r), w h o w as assassinated, a n d th e n O lu se g u n m e n t a n d w as reelected fo r a second te rm in 2 0 0 3 . H e th e n
O b asan jo (a so u th w e ste rn Y oruba). O b a sa n jo u ltim ate ly ceded p o w er in 2 0 0 7 to a n o th e r P D P p resid en t, th e M u slim
p roposed free elections a n d th e e stab lish m en t o f a n ew re­ n o rth e rn e r U m a ru Y ar’A d u a . Y ar’A d u a w as ill for m o st o f
public, a n d tu rn e d p o w er over to civilian leader S hehu h is presidency, a n d a u th o rity w as largely exercised b y Vice
S h ag ari, a n o rth e rn M u slim . S h ag ari a n d th e republic d id P re sid e n t G o o d lu c k J o n a th a n a fte r 2009. In 2 010, Y ar’A d u a
n o t see o u t th e ir term , how ever, as th e m ilita ry seized con­ d ied a n d J o n a th a n becam e presid en t; he late r w o n a fu ll
tro l a g ain u n d e r G e n e ra l M u h a m m a d u B u h a ri, c itin g ex­ te rm o f office r u n n in g as an in c u m b e n t in 2011.
tensive c o rru p tio n a n d frau d u n d e r S hagari. M ilita ry ru le O n e political challenge th a t em erged is th e fact th a t Jo n ­
c o n tin u e d u n d e r P re sid e n t Ib ra h im B ab an g id a, w h o ru led a th a n is a southerner. T his has led som e n o rth ern ers to object
from 1985 to 1993, b u t g o v e rn in g c o n d itio n s d id n o t im ­ th a t th e so u th h a d tw o tu rn s at having recent presidents,
prove. I n p a rticu la r, c o rru p tio n c o n tin u e d u n a b ated despite w ith O basanjo a n d Jo n a th an , w h ile th e n o rth h a d only one
th e im p riso n m e n t o f several h ig h -ra n k in g officials a n d th e president in Y ar’A d u a, and th a t for less th a n one term . T his is
execution o f vio len t c rim in als. W h ile B a b an g id a w as in i­ seen b y som e as b re ak in g a n u n w ritte n rule th a t pow er
tia lly po p u lar, he cam e u n d e r pressure to re d em o cra tiz e as should be system atically altern ated b etw een n o rth a n d south
a wave o f dem ocracy sw ep t across A fric a in th e early 1990s. to ensure stability. In th is tense issue, it should b e n o ted th a t
T he m ilita ry held elections in 1993, b u t w h e n p ro m in e n t Jo n a th a n is a m em b er o f th e Ijaw e th n ic group, and n o t o f th e
businessm an C h ie f M o sh o o d A biola looked to b e th e victor, m ore num erous Y oruba or Ig b o groups.
th e m ilita ry ann u lled th e results. T his paved th e w ay for th e E th n ic a n d re g io n a l tensions have com e to th e fore
presidency o f m ilita ry G e n era l Sani A b a ch a (for a n overview ag ain in re ce n t years in N ig e ria w ith a strin g o f clashes b e ­
o f this period, see Falola and H e a to n 2008: 2 2 9 -2 3 4 ), w ho tw e e n C h ristia n s a n d M u slim s a n d w ith th e em ergence o f
earned th e dubious d istin c tio n o f bein g th e w orst d ictato r in Isla m ist fu n d a m e n ta lis t groups. M u c h o f th e violence has
N igeria’s le ss-th an -p ro u d histo ry o f c o rru p t a n d a u th o ritar­ o c cu rre d alo n g th e c en tra l b e lt o f N ig e ria , alo n g th e fault
ian presidents. C o rru p tio n a n d h u m a n rights abuses reached lin e b e tw e e n th e M u s lim -d o m in a te d n o rth a n d th e C h ris ­
th e ir w orst levels u n d e r A bacha. The regim e stood accused o f tia n -d o m in a te d so u th . In c en tra l states such as P la te a u a n d
e ngaging in to rtu re on a re g u la r basis. I t also executed dissi­ B auchi, m ore th a n one th o u sa n d people w ere k ille d
dents, m o st notably th e a u th o r K en S aro-W iw a a n d his col­ in clashes in 2010. T he city o f Jos, cap ital o f P la te a u State,
leagues, w h o h a d b ecom e p ro m in e n t p olitical activists o f the has b e e n th e b ig g est flash -p o in t, b u t k illin g s have h a p ­
M o v em en t for th e Survival o f th e O g o n i People, a n enviro n­ p e n e d in o th e r cities, to w n s, a n d v illages. O v e r th ese sam e
m en tal m ovem ent declaim ing th e d e gradation o f air, w ater, years, th e Isla m ist e x tre m ist g ro u p B oko H a ra m has
and lan d in N igeria’s oil-rich N ig e r D elta. D u rin g h is reign, em erg ed as a sig n ific a n t th re a t to stability, h a v in g co o rd i­
A b ach a a n d his fam ily w ere ru m o red to have accum ulated n a te d a n d led d ead ly b o m b in g s a n d attack s o f m arkets,
several b illion dollars in assets, th o u g h th e exact a m o u n t police statio n s, p o llin g statio n s, a n d in te rn a tio n a l agencies
squirreled away overseas has n o t been determ in ed . I n 1998, in cities such as B auchi a n d th e capital A buja, over recent
A bacha’s rule cam e to a sudden e n d w h e n he died in office. years k illin g th o u sa n d s o f p eople a n d b e co m in g in te rn a ­
R um ors soon em erged th a t he w as poisoned; th e ru m o r tio n a lly no to rio u s for its m ass a b d u ctio n o f schoolgirls in
g a in e d in p o p u larity w h en his d e ath w as soon follow ed by 2014. T he g roup calls for stric te r e n fo rcem en t o f Islam ic
th e sudden a n d suspicious d e ath o f C h ie f M o sh o o d A biola, S h a ria law in N ig e ria , w here it is a pplied to som e e x te n t in
th e presum ptive w in n e r o f th e 1993 elections. th e n o rth e rn states, a n d for th e o u trig h t rejectio n o f m o d ern
A fte r A b a ch a , a tra n sitio n a l m ilita ry g o v e rn m e n t u n d e r e ducation, a n d has c la im e d a n affiliation w ith IS IS .
G e n e ra l A b d u lsa lam i A b u b a k a r m oved to d ra ft a n ew con­ N ig e ria ’s h isto ry th u s includes lo n g -sta n d in g tensions
s titu tio n , estab lish a n ew republic, a n d re tu rn N ig e ria to b e tw ee n e th n o -re g io n a l g ro u p s, w ith relig io n overlapping
civilian ru le by 1999. In elections th a t year, form er g en eral th is conflict. I t also includes a lo n g h isto ry o f c o rru p t, inef­
and o n e -tim e m ilita ry p re sid en t O lu se g u n O b a sa n jo w o n ficient, a n d ineffective g o v e rn m e n t, th o u g h m o st in d ic a ­
th e presidency handily. T his C h ristia n so u th e rn e r selected tio n s are th a t th is has slowly im p ro v ed in th e n ew republic
a M u slim n o rth e rn e r as vice p re sid en t a n d g o verned a t th e since 1999. T he c o n tin u a tio n o f th e se tw o basic issues
h e a d o f th e P eople’s D e m o cra tic P a rty (P D P ), w h ic h shapes m u ch o f th e re st o f N ig e ria ’s po litics.
 Profile 515

Regime and Political Institutions

A c co rd in g to its c o n stitu tio n , N ig e ria no w follow s th e p o li­ A ssem bly can o verride th e p re sid en t b y a vote o f tw o -th ird s
cy m a k in g processes th a t exist in m an y o th e r p re sid en tial in b o th ch am b ers. L aw s are su b ject to c o n stitu tio n a l review
system s, a n d th e system sh o u ld so u n d fa m ilia r to stu d e n ts b y th e in d e p e n d e n t Suprem e C o u rt. A n d , as a federation,
w h o are know ledgeable a b o u t A m e ric a n law m ak in g . T he N ig e ria h a s sta te s t h a t ex ercise c o n sid e ra b le a u th o r ity as
legislature passes bills th ro u g h b o th h o u ses— th e N a tio n a l w e ll, in a w ay t h a t is se m i-a u to n o m o u s fro m th e c e n tra l
A ssem bly a n d th e S en ate— a n d th e p re sid en t signs th e b ill g o v ern m en t.
in to law o r v e to e s it. I n th e case o f a v e to , th e N a tio n a l

Regime and Political Institutions

Regime Federal republic, democratically elected since 1999

Administrative Divisions Thirty-six states + Federal Capital Territory (Abuja)

Executive Branch President

Selection of Executive Direct election by national popular vote; runoff among top two candidates if none secures
50 percent in first round; to win in first round, candidate must also secure at least 25 percent
of the vote in at least two-thirds of the states.

Legislative Branch Bicameral

Lower chamber: House of Representatives
Upper chamber: Senate

Judicial Branch Supreme Court, appointed by president, confirmed by Senate

Political Party System Multiparty, but with leading/dominant party

Dominant party: People's Democratic Party (PDP)

H ow ever, th e re are tw o features o f N ig e ria n politics concerns a b o u t e th n ic ity h ave led n a tio n a l d ecision-m akers
t h a t d ra w th e a tte n tio n o f m o st outside observers a n d th a t to “b a la n ce ” c e rta in decisions a n d try to in co rp o ra te differ­
affect th e m a k in g o f law a n d policy. O n e is th e pervasive e n t re g io n a l gro u p s in to decision m ak in g , for in stance
c o rru p tio n in th e system , w h ic h has fam ously involved th ro u g h th e stru c tu re o f th e le a d in g P eo p le’s D e m o cra tic
bribes to law m akers a n d th e ft o f state assets b y p o litica l P a rty . O n th e o th e r h a n d , e th n ic ity a n d k in sh ip also relate
elites. P o liticians have lo n g received “kick b ack s” o n c o n ­ to th e issue o f use o f state resources for p e rso n a l gain. P o ­
trac ts a n d sh ared in th e profits o f com panies th a t receive litica l elites are e x p ec te d to b rin g “re n ts” h o m e to “th e ir
g o v e rn m e n t favors. T his is in s tru m e n ta l in la w m a k in g a n d p eople.” A c o m m o n view h a s b e e n th a t a n e th n ic group
is p a rt o f th e “process.” T his has h a p p e n e d u n d e r b o th civil­ h a v in g a p ro m in e n t re p resen tativ e in office m eans a chance
ian a n d m ilita ry regim es. T he second issue o f n o te is th e to “e at” (or “chop” in N ig e ria n parlance) fro m th e natio n al
role o f e th n ic ity a n d p o te n tia l e th n ic conflict. O n o ne h a n d , plate.

Political Culture
F o r m an y observers, th e w a tch w o rd for N ig e ria ’s p o litica l h as b e en p lag u e d b y c o rru p tio n for decades, u n d e r m ilita ry
c u ltu re has b e en corruption. T he c o u n try ro u tin e ly appears a n d c iv ilia n regim es alike. T he p h e n o m e n o n reaches from
a m o n g th e w o rst o n lists by T ran sp a re n c y In te rn a tio n a l relatively low -level p u b lic servants, such as traffic police
w h e n it ra n k s th e m o st c o rru p t c o u n tries o n e a rth . P olitics w h o stop cars o n tru m p e d -u p charges lo o k in g for a sm all
516 Nigeria

brib e, to presidents a n d o th e r to p officials. F o rm e r presi­ over re g io n a l autonom y. M a n y m ovem ents have em erg ed in
d e n t S ani A b a ch a , a m ilita ry leader, w as ru m o re d to have th e N ig e r D e lta , th e locus o f m u ch o f N ig e ria ’s oil th a t is
several billio n dollars sta sh e d aw ay in in te rn a tio n a l b a n k also one o f th e p o o re st a n d m o st p o llu te d regions o f th e
accounts from h is fo u r years in office w h e n h e died sud­ country. R esistance th e re has ra n g e d fro m n o n -v io le n t c iti­
denly in 1998. z e n s’ p ro tests to th e em ergence o f a rm e d se p a ra tist groups,
T he issue o f c o rru p tio n is lin k e d to th e d istrib u tio n o f as w ell as c rim in a l gan g s seeking profit fro m k id n ap p in g s
spoils to differen t groups. G ro u p s o f p eople in N ig eria o r b an d itry .
o ften view elected representatives fro m th e ir g roup as b e in g W h ile th ere are c erta in “N ig e ria n ” p o litica l c h ara cte ris­
responsible for p ro v id in g for a n “ex te n d ed fam ily,” a n d a tics, th e re are also m an y d iffere n t N ig erias, a n d th e c o u n try
w hole e th n ic g ro u p can som etim es be seen as ju s t such a n is n o t a c o n flict-rid d en d e n o f thieves. T here are a t least
e x ten d ed fam ily. A s th e saying goes in w e st A frica , w h e n a th re e k in d s o f v a ria tio n here. T he first is across d ifferent
g ro u p has elected one o f its ow n as a p ro m in e n t public in stitu tio n s , som e o f w h ic h have re p u ta tio n s for w o rk in g
figure, th e n “zYis our turn to chop”w h ere, as n o te d before, to qu ite effectively. T he S uprem e C o u rt, for in stan c e, is rela­
“chop” m eans to eat. A sim ila r proverb is th a t a “g o a t eats tively in d e p e n d e n t a n d reputable (S uberu 2008). So to o is
w here it is te th e re d ,” w h ic h m eans th a t p eople w ill m ake th e n e w electo ral com m ission th a t w as responsible for
th e b e st for them selves o u t o f w h atev er resources th e y can h o ld in g free a n d fa ir elections in 2010, in a c o u n try w here
reach; by extension, th o se w o rk in g inside th e state w ill use d o in g so is very c h allen g in g . T his co n trasts w ith th e w orse
th e state for th e b e n efit o f them selves o r th e ir e x ten d ed tra c k records o f m an y elected officials a n d o th e r in s titu ­
fam ilies. P ro m in e n t books in th e 1990s held th a t “A frica tio n s. T he second v a ria tio n is across d iffere n t states, som e
w orks” in its ow n w ay for th o se lin k e d to pow er a n d th a t a o f w h ic h have d eveloped re p u ta tio n s fo r effective gover­
c om m on a pproach is th e “p olitics o f th e b e lly ” (B ay art nance, o ften u n d e r especially dyn am ic governors. T his has
1993). T his does n o t m ea n th a t N ig e ria n (or A frica n ) c iti­ b e e n p a rtic u la rly c o n sp ic u o u s m o st r e c e n tly in L a g o s
zens approve o f c o rru p tio n a n d im p u n ity . R a th e r, it is to say S ta te , w h e re th e c o u n try ’s la rg e st c ity (L agos) is located.
th a t th e com plex p a tro n -c lie n t system s involve b ro ad er T en sio n a n d c o n flict also differ b y state, b e in g h ig h e r in
c o m m u n ities th a n ju s t a h a n d fu l o f c o rru p t elites. th e c e n tra l-n o rth o f th e co u n try , alo n g th e fa u lt lin e b e ­
W h ile c o rru p tio n has b e en an e n d u rin g p roblem , th is tw e en C h ristia n s a n d M u slim p o p u latio n s, a n d in th e N ig er
does n o t c ap tu re all o f N ig e ria n p o litica l life. N ig e ria fea­ D e lta . T he fin al v a ria tio n is ch an g e over tim e . T here are
tu re s a g re at deal o f m o b iliza tio n , a n d th e c itiz e n ry has som e in d ic a to rs th a t c o rru p tio n in N ig e ria is re c e d in g ever
o ften ta k e n o n th e c en tra l g o v e rn m e n t in various ways. T he so slig h tly , w h ile e th n ic a n d re lig io u s v io len ce m ay b e
c o u n try w itn esse d sig n ifican t m ovem ents fo r autonom y in w o rse n in g once again. N ig e ria ’s p o litics is never static, b u t
th e 1990s, n o t to m en tio n a m ajor civil w a r in th e 1960s alw ays sh iftin g .

Political Economy
N ig eria has a low average incom e co m pared to m an y o f th e c o u n try b rin g s in large a m o u n ts o f m o n ey a n d relies on
countries profiled in th is book. Y et th e c o u n try is an eco­ n a tu ra l resources ra th e r th a n b ro a d -b a se d taxes to su p p o rt
nom ic g ia n t b y A fric a n stan d ard s, due to its large p o p u la ­ g o v e rn m e n t s p e n d in g . O il sh a p e s th e c o u n try ’s p a tte rn s
tio n a n d a p e tro leu m in d u stry th a t is th e source o f m uch o f o f econom ic g ro w th a n d inequality. I n term s o f econom ic
th e nation’s revenue. N e w estim ates suggest it is th e largest g ro w th , th e c o u n try ’s p e rfo rm a n ce d ep en d s in p a r t o n th e
econom y in A frica so u th o f th e S ahara, su rpassing S o u th in te rn a tio n a l p rice for oil, th o u g h N ig e ria ’s d y sfu n c tio n a l
A frica. N ig eria is th u s seen as a particularly im p o rta n t coun­ p o litica l econom y has rep eated ly re su lte d in th e sq u an d er­
try in su b -S ah aran A frica, b u t it is also seen as representative in g o f revenues w h e n th e price for N ig e ria ’s m a in e x p o rt is
o f th e c o n tin e n t w ith its p o v erty a n d o th e r challenges. h ig h . T he sq u a n d e rin g o f resources lin k s to th e fa ct th a t oil
T he m o st im p o rta n t single sector in N ig e ria ’s econom y is revenues are d istrib u te d in very u n e q u al a n d ineq u itab le
p etro leu m e x tra ctio n . O il revenues account for over 90 p e r­ fashion. O il-p ro d u c in g regions are som e o f th e p o o re st in
cent o f e x p o rt e arn in g s a n d over th re e -fo u rth s o f th e gov­ N ig e ria , w h ic h has led to conflicts a n d d e m a n d s for a u to n ­
e rn m e n t’s revenues. T his affects incom es a n d taxes: The om y (as th e boxes in th is c h a p te r note). A p a rt fro m reg io n al
 Case Studies 517

differences, p erh ap s th e m o st s trik in g in eq u a lities are b e ­ A p a rt fro m th e e x tra ctio n o f p e tro leu m (and now n a tu ­
tw e en th o se individuals w h o are lin k e d to th e state p a tro n ­ ra l gas) a n d th e re n ts th ese g en erate, N ig e ria is a large a n d
age n e tw o rk a n d th o se w h o are no t. S tate elites have relatively advanced econom y b y A fric a n sta n d ard s. T he
siphoned o ff a large p ro p o rtio n o f n a tio n a l revenues for d e ­ c o u n try does h ave a d evelo p ed in d u stria l sector, a n d it is th e
cades, w ith to p elites so c k in g aw ay m illio n s o f d ollars w hile le a d in g m a n u fa c tu re r in w e st A frica , th o u g h it is n o t a
a large n u m b e r o f N ig e ria n s live o n less th a n a d o lla r a day. w o rld lead er in in d u stria l technology: M a n y p ro d u c ts are
W h ile p a tro n a g e a n d c o rru p tio n are n o t th e o nly reasons sim ple c o n su m er goo d s such as p rocessed foods a n d bever­
for th is, th e state figures p ro m in e n tly in sh a p in g th e d is tri­ ages, tex tile s, a n d basic h o u se h o ld p ro d u c ts. A g ric u ltu re ,
b u tio n o f incom e. N ig e ria ’s p o litica l econom y th u s relates to m ea n w h ile, still em ploys a n e stim a te d 70 p e rc e n t o f N ig e ­
its political cu ltu re. rian s a n d accounts for nearly o n e -th ird o f th e G D P (C IA
The r u n n in g th e m e in N ig e ria n politics has b e e n cor­ W o rld F actbook). In u rb a n areas, large n u m b ers o f N ig e ri­
ru p tio n a n d th e m isuse o f state resources. In N ig e ria a n d in ans w o rk in w h a t is k n o w n as th e in fo rm a l sector, th e
A frica m ore generally, th e p a rtic u la r style o f p o litica l econ­ largely u n re g u la te d p a r t o f th e e conom y in w h ic h w orkers
om y has given rise to n e w term s, such as “n e o p a trim o n ia l- t r y to eke o u t a m o d e s t liv in g w ith o u t fo rm al c o n tracts or
ism ” (B ra tto n and V an de W alle 1997). T he m ain g u a ra n te e d w ages. A m o n g th e m an y m illio n s w o rk in g in
im p lica tio n o f th ese term s is th a t th o se in state office view N ig e ria ’s v a st a n d d y n am ic in fo rm a l secto r are stre e t ven­
th e resources o f th e state as available for th e ir ow n p e rso n al dors, haw kers, sm all m erc h an ts, a n d providers o f a ran g e o f
use, ra th e r th a n for public services. S tate officials at all services, fro m m essengers a n d couriers to m ec h an ic shops
levels m ake use o f g o v e rn m e n t fu n d s to favor them selves o n th e side o f th e ro a d to a m b u la n t sh o e -sh in e w orkers.
a n d th e ir ow n fam ilies, e th n ic g roups, o r o th e r favored con­ F inally, N ig e ria is a n A fric a n leader in co m m u n icatio n s,
stitu en ts. T he system view s th e officeholder as a “p a tro n ” w ith m ajo r in d u strie s ra n g in g fro m m obile p h o n e netw orks
a n d th ese recipients o f resources as “clients,” fro m w h ic h to “N o lly w o o d ,” th e N ig e ria n film in d u stry th a t d istrib u tes
com e th e term s patron-client relations a n d clientelism. m ovies across A fric a a t a ra te fa ster th a n H o lly w o o d itself.

CASESTUDIES

CASE STUDY

W hat Is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed?

jig g j The Case of Nigeria CHAPTER 3, PAGE 63

Nigeria is one of the world's paradigmatic Weak states can be defined as those government to shower favors upon the
cases of a weak and dysfunctional state. It that fail to establish decision-making president's home region (Chabal and
is seen as a direct contrast to more suc­ autonomy from actors in society. Weak Daloz 1999). The use of public monies to
cessful and stronger states in East Asia, states are not autonomous, but instead serve private interests is a sign of perme­
such as South Korea or Taiwan (Evans succumb to private interests. Their actions able boundaries between the state and
1995; Kohli 2004). But what does it mean are permeated and infiltrated by private society itself. Where there is a lack of a
to have a 'weak state," especially in a actors seeking special advantages, often clear distinction between public and pri­
country that has long been dominated called rents. These "special interests" can vate, it becomes possible to use public
by the military and has stood accused take a range of forms. They may be indus­ power for private gain, which results in a
of repression and corruption? Are these trialists and investors that want preferen­ "criminalization of the state" (Bayart, Ellis,
not indicators that the state is overbear­ tial treatment to ensure their monopoly and Hibou 1999). If a state is "strong," by
ing, rather than weak? And if a state like advantages or government contracts contrast, it has the ability to stand up to
Nigeria is weak, can anything be done to (see Bates 1981). Or they can be from the special interests and private actors on a
change it? ethnic group of the president that expects regular basis in order to make decisions
518 Nigeria

CASE STUDY (continued)

What is a Weak State, and Can It Be Changed?
The Case of Nigeria CHAPTER 3, PAGE 63

that benefit the whole of society more citizenry, is a daunting task. The oil re­ will emphasize that institutions are em­
broadly. source curse (see box on chapter 5, "Why bedded in a set of conditions that make
The term state capacity is also often Are Natural Resources Sometimes a rapid change difficult: Nigeria is a highly
used in a similar vein. When a state lacks Curse?") also compounds the problem. unequal society with a long history of cor­
capacity, this does not mean the state is As suggested by a range of scholars, the ruption at this point, and these will slow
incapable of doing things such as engag­ easy money that comes with natural re­ any change, preventing the development
ing in theft, abusing human rights, or rig­ sources can weaken a state in certain con­ of a strong state "overnight."
ging elections. Rather, a weak state with texts (see Karl 1997; Dunning 2008). There is surely some truth in all of
little capacity often does these things. It The answer to whether Nigeria can these elements when it comes to building
takes a state with strong capacity to im­ develop a strong state will draw different a strong state: History and culture matter
plement more challenging and pro­ responses from comparativists with differ­ for how most individuals perceive the
ductive public services, like vaccination ent theories of the state. Those more in­ state and its possibilities, and thus condi­
campaigns in remote villages, nationwide clined to think that the state can be tion outcomes strongly, but better de­
educational investments, or establishment rationally engineered to work correctly signs and better leaders will contribute to
of a rule of law. Thus, a strong state is de­ will emphasize the political institutions more effective governance than poorly
fined by its ability to make autonomous that can be put in place and the incen­ designed systems and weak leaders. And
decisions on behalf of society at large, not tives these will provide for actors to re­ most analysts would not adopt extreme
by its ability to resort to violence and crack spond accordingly. Others who believe in views that deny the importance of several
down on dissent. the importance of individual actors will factors: rationalists understand that cul­
Some of the most important reforms note that good performance of an institu­ ture matters, and culturalists understand
for Nigeria's development would be im­ tion like the state depends upon the that people respond to incentives, for ex­
provements in governance and strength­ people who comprise it; finding the right ample. Yet the analysis of which factors are
ening of the state. But can this be done? set of leaders and officials should turn an most important will condition whether
There are several impediments. Ending institution around in a relatively short one thinks transforming the state is feasi­
corruption and impunity, and making period of time. By contrast, those with a ble in a given span of time, and what steps
public officials more accountable to the more structural, cultural, or historical bent can be recommended to get there.

W hy Are Natural Resources Sometimes a Curse?

The Nigerian Case CHAPTER 5, PAGE 101

Nigeria has the largest population and the discovering oil would be very good for an first is called the "Dutch Disease." Export­
second-largest economy in sub-Saharan economy, and in some cases it can be, ing oil brings in lots of foreign currency.
Africa, but it is not a success story. Instead, especially if the economy is already robust The ready supply of, say, dollars means
Nigeria— a major oil producer— is often and diversified when oil is discovered. But dollars are not seen as valuable relative to
held up as an exemplary case of the "re­ often oil and similar high-value commodi­ the national currency; the domestic cur­
source curse.” You would expect that ties produce unanticipated problems. The rency rises in value, and this hurts other
 Case Studies 519

W hy Are Natural Resources Sometimes a Curse?

The Nigerian Case CHAPTER 5, PAGE 101

exports because these goods are expen­ money has a rather subtle effect: It stunts In addition to domestic challenges,
sive for foreigners in dollar terms. Along the growth of important relationships be­ the politics of oil and natural resources
the same lines, the potential profitability tween the state and the society at large. also involves international actors such as
of oil makes it a magnet for big capital in­ Politicians can have incentives to make oil companies. This is because developing
vestment, thus crowding out investment bad policy in oil-rich countries. 'Easy countries themselves often lack technical
in other industries. Oil-producing coun­ money" from oil can make states such as capacity in areas that require advanced
tries thus often see other areas of their Nigeria more likely to simply offer hand­ technology, and may also lack the capital
economies decline. outs to their “clients" and to the populace needed for investment, at least at early
Equally important, the global price for during boom times. States with substan­ stages. Such countries thus commonly
oil is cyclical. Economies like Nigeria tend tial cash flows from oil often do not de­ rely on licenses to foreign companies, or
to see boom and bust cycles that prevent velop a capacity to tax the population. the use of foreign advisors, or joint ven­
them from achieving development. High This may sound like a low-tax paradise, tures between major multinational com­
prices at one point in time can leave a but without taxation, the populace is less panies and relatively weak states (Kohli
country vulnerable to downturns in the likely to see the government as a set of 2004). This leaves another form of depen­
price of its main export commodity. institutions to be held accountable for its dence. The impacts of interactions with
Nigeria boomed during the 1970s when governing performance. Rather, citizens foreign actors are hotly debated, but in
oil prices were high, but declined during become accustomed to government Nigeria low state capacity, partially dating
the period of low prices in the 1980s (Kohli simply distributing benefits. This can result back to weak state development under
2004: 351). More recently, growth has in­ in a destructive relationship between British colonialism, seems not to mix well
creased again as oil prices have risen again, state and society, especially in oil-produc­ with oil. In short, despite the enormous
but Nigeria remains quite dependent on ing countries. Such a counterproductive wealth that Nigerian oil has created for
a single product. relationship is not universal, but may be some, it has left the country with high
Oil dependence also affects politics, most likely in places such as Nigeria levels of poverty and inequality, and with
and often for the worse (Karl 1997; Herbst with high prior levels of inequality institutional problems that will make
2000: 130-133). The easy access to oil (cf. Dunning 2008). overcoming these challenges difficult.

Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding

Together or Tearing Apart? CHAPTER 8, PAGE 187

Nigeria is a crucial case in examining Development" section, the subject of regions at independence to thirty-six today.
whether constitutional engineering and federalism and autonomy came to the This happened in a series of steps. Indepen­
design, particularly with regard to federal­ fore most dramatically with the Nigerian dent Nigeria began with three regions—
ism, can contribute to stability and democ­ civil war from 1967 to 1970. Northern, Western, and Eastern— each of
racy. Federalism has been essential to A principal tactic of the central gov­ which was associated with a particular
efforts to address one of Nigeria's leading ernment to hold the country together has dominant ethnic group: the Hausa-Fulani,
political challenges: ethnic and regional been to increase the number of states, Yoruba, and Igbo, respectively. The Mid-
divisions. As noted earlier, in the “Historical which have gone from an original three West Region was added in 1963. In the
520 Nigeria

Federalism and the States in Nigeria: Holding

Together or Tearing Apart? CHAPTER 8, PAGE 187

lead-up to the Nigerian Civil War (see also favor new states, though at different times preventing winner-takes-all politics in na­
the box on the civil war that follows), the Nigeria's dominant ethnicities have op­ tional elections. Or it could draw such
central government moved to reorganize posed plans they believed would weaken stark dividing lines between groups that it
the four regions into twelve states. The them in the delicate balance of power. might give rise to secessionism or civil
Civil War then pitted the Eastern region Most new states were created by war. The Nigerian approach has been to
against the rest of Nigeria, and after the the military governments, rather than give more small groups additional say,
rebels surrendered, the military govern­ through public consultation, and the jus­ and to blur (or redraw) the lines between
ment responded by creating seven more tifications have ultimately been about na­ the large groups.
states in 1976, and two additional states in tional stability (see Suberu 2001: 80). The Has it succeeded? The evidence can
1987. In 1991, President Babangida an­ creation of states in the 1960s was based be interpreted in different ways. On one
nounced that the number of states would on the idea of balance: No region should hand, Nigeria has remained intact after
increase to thirty, and six more states were be able to dominate the federation. As the Civil War of the late 1960s, which is a
added in 1996 (Suberu 2001: xxiv-xxvi). the Civil War approached and the Igbo- non-trivial achievement in a society that
The numbers thus went from three to four dominated Eastern Region threatened is so fractured along ethnic, religious,
regions, then to twelve states and on to to secede, the military in power gained and regional fault lines. On the other
nineteen to twenty-one to thirty and fi­ some support from non-lgbos in that hand, the creation of new states has not
nally to thirty-six states. region by offering to grant them new ended ethnic or sectarian tensions. Poli­
Why would subdividing the states and states (Suberu 2001: 87-89). Similarly, a tics in Nigeria is still centered around the
increasing their number matter for stabil­ panel in the 1970s argued that Nigeria division between the north, the south­
ity? The approach has been largely about would not remain stable without further west, and the southeast that troubled
ethnic arithmetic (see Suberu 2001). In subdivision; this resulted in the nineteen the country at independence. The 2015
Nigeria, the central government has used states as of 1976 (Suberu 2001:90-91). The presidential election, for instance, had
the creation of new states in an attempt logic played out in slightly different ways an electorate divided geographically,
to multiply the number of administrative in subsequent divisions, but always with with the victor Muhammadu Buhari
divisions in Nigeria. The theory was that an eye toward governability. Beyond cre­ winning the north and the southwest,
this would eliminate the big divisions ating states, the federal government has while the defeated incumbent Goodluck
between the largest ethnic groups as an taken a number of other steps that sup­ Jonathan won in his native southeastern
important factor in Nigerian politics, and ports them, most notably guaranteeing region. The creation of states has cre­
would substitute for this new administra­ substantial revenues to the state and local ated new divisions in Nigerian politics,
tive boundaries that citizens would focus governments. At the same time, while but has not overcome the old divisions
on. At the same time, those living in the creating these states, the central govern­ (Suberu 2001:110). Nigeria still witnesses
newly created states often favored the ment has also attempted to centralize a spiral of intergroup conflict. Demands
proposals for two reasons. First, the many powers. for more states or greater federalism
smaller ethnic groups in Nigeria sought Giving different ethnic and regional are unlikely to mitigate conflict at this
their own states to avoid domination groups their own authority and resources point, and may only serve to appease
by the Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, and Igbo. could either improve stability and in­ different groups clamoring for the re­
Second, the creation of states in a partic­ crease the likelihood of democracy, or sources that come with getting a state.
ular area meant they would share in the harm those prospects. It could help by Federalism might have changed the nature
distribution of the country's revenues. allowing each group some say in its own of conflict, but it has not necessarily
This gave incentives for many groups to affairs and some role in government, stopped it.
 Case Studies 521

The Presidency in Nigeria: Powers and Limitations CHAPTER 10, PAGE 241

Over time, Nigeria's presidencies have seen Corruption pervades much of the state this question of federalism, constitution
their powers increase and decrease in dif­ bureaucracy over which the executive and legal provisions require the federal
ferent ways, and a brief comparison can presides. For many years, positions in the government to send a large portion of
provide insight into what has and has not bureaucracy have been seen as rewards its revenues to the states and local au­
changed in the country between military for kin and supporters, for the salaries and thorities (Suberu 2001). This latter point
and-civilian rule. Nigeria has elected civilian more importantly for the corruption op­ has important effects on governance:
presidents since 1999, when a period of portunities these positions provide. This Because states and local authorities con­
military rule came to an end. Prior to this, form of patronage and clientelism re­ trol so much of the national revenue, the
Nigeria had a parliamentary system in mains prominent in Nigerian politics, part quality of governance can vary a great
place from 1960 to 1966, followed by mili­ of the calculus of retaining power. Pa­ deal from place to place across the coun­
tary rule for all but four years from 1966 to tronage and corruption cut both ways, try. Some states will govern better and
1999, during which the country lived under giving the executive the opportunity to others worse, and the president has less
several brutal and corrupt dictators, such buy support but also a sense that it leverage over this than might be the case
as General Sani Abacha (1993 to 1998). cannot control the actions of bureaucrats in other countries.
The civilian presidents since 1999 and is as much a prisoner of the system as All presidents from 1999 to 2015
have included one-time military leaders a beneficiary of it. were from People's Democratic Party
Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) and cur­ The Nigerian presidency has formal (PDP), though the party was defeated by
rent president Muhammadu Buhari, as powers attached to it, such as the power Buhari and his All Progressives Congress
well as Goodluck Jonathan, who was pres­ to assent to legislation or send it back to (APC) in 2015. Each president (of the PDP
ident from 2010 until his defeat in 2015. the legislature, where a two-thirds major­ or APC) has had a legislative majority,
They have earned better reputations for ity is required to pass a law without pres­ which gives a degree of partisan power
civil liberties than the military regime, and idential assent. Yet there are also major as well. Yet this too cuts both ways; the
the presidents themselves have not stood limitations to presidential action, and some entrenchment of co-partisans makes it
directly accused of the titanic forms of of these reflect the need to address hard to shake up governance: Presidents
corruption seen previously. While they have Nigeria's other big challenge besides must reckon with governors and legisla­
not eradicated abuses and corruption, corruption: ethnic and regional tension. tors who have strong bases in their re­
they are widely viewed as an improvement To be elected, the president is required to spective states. And, to close the circle,
upon military rule. win a majority of the vote nationally, but this means that patronage and clien­
Despite some improvements, Nigeria's also must win at least 25 percent of the telism persist.
core governance problems persist under vote in two-thirds of the states. Formal With its persistent tendency for pa­
the new presidencies, and this shows and informal requirements hold that po­ tronage and the need to balance the pre­
how these challenges remain embedded litical parties should represent the nation's carious relationship between north and
in the political culture and society As federal character, especially the division south, Nigeria shows that social context
noted in several instances earlier in this between the mostly Christian south and greatly affects the environment in which
profile, Nigeria is one of the most corrupt mostly Muslim north. presidents operate, regardless of constitu­
nations on earth despite some earnest The president is also not completely free tional powers. Presidents since the mili­
presidential efforts to tame this problem; to establish his own cabinet, though no tary leader Sani Abacha may be better
the presidencies have not proved capable written rules put it this way. The president than their military predecessors, but gov­
of dramatic advances, but rather modest is "expected” to choose a vice-president ernance has not been fully cleaned up,
and incremental steps that will leave cor­ and ministers from the opposite region of nor will it be for some time regardless of
ruption endemic for some time to come. the country to his place of origin. Also on good or bad presidential intentions.
522 Nigeria

The Nigerian Civil War or Biafran War: Nationalism

and Ethno-National Conflict in a Post-Colonial Society CHAPTER 13, PAGE 316

Nigeria is an excellent example of a coun­ from British colonialism and to create three million (Falola and Heaton 2008:
try where the state-linked national iden­ an independent state (or independent 158). In terms of human life and suffering,
tity needs to compete with other, perhaps states). But it is clear that the idea of "Nige­ it was catastrophic.
more deeply established, identities and ria" as a nation was not the single basis for Some theories of ethno-national vi­
interests that precede the rise of the na­ national loyalty among these nationalists olence would stress the strong ethnic
tional state (Falola and Heaton 2008). Of (Falola and Heaton 2008: 136-157). Some boundaries and, perhaps, religious mark­
course, every case of state-sponsored na­ were Pan-African nationalists and hoped ers of identity difference here. Others
tional identity experiences this conflict to to craft an identity for a nation much would stress the tit-for-tat nature of the
some extent— national identity can con­ larger than present-day Nigeria. Others conflict: Igbo people rebelled, this theory
flict with other identities like religion, eth­ had their strongest affiliation with their would suggest, because oppression
nicity, clan, tribe, or locality— but the more local groups, expressing interest in, from the north led them to draw the
problem has often been acute in post­ say, the Yoruba nation. rational conclusion that they would be
colonial situations where the state is left British colonial West Africa saw a rela­ safer as an independent state. Instru­
to create a nation out of groups that do tively peaceful transition to post-colonial mental theories would stress that Nigerian
not necessarily identify with each other. regimes. But in Nigeria, once the colonial oil reserves are heavily concentrated in
Nigeria was a colony of Great Britain. It authority was gone, jealousies and con­ the country's southeast, noting that the
had been the site of many different social flicts became more problematic. Ethnic, stakes for both groups extended beyond
groups before colonialism, most notably religious, and regional tensions— which ethnic conflict and rivalry, and con­
the Hausa-speaking Islamic population of had been present all along— spilled over cerned access to and control over Nigeria's
the northern region, the Yoruba of the into open violence and conflict (as noted most important natural resource and the
west (many of whom practice traditional previously). Two coups d'etat in 1966 were basis for its economy and for the state's
animistic religion), and the Igbo of the related to these tensions, and the second revenues.
east (who are predominantly Christian). of these issued in anti-lgbo violence. In Debates remain about how to classify
British colonialism drew all of these 1967, the mostly Igbo eastern region de­ or characterize events like this conflict.
groups together and artificially con­ clared itself the independent state of Proponents of the Biafran independence
structed a political boundary around Biafra. The central government did not effort would likely classify these events as
them. This issued in considerable tension accept the legitimacy of this action, and a a political or even anti-colonial revolution,
that continues today. bloody civil war lasted until 1970. The cen­ arguing that the central government was
The importance of British colonialism tral government was victorious, and the an oppressive external imposition from
does not mean Nigerians had no agency Igbo-dominated east remains to this day which they were attempting to liberate
in the creation of the Nigerian nation­ part of Nigeria. The war cost many thou­ themselves. Others consider this conflict
state and Nigerian nationalism. Indeed, sands of lives directly, and produced to be a civil war, since it took place within
many important Nigerian intellectuals many more deaths as a result of the eco­ an existing nation-state, regardless of
and political actors from at least the late nomic dislocation and famine it gener­ whether that state itself was constructed
nineteenth century sought to escape ated, with estimates ranging from one to from the outside.
 Case Studies 523

Religious Difference and Conflict in Nigeria:

Disentangling Ethnicity and Religion? CHAPTER 15, PAGE 361

As noted in the previous case study, balance professing a traditional animistic Islamist fundamentalists whose name
Nigeria's boundaries and structure were faith. Religious conflict remains common, means "Western education is sinful." They
shaped by European colonialism. The and the government has struggled in its have claimed responsibility for numerous
British brought together groups and re­ efforts to restrain it. Paradoxically, per­ bombings and coordinated gun and gre­
gions that likely would not have been po­ haps, intergroup violence has increased nade attacks in several states in central
litically unified, at least not in the short under non-military governments that and northern Nigeria, most notably Pla­
run, if not for European involvement. This have held power since 1999. To some, teau State and Bauchi State. Boko Haram
has often produced rivalries and tensions, this suggests that federalism is not an bombed the United Nations compound in
the most notorious of which was the ca­ effective solution, while others argue the capital, Abuja, in 2011. This was fol­
lamitous Biafran War described previ­ that this is a simplistic conclusion to draw lowed by news reports that it seeks to col­
ously. The Nigerian state retained control on the basis of limited evidence (see laborate and integrate more with al Qaeda
over all of these groups, however, and Suberu 2001). and other related Islamic fundamentalist
does to this day, though the society has Ethno-religious violence in Nigeria is groups such as al-Shabaab in Somalia and,
seen considerable ethno-religious con­ difficult to sort out, in part because it more recently, with ISIS. Boko Haram's vio­
flict. One of the major questions of com­ probably should not all be classified in lence has increased in recent years and, as
parative politics highlighted by this case similar terms. Conflicts in the area where noted previously, includes not just mass
is how, if it all, we might disentangle eth­ Hausa-Fulani (predominantly Islamic) killings but also mass kidnappings. In light
nicity and religion in terms of their effects populations are contiguous with Igbo of the tensions in Nigeria, is important to
on politics. In other words, are these con­ (predominantly Christian) involve both note that the relationship between instru­
flicts about religion, or are they about material interests and, sometimes, ethnic mental, ethno-national, and religious mili­
ethnicity, or both? and religious dimensions. Some of the tancy is potentially dynamic. Religious
Nigeria has attempted to address its violence by minority ethnic groups in frames may come to be more or less im­
diversity through federalism. In terms of the Niger Delta, however, such as attack­ portant depending on the context.
religion, while the federal government ing oil pipelines, has little to no religious Religion is a crucial element in the
maintains formal separation of church component. balancing act among Nigerian political
and state, religion finds its way into gov­ Some of the most significant events in elites, as with the People's Democratic
ernment at the state level (Fox 2008: Nigeria's recent timeline have to do with Party. Former president Goodluck Jonathan
272-273). Sharia law is practiced in north­ sectarian or religious strife. As noted in the (a southern Christian) faced some oppo­
ern majority-Muslim states, though some “Historical Development" section, conflict sition in the north, and current president
of its more radical provisions have not has emerged in many of the states and Muhammadu Buhari (a northern Muslim)
been exercised. At the same time, people cities along the dividing line between may similarly face some opposition in the
in non-majority-Muslim states are not the majority-Muslim north and the south. Yet one of the important ques­
subjected to these laws. In today's Nigeria, majority-Christian south. The city of Jos, tions is how these efforts at the top to
as noted earlier, it is estimated that about for one, has witnessed numerous riots and manage the institutions relate to the
half of the population is Muslim and clashes. The deadliest acts have been per­ identities, sentiments, and behaviors of
two-fifths Christian, with most of the petrated by Boko Haram, a group of people in society.
524 Nigeria

Research Prompts
1. British colonialism in Nigeria ended over fifty years ago. To what from one or more other African countries, and in what ways is
extent does the legacy of colonialism still affect the politics and it comparable (or "most similar")? If you examine another sub-
economy of Nigeria today? How can we determine what con­ Saharan African country and determine that it faces similar
temporary outcomes are the result of historically distant factors problems or does not face similar problems, which variables
like colonialism as opposed to more recent factors such as the does your finding point to as helping to shape Nigeria's
events of the late 1990s? outcomes?
2. Nigeria is used by scholars of development as a quintessential 5. One key element of Nigeria's political life seems to be corrup­
example of economic failure and underperformance. Viewing tion. Can we say this corruption is caused by culture and soci­
the history of Nigeria's political economy, does Nigeria's weak ety? Or by economic realities? Or political institutions? Which of
economic performance over the decades give more credence these do you find to be the leading the cause, and how can you
to proponents of market-led development or state-led develop­ know?
ment? What would be the recommendations from both market- 6. Conflict in Nigeria has at least three components: ethnic, reli­
led and state-led development advocates for Nigeria? gious (or sectarian), and regional. Which of these divisions in
3. Compare and contrast Nigeria's development experience with Nigerian society is the primary cause of the conflict? Can you
one of the other developing countries mentioned in chapter 5: trace the historical evolution of conflicts in Nigeria to determine
Brazil, China, or India. What do you learn from the comparison, which of these is the leading causal factor?
and are there any comparative lessons that you can draw for 7. Nigeria has implemented numerous institutional reforms to
why development does or does not happen? limit violence and conflict. These include the creation of more
4. Consider several of Nigeria's troubles— such as economic stag­ states in the federation and provisions requiring presidents to
nation, corruption, or conflict— and select one issue of greatest win a substantial proportion of the vote across many states. Is it
interest to you. Examine to what extent Nigeria's challenge ap­ possible to determine what the effects of these reforms have
plies in another African country, and address how generaliz- been on conflict and ethnic tension? How might you approach
able Nigeria's experience may be to the continent of Africa as a this question and research it to be able to offer an answer? How
whole. In what ways is Nigeria distinctive (or "most different") might comparative study help?
 525

H Russia (Russian Federation)

PROFILE Introduction
T he R u ssia n F e d e ra tio n is, in geographic
Key Features of Contemporary Russia term s, th e larg e st c o u n try in th e w orld. Its
la n d is h ig h ly v a rie d , stre tc h in g from te m ­
Population: 142,470,272 (estimate, July 2014) p e rate areas to th e A rc tic , a n d fro m W e ste rn

Area: 17,098,242 square kilometers E u ro p e to th e Sea o f Ja p a n . Its p eople a n d

th e ir c u ltu re are v aried as w ell. B o th its
Head of State: Vladimir Putin (president, 2012-present) p eople a n d its expanse o f la n d have c ap tu red

Head of Government: Dmitry Medvedev (premier, May 2012-present) th e im a g in a tio n o f w rite rs for g enerations,
a n d m an y have felt th a t th e re is so m e th in g
Capital: Moscow ineffable a b o u t R ussia. H ow ever, w h a t is o f

Year of Independence: The Russian Empire dates back to 1721, and still g re a te r in te re s t a b o u t R ussia to com ­
independent states comprising much of p arativ e p o litica l analysts is th e c o u n try ’s
Russia predate that founding. The current tu m u ltu o u s p o litica l a n d econom ic history.
state became independent of the Soviet R ussia, as w e w ill see, has over th e last cen­
Union in 1991.
tu ry gone fro m b e in g a re a c tio n a ry C z a rist
Year of Current 1993 re g im e, to c re a tin g th e S oviet U n io n , d u rin g
Constitution: w h ic h it a im e d to com pletely rem ake the
society a n d to spread so cialist revolution
Languages: Russian is spoken by most citizens; there are
more than one hundred other languages in the a ro u n d th e globe, to w a tc h in g th e Soviet
Russian Federation: Tatar and Ukrainian are U n io n collapse, to b e in g replaced by a rela­
among the most important. tively w e a k g o v e rn m e n t, a n d finally, u n d e r
V la d im ir P u tin , to th e re sto ra tio n o f cen­
GDP per Capita: $14,612 (World Bank estimate, 2013)
tra liz e d auth o rity . C o n te m p o ra ry R ussia is
Human Development 57th (high human development) E x h ib it A in p o litic a l scien tists’ efforts to
Index Ranking (2014): describe so -c alled “h y b rid ” o r “com petitive
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Developmen t Report 2014.

Russian 79.8% 1 N ot formally practicing 63—73%

Tartar 3.8% | Russian Orthodox 15—20%
Ukrainian 2% Islam 10-15%
Bashkir 1.2% H Other Christian 2%
Chuvash 1.1%
Unspecified other 12.1%
Religious Affiliation in Russia, 2006 Estimates of
Ethnic Groups in Russia Practicing Religious Populations
Note that there are numerous smaller groups as well, including Note that some of those counted as "Russian Orthodox" may be only

Chechens, captured in the "unspecified/other'' category here. nominally so.

Source: CIA World Factbook.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
526 Russia (Russian Federation)

AR C T I C
NORWAY
OCEAN East
Siberian
SWEDEN Barentz Sea
Sea
M urm ansk Laptev
FINLAND Sea
Kara Sga

S a in t
Pe te rsburg A rk a n g e l'sly
.BELORUS
N orilsk
Petropavtoski-
UKRAINI K a m ch a tsk iy
N izh n iy N o v g o ro d .. dV
V oron ezh .'Y a k u t s k Sea of
Kazan' Pem V
Okhotsk
Saratov Sa m a ra )
KURIL
* #Ufa a Ye k ate rin b u rg
ISLANDS
Krasnodar
It / •Che|y£binskv%>

Khabarovsk!
N o vo sib irsk ■rasnoyai
Lake
Barnaul Y Baikal
KAZAKHSTAN Irku tsk

• N akh o d ka
TURK.
'la d ivo sto k *

MONGOLIA

CHINA

a u th o rita ria n ” (L ev itsk y a n d W ay 2010) regim es discussed lib e ra lis m a n d so c ial d em o cracy . R u ssia is also o f in te re s t
in c h ap ter 7 o f th is volum e. to s tu d e n ts o f id e n tity p o litic s . D e b a te s a b o u n d c o n c e rn ­
R u ssia ’s 1917 re v o lu tio n s— b o th th e o n e t h a t re m o v e d in g th e n a tu r e o f R u ss ia n n a tio n a l id e n tity a n d th e
th e ts a r fro m p o w e r a n d th e su b s e q u e n t o n e , w h ic h gave tim in g a n d causes o f its e m e rg e n c e a n d sp re a d . T hese
th e B o lsh e v ik s c o n tro l o f th e s ta te — in s p ire d w aves o f q u e stio n s b e co m e p a rtic u la rly c o m p lic a te d in th e S o v ie t
im ita to rs . T he S o v ie t U n io n fo rm e d o n e o f th e tw o poles ye ars. A s a M a r x is t re g im e , th e S o v ie t U n io n w as offi­
in th e C o ld W a r t h a t s tr u c tu r e d g lo b a l a ffa irs fo r h a l f a c ia lly in te r n a tio n a lis t, b u t a n u m b e r o f o b se rv ers see it as
c e n tu ry : I t w o u ld b e d iffic u lt to e x ag g e rate th e e x te n t o f h a v in g b e e n a v e h ic le fo r R u ss ia n n a tio n a l a im s, a n d
th is lo n g c o n flic t’s im p a c t, e sp e c ia lly o n th e p o p u la tio n s S ta lin h im s e lf w as a th e o r is t o f n a tio n a lis m (S ta lin
o f th o s e c o u n trie s w h e re p ro x y w a rs b e tw e e n th e p o les 1994). R u ss ia n n a tio n a lis m h a s ty p ic a lly b e e n c o n sid e re d
w ere fo u g h t. A t th e sam e tim e , th e S o v ie t U n io n ’s b r u ­ to fa ll in to th e e th n ic ty p e (G re e n fe ld 1992), a n d R u ssia n
tality , p a rtic u la rly u n d e r J o s e p h S ta lin , p u sh e d m a n y h is to ry gives n u m e ro u s ex am p les o f re p re ss io n o f e th n ic
g lo b a l p o litic a l a c to rs aw ay fro m so c ia lism a n d to w a rd m in o ritie s.
 Profile 527

R ussia’s p o st-c o m m u n ist tra n s itio n is o f p a rtic u la r in ­ reaso n , R ussia h a s never d eveloped a sustainable, fully
tere st to com parative analysts, in p a r t because o f th e p a t­ fu n c tio n in g dem ocracy. T here is m u ch g rist here for th e
te rn o f a u th o rita ria n persistence th a t it reveals. F o r som e m ill o f d e m o c ratic theory.

Historical Development
M a n y a cc o u n ts o f m o d e rn R u ssia b e g in w ith P e te r th e even w h en th ey w ere n o t fully sup p o rted in th e ir hom e coun­
G re a t, w h o in th e la te se v e n te e n th c e n tu ry a tte m p te d to try). T he first h a lf o f th e n in e te e n th c en tu ry saw th e rule o f
fo rcibly m o d e rn iz e th e c o u n try . P e te r w as n o t th e first A lex an d er I a n d N icolas I. A lexander is b e st rem em bered for
n o ta b le ru le r o f R u ssia , b u t h e is w e ll k n o w n fo r th e leading R ussia as it defeated N apoleon in his fam ous invasion
d e g ree to w h ic h h e c e n tra lly im p o s e d re fo rm s o n h is so ­ (in w h ich th e F ren ch occupied M o sco w b u t w ere eventually
c ie ty (B u sh k o v itc h 2 0 1 2 : 79). S om e o f th e s e re fo rm s defeated b y R ussian resistance a n d th e h a rsh R ussian winter).
c h a n g e d th e so c ial s tru c tu r e in im p o r ta n t w ays. F o r ex­ B o th N icolas I a n d A lexander I, th o u g h , presided over a
am p le, h e im p o s e d a “T ab le o f R a n k s ” t h a t re -e n g in e e re d p e rio d in w h ich R ussia failed to continue its p a th o f m odern­
th e R u ssia n so c ial h ie ra rc h y , m a k in g n o b le s ta tu s d e p e n ­ izatio n (A scher 2009: 8 0 -8 1 ). M u c h o f th is changed beg in ­
d e n t o n sta te service a n d c re a tin g th e p o ss ib ility to n in g in th e 1860s u n d e r A lexander II, w ho im plem ented a
achieve n o b ility th ro u g h p a rtia lly m e rito c ra tic c o m p e ti­ n u m b er o f reform s. The m o st im p o rta n t w as th e em ancipa­
tio n (A sch e r 2 0 0 9 : 63; G re e n fe ld 1992). H e p e rso n a lly tio n o f th e serfs (B ushkovitch 2 0 1 2 :1 8 8 -1 9 3 ) and state peas­
stu d ie d W e s te rn te c h n iq u e s fo r s h ip b u ild in g a n d o th e r ants, w h ic h com m enced b etw ee n 1861 a n d 1866 (the precise
te c h n o lo g ie s t h a t h e e x p e c te d w o u ld in c re a se R u ssia ’s d a tin g is d ep en d en t o n w h e th e r one w as a se rf or state peas­
p o w e r a n d p re stig e , a n d h e b r o u g h t fo re ig n e x p e rts to ant). M a terial conditions o f peasants, th o u g h , in m any cases
R u ssia in larg e n u m b e rs (A sch e r 2 0 0 9 : 5 8 - 6 5 ) . S om e d id n o t im prove over th e several decades th a t th ey paid for the
o f his re fo rm s w ere m o re sy m b o lic as w e ll a n d in v ite d lan d th e y received.
a c u ltu ra l t u r n to th e W e s t (H u g h e s 2 0 0 8 : 6 8 -7 7 ; T he fo rm a tio n o f th e R u ssia n sta te a n d th e w ay in
B u sh k o v itch 201 2 : 8 2 -8 3 , 9 4 -9 8 ). F o r exam ple, he for­ w h ic h sta te service a n d th e e d u c a tio n a l system lin k e d to
b a d e n obles to w e a r th e ir c u sto m a ry b e a rd s a n d d e m a n d e d th e stra tific a tio n system h a d im p o rta n t im p lica tio n s for
ch an g e s in d ress. N o t a ll o f th e s e m oves w ere p o p u la r, b u t R ussia’s fu tu re , ex ac erb a ted b y la te -n in e te e n th -c e n tu ry
th e re w as little d o u b t th a t R u ssia u n d e r P e te r w as s tr o n ­ refo rm . O n e , p e rh a p s u n in te n d e d , c o n seq u en ce o f th e long
g e r th a n it h a d b e e n in p re v io u s years. R u ssia p lay e d a series o f refo rm s th a t ra n fro m P e te r th e G re a t’s years
c e n tra l role in th e G re a t N o r th e rn W a r th a t d ra m a tic a lly o n w a rd w as th a t e d u c a tio n a l a tta in m e n t w as very closely
re d u ce d S w ed ish p o w er, m u c h to R u ssia ’s b e n e fit (A sch e r lin k e d to sta tu s a tta in m e n t: T o b e a n in te lle c tu a l w as very
2 0 0 9 : 6 1 -6 2 ). desirable. T his m ad e e d u c a tio n a l a tta in m e n t a m ajo r d raw
Subsequent years saw som e decline (A scher 2 0 0 9 :6 6 -6 7 ), for ta le n t, a n d sociologically a so c iety w ith a n a g ra ria n
b u t Russia encountered a n o th e r strong leader in C ath erin e eco n o m y a n d relativ ely few p ro sp e cts outsid e o f state
th e G reat, w ho seized th e th ro n e in a coup d ’eta t in 1762. service (in c lu d in g th e m ilita ry ) a n d a n im p o rta n t, i f n u ­
C ath erin e w as kn o w n as a p atro n o f th e E u ro p ea n E n lig h t­ m erica lly sm a ll, se g m e n t o f h ig h ly e d u ca te d p erso n s is p o ­
enm ent (on R ussian culture u n d e r C a th e rin e, see H ughes te n tia lly explosive (G re en fe ld 1992). R u ssia n n a tio n a lism
2008: 81-88). I n th is, as in o th er th in g s, there w as an affinity sp re ad as R u ssia n lite ra tu re a n d c u ltu ra l p ro d u c tio n grew.
b etw een her rule a n d th a t o f Peter, as again she tu rn e d to M o re o v er, th a t n a tio n a lism a cq u ire d a stro n g ly p o p u list
W este rn m odels as she aim ed to increase R ussia’s pow er and co m p o n en t, e p ito m iz ed in th e N a ro d n ik , or “T o th e People,”
status. She increased th e adm inistrative reach and centraliza­ M o v e m en t in th e early 1870s (Service 2 0 0 9 :1 7 -1 8 ). A m o n g
tio n o f th e state, a n d co ntinued to assert R ussia’s role as a o th e r th in g s, R ussian in te lle ctu a ls w e n t to live w ith p o o r
geopolitical power. M oreover, she spread W e ste rn ideas peasants in h opes o f h e lp in g to lead a m ovem ent, w h ic h m e t
th ro u g h o u t R ussia a n d even p atro n ize d th e m in W este rn w ith little success. H ow ever, d isc o n te n t a n d agitatio n w ould
E urope (supporting F ren ch intellectuals, for exam ple, continue. M o s t notably, T sa r A le x a n d e r I I w as assassinated
528 Russia (Russian Federation)

Historical D evelopm ent

Tim eline
1682-1725 Reign of Peter the Great, seen as Western-oriented invades the Soviet Union, but ultimately
modernizer of Russia retreats in a major turning point in the war
1762-1796 Reign of Catherine the Great, another Westernizer, in Europe.
patron of philosophers and other intellectuals, but 1945 Soviets occupy Berlin with the fall of Hitler.
nevertheless autocratic and a critic of the French 1946-1989 Cold War, an ideological, military, and economic
Revolution rivalry between the Communist world led by the
1812 Invasion of Russia by Napoleon of France; French Soviet Union and the capitalist, democratic world
reach Moscow, but then retreat and Napoleon is led by the United States
defeated. 1949 Soviets test atomic bomb.
1815 Congress of Vienna 1953 Death of Stalin
1853-1856 Crimean War pits Russia against France, Great 1956 U.S.S.R. cracks down on dissent in Hungary with
Britain, and the Ottoman Empire. invasion.
1861-1866 Beginning of the process of emancipation of the 1957 U.S.S.R. launches Sputnik satellite.
serfs and state peasants 1961 Berlin Wall erected; Soviet Union becomes first
1881 Assassination of Tsar Alexander II country to send man into space.
1905 1905 Revolution (brings about constitutional 1968 U.S.S.R. crushes “Prague Spring" movement in
monarchy) Czechoslovakia.
1917 Russian Revolution(s) that topple the tsar and bring 1972 SALT I treaty as policy of detente between the
the Communists to power U.S.S.R. and the United States commences.
1918-1921 Russian Civil War 1989 Fall of Berlin Wall and collapse of Soviet-led com­
1921 Vladimir Lenin's New Economic Policy (NEP) munism in Eastern and Central Europe (Poland,
1924 Death of Lenin, which leads to Joseph Stalin's rise Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Bulgaria,
to prominence Romania); Soviet Union begins to unravel.
1928-1933 First Five Year Plan and introduction of a command 1991 Communist hardliner coup to replace Mikhail
economy Gorbachev results in street mobilizations for
1929 Consolidation of Stalin's authority; Leon Trotsky is further reform; U.S.S.R. collapses and divides into
forced into exile. fifteen countries; Boris Yeltsin becomes president
1933-1937 Second Five Year Plan of independent Russia.
1935-1938 Period Notable for Stalinist Purges, including 2000 Vladimir Putin is elected president.
1937-1938 mass executions (the "Great Terror") 2008 Dmitry Medvedev is elected president, with
1938-1941 Third Five Year Plan (ends prematurely due to the Vladimir Putin as prime minister.
Second World War) 2012 Vladimir Putin is re-elected president amid allega­
1939 Soviets sign Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi tions of electoral irregularities and widespread
Germany, including secret agreement to divide up public protests; Putin nominates Dmitry Medvedev
Europe; World War II begins in Europe. as prime minister.
1940 Trotsky is murdered in Mexico. 2014 Russia annexes the Crimean peninsula, a
1941 Germany invades Soviet Union. Russian-majority region in neighboring Ukraine,
1941-1945 Soviet involvement in World War II, in which and Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine
more than 20 million Soviets die; Hitler seek to join with Russia.

in 1881. H is successor, A le x a n d e r I I I , en d eav o red to u n d o D e m a n d s for c h a n g e cam e to a h e a d in th e first years

m a n y o f th e reform s o f th e previous decades (A sch e r 2 0 0 9 : o f th e tw e n tie th c en tu ry . N o te th a t R u ssia w as relatively
1 2 5 -1 3 0 ). e x ce p tio n a l in th is p e rio d (in th e E u ro p e a n c o n te x t) for
 Profile 529

still b e in g a n o n -c o n s titu tio n a l m o n arch y . R u ssia’s h ig h ly to L e n in ’s e x p e c ta tio n s, th e rise o f th e S o v iet U n io n d id

e d u ca te d , lite ra te , a n d p a rtia lly W e s te rn iz e d n o b ility , n o t trig g e r a w ave o f successful p ro le ta ria n revolutions
alo n g w ith n o n -n o b le in te lle c tu a ls , w ere p a in fu lly aw are th ro u g h o u t E u ro p e (A sch e r 2 0 0 9 : 167-168). T he new
o f th is sig n o f “b a c k w a rd n e ss.” T he c o u n try h a d b e g u n g o v e rn m e n t so o n b e g a n to in cre ase th e a lre a d y notable
sta te -le d in d u s tria liz a tio n (Service 2 0 0 9 : 4 - 5 ) , a n d w h ile role o f th e sta te in th e R u ssia n econom y, a n d it b eg an
in d u s tria l w o rk ers w ere o n ly a tin y fra c tio n o f th e ov erall a g ra ria n re fo rm s, p ittin g p o o re r p e a s a n ts a g a in st th o se
p o p u la tio n , th e y w ere im p o rta n t a g ita to rs c o n c e n tra te d in w h o w e re b e tte r off. S o m e o f th is w as re la x ed w ith L e n in ’s
th e la rg e st c ities in w h a t w o u ld b e c alled th e R e v o lu tio n o f m o re p ra g m a tic “N e w E c o n o m ic Policy,” b e g in n in g in
1905 (C a rr [1979] 2 0 0 4 : 2; F itz p a tric k 1994: 3 3 -3 4 ). A n ­ 1921 (Service 2 0 0 9 : 1 2 3 -1 4 9 ; B u sh k o v itc h 2012: 3 1 8 -
o th e r c ritica l fa cto r w as R u ssia’s p o o r sh o w in g a g a in st 319). L e n in d ie d in 1924, s e ttin g o ff a stru g g le w ith in th e
Ja p a n in th e R u sso -Ja p an e se W a r, w h ic h seem ed to sig n a l p a r ty for suprem acy. T he m a in c o n te n d e rs w ere Jo se p h
sta te w eak n e ss a n d th e n e e d fo r re fo rm . T he rev o lu tio n S ta lin a n d L e o n T ro tsk y . By 1929, S ta lin h a d co n so lid a ted
its e lf co n sisted larg e ly o f a series o f s trik e s a n d o th e r ac­ h is a u th o rity , a n d T ro ts k y w as fo rce d in to exile (A sch e r
tio n s (F itz p a tric k 1994: 3 2 -3 3 ). I t also, lam en tab ly , u n ­ 2 0 0 9 ): H e w o u ld b e m u rd e re d b y S ta lin ’s a g en ts, in
leash ed a series of p o g ro m s. T he goals of th e M e x ico , in 1940. P a rtic u la rly b e g in n in g in th e 1930s,
“re v o lu tio n aries” v a rie d considerably. S o m e w ere sim ply S ta lin b e ca m e fam o u sly p a ra n o id , a n d th e S ta lin is t reg im e
d isa ffec te d p e a sa n ts a n d u rb a n w o rk ers. O th e r s w ere p u rg e d n u m ero u s a lle g ed o p p o n e n ts , o fte n u sin g “show
c o m m itte d id eo lo g u e s, m o st n o ta b ly th e P e te rs b u rg tria ls ” a n d fo rce d co n fessio n s in a n e ffo rt to m a in ta in th e
Soviet, w h ic h w as a h a rb in g e r o f th in g s to com e. T he rev­ a p p ea ran c e o f leg itim acy . T his b e h a v io r w o u ld c o n tin u e
o lu tio n e n d ed w ith R u ssia b e c o m in g a c o n s titu tio n a l a fte r th e w ar. M illio n s d ie d o r w ere im p riso n e d u n d e r
m onarchy. F o r m an y M a rx is t c o m m e n ta to rs , th is m ark e d S ta lin .
it as a “b o u rg e o is re v o lu tio n ,” p o te n tia lly s e ttin g th e stage T he S ta lin is t re g im e set o u t to e x te n d so c ialist revolu­
for th e n e x t re v o lu tio n a ry seq u en ce, w h ic h th e y h o p e d tio n . T he first Five Y ear P la n (1 9 2 8 -1 9 3 3 ) a im e d to b o th
w o u ld issue in c o m m u n ism . force ra p id in d u s tria liz a tio n a n d to c o lle ctiv iz e a g ric u l­
T hey w o u ld n o t have to w a it lo n g , as “th e ” R u ssian tu re (F itz p a tric k 1994: 1 2 9 -1 4 1 ). I t w as so m e w h a t suc­
R evolution w o u ld em erge in 1917 (F itz p a tric k 1994; C a r r cessfu l w ith re g a rd to th e fo rm e r g o al, b u t th e la tte r goal
[1979] 2 0 0 4 ). T he years a fte r th e 1905 rev o lu tio n saw w as larg e ly a fa ilu re in e co n o m ic a n d h u m a n te rm s, cost­
a g ra ria n re fo rm th a t w o u ld in crease priv ate la n d h o ld in g as in g m illio n s o f lives (Service 2 0 0 9 : 181). T he S econd
w ell as o th e r c h an g es. H o w ev er, th e decisive ev en t th a t (1 9 3 3 -1 9 3 7 ) a n d T h ird (1 9 3 8 -1 9 4 1 ) Five Y ear P la n s c o n ­
h e lp e d to trig g e r th e R e v o lu tio n o f 1917 w as th e F irs t tin u e d S ta lin ’s efforts to achieve sta te -le d fu ll in d u s tria l­
W o rld W ar. R ussia suffered heav y losses, a n d its tro o p s iz a tio n . T he la st o f th e se efforts w as d isru p te d by the
faced difficu lt c o n d itio n s. T he w a r lo st p u b lic su p p o rt, a n d invasion o f N a z i G e rm an y . F o r th e first tw o years o f th a t
th e relative m ilita ry w e ak n e ss o f th e sta te th a t h a d lo st th e w a r th e Soviet U n io n re m a in e d u ninvolved because o f a
C rim e a n W a r a n d th e R u sso -Jap an ese W a r w as a g a in ex­ n o n -a g g re ssio n p a c t th a t H itle r a n d S ta lin h a d signed in
p o sed . T he y e ar 1917 w as th e key year, w ith tw o c ritica l 1939 (K itch e n 2 0 0 6 : 2 9 7 -2 9 8 , 3 0 1 -3 0 4 ). B u t in 1941
re v o lu tio n ary stages. In M a rc h , stre e t p ro te sts le d to th e H itle r c h a n g e d co u rse a n d in v a d e d th e S o v iet U n io n
fa ll o f th e tsa r a n d his g o v e rn m e n t. A p ro v isio n al g o v e rn ­ (B u sh k o v itc h 201 2 : 3 7 8 -3 8 2 ). T he fig h tin g o n th e easte rn
m e n t w as fo rm ed b y th e leg isla tu re (th e D u m a ), b u t it w as fro n t (G e rm a n y fo u g h t th e S o v iet U n io n in th e e ast a n d
soon riv aled b y “S oviets” (councils) o f w o rk ers, p e asan ts, th e o th e r a llies in th e w est) w as b ru ta l a n d th e loss o f life
a n d g e n era l m ilita ry p e rso n n e l in o th e r p a rts o f th e c o u n ­ e n o rm o u s. W h ile th e a llies e m e rg e d v icto rio u s, th e p ro ­
try. I n sh o rt, it w as n o t e n tire ly clear w h o w as in c h arg e o f cess w as v e ry co stly fo r th e S o v iet U n io n . A t th e sam e
R ussia. B efore lo n g th e B olsheviks, a ra d ic a l so cialist tim e , it e n d e d u p g re a tly e x p a n d in g th e te rrito ry c o n ­
g ro u p , to o k over th e Soviets, a n d th e P ro v isio n a l G o v e rn ­ tro lle d b y th e S o v iet R e g im e , n o ta b ly E a s te rn E u ro p e a n d
m e n t fell, leaving th e Soviets in c h arg e . T h is w o u ld b e fol­ m u c h o f C e n tra l E u ro p e , w h ic h in th e y ears a fte r th e w a r
low ed b y w ith d ra w a l fro m W o rld W a r I early th e n e x t y ear b e ca m e S o v ie t sa tellite states.
a n d o n g o in g civil w a r b e tw e e n B olsheviks (w ho re n a m e d T he s e ttle m e n t a t th e e n d o f W o rld W a r I I se t th e stage
them selves th e C o m m u n ists) a n d M e n sh e v ik s. C o n tra ry fo r th e C o ld W a r. T he S o v iet U n io n a n d th e U n ited
530 Russia (Russian Federation)

S ta te s— th o u g h t o f as re p re se n tativ es o f tw o , in c o n siste n t, 2 0 0 9 : 5 2 2 -5 2 8 ). F ro m th e b e g in n in g , Y eltsin em braced

v isions for h o w to o rg a n iz e society — -jostled for g lo b al in ­ ra d ic al fre e -m a rk e t refo rm (M c F a u l 2 008: 359-361),
fluence, a n d p roxy w ars w ere fo u g h t in a n u m b e r o f devel­ quick ly p riv atizin g key in d u strie s a n d h e lp in g to create
o p in g c o u n trie s, c au sin g c o n sid erab le su ffe rin g a n d loss o f w h a t co m m e n ta to rs n o w so m etim es refer to as R ussia’s
life. F o r b o th sides, fears o f th e p ro sp e c t o f n u c le ar “cro n y cap italism .” A relatively sm all g ro u p o f w e alth y in d i­
w a r w ere p a r t o f d a ily life. S ta lin d ie d in 1953, a n d w as v id u als b e n efite d d isp ro p o rtio n a tely fro m p riv atiza tio n
follow ed b y lo n g te rm s fo r tw o c o n secu tiv e leaders, schem es, a n d econom ic p e rfo rm an ce w as co n sisten tly p o o r
K h ru s h c h e v a n d B rezh n ev . K h ru s h c h e v a im e d to “d e - for a n u m b e r o f years, y ield in g a n increase in p o v erty
S ta lin iz e ” th e c o u n try , r e p u d ia tin g th e p u rg e s a n d o th e r (A sch er 2 0 0 9 ; Service 200 9 : 518-519, 5 4 0 -5 4 1 ). R ule o f
form s o f o p p re ssio n th a t h a d c la im e d so m any, a n d m a k in g law d e clin ed precipitously as w ell (Service 2 0 0 9 : 519, 534;
a n u m b e r o f reform s. F ive y e a r p lan s c o n tin u e d , how ever, B u sh k o v itch 2012: 4 5 2 -4 5 3 ). E co n o m ic problem s w ere
a n d n e ith e r o f th e se lead ers seriously c o n sid ere d a n o n ­ ex acerbated by th e d isap p earan ce o f Soviet social e n title ­
so c ialist m o d el in e co n o m ic policy. T he fa c t th a t th e y m en ts, how ever im p e rfe c t th is m ay have been . E u p h o ria
c ritic iz e d S ta lin ’s a tro c ities sh o u ld n o t lead u s to c onclude, gave w ay to fru stra tio n and, for som e, to n o sta lg ia (Service
how ever, th a t th e y w ere n o t w illin g to rep ress civ ilian s 2 0 0 9 : 529). Y eltsin’s in co n siste n t lead ersh ip d id n o t help
th em selv es, as a n u m b e r o f c itiz e n s o f R u ssia a n d o f S oviet m atters, n o r d id th e w a r in C h e ch n y a . I n 1999 Y eltsin
satellite states w ere to le a rn (D a v ies 1996: 1 1 0 2 -1 1 0 4 ; elevated V la d im ir P u tin , first to th e p o st o f p rim e m in iste r
Service 2 0 0 9 : 4 3 5 -5 0 0 ). an d th e n a c tin g p re sid en t, a n d P u tin w as th e n elected
A fte r B rezhnev’s d e ath in 1982, th ere w as a series o f p re sid e n t in 2 0 0 0 .
short-lived, inconsequential leaders u n til M ik h a il G orbachev R u ssia u n d e r P u tin has b e e n fr u s tr a tin g to th o se w h o
was selected in 1985. G orbachev em barked o n a series o f re­ h o p e d t h a t th e p o s t-S o v ie t tr a n s itio n w o u ld le a d to a lib ­
form s (D avies 1996: 1121; B ushkovitch 2012: 448 -4 5 1 ). In e ra l, re p re se n ta tiv e d e m o c ra c y a n d a fu lly c a p ita lis t e c o n ­
th e econom ic sphere, th is involved try in g to expand th e role om y. P u t i n ’s k e y g o als seem to have b e e n to (1) so lid ify
o f m arkets, so as to preserve socialism th ro u g h e n h an cin g h is o w n p o w e r b ase; (2) c e n tra liz e a u th o r ity (Service
productivity and efficiency. It w as clear to all in th e Soviet 2 0 0 9 : 552); (3) s tre n g th e n th e sta te ; (4) cu rb th e in flu e n ce
w orld th a t change w as afoot, a n d once it becam e clear th a t o f th e b u sin e ss lea d ers o r “o lig a rc h s” w h o m ig h t o p p o se
G orbachev w ould n o t repress pro test in C e n tra l and E astern h im a n d h is allies; a n d (5) re su m e a m o re a sse rtiv e for­
E urope w ith th e force th a t previous Soviet leaders h a d used, e ig n policy. U n d e r P u tin , R u ssia h a s re a ss e rte d c o n tro l
th o se countries began to seek independence. P o lan d w as th e over its tr a d itio n a l sp h e res o f in flu e n ce . N o ta b le e x a m ­
in itial leader, a n d its S olidarity M o v em en t struggled for years ples are R u ssia ’s decisive v ic to ry over G e o rg ia in 2 0 0 8
in its efforts to b rin g about a transition, w ith a successful and a n d its m ilita ry in v o lv e m en t in n e ig h b o rin g U k ra in e , i n ­
peaceful revolution ta k in g place in 1989, follow ed shortly c lu d in g R u ssia ’s a n n e x a tio n o f C rim e a in 201 4 . A su s­
thereafter by a wave o f sim ilar ones th ro u g h o u t th e region ta in e d in c re a se in oil p rice s in th e m id -2 0 0 0 s c o n trib u te d
(A sh 2002). C o m m u n ist elites in th e Soviet U n io n w ere to c o n siste n t R u ssia n e co n o m ic g ro w th a n d a id e d P u t i n ’s
alarm ed, n o t surprisingly. E ventually som e o f th e m launched efforts.
a coup d ’eta t ag ain st G orbachev in an effort to restore cen­ P u tin h a s so lid ifie d p e rs o n a l c o n tro l o f R u ss ia n p o li­
tralize d control: The p lan backfired, and w h en th e d u st set­ tic s. W h il e th e g o v e rn m e n t h a s fo rm a lly in d e p e n d e n t
tle d Boris Yeltsin w as in charge o f th e R ussian Federation b ra n c h e s , fe w d o u b t h is a u th o rity . T h is is p e rh a p s c le a r­
(the Soviet U n io n w as gone). e st in e le c to ra l p o litic s , w h e re R u ssia is a case o f so -
G o rb a ch e v h a d h o p e d to save th e d re am o f c o m m u ­ c a lle d “c o m p e titiv e a u th o r ita r ia n is m ” (L e v its k y and
nism : Y eltsin m oved to e n d it. H e p re sen te d h im s e lf as a W a y 2010). P u t i n h a s fo rm a lly sa tisfie d th e ru le s re g a r d ­
d em o crat, th o u g h his g o v e rn in g style w as so m ew h at a u to ­ in g te rm lim its , m o v in g to th e p o s itio n o f p rim e m in is te r
cratic. H e w as able to in au g u ra te a new , m ore dem o cratic w h ile a p ro te g e , D m itr y M e d v e d ev , a sc e n d e d to th e
c o n stitu tio n for th e R u ssian F e d e ratio n a fte r ta k in g adv an ­ p re sid en c y . F o r a tim e , c o m m e n ta to rs w o n d e re d w h e th e r
tag e o f a conflict w ith th e S uprem e Soviet, w h ic h h a d b een a n d to w h a t e x te n t M e d v e d e v w o u ld sta k e o u t a n in d e ­
elected before th e collapse o f th e Soviet U n io n (Service p e n d e n t lin e . H o w ev e r, it so o n b e c a m e c le a r t h a t P u tin
 Profile 531

w o u ld re m a in th e c e n tr a l fig u re in R u ss ia n p o litic s. g o v e rn m e n t’s se lectiv e ta r g e tin g o f p o litic a l o p p o n e n ts

P u tin w as re -e le c te d to th e p re sid e n c y in 2 0 1 2 , w ith n u ­ fo r p ro s e c u tio n (S e rv ice 2 0 0 9 : 550). A s o f 2 0 1 4 a n d early
m ero u s a lle g a tio n s o f e le c to ra l ir re g u la ritie s a n d w id e ­ 2 0 1 5 , as oil p rice s h ave d ro p p e d , th e re g im e ’s a u th o ri­
sp re a d p u b lic p ro te s ts . T he a u th o r ita r ia n c h a ra c te r o f th e ta ria n is m and m ilita r is m h ave b e co m e s till m o re
c o n te m p o ra ry R u ssia n re g im e is also re v e a le d b y th e e v id e n t.

Regime and Political Institutions

F ro m an in stitu tio n a l perspective, R ussia is a sem i- p re sid e n t even w h ile his ally, M edvedev, h a d a n o th e r te rm
pre sid en tial system . T he p re sid en t a n d th e p rim e m in iste r o f e lig ib ility — a n d th e fa ct th a t M e d v e d ev d id n o t publicly
b o th have considerable pow ers. H ow ever, in re a lity in c o n te st th is — in d icates th a t th e in fo rm a l a n d b ackstage ex­
re ce n t years, in stitu tio n s are n o t as stro n g a n d in d e p e n d e n t ercise o f pow er w as fu n d a m e n ta l here. P re sid e n tia l pow ers
as a review o f th e ir fo rm al featu res m ig h t lead us to suppose are stro n g on paper. T he p re sid en t can even veto n o -
(as can b e seen in several o f th e case stu d y boxes th a t confidence votes in th e leg islatu re, th o u g h th ese are subject
follow). M o s t observers believe th a t even in his years as to override in th e D u m a . In practice, th o u g h , in th e c u rre n t
prim e m in ister, c u rre n t p re sid e n t V la d im ir P u tin w as th e system , P u tin ’s p e rso n a l a u th o rity seem s m ore im p o rta n t
tru e decision m ak er o n key issues, n o t th e n -p re sid e n t th a n fo rm al p ow ers (see fu rth e r discussion in th e case study
D m itri M edvedev. O p tim ists m ig h t arg u e th a t som e degree for c h a p te r 10). P e rso n a lism is n o t re stric te d to th e execu­
o f in stitu tio n a liz e d dem ocracy p ersists th ro u g h th is p a t­ tive itself: P o litical p a rtie s have com e to b e associated w ith
tern . A fte r all, P u tin d id n o t a tte m p t to ig n o re th e c o n sti­ le a d in g in d iv id u a ls in several cases. In sh o rt, co n te m p o ra ry
tu tio n a l ru le th a t w o u ld have p re v en ted h im fro m h o ld in g R u ssian politics still has som e m in im a l d em o cratic fea­
a n o th e r consecutive p re sid en tial term . P essim ists, th o u g h , tu re s , b u t few observers n o w re g ard it as a fu n c tio n in g
w o u ld n o te th a t his p e rso n al decision to ru n a g ain for dem ocracy.

Regim e and Political Institutions

Regime Federal Republic

Administrative Divisions Eighty-three or eighty-five units in the Federation, of which twenty-one (or
twenty-two) are formally republics; since annexation in 2014, Russia has claimed
Crimea as a constituent republic and the Crimean city of Sevastopol as a federal
city, but many Western countries do not diplomatically recognize this change.

Executive Branch Semi-presidential: president and prime minister

Selection of Executive President is elected, and appoints the prime minister.

Legislative Branch Bicameral

Lower chamber: State Duma
Upper chamber: Federation Council

Judicial Branch Supreme Court is the highest judicial authority. A Constitutional Court is
responsible for judicial review. There is a separate Superior Court for economic
issues, called the Supreme Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation.

Political Party System Russia's is a multiparty system, though some doubt the independence and
efficacy of some of the parties. Important parties include United Russia (the
party of Putin); the Communist Party; and the Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia.
532 Russia (Russian Federation)

Political Culture
A s n o ted in th e “H isto ric a l D e v e lo p m e n t” sectio n o f th ese an d econom ic stru c tu re s as b a ck w a rd (a ju d g m e n t th a t, as
c o u n try m aterials, R ussia has long stru g g led w ith its rela­ th e p re c e d in g h isto ric a l n arrativ e show s, th e c o u n try has
tio n sh ip w ith W e s te rn E u ro p e. O n e stro n g p o litica l cul­ lo n g b e e n try in g to escape). T hese tendencies have n o d o u b t
tu ra l ten d en cy has b e en to w a rd W e s te rn iz a tio n and fa cilitate d th e a u th o rita ria n featu res o f th e R ussian g o v ern ­
m o d ern iza tio n . T his has m e a n t d iffere n t th in g s a t differen t m e n t in th e P u tin years, as h e p resen ts h im s e lf as th e one
tim es a n d for d ifferen t constituencies, in c lu d in g c o n stitu ­ p e rso n capable o f re sto rin g R ussia’s “rig h tfu l” place in th e
tio n a l m onarchy, d e m o c ratiza tio n , econom ic developm ent, in te rn a tio n a l sta tu s h iera rch y (on th e im p o rta n c e o f resto r­
lite rary a n d a rtistic achievem ent, a n d even th e t u r n to so­ in g R ussia’s im ag e, see Service 200 9 : 549). P u tin can also
cialism . A n o th e r tendency, th o u g h , has p u lle d in th e o p ­ dra w o n n o tio n s m en tio n e d earlier o f R ussia as “d iffere n t”
posite d irec tio n , em p h a sizin g th e id ea o f a distin ctiv ely fro m W e s te rn E u ro p e a n d special, a rg u in g th a t R ussian
R ussian, Slavic, o r O rth o d o x id e n tity th a t is d ifferen t from , dem ocracy is likew ise d iffere n t fro m th e dem ocracy o f
a n d p erhaps su p erio r to , W e s te rn E u ro p e a n c u ltu re. o th e r c o u n tries. A t th e sam e tim e , som e scholars have
L in k e d to th is has b e e n R ussia’s h isto ric a b ility to d o m i­ p o in te d to su pposed h ig h levels o f R ussian su p p o rt for
nate th e natio n s in its periphery, w h ic h has le n t th e c o u n try d e m o c ratic values as a c o u n te rw e ig h t to th is so rt o f n a rra ­
a sense o f im p o rta n t g eopolitical status. T hus it is h a rd ly tive (B row n 2 006: 393 -3 9 4 ).
su rp risin g th a t R ussian p o litica l c u ltu re a fte r th e fall o f th e A n o th e r key fe a tu re o f R ussia’s p o litic a l c u ltu re in
Soviet U n io n show ed signs o f fru stra tio n a n d loss, b o rd e r­ re c e n t y ears h a s b e e n w id e sp re a d c o rru p tio n . A s a fe atu re
in g o n w h a t sociologists call “status-inconsistency,” as C e n ­ o f p o litic a l c u ltu re , c o rru p tio n acts b o th d ire c tly a n d
tra l a n d E a s te rn E u ro p e w ith d re w a n d m oved in to th e o rb it th r o u g h p e rc e p tio n s. I n o th e r w o rd s, th e a c tu a l c o rru p ­
o f W e ste rn E u ro p e a n d th e U n ite d States. In d e e d , R ussia’s tio n p ro d u c es c e rta in co n seq u en ces, b u t p e rc e p tio n s o f
concerns ab o u t som e o f th ese c o u n tries’ e n try in to N A T O c o rru p tio n fa cilitate c e rta in k in d s o f p o litics. M a n y com ­
can o nly be p a rtia lly ex p lain ed in term s o f n a tio n a l secu rity m e n ta to rs , b o th in R u ssia a n d a b ro ad , allege th a t R u ssia n
in te rest, as th is in te rest is b len d ed w ith concerns ab o u t n a ­ e co n o m ic lib e ra liz a tio n w as m ism a n a g e d , le a d in g to oli­
tio n a l prid e a n d th e sense th a t R ussia has a n a tu ra l o r h is­ g a rc h ic a l p o litics in th e 1990s. S u p p o rte rs trie d to ju s tify
to rically established “r ig h t” to d o m in a te th ese countries. P u tin ’s m o re a u th o rita ria n t u r n as a n e ce ssa ry re sp o n se to
M o re generally, R ussia u n d e rw e n t a tra n s itio n fro m b e in g a su c h d e v elo p m en ts, y e t in c e rta in re sp ec ts it has led to
society th a t saw its e lf as b e in g o n th e “rig h t side o f h istory,” w e a k ru le o f law a n d o n g o in g c o rru p tio n in b o th eco n o m ­
w ith allegedly scientific c e rta in ty o f even tu al triu m p h , to ics a n d p o litic s, even w h ile o rd e r w as re sto re d (B ro w n
one th a t saw m u ch o f th e globe view th e so ciety ’s political 2 0 0 6 : 395).

Political Economy
R ussia is a fa scin a tin g case for p o litica l econom ists because societies. I t d id , how ever, have p e rio d s o f stro n g g ro w th
it has w itn esse d a sh ift fro m a largely a g rarian econom y, to a n d clearly w as successful in ach iev in g in d u stria liz a tio n
sta te -led in d u stria liz a tio n a n d c en tra l p la n n in g u n d e r th e (th o u g h th e h u m a n costs o f th is w ere very high). Som e
Soviet U n io n , to a b u m p y tra n sitio n to a m a rk e t econom y. w o u ld allege th a t th e Soviet system failed because it does
T he Soviet system w as a c o m m a n d econom y. T his m eans n o t give sufficient incentive to e n tre p re n e u ria l a ctiv ity a n d
th a t th e state w as responsible for m ajor decisions ab o u t in ­ encourages a c u ltu re o f dependency. I t is h a rd to k n o w ho w
v e stm e n t, p ro d u c tio n targ e ts, a n d th e social o rg a n iz atio n o f tru e th is is o f th e R u ssian case. O n one h a n d , p o p u la r dis­
econom ic life. F ro m th e perspective o f c o n te m p o ra ry eco­ satisfaction w ith th e m a rk e t reform s o f th e 1990s might be
nom ics, th is leads to inefficiencies, since m ark ets are ju d g e d ta k e n to in d ic a te a sense o f c itize n e n title m e n t o f th is sort.
m ore capable th a n state fu n c tio n arie s o f h a n d lin g th e com ­ O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e “sh o ck th e ra p y ” stra te g y o f R ussian
plex arrays o f in fo rm a tio n ab o u t p ricin g , supply, and p riv atiza tio n a n d th e p o litica l a n d econom ic c o rru p tio n
dem an d . O v e r th e lo n g h a u l th e Soviet U n io n d id n o t t h a t follow ed m ig h t b e to b lam e for th is reactio n . P erhaps
m atc h th e econom ic p erfo rm an ce o f th e advanced cap italist m ore m ea su re d econom ic reform s— w ith less tu m u ltu o u s
 Case Studies 533

econom ic a n d social consequences— w o u ld have m itig ate d R ussia faces a series o f social problem s lin k e d in differ­
th e im p a c t o f changes. e n t w ays to its econom ic fo rtu n es, in c lu d in g h ig h rates o f
T he R ussian econom y saw relatively s tro n g p e rfo rm a n ce alcoholism a n d d ru g a d d ic tio n , a h ig h crim e rate, relatively
in th e first p a rt o f th is century. R ussia saw h ig h G D P lo w life expectancy, a n d a v e ry low b ir th rate, p a rticu la rly
g ro w th in th e 2 0 0 0 s, o w in g in p a r t to h ig h oil prices. T he am o n g e th n ic R ussians, p ro d u c in g c h allen g in g d e m o ­
global recession h it R ussia h a rd in 2 0 0 9 , a n d a fte r a b rie f g ra p h ic issues. A lc o h o lism has lo n g b e e n a pro b lem in
recovery, g ro w th w as e stim a te d at o nly 1.3% in 2013 (C IA R ussia, b u t it seem s to have in creased d u rin g th e tu m u ltu ­
W o rld F actbook). A t p resen t, w ith th e re ce n t fall in oil ous years follo w in g th e collapse o f th e S oviet U n io n . The
prices, p o ten tially serious econom ic problem s lo o m , a n d sam e is tru e o f life expectancy, w h ic h fell n otably as eco­
th is could b e ex acerbated b y in te rn a tio n a l sanctions a g ain st n o m ic problem s m o u n te d in th e years a fte r th e tran sitio n .
R ussian b an k s a n d com panies follo w in g R ussia’s in cu rsio n P o v e rty ju m p e d dram atically, a n d as c rim in o lo g ists w ould
in to U k ra in e in 2014. A s o f 201 3 , th e c o u n try ’s g in i coef­ p re d ic t, a ll else b e in g e q u al th is leads to in cre asin g crim e.
ficient sto o d a t 39.7 (W o rld B a n k estim ate), w ith a slightly Y et h ere, as w ith o th e r m ajo r social p roblem s faced b y th e
m ore eq u al incom e d istrib u tio n th a n th e U n ite d States, R u ssian state today, th e e x p la n atio n c a n n o t ju st tu rn to eco­
th o u g h m ore u n e q u a l th a n m o st o fW e s te rn E u ro p e. R ussia nom ics. R a th e r, th e failure o f th e state to estab lish ru le o f
rem ain s a society w ith a relatively h ig h level o f in d u stria l­ law a n d th e re su ltin g c o rru p tio n , cronyism , a n d im p u n ity
ization. O f its G D P , 4 .2 p e rc e n t is p ro d u c ed by th e a g ric u l­ m e n tio n e d previously— are no d o u b t also im p lica ted in o n ­
tu ra l sector a n d 37.5 p e rce n t b y in d u stry , w ith th e service g o in g h ig h rates o f crim e. T he d e clin e o f th e e th n ic R ussian
sector a cc o u n tin g for th e re m a in in g 58.3 p e rc e n t o r so p o p u la tio n is p o te n tia lly q u ite pro b lem atic, p a rticu la rly
(C IA W o rld F actbook). T he oil a n d n a tu ra l gas in d u strie s given th e h ig h levels o f x en o p h o b ia a n d nativ ism am o n g
are p a rticu la rly im p o rta n t c o m p o n e n ts o f th e R ussian e th n ic R ussians: I f th e d e m o g rap h ics d o n o t c h an g e, R ussia
econom y, a n d th e c o u n try d ep en d s u p o n th e proceeds o f its w ill n e ed to d e p en d m ore o n im m ig ra n t labor, b u t given
ex p o rts to E u ro p e. R ussia’s tra d itio n s, th is m ig h t g en era te fu rth e r problem s.

CASESTUDIES
7

Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia CHAPTER 7, PAGE 153

Russia's political development has been by a return to more centralized power and developed only weak state institutions
mixed since the fall of the Soviet Union in decision making by a closed set of eco­ and lacked a rule of law. This gave rise to a
1991. An optimistic burst of activity in the nomic and political elites. corrupt network of “oligarchs," newly
early 1990s pushed the country from In the early 1990s, as the former Soviet wealthy tycoons that operated in a style
Soviet rule toward a greater emphasis on Union crumbled, Russia moved toward reminiscent of the mafia, especially in the
individual rights, but the country is now more open and democratic rule under areas of oil and natural gas. Privatization
widely considered to be under authoritar­ the erratic president Boris Yeltsin. The was seen going in step with democratiza­
ian rule, or at least to be moving decisively country also moved to a more open tion by giving individuals more freedoms,
toward centralization. At best, Russia can economy as privatization turned state en­ but the practice led to the creation of
be seen as a hybrid regime with many au­ terprises over to private hands. Despite mega-rich corporate bosses that came to
thoritarian features that blends in some the excitement of the reforms, the stron­ dominate the economy due to privileged
elements of electoral democracy. Russia's gest lasting image of this period is prob­ connections to the state at the time of
trajectory since 1991 is one in which a de­ ably the dysfunctional transfer of privatization. The result was a massive
mocratizing moment has been followed economic power in which Russia concentration of wealth in the hands of a
534 Russia (Russian Federation)

CASE STUDY (continued)

Oligarchy, Democracy, and Authoritarianism in Russia c h a p t e r ? ,p a g e 153

few elites who were well connected to Putin administration renationalized his oil into Putin's claims that the rule of law and
the state. As one observer noted, "an oli­ firm Yukos, transferring the resources to security required a strong central hand.
garch's success, in other words, almost the Russian state, in what was widely seen Putin abolished gubernatorial elections in
always depended on his connections to as a deliberate attack on the power of oli­ 2004 and increasingly cracked down on
the government officials in charge of garchs who might get out of line (for ex­ non-governmental organizations over
privatizing the country's rich energy and ample, by funding political opponents of time (Sharafutdinova 2011: 5; Freedom
mineral deposits” (Goldman 2004: 36). Putin and his allies). The move signaled House 2011).
The oligarchs exercised considerable con­ that Putin would allow no dissent, though One of the key features of Russia's au­
trol in Russian politics under Yeltsin and the government would work with oli­ thoritarian rule has thus been the removal
contributed to the breakdown of the rule garchs that supported Putin and his ver­ of alternative sources of power. The
of law, even bankrolling Yeltsin's cam­ sion of "managed democracy" (Colton moves to sideline those oligarchs who
paign in exchange for options to pur­ and McFaul 2003; Goldman 2004: 36). were critical of Putin's rule have been part
chase state assets at favorable prices Many of the wealthy beneficiaries of Rus­ and parcel of a broader centralization of
(Rose, Mishler, and Munro 2006:64). sia's 1990s privatization have either power and control. One leading com­
While the emergence of the oligarchs learned to work closely with the state or mentator notes that Russia is actually
thus undermined the rule of law under have been harassed by the state. The oli­ quite similar to other authoritarian re­
Yeltsin in the 1990s, cracking down on garchy has thus increasingly come under gimes in middle-income countries: It is
them also compromised democracy and state pressure or state control. not a totalitarian dictatorship, but “Putin
facilitated the rise of new authoritarianism Putin's centralization of authority has has reduced the role of parliament, in­
under Vladimir Putin. During his presi­ taken on several forms, and the year 2004 creased state control over the media, and
dency, Putin used state power to suppress was important on many fronts besides overseen the renationalization of two
powerful adversaries, most notably the the crackdown on Khodorkovsky. A major major oil companies" (Treisman 2011:342).
oligarchs. A key period was 2003 to 2005. tragedy altered Russian politics when The assertion of power over political insti­
In that time, the Putin government jailed separatists in the Caucasus region at­ tutions has gone hand in hand with the
Russia's wealthiest oligarch, the outspo­ tacked a school and massacred more state's establishment of control over the
ken Mikhail Khodorkovsky, and prose­ than three hundred people, mostly economy. We return to Putin and his style
cuted him on charges of tax fraud. The school children; this terror attack plugged of rule in the case studies that follow.

Executives in Russia: Formal and Informal Powers CHAPTER 10, PAGE 234

In the 2012 elections, Vladimir Putin re­ President Dmitry Medvedev (2008-2012) of executive power. Putin created a presi­
turned to Russia's presidency, after having was seen by many as a near-puppet who dency that has strong formal powers, but
previously been president from 2000 to never emerged from Putin's shadow. it is clear his informal powers and control
2008. What is especially striking about Medvedev was widely viewed as Putin's over much of Russian politics-are even
recent years, however, is the way Putin protege and as owing his political career more significant.
exercised substantial executive power to his predecessor. This case raises the Medvedev's relative weakness com­
while he was not the president. In fact, issue of the formal and informal sources pared with Putin was not for a lack of
 Case Studies 535

formal powers of the presidency. The legislative branch. In a Russia where de­ leverage over appointments in the media
prime minister is appointed by the presi­ mocracy has been under increasing au­ and judiciary. These informal sources of
dent with the consent of the legislature, thoritarian pressures, Putin has wielded power— which are more a function of the
the Duma. The prime minister is thus re­ extraordinary power over both the execu­ individual's leverage than the constitu­
sponsible both to the president and to tive and legislature, first as president and tional post that he holds— enabled him to
the Duma, and can be dismissed by either. then as prime minister. The peculiarity is retain effective control in Russia even
Under normal circumstances, the presi­ that Putin for a time wielded his power as while outside of the presidency. Indeed,
dent would seem to have considerable prime minister in a system in which he the effects of this can be seen even in the
authority over the prime minister. In fact, concentrated so much power in the process that led to Putin's return to the
the dominance of the presidency was presidency. presidency. Putin maneuvered in such a
clear during Putin's first two terms (2000— Putin's apparent dominance of the po­ way that the incumbent president de­
2008), but power seemed to remain more litical system in the period in question was clared that Putin should reclaim the post,
with Putin than with the office of the not spelled out in the constitution. Rather, even though Medvedev was eligible to
presidency once Russia's strongman the underpinnings of his power were (and run for a second term. Indeed, Medvedev
changed offices. remain) more numerous and less explicit. signed a law extending the next presiden­
During his first two terms as president, He is, for instance, a former head of the tial term from four years to six, with the full
Putin concentrated authority over secu­ intelligence services (formerly the KGB knowledge that Putin was likely to run
rity decisions, the budget, and policymak­ under Soviet rule) and tightly linked to the once again.
ing, especially relative to Russia's first security apparatus. He also has close link­ One thing is clear: for the period from
elected president, Boris Yeltsin (1991— ages to businesses owned or supported 1999 to the present, one man has domi­
1999). Yet Putin seemed to carry similar by the state, some of which are corrupt nated Russian politics, even though he
power over to the position of prime minis­ and rely upon Putin's power apparatus for has held different political leadership po­
ter, presiding over the State Duma in the their power and wealth. Putin exercises sitions during that time.

Personalism and the Party System in Russia CHAPTER 11, PAGE 265

Russia illustrates the challenge and im­ well-institutionalized party to contest "assiduously avoided any official affiliation
portance of party system institutionaliza­ democratic elections. On the contrary, with any national political party, prefer­
tion. During the Soviet period from 1918 Russia's poorly institutionalized party ring instead to rule in a non-transparent
to 1991, the party system was focused on system has facilitated authoritarian ten­ fashion through family members and
the single party, the Communist Party. dencies even in the absence of single­ longtime friends."
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, party rule. Personalism is not limited exclusively to
Russia became a country where the po­ To continue building on the themes of Putin and the United Russia party. Another
litical party system lost much of its struc­ the previous boxes, the Putin years have leading party has also become associated
ture. Russia saw some major parties seen significant centralization of power. with their particular leadership: the Liberal
emerge— and the Communists remained But the United Russia party that has Democratic Party under the erratic and un­
a minority party— but many of these backed Putin has taken a back seat to a predictable xenophobe Vladimir Zhiri­
came and went. In more recent years, more personal system of rule. As Kathryn novsky. Perhaps more significantly, Russians
Vladimir Putin has accumulated more Stoner-Weiss (2006: 114) describes Putin's felt little affinity for parties even after the
power, but not through constructing a presidency through his first term, he had transition from Soviet rule to a multiparty
536 Russia (Russian Federation)

Personalism and the Party System in Russia CHAPTER 11, PAGE 265

system in the 1990s (Mainwaring 1998). parties— with their weak links to society tightly linked to the personalism of the
President Boris Yeltsin was nominally an in­ and lack of consistent programmatic alter­ president. Similarly, the legislature has
dependent during his time in office. This natives— facilitated the rise of powerful been reshaped in a way that facilitates
meant that the political party system never actors such as Putin who work around central control, while the structure of the
institutionalized before the Putin years; in­ institutions. executive seen in chapter 10 clearly facili­
stead, Russians generally expressed dissat­ This prevalence of personalism in Rus­ tates personalism. In short, the various fea­
isfaction with the emergence of party sian politics is a clear demonstration of tures of Russian politics work together to
options, which may have contributed to how political development and political create a top-down system. Personalism is
a desire for a strong central hand in the institutions interact. The box on chapter 7 thus a theme that shows how the various
long run (Sharafutdinova 2011). In other shows how Russian authoritarianism con­ institutions of government link to other
words, the weak institutionalization of sists of centralized decision making that is features of a society's political culture.

Karl Marx expected that the great revolu­ group was numerically smaller than some exploitation and other classes beyond the
tion against capitalism would come in a other groups demanding change, their working class. Eventually, there would be
highly developed capitalist society like organization and unanimity may have no more need for a coercive state. This is
Britain. If he had lived long enough to been key to their success. Russia's involve­ not what happened in practice. While the
see it, he might have been surprised that ment in the First World War weakened the regime was indeed somewhat successful
it was in Russia where the most iconic state's position in society, and the Czar fell in redistributing wealth, it was very author­
revolution in his name would be made in early 1917. In the fall, the provisional itarian. Indeed, the state became highly
(Fitzpatrick 1994:26-27). government collapsed and the Soviets, coercive and totalitarian, attempting to
The setting for the Russian Revolution largely controlled by the Bolsheviks, as­ control not just the economy, but even po­
of 1917 was made over many years. By the sumed increasing authority. Russia with­ litical thought. Especially under Joseph
late nineteenth century, it was clear that drew from the First World War in early Stalin, the Soviet Union's human rights
the Czarist regime (Russian monarchs 1918, and civil war broke out between abuses were legion (Service 2009: 220-
were called czars) was falling behind the groups of "red" and "white" Russians. This 229). Millions were killed by the state. The
rest of Europe and needed reform. In conflict lasted several years, but in the end regime also came to dominate much of
1905, this produced Russia's so-called lib ­ the Bolshevik forces were victorious. Central and Eastern Europe.
eral revolution," which ended with a weak Through this process the Soviet Union The Russian Revolution was, however,
constitutional monarchy. However, this was born. Until its demise in 1991, the without a doubt one of history's most
did not stop political agitation. Though Soviet Union declared itself to be a Marxist dramatic social revolutions. It radically
Russia was a largely agrarian society, fig­ revolutionary regime. Among other things, transformed not just the structure of
ures like Leon Trotsky (and Vladimir Lenin, it aimed to ultimately collectivize all of the politics in Russian society, but the state's
though he was in exile for many years) as 'means of production,” doing away with role in the economy and the nature
well as lesser-known figures, led or influ­ the capitalist division of labor. That is, the of social stratification both within that
enced socialist organizing in the face of state looked to take over economic activ­ society and in the world outside of it. In
ongoing repression. Lenin in particular is ity, from industrial factories to agriculture fact, by becoming the leading example
famous for insisting on party discipline to shops. According to Marxist theory, this of communism, it had a transformative
(Fitzpatrick 1994: 30-31): Though his would do away once and for all with effect on politics around the world.
 Case Studies 537

A number of societies turned to socialism Americans often thought of the Soviet ideology between Lenin and Marx, it is
in the twentieth century, but the most Union as "the Russians," the Soviet Union worth noting that, particularly in the early
iconic exemplification of this ideology claimed to be multinational and based on years, there were ideological differences
was the Soviet Union, brought into being class rather than national identity. It came among the leaders of the Soviet Union,
by the great Russian Revolution discussed to incorporate many other societies. It most famously reflected in the conflict be­
in the previous case study. tried, with considerable success, to force tween Stalin and Trotsky (who was forced
It is important to recognize that how­ the ongoing industrialization of its under­ into exile in Mexico and later killed there).
ever much the society violated these lying societies. It tried, with mixed success, Stalin's repression of dissent temporarily
claims, the Soviet Union claimed to be to transform agricultural productivity. Per­ reduced the public expression of ideologi­
democratic, indeed, more democratic haps most important, it aimed to serve as cal dissent, but his successors partially re­
than the capitalist West. In essence, de­ the vanguard in a global revolution that pudiated some of his initiatives.
fenders of this view can draw on early would end capitalism everywhere. We The ideological conflict between so­
ideas of Marx's, that representative de­ would not want to exaggerate the extent cialism and liberalism in the post-war
mocracy is not enough, given that unfree­ of ideological uniformity in the Soviet period issued in the "Cold War,” a period
dom is not just a lack of political Union, especially in the early years. First, it is of intense but indirect conflict between
representation but more fundamentally worth noting that Leninism differed on the Soviet Union and its allies, on one side,
alienation produced by the division of certain points from Orthodox Marxism, at and the United States and its allies on the
labor. Given the Marxist view of history as least as understood by some others. In par­ other. It may seem hard to imagine now,
class struggle moving inexorably forward, ticular, some doubt whether Marx would but it was by no means clear to all observ­
it was not felt that the "bourgeoisie" or in­ have thought Russia, with its relatively brief ers that the United States or liberalism
dividuals thought to have bourgeois period of industrialization and its only very would triumph.
values and interests at heart ought to be recent turn to constitutional monarchy (in The Soviet Union committed mass
given representation in a democracy. its "bourgeois revolution" of 1905), to be atrocities, especially under Stalin. This
Rather, the proletariat was imagined to be the appropriate site for revolution, as men­ caused many international observers
the demos, and methods and practices tioned in the previous case study, though who were previously sympathetic to
many observers would regard as authori­ Marx and Engels did allude to this possibil­ turn against the regime. Indeed, follow­
tarian and antidemocratic were said to be ity in a late, Russian-language edition of the ing the Soviet Union's weakening and
justified in relation to serving their alleged Communist Manifesto. Lenin, however, collapse over the course of the late
"class interest." It is, of course, not hard to saw conditions as propitious. Moreover, twentieth century, many considered the
see how such an argument could be ex­ Lenin emphasized the efficacy of a strong broader ideology of socialism to be to­
ploited by authoritarian party leaders to "vanguard" party leading the revolution tally discredited, though this judgment
their advantage. (there were some textual sources in Marx has been disputed by those who argue
The Soviet Union had a number of for this idea, but it is recognized that that the Soviet Union was not a true and
aims. While Russia was dominant, and Lenin took it further). Beyond variation in accurate test of socialist ideology.
538 Russia (Russian Federation)

Research Prompts
1. Russia has a notable tradition of authoritarian politics. How zone," and "competitive authoritarian" systems. What does
would you account for authoritarian persistence in Russia? What Russia show us about the democratic status of such systems? Is
would the major theories from chapter 7 say about this case? a "hybrid" regime half democratic? Or is democratization a
2. Compare the reforms of Gorbachev to the reforms of Deng threshold status of which hybrid regimes fall short?
Xiaoping in China. What is similar about the circumstances they 5. Russian politics is characterized by personalism and a high
faced, and what are the major differences in this respect? What degree of centralization and authoritarian decision making.
was different about their respective strategic approaches to This is reflected in various institutions, as seen in the various
reform? To what extent can the recent political and economic case studies presented above. Would reforming one of these
trajectories of these two societies be traced to different ap­ institutions alter the Russian political culture, or would
proaches to and processes of reform? changing institutional designs be ineffective without a
3. The Russian Revolution of 1917 produced a dramatic series of deeper change in the culture? If institutional reform would
political, social, and economic changes. Compare that revolu­ be helpful, what institution would be the most useful one to
tion to the French and Chinese Revolutions. Can a common change? Since your answer will be forward-looking and
causal framework explain all three? What if we add the Iranian speculative, what sorts of evidence could you find from com­
Revolution to the mix? parative study or from within-case comparison to support
4. Russia is a useful case for proponents of the idea that the con­ your claim?
temporary world is increasingly populated by "hybrid," "gray
 539

United Kingdom
PROFILE Introduction
I t is o fte n n o te d th a t th e U n ite d K in g d o m is
Key Features of the Contemporary United Kingdom an islan d society, a n d th a t th is has h a d im ­
p o rta n t im p lica tio n s for its developm ent. It
Population: 63,742,977 (estimate, July 2014) is relatively sm all, co m p risin g o nly a bout

Area: 243,610 square kilometers 2 4 4 ,0 0 0 square k ilo m e te rs, a n d y e t in sev­

eral im p o rta n t w ays it p io n ee red key features
Head of State: Queen Elizabeth II (1952-present) o f m o d e rn politics. W h ile it lacks a form al,

Head of Government: David Cameron (prime minister, 2010-present) w ritte n c o n stitu tio n , it w as p erh ap s th e soci­
e ty in w h ic h th e id ea o f a “c o n stitu tio n a l
Capital: London o rd e r” first em erged. Its p a rlia m e n t survived

Year of Independence: Never colonized. Political arrangements linking th e rise o f absolutism (or, as som e w o u ld p u t
Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales, and England have it, B rita in never saw fu ll-scale absolutism at
changed overtime. all), a n d c o n stitu tio n a l m o n arc h y w as e stab ­
lish ed early, w ith th e “G lo rio u s R evolution”
Year of Current Common law system; there is no formal constitution,
Constitution: though the Magna Carta dates back to the thirteenth o f 1 6 8 8 -1689. M oreover, m an y scholars
century. c o n sid e r it to have b e e n a m o n g th e first
societies, a n d possibly th e first, to establish
Languages: English is the majority language. Other languages
m o d e rn n a tio n a l id e n tity (H a stin g s 1997;
include Scots, Scottish Gaelic, Irish, and Welsh.
G reen feld 1992; K o h n 1944). Finally, B ritain
GDP per Capita: $41,787 (World Bank estimate, 2013) w as a lead colonizer, sp re ad in g m an y o f its
p o litica l p ractices abroad. T here is a lively
Human Development 14th (very high human development)
discussion a m o n g p o litica l scientists a bout
Index Ranking (2014):
w h e th e r B ritish co lo n ialism p ro d u c ed dem ­
Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Developmen t Report 2014. o cratic in d e p e n d e n t societies follow ing d e ­
c o lo n iz atio n (e.g., B e rn h a rd , R een o ck , a n d
N o rd s tro m 2004).

■ W hite 87.2% ■ Christianity 59.5%

■ Black 3.0% ■ Islam 4.4%
■ Indian 2.3% ■ Hindu 1.3%
■ Pakistani 1.9% ■ Other 2.0%
■ M ixed 2.0% ■ None 25.7%
■ Other 3.7% ■U nspecified 7.2%

Ethnic Groups in the United Kingdom Religious Affiliation in the United Kingdom
Note that within the category “white," more than 80 percent consider Source: CIA World Factbook.
themselves English, with the bulk of the remainder being groups that
consider themselves Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Irish.
Source: CIA World Factbook.
540 United Kingdom

SHETLAND
ISLANDS .
Lerwick

ORKNEY
ISLANDS ^ c a p a

HEBRIDES
NORTH
ATLANTIC
OCEAN
i Peterhead

SCOTLAND ’ Aberdeen
Dundee/

North
Sea

>
Edinburi

Newcastle
upon Tynetyne

ISLE OF

Liverpool Manchester upon Hull

• Birmingham

ENGLAND
Celtic Sea iardiff FelixstQwi

Bristol \
Southampton
Dover

Falmouth

English Channel

GUERNSEY
ISLAND *
FRANCE
JERSEY
ISLAND 20 Kilometers

120 Miles
 Profile 541

W h ile th e U n ite d K in g d o m w as h isto ric a lly a lea d so ­ them selves to b e E n g lish , w ith th e re m a in d e r id en tify in g
ciety in m a n y o f th e se areas, it is n o w o fte n v iew ed as them selves as S c o ttish , N o r th e rn Irish , o r W elsh . A ro u n d
h ig h ly tra d itio n a lis tic . U n lik e F ra n c e , it still h a s a c o n sti­ 3 p e rc e n t o f th e U .K . p o p u la tio n is o f A fric a n descent, w ith
tu tio n a l m o n arch y , th o u g h Q u e e n E liz a b e th ’s role is th e m ajo rity o f th is p o p u la tio n h a v in g d escen d ed fro m im ­
larg e ly sym bolic. M o re o v er, its leg a l system is a c o m m o n m ig ra n ts fro m B rita in ’s fo rm er C a rib b e a n a n d A fric a n
law system in w h ic h tr a d itio n a l p ra ctic e is d e te rm in a tiv e colonies (or h a v in g im m ig ra te d them selves).
o f outcom es. In religious term s, th e la rg e st g ro u p in th e U n ite d
T he U n ite d K in g d o m , alo n g w ith th e U n ite d States, has K in g d o m , a t n e a rly 60 p e rc e n t, is C h r is tia n . H o w ev e r, it
b e en a key p ro m o te r o f th e m o d e rn ideology o f liberalism , is w o rth k e e p in g several th in g s in m in d w h e n you in te rp re t
h o ld in g th a t in d iv id u a l rig h ts; representative, dem o cratic th is . F ir s t, th e la rg e s t p o p u la tio n w ith in th is g ro u p is th e
g o v ern m en t; a n d m ark e t-d riv e n econom ics are th e keys to A n g lic a n C h u rc h , w h ic h is th e e s ta b lish e d C h u r c h o f
p olitical m o d ern ity . T his is n o t to say th a t it has lack ed a E n g la n d . Second, th e o th e r m ajor groups w ould include
tra d itio n o f left-w in g o rg a n iz in g , a n d th e left in B rita in has b o th o th e r P ro te sta n t d e n o m in a tio n s as w ell as R o m an
h isto rically h a d a n u m b e r o f successes, m o st n otably in th e C atholics. F inally, a large share o f th is nearly 60 p ercen t is
decades im m e d ia tely follo w in g th e Second W o rld W a r u n d e rsto o d b y social scientists to be only nom in ally
(C larke 200 4 : 2 2 1 -2 2 4 ). A m o n g o th e r th in g s , th e B ritish C h ristia n . In d e e d , it is o ften claim ed th a t m ore M u slim s
le ft played a key role in th e c o n stru c tio n o f th e U n ite d th a n A n g lica n s a tte n d religious services in th e U n ited
K in g d o m ’s relatively ro b u st w elfare state, in c lu d in g th e K in g d o m each w eek (a fact w h ic h , i f tru e , p o in ts b o th to
h ig h ly p o p u la r H e a lth Service (the U n ite d K in g d o m ’s low levels o f religiosity am o n g A n g lica n s a n d h ig h religios­
single-payer h e a lth care system ). ity am o n g B ritish M uslim s). I n any case, it is clear th a t th e
A s can be seen in th e p o p u la tio n c h a rt, th e m ajo rity o f U n ite d K in g d o m is no w a religiously diverse society, and
th e p o p u latio n o f th e U n ite d K in g d o m is w h ite B ritons. A s one in w h ic h se cu larizatio n has b e en extensive (Berger,
n o ted , a ro u n d 80 p e rce n t o f th ese ind iv id u als consider D avie, a n d F okas 2 0 0 8 ; B ruce 2004).

Historical Development
A s n o te d alread y , th e U n ite d K in g d o m (or G re a t B rita in , w e associate w ith p o litica l m o d e rn ity som e centuries ago.
a n d be fo re th e u n io n w ith S c o tla n d a n d Ire la n d , E n g la n d R a th e r, th e po litical h isto ry o f th e B ritish Isles is a story o f
its e lf) is o fte n v iew ed as a n “e arly m o d e rn iz e r.” I t w as g ra d u a l chan g e w ith several key m o m en ts o f “p u n c tu a te d ”
a m o n g th e first g r o w th -o rie n te d , m o d e rn e co n o m ies a n d m ore rapid tran sfo rm a tio n . In th is section w e w ill
a n d , re la te d ly , a m o n g th e first “c o m m e rc ia l so c ie tie s” very briefly survey som e o f th e key po litical developm ents
(G re e n fe ld 2 0 0 1 ). I t w as th e first W e s te rn E u ro p e a n o f th e seventeenth, e ig h te en th , n in e te e n th , a n d tw e n tie th
s o c ie ty to b re a k fro m th e d o m in a n c e o f th e R o m a n centuries.
C a th o lic C h u rc h . I t w as a m o n g th e first w ith a c o n s titu ­ I n m u ch o f th e re st o f E u ro p e , th e sev e n te en th c en tu ry
tio n a l o rd e r, th o u g h it h a s n o fo rm a l, w r itte n , c o n s titu ­ w as th e c e n tu ry o f royal absolutism . T he state g re w as th e
tio n . Its p a rlia m e n t h e lp e d it to re sist ro y al a b so lu tism in c e n tra liz in g m o n a rc h m a rg in a liz e d his noble a n d religious
th e se v e n te e n th c e n tu ry , th o u g h th e c o st o f th is w as c ivil o p p o n e n ts. I n E n g la n d , how ever, th in g s w ere d iffere n t (for
w ar. In d e e d , in th e m id d le o f th e s e v e n te e n th c e n tu ry it a n excellent o verview o f th is h ig h ly com plicated p e rio d , see
e x iste d as a re p u b lic , b e fo re th e R e s to ra tio n o f th e S tu a r t K ish lan sk y 1996). P a rlia m e n t re m a in e d pow erfu l, and
m o n a rc h y in 1688. S om e sc h o lars a rg u e t h a t E n g la n d co u ld o n occasions effectively resist royal efforts to collect
w as th e first so c ie ty to e sta b lish a m o d e rn n a tio n a l taxes. M oreover, religious d isse n t w as com m on. W h e n th e
id e n tity (H a s tin g s 1997; K o h n 1944; G re e n fe ld 1992). k in g trie d to enforce religious o rth o d o x y a n d th e n to force
F in a lly , a c c o rd in g to so m e sc h o lars (e.g., P in c u s 2 0 0 9 ), P a rlia m e n t to c o n se n t to ta x a tio n , th e C iv il W ars, w hich
its “G lo rio u s R e v o lu tio n ” o f 1 6 8 8 -1 6 8 9 w as th e first p itte d th e “R o u n d h e a d s” a g a in st th e royalist “C avaliers,”
m o d e rn re v o lu tio n . bro k e out. T he K in g , C h a rle s I, w as dep o sed a n d eventually
Yet th is should n o t lead us to suppose th a t th e U n ite d executed in 1649. O liv er C ro m w e ll d o m in a te d E n g lish
K in g d o m suddenly cam e to assum e all o f th e featu res th a t (and S c o ttish a n d Irish ) p olitics u n til his d e a th (K ishlansky
542 United Kingdom

Historical D evelopm ent

Tim eline
1215 Magna Carta 1947-1960s Waves of decolonization in India, Africa, the
1530-1534 Break from Rome Caribbean, and elsewhere
1580S-1700 First Wave of English Colonialism 1949 Independence of Ireland (except Northern Ireland)
1600 Establishment of East India Company 1951-1955 Second Churchill Government (Conservative). Con­
1642-1651 Civil Wars servative governments will continue until 1964.
1649-1659 Cromwell and the Protectorate (1653-1659) 1956 Suez Crisis
1660 Restoration (Charles II) 1964-1970 James Harold Wilson Government (Labour). Labour
1688-1689 Glorious Revolution (William and Mary) governments will succeed each other until 1979,
1694 Creation of the Bank of England with the exception of the 1970-1974 (Heath) Con­
1707 Act of Union (England and Scotland) servative government.
1714 Hanoverians inherit the throne (George I) 1973 United Kingdom joins the Common Market (EC).
1756-1763 Seven Years War 1975 Referendum on Common Market (EC) Membership
1776-1783 American Revolution (Approved)
1798 Major Irish revolt led by Wolfe Tone and 1976-1979 James Callaghan Government (Labour)
the United Irishmen 1979-1990 Margaret Thatcher Government (Conservative).
1801 Act of Union Some efforts to reduce the scope of the welfare
1807 Slave Trade Act state, including notable privatizations.
1832 Reform Act of 1832 1982 Falkland Islands/Malvinas War
1833 Slavery Abolition Act 1990-1997 John Major Government (Conservative)
1867 Voting rights extended 1991 First Iraq War
1911 National Insurance Act (early, very limited welfare 1997 Hong Kong passes from United Kingdom to China.
state development) 1997 Scottish and Welsh voters choose to create their
1914-1918 World War I own legislatures.
1918 Limited women's suffrage 1997-2007 Tony Blair Government (Labour)
1921 Emergence of Irish Free State 2002 Eurozone begins, but the United Kingdom opts not
1930 Women's suffrage to participate.
1938 Munich Pact 2003 Beginning of Second Iraq War
1939-1945 World War II 2007-2010 Gordon Brown Government (Labour)
1942 Beveridge Report (very influential in subsequent 2010-present David Cameron Governments (Conservative/
welfare state development) Liberal Democrats Coalition from 2010 to 2015,
1940-1945 Churchill government Conservative majority after 2015 election)
1945-1951 Labour Government with Clement Atlee as prime 2014 Scotland referendum on independence fails, with
minister. Creation of British welfare state, including 45% voting for independence and 55% for remain­
National Health Service (1948). ing in the United Kingdom.

1996: 187-212). O n c e C ro m w e ll w as gone, th o u g h , th e W illia m o f O ra n g e , invaded. H e faced a lm o st no resistance,

c o u n try tu rn e d b a ck to th e S tu a rts, a n d C h arles I I w as a n d h e a n d h is w ife, M a ry (w ho w as a S tu art), w ere crow ned
crow ned in th e R esto ratio n . H e w as follow ed by Jam es II, K in g a n d Q u e e n in th e “G lo rio u s R evolution.” In general
w h o w as c riticize d because o f his C a th o lic leanings. P e r­ th is p e rio d w itn essed h e ig h te n ed p o litical activity, w ith lots
haps m ore im p o rta n t, Jam es II set ab o u t to d ra m a tic ally o f coffeehouse discussion a n d p a m p h le t w ritin g , w hich
s tre n g th e n th e state, in clu d in g b u ild in g a larg er navy a n d a som e have arg u ed led to th e creation o f th e first m o d ern
sta n d in g arm y (P incus 2009). W ith th e su p p o rt o f som e “public sphere” (H a b erm a s 1989). I t also w itn essed th e d e ­
w ell-placed B ritons, how ever, th e D u tc h S tadtholder, velopm ent o f th e tw o p arties, th e W h ig s (m ore liberal) a n d
 Profile 543

th e T ories (m ore conservative) w h o w o u ld d o m in a te B ritish p erh ap s m o st n otably th e “C h a rtis t m ovem ent,” w h ich
p olitics for m an y years (K ish la n sk y 1996: 3 1 3 -3 3 5 ). d re w o n in d u stria l w orkers a n d u se d strik es a n d d e m o n ­
The e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry largely w itn esse d a r e tu rn to stra tio n s in its effort to e x p an d suffrage a n d re p re se n tatio n
sta b ility (L a n g fo rd 2010). P o litic al sta b iliza tio n w as evi­ (H a rv ie 2010: 4 9 8 -4 9 9 ). F u rth e r v o tin g reform to o k place
den ced by th e e n d o f Jaco b ite “p re te n d e rs” (people w h o in 1867, w here suffrage w as e x te n d ed , th o u g h o nly to
claim ed to b e th e tru e h e irs to th e S tu a rt line) a n d th e tr a n ­ (som e) m ales a n d in a w ay th a t by to d ay ’s sta n d ard s w ould
sition to th e H o u se o f H an o v er. P rim e M in is te r R o b e rt still be co n sid ered h ig h ly restric te d .
W alp o le p ra ctic e d a so rt o f m ac h in e po litics, a n d m an y B rita in ’s tw e n tie th -c e n tu ry experience (like th a t o f
t h in k o f th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry as one in w h ic h a k in d o f o th e r advanced in d u stria l societies o f th e tim e) w as largely
new , com m ercial a risto c rac y e stab lish ed itself. T h ro u g h o u t sh a p e d b y th e tw o w o rld w a rs a n d th e G re a t D ep ressio n
th e century, B rita in h a d n o tab le m ilita ry success, b o th in (M o rg a n 2010b; C la rk e 2 0 0 4 ). W o rld W a r I w as e nor­
th e W a r o f th e S p a n ish Succession (1701-1714) a n d in th e m ously costly in term s o f b o th lives a n d resources, b u t
Seven Y ears W a r (1756-1763), th o u g h it fa iled in its effort B rita in a n d its allies em erg ed victorious. V otin g rig h ts w ere
to h o ld o nto th e colonies th a t b e cam e th e U n ite d States. fu rth e r e x te n d ed in th e p o st-w a r years, n o tab ly to w om en.
C o m m e rc ia l so ciety grew , a n d in th e second h a lf o f th e A s o f 1918, w o m en over th ir ty w h o m e t c erta in c o nditions
c en tu ry B rita in saw th e b e g in n in g s o f th e In d u s tria l R evo­ co u ld vote, a n d a fte r 1928 all m en a n d w o m e n over tw e n ty -
lu tio n , in w h ic h tec h n o lo g ic ally a d a p te d m a n u fa c tu rin g , one w ere able to exercise th is rig h t. B rita in , lik e m o st o f th e
especially o f tex tiles, d ra m a tic ally e x p an d e d p ro d u c tiv ity w o rld , suffered serious econom ic difficulties in th e late
(H a rv ie 2010: 4 7 5 -4 8 1 ). T his h a d n u m ero u s consequences, 1920s a n d th e 1930s. T he c o u n try a im e d to stay o u t o f
as it m ade new fo rtu n es, slowly b u t surely c h a n g e d th e W o rld W a r II, a n d P rim e M in is te r N ev ille C h a m b e rla in
n a tu re o f labor, a n d led ev en tu ally to th e u rb a n iz a tio n o f fam ously a p p eased H itle r at M u n ic h , b u t th e y w ere ev en tu ­
B ritish society. A t th e sam e tim e , th e re is evidence th a t all ally forced to p a rtic ip a te in th e w a r a fte r G e rm a n y invaded
o f th ese changes w ere ex p erien ced by som e as d iso rien tin g . P o lan d . W h ile n o t as m an y B ritish soldiers d ied in W o rld
T he lite ra tu re a n d a rt o f th e e ig h te e n th c e n tu ry show s th is, W a r I I as in W o rld W a r I, fig h tin g w as in te n se , a n d B ritons
a n d th e re w as a h e ig h te n e d co n cern for social p roblem s like h a d to face c o n sta n t G e rm a n air raid s, w h ic h k ille d a n es­
p o v erty a n d sta rv atio n , p e rh ap s because th ese w ere in ­ tim a te d six ty th o u sa n d civilians (M o rg a n 2010b).
creasing (L an g fo rd 2010: 4 2 4 -4 3 8 ). I n th e religious field, A s w e discuss f u rth e r la te r in th is profile, in th e p o st­
n ew form s o f P ro te sta n tism e m e rg ed a n d spread, especially w a r years th e L a b o u r P a rty w as a sc en d a n t, a n d it w o rk ed to
M e th o d is m , w h ic h w o u ld play a c ritica l role in th e ab o li­ c o n stru c t th e B ritish w elfare state (C lark e 2 0 0 4 : 2 1 6 -2 4 7 ).
tio n (o f th e slavery a n d th e slave trad e) a n d refo rm m ove­ T his w elfare sta te has b e e n so m e w h a t re d u ce d in subse­
m en ts (of B ritish politics) th a t b e g a n to develop b y th e end q u e n t years, especially in th e a d m in istra tio n o f M a rg a re t
o f th e century. T h atch e r (19 7 9 -1 9 9 0 ), b u t im p o rta n t c o m p o n e n ts o f it
T he n in e te e n th c e n tu ry , fo r m u c h o f w h ic h Q u e e n have b e e n re m a rk ab ly re silie n t (P ra sa d 2 0 0 6 ). A n o th e r,
V ictoria held th e th ro n e , w as a tim e o f e x p an d in g lib eral­ m ajor, tw e n tie th -c e n tu ry d ev elo p m en t w as th e sh rin k in g
ism , th e extension o f suffrage, a n d th e solidification a n d ex­ a n d e v en tu al d isa p p ea ran c e o f th e B ritish E m p ire (C larke
pansion o f B ritish colonialism (H a rv ie 2010; M a tth e w 2 0 0 4 ). O n c e it h a d stre tc h e d across th e globe, b u t in th e
2010). B e g in n in g early in th e late e ig h te en th century, a n d m id - to late tw e n tie th c e n tu ry a lm o st a ll o f th e U n ite d
accelerating in th e n in e te e n th , som e B ritish leaders (often K in g d o m ’s colonies achieved in d ep e n d en c e , th o u g h m o st
W h ig s b u t also som e T ories) advocated e x p an d in g th e elect­ re ta in e d som e tie s to B rita in a n d to each o th e r th ro u g h th e
orate a n d u p d a tin g p a rlia m e n ta ry rep re se n tatio n to m ake it C o m m o n w e a lth o f N a tio n s (in itially called th e B ritish
m ore representative o f th e in d u stria liz in g a n d u rb a n iz in g C o m m o n w ea lth ). T he U n ite d K in g d o m also slowly
society th a t B rita in h a d becom e. A t th e sam e tim e , p o p u la r achieved p a rtia l, i f controversial, in te g ra tio n w ith E u ro p e,
actors cam e to m ak e m ore d e m a n d s o n g o v e rn m e n t (T illy jo in in g th e E u ro p e a n C o m m u n itie s in 1973, th o u g h it d e ­
1997). T he R efo rm A c t o f 1832 e x p a n d e d th e v ote, th o u g h cid ed n o t to a d o p t th e eu ro , a n d even as pow ers w ere p a r­
one still n e ed e d to have p ro p e rty to vote even a fte r th is tia lly devolved to S c o ttish a n d W e lsh leg islatu res in th e
act. H ow ever, social m ovem ent a ctiv ity b e g a n to develop, late 1990s.
544 United Kingdom

Regime and Political Institutions

G o v e rn m e n t in th e U n ite d K in g d o m is based o n th e p rin ­ to five y e ars, as lo n g as it m a in ta in s th e “c o n fid e n ce ” o f th e
ciple o f p a rlia m e n ta ry sovereignty, w h ic h holds th a t P a rlia ­ H o u s e o f C o m m o n s; e lectio n s m u st b e h e ld a t le a st every
m en t (and p a rticu la rly th e H o u se o f C o m m o n s) is th e five y e ars, a n d th e executive c an b e re elec ted for m u ltip le
suprem e law m a k in g body, a n d th a t w h atev er it votes in to term s. P a rlia m e n t h a s th e p o w e r to “b rin g d o w n ” th e
law is d e em ed c o n stitu tio n a l. A c ts o f P a rlia m e n t are n o t p rim e m in is te r’s g o v e rn m e n t b y a m a jo rity vote o f no c o n ­
subject to ju d ic ia l review a n d can be o v e rtu rn e d o nly by fidence (or b y d e fea t o f a m ajo r b ill, w h ic h is o fte n in te r­
subsequent acts o f P a rlia m en t. W h ile th e leg islatu re is su­ p re te d as a vote o f n o confidence), w h ile th e p rim e m in iste r
p rem e, th e executive b ra n c h o f g o v e rn m e n t is pow erfu l, h a s th e p o w e r to dissolve P a rlia m e n t a n d ask th e m o n a rc h
b e in g led by a p rim e m in iste r w h o is selected by m ajo rity to c a ll fo r a n e w e le ctio n . D iss o lu tio n m ay h a p p e n e ith e r
vote o f th e H o u se o f C o m m o n s. w h e n th e executive believes P a rlia m e n t is u n a b le to
T he p rim e m in is te r is ro u tin e ly th e lea d er o f th e p a rty g o v e rn , o r w h e n th e p rim e m in is te r senses a n e le cto ra l a d ­
w in n in g th e m o st seats in th e p a rlia m e n ta ry e le ctio n s, v a n ta g e in c a llin g a n e lectio n . In g e n era l, bills p ro p o se d
a n d h e /sh e in t u r n selects a c a b in e t th a t p ro p o ses a n d by th e p rim e m in is te r’s g o v e rn m e n t are p a sse d b y th e
p re sen ts m o st bills fo r p assage in to law b y th e b ro a d e r H o u s e o f C o m m o n s , d u e to stro n g d isc ip lin e w ith in p o ­
H o u se. T his g o v e rn m e n t re m a in s in office for a te rm o f up litic a l p a rtie s.

Regim e and Political Institutions

Regime Constitutional monarchy, with parliamentary democracy

Powers in Constitution No formal written constitution; but widely considered to include certain established laws and
rights that are assumed to have constitutional status

Administrative Divisions Great Britain (includes England, Scotland, and Wales) and Northern Ireland; three island
dependencies (Isle of Man, Jersey, Guernsey); over a dozen overseas territories (British Virgin
Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Falkland Islands, etc.)

Executive Branch Prime minister (and cabinet)

Selection of Executive Elected by House of Commons

Legislative Branch Bicameral Parliament

Lower chamber: House of Commons
Upper chamber: House of Lords

Judicial Branch Interprets statutes, but has no right of judicial review

Political Party System Two-party to three-party system; Conservatives (Tories) and Labour are two main parties;
Liberal Democrats are third party.

D e sp ite th e p rin c ip le o f p a rlia m e n ta ry sovereignty, stays w ith in th e b o u n d s o f c o m m o n in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e

th ere are som e pra ctic a l lim ita tio n s o n P a rlia m en t. N o m i­ B ritish c o n stitu tio n . A final re stra in t o n P a rlia m e n t in
nally, th e m o n arc h calls elections a n d invites w in n in g p a r­ recen t years has seen som e devolution o f p o w er from th e
ties to form g o v ern m en t, th o u g h th e m o n a rc h ’s role is U .K . P a rlia m e n t to assem blies in th e reg io n s o r “c o u n tries”
alm o st exclusively cerem o n ial ra th e r th a n p o litical. M o re o f th e U n ite d K in g d o m (the S c o ttish P a rlia m e n t a n d th e
substantively, P a rlia m en t its e lf is g o v ern ed by tra d itio n s, W e lsh A ssem bly), as w ell as som e re co g n itio n o f th e pow ers
custom s, a n d c o n stitu tio n a l in te rp reta tio n s: T h o u g h P a rlia ­ o f th e E u ro p e a n U n io n to legislate o n c e rta in m a tte rs th a t
m en t could th eo re tic ally pass any law it w a n ts, it routinely are b in d in g o n B ritish law.
 Profile 545

Political Culture
P o litical c u ltu re in th e U n ite d K in g d o m , lik e in o th e r w ith a m ajo rity in 2015. C a m e ro n a n d his associates, in ad­
countries, is hetero g en eo u s a n d d y n a m ic a n d th erefo re h a rd d itio n to sc a lin g b a ck aspects o f th e w elfare state, explicitly
to p in d ow n. T he classic com parative stu d y o f A lm o n d a n d sp e a k o f tra n s fo rm in g B ritish p o litica l c u ltu re , h o p in g to
V erba (1963) tre a te d th e U n ite d K in g d o m as p ossessing a create w h a t th e y call th e “B ig Society,” in w h ic h volun­
v ib ra n t “civic c u ltu re .” S everal th em e s, th o u g h , have b e e n ta rism a n d c o m m u n ity a ctiv ity p a rtia lly replace th e actions
p a rtic u la rly im p o rta n t in th e p o litic a l c u ltu re o f la te - o f th e state.
tw e n tie th - a n d tw e n ty -first-c e n tu ry G re a t B rita in a n d are, A n o th e r m ajor th e m e in th e c h a n g in g p o litica l cu ltu re
therefore, w o rth special m en tio n . o f tw e n tie th -c e n tu ry B rita in w as th e re d efin itio n o f B ritish
T he first th em e concerns th e s h iftin g n a tu re o f lib e ral­ id e n tity in th e w ak e o f th e collapse o f th e B ritish E m p ire.
ism a n d th e rela tio n sh ip b e tw e e n class affiliation a n d p a rty “E m p ire ” h a d b e e n a key a sp ect o f th e id e n tity o f subjects o f
loyalty. A h ig h ly stra tified society, th e U n ite d K in g d o m in th e U n ite d K in g d o m for a t lea st th e late n in e te e n th and
th e early to m id -tw e n tie th c e n tu ry saw a stro n g re la tio n ­ early tw e n tie th c en tu rie s (this is n o t to say th a t em pire was
ship b e tw ee n w o rk in g -class m em b e rsh ip a n d L a b o u r P a rty u n im p o rta n t before th is , b u t th a t th e im p e ria l n a tu re o f
su p p o rt. By th e 1970s, how ever, th is h a d b e g u n to ch an g e B ritish n ess becam e especially salien t a t th is tim e). R elat-
(M o rg a n 2010b). O n one h a n d , th is c h an g e m ig h t be at­ edly, th e role o f th e m o n arc h y in B ritish p o litica l cu ltu re
trib u te d to th e sta g fla tio n th e B ritish econom y faced in th a t h as g ra d u ally c h an g e d . T he Q u e e n is still im p o rta n t, b u t
decade. O n th e o th e r h a n d , th e U n ite d K in g d o m w itn essed th e royal fam ily has for som e tim e no w b e e n m u ch m ore
a fa m ilia r p a tte rn in th e p o litic a l-c u ltu ra l develo p m en t o f d iscu ssed in gossip tabloids th a n in p o litica l new spapers
p o st-in d u stria l societies. R isin g incom es a n d a m ajor sh ift (M o rg a n 2010b: 674; C lark e 2 0 0 4 : 3 88, 418 -4 1 9 ). T heir
in th e c o m position o f th e lab o r m ark e t— a m ove aw ay from role is largely sym bolic, a n d even still th e y are n o t typically
m a n u fa c tu r in g and to w a rd se rv ice s— h ave g e n e ra lly tre a te d w ith th e sam e deference as th e ir (also sym bolic)
b e e n fo u n d to c h a n g e p o litic a l c u ltu re , r e n d e rin g it m o re forebears fro m th e early to m id -tw e n tie th c e n tu ry w ere. A s
in d iv id u a listic a n d less tie d to c o m m u n itie s a n d classes is discussed later, in th e case stu d y o f n a tio n a l id e n tity in
(In g le h a rt a n d W elze l 20 0 5 ). By th e 1970s, L a b o u r w as in th e U n ite d K in g d o m , to som e e x te n t th e se changes have
crisis, a n d it w o u ld n o t tak e p o w er a g ain u n til it h a d com e co in cid ed w ith o th e r c h an g es in B ritish iden tity , in clu d in g
to rep resen t th e in terests, a n d m atc h th e c u ltu ra l style, o f a g ro w in g resurgence o f re g io n a l-n a tio n a l id en titie s and
m id d le-class service secto r w orkers (M o rg a n 2010b; C lark e th e g ro w th o f a m u ltic u ltu ra l u n d e rsta n d in g o f citizen sh ip
2 00 4 : 4 0 1 -4 3 9 ). T his “N e w L a b o u r” has h a d to co n te n d (M o d o o d 2 0 0 7 ). H ow ever, th is sh o u ld n o t lead us to sus­
w ith a re su rg en t lib eralism , w h ic h p reced ed it in th e form p e c t th a t B ritish n e ss has ceased to b e a n im p o rta n t feature
o f th e reform s o f M a rg a re t T h a tc h e r’s g o v ern m en ts (1 9 7 9 - o f p o litica l c u ltu re in th e U n ite d K in g d o m . T he p o p u latio n
1990) a n d , to a lesser e x te n t, th e g o v e rn m e n t o f h e r succes­ o f th e U n ite d K in g d o m has b e e n n o te d for its relatively
sor J o h n M a jo r (1 9 9 0 -1 9 9 7 ), b u t also, m ore recently, h ig h level o f “eu ro -sk ep ticism .” T his c u ltu ra l featu re o f th e
follow ing th e electo ral success o f c u rre n t P rim e M in is te r p o p u latio n has im p o rta n t policy consequences: F or exam ple,
D av id C a m e ro n o f th e C o n serv ativ e P a rty , w h ic h governs th e U n ite d K in g d o m has never jo in e d th e eurozone.

Political Economy
A s m e n tio n e d in o th e r se c tio n s o f th is c o u n tr y p rofile it p lay e d a n im p o r ta n t ro le in c o n s tru c tin g th e g lo b al
a n d as d isc u sse d in th e case stu d ie s th a t follow , th e e c o n o m y th r o u g h its fo rm a l c o lo n ia lism a n d in fo rm a l ef­
U n ite d K in g d o m h a s h a d a c e n tra l role in th e h is to ry o f fo rts to tr a d e w ith o th e r p a rts o f th e w o rld . I t is w o rth
g lo b al p o litic a l econom y. I t w as th e site o f o rig in for k e e p in g in m in d , th o u g h , th e U n ite d K in g d o m ’s p o litic a l
m a n y ideas a b o u t free tra d e (even i f th e c o u n try d id n o t e c o n o m y in th e p o s t-w a r w o rld , as th e c o u n try u n d e r­
alw ays p ra c tic e th e m i f u n s u ite d to its in te re sts); it h a d w e n t e n o rm o u s c h a n g e s in t h a t p e rio d . T he tw o m o st im ­
a rg u ab ly th e first m o d e rn , g ro w th - o rie n te d eco n o m y ; it p o r ta n t in th is c o n n e c tio n a re (1) th e d e -c o lo n iz a tio n o f
w as th e la u n c h in g p o in t for th e in d u s tr ia l re v o lu tio n ; a n d m a n y o f its overseas p o ssessio n s a n d th e a c c o m p a n y in g
546 United Kingdom

re c a lib ra tio n o f B rita in ’s ro le in b o th g lo b a l p o litic s a n d 2013 estim ate). A s o f th e m ost recent estim ate, though, it was
th e g lo b a l eco n o m y ; a n d (2) th e c re a tio n o f th e B ritish estim ated to have a poverty rate o f over 16 percent, w hich is
w e lfare sta te . T he la tte r d e v e lo p m e n t is d isc u sse d fu r th e r com paratively quite h ig h (C IA 2013 estim ate).
later, in th e case stu d y o n d e v e lo p m e n t in th e U n ite d A s is discussed in m ore d e ta il in th e case stu d ies th a t
K in g d o m . follow , th e w elfare state in th e U n ite d K in g d o m has faced
L ik e m an y o th e r c ountries th a t in d u stria liz e d early, p o litica l o p p o sitio n since th e early 1980s. A s such, it m akes
B rita in has becom e a p o st-in d u stria l econom y, m ea n in g , in a n in te re s tin g co m p a riso n w ith F rance, w h ic h saw n o M a r­
essence, th a t services (w hich a cco u n t for 78.9 p e rce n t o f g a re t T h atch e r arise in th a t decade (see fu rth e r discussion
G D P ) d ra m a tic ally o u tstrip m a n u fa c tu rin g (20.5 percent) in th e F re n c h case). O n e m ajo r th e o ry focuses o n th e p o lit­
in econom ic im p o rta n ce . B rita in is also notable for th e ics o f re tre n c h m e n t, n o tin g th a t in places lik e th e U n ite d
sm all share th a t a g ric u ltu re plays in its G D P , c o n stitu tin g K in g d o m (and th e U n ite d States), th e w elfare state w as cre­
o nly 0.7 p e rce n t (C IA 2013 estim ate). T he c o u n try is am o n g ated by p a rtie s o n th e left in response to th e crises o f th e
th e w e a lth ie st c ountries in term s o f G D P p e r capita in th e m id d le o f th e tw e n tie th c e n tu ry (the G re a t D e p ressio n and
w orld (W o rld B a n k 2013 estim ate: $41,787), a n d its e sti­ W o rld W a r II). T his creates th e p o ssib ility o f a strid e n t o p ­
m ate d u n em p lo y m en t rate as o f 2013 sto o d a t 7.2 p ercen t, p o sitio n fro m across th e sp e c tru m (P ra sa d 2 0 0 6 ; H u b e r
relatively low given recen t global econom ic difficulties. Its a n d S tephens 2001).
g in i in d ex (w hich m easures incom e in eq u ality ) stan d s at
38.0, w h ic h is a ro u n d th e average fo r W e s te rn E u ro p e a n Sourcesfo r economic data in this discussion: CIA World Fact­
societies w ith re d istrib u tiv e w elfare states (W o rld B a n k book; World Bank World Development Indicators.

CASESTUDIES ►

CASE STUDY

The State in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 3, PAGE 62

As with many other aspects of the politi­ century), it had badly damaged itself places like France, was a key stage in
cal development of the United Kingdom, through internal conflict, most notably in modern state-building. In France, the
the state in the British Isles, beginning in the "War of the Roses." In terms of the modern state emerged, in part, as succes­
England, had strong early development actual mechanics of English state-build­ sive kings managed to expand their
and then, in some ways, did not later de­ ing, Strayer (1970: 37-38), in his classic ac­ power vis-a-vis the nobility. At first glance,
velop as rapidly as some cases to which count, stresses the late medieval rise of it looks like the English kings of the seven­
we might wish to compare it. Scholars royal officials, the royal court system, and teenth century failed in this endeavor. But
who study the rise of the state point to the emergence of the Exchequer as key in there is more here than meets the eye.
late medieval England as a place where this connection. All of these institutions While it is true that Parliament successfully
the modem state first started to come either increased the king's role as an arbi­ resisted royal initiatives, it was not simply
into view (Strayer 1970: 35-48). England ter of domestic disputes (thus moving in an organ that represented the upper no­
was likely aided in this by several factors. the direction of the Weberian "monopoly bility. Indeed, many of the upper nobility
First, it is a relatively small island, facilitat­ on legitimate force") or expanded the in the seventeenth century sided with
ing centralized rule. Second, historically, state's ability to record information and, in Charles I rather than Parliament and
the English nobility was in certain re­ essence, to monitor localities and its deal­ Cromwell, though this was by no means
spects not as strong as its peers on the ings with them. universal. When Charles II and especially
continent, and by the time of the rise As noted previously, England never James II, after the Restoration, set about
of the Tudor monarchy (late fifteenth fully embraced royal absolutism, which, in building a more modern state, with a
 Case Studies 547

CASE STUDY (continued)

The State in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 3, PAGE 62

more complex bureaucracy, a greater abil­ seems very suspicious of strong states. States, only developed around World War
ity to extract resources from its citizens, Even today, as mentioned earlier, David II (indeed, in the Labour government that
and with a modern military, there was re­ Cameron's government stresses the "Big was elected in 1945), though there were
sistance in the form of the Glorious Revo­ Society," implying that the private action precedents in the early twentieth century
lution (Pincus 2009), but this did not stop of citizens should replace a state that has (Clarke 2004: 59-60). In France, typical ar­
the effort. Subsequent monarchs contin­ allegedly grown too large and powerful. guments against preserving the welfare
ued James's state-building efforts in im­ More generally, the British welfare state is state in its entirety focus largely on ques­
portant ways (Kishlansky 1996). probably best viewed as an organization tions like the efficiency of labor markets
One of the great tensions in the his­ that developed because of factors exter­ and economic competitiveness. In places
tory of British state-building is that the nal to British politics writ narrow: two like the United Kingdom (and the United
society produced a relatively strong state world wars, the Great Depression, and the States), there is an alternative, liberal cri­
but also, as discussed elsewhere in changing British class structure. Note that tique of the welfare state as a result of this
this text, an ideology— liberalism— that many of its features, as in the United tension.

CASE STUDY
Political Economy of Britain CHAPTER 4, PAGE 77

The United Kingdom may be seen as the innovations that drove down costs of became a leader in the globalization that
birthplace of the modern world economy. production and brought about rapid in­ transformed the world economy from
While not considered a "developing coun­ dustrialization: new inventions (such as the late nineteenth century up to the
try" today, the British experience has been the steam engine), new factory tech­ Great Depression of the 1930s.
the basis of many of the most enduring niques (including greater use of machin­ Britain was a leader in promoting the
research questions in the study of devel­ ery), and improved infrastructure (such laissez-faire or liberal economic policies
opment, precisely because it is the country as railways and improved shipping). that had been dominant in years before
where the massive economic expansion of Other factors helped make this set of in­ the Great Depression, but it also was the
the last two centuries started. It was here, novations work especially well in Britain. home of economist John Maynard
from the late 1700s to the mid-1800s, that Some argue that the availability of coal Keynes, who offered a twentieth-century
the Industrial Revolution began, giving rise mattered, while others argue that the approach to preventing depression and
to the explosion in productivity and rising country was relatively urbanized. Yet taming the business cycle: counter­
incomes that have set the last two centu­ others suggest that development hap­ cyclical government spending. A central
ries apart from any other period of human pened here due to attitudes and culture, idea of Keynesian economics is that reces­
history. whether in the populace at large or in sions and depressions are self-reinforcing
The desire to understand why the In­ the relatively liberal government with its because demand drops as employment
dustrial Revolution happened here orientation toward individual economic falls and assets lose their value, and that
rather than somewhere else was the be­ rights. Also in the 1800s, Great Britain government spending can halt or reverse
ginning of the comparative study of consolidated its imperial control over this process by stimulating demand. In
modern economic development, and colonies ranging from Africa to India to theory, governments could build up sur­
analysts have put forward numerous the Caribbean, though it had lost control pluses in good times and spend as ne­
theses. The Industrial Revolution con­ of America by 1783. As the Industrial Rev­ cessary to soften or stop downturns. This
sisted of a cluster of technological olution spread, the United Kingdom theory was (and remains) hugely influential,
548 United Kingdom

CASE STUDY (continued)

Political Economy of Britain CHAPTER 4, PAGE 77

as over the course of the century the state the expansion of public housing initia­ process, but also business organizations),
intervened more in the economy in Britain tives (called "council houses"), as well as reducing government spending, and de­
and beyond. social insurance (Clarke 2004:216-231). regulating the economy (Clarke 2004:
After surviving the two world wars As in many other advanced industrial 358-400). Notably, the Thatcher govern­
without defeat, the United Kingdom has societies, Britain did relatively well in the ment (1979-1990) barely attempted to
remained one of the linchpin economies post-war years, but by the 1970s had en­ scale back some key aspects of the wel­
of the global order. State involvement in tered into recession and "stagflation" (in­ fare state, such as the National Health Ser­
the economy increased notably after flation accompanied by stagnation in vice, given their high levels of public
World War II. The Labour Party, under the economic growth and wages). This support (Prasad 2006). Following the era
leadership of Clement Atlee, won a plural­ prompted some rethinking, and one of of Thatcher and her Conservative succes­
ity for the first time in 1945, displacing the the major changes in the country's eco­ sor John Major (1990-1997), the govern­
Conservative Party from which both Nev­ nomic policy took place beginning in ment of Tony Blair (1997-2007) brought in
ille Chamberlain and Winston Churchill 1979, when the newly elected Prime Min­ an era of "New Labour" that largely re­
had governed. The British welfare state ister Margaret Thatcher (the "Iron Lady”) tained a pro-market orientation. Today,
was relatively underdeveloped up to this pushed the economy toward free-market the British economy is actively plugged
point, but it grew notably in the post-war principles by privatizing state-owned en­ into world trade, especially in services,
years, particularly through the establish­ terprises (including many council houses, where the City of London is a top financial
ment of the National Health Service and increasing home-ownership rates in the center in the global economy.

No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality

in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 8, PAGE 181

For two countries that are so historically and unique to the United Kingdom is probably patterns of succession to the throne. In a
culturally intertwined, the United Kingdom the lack of a single constitutional docu­ sense, it may be said that the United
and the United States have dramatically dif­ ment. Rather than one core written char­ Kingdom has a "written" constitution, but
ferent democracies. The United Kingdom is ter that is amended periodically (as in one that relies on a range of written docu­
a constitutional monarchy with no single most countries), the United Kingdom ments rather than a single one. More
constitutional document, no judicial review deems several documents to have consti­ generally, the "British Constitution” is
of the constitutionality of laws, a prime tutional significance. As the country devel­ partly shaped by tradition, custom, and a
minister elected chief executive by the le­ oped its unified political system over the common cultural understanding of basic
gislature, and a principle of legislative su­ course of many centuries, several major laws, powers, and functions of different
premacy; this contrasts with the American acts shaped British political tradition. The political actors.
republic, centered around a Constitution, constitutional documents include the The British Constitution is one of the
separately elected legislatures and execu­ Magna Carta of 1215, but also a range of most flexible in the world, at least accord­
tives, a Supreme Court, and a set of checks other laws of great significance and stat­ ing to the law. This is not solely because
and balances and separations of powers ure. These include the Bill of Rights of 1689, the United Kingdom has an "unwritten"
between government actors. which emphasized certain limitations on constitution, though this certainly relates
Many countries follow certain aspects the power of the monarchy, and the Acts to the question of how the constitution
of the British model, but the aspect most of Settlement of 1701, which established can be changed. Rather, the flexibility
 Case Studies 549

No Constitution? No Supreme Court? Constitutionality

in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 8, PAGE 181

comes from the fact that in the British The unwritten constitution and the activism," and there is one clear way to end
system, Parliament is sovereign. What fact of parliamentary sovereignty have it: End judicial review. One argument
does this mean? When Parliament passes one more implication for constitutionality against extensive use of judicial review is
a law, it is by definition constitutional, as in the United Kingdom: There is no role for that judiciaries remove contentious issues
the legislating body is the highest politi­ the judiciary in ruling on whether a law is from the public arena. According to this ar­
cal and legal authority in the land. Con­ constitutional. In most countries, some gument, debates about the most funda­
trast this with the United States, in which judicial body has the power to rule on mental issues in a democracy are now
the Constitution is the ultimate sovereign whether laws passed by the legislature increasingly fought out by ideologues and
authority: Even Congress and presidents are compatible with the written constitu­ advocates in front of unelected judges.
as must act in accordance with its tion. If that judicial body, such as the Su­ These issues are thus examined and de­
principles. preme Court in the United States, finds a cided upon by small groups and powerful
So why does Parliament not simply law unconstitutional it may strike it down. individuals, and may not be reflective of
overturn long-standing parts of the British But if Parliament is sovereign and there broader public opinion. Those arguing
constitution on a whim? Why has there not is no single constitution, there is no against judicial activism would often prefer
been massive "zigzagging" in terms of what place for judicial review. Thus, the United to have society's most contentious issues
the constitution means, from one election Kingdom had no real "Supreme Court" decided in legislatures rather than in
to the next, as new parties take power and until the 2000s, and even now its powers courts. The United Kingdom prevents judi­
lose power? In reality, custom and tradition are limited to specific questions relating to cial activism by granting Parliament unam­
prevent Parliament from overturning the issues of devolution of power to Scotland biguous supremacy over the judiciary. One
founding laws of the polity. Much as Ameri­ and Wales, along with very restricted re­ question for opponents of judicial activism
can political parties would probably not sponsibilities in the area of legal revision. is thus whether they would be willing to
envision getting rid of core elements of the This limited judiciary should be of inter­ sacrifice judicial review. Put another way,
Constitution such as the Bill of Rights, even est to Americans accustomed to a different judicial review and some judicial activism
if they had the supermajority they would system with its own controversies, espe­ are the "flip side" of the checks and bal­
need, so too does the British system exhibit cially the debate in the United States about ances between branches of government:
constitutional stability from one elected whether unelected judges make law from The U.K. system forgoes most of these
government to the next. the bench. This is referred to as “judicial checks and balances.

Mother of Parliaments: The United Kingdom

and the Westminster Model CHAPTER 9, PAGE 206

The United Kingdom is called the "Mother of nobles to raise revenue for the crown, so notably beginning in the seventeenth cen­
Parliaments," as its Parliament dates back to they insisted upon a "Great Charter"— the tury with the English Civil Wars and their af­
at least the thirteenth century, when King Magna Carta— and thereby secured various termath (1642-1660), and with the Glorious
John convened the nobility of England as an rights with respect to property and require­ Revolution of 1688. Initially comprised of
advisory council that controlled the econ­ ments for royal consultation of the nobles. nobles (lords) and later also of commoners,
omy. In 1215, the nobility sensed the King's Since that time, Parliament has steadily these Parliaments evolved from advisory
weak position and need for the support of gained power relative to the monarch, most councils to become powerful legislatures
550 United Kingdom

The Mother of Parliaments: The United Kingdom

and the Westminster Model CHAPTER 9, PAGE 206

that eventually asserted their sovereignty countries, from the giant India to tiny is­ Commons' policymaking process by re­
over the monarch. These origins can still be lands in the Caribbean. questing further review. Major reforms in
seen today in the existence of the House of In the British parliamentary model, the 1999 dramatically reduced the number of
Commons and the House of Lords. House of Commons is now the dominant hereditary lords, and debate continues
From these origins has come the chamber. It houses the executive branch about eliminating hereditary peerages en­
system known worldwide as the Westmin­ of the prime minister and the cabinet, and tirely. The queen or king, meanwhile, re­
ster system, after the London neighbor­ has almost sole responsibility for passing tains powers to invite parties to form a
hood where the government resides. laws, approving budgets, and holding the government or accept a resignation, but
Parliament is considered the country's su­ executive accountable; it can cause these are almost purely ceremonial.
preme and sovereign political power (see the government to fall by a vote of no This Westminster parliamentary
preceding section on 'Regime and Politi­ confidence. Members of the House of system is partially emulated in many other
cal Institutions"). While parliamentary sov­ Commons are chosen in single-member countries, though some countries estab­
ereignty is the central fact of the United districts, in a "first-past-the-post" system lished their own parliaments and as­
Kingdom's political system, a variety of in­ in which the largest number of votes in a semblies independently of the United
stitutional mechanisms gives the execu­ district suffices to elect a member of par­ Kingdom in their early histories. While the
tive substantial power to push legislation liament (MP), even if this is only a plurality United Kingdom and its Parliament may
through Parliament. The legislature votes, and not a majority. This electoral system is have been the Mother of Parliaments,
but the cabinet and the prime minister for­ widely viewed as favoring the largest par­ there are few other places that precisely
ward most legislation, on the assumption ties and punishing smaller parties. follow the House of Commons/House of
that the “backbenchers" in the governing The House of Lords is marginal by con­ Lords model; in most places with bicam­
party will support the government's pro­ trast, as is the monarchy. Though they were eral legislatures, the role of the upper
posal. This model of parliamentary de­ the founding body of Parliament, Lords chamber is more explicitly territorial, rep­
mocracy has been used as a model by progressively lost power to Commons over resenting states, provinces, or regions. The
countries around the world, not least be­ the centuries as the United Kingdom mod­ lower chambers around the world, mean­
cause of the influence of Britain's colonial ernized and expanded the franchise. Lords while, are elected in a variety of different
empire on many of today's independent now possesses some limited ability to slow electoral processes, as chapter 9 shows.

CASE STUDY
kH National Identity in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 13, PAGE 308

Many scholars see English nationalism as nationalism as developing early see it as England and helped to resolve the status-
having developed early. Indeed, some see linked to a number of prominent features inconsistency of upwardly mobile English
England as the first national society (Hast­ of early modern English society, especially persons favored by the Tudor monarchs
ings 1997; Greenfeld 1992). Others see it as the distinctively modern political philoso­ (Greenfeld 1992). Before this, the word
the first modern nationalism (Kohn 1944). phy produced in the seventeenth century nation had referred to elite groups.
Still others see English nationalism as de­ as well as the civil wars and the "Glorious Basically, defining England as a nation
veloping rather late (Kumar 2003). As in all Revolution" discussed earlier. amounted to bestowing a kind of status
cases, this depends on how one defines According to one major argument, on socially mobile English persons as a
"nationalism." Those who see English English nationalism emerged in Tudor result of their membership. English
 Case Studies 551

CASE STUDY (continued)

National Identity in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 13, PAGE 308

nationalism was helped and hindered by was perpetrated by supporters of unifica­ civic character, according to many ana­
a variety of actors. Queen Elizabeth seems tion of the north with the Republic and lysts, was on display in the gradual pro­
to have promoted it, and Mary to have op­ supporters of continued ties to England. cess via which Great Britain or the United
posed it. English Protestantism contrib­ The Irish Republican Army (IRA) carried Kingdom was formed. That is, an ideal of
uted to its spread across society and out terrorist bombings both in Northern "Britishness" developed that was inclusive
down the social hierarchy. Ireland and in England itself, and both of (at least some) Welsh, Scottish, and
Nationalism was clearly institutional­ sides carried out targeted assassinations Northern Irish persons. Its civic character
ized as one of the main ways in which the and torture. A peace process was initiated was also on display, paradoxically, in the
state would legitimate itself by the estab­ in the 1990s and yielded agreements in United Kingdom's imperial identity. The
lishment of constitutional monarchy in the 2000s. It has been largely successful in empire, it was important to note, like all of
the late seventeenth century. One thing ending the violence. European colonialism, was an important
that had not been decided once and for Scottish and Welsh national identities carrier of national identity, and a spur to
all, though, was the composition of the also underwent resurgence beginning in the development of modern national
body of the nation itself. Over the course the late nineteenth century. Initially, many identities in much of the colonial world. It
of the "long eighteenth century" British, of these efforts were focused on the pres­ spread national identity through provid­
rather than English, nationalism was ervation of cultural traditions, styles of life, ing an example, but also through foment­
broadened to include the Scottish and and language. Some came to view British ing resistance (Calhoun 1997:108-110).
Northern Irish (Colley 1992). In institu­ identity as the imposition of English "in­ Among other things, the British case
tional terms, this was accomplished when ternal colonialism" (Hechter 1975). In shows well that civic nationalism, while
union was established in 1707. in cultural recent years, resurgent regional (or per­ existing in tension with racism, is never­
terms, though, it is unclear to what extent haps national) identities among some of theless compatible with and can reinforce
it was successful. these groups, particularly the Scottish, ethnic hierarchies of various kinds. More
Irish nationalism gained strength with have led toward efforts to decentralize au­ recently, as in a number of other countries
the movement of the United Irishmen in thority and to establish some degree of whose national identities have been un­
the late eighteenth century, and under­ regional autonomy (a process that bears derstood to be civic, there has been some
went another revival in the late nineteenth useful comparison with somewhat similar discussion of whether civic identity is
and early twentieth centuries. Ireland was developments in Spain). Scotland voted being replaced by a multicultural model.
granted "home rule" status in 1912, but to create its own parliament and Wales its Some have maintained that multicultural-
civil conflict developed, as the society was own assembly in 1997. In 2014, a referen­ ism is civic or is broadly consistent with
divided between those who favored an dum on Scottish independence failed, civic political traditions (Modood 2007).
independent, Catholic Ireland and those but many had expected it to succeed. In addition, as in most cases of civic
(often Protestant) who favored continuing The predominant tradition of nation­ nationalism, one sees counter-currents
political ties to Britain. An insurrection led, alism in the United Kingdom, according to that dispute the civic conception of na­
finally, to the establishment of the (still de­ most analysts, has been civic. This, how­ tionhood and propose an ethnic one in its
pendent) Irish Free State in 1921, with its ever, should be qualified. In the early place. In recent years in Britain this is best
1937 constitution to follow and its achieve­ modern period national membership exemplified by the British National Party,
ment of full independence, as the Repub­ might have been civic in the sense of with its sense of "Englishness" as an ethnic
lic of Ireland, in 1949. being open to some, but there were clear category and its xenophobic attitude
However, Northern Ireland remained boundaries established between English toward immigrants, particularly Muslims
(and remains to this day) part of the nationals and members of "out-groups," and those from South Asia and the Carib­
United Kingdom. Throughout the late most notably the Irish, American Indians, bean. Fortunately, this party remains
twentieth century considerable violence and African slaves. English nationalism's marginal.
552 United Kingdom

Liberal Ideology in the United Kingdom CHAPTER 15, PAGE 355

The United Kingdom is considered by British colonialism transmitted liberal as paternalistic and threatening to indi­
many to be the birthplace of liberalism. ideas to elites in colonial societies. This is vidual choice. More progressive liberals,
The earliest architects of the ideology, very clear in the cases of settler colonial­ though, argued that investments in
such as John Locke and the Earl of Shaft­ ism like today's United States— which is human capital and the maintenance of
esbury, wrote and acted in Britain in the considered liberalism's "lead society' in basic protections against serious depriva­
tumultuous seventeenth century. Later today's world, essentially replacing the tion are perfectly consistent with and
British thinkers like Adam Smith and David United Kingdom in this connection— as even help to fulfill the goals and aspira­
Ricardo developed liberalism's core eco­ well as British Canada, Australia, and tions of a liberal and democratic polity.
nomic doctrines. In the nineteenth cen­ New Zealand, but may also be visible in Liberals closer to the right of the po­
tury, the British philosopher John Stuart the societies like India and in the former litical spectrum typically would view
Mill produced what many consider to be British colonial possessions in Africa and social democracy as a betrayal, or at least
the most forceful and coherent articula­ East Asia. a watering down, of liberal principles.
tion of liberal doctrine, providing clear ra­ Some would argue that after the Those on the radical left, however, view
tionales for both its political dimensions, Second World War, liberalism went into the liberalism of the Labour Party as con­
such as respect for the rights of the indi­ partial retreat in Britain. It is true that the servative and reactionary. In some ways
vidual and representative government, Labour Party, which dominated for sev­ these distinctions have been flattened
and its economic dimensions, which eral decades, blended liberalism and so­ out in recent Britain. Beginning in the
above all involve reducing state involve­ cialism into "social democracy." Perhaps 1990s, with the rise of Tony Blair's "Third
ment in the economy. the most notable change was the estab­ Way" leadership strategy in the Labour
Some argue that the United Kingdom lishment of the National Health Service in Party, the British social democrats have
played an important role not only in de­ 1948. Old-fashioned liberals criticized the shown themselves to remain clearly in the
veloping liberalism but also in spreading it. creation of a universal health care system liberal camp.

Research Prompts
1. Compare and contrast state formation in the United Kingdom Labour Party that constructed it? How does this compare to the
and France. What is similar and what is different about the American and French cases?
timing and nature of state-building in each case? 4. What are the major implications of Britain's development history
2. Compare and contrast the United States, the United Kingdom, for today's developing countries? Can these countries simply
and one other case on the question of judicial review. Be atten­ repeat Britain's steps? Why or why not?
tive to why you select that other case. In the cases, what are the 5. Some scholars say national identity in the United Kingdom de­
relative consequences of having or not having judicial review? veloped in the sixteenth century, others the seventeenth, others
What conclusions can you draw about the costs and benefits of the eighteenth, and some even later. As comparative political
judicial review? analysts, how do we decide? Stake out an argument for a defin­
3. Analyze in comparative perspective the construction of the wel­ ition of national identity, and design a project exploring when
fare state in the United Kingdom after the Second World War. this identity emerged in the United Kingdom.
What are the major implications of the fact that it was the
 ■ H H M R R B IiliR V !
553

United States
PROFILE Introduction
If you were taking this course several de­
Key Features of the Contemporary United States cades ago, you would likely find the institu­
tions and political culture of the United
Population: 318,892,103 (estimate, July 2014) States held up as the benchmark against
Area: 9,826,675 square kilometers which the politics of other countries could
be compared (and, perhaps, judged). On one
Head of State: Barack Obama (president, 2009-2017) hand this is understandable. If you are a stu­
Head of Government: Barack Obama (president, 2009-2017) dent in a university in the United States,
there is a reasonably high likelihood that you
Capital: Washington, D.C. already have some familiarity with the basic
Year of Independence: 1776/1783 political features of this society. If this is the
case, it is natural that you would use this
Year of Current Constitution: 1787 (ratified 1788) knowledge as you make comparisons. At the
Languages: English; many others, including most same time, we need to be careful to not im­
prominently Spanish, other Asian and European plicitly assume that U.S. politics is the
languages model toward which other societies are (or
should be) headed or the standard against
GDP per Capita: $47,199 (World Bankestimate,2013)
which they should be judged. It is, of course,
Human Development 5th (very high human development) perfectly appropriate for us to draw whatever
Index Ranking (2010):

Sources: CIA World Factbook; World Bank World Development Indicators; United Nations Human
Developmen t Report 2014. | Protestant Christianity 51.3%
| Roman Catholicism 23.9%
■ W hite 79.96% Mormonism 1.7%
■ Black 12.85% B Other Christianity 1.6%
Asian 4.43% I Judaism 1.7%
I Amerindian/Alaskan Native 0.97% Buddhism 0.7%
I Pacific Islander/Native Hawaiian 0.18% f t Islam 0.6%
Two or more groups 1.61% I Other/Unspcified 2.5%
B Unaffiliated 12.1%
Ethnic Groups in the United States
Note that Hispanics, not captured here as a group because of the categories used
None 4%
when data is collected in the United States, are estimated to constitute about 15 Religious Affiliation in the United States
percent of the population. Most persons of Hispanic ancestry or ethnic Note that again these data are dependent on how categories are
identification show up here in either the "white" or "black" categories. determined and measured. Some scholars would want to draw a
Source: CIA World Factbook. distinction within the category of "Protestant Christianity" between
evangelical Christian denominations and ‘mainline' Protestant
denominations. In recent decades, the former have been growing or at
least maintaining strength while the latter have seen some declines,
and social scientists'predictions about future trends have varied
(Wuthnow 2007).
Source: CIA World Factbook.
554 United States

GREENLAND
Prudhoe Bay (DEN.)

Anchora<

NORTH
PACIFIC
OCEAN CANADA

ioston

Francisco » New York

Chicago* Detroi Philadelphia
Denver
In d ia n a p o lis * ^ - / ishington D.C
Los Angeles;-
Phoenix/ Oklahoma NORTH
San Diego4
Memphis
ATLANTIC
Dallas* # OCEAN
Jacksonville
itonio Houstti
lew Orleans BAHAMAS
x *' •
MEXICO % - V ? -

Gulfof
Mexico CUBA

JAMAICA

NICAR.
X
C O LO M B IA

400 800 Kilometers

800 Miles
 Profile 555

value ju d g m e n ts w e lik e ab o u t such m a tte rs as c itizen s (pro e x te n t th e U n ite d S ta te s is “e x c e p tio n a l” in its lib e ra l d e ­
or con), b u t as social scientists o u r jo b is to b ra ck e t any such m ocracy, its “d e n o m in a tio n a l” a p p ro ac h to o rg a n iz in g th e
ju d g m e n ts. p lace o f re lig io n in p u b lic life (N ie b u h r 1929), a n d its re la ­
A s su ch , le t us n o te several key fe a tu re s o f th e U n ite d tively w e a k so c ialist tr a d itio n (K a u fm a n 2 0 0 2 ). R e la te d to
S tates th a t m ak e it esp ecially in te re s tin g for th e s tu d e n t o f th e la st p o in t, w h ile th e U n ite d S tates has sh a red w ith
co m p arativ e po litics. F irs t, it w as th e e a rlie st la rg e -sc ale its p e ers th e c re a tio n o f a w e lfare sta te over th e la s t n e a r­
m o d e rn so c iety to em brace d e m o c rac y a n d re p u b lica n ism . c en tu ry , it s ta n d s o u t a m o n g th e m ajo r a d v an c ed in d u s tria l
A s such, it w as view ed by its fo u n d e rs a n d by su b seq u e n t a n d p o s t-in d u s tria l so cieties fo r th e relativ e w e ak n e ss o f
g e n era tio n s as a k in d o f e x p e rim e n t, a n d w h ile it is no its w e lfare state. (N o te: I t is n o t th a t its sta te is w e a k b u t
lo n g er th e o n ly such e x p e rim e n t, w e c an still v iew it as th a t its w elfare fu n c tio n s are n o t as ro b u st as th o se o f som e
one. I t has b e e n relatively stab le, g o v e rn ed u n d e r a single o th ers.)
c o n stitu tio n for c e n tu rie s, a n d it ro se fro m b e in g a suc­ F inally, w h ile m an y societies are a n d have b e en n e t des­
cessful co m m e rc ial a n d a g ric u ltu ra l so c iety to a m ajor in ­ tin a tio n sites for im m ig ra tio n , th e U n ite d S tates, b o th in its
d u stria l p o w er to a key “p o s t-in d u s tria l” society. I t is also, e x te n t a n d th e d egree to w h ic h th is is b o u n d u p w ith th e
at p re sen t, largely w ith o u t p eers in term s o f g e o p o litic al c o u n try ’s iden tity , largely stan d s a p a rt in th e c e n tra lity o f
p o w e r a n d influ en ce. S eco n d , as sch o lars since T o cq u e v ille im m ig ra tio n in its history. T he society is b o th e th n ic ally
(see also H a r t z 1955; L ip s e t 1963) have stre sse d , th e a n d religiously hetero g en eo u s. T his p e rio d ica lly produces
U n ite d S tates w as b o rn as a “n e w ” society, m e a n in g th a t it ten sio n , a n d w aves o f larg e-scale im m ig ra tio n have o ften
o nly m in im a lly in h e rite d th e social s tru c tu ra l fe atu res b e e n m e t by w aves o f x en o p h o b ia a n d into leran ce (K ennedy
t h a t a tte n u a te d th e rise o f d e m o c rac y for som e tim e in th e 1999: 1 4 -15). P erh ap s related to th is h e te ro g en e ity is th e
E u ro p e a n co n te x t. T his allow s us to ask in te re s tin g q u e s­ degree o f religious p lu ralism c h ara cte ristic o f th e society, a
tio n s a b o u t th e re la tio n s h ip b e tw e e n h isto ric a l factors fe atu re th a t has b e en lin k e d by som e scholars to its com ­
(like lo n g -s ta n d in g p a tte rn s o f lan d o w n ersh ip ) a n d v a ri­ p arativ ely h ig h levels o f relig io sity (Ian n a c co n e , F in k e , and
ables lik e d e m o c ra tiz a tio n o r th e fo rm a tio n o f lib e ra l p o ­ S ta rk 1997). In d e e d , th e U n ite d S tates is far m o re religious
litic a l c u ltu re , c o m p a rin g th e U n ite d S tates to “O ld th a n one m ig h t e x p ect it to b e b a se d o n its level o f econom ic
W o rld ” societies. S ch o lars d eb ate w h e th e r a n d to w h a t d ev elo p m en t (N o rris a n d In g le h a rt 2004).

Historical Development
T oday’s U n ite d States includes areas th a t w ere co lo n ized by q uasi-aristocracy. I n th e so u th e rn colonies, p la n ta tio n ag ri­
S pain, th e N e th e rla n d s, F rance, a n d E n g la n d . C o n tra ry to c u ltu re developed. H e re , m ore larg e -sc ale la n d h o ld in g
w h a t stu d e n ts in th e U n ite d S tates m ig h t expect, fo r m o st o f w as c o m m o n , a n d elites lived a m o re a risto cratic life.
th e colonial p e rio d th e th irte e n colonies in N o r th A m e ric a M oreover, th e ir o rig in s in B rita in its e lf te n d e d m ore to w ard
w ere n o t considered th e m o st im p o rta n t o f B rita in ’s colonial a risto c ratic groups (F isc h e r 1989). W h ile som e slavery w as
possessions. C a rib b e a n societies lik e B arbados a n d Ja m aica p ra ctic e d in th e N o r th before in d ep e n d en c e , it becam e
w ere far m ore sig n ifican t as sources o f w e a lth (D u n n [1972] th e basis o f m u c h o f th e so u th e rn p la n ta tio n econom y.
20 0 0 ), as In d ia late r w o u ld be. H ow ever, b y th e m id - to late W h e n in d ep e n d en c e w as e stab lish e d in th e U n ite d States,
e ig h te e n th century, th e c ro w n w as b e co m in g increasingly th e m o v em e n t w as p re d o m in a n tly led b y elites fro m these
in te rested in its N o rth A m e ric a n colonies as b o th m ark ets tw o regions.
for B ritish m a n u fa c tu re d goo d s a n d a p o te n tia l source o f E ven a fte r g a in in g in d ep e n d en c e , it w as u n c le ar i f th e
revenue. T he p o p u la tio n o f colo n ial N o r th A m e ric a h a d n e w n a tio n w o u ld survive as a p o lity o r w o u ld sim ply prove
som e notable ch aracteristics, v a ry in g b y re g io n (F isc h e r vu ln era b le to d isin te g ra tio n . A n u m b e r o f view s ab o u t w h a t
1989). In th e N o rth e a st, th e o rig in a l settlers w ere largely sh o u ld replace B ritish co lo n ialism w ere in c ircu latio n , b u t
seeking th e free d o m to practice th e ir relig io n , a n d here a th e n e w c o u n try finally s e ttle d o n th e c o n stitu tio n a l system
co m m ercial society late r developed. L a n d w as m ore evenly th a t re m a in s in place to th is day; th e C o n s titu tio n w as d e ­
d istrib u te d here th a n in th e so u th e rn colonies (th o u g h sig n ed to c o rre c t th e deficiencies o f th e “A rticles o f C o n ­
th ere w as still a lo t o f ineq u ality ), a n d th e re w as no real fe d era tio n ,” a c h a rte r th a t h a d left th e g o v e rn m e n t o f th e
556 United States

Historical Development
Timeline
1600s Establishment of early colonial settlements at 1941 U.S. enters World War II with Japanese bombing of
Jamestown, Virginia (1607), Plymouth, Massachu­ Pearl Flarbor, Flawaii.
setts (1620), and other sites along the Atlantic coast 1945 World War II ends with U.S. dropping of atomic
1754-1763 French and Indian Wars, conflict between English bombs on Japanese cities Fliroshima and
and French settlers, along with Native American Nagasaki.
allies, in present-day United States and Canada 1950s-1960s Civil Rights movement, Brown v. Board ofEducation
1775 Beginning of American Revolution after years of (1954) Supreme Court decision; Civil Rights Act
tension between colonies and British Crown over (1964); Voting Rights Act (1965)
taxation and representation 1963 Assassination of President John F. Kennedy
1776 Signing of Declaration of Independence 1963-1969 Presidency of Lyndon Baines Johnson, who both
1781 Articles of Confederation take effect as first at­ increases U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and
tempt at independent American government. expands the welfare state via his "Great Society”
1783 Surrender of British forces at Yorktown, Virginia, programs
signifies end of American Revolution. 1969-1974 Presidency of Richard Nixon, which included con­
1787 Constitution drafted, ratified by states in 1788. tinued war in Vietnam, partial rapprochement with
1791 Bill of Rights, the first ten amendments to the Con­ China, and the decision to float the dollar on cur­
stitution, takes effect. rency exchanges rather than pegging its value to
1803 Louisiana Purchase gold; Nixon resigned in August 1974 as he faced
1812 War with Great Britain, ends in 1815 impeachment for the Watergate Scandal.
1820 Missouri Compromise attempts to balance power 1974-1977 Presidency of Gerald Ford, which included the end
between northern free states and southern slave of the Vietnam War
states. 1977-1981 Presidency of Jimmy Carter, with a renewed
1840s Annexation of Texas and Mexican-American War emphasis on human rights in foreign policy
greatly expand U.S. territory. but economic problems domestically
1850s Rising tensions between North and South 1981-1989 Presidency of Ronald Reagan, which includes par­
1861 Civil War begins. tial retrenchment of the welfare state and a more
1863 Emancipation Proclamation aggressive foreign policy
1865 End of Civil War; President Abraham Lincoln 1989-1993 Presidency of George H. W. Bush, which includes
assassinated. war in Iraq and end of the Cold War
1870s Reconstruction 1993-2001 Presidency of Bill Clinton, which includes notable
1880s Peak of the Gilded Age economic growth and the fiscal solvency of the
1898 Spanish-American War state, the signing of the North American Free Trade
1916-1918 American involvement in World War I on the side Agreement, and welfare reform
of Allies 2001-2009 Presidency of George W. Bush, which includes the
Women's suffrage movement results in vote for all September 11 attacks, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq,
adults. and the financial crisis of 2008, causing a major
1929 Great Depression begins, lasts through 1930s. recession
1933-1945 Presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who 2009-2017 Presidency of Barack Obama, which includes
champions the New Deal (including Social Security) ongoing economic difficulties and the passage of
and leads the U.S. through most of World War II the Affordable Care Act
 Profile 557

th irte e n o rig in a l colonies excessively d e ce n tra liz ed , w ith it. P re sid e n ts a n d co n g ressm en w o rk e d to b a lan ce pow er
little c en tral pow er (for a n a u th o ritativ e acco u n t, see W o o d su ch th a t th e sta tu s quo co u ld p ersist— in w h ic h so u th e rn
[1969] 1998). T he U .S . C o n s titu tio n estab lish ed a division states co u ld c o n tin u e slavery a n d n o rth e rn states could
o f pow ers across th re e b ra n ch e s o f g o v e rn m e n t a n d a sepa­ m eekly op p o se it— b u t ev en tu ally th is becam e im possible.
ra tio n o f pow ers b e tw ee n th e c en tra l g o v e rn m e n t a n d th e T he c o u n try ’s d e fin in g ev en t o f th e n in e te e n th century, th e
states. T he A m e ric a n C o n s titu tio n becam e an em b lem atic C iv il W a r (1861-1865), w as fo u g h t over th is issue (for an
exam ple o f a fram e w o rk d o c u m e n t th a t o u tlin e s th e basic overview , see M c P h e rso n 1988). A fte r fo u r calam itous
system o f g o vernance a n d establishes th e principles o f th e years, th e U n io n w as victorious. In th e in itia l p o st-w ar
ru le o f law th a t “c o n stitu te s” th e basic p o litica l com pact. years A fric a n A m e ric an s h a d social a n d electoral success in
It is, in a sense, an o u tlin e for p olitics. C o m p rise d o f ju s t a n u m b e r o f so u th e rn regions. B u t m u ch o f th is dep en d ed
seven articles a n d a sm all n u m b e r o f sections, th e e n tire o n th e presence o f n o rth e rn tro o p s d u rin g R e co n stru c tio n ,
d o c u m e n t fits com fo rtab ly o n to a h a n d fu l o f pages. Y et it w h ic h en d ed in th e late 1870s. A fte r th e e n d o f th is perio d ,
has proved ro b u st e n o u g h to w ith s ta n d over tw o c en tu rie s local m ajo rity -g ro u p actors in th e S o u th u se d force to re ­
o f chan g e w ith o nly tw e n ty -sev e n a m e n d m en ts in over tw o establish exclusive co n tro l over p o litica l org an izatio n s and
cen tu ries, d espite m ajo r econom ic a n d p o litica l develop­ th e n w ro te explicit racial d isc rim in atio n in to law, creating
m en ts, a n d several w ars th a t c h allen g e d th e existence o f th e w h a t w as called th e “Jim C ro w S o u th ” w ith its sh arp racial
U n ite d States as a republic. seg reg atio n a n d , in som e localities, th e th re a t o f non-official
Som e o f th e a m e n d m en ts to th e C o n s titu tio n have been (b u t tolerated) violence a g ain st A fric a n A m e ric an s w h o in
su b sta n tia l, a n d b ro a d er social ch an g e has a lte re d th e any w ay seem ed to th re a te n th is order.
U n ite d S tates p o lity considerably over th e years. H e re w e A t th e sam e tim e , A fric a n A m e ric an s w h o m oved to
briefly h ig h lig h t th re e m ain d evelopm ents in th a t co n n ec­ n o rth e rn cities in th e “G re a t M ig ra tio n ” o ften discovered
tion: th e extension o f suffrage a n d fu ll p a rtic ip a tio n in th e th a t d isc rim in a tio n w as also p re se n t th e re (for a n evocative
life o f th e society to gro u p s th a t w ere once excluded; th e acco u n t, see W ilk e rs o n 2010). Jim C ro w o nly fell in th e
creatio n o f th e m o d e rn p a rty -sy ste m th a t has d o m in a te d face o f social o rg a n iz in g , social m o v em e n t activity, a n d ex­
A m e ric an p olitics n o w fo r decades; a n d th e g ro w th o f th e tensive litig atio n . In d e e d , w h e n th e fe d era l g o v ern m en t,
state, an d , in p a rtic u la r, o f th e w elfare state in th e tw e n ti­ u n d e r pressure, b e g an to enforce e q u al access to votin g ,
e th century. ed u ca tio n , a n d o th e r rig h ts in th e 1960s, it faced resistance
L e t us b e g in w ith th e g ra d u a l e x te n sio n o f fu ll c itiz e n ­ fro m som e so u th e rn p o p u latio n s a n d even fro m state-level
ship. O n one h a n d , w ith its civic n a tio n a lism a n d its leaders lik e G e o rg e W allac e (P a tte rso n 1996: 5 7 9 -5 8 9 ). It
fo u n d in g d e clara tio n th a t “A ll m en are c rea te d e q u al,” th e w o u ld be a stre tc h to say th a t th ese stru g g les are over,
early U n ite d S tates w as a n exam ple o f e q u a lity a n d fre e ­ th o u g h trem en d o u s progress has b e e n m ade, largely as a
d om (W o o d [1969] 1998). O n th e o th e r h a n d , ju d g e d by re su lt o f th e civil rig h ts m ovem ent. S ocial scientists p o in t to
to d a y ’s sta n d ard s, a g re a t deal o f exclusion a n d in e q u a lity o n g o in g evidence o f jo b d isc rim in a tio n , su b sta n tia lly low er
re m a in e d . T he c o n stitu tio n a l c o n v en tio n failed to b a n slav­ incom es a n d asset levels, su b sta n tia lly p o o re r public h e alth
ery, leaving su ch m a tte rs , like so m u c h else, u p to th e in d ic a to rs, a n d h ig h e r in ca rce ratio n rates a m o n g A fric a n
states, s e ttin g u p a m ajo r la te r sh o w d o w n over th is issue. A m e ric a n s as evidence th a t b o th h isto ric a l legacies a n d o n ­
T he A m e rin d ia n p o p u la tio n w as larg ely co n sig n ed to th e g o in g d isc rim in a tio n re m a in issues in th e c o u n try (B row n
lea st p ro d u c tiv e la n d , a n d th e “ru les o f th e g a m e ” w ere re ­ e t al. 2003).
p eated ly c h a n g e d o n th e m as th e U n ite d S tates c o n sisten tly You m ay be surprised to see th a t th e evolution o f the
failed to abide b y previous tre a ty a g ree m e n ts. W o m e n ’s m o d ern p a rty system in th e U n ite d States is lin k ed to these
civil rig h ts w ere also n a rro w ly circ u m scrib e d . O f course, developm ents. O n one h a n d , th e fact th a t th e U n ited States
in e q u a lity w as felt b y o th e r g ro u p s in o th e r w ays, in c lu d in g has a tw o -p a rty system is partially a fu n c tio n o f its “w in n e r
class in eq u ality , b u t w e focus here v e ry briefly o n th e e x p e­ tak e a ll” approach to elections, b u t th is does not, in and o f
rience o f A fric a n A m e ric an s. itself, explain w hy th e tw o p arties have developed as they
O v e r th e course o f th e n in e te e n th c e n tu ry ten sio n b u ilt have a n d lin k e d them selves to th e interests and support o f the
over th e persistence o f slavery. A b o litio n ists c am p aig n e d groups th a t th ey have. In th e in itial years o f th e republic, the
a g ain st it, w h ile slave ow ners a n d th e ir su p p o rte rs ju stifie d m ajor conflict w as betw een so-called “federalists” and
558 United States

“dem ocratic republicans.” T he form er favored stronger central w ith som e form s o f h o u sin g assistance, p e rio d ic re lie f p ro ­
pow er (indeed, b o th groups w ere proponents o f “federalism ” g ra m s m e a n t to provide w o rk a n d o th e r form s o f assistance
as such), a n ational b ank, and so fo rth , w hile th e latter group d u rin g th e G re a t D e p ressio n , a n d increased re g u la tio n o f
felt m ore strongly about having a w eak central governm ent th e lab o r m ark et.
w ith stronger state and local governm ents. O v e r tim e, th e T he second m ajor p e rio d o f c o n stru c tio n o f th e A m e ri­
federalists w ere essentially replaced by th e W h ig s . T he C ivil can w elfare state (P a tte rso n 1996: 5 2 4 -5 9 2 ) w as d u rin g th e
W ar, th o u g h , w as a critical ju n ctu re. A b ra h am L incoln, the presid en cy o f L y n d o n B aines Jo h n s o n (1963-1969). H e re,
candidate o f th e little -k n o w n R epublican Party, w as elected m ajo r h e a lth care p ro g ram s like M e d ica re (w hich provides
in 1860, and th e p a rty com petition th a t em erged in subse­ h e a lth care to retirees) a n d M e d ic a id (w hich provides care
quent years m ean t th a t th e D em ocrats w ould be strong to som e ind iv id u als w h o o th erw ise co u ld n o t afford it) w ere
am ong p redom inantly w hite voters in th e S outh, a n d R epub­ established, as w ere nu m ero u s o th e r social w elfare p ro ­
licans in th e N o rth . M oreover, A frican A m erican political g ra m s such as H e a d S ta rt a n d F o o d S tam p s (technically
actors ten d ed to be strongly R epublican. T his changed in called th e S u p p lem en tal N u tritio n A ssistan ce P rogram ),
th e tw e n tie th c entury (K ennedy 1999), particularly d u rin g a m o n g oth ers. B e g in n in g in th e 1970s, as th e U .S . econ­
th e years o f th e G re at D epression, w here F ra n k lin D elan o om y faced “sta g fla tio n ” a n d o th e r difficulties, a m ovem ent
Roosevelt’s expansion o f th e w elfare state appealed to k n o w n to scholars as “re tre n c h m e n t” g a th e re d steam , as in
m any groups o f m in o rity voters, including m any A frican som e o th e r c o u n tries (P rasad 2006).
A m ericans, w orkers, and m em bers o f im m ig ra n t groups. For W h e n R o n a ld R eag an to o k office in 1980, h e d id so
a tim e, there w as considerable tension in th e D em ocratic a fte r stro n g ly o p p o sin g th e w elfare state features e stab ­
P a rty betw een m ore conservative, o ften southern, trad itio n ­ lish ed b y th e N e w D e a l a n d th e G re a t S ociety program s.
alist p a rty m em bers and supporters o f th e m ore “liberal” (in H ow ever, w h ile h e scaled b a ck a v a rie ty o f re lie f p rogram s,
th e A m erican sense) trajectory o f th e D em ocratic P a rty in the key featu res o f th e w elfare state p ersisted. In d e e d , it w as
post-w ar years. M o re recently, follow ing R ichard N ixon’s u n d e r th e p resid en cy o f D e m o c ra t B ill C lin to n th a t so-
fam ous “S outhern Strategy” (P atterson 1996: 702, 741-742), called “w elfare”— th e A id to F am ilies w ith D e p e n d e n t
th e Republicans have, quite ironically, established th eir C h ild re n (A F D C ) p ro g ram — w as “refo rm ed .” T h a t is, it
strongest base in th e S outh, a n d regions like th e N o rth e a st w as tra n sfo rm e d in to th e m ore restrictiv e T e m p o rary A id
have becom e staunchly D em ocratic— indeed, in th e 2008 to N e e d y F am ilies (T A N F ) p ro g ram , a d m in istere d via
congressional elections, N e w E n g la n d sent no R epublicans to blo ck g ra n ts to th e states a n d no lo n g er classified as a n “e n ­
th e H ouse o f R epresentatives. title m e n t” (P a tte rso n 2005: 374-376). T his p a tte rn o f m id ­
T he w elfare state in th e U n ite d S tates is n o t especially c e n tu ry w elfare state exp an sio n follow ed b y re tre n c h m e n t
ro b u st i f you com pare it to th o se fo u n d in o th e r advanced b e g in n in g in th e 1970s is c o m m o n to o th e r advanced in ­
in d u stria l societies such as F rance, G erm an y , o r th e S can­ d u stria l societies, even i f th e U .S . w elfare state w as rela­
din av ia n countries. P ro p o n e n ts o f th e w elfare state in th e tively w e ak to b e g in w ith . In terestin g ly , th o u g h , recent
U n ite d States could, how ever, p o in t to c e rta in notable p olitics has involved b o th th e e stab lish m en t o f a m ajor
achievem ents. W h ile th ere h a d b e e n previous efforts at h e a lth care b ill th a t w o u ld e x te n d coverage to m o st o f th e
re g u la tio n a n d im p ro v in g th e co n d itio n s o f w orkers a n d U .S . p o p u la tio n (so m e th in g alw ays conspicuously absent
o th e r p o p u latio n s, th e A m e ric a n w elfare state w as really fro m th e U .S . w elfare state) and a ren ew ed effort by o th e r
created in F ra n k lin D e la n o R oosevelt’s “N e w D e a l” in th e actors to refo rm th o se aspects o f th e w elfare state th a t have,
1930s (K en n ed y 1999). T his is th e p e rio d in w h ic h social u n til now , largely b e en stro n g ly d efen d ed by b o th parties:
secu rity— th e A m e ric a n fo rm o f social in su ra n ce th a t b o th M e d ic a re a n d S ocial Security. In sh o rt, th e issues th a t have
provides re tire m e n t benefits a n d also su p p o rt in th e event o f a n im a te d th e d eb ate ab o u t th e A m e ric a n w elfare state are
a w age e arn e r’s d isa b ility or d e a th — w as established, along still very m u ch p a r t o f p ublic discussion.

Regime and Political Institutions

The p re d o m in a n t features o f th e A m e ric a n p o litica l system “checks a n d balan ces” b e tw ee n th e legislature, th e execu-
are th e sep aratio n o f pow ers am o n g various levels a n d in sti- tive, a n d th e ju diciary, b u t also th e se p a ra tio n o f pow er b e -
tu tio n s o f go v ern m en t. T his includes n o t only th e set o f tw e en th e fed eral g o v e rn m e n t a n d th e fifty states. A t th e
 Profile 559

federal level, th e U n ite d States C o n g re ss is a b icam eral leg­ po w ers b e tw e e n th e fe d era l (central) g o v e rn m e n t a n d th e
islature com prised o f a H o u se o f R epresentatives a n d th e states. T he U n ite d S tates w as a n early lea d er in e stab lish in g
Senate; th e R epresentatives in th e H o u se are selected in one th e p rin cip le o f fed eralism , in w h ic h b o th levels o f go v ern ­
o f 435 d istric ts a ro u n d th e country, w ith each d istric t re p ­ m e n t have sig n ific a n t c o n stitu tio n a l a u th o rity . O n e o f th e
re sen tin g over a h a lf-m illio n A m erican s. E very state has a key aspects o f th e C o n s titu tio n is th e re serv a tio n o f “re ­
m in im u m o f one seat for a R epresentative in th e H o u se, a n d sid u a l” pow ers to th e states, m e a n in g th e states have au­
th e n u m b er o f d istric ts p e r state ranges fro m o ne in th e least th o r ity over issues n o t expressly g ra n te d to th e federal
populous states (such as W y o m in g ) to fifty -th re e in C a li­ g o v e rn m e n t. T his q u e stio n o f “sta te s’ rig h ts” relative to
fornia. T his re p re se n tatio n in th e H o u se, w h ic h is ro u g h ly fe d era l law w as th e c ru x o f th e issue o f slavery u p th ro u g h
p ro p o rtio n a l to a sta te ’s p o p u latio n , is co u n te rb ala n ce d by th e C iv il W a r, a n d to th is d a y m a n y o f th e b ig g est debates
th e tw o Senators for each state. E ith e r c h a m b e r can propose in A m e ric a n p o litics are over w h e th e r issues ra n g in g from
bills it w ishes to see b ecom e law, b u t th e b ill m u st pass b o th w elfare to a b o rtio n law sh o u ld b e th e re sp o n sib ility o f th e
houses o f C o n g re ss, th e n be signed in to law b y th e presi­ fe d era l o r sta te g o v e rn m e n ts. S tates a n d local g o v ern m en ts
dent. A lternatively, th e p re sid en t can choose to veto th e bill, have a g re a t deal o f re sp o n sib ility in social services. States
w h ich can th e n b e o v e rtu rn e d o nly b y a tw o -th ird s m ajo rity d o m u c h o f th e w o rk in a d m in is te rin g p ro g ra m s fo r th e
vote in b o th houses o f C o n g re ss. I n a d d itio n , th e federal p o o r (such as M e d ic a id a n d incom e su p p o rt), w h ile locali­
ju d ic iary can strik e d o w n law s it deem s u n c o n stitu tio n a l. tie s have esp ecially sig n ific a n t resp o n sib ilitie s in educa­
T his provides th e ju d ic ia l ch ec k o n th e o th e r branches; th e tio n . M o re p eople p a rtic ip a te in e le cte d offices o n school
ch eck on th e ju d ic ia ry in tu r n is th a t its ju d g es are n o m i­ b o a rd s th a n a n y o th e r p o sitio n . L o c a l executives such as
n a te d by th e p re sid en t a n d approved by th e Senate. m ayors also oversee services su ch as local roads, sa n ita tio n ,
A lo n g sid e th ese checks a n d ba la n ce s in th e p o lic y m ak ­ a n d th e police.
in g process, th e U n ite d S tates also e xhibits a se p a ra tio n o f

Regim e and Political Institutions

Regime Federal republic, democratically elected

Administrative Divisions Fifty states, each of which has counties, cities, towns, etc. Also District of Columbia (federal capital)
and several overseas territories and dependencies.

Executive Branch President

Selection of Executive Elected by "electoral college," with delegates awarded depending on popular vote in each state or
electoral district

Legislative Branch Bicameral Congress

House of Representatives (lower chamber) elected in single-member districts
Senate (upper chamber), two senators per state

Judicial Branch Federal court system led by Supreme Court with powers of Constitutional review

Political Party System Two-party system; Democratic Party, Republican Party

Political Culture
A m e ric a n p o litica l c u ltu re , lik e p o litic a l c u ltu re every­ o ften p u rsu e d g o v ern m en tal action as w ell); so-called
w h ere, has m u ltip le stream s a n d featu res. H o w ev er, c e rta in “ru g g e d ind iv id u alism ”; th e m u ch -d isc u ssed A m e ric an
key th em e s sta n d o u t a n d have b e e n d iscu ssed a t le n g th by “fro n tie r m e n ta lity ”; a n iso latio n ist ten d en cy w ith respect to
scholars in te re ste d in th is case. T hese in clu d e a tra d itio n o f foreign policy, b u t alongside a n im p o rta n t m ilita ris t strain ;
skepticism o f g o v e rn m e n ta l a u th o rity , w h ic h e x ten d s b a c k a n d th e id ea o f th e “A m e ric a n d re a m ” a n d th e associated
a t lea st to th e re v o lu tio n ary era (th o u g h A m e ric an s have id ea o f m e rito c ra tic equality. A lm o n d a n d V erba (1963)
560 United States

arg u e d th a t th e U n ite d S tates w as a case e x h ib itin g stro n g T he n o tio n o f “ru g g e d in d iv id u a lism ” carries th e im ag e o f
“civic c u ltu re ,” th o u g h in recen t years som e have w o rried single p e rso n s a n d sm a ll fam ilies stru g g lin g , w ith o u t aid,
ab o u t w h e th e r th is is still tru e (P u tn a m 20 0 0 ). a g a in st n a tu re . In g e n era l, c o m p a rativ e re sea rc h ers fin d a
T he tra d itio n o f skepticism o f g o v e rn m e n ta l a u th o rity stro n g in d iv id u a list te n d e n c y in A m e ric a n p o litic a l cul­
may, to som e ex ten t, have its o rig in s in th e early stages o f tu re . T his lin k s to A m e ric a n s’ u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e
c olonialism . In th e N e w E n g la n d colonies in p a rtic u la r, m e rito c ra tic c h a ra c te r o f th e A m e ric a n class stru c tu re .
th e p o p u la tio n w as, in th e in itia l stages, largely th e re for A m e ric a n s , u n lik e E u ro p e a n s, te n d to believe th a t in d i­
reasons o f religious in to leran ce b a c k hom e. T hey lived in v id u als are larg e ly re sp o n sib le for w h e re th e y e n d u p in
fear o f E n g lish a u th o ritie s, a n d th e y e stab lish ed stro n g tr a ­ life: S o c iety is basically fair, a n d everyone w h o is ta le n te d
d itio n s o f c o m m u n ity reliance a n d local self-governance. a n d w o rk s h a r d h a s a g o o d ch an c e o f g e ttin g ah ead .
A t th e very least, late r A m e ric an s could look b a ck to th in k ­ In d e e d , A m e ric a n s o ften believe th a t th is a lle g ed q u a lity
ers lik e R o g er W illia m s a n d see th e m as a n tic ip a tin g th e ir o f th e A m e ric a n class s tru c tu re is w h a t sets th e c o u n try
ow n skepticism o f g o v e rn m e n t involvem ent in priv ate life a p a rt (thus th e “A m e ric a n d re a m ”) even th o u g h co n sid er­
(M ille r 1983a, 1983b). T his w as c e rta in ly tru e o f key m em ­ able re sea rc h show s th a t, a t le a st in re c e n t years, th e
bers o f th e rev o lu tio n ary g e n era tio n , w h o objected n o t o nly A m e ric a n class s tru c tu re is n o m ore o p e n th a n th e class
to tax a tio n w ith o u t c o n se n t b u t also to th e use o f force B rit­ s tru c tu re s o f m o st W e s te rn E u ro p e a n c o u n tries (H a sk in s,
ish a u th o ritie s exercised in su p pressing th e ir pro tests. Isaacs, a n d S aw h ill 2 0 0 8 ). T he n o tio n o f th e “fro n tie r
(Som e accounts o f th e revolution, such as N a sh 1979, stress m e n ta lity ,” w as m u ch d iscu ssed a fte r a fam ous a rg u m e n t
a d d itio n a l grievances a n d p o in t to differences in social p u t fo rw a rd b y h isto ria n F re d e ric k Ja c k so n T u rn e r (1921)
class.) W h e n th e c o u n try becam e in d e p e n d e n t, its fo u n d ers in th e late n in e te e n th a n d early tw e n tie th c en tu rie s.
clearly d id have in m in d “lim ite d g o v e rn m e n t,” a n d gov­ T u rn e r a n d th o se in flu e n ce d by h im w o rrie d a b o u t w h a t
e rn m e n t pow ers e x p an d e d in several key stages a n d in re ­ w o u ld b eco m e o f A m e ric a n s’ en erg ies n o w th a t th e fro n ­
sponse to crises a n d c h a n g in g co n d itio n s in su b seq u en t tie r w as gone (because w e stw a rd e x p an sio n w as c o m ­
years. S till, h a v in g fo u n d in g d o c u m e n ts a n d tra d itio n s th a t pleted). T his id ea is b a se d o n th e re c o g n itio n th a t
so clearly express skepticism o f g o v e rn m e n t m eans th a t th e A m e ric a n s have h isto ric a lly th o u g h t o f them selves in rela­
p o litica l c u ltu re , no m a tte r h o w m u c h it chan g es, alw ays tio n to fo u n d in g m y th s a b o u t stru g g le a g a in st n a tu re ,
h as th ese p o in ts o f reference. A s anyone w h o even d ista n tly m a k in g b o u n tifu l a n (allegedly) u n p o p u la te d lan d , and,
follow s A m e ric a n p olitics could a tte st, th ese issues re m a in a g ain , re ly in g o n them selves in th is stru g g le. T he isola­
m u ch discussed. tio n is t im p u lse , d iscu ssed m ore in o n e o f th e case stu d ies
Several o f th e o th er com m only cited features o f A m erican th a t follow (“T he U n ite d S tates a n d th e W o rld ”), also is
p o litic a l c u ltu re n o te d p re viously are re la te d to th is idea. re la te d a n d also h a s lo n g h isto ric a l ro o ts.

Political Economy
T he U n ite d S tates is th e w o rld ’s la rg e st e co n o m y as o f a u to m a tio n a n d in c re a sin g im p o rts o f p ro d u c ts b u ilt over­
201 5 , desp ite re ce n t c h allen g e s a n d th e rise o f C h in a . T he seas (and, th e re fo re , th e o u tso u rc in g o f m u c h in d u stria l
tw e n tie th c e n tu ry w as a tim e o f d ra m a tic ex p an sio n o f w o rk to dev elo p in g c ountries). T he e conom y has becom e
A m e ric a n m a n u fa c tu rin g , e p ito m iz e d b y th e rise o f th e m ore “se rv ic e -o rie n te d ,” in c lu d in g m an y professionals
auto m o b ile in d u s try (K e n n ed y 1999: 2 0 -2 1 ). A s th e w ith college d eg rees a n d m a n y w o rk in g in re ta il sales.
U n ite d S tates b e cam e th e u n d isp u te d in d u s tria l lea d er o f I n e q u a lity has in creased n o tab ly as th e se tre n d s have u n ­
th e free w o rld a fte r W o rld W a r I I , it also b ecam e th e folded (P a tte rso n 2005: 351-353).
w o rld ’s le a d in g voice fo r cap italism . E c o n o m ic setbacks T he U n ite d States does n o t have th e h ig h e s t G D P per
cam e w ith th e G re a t D e p ressio n o f th e 1930s, th e oil crises capita, as it lags b e h in d several sm all c o u n tries th a t are
o f th e 1970s, a n d th e g lo b al fin an c ia l crisis o f 2 0 0 7 -2 0 0 9 , b a n k in g centers a n d several o il-e x p o rtin g c o u n tries w ith
b u t th e A m e ric a n e conom y c o n tin u e s as a w o rld leader. By sm all p o p u latio n s. M oreover, in e q u a lity in th e U n ite d
th e tw e n ty -first cen tu ry , th e e conom y h a d sh ifte d aw ay States is h ig h c o m p a red to o th e r w e alth y c o u n tries, a n d
fro m lo w -sk ille d , lab o r-in ten siv e m a n u fa c tu rin g , d u e to m ore th a n 10 p e rce n t o f th e p o p u la tio n falls belo w th e
 Case Studies 561

p o v erty line. T his suggests th a t b y m an y m easures, th e issue su sta in a b ility o f th e n a tio n a l d eb t, a n d som e are con cern ed
o f develo p m en t is relev an t even in th is seem ingly p o w e rfu l t h a t th e im b a lan c e m ay w o rsen as a re su lt o f c o n tin u e d low
econom y. H e a lth in d icato rs a n d e d u ca tio n lag b e h in d m an y taxes a n d in cre ased sp e n d in g for a n a g in g p o p u la tio n in th e
co u n tries in b o th E u ro p e a n d A sia. Som e m in o rity g roups, c o m in g years.
such as A fric a n A m e ric an s, have econom ic a n d social in d i­ D e sp ite th ese m an y c h allen g es, th e A m e ric a n econom y
cators th a t are m u ch w orse o ff th a n th e n a tio n a l average. is diversified a n d ro b u st in m an y areas, a n d it rem ain s th e
T his is also clear w ith re sp ec t to social class. F o r exam ple, envy o f m an y c o u n tries a ro u n d th e w orld. It is h om e to
ed u catio n level— a proxy for class— is negatively correlated m a n y o f th e larg e st a n d m o st successful c o rp o ra tio n s in th e
w ith th e lik e lih o o d th a t A m e ric an s w ill die fro m c h ro n ic w o rld a n d is a lea d in g c en ter o f tec h n o lo g ic al in n o v atio n
disease or even suffer injuries (B e rk m a n 2004). a n d finance. T he U n ite d S tates also features countless sm all
T he A m e ric a n e conom y faces several sig n ific a n t c h al­ businesses a n d is re n o w n ed for its c u ltu re o f e n tre p ren e u r­
lenges a t p re sen t, especially a fte r th e deep recession o f ship. F inally, th e c o u n try is w id ely seen as h a v in g m u ch o f
2 0 0 7 to 2 0 0 9 a n d th e slow recovery a n d h ig h u n em p lo y ­ th e “so ft in fra s tru c tu re ” th a t m akes for a re silie n t a n d vi­
m e n t th a t p e rsisted in its a fte rm a th . In th e sh o rt te rm (as o f b ra n t econom y: p ro te c tio n o f p ro p e rty rig h ts, deep labor
early 2015), th e c en tra l c h allen g e is one o f c o n tin u in g to a n d capital m ark ets, a n d clusters o f in n o v atio n a n d k now l­
restore d e m a n d w h ile cap italiz in g o n th e m o m e n tu m th a t edge. A s a result, th e U n ite d S tates c o n tin u e s to d ra w ta le n t
has d eveloped in th e lab o r m a rk e t, as u n e m p lo y m en t is a n d cap ital in v e stm e n t fro m a ro u n d th e w o rld , a n d it looks
no w w ell b e lo w 6%. S om e also w o rry ab o u t th e size a n d set to re m a in a global econom ic po w erh o u se in to th e fu tu re.

CASE STUDIES

Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich?

Will They in the Future? CHAPTER 4, PAGE 72

Development is a process that unfolds over time, and it can be clarity) is from one of the Founding Fathers of the United
helpful to consider a range of different cases in comparative per­ States: Alexander Hamilton ([1791] 1828: pp. 110-111). Why would
spective, whether these are different countries at the same point Hamilton argue against free markets and for protectionism and
in time, the same country at different points in time, or other pos­ active government promotion of industry? Because the United
sibilities. As a thought experiment, consider this statement about States was a backward country when he was writing in 1791. The
the usefulness of tariffs (taxes on foreign goods) and subsidies (or world's leading economy was Great Britain, which had led the
government support for domestic producers), and guess in world into the Industrial Revolution. In fact, powerful Britain was
which country the government published this report advocating the leading advocate for free trade in the nineteenth century.
for state intervention: Partly due to the protectionist logic laid out by Hamilton, the
United States relied heavily on tariffs for government revenues
[We should] place tariffs on foreign goods of those
through the nineteenth century and up to the 1930s. As early as
products we wish to encourage, and to apply the
the 1800s, northern industry in the United States sought to pro­
proceeds of that tariff as a subsidy on the production or
tect its production by imposing higher tariffs on imported
manufacture in [this country]. In this way, our companies
goods. This culminated in the sky-high Tariff of 1828, the highest
have every advantage in their production.
rates in American history. The southern states abhorred the tar­
Notice the anti-free-market tone. Is this a statement from Russia? iffs, which raised prices of imported goods, and called it the
Communist China? Actually, this excerpt (slightly modified for "Tariff of Abominations." The resulting dispute contributed to
562 United States

CASE STUDY (continued)

Did Free Markets Help the United States Get Rich?

Will They in the Future? CHA PTER 4, PAGE 72

rising tensions before the Civil War. While tariff rates later de­ contracts, and the government is a major consumer of pharma­
clined, the United States passed the Smoot-Hawley tariff a cen­ ceuticals and medical devices through its Medicare program that
tury later, which was interpreted as contributing to the Great provides health care to senior citizens. The U.S. protectionist im­
Depression. pulse can be seen especially in debates over the rise of China,
The United States became the leading advocate for free trade which is often accused of unfairtrade practices. American policy­
only after World War II. That is, the United States pushed for free makers and voters routinely lament the low wages, lack of worker
trade when it was the preeminent economic power in the world. protections, and environmental abuses of Chinese production,
One theory is that wealthy countries like to “kick away the ladder’ all of which lower the prices of Chinese goods and can make
after they have climbed it. That is, the United States and other American goods less competitive. A common response is to ad­
wealthy countries succeeded under protectionism, but once vocate for protection of American jobs by putting barriers on
they became dominant powers, they sought to establish rules Chinese goods.
that favor the powerful and make everyone else live by them. Countries change their development strategies over time,
This would explain not only the American conversion to a pro- with some periods involving much more state intervention and
free-trade stance, but also the British preference for free trade in other periods less so. Perspectives on free trade also tend to
the nineteenth century. change depending on a country's economic circumstances. It is
Contemporary American economic policy still features a pro­ worth remembering that the United States was not always a
tectionist streak and heavy government spending in several paragon of free markets, and it is possible that in the future too it
areas, and not only due to the financial crisis of the late 2000s. For may have a much less favorable view of whether free markets are
example, the defense industry depends heavily on government the road to wealth.

CASE STUDY

Is Ameri
srican Democracy in Trouble? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 140
■■H i

Many of today's most robust democra­ Very few political scientists fear the gap between rich and poor Americans is
cies have had tumultuous histories. imminent demise of American democ­ much wider today than it was several de­
Think, for instance, of Germany or France, racy, but scholars do vary considerably in cades ago. According to scholars like
which over the last two centuries have terms of how safely institutionalized they Pierson and Hacker, this change has
seen both democratic and authoritarian consider that democracy to be. Think, for dangerous implications, and we might
regimes (and, in the former case, per­ a moment, about what the different theo­ expect it to be self-reinforcing, since the
haps the most notorious totalitarian ries of democracy discussed in chapter 6 "beneficiaries" of expanding income in­
regime in modern history). Other coun­ might suggest about this case. What are equality exert disproportionate influ­
tries, though, saw slow and steady de­ the implications of each theory for the ence in the political process and might
mocratization over time. The United survival of democratic regimes? What risk block efforts to reduce inequality. This
Kingdom and the United States stand factors might increase the probability of concern links to traditional "moderniza­
out as clear examples of the latter pat­ democratic decay? tion" theories of democracy like that of
tern. This means that polities like the One worry that some scholars have Upset (1959,1960) discussed in chapter 6.
United States are securely democratic, voiced concerns rising income inequal­ Recall that Upset saw a strong middle
right? ity (e.g., Hacker and Pierson 2010). The class as the backbone of democratic
 Case Studies 563

CASE STUDY (continued)

Is American Democracy in Trouble? CHAPTER 6, PAGE 140

regimes, seeing economic development the habits, tastes, and modes of participa­ for the resilience of American democratic
as, in part, acting indirectly to promote tion that had been operative in the United institutions in the face of these changes
democratization through creating and States since its founding, and which and some, in fact, suggest that scholars
sustaining a middle class. If the middle had been documented by Alexis de Toc­ like Hacker, Pierson, and Putnam exag­
class shrinks or its position weakens, an queville in the nineteenth century, were in gerate the trends in question. Moreover,
implication of the theory would be that decline. According to Putnam, the volun­ the attentive reader will not fail to note
one of democracy's "social requisites" is tary tendencies that were conducive to that these very discussions, for perhaps
in decline. robust civic participation were giving way obvious reasons, enter into American po­
Another worry links to a different to individualism. The implication, again, is litical speech at the highest level and
theory of democratization discussed in that the failure to practice democratic resonate in politicians' statements and
the chapter, the “cultural" theory. Some habits— or to maintain a democratic cul­ debates as well as journalistic accounts
years ago, political scientist Robert ture of civic participation— could under­ of American politics. We encourage you,
Putnam (2000; for a similar set of concerns mine democratic institutions. though, to think like a comparativist in
see Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and These worries are not shared by all coming to judgments about them. Try to
Tipton 1985) published a book called scholars (for a critique of Putnam's argu­ put the comparative approach to work in
Bowling Alone, in which he argued that ment, e.g., see Ladd 1999). Some argue thinking about these critical issues.

Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem? CHAPTER 8, PAGE 192

The federal judiciary in the United States Over the years, certain key rulings by public schools. The ruling predated and
has a significant role in the interpretation the United States Supreme Court have anticipated the civil rights achievements
of law and in ruling whether laws are con­ proven especially noteworthy. The first of of the 1960s, with the Supreme Court re­
stitutional. This role has led to accusations these, and the one decision that gave flecting a growing social consensus
of 'judicial activism." Because judges can power to subsequent decisions, was Mar- among a majority of Americans that racial
invalidate laws or add new interpretations bury v. Madison in 1803. This ruling as­ segregation should be outlawed. This
to laws passed by Congress, some argue serted the power of judicial review, a ruling had several elements of judicial ac­
that the judiciary is too powerful and that power the Supreme Court found to be tivism: It took action when Congress had
"unelected judges are legislating from the implicit in the structure of government not done so, it substantially limited the
bench.” Examples of controversial judicial established in the Constitution. Several extent to which states could make their
decisions can be found in the federal other key decisions in United States Su­ own determinations about education, and
courts, but they are not limited to these; preme Court history can shed light on the it also essentially overturned the long­
they also happen at the state level as well, question of judicial activism. standing precedent of one of the Supreme
such as when the top courts in states such One of the leading decisions in which Court's most notorious decisions: Plessy v.
as Massachusetts, Iowa, and New Jersey judicial action preceded legislative action Ferguson (1896), which had established
ruled that the state must extend same- was the famous Brown v. Board ofEducation that "separate but equal" provisions for dif­
sex marriage rights or equivalent benefits (1954) decision. This unanimous (9-0) deci­ ferent races were constitutionally permis­
to gay couples. sion outlawed official racial segregation in sible. This had allowed racial segregation
564 United States

CASE STUDY (continued)

Is Judicial Activism in the United States a Problem? CHAPTER 8, PAGE 192

to persist. While arguably a textbook in­ inventing or "discovering" rights that were depending on one's definition of the term.
stance ofjudicial activism, Brown v. Board of not explicitly established in the Constitu­ In fact, many critics of judicial activism do
Education is also widely seen as one of the tion. Less than a decade later, Roe v. Wade not wish to criticize all court action, and
Supreme Court's proudest moments. (in 1973) ruled that women have a condi­ would often be happy with courts taking
Other controversial rulings in the his­ tional right to abortion, depending upon consequential decisions that overturn
tory of the U.S. Supreme Court have also the trimester of pregnancy, with few re­ laws and statutes. Rather, critics often have
raised the question of judicial activism on strictions in the first three months, case- an interpretation of the Constitution in
hot-button issues such as slavery in the by-case consideration in the second three mind, and wish judges would rule accord­
nineteenth century, and in the twentieth months, and significant restrictions (such ing to that interpretation. Perhaps they
century issues of contraception, abortion, as jeopardizing the life of the mother) in view the Constitution as allowing only
and affirmative action. The case Griswold v. the final three months. Another case that quite limited government and lament
Connecticut (in 1965) was concerned with drew mixed reactions was Bush v. Gore (in courts that read new rights into the Con­
contraception laws; the Supreme Court 2000), which ruled that the state of Florida stitution. Or perhaps they view the Consti­
ruled that individuals have a constitutional must stop its recount of the vote tally from tution as enabling many tacit rights for
right of privacy, based on a combined the razor-thin 2000 presidential election individuals (such as privacy, e.g.) and
reading of a number of amendments to between George W. Bush and Al Gore. This regret courts that make decisions they
the Constitution. No specific "right to pri­ effectively ended the election dispute and perceive as limiting these rights. That is,
vacy" is found there, but the ruling stated resulted in George W. Bush's inauguration many critics of judicial activism in some
that this right could be inferred from the as president. decisions may look for an active judiciary
"penumbras and emanations" of other In essence, most major Supreme Court in other areas; the debate is as often over
foundational rights. Critics saw this as decisions of great consequence are likely conceptions of rights as it is over what the
a case of an activist court run amok. to have elements of judicial activism, judiciary should and should not do.

CASE STUDY

The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or

Functioning by Design? CHAPTER 9, PAGE 217

The "Founding Fathers" of the United up these rights in the form of a Senate after the Civil War settled the question of
States developed an intricate political where each state was to have equal repre­ state attempts to nullify federal law, the
compromise designed to satisfy both the sentation, regardless of population. While debate continues.
larger and smaller of the thirteen original the idea of compromise between central Some of the leading debates about
colonies that came together to create the and state power was crucial in the early how representative democracy truly is in
new nation. Led by James Madison, con­ development of the country, the balance the United States focus on the function­
sidered the "Father of the Constitution," of that power has been controversial for ing of Congress, and especially the Senate.
the founders reserved considerable rights the entire history of the republic. Long Consider one question: Would it seem
to those states that the central govern­ after the acrimonious battles at the democratic if elected officials represent­
ment could not infringe upon and backed founding over states' rights, and long ing about 12 percent of the population
 Case Studies 565

CASE STUDY (continued)

The United States Congress: Dysfunctional or

Functioning by Design? CHAPTER 9, PAGE 217

could block legislation that the other 88 senators representing well under half the congressional district for the urban
percent wants? Probably not, assuming population have blocked legislation fa­ center and one for the suburbs? The
the law in question does not violate any vored by senators representing a large 'straight line" solution might well give
basic civil rights. Yet this could happen in majority of the population. In a sense, tol­ two Republican seats (since Republicans
the United States, at least in theory. The erating the possibility of gridlock and in­ would outnumber Democrats by a ratio
Senate features significant malapportion­ action is the flip side of encouraging of 3:2 on either side of the dividing line),
ment and provides major leverage to extensive negotiation and requiring su­ while the "center and ring" solution
smaller and less populous (often rural) permajorities to pass legislation. would probably give one seat in the
states. There are historical reasons for this, Representation in the House of Rep­ House to each party (since the Demo­
of course: the "Great Compromise" at the resentatives is also subject to maneuvers crats would dominate in the inner city
founding of the American republic cre­ that can distort representation. The dis­ and the Republicans in the district in the
ated a bicameral congress and gave the tricts for elections depend on the results suburbs). The chosen solution may be
more populous states more representa­ of the Census, which takes place every determined by which party (if either)
tion in the House of Representatives, ten years. As states grow in population, controls the redistricting process. In
while protecting the interests of the less they may be awarded additional seats some instances, the map making be­
populous states by creating a Senate in among the 435 in the House, while these comes an elaborate process known as
which each state would have two seats are taken away from states declin­ "gerrymandering," in which incumbents
Senators. ing in population. This realignment gives who see an advantage in drawing a map
The power of a minority in the Senate rise to redistricting, or the drawing of a certain way create districts with bizarre
can be further enhanced by certain rules new maps that define the boundaries of shapes designed to help themselves
that have been applied with increasing congressional districts. The shape of dis­ and/or hurt their political opponents.
frequency. For instance, even a minority tricts is a hotly contested issue, since it The design of the two chambers of
of Senators can block legislation, given shapes the likelihood of who is elected to Congress was thus deliberate and useful,
the use of such rules as the "filibuster" (or office. For instance, imagine a large urban but it has also permitted results that
more formally, a cloture vote), which re­ area shaped like a large circle, that is large have led some to say the institutions are
quires a supermajority of sixty out of one enough to merit two congressional seats. dysfunctional (see Mann and Ornstein
hundred senators to end a debate and Say the population of the whole area is 2008). Representation in the United
move to a vote on a bill. In the most ex­ comprised of 40 percent Democrats, States Congress was conceived to pro­
treme scenario, legislation in the United mostly located in the urban center, and tect the rights of individuals and politi­
States could be stopped by forty-one 60 percent Republicans, mostly located cal minorities as well as the principle of
senators representing only about 12 per­ in the suburbs that ring the city. Should federalism, but the institutions designed
cent of the country's population. While the map makers draw districts that cut to do so also have certain features that
this particular configuration is unlikely, it the circle in half along its diameter with a advantage incumbents and promote
is clear that groups of as few as forty straight line? Or should they create one partisanship.
566 United States

The Most Powerful Person in the World"? Checks on

American Presidents CHAPTER 10, PAGE 231

While the president of the United States happened with the Kyoto Protocol on Apart from the other branches of
has long been considered the "Leader greenhouse gas emissions in the late government, many other factors also
of the Free World," these presidents 1990s. On a more domestic note, the fre­ limit presidential authority. One of these
are part of a system of checks and bal­ quent fact of divided government regu­ is public opinion, to which presidents are
ances between executives and the other larly frustrates presidential intentions. For responsive. In part, the influence of
branches. In fact, while presidents have instance, President Barack Obama (2009- public opinion is mediated through Con­
the advantage of the "bully pulpit" of the present) and his administration have gress, with presidents aware that unpop­
office and can push for policies they recently had difficulty passing most sig­ ular ideas or proposals have little chance
prefer, they are quite constrained by the nificant legislation through Congress, of passing Congress. Public opinion mat­
institutional environment in which they since it is controlled by the opposing ters in obvious ways for presidents who
operate. Congress has responsibility for party. Even when a president has a major­ hope to be reelected to a second term,
proposing legislation, and while the ity, passing preferred legislation can be but also for presidents in their second
president can choose to sign bills into difficult, given the use of institutional ma­ terms who are reputed to be thinking of
law or opt to veto a bill, the president neuvers such as the congressional 'filibus­ their historical legacy. By way of example,
cannot secure passage of any law with­ ter' (see chapter 7). efforts by George W. Bush to transform
out the backing of a majority in both Constraints on the executive also the popular Social Security program for
houses of Congress. By contrast, the come from the judiciary, and not just from senior citizens into a more privatized
Congress can override the president's congressional resistance. An example was system were unsuccessful as citizen re­
veto with a two-thirds majority in both seen in the recent George W. Bush (2001- sponses came out against the proposal.
houses. Congress also controls the 2009) administration, when the Supreme Beyond public opinion, the influence of
"purse" and can revoke the spending au­ Court ruled in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (in the markets and money also matters: If
thority of the executive branch in some 2006) that the administration could not stock and bond markets lose confidence
circumstances, and it is responsible for try detainees in certain military tribunals in the government, their declines can
executive oversight; for example, it can and deprive them of access to other raise costs for government and give the
demand that executive branch employ­ courts; the Rumsfeld named on the losing president less latitude in policy options.
ees appear to testify before the legisla­ side of the argument was the administra­ Finally, the international system and cur­
ture. Finally, the Congress can impeach tion's Secretary of Defense and a member rent events beyond the president's con­
the president and bring him/her to trial, of the president's cabinet. President trol can set the tone for a presidency in
with the possibility of removing the Obama and his administration experi­ unexpected ways: September 11, 2001,
president from office. enced challenges in court to the major and the economic recession of 2008-
Thus, the word of'the most powerful health care initiative— the Affordable 2009 no doubt reshaped the last two
person in the world" is not always final. Care Act— that the president backed and presidencies in ways not initially intended
This has given rise to several historical that was passed in 2010. The Supreme by the respective presidents. Altogether,
oddities. One was the diplomatic work of Court, though, ultimately found the law the checks and balances and other cir­
President Woodrow Wilson while over­ constitutional in a 5-4 vote. The judiciary cumstances that limit American presi­
seas after World War I to establish an inter­ interprets constitutional limitations to ex­ dents make the job of the 'most powerful
national League of Nations, only to have ecutive power that include prohibitions person in the world" seem much more a
Congress vote down American member­ on the president usurping powers of state task of accommodating others than
ship upon his return. A similar result governments. imposing one's will.
 Case Studies 567

CASE STUDY

The United States and the World: A Love-Hate

Relationship? CHAPTER 16, PAGE 381

Internationally, the United States is often Roosevelt in World War II had to work very both the right and the left sometimes
viewed as one of the key proponents of hard to convince the country to partici­ oppose U.S. efforts to expand free trade,
globalization, and as one of the societies pate in those wars. However, through par­ and some actors (typically on the right)
the culture and economy of which have ticipating, the United States gradually have even pushed for the United States to
most benefited from increasing global in- began to serve a global role from which it withdraw from the United Nations. In
teg ration.To a considerable extent we con­ would be difficult to extricate itself, and short, while isolationism is not regarded
sider this impression to be correct, though U.S. global involvement accelerated rap­ as a viable policy option by most analysts,
the story behind how the United States idly after World War II as it worked to help an isolationist stream in American politi­
came to be a key actor in globalization has rebuild Japan and Europe, to counter the cal culture is still visible (just ask Ron Paul!).
some potentially surprising elements. influence of the Soviet Union, and to re­ It is likely that in coming years the
There has been a long-standing ten­ store international order in a manner con­ United States will face new pressures and
sion in American politics between shut­ sistent with its interests. Much of the challenges related to globalization and
ting the United States off from the world responsibility for the enforcement of the changing global order. China's influ­
and engaging with it. Washington fa­ global order has continued to be shoul­ ence in the Pacific will continue to rise,
mously urged the United States not to get dered by the United States, which was in­ and both powers will need to be cautious
involved in foreign wars, and for many strumental in creating NATO, the United as they gradually sort out how they will
years the United States had a very small Nations, and international economic interact in the region. Diplomatic relation­
standing army, owing to a strong "isola­ actors like the World Bank and the Interna­ ships in the Americas have changed as
tionist” tendency in American political tional Monetary Fund. Further, after Brit­ well, and the Organization of American
culture, an isolationism no doubt facili­ ain's relative decline, the United States States seems more autonomous from the
tated by the country's geographical dis­ emerged as the most important state pro­ United States than in the past. Beyond
tance from many potential rivals. The ponent of economic liberalism, and it has these issues of power politics, themselves
country was relatively late to imperialism been instrumental in pushing for trade traditional in character, the United States
and did not join in the European powers' agreements like NAFTA and the General will likely continue to face the following
"scramble for Africa." Indeed, where it did Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). problems and challenges:
seek influence, such as in the Americas As it has assumed these roles, it has, Criminality, from drugs to piracy
(Schoultz 1998), it used a combination of not surprisingly, generated both admira­ Terrorism
soft and hard power (the sheer number of tion and resentment. Its position as a pre­ Economic globalization and
historical U.S. military interventions in eminent global power and as a showcase interdependence
Latin America and the Caribbean is as­ of capitalist development can inspire ef­ Immigration and demographics
tounding!) but in most cases without for­ forts at emulation, envy, and anger. This Each of these issues is transnational in
mally establishing colonies (see Puerto has been especially true to the extent that nature. They are about phenomena that
Rico and the Philippines for key excep­ the country has attempted to encourage cross borders and affect the domestic
tions, and many would judge its treat­ or even impose its preferred solutions for politics of different nation-states. The
ment of Cuba under the Platt Amendment other countries' problems. rising prevalence of such issues shows
to blur the line here). As noted earlier, in Interestingly, some domestic actors that the twenty-first century will likely be
the box for chapter 10 Woodrow Wilson within the United States argue not that an era in which comparative politics that
was the driving force behind the creation the United States is exerting dispropor­ looks at politics within countries will
of the League of Nations, and then the tionate influence on others but, rather, become ever more integrated with the
United States refused to join! Both Presi­ that global mechanisms threaten the sov­ study of international relations between
dent Wilson in World War I and President ereignty of the United States. Critics on countries.
568 United States

Research Prompts
1. Consider the discussion of basic American political institutions and then free trade. Based on your reading of these cases and
in this country profile and its accompanying case studies, and their profiles, do you expect that we will see the same pattern in
then consider these materials alongside the discussion of the China? Why or why not?
same institutions in the materials on France and the United 5. Compare and contrast the key points of the politics of ethnicity
Kingdom. What are the major differences in political institutions in the United States and India. Both countries have pasts that
in the countries? What would any large-scale comparative anal­ include racial and ethnic discrimination, and empirical evidence
ysis of political institutions in the three countries need to suggests that both legacies of past discrimination and ongoing
explain? concerns continue to disadvantage some groups in each soci­
2. The "institutional chapters" in this volume have asked you to ety. Does this take place in the same way? Why are there differ­
move beyond the United States and the United Kingdom in ences in how ethnic diversity is reflected in patterns of political
terms of your thinking about political institutions. In the other representation in the two countries?
country profile materials, find three cases that differ from the 6. In recent years, the United States has largely promoted globaliza­
United States in some important way in terms of political institu­ tion while France has been ambivalent. Explain this difference.
tions. Why are these models so different? What are the advan­ 7. From the box on free markets (pp. 561-562), what might Alexander
tages and disadvantages of each for politics in the respective Flamilton advise today for a country whose economy is based on
countries? producing (for example) bananas for export? Or, if you were an
3. Look in the country profiles at discussions of the welfare state American diplomat and someone from a developing country
in France, the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United made a case for protectionism, how might you reply if you wished
States. You will see that different welfare states developed at them to open their markets to American goods? In the study of
different paces and with different consequences (for example, development, it is clear that countries— including the United
some spend more than others). Flow might you explain these States— have much to learn from debating the merits of causal
variations? arguments and from examining the cases studies of one another's
4. Both the United States and the United Kingdom have, at differ­ experiences. What economic lessons can the United States learn
ent points in their history, been proponents of protectionism from other countries?
 Notes

CHAPTER 1 10. This is much debate about how standardized concepts should
1. O f course, we are always curious to know greater historical be in political science. Some argue that concepts should be
detail, such as about who Columbus was, or about fifteenth- standardized and agreed upon to mean the same thing from
century Spain, or about the first encounters between Europeans one work of scholarship to the next. Others argue that since
and the indigenous peoples of the Americas. And there will no concept is perfect, scholars should be free to offer concep­
remain some debate about whether the Americas were previ­ tual innovations depending on their specific projects, so long
ously discovered by other peoples. Learning new facts will often as they are clear.
force us to reinterpret our histories and to understand events 11. Conceptualization is also challenging for several additional
differently. Therefore, attention to factual information is part of reasons. It is bound up with our own values, making it chal­
our analysis and a source of our intellectual curiosity. Yet there lenging to define issues such as democratization, gender, or
is a fundamental difference between w hy questions and the revolutions without bringing to mind lots of connotations. In
closed-ended questions easily answered through memorization addition, while ordinary language is precise enough for daily
or a quick search. life, it is often riddled w ith internal contradiction and lack of
2. We emphasize w hy questions here for heuristic purposes— to conceptual clarity. Many concepts have multiple and distinct
help you learn and discover for yourself. Well-posed w hy meanings across different contexts and from person to person,
questions very often lead to social-scientific explanations. leading to confusion and miscommunication.
However, as Jon Elster (2007) reminds us, we should not 12. In chapter 13 we discuss specific conceptualizations of na­
equate good explanations with the answers to w h y questions. tionalism and national identity put forward by various
Furthermore, in actual social science, the place where a w hy scholars.
question ends and a how question begins can sometimes be 13. This is also sometimes referred to as Sartori’s “ladder of gen­
difficult to say. erality.” See Sartori 1970; Collier and Levitsky 1997.
3. This example, which is discussed further in chapter 13, is 14. Berlin 1958.
adapted from Fearon and Laitin 2003. 15. In ordinary life, the ambiguity of words and concepts has
4. If one is primarily interested in the causes of education policy some advantages. For example, in political discourse (e.g.,
in different countries, the safest way to formulate the question presidential speeches) the very generality of the word “free­
may be “W hat are the causes of education policy?” or “W hy dom” allows it to serve as a collective symbol for most every­
does education policy vary across countries?” If one is primar­ one, because even individuals with very different notions of
ily interested in the consequences of systems of government, what it means to be free can reach public, symbolic agree­
one might ask, “W hat are the consequences of systems of gov­ ment. Yet this is not how we want social science to proceed,
ernment for policy?” given that its goals are very different from those of forming
5. There are caveats to this claim about the lack of laboratories and maintaining a political community or establishing con­
in comparative politics. In certain circumstances, it is possi­ sensus in conversation.
ble to set up controlled experiments, and statistical methods 16. Gerring 2009.
make it possible to control for many factors. O ur emphasis 17. These terms date back to the work of the political theorist
here is on introducing qualitative comparative politics, where John Stuart M ill in the nineteenth century.
such experiments and statistical methods are not assumed to 18. It was true historically in W est Africa that urban residents
be available. had greater political freedoms, and one could make a similar
6. So too, for that matter, do other physical and natural scien­ case for contemporary China, for example, where economic
tists rely on interpretations, it should be noted, but the social liberties and political participation are greater along the
sciences deal with many facts that are not “laws of nature” or coasts than in the interior.
“laws of physics.” See discussion in Lieberson and Lynn 19. That is, some argue that social science issues in probabilistic
2002. rather than deterministic explanations. For an example, again
7. For a sophisticated and classic discussion of these issues, see see Lieberson and Lynn 2002.
Weber 1949. 20. D unning 2012.
8. Gerring 2001. 21. King, Keohane, and Verba 1994.
9. Collier and Levitsky 1997; Collier and Adcock 1999. 22. Przeworski and Teune 1970.
569
570 Notes

CHAPTER 2 18. One example that was hypothesized to exist for a long time
1. Nossiter 2014. was the supposed “Bradley effect,” in which some American
2. A clue that further explains what a hypothesis is can be found in voters would profess to pollsters a preference to vote for an
the word itself, whose etymology includes the prefix hypo, mean­ African American candidate, but would then vote for a white
ing “less than.” This suggests that a hypothesis is an idea that is opponent when alone in the voting booth. The hypothesized
“less than a thesis” until it receives some evidence to support it. reason was that some of those surveyed would not want to
3. We thank one of our anonymous reviewers for this seem to the pollster that they had a racial preference, even if
formulation. they really held one. The result would be an overestimation of
4. If you are interested in understanding in more detail w hy this the number of voters favoring the black candidate. It is un­
is the case, you might want to read a classic book by Karl clear whether the bias ever actually existed, and it was not
Popper (1963) called Conjectures a n d Refutations. Popper argues found in the 2008 presidential election between Barack
that scientists should actually try to disprove their hypotheses Obama and John M cCain, but the example serves to show the
or conjectures. challenges of collecting reliable data.
5. A long tradition of work in the history and philosophy of sci­ 19. Centeno 2002.
ence since at least Kuhn (1962) gives us reason to be suspi­
cious of such idealized portrayals as descriptions of how CHAPTER 3
theories actually change, but most social scientists think that 1. Morgan 2007.
we should aspire to these ideals. 2. Anthropologists and historians have noted many kinds of
6. The quantitative approach requires some knowledge of key states, going back thousands of years. Most comparative po­
descriptive statistics and how to formulate and test hypothe­ litical analysis, however, is focused on the modern state, and
ses in a general sense, but it also depends upon knowledge of thus we focus exclusively on this form here. Throughout the
rules of probability and probability distributions. Statistical chapter, we use the term state to refer to the “modern state.”
methodologies formalize the process of testing hypotheses 3. Weber 1946: 78.
and allow researchers to speak with numerical confidence 4. Strayer ([1970] 2005), in a classic study, sees the state as origi­
about the precision of their findings. nating in medieval Europe, particularly in England and
7. The most important work making this argument is King, France, but his argument is really that some of the key charac­
Keohane, and Verba 1994 (or KKV, as it is often called). teristics of modern states were established in this period. Few
8. Brady and Collier 2004, van Evera 1997. political scientists would see twelfth- or thirteenth-century
9. Or, alternatively, “W hat does country A have more of than France or England as modern states.
country B?” For example, it may be that variable levels of 5. Over time, a number of actors, especially elites, did increas­
human capital and education impact development. Country B ingly seek the king’s protection. See Strayer [1970] 2005. See
is not presumably totally lacking in education and human also North, Wallis, and W eingast 2009.
capital, but has generally lower levels of these things. 6. Strayer stresses the importance of early efforts of the crown in
10. This is partially adapted from Staffan Lindberg’s work on de­ France and England to establish control over the law in estab­
mocratization in Africa (2006: 118). lishing state structures. Strayer [1970] 2005: 26-33.
11. Even more troubling are cases where we could use another 7. Tilly [1990] 1992: 69.
mathematical identifier and say X = Y, that is, X is defined as 8. North, Wallis, and W eingast 2009.
being equal to Y. (To continue the logic using mathematical 9. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Giddens 1987.
notation for a moment, even X = Y can be a problem. This is 10. In referring to the goals of the state, we are using a kind of
because there is so little separating cause and effect that the shorthand. The state, as such, does not have goals. Rather, the
argument becomes uninteresting.) individuals and groups that compose it and make claims on it
12. A t the time of this writing, Kim Jong-un has only held power have goals. However, sometimes such goals become “institu­
for several years following the death of his father. All indica­ tionalized” over time, and states carry them on even when
tions, so far, are that the North Korean regime will maintain nobody is actively campaigning for them.
its highly authoritarian character under his leadership, though 11. Tilly 1992; Levi 1988.
perhaps this will change. 12. Levi 1988: 2.
13. Endogenous comes from endo-, meaning “within,” and -genous, 13. On the concept of stateness see Evans 1997 and Fukuyama
meaning “origin,” suggesting that the origin of a phenomenon 2004.
comes from within the phenomenon itself. So if X causes Y, but 14. On “state breakdown” as a precondition of revolution, see
Y also causes X, then X is causing itself. Tocqueville 1983; Skocpol 1979.
14. See, for example, Babbie (2010: 95), who writes of a closely 15. Perez Diaz 2011.
related example of a statistical association between ice cream 16. Putnam 1993.
sales and drowning rates. 17. M igdal 1988.
15. Leinweber 2007. 18. Ostrom 1990: 41.
16. See Lipset 1959. 19. See Migdal 1988; Putnam 1994.
17. For an overview see Cassidy 2013. 20. Weber 1978: 956-1003. O n bureaucracy and the state, see
also Poggi 1990.
 Notes 571

21. Poggi 1990: 74-75; Greenfeld 1996. 62. Colley 1992.

22. As Strayer ([1970] 2005: 58) puts it, “Sovereignty requires in­ 63. Pincus 2009.
dependence from any outside power and final authority over 64. Greenfeld 1992.
men who live within certain boundaries.”
23. Sahlins 1991. CHAPTER 4
24. Huntington 1957. 1. There is another sense in which scholars also use the phrase “po­
25. W eingast 1997. litical economy” that is beyond the scope of our text. For some,
26. Moreover, it does so unequally. See Pettit and Western 2004 it refers to using the methods of economics— especially formal
and Western 2006. algebraic models of decision making and strategic interaction—
27. Foucault 1977. and applying these to political problems. We occasionally make
28. Note that this does not mean that strong states necessarily tax reference to these sorts of approaches throughout the text, espe­
a lot, but just that they tax successfully and regularly. cially when we draw on “rational choice” or ’’rationalist” theo­
29. The quintessential example may be England’s “Glorious Rev­ ries, but for the sake of clarity, we do not use “political economy”
olution.” See Pincus 2009. in that context.
30. For example, see Karl 1997. 2. The Gini Index is a measure very similar to the Gini coeffi­
31. Scott 1999. cient that varies from 0 to 100 instead of from 0 to 1.
32. Loveman 2014. 3. This argument, which can be found in most basic economics
33. Hardin 1997. textbooks today, dates originally to Ricardo 1817.
34. Hobbes [1651] 1996. 4. See Weingast and N orth 1989; North 1990.
35. For an example of a theory that focuses on predatory elites, 5. For a concise version of this, see Friedman 1990.
see Levi 1988. 6. Buchanan 1984: 11.
36. On weak states as being failures to contain predation, see 7. Bell 2001.
Bates 2008. See also North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, dis­ 8. Greenfeld 2001.
cussed in the next section. 9. Esping-Andersen 1990.
37. Tilly 1992; Centeno 2002. 10. For a critical view see W ilensky 1975.
38. Tilly 1992; W. McNeill 1982. See also Downing 1992. 11. Arendt 1963; Foucault 1977; Taylor 2007.
39. Spruyt 2007. 12. See discussion in Pierson 2006: 12-14.
40. McNeill and McNeill 2003; Chirot 1994. 13. Hayek [1944] 1994.
41. Tilly 1975:42. 14. Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001.
42. Tilly 1992: 30. 15. Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001.
43. Centeno 2002. 16. Howard (2007) argues that the U.S. welfare state is not so
44. H erbst2000. much small or weak as it is poorly designed.
45. M arx 1978:187. 17. Prasad 2006.
46. Evans, Reuschmeyer, and Skocpol 1985. 18. M ettler 2011.
47. Gorski 2003; Greenfeld 1996. 19. Esping-Andersen 1990: 29.
48. Gorski 2003; Foucault 1977; see also Taylor 2007. 20. “Asia’s Next Revolution,” The Econom ist, September 8, 2012.
49. Among others, Greenfeld (1996) emphasizes nationalism as a 21. Goodman and Peng 1996.
critical prerequisite for the development of the modern state. CHAPTER 5
As we shall see, other scholars see the state as the source of 1. Sen 1999.
national identity. It is probably closer to the mark to see the 2. Poverty may also be understood as occurring when people
development of the state and national identity as endogenous, are deprived of certain capabilities, as we discuss later (Sen
as defined in chapter 2. 1999).
50. Gorski 2003: xvi. 3. Pogge 2008: 103; Collier 2007.
51. In making this argument Gorski is partly following in the 4. See the W orld Bank website: http://www.worldbank.org.
footsteps of the French social theorist, Michel Foucault. 5. See the U.S. Census Bureau website at: http://www.census.gov.
52. Gorski 2003: 36. 6. See Sen 1999 on how this process has happened in Kerala and
53. Strayer [1970] 2005. in the country of Sri Lanka.
54. Spruyt 1994; Wallerstein [1974] 2011; Meyer et al. 1997. 7. This distinction was made persuasively by Sen 1999.
55. Lenin 1939. 8. In many societies, women bear greater work burdens (both
56. Wallerstein [1974] 2011. outside and inside the home) yet see fewer of the benefits of
57. DiMaggio and Powell 1983. economic development. W e discuss this in chapter 14.
58. Meyer and Rowan 1991. 9. See Escobar 1995.
59. For a partly critical perspective, see W immer and Feinstein 10. Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010.
2010 . 11. Rosenstein-Rodan 1943.
60. Strayer [1970] 2005. 12. See W eingast and North 1989.
61. North, Wallis, and Weingast 1989. 13. See Mahoney 2010, and Pierson 2004, among many others.
572 Notes

14. Tocqueville 1988: 513. 8. See the discussion in the country materials at the back of this
15. On how this can contribute to the performance of govern­ book.
ment institutions, see Putnam 1995. 9. Ash 1993: 78.
16. On “bonding” and “bridging” capital see Putnam 2000. On 10. On the concept of democratic consolidation, see Schedler
“structural holes” see Burt 1992. 1998.
17. We discuss religion in politics in chapter 15 (and note the 11. Linz and Stepan 1996: 5.
possible relationship between religion and regime type in 12. Lipset 1959,1960; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Rueschemeyer,
chapter 6), but the link between religion and development Stephens, and Stephens 1992.
merits some comment here. 13. Almond and Verba 1963; Putnam 1993.
18. Noland and Pack 2004. 14. Huntington 1991; M arkoff 1996; for an alternative sort of
19. Almond 1991. structural/systemic approach, see Bollen 1983.
20. Lenin 1948 [translated from Russian edition of 1917]. 15. Linz 1990a, 1990b. Stepan and Skach 1993.
21. Representative and influential works included Andre Gunder 16. An actor-centered theory can be found in the four-volume
Frank’s Capitalism a nd Underdevelopment in L a tin America: H is­ series edited by O ’Donnell, Schmitter, and W hitehead (1986).
torical Studies o f Chile a nd B ra zil (1967) and Walter Rodneys See in particular volume 4, by O ’Donnell and Schmitter, en­
H ow Europe Underdeveloped A frica (1981). titled Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions
22. Prebisch 1950. About Uncertain Democracies,
23. Wallerstein 1974. 17. For a discussion of the debate about whether institutional
24. Cardoso and Faletto 1979; Evans 1979. change and democratization is a cause or a consequence of eco­
25. See W orld Bank 1997. One of the authors behind the W orld nomic development, see Glaeser, La Porta, Lopes de Silanes,
Bank’s 1997 W orld D evelopm ent R ep o rt was Peter Evans, who and Shleifer 2004.
was a leading figure in the revised version of dependency 18. For more on causal mechanisms in social science, see Elster
theory. Another leading dependency theorist, Fernando 2007.
Henrique Cardoso, went on to become president of Brazil 19. Lipset 1959,1960.
(1995-2003), where he undertook many pro-market reforms 20. Inglehart and Welzel 2005.
but also presided over efforts to build state capacity and 21. The best known comparative study of this sort is probably still
strength. Almond and Verba 1963.
26. Collier 2007. 22. For a scholarly discussion of some of these issues, see Fukuyama
27. For a sophisticated historical interpretation of this, see Ac- 1995.
emoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, as outlined in the 23. W iarda 2001; Veliz 1980.
“Insights” box. 24. For one of the better examples, see Woodberry 2011 and
28. The World Values Survey, available online: http://www W oodberry and Shah 2004.
.worldvalues survey.org. 25. Huntington 1991.
29. Such questions were asked in slightly different forms in Evans 26. Huntington 1991: 100-106.
1995 and Kohli 2004. 27. Meyer et al. 1997.
30. Kohli 2004. 28. Stepan 1999.
31. See Amsden 1992; Kohli 2004. 29. Linz 1990a, 1990b.
32. Amsden 1992. 30. The broader social theory question underlying this issue is
CHAPTER 6
often called the “structure-agency problem,” the main idea of
1. Indeed, important work on conceptualizing, defining, and which is that it is often difficult to sort out how much of a
measuring democracy and democratization is ongoing in to­ social or political process is due to the intentional behavior of
day’s political science. See, for example, Coppedge et al. 2011. individuals and how much of it is due to social structures or
2. W hile this distinction between procedural and substantive institutional constraints.
definitions is conventionally drawn and important, we wish 31. For one well-known view on variables and “proper names” in
to emphasize that there is a grey area between them. Gerardo research, see Przeworski and Teune 1970.
Munck, for example, following Robert Dahl, defines democ­ 32. O ’Donnell, Schmitter, and W hitehead, eds. 1986.
racy as procedural but sees it as a substantive good. Munck 33. Huntington 1991.
2009: 129. 34. See Putnam 2000.
3. See Dahl 1971, and Schmitter and Karl 1991, for a concise 35. Collier, Mahoney, and Seawright 2004.
summary. 36. George and Bennett 2005.
4. On competitive authoritarianism, see Levitsky and Way CHAPTER 7
2002,2010 (discussed in chapter 7). On the related concept of 1. Adorno et al. 1950.
electoral authoritarianism, see Schedler 2006. 2. According to anthropologists and historians, there is aston­
5. Schmitter and Karl 1991. ishing variability in the political systems of hunter-gatherer
6. Huntington 1991; M arkoff 1996. societies, in which we spent most o f our evolutionary history,
7. Linz and Stepan 1996. but in general these were more egalitarian than the more
 Notes 573

complex societies that emerged after the development of set­ 36. See Jackson and Rosberg 1982.
tled agriculture and the creation of pre-modern states. See 37. Greenfeld 1997.
McNeill and McNeill 2003. 38. Veliz 1980.
3. On the democratic wave, mentioned in chapter 6, see 39. Palmer 1980; W iarda 2003.
H untington 1991. On contemporary authoritarianism, see 40. Almond and Verba 196 3; Inglehart and W elzel 2005.
Levitsky and Way 2010. 4 1. For an overview, see W introbe 2007.
4. For classic treatments of democratic breakdown, see Linz and 42. Olson 1965; Lichbach 1995. See also discussion of these
Stepan 1978 and Valenzuela 1978. issues in chapters 11 and 12.
5. For a thoughtful consideration of hybrid regimes, see Diamond 43. Kuran 19 9 1.
2002 .
6. For a seminal treatment of totalitarian rule, see Arendt [1958] CHAPTER 8
2004. 1. For an exploration of constitutional design issues relating to
7. See some discussion of these issues in the country profile the legislative and executive branches, two of the leading
materials at the back of this book. works are Sartori 1994 and Lijphart 1999.
8. See, for example, Zizek 2002. 2. Benjamin Franklin allegedly put his worries to an interested
9. See, for example, Linz 2000 and the informative discussion in citizen in Philadelphia who asked what type of government
Brooker 2009. the Constitutional Convention had established, saying the
10. On “sultanistic regimes,” see Chehabi and Linz 1998. Founding Fathers built “a republic, if you can keep it.”
11. For one example, see Vallenilla Lanz 1991. 3. This is sometimes referred to casually as the “fourth branch”
12. On Africa’s personalistic dictatorships, see Jackson and of government, though most civil servants and administrators
Rosberg 1982 and Decalo 1985. are technically part o f the executive branch.
13. Verbitsky 1996. 4. State-level rulings can be very significant not only for state resi­
14. O ’Donnell 1973. dents (obviously), but also in broader national debates, as in
15. Levitsky and Way (2010: 3) add to this the fall of the Soviet recent years when the top courts in states such as Massachusetts,
Union and its consequences. Iowa, and New Jersey ruled that the state must extend same-sex
16. Collier and Levitsky 1997. marriage rights or equivalent benefits to gay couples.
17. Zakaria2003. 5. The high court may uphold lower court rulings by simply re­
18. O ’Donnell 1994. fusing to “hear the case” of a challenge or appeal.
19. Schedler 2006. 6. Before 2009, the House of Lords was for a long time a quasi­
20. Levitsky and Way 2002, 2010. judicial body that offered commentary on decisions by the
21. This quote has been attributed to de Soto for many years, House of Commons, but could not overrule it.
and can be found in the Hans M orgenthau Lecture of the 7. Depending upon one’s historical perspective, federalism may
Carnegie Council in 2002: http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/ date back to the ancient world, when rulers such as Alexander
publications/archive/morgenthau/99.html (accessed April 7, the Great used decentralized authorities to govern distant
2015). parts of their far-flung empires. These rulers used local mag­
22. Levitsky and Way 2010. istrates, representatives, or agents to ensure governability. At
23. See Brownlee 2007 and Levitsky and Way 2010 on this issue. other points in history, small territories sought the advantages
24. For this reason some scholars have emphasized the impor­ of uniting certain powers under common rule, even while
tance and potential difficulty of transitioning away from they retained authority and autonomy locally. In many cases,
clientelism as societies democratize. See the discussion in these arrangements could be best characterized as confederal,
Fox 1994. with examples including different “leagues” of city-states and
25. Corrales and Penfold 2011; Smilde and Hellinger 2011; united provinces and principalities in Europe as the modern
Levitsky and Way 2010. nation-states came into being.
26. See the many excellent essays in Mahoney and Thelen (2010) 8. On this, see Riker 1964; Stepan 1999.
on historical institutionalism. 9. There are several ways to specify the concept of federalism with­
27. On coalitions and institutions, see Hall 2010. out specific reference to constitutions. For some scholars, fed­
28. Skocpol 1973. eral countries are determined by other features: whether
29. This is an implication of a number of the findings of Inglehart subnational governments have some representation at the na­
and Welzel 2005. tional level, usually through an upper chamber in the legislature
30. The attentive reader will recognize this as key to Inglehart and (such as a Senate) that is designed to defend the interests of the
Welzel’s neo-modernization theory of democratization, dis­ subnational units; or independent legislatures at the subnational
cussed in the previous chapter. Inglehart and Welzel, 2005. level, such as state assemblies, which ensure democratically
31. North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009. elected subnational government. See Wibbels 2005.
32. Paige 1997. 10. Examples of small federal island nations are Comoros and
33. Roberts 1995. Federated States of Micronesia.
34. See, for example, M igdal 1988, discussed briefly in chapter 3. 1 1 . As a character in M o n ty P ython a n d the H oly G rail once sug­
35. Bates 2008. gested with respect to the divine right of kings as opposed to
574 Notes

constitutional government, “power is derived from a mandate 5. M any of the changes come down to how “remainders” are
from the masses, not from some farcical aquatic ceremony.” dealt with when it comes to assigning seats. The various
12. The most famous early example was the signing of the Magna methods include the D ’Hondt method, the Sainte-Lague
Carta in England in 1215, when English nobles defeated the method, and the largest remainder method.
forces of King John and demanded that he approve a “Great 6. See Power 2000.
Charter” that conferred rights to the nobility and required the 7. In that chapter, we discuss the work of Duverger 1954.
participation of Parliament in certain decisions. This was by 8. See Cox and McCubbins 1993; Mezey 1979; Shepsle and
no stretch a full-blown democracy (as the rights were for the W eingast 1981.
nobility and not for commoners), but it did establish an im­ 9. See the various chapters in Morgenstern and N acif 2002 for
portant principle that the ruler was at least partially con­ an examination of party discipline using several Latin Ameri­
strained by the will of those governed. can cases.
13. Examples might be found in the Middle East, such as with 10. There are limitations on votes of no confidence in many coun­
the House of Saud in Saudi Arabia. tries. As noted in the Germany “Case in Context,” a vote in that
14. O f course, democratic regimes as well may fail to enforce cer­ country must be a “constructive vote of no confidence,” mean­
tain constitutional rights, since these are regularly subject to ing that the members of the parliament proposing to bring
interpretation and are not always perfectly implemented. down the government must simultaneously propose a new gov­
15. Hirschl 2010. ernment to take its place. This is designed to discourage exces­
16. Riker 1964. sive “cycling” from one failed government to another.
17. See Stepan 1999.
18. See Tiebout 1956. CHAPTER 10
19. Tiebout 1956. 1. Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981.
20. Wibbels 2005. 2.W e emphasize directly elected presidents in this section, distin­
21. Rodden, Eskeland, and Litvack 2003. guishing them from prime ministers in the section on parlia­
22. Rodden 2006. mentarism. But there are rare occasions, such as in South
23. See Oates 2005; Weingast 2009. Africa, where a head of state is elected in an indirect fashion
24. See Wibbels 2005; Rodden 2006; Rodden, Eskeland, and as a prime minister, yet is called a “president.”
Litvack 2003. 3. As noted previously, some parliamentary executives are even
25. For an overview, see Kmiec 2004. called by the confusing moniker of “President.”
26. See Dworkin 1977,1986. 4. On political business cycles, see Nordhaus 1975.
27. Gewirtz and Golder 2005; Miles and Sunstein 2007. 5. This may seem self-evident, but there is a substantial literature
documenting the importance of these institutional designs.
CHAPTER 9 6. Examples may be the need for an expression of national unity
1. The United States is an exception to the rule among demo­ at a time of war or national tragedy or sacrifice. Under these
cratic countries, in that many presidents have not held elective circumstances, several parties may agree to put certain aspects
office at the national level prior to their election, instead of political competition aside for the good of the nation. An­
coming often from the governorship of a state. It is for this other example is the desire to create a supermajority, as in
reason of political socialization that some scholars prefer par­ South Africa, where the African National Congress had a
liamentary government—where the legislature chooses the strong majority and needed only the support of one or two
executive— over a system where the president is directly very small parties to have the supermajority needed to amend
elected: It weeds out “outsiders” unfamiliar with how the the constitution.
system works, and favors politicians who have come through 7. This may be an explicit rule or a commonly accepted norm.
the political system. O f course, a contrary argument can be In many cases, the ceremonial head of state (such as the
found among those who find the political classes to be too king or queen) will call upon the largest party to form the
insular, and who want outsiders who are willing to “shake up” government.
a political establishment that might be seen as lazy, or cor­ 8. Some of the most significant and influential ministries sought
rupt, or sclerotic. by coalition partners are the M inistry of Finance (or Economy)
2. Or, if retiring, they may work to ensure that their preferred and the M inistry of Foreign Affairs, which correspond to the
candidate takes their place. Secretary of the Treasury and the Secretary of State in the
3. Mayhew 1974. U.S. government, respectively. Coalition partners may prioritize
4. These qualifications may include getting a certain number of control over other ministries depending on their interests. For
signatures on a petition to support the candidacy, or perhaps example, a Green Party may seek the M inistry of the Envi­
making a cash deposit (which may be refundable, if the candi­ ronment, an anti-immigration party may want the M inistry
date polls enough votes in the election). The reason for placing for Home Affairs (or Interior), and a rural party representing
such restrictions on the ballot is to ensure that the electoral farmers may seek to control the M inistry of Agriculture.
authorities can control the number of candidates, and that elec­ 9. This exercise is a modified version of that used in Lijphart
tions are contested only by “serious” candidates and parties. (1999).
 Notes 575

10. Lijphart (1999) calls this coalition the “bargaining proposi­ CHAPTER 12
tion” coalition. 1. Katz 1999; M artin 2008.
11. Lijphart (1999) calls this coalition the “policy-viable” 2. The basic distinction between class, status, and power as di­
coalition. mensions of social stratification can be found in W eber 1946.
12. Neustadt 1960. 3. Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 4-11 and passim.
13. Critics of the view that parliamentarism is preferable gener­ 4. Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 5-6.
ally argue that the two forms are more or less equal in their 5. Scott 1985.
effects, not that presidentialism is better. 6. Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998: 16-18.
14. See Geddes 1994. 7. Perez Diaz 2011; Shils 1997: 320-325.
15. See Geddes 1990. 8. A t the same time, it is im portant to remember that civil soci­
ety is not autonomous from power and status. See Alvarez,
Dagnino, and Escobar 1998: 16-18.
CHAPTER 11 9. Tilly and Tarrow 2007.
1. See Kirchheimer 1966; Kitschelt 1994. 10. Tarrow 2005.
2. Kirchheimer 1966. 11. Lindholm and Zuquete 2010.
3. See Michels 1962: 367. 12. See Ondetti 2008 for a detailed account.
4. Some African countries, such as Ethiopia or Tanzania, did 13. Michels 1962: 342-356.
indeed have highly ideological single-party systems, while 14. For a classic account of the U.S. civil rights movement from
many former French and Belgian colonies in west and central the perspective of social movement theory, see McAdam
Africa had single-party regimes without strongly identifiable 1982.
ideologies. 15. Burns 1997: 4-5,10-11, 15.
5. Zakaria 1994. 16. Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 108.
6. Lijphart 1999: 76-77. 17. Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 29-36, 108.
7. See Lijphart 1999. 18. Some scholars even refer to contemporary societies as “social
8. Laakso and Taagepera 1979. movement societies.” See Tarrow 2011: 5-6, 117-118 and es­
9. Rae 1968. pecially the essays in Meyer and Tarrow 1998.
10. See Mainwaring and Scully 1995. 19. It should be acknowledged that if this distinction holds it is
11. Parties also differ in terms of how “disciplined” they are. That only a matter of degree.
is, they differ on the extent to which party members follow 20. See discussion in Pincus 2007: 398-399.
the wishes of the party leadership. This was considered in the 21. Huntington 1968: 264-266.
chapters on legislatures and executives. 22. Brinton 1952: 41.
12. Mainwaring and Scully 1995. 23. Skocpol 1994: 5.
13. Collier and Collier [1991] 2002; W iarda 1997: 73. 24. Skocpol 1979: 4-5.
14. Lukes [1974] 2005. 25. Arendt 1963; Kumar 2005.
15. See Schmitter 1974. 26. N ot all scholars agree that the distinction between coups
16. Collier and Collier [1991] 2002; Katzenstein 1985. and revolutions is easily made. For more on conceptualiz­
17. We are thankful to an anonymous reviewer for suggestions ing and explaining coups d ’etat, see Belkin and Schofer
on the discussion of authoritarian and democratic forms of 2003; Johnson, Slater, and M cGowan 1984; and Powell
corporatism. and Thyne 2011.
18. There are hybrids and combinations of the two systems; see 27. In his classic treatment, Huntington refers to these as the
chapter 7 for further detail. “eastern model” of revolution. Huntington 1968: 266-267.
19. Veliz 1980; Zolberg 1966. 28. Foran 2005.
20. See Sartori 1976: 336. 29. See Stathis Kalyvas’s differentiation of civil wars from other
21. The literature here is extensive, and it relates to issues of in­ forms of conflict on these grounds. Kalyvas 2007: 417.
cumbent advantage, redistricting, and other issues beyond the 30. Metelits 2009: 3.
scope of this chapter. A partial and early review of the question 31. Kalyvas suggests that revolutions are a type of civil war, but
of safe seats can be found in Mayhew 1974. not everyone agrees. Kalyvas 2007: 417.
22. Marx and Engels [1848] 1998; Lenin 1902. 32. Centeno notes that they partially resembled civil wars. Centeno
23. See Fukuyama 1992, among others. 2002: 47.
24. See Dahl 1989, among others. 33. O ’Leary and Silke 2007: 388-390.
25. W hether representatives should basically translate the will of 34. Tilly 2004; Oberschall 2004: 26.
the majority or should exercise independent judgment after 35. Sanderson 2010: 172.
being elected is a source of continuing debate, reflecting the 36. Tilly 2004: 8-9.
so-called “mandate-independence controversy” mentioned in 37. Senechal de la Roche 2004: 1-2.
chapter 8. 38. Black 2004: 17.
26. See Evans 1995. 39. Senechal de la Roche 2004: 2; Black 2004: 16.
 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

576 Notes

40. Senechal de la Roche 2004: 2; Black 2004: 15, 23. CHAPTER 13

41. O ’Leary and Tirm an 2007: 6-7. 1. Tajfel 1981; Stets and Burke 2000: 225; Brewer and Gardner
42. Gibbs 1989: 330. Bergesen and Lizardo 2004: 38. 1996; Greenfeld and Eastwood 2007.
43. Pape 2003: 345. 2. O n symbolic boundaries, see Lamont and M olnar 2002.
44. Sageman 2004: 140. 3. Calhoun, 1997: 2-3.
45. Hobsbawm 1981. 4. The author who has most clearly and consistently defined
46. Scott 1985. them in this way is Greenfeld 1992, 2001. For a partially
47. Scott 1985: xvi. overlapping definition see Anderson [1983] 1991.
48. Smelser 1962: 1-12. 5. This typology was identified by Smith 1986.
49. Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 9-10. 6. Smith 1986. Greenfeld would date the origins of nationalism
50. Some are further apart than others. Most social movements, for in sixteenth-century England, but considers this modern.
example, have not even the remotest connection to terrorism. 7. However, see Gorski 2000 for a critique of other scholars’ ap­
51. See the insightful discussion in Buechler 2004. plication of modernist conceptualization and definition to
52. Smelser 1962. European cases, arguing that by most modernist conceptual­
53. Toch 1965. izations and definitions, early modern political identities were
54. Elster 1998: 58-60. national. O n conceptualization and timing, see Connor 2004.
55. Brinton 1952: 33-36, 278. 8. See discussion in Smith 1995: 32-35. See also Van den Berghe
56. G urr 1970: 22-122 and passim. 1981 and Rushton 2005.
57. Huntington 1968: 275. 9. Smith (1995: 33-34) identities Clifford Geertz and Edwards
58. Huntington 1968: 277. Shils as examples.
59. M cCarthy and Zald 1987. Doug M cAdam, perhaps the 10. Gorski 2000; Hastings 1997.
most influential scholar in the “political process” or “political 11. Hastings, 1997: 25.
opportunities” school, presents this perspective as a critique 12. Smith (1995: 56-57) gets close to this view.
of resource mobilization theories. M cAdam 1982: 20-35. 13. Again, the clearest exponent of this conceptualization has
However, we consider them to fall into the same family of been Greenfeld 1992. See also Anderson [1983] 1991.
theories for our purposes in this introductory textbook. 14. Gellner 1983.
60. Goldstone 1991. 15. Greenfeld 1992.
61. See Goldstone 2001 for an overview of these and related 16. Greenfeld 2001.
theories. 17. See, for example, Kohn 1944.
62. Some of these and other issues are reviewed in Goldstone 18. Again, a good example of this view is Kohn 1944.
2001: 145-147. See also Parsa 2000. 19. For a partially critical perspective see Brubaker 1999.
63. The most important works on revolution from a rational choice 20. Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1992.
perspective are Lichbach 1995,1998. See also Coleman 1990: 21. Smith 1986: 134.
489-502; Tullock 1971; and also Finkel, Muller, and Opp 22. Greenfeld 1992.
1989. 23. M arx 2003; Hechter 2000: 6-7.
64. Lichbach 1998. 24. H arff and Gurr, 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003.
65. Olson 1965; Lichbach 1995. 25. Laitin 2007.
66. This example, which illustrates what Lichbach calls the “rebel’s 26. Brubaker and Laitin 1998.
dilemma,” follows the pattern of examples given in Lichbach 27. Brubaker and Laitin 1998; see also Varshney 2002.
1995. 28. Jow itt2001.
67. O f course, some political opportunity theorists are attentive 29. Horowitz 1985; Varshney 2002.
to cultural factors. For example, see McAdam 1996: 25. 30. Brubaker and Laitin 1998.
68. H unt and Benford 2004: 437-438. 31. For one typology of such conflicts, see Chirot 2001: 7.
69. Melucci 1989; Castells, 2010. 32. H arff and G urr 2004.
70. On framing and “frame analysis,” see Goffman 1974; Gamson 33. Jowitt 2001. See also Greenfeld and Chirot 1994.
1992; and Benford and Snow 2000. 34. On “barricaded identities,” see Jowitt 2001.
71. Kurzman 2005. 35. Akerlof and Kranton 2010.
72. Greenfeld 1995. 36. Laitin 2007.
73. Kumar 2005; Arendt 1963. 37. Laitin 2007 uses the term “cascading” to describe spreading
74. Tilly and Tarrow 2007. participation in secessionist movements.
75. Oliver and Johnston 2000. 38. See related theories discussed in chapter 12. For the applica­
76. Foran 2005. tion of these theories to ethno-national conflict, see Horowitz,
77. A full analysis, of course, would question this assumption, 1985, 2001.
looking at other indicators of development in order to be sure 39. In addition to Horowitz, see Greenfeld 1992 and Petersen
that high per capita G D P in the context of high inequality 2002 on these issues.
may not mask significant sources of economic discontent on 40. See Fearon and Laitin 1996, 2003; Laitin 2007.
the part of key populations. 41. Cederman, Wimmer, and M in 2010.
 Notes 577

42. For an accessible overview of research in this area, see H arff 20. Marx 1998.
and Gurr 2004. 21. Smith 1995: 57. Note that he refers to such groups as “ethnie.”
43. Some scholars of nationalism have urged caution about simple 22. Smith famously argues that national identities grow out ofb ut
institutional policy recommendations such as democratiza­ are not fully reducible to ethnic identities.
tion. For an interesting argument in this connection, see 23. For this reason, some distinguish between ethnicity and race on
Snyder 2000. the grounds that ethnicity may be more a matter of choice, with
44. For a classic discussion of consociationalism, see Lijphart 1977. multiple affiliations possible, whereas race may be more a matter
For consideration of the relative performance of some conso­ of external ascription, and thus inescapable. This perspective is
ciational systems, see Lemarchand 2007. expressed in Fredrickson 2003, among many other works. For a
45. Kaufman 2001; Pettigrew and Tropp 2011. fuller discussion of some of the differences between the concepts
46. Varshney 2002. of race and ethnicity, see Cornell and Hartmann 1998: 25-35.
47. For a discussion of the complexities involved in doing so, see 24. For discussion of some of these issues, see Tienda and Ortiz
Sikkink 2011; Teitel 2011; and Drumbl 2007. 1986 and Hirschman, Alba, and Farley 2000.
48. Chirot 2001: 20-24. 25. Posner2005.
49. See especially H arff and Gurr 2004. 26. For two accounts of multiculturalism, one more supportive and
50. For an example, see H arff 2003. the other partially critical, see Modood 2007 and Glazer 1997.
27. Gans 2005.
CHAPTER 14 28. Indeed, some in the United States seek this as well.
1. W e discuss immigration further in chapter 16. 29. For one example, see Loveman 2009.
2. On transnationalism see Khagram and Levitt 2008; Ong 1999. 30. Brown et al. 2003; Pettit and W estern 2004.
3. Barth, ed. 1969; see also the work by social identity theorists 31. Shapiro 2004.
discussed in chapter 13. 32. Herring 2002.
4. American Anthropological Association website: Race: A re We 33. Pager and Shepherd 2008: 182.
So D ifferent? http://www.understandingrace.org/home.html. 34. Brown et al. 2003.
See also Duster 2005. 35. O n “audit studies,” see Pager and Shepherd 2008: 184-187.
5. Kimmel2000. Pager and Shepherd’s review more generally is an excellent
6. Lovenduski 2005: 6. guide to the state of current research on discrimination.
7. Costa, Terracciano, and McCrae 2001, though, find cross- 36. M arx 1998.
cultural variation in gender role stereotypes, noting that this 37. Henderson and Jeydel 2010: 238-242; Roth 2006.
is a problematic finding for theories that argue for strong evo­ 38. Moreover, according to some analysts, gender inequality
lutionary shaping of gender roles. There is a vibrant debate seems to negatively impact societal-level economic perfor­
about these issues in psychology. mance. See Dollar and G atti 1999.
8. England et al. 1994; Eccles 1987. 39. O n sexual harassment, see Henderson and Jeydel 2010:
9. On the social construction of heterosexuality as the norm, see 124-130.
Katz 2007. 40. Henderson and Jeydel 2010: 116; Padavic and Reskin 2002:
10. There is a growing comparative literature on LGBT move­ 121-147.
ments in different global regions. For example, on LGBT 41. For a recent discussion of these and related issues, see Haveman
movements in Latin America, see Corrales and Pecheny 2010 and Beresford 2012.
and de la Dehesa 2010. 42. For an interesting analysis of some of the cultural sources of
11. American Anthropological Association, website: Race: A re We such conflicts, see Blair-Loy 2003 as well as Haveman and
So D ifferent? http://www.understandingrace.org/home.html. Beresford 2012.
12. On the Irish and the racial category of “whiteness” in the 43. Padavic and Reskin 2002: 6-16. O n consequences of this, see
United States, see Roediger 1999: 133-163. On race in Latin also Blau and Kahn 1992.
America, see W inn 1992: 271-307. 44. O n health, education, and related arenas of inequality and
13. These categories were depicted in so-called casta paintings. disadvantage, see the extended discussion in Henderson and
See Katzew 2004. Jeydel 2010: 266-302.
14. Cornell and H artm ann 1998: 22-23. 45. Jaschik2011.
15. See, for example, Omi and W inant 1994. 46. O n political underrepresentation, see Squires 2007: 22-24,
16. Gans 2005. 32 and Henderson and Jeydel 2010: 5-6.
17. Sorenson 2001. 47. Henderson and Jeydel 2010: 22-31.
18. Fredrickson 2003; Gans 2005. 48. Sainsbury 2005; Holli and Kantola 2005.
19. See the overview of this history in Fredrickson 2003 as well as 49. Here we use the concept of “capability” as developed by Amartya
Pagden 2009, who stresses both the importance and the limits Sen (see chapter 5).
of racist and racist-like attitudes in colonial expansion, and 50. Indeed, some theories suggest that economic empowerment is
Canizares-Esguerra 2009, who suggests that the idea of race fundamental. For example, see Blumberg 1984. For a par­
as justification for colonial domination was developed by tially contrasting view emphasizing culture and beliefs, see
overseas colonials rather than European actors. Ridgeway and Correll 2004.
578 Notes

51. For a critical perspective, see Izugbara 2004. 76. Bernhard, Reenock, and Nordstrom 2004.
52. On the efficacy of conditional cash transfer programs, see 77. The indicator referred to here is calculated annually in the
Rawlings and Rubio 2005 and Handa and Davis 2006. United Nations Human Development Reports, available at
53. Weber 1946. http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/. For further information on the
54. As noted before, political empowerment can take many Gender-Related Development Index (GDI) and the Gender
forms, including women’s representation in political institu­ Empowerment Measure (GEM), see http://hdr.undp.org/en/
tions. On women’s representation in legislatures, see Sawer, statistics/indices/gdi_gem/ (accessed August 13,2012).
Tremblay, and Trimble 2006. 78. Hirway and Mahadevia 1996.
55. H tun 2004. 79. South Africa, incidentally, is ranked tenth, but it is a special case.
56. Lovenduski 2005: 4.
57. See the essays in Stetson and M azur 1995, as well as Squires CHAPTER 15
2007: 32-38. 1. Fox 2008.
58. Henderson and Jeydel 2010: 37-64. For a model analysis of 2. Norris and Inglehart, Sacred a n d Secular 2004. Norris and
ethnic groups’ social movement mobilization, see Yashar Inglehart, as we will see later, do believe that religion declines
2005. when societies modernize.
59. Van C ott 2005. 3. Bell [1960] 2000; for a more recent version of this sort of
60. O f course, some would argue that Michels’ “iron law of oligar­ argument, see Fukuyama 1992.
chy” still applies in such cases. 4. Berger 1967.
61. Kriesi et al. 1992. 5. See discussion in Freston 2008 as well as Woodberry 2011
62. Castells 2010: xxviii. and W oodberry and Shah 2004.
63. Krook (2009) makes the same point with response to success­ 6. O n the complex relationship between religion and democratic
ful cases of quota system adoption. She draws on work by politics more generally, see Stepan 2000.
Charles Ragin and others that suggests that social and politi­ 7. Zarakol2011.
cal outcomes are not just products of constant relationships 8. Appadurai 1996; Coronil 1997.
between certain sets of variables but rather products of more 9. O n this point see the writings of Partha Chatterjee, among
complex interaction effects. others; for example, see Chatterjee 1993, 1997.
64. For one strong view on the relationship between the size of 10. O n the concept of “soft power,” see the work of Joseph Nye
ethnic groups and group affiliation, see Posner 2005. 1990.
65. As noted in the “Insights” box, some of these factors are high­ 11. See the very interesting discussion of Islamic encounters with
lighted by Van C ott 2005. W estern modernity in Moaddel 2005.
66. For a review of these concepts, see chapter 12. 12. Though, as scholars like the anthropologist Talal Asad (2003)
67. Van C ott 2005. have pointed out, we do not always succeed in our efforts to
68. Indeed, proportional representation seems to lead to women’s avoid doing so.
holding elected office at a higher rate, at least in more eco­ 13. For a classic statement of “modernization theory,” see Inkeles
nomically developed countries. See M atland 1998. and Smith 1974 as well as Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1973.
69. On the impact of cross-cutting affiliations on group party for­ For a more recent version, see Inglehart and Welzel 2005 and
mation, in addition to H tun 2004, see Dunning and Harrison Norris and Inglehart 2004.
2010. The latter work suggests that under some conditions 14. Eisenstadt 2000.
other forms of cross-cutting affiliation can weaken the poten­ 15. This means that not all political beliefs should be thought of
tial for ethnic groups to form political parties. as “ideology.” For classic statements, see Geertz 1973a and
70. On quotas and quota systems see Franceschet, Krook, and Converse 1964. For a highly sophisticated discussion of the
Piscopo 2012; Krook 2009; and Squires 2007. many ways in which the term has been used by political scien­
71. Krook 2009: 6-9. tists, see Gerring 1997.
72. Krook 2009. See also discussion of reserved-seat systems in 16. Unless your wardrobe is specifically crafted to express your
general (not just for women) in Reynolds 2005. More gener­ political views.
ally, for an overlapping approach, known as consociational- 17. Karl M arx’s followers go so far as to suggest that ideologies
ism, see Lijphart 1977. are simply reflections of underlying class interests.
73. For a more detailed discussion of different types of quota sys­ 18. See, for example, Boli 1981.
tems see Krook 2009. Some scholars have argued that quotas 19. Berger 1974.
are not as effective at changing attitudes and behavior as their 20. Greenfeld 1996.
advocates sometimes claim. See Zetterberg 2009. 21. On viewing religion as a “cultural system,” see Geertz 1973b.
74. Krook 2009: 7-9; Henderson and Jeydel 2010: 15. On transcendence as a key, substantive feature of religion, see
75. On the effectiveness of quota systems more generally, see Greenfeld 1996 and James 1902.
Krook 2009; Squires 2007: 53—60; and Franceschet, Krook, 22. For an overview and relatively recent example, see Bruce 2002.
and Piscopo 2012. 23. Berger 1967.
 Notes 579

24. Weber 1958. 60. Proponents of the Chavista government would argue that
25. Berger 1999; Berger, Davie, and Fokas 2008. contemporary Venezuelan leftism differs from traditional so­
26. Stark 1999. cialism in its focus on participatory democracy, a claim that
27. Kaufmann 2010. has generated much debate. See the discussion in Smilde and
28. Casanova 1994. Hellinger 2011; Ponniah and Eastwood 2011. It is also quite
29. Casanova 1994. See also Bell 1977. clear that the Bolivian regime under Evo Morales is ideologi­
30. The concept of “privatization” has been most clearly discussed cally far more innovative than our simplifying account here
by Casanova 1994. could be taken to suggest.
31. Niebuhr 1929. 61. For an example of the first type of research, see Hawkins 2010.
32. Juergensmeyer 1993; Kepel 1994.
33. Fukuyama 1992. CHAPTER 16
34. For an historical overview, see Payne 1995. 1. On interdependence, see Keohane and Nye 1977.
35. M arx 1978b and 1978c. 2. See Friedman 2005.
36. Fox 2008. 3. See W olf2004.
37. Fox 2008. 4. Rogowski 1987.
38. Blancarte 2008. 5. For two leading perspectives on this debate, see W olf 2004
39. On churches and sects, see the classic work of Weber (1969) for a perspective favoring the free market and Stiglitz 2002,
and Troeltsch (1969). On denominationalism as a distinct 2007 on a critique of the international financial institutions.
category, see Niebuhr 1929 as well as Casanova 1994, 2007. 6. Some of these “debates” may be explicit and take the form of
40. It is im portant to remember that these are all “ideal types” dialogue, while other “debates” may be more implicit, with
and that in the real world we will find many exceptions and their implications revealed more in terms of decisions and be­
cases that do not neatly fit into one or another of these haviors of the immigrant groups.
categories. 7. For one of the recent major statements arguing in favor of as­
41. See Jose Casanova’s (2007) thoughtful comparison of immi­ similation to protect a national identity, see Huntington 2004.
gration and religious pluralism in W estern Europe and the For a classic statement about the tendency to essentialize foreign
United States in this connection. cultures, particularly those of the Middle East, see Said 1978.
42. This is closer to Niebuhr’s classic (1929) view. 8. See BBC News Europe, “Merkel Says German Multicultural
43. For a summary, see Gorski and Altinordu 2008. Society Has Failed,” available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
44. See, for example, R. Stephen W arner 1993. world-europe-11559451 (accessed May 6, 2012).
45. Finke and Iannaccone 1993. 9. Phillips 2006.
46. Stark 1999. 10. M odood 2007.
47. Chaves and Gorski 2001; Voas, Crockett, and Olson 2002. 11. Huntington 2004.
48. Casanova 1994; Chaves 1994; M artin 2005. 12. Portes and Rumbaut 2006.
49. See discussion of traditional and more recent approaches to 13. For reports on this issue, see the Intergovernmental Panel on
differentiation theory in Chaves 1994. Climate Change (IPCC) at http://www.ipcc.ch/.
50. Smith 2003. 14. See Ostrom 1990.
51. See Lindholm and Zuquete 2010. On the left, see Levitsky 15. See Singer 2004 for a discussion of the ethics of this debate.
and Roberts 2011. 16. O n the characteristics that make for successful governance of
52. See discussion of these issues in the essays in Smilde and the commons, see Ostrom 1990.
Hellinger 2011. 17. Burke 2004.
53. Smilde and Pagan 2011. 18. See Naim 2003.
54. For a partially overlapping argument, see Meyer, Boli, Thomas, 19. Keck and Sikkink 1998.
and Ramirez 1997. 20. Ibid.
55. Castaneda 2006; Weyland, M adrid, and Hunter 2010. 21. As of M arch 2015, the U.S. list of state sponsors of terror­
56. The phrase “pink tide” has been much used in the media and ism consisted of Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria. See http://
policy discussions of the region. See, for example, The Econo­ www.state.gov/j/ct/list/cl4151.htm (accessed M arch 31,
m ist , “Peru’s Reviving Left: Oh! Susana... A Mayoral Contest 2015). O n April 14, 2015, the Obama administration pro­
May Rewrite the Country’s Political Script,” September 23, posed to remove Cuba from this list, pending a 45 day
2010, http://www.economist.com/node/17106220 (accessed review period, unless a joint resolution of Congress prevents
August 13, 2012). the removal.
57. Later in the chapter we begin to establish a typology of Latin 22. Thucydides [n.d.] 1974; Machiavelli [1532] 1984; Hobbes
American leftism. For a more sophisticated effort in this con­ [1651] 1996.
nection, see the essays in Levitsky and Roberts 2011. 23. W altz 1954,1979.
58. Weyland, M adrid, and Hunter 2010. 24. W alt 1998: 31.
59. McCoy and Myers 2004. 25. Mearsheimer 2001.
580 Notes

26. See Jervis 1978. 33. Allison 1971.

27. Axelrod and Hamilton 1981: 1392. 34. W endt 1992.
28. Doyle 1983a: 218. 35. W endt 1992.
29. See W alt 1998: 32. 36. Lenin [1917] 1996.
30. Moravcsik 1997: 515. 37. W altz 1954.
31. Keohane 1984. 38. Putnam 1988.
32. Doyle 1983a, 1983b, 1997. 39. Gourevitch 1978.
 Glossary

absolute deprivation A condition of being deprived of resources biological determinism The view that a feature of social life,
below some given threshold, as distinguished from relative such as gender or ethnicity, is caused by underlying biology.
deprivation. boundary Line drawn symbolically between groups of people.
absolute poverty A conception of poverty that involves setting a brain drain The departure or emigration of skilled and educated
certain line below which people will be defined as poor, typi­ members of a population, especially with reference to develop­
cally understood in terms of the inability to purchase a certain ing countries in the international system.
set of basic goods or services,
bureaucracy A form of organization that, in its ideal form, has
administration The bureaucracy of state officials, usually consid­ individuals operating and working under established, specified,
ered part of the executive branch, that executes policy. and complex rules. In government, the organization of un­
alternative energy Energy sources, such as solar or wind power, elected officials, often considered part of the executive branch,
that are not derived from fossil fuels, that implements, executes, and enforces laws and policies.
alternative vote Voting system in which voters rank candidates bureaucratic-authoritarian regime A type of authoritarian
and the votes of low-ranking candidates are reallocated until a regime, common in Latin America and elsewhere in the mid- to
winner is determined, late twentieth century, that was associated with control of the
anti-colonial revolutions Revolutions brought by subjugated pop­ state more by a group of elites (often military) than by a single
ulations against colonial powers, typically with the purpose of individual leader.
removing them so that the society in question can achieve cabinet The group of senior officials in the executive branch, in­
independence. cluding ministers, who advise the head of government or head
apportionment The process by which legislative seats are dis­
of state.
tributed among geographic constituencies. capital A factor of economic production consisting of accumu­
argument The placement of evidence in logical form in support
lated wealth or financial resources available for investment.
of a position or claim, case In comparative analysis, a unit or example of a phenomenon
assimilation The practice of being integrated into another cul­
to be studied.
ture, especially with respect to immigration. catch-all parties Political parties that are flexible on their ideo­

audit studies Research carried out by social scientists to measure

logical positions and aim to attract support from a broad range
the extent to which hiring practices are discriminatory. of interest groups and voters.
causation The property that obtains when one thing can be
authoritarian persistence The ongoing continuation of an au­
thoritarian regime, such that democratic transition does not shown to cause another.
take place. chamber An assembly or body of a legislature, often referring to
authoritarian regime A non-democratic regime,
one of two such bodies in a bicameral legislature.
citizenship A form of relationship between the state and indi­
authoritarianism A form of government or regime that is non-
democratic. viduals subject to its control, in which citizens have certain
basic rights and are in some way represented in the state.
bellicist theory Theory associated with scholars such as Charles
civic nationalism A form of nationalism that says that you are a
Tilly, who argue that interstate wars were decisive in the cre­
ation of the modern state, member of the nation if you are a citizen of its state.
civil rights Rights of individuals to participate in civic life, includ­
bias A preference for one idea or perspective over another, espe­
cially a preference that may result in unbalanced use of evidence ing freedoms of assembly, speech, access to information, and
or in analytical error, equal access to institutions, among others.
civil society A space in society outside of the organization of the
bicameral legislature Legislature with two chambers, which may
have equal or unequal powers. state, in which citizens come together and organize themselves.

581
582 Glossary

civil wars Sustained military conflict between domestic actors. consolidation The process through which a new democratic
class structure The ongoing and patterned relationships between order becomes institutionalized and therefore more likely to
“classes,” typically understood as groups of individuals linked endure.
together by economic interest or activity. constituency A group of voters or a geographic district that leg­
clientelism The practice of exchanging political favors, often in islators or other elected officials represent.
the form of government employment or services, for political constitution Fundamental and supreme laws, usually written in a
support. charter, that establish the basis of a political system and the
climate change A set of changes to the earth’s climate and the
basis for other laws.
study of what causes these changes. constitutional design Features of constitutions that shape the

coalition A group of two or more political parties that governs by

basic features of the political system, such as separation of
sharing executive power and responsibilities. powers and responsibilities between levels of government and
branches of government.
collective action Action undertaken by individuals and groups
constitutional monarchy A political system in which a monarch
to pursue their ends in formally or informally coordinated ways,
often in pursuit of some common or public good such as ex­ such as a king, queen, or emperor plays a role as a head of state,
panded civil rights or sustainable use of common resources. but has powers limited by a constitution.
constitutional republic A polity without a monarch in which the
collective action research program The name given to the ra­
tional choice theory of contention associated with the work of basic rules of politics are laid out in a constitution.
Marc Lichbach. constitutionalism T he lim itation of government through a

collective behavior A paradigm for understanding various forms

constitution.
of contention, popular for part of the twentieth century, that constructivism In international relations, a theory that holds
emphasized the irrational, social-psychological dynamics of that decisions made by states need to be understood in the con­
protest. text of social and political interactions, and that behavior is
committee In a legislature, a body composed of a group of legis­
shaped by norms and values as well as by narrowly defined
lators convened to perform a certain set of tasks. interests.
constructivism In nationalism studies, the view that nations are
comparative advantage In international trade, the idea that dif­
ferent countries or territories will have different relative advan­ symbolic constructs and so place greater emphasis on the cre­
tages in the production of different goods and services, which ative efforts of individuals and groups to define and redefine
forms the basis for gains from trade. their identities.
contention The name, most associated with scholars like Sidney
comparative checking The process of testing the conclusions
from a set of comparisons against additional cases or evidence. Tarrow and Charles Tilly, referring to the pursuit of collective
goods largely outside of formal political institutions.
comparative politics The subfield of political science that aims to
corporatism A system of interest group representation in which
analyze multiple cases using the comparative method. certain major groups are officially designated as representatives
competitive authoritarianism A form of government or regime of certain interests, and have a more structured interaction with
that allows some political competition but not enough to qual­ the government in power and with the state’s administration.
ify as fully democratic. correlation A relationship between two variables in which they
concentration (of party system) Contrasting with fragmenta­ tend to move in either the same direction (positive correlation)
tion, the extent to which political power and representation in a or in opposite directions (negative correlation).
party system are characterized by relatively small numbers of coup d'etat The use of force or threat of force, typically by the
relatively large parties. (See also fragmentation) military or a coalition involving the military, to impose a non-
concept An idea comparativists use to think about the processes electoral change of government.
we study. critical race theory A movement in social, political, and legal
conceptualization The deliberate process through which we create theory that aims to discern the subtle effects of racism and re­
and select social-scientific concepts. lated forms of prejudice.
congress A form of legislature, typically associated with a presi­ decree An executive-made order that has the force o f law, despite
dential system in which there is a separation of powers. not being passed through a legislature.
consociational Systems that use formal mechanisms to coordinate deductive reasoning The process of moving from general claims
different groups sharing access to power. or theories to specific observations or predictions about a phe­
consociationalism An institutional approach to managing po­ nomenon or set of cases.
tential conflict in polities with multiple groups, one which in­ defensive realism A realist theory that holds that peace or coop­
volves ensuring that t&ch. group has political representation. eration can emerge under specific circumstances, namely when
 Glossary 583

it is easier to defend than to attack and when states can see direct democracy A conception of democracy that places great
clearly what other states’ intentions are. emphasis on direct citizen involvement in politics, especially
deflation Decline in the prices of goods and services, often as­ involving plebiscites and/or citizen assemblies.
sociated with depressions or serious slowdowns in economic direct election W ith regard to executives, an electoral system in
activity. which voters cast a vote directly for the head of government or
delegative democracy A hybrid form of regime that is demo­ head of state.
cratic but involves the electorate “delegating” significant au­ dissolving the legislature The practice of a chief executive dis­
thority to a government. banding the legislature, often accompanied in a democratic
democracy A form o f regime associated with “rule by the people”
regime by the calling for new elections.
that signifies rights and liberties for citizens, including political district system An electoral system in which voters select repre­
rights to participate in elections and civil liberties such as free­ sentatives from specific geographic constituencies.
dom of speech. districting The process by which districts or other geographic
democratic breakdown The process through which a democratic constituencies are created for the purposes of elections.
regime partially or completely loses its democratic status. dominant-party system Party system in which a country con­
democratic consolidation The process through which, after a tran­ tains only one large political party that predominates politi­
sition from authoritarianism, a polity strengthens its democracy. cally, often controlling the legislative and executive branches of
democratic peace A phenomenon associated with liberalism
government.
that holds that democratic countries will rarely if ever go to war Eastern nationalism A n antiquated term for what is now often
with one another. called “ethnic nationalism.” (See also ethnic nationalism)
democratic regime A regime with predominantly democratic in­ economic management States’ efforts to shape the economic
stitutions, including basic civil rights and regular, free elections. performance of their societies, especially in fiscal and monetary
democratic transition The process through which a non-democratic
policy.
regime becomes democratic. effective number of parties A measure designed to capture the

democratization The process of a regime becoming more demo­

number of meaningful parties in a party system that weights
cratic, including both democratic transition and democratic the number of parties represented by their size.
consolidation. electoral authoritarianism A name applied to situations in which

denomination A type of religious organization, prevalent in the

authoritarian regimes nominally compete in elections.
United States among other places, that is voluntary and accepts elite parties Political parties in which membership and scope
the principle of religious pluralism. were largely restricted to a small number of political elites.
denominationalism A system or set of beliefs that privileges de­ empirical critique An effort to point to im portant evidence that
nominational forms of religious organization. does not support a conventional version of any given theory.
dependency A theory that argues that developing countries empirical Drawn from observations of the world.
cannot simply embrace free trade because this will lead to ever- employment Ongoing, regular access to paid work.
increasing wealth disparities between them and the advanced
empowerment An increase in the social, political, or economic
economies.
capabilities of an individual or group.
dependent variable In hypothesis testing, the dependent vari­
endogeneity The name given to any circumstance in which two
able is the effect or outcome that we expect to be acted on (or
have its value altered) by the independent variable. variables exhibit mutual or reciprocal effects.
environmental sustainability The quality that one or another
development A process by which a society changes or advances,
often measured in terms of economic growth, but also some­ practice has with being compatible with the long-term health of
times measured in terms of quality of life, standard of living, the environment.
access to freedoms and opportunities, or other indicators. established religion Religion that is granted official status and

deviant case (outlier) A case that does not fit the pattern pre­
support by the state.
dicted by a given theory; also known as a negative case. ethnic group A group that identifies itself as having strong cul­

differentiation The process through which institutions become

tural commonality and a shared sense of long-run history,
increasingly autonomous from one another, including the re­ sometimes thinking of itself as a kind o f kinship group.
duction or other change in the linkages between religion and ethnic nationalism A form of nationalism that says that you are
other institutions. a member of the nation because of your ancestry.
diffusion The process through which a practice or idea spreads ethnicity The quality that one has by identifying with or being
locally, nationally, and globally. ascribed membership in an ethnic group.
584 Glossary

European Union (EU) The political and economic union of many fragmentation (of party system) Contrasting with concentra­
European states, numbering twenty-eight as of 2015. tion, the extent to which political power and representation in a
everyday resistance Efforts to resist or obstruct authority that party system are characterized by relatively large numbers of
are not clearly organized over time, such as work stoppages, relatively small parties. (See also concentration)
slowdowns, and sabotage, framing The way in which a given problem or situation is de­
evidence A set of facts or observations used to support a proposition scribed and understood, with implications for how it might be
or hypothesis. addressed.
evolutionary psychology An approach to the analysis of human free rider Someone who benefits from a collective or public good
behavior that seeks to explain it almost exclusively on the basis without contributing to it.
of evolutionary theory. (See also sociobiology) functional definition Definition that aims to define a given phe­
executive order An order made by a chief executive or top official nomenon by what it does (as opposed to substantive definition).
to the bureaucracy that determines how the bureaucracy should game theory A set of approaches to the study of strategic inter­
enact or interpret the law. action between actors, often relying on mathematical modeling
executive The branch of government, or the individual(s) at the and assumptions of the rationality of different actors.
top of that branch, that executes or administers policies and gender Culturally constructed roles or identities one has by
laws in a country, virtue of being ascribed the status of male or female, to be dis­
executive-legislative relations The set of political relationships tinguished from biological sex.
between the executive branch of government, which executes generalizability The quality that a given theory, hypothesis, or
laws/policies, and the legislative branch, which often has the finding has of being applicable to a wide number of cases.
authority to pass those laws/policies, genocide Efforts to diminish or destroy a people and/or culture.
export-led growth A strategy for achieving economic growth
gerrymandering Creation of districts of irregular shape or com­
dependent on sending natural resources or agricultural or in­ position in order to achieve a desired political result.
dustrial products for sale in foreign markets,
Gini coefficient The most common measure of income inequality
externality An economic phenomenon in which the gains and
in any given population, usually expressed as a number between
costs from a given activity do not accrue to the same actor, 0 and 1, w ith 0 being total equality and 1 being maximal
failed state A state that cannot or does not perform its expected inequality.
functions. globalization The increasing interaction, both economic and cul­
falsif iability The testability of a theory or hypothesis. A good hy­ tural, among peoples and societies across national borders.
pothesis could be logically demonstrated to be false by evidence, government In the context of executives, the set of top elected
fascism An authoritarian ideology associated with regimes like executive officials and high-level political appointees that shape
the Nazis and that of Italy’s Benito Mussolini, favoring authori­ and orient policy; also refers to the broader administrative ap­
tarianism, militarism, and right-wing nationalism. paratus of the state.
federalism System of government with constitutional design of grand coalition A governing coalition composed of two or more
separation of powers between central government and subna­ major parties that hold a supermajority of legislative seats and
tional governments, represent a supermajority of the electorate.
feminism A social and intellectual movement that aims to ensure greenhouse gases (GHG) Emissions of gases such as carbon di­
equal rights for women and men. oxide and methane from industrial activity and consumption of
first-past-the-post Electoral system in which the candidate with fossil fuels that contributes to climate change.
the most number of votes is elected, regardless of whether a gross domestic product (GDP) The total value of goods and ser­
majority has been attained. vices produced in a given country or territory; per capita GDP
fiscal measure M easure of a governm ent’s revenues and/or is divided by the population.
expenditures. gross national income (GNI) A measure of the total income of all
fiscal policy Budget setting, which is dependent on generating of a country’s citizens, whether living in their home country or
revenue followed by government spending. abroad.
foreign policy The set of policies toward foreign nations made by guerrilla tactics Military techniques designed to produce ongo­
a national government. ing stalemate, usually employed in situations of asymmetric
formal institutions Institutions that are governed by formal rules military capability.
and typically linked to complex organizations like the state or head of government The top executive official responsible for form­
corporations. ing governments and formulating and implementing policies.
formal powers The powers possessed by a political actor, such as head of state A person with executive functions that is a coun­
a chief executive, as a function of their constitutional or legal try’s symbolic representative, including elected presidents and
position. unelected monarchs.
 Glossary 585

historical institutionalism An approach to theorizing that places informal powers Those powers possessed by an office holder that
emphasis on the power of institutions to shape the behavior of are not “official” but rather based on custom, convention, or
individuals, and how this operates over time. other sources of influence.
Human Development Index (HDI) A composite measure devel­ institution A regularized or patterned activity that shapes the
oped by the United Nations to provide a broad view of annual behavior of individuals and groups, including formal organiza­
development and well-being around the world, based on income, tions like the state or political parties, as well as more informal
life expectancy, and literacy and school enrollments. institutions such as norms and values. Also, a social or political
hybrid regime A class of regime that appears to be neither fully
structure or set of practices, including government organiza­
democratic nor fully authoritarian, such as electoral authori­ tions, that shapes the behavior of individuals and groups.
tarianism, delegative democracy, and illiberal democracy. institutionalism An approach to theorizing in comparative poli­
hyperinflation Exceedingly high inflation, which dramatically
tics and related fields that places emphasis on the power of in­
erodes the value of money over time. stitutions to shape the behavior of individuals..
instrumentalism A type o f explanation in social science that says
hypothesis A specific prediction, derived from a theory, that can
be tested against empirical evidence. that you can explain something by showing how its develop­
ment or persistence is in the (usually material) interest of pow­
identity The social label ascribed to an individual or group that erful individuals or groups.
locates the individual or group in political society more broadly.
insurgencies Contention with formalized m ilitary conflict.
ideology A systematically coordinated and cognitively salient set
integration In international relations, a process by which coun­
of beliefs focused on politics.
tries agree to collaborate economically or politically, to make
illiberal democracy A polity with some democratic features but in some decisions collectively and to shape common strategies.
which political and civil rights are not all guaranteed or protected. interdependence A relationship in which two or more actors
immigration The movement of people to foreign countries. (such as countries) are mutually dependent.
impeachment A process by which a legislature initiates proceed­ interest aggregation The process by which individuals’ prefer­
ings to determine whether an official, often a top-ranking ex­ ences are brought together to make collective decisions, often
ecutive official, should be removed from office. through political parties and the party system.
impersonality A quality attributed by some scholars to modern interest articulation The process by which political actors ex­
states, which are presumed to be less likely to be identified with press their demands, needs, or wants in a political system, often
the personalities of their leaders. through interest groups.
independent variable In hypothesis testing, an independent interest groups Organizations that make demands in the politi­
variable is one that we expect to “act on” or change the value of cal system on behalf of their constituents and members.
the dependent variable. intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) The set of interna­
indicator An element or feature that indicates the presence of an tional organizations that push for cooperation between coun­
underlying factor. tries and work for the prevention or mitigation of international
indirect election Electoral system in which representatives are conflicts.
chosen by other elected officials, rather than directly by the citi­ international financial institutions (IFIs) M ultilateral institu­
zenry at large. W ith regard to executives, an electoral system in tions, particularly the International Monetary Fund (IM F) and
which most voters never cast a ballot directly for the individual the W orld Bank, that have considerable leverage in interna­
who becomes head of government. tional economy.
individualization The treatment of problems as linked to the in­ international political economy The study of how the economic
terests of individuals rather than as issues of common concern relations between countries affect politics and how political re­
or interest. lations affect economies.
inductive reasoning The process of moving from specific obser­ international relations The study of relations between countries
vations to general claims. and between actors in the international system.
inequality In the social sciences, the differential distribution of international security The study of issues of war and peace be­
access to goods like power, status, and material resources. tween nations and global security and conflict more broadly.
infant mortality A major public health indicator, which typically international trade The economic exchange of goods, services,
measures the number of infants per 1,000 born that do not sur­ and capital across international borders.
vive until the age of one year. iron law of oligarchy The idea, developed by Robert Michels,
inference The process through which we aim to test observable that collective action always produces new elites.
implications (often about cause and effect) of any given theory; isomorphism In institutional theory, the quality that two or
also refers to conclusions reached through this process. more organizations have by virtue of being structurally very
inflation Increase in the prices of goods and services. similar.
586 Glossary

judicial activism Term used, often pejoratively, to characterize measurement error Either an episodic error, such as improperly
judicial actions that actively reinterpret legislation and thus recording data, or a systematic error, meaning that a measure­
imply exercising powers typically reserved for the legislative ment does not fully reflect what it is designed to measure.
branch. measurement validity W hether a given measure effectively cap­
judicial review System of constitutional interpretation in which tures or represents what we are researching.
judges rule on the constitutionality of laws passed by legislature median voter The voter who is theoretically exactly in the middle
and executive. of the distribution of voters.
judiciary The branch of government responsible for the interpre­
minimum connected winning coalition A minimum winning
tation of laws in courts. coalition in which all parties in the coalition are “connected” or
lai'cite The French name for the ideal of a lay state. adjacent to one another on the political spectrum.
lay states States that establish a formal separation of religion and minimum size coalition A governing coalition that is closest to
public life. the threshold needed to govern, typically 50 percent of the leg­
legislature Assembly or body of representatives with the author­ islative seats plus one seat.
ity to make laws. minimum winning coalition A governing coalition that contains
level of analysis The level (e.g., individual, organizational, soci­ no surplus parties beyond those required to form a government.
etal) at which observations are made, or at which causal pro­ mobilization The engagement of individuals and groups in sus­
cesses operate. In international relations, the different levels tained contention.
that can be the context of a study, including the individual level, modern state A concept used to distinguish states in the modern
the nation-state level, and the level of the international system. world from earlier forms of political centralization; it includes
liberalism In political theory, and ideology that emphasizes indi­ features such as extensive bureaucracy, centralization of vio­
vidual freedoms, representative democracy, and the market lence, and impersonality.
economy. In international relations, a theory that holds states modernism The label applied by Anthony Smith to those theo­
can have different preferences and internal structures that ries of national identity that see it as exclusively modern.
lead them to behave in different ways, especially with regard
to the conduct of states that hold liberal values of democracy modernity A contested term that refers to a type of society,
and free market commerce. typically one experiencing economic growth and with a
libertarianism A form of liberalism, strongly opposed to social
relatively strong state, among other characteristics. (See also
democracy, that is especially concerned to minimize the role of modernization)
government. modernization The process through which a society becomes

life expectancy The average age until which members of a soci­

“more modern,” which is typically understood to mean having
ety (or some group within society) live. an advanced economy and, sometimes, a democratic polity.
modernization theory A theory that traces democracy to broad
literacy rate The percentage of a population who can read.
social changes, especially economic development and the
lower chamber In a bicameral legislature, the house that typi­ changes that accompany it.
cally has a larger number of legislators than upper chambers,
monarch A head of state in a monarchy, who usually inherits a
and often represents the national vote either more proportion­
ally or through smaller geographic constituencies. position for life and may have either substantial political powers
or very limited ceremonial powers.
malapportionment A pportionm ent in which voters are un­
monetary policy States’ efforts to shape the value of a society’s
equally represented in a legislature, such as through relatively
greater numbers of legislators per capita for low-population areas currency, often through the use of a central bank in the case of
and lesser number of legislators per capita for high-population a modern state.
areas. most-different-systems (MDS) A research design in which we
market-led development An approach to economic manage­
compare cases that differ with respect to multiple factors but in
ment in which the state aims to control economic behavior as which the outcome is the same.
little as possible. most-similar-systems (MSS) A research design in which we
Marxism In international relations, a theory that emphasizes the compare cases that are similar with respect to a number of fac­
role of social classes in shaping politics and highlights the role tors but with distinct outcomes.
of capitalist accumulation as a prime driver in international multilateral In international relations, the actions of three or
affairs. more countries working together.
mass parties Parties consisting of large numbers of citizens as multi-member district (MMD) Electoral system in which district
members and that undertake massive political mobilization. constituencies have more than one representative.
measurement bias A measure is biased if it will not produce multiparty democracy A democracy in which at least two par­
comparable results for all observations. ties compete for power.
 Glossary 587

multiparty system A political party system consisting of more parliamentary sovereignty System in which the constitutional­
than two significant parties that have opportunities to govern. ity of laws passed by legislature and executive are not subject to
nation (the) A group thought of as sovereign and equal, typically constitutional interpretation by judiciary.
comprised of a large, often geographically bounded population. partisan powers The powers accruing to a government official,
national identity An identity that locates one’s social position in such as a chief executive, by virtue of the official’s leverage or
relation to national membership. power over members of a political party.
nationalism The view that the world is and should be divided into party system institutionalization The degree to which a party
nations that are thought of by nationalists as sovereign and system is stable and remains so over time, as measured by such
egalitarian. characteristics as the persistence o f parties, the stability of their
ideologies, and the degree to which they are distinct from the
nativism A political attitude that seeks to protect the interests of
specific individuals that lead them.
established groups of residents in a given country against the
interests of more recent immigrants. party system Patterns of party politics characterized by the

neoliberalism A n ideological tendency that favors liberal de­

number of relevant parties in a country.
mocracy and market-led development. path dependent The name given to historical processes in which

new institutionalism The name given to the turn to institutional

future developments are shaped or partially determined by
theory in the last several decades in economics, political sci­ events at previous stages in those processes.
ence, and sociology, patronage The use o f government favors, typically in the form of

nonstate actors In international relations, actors in international

employment, to garner political support.
politics that are not nation-states; includes multinational cor­ payoff matrix In game-theoretic models, the distribution of pay­
porations, transnational advocacy groups, and international offs to players depending on the choices made.
criminal networks, peak organization Top associations, such as labor federations
normative Concerned with specifying which sort of practice or and large business organizations, that represent common inter­
institution is morally or ethically justified, ests by bringing together many like-minded organizations.
nuclear proliferation The expansion of the number of countries perennialism The label applied by Anthony Smith to those theo­
and other actors possessing nuclear technology, ries of national identity that see it as neither exclusively modern
offensive realism A realist theory that holds that states will seek
nor continuous w ith pre-historical forms of identity.
to maximize their power whenever they can. personalistic dictatorship A form of authoritarianism in which
offshoring In international trade and business, the practice of an
the personality of the dictator is highlighted.
economic actor basing some of its services or processes abroad pluralism A system of interest group representation in which
rather than in its domestic market. (See also outsourcing) groups compete openly to influence government decisions and
open-ended question A question that, in principle, is open to public policy, and in which specific groups do not have official
numerous possible answers, preferential access to decision making.
open-list proportional representation Electoral system in political culture The symbolically encoded beliefs, values, norms,
which voters choose a candidate but votes are aggregated by po­ and practices that shape the formal distribution of power in any
litical party to determine the allocation o f seats across parties, given society.
operationalization The process through which we make a con­ political economy The interaction or interrelationship between
cept measurable, politics and the economy in a given country or internationally,
to include how politics affects economies and how economies
organization Institutionalized group such as a state, corporation,
political party, social movement, or international body. Also, affect politics.
the ongoing coordination of collective action in the pursuit of political opportunities The availability of political options to re­
common purposes, dress grievances.
outcome Typically used as a synonym for “effect,” something that political party A political organization that seeks to influence
is produced or changed in any social or political process, policy, typically by getting candidates and members elected or
outsourcing In international trade and business, the practice of
appointed to public office.
an economic actor contracting out to other actors, often over­ political revolutions Revolutions, the main effect of which is
seas. (See also offshoring) to alter political institutions rather than social and economic
parliament A type of legislature, often associated with systems
structures.
in which the legislators vote on the leadership of the executive political rights Rights of individuals to participate in political
branch and the formation of a government, life, including the right to political speech, the right to vote,
parliamentarism A system of government in which the head of
and the right to join political associations.
government is elected by and accountable to a parliament or populism A political approach in which leaders, often heads of
legislature. government and top executive branch officials, make direct
588 Glossary

appeals to “the people” and seek to develop direct political ties quantitative Quantitative analysis aims for the mathematical
with the masses. discernment of relationships between variables, typically in­
portfolio The set of duties and tasks that correspond to a given
volving a large number of cases or observations.
ministerial office. race The idea that human beings are divided into different groups,
poverty The state of being poor, as measured by low income,
often thought of (erroneously) as biological categories.
deprivation, lack of access to resources, or limited economic racial formation A concept developed by Omi and W inant (1994)
opportunities. that describes the process through which ideas of race are con­
poverty line A specified threshold below which individuals or
structed and develop over time.
groups are judged to be in poverty. racialization The historical process through which social rela­
president A n executive leader that typically combines the func­
tions become interpreted in terms of racial categories.
tions of head of state and head of government, and is not di­ rational institutionalism An approach to theorizing in compara­
rectly responsible to a legislature. tive politics and related fields that places emphasis on the power
presidentialism A system of government in which a president
of institutions to shape the behavior of individuals, one which
serves as chief executive, being independent of the legislature often focuses on implications of institutions for individuals’
and often combining the functions of head of state and head of strategic choices.
government. realism In international relations, a theory that treats states in the
prime minister A chief executive in a parliamentary system of international system largely as acting on the basis of national self-
government. interest, defined often in terms of power, survival, and security.
primordialism The label applied by Anthony Smith to those referendum A popular vote on a specific issue.
theories of national identity that see it as continuous with pre- regime A form or type of governmental system, with an emphasis
historical (“primordial”) forms of identity. on institutions and rules.
prisoner's dilemma (game) A model of a game in which two regime change Any major change of regime type, including de­
actors would benefit from mutual cooperation, but each has in­ mocratization, democratic breakdown, or certain types of au­
dividual incentives to defect from cooperation. thoritarian persistence in which one type of authoritarian
privatization Transfer of control (of a business, industry, or ser­ regime gives way to another.
vice) from public to private. regime type The form of a political regime, such as democratic
privatization In the context of the social scientific study of reli­ versus authoritarian, as well as subtypes, such as personalistic
gion, this refers to the process of religious practice being con­ dictatorships or totalitarian regimes.
fined to the private sphere. relative deprivation The state of having or feeling that one has
procedural definition of democracy A conception of democ­ less than other members of one’s reference group (including
racy, contrasted with a substantive definition, that emphasizes one’s own group over time).
the minimal standards, procedures, or rules that a country religious monopoly The situation in which one major religion
should have in place to govern political life. dominates the religious landscape within a given society (the
proportional representation (PR) In its pure form, an electoral opposite of religious pluralism).
system in which voters choose a preferred party and seats are religious pluralism The situation in which there are multiple re­
allocated to parties according to the percentage of the vote the ligious organizations within a given society (the opposite of
party wins. religious monopoly).
protectionism In international trade, the practice of a country religious states States in which religion is a key part of official
protecting or giving favor to its own domestic producers. politics, often involving religious establishment, religious le­
public goods Goods or services, often provided by a government, gitimation of the state, and restrictions on religious minorities.
for use by all members of a society and for which one person’s remittances Cash or resources sent to a home country, often to
use of the good does not compromise anyone else’s use of the family and friends, by emigrants.
good. Examples include national defense, basic infrastructure, representation In legislatures, the process by which elected leg­
and a healthy environment. islators reflect the interests and preferences of voters in their
public sphere The space in which public life and deliberation constituencies.
take place (as opposed to the “private sphere”). representative democracy A conception o f democracy in which
purchasing power parity (PPP) An adjustment made to income politicians and institutions are understood to represent the
measures to account for differences in cost of living. electorate, who nevertheless can constrain their behavior
qualitative A form of analysis that aims to discern relationships through periodic elections and other forms of participation.
between events or phenomena as described in narrative form, revolution A form of collective action in which some large-scale,
such as an account of an historical process. structural change is either attempted or accomplished.
 Glossary 589

rule of law A system that imposes regularized rules in a polity, social revolutions Revolutions that dramatically change social
with key criteria including equal rights, the regular enforce­ structures.
ment of laws, and the relative independence of the judiciary. socialism An ideology (or family of ideologies) that emphasizes
runoff Electoral system in which the top candidates after a first economic equality as a key goal, to be pursued in large measure
round of voting compete in one or more additional rounds of through state action.
voting until a candidate receives a majority. sociobiology An approach to the study of societies that sees
Sartori's ladder of abstraction The idea that we can organize human society as governed by the same (evolutionary) princi­
concepts on the basis of their specificity or generality, ples as animal societies.
scope conditions The conditions or range of cases for which an sovereignty The key way the authority of the modern state is
argument works. conceptualized: states are understood to be the ultimate au­
secularism The ideological complex that favors secular culture thority within their specifically demarcated territories.
(the term is also sometimes used as a synonym for secular cul­ state The most im portant form of political organization in
ture more generally), modern politics, which, in its ideal form, is characterized by
secularization The process through which (according to some centralized control of the use of force, bureaucratic organiza­
theories) societies become less religious as they become more tion, and the provision of a number of public goods.
modern. state breakdown Dramatic decline in state capacity.
security dilemma Dilemma in which each actor in the interna­ state capacity The ability of the state to achieve its objectives,
tional system expects others to maximize their own security ad­ especially the abilities to control violence, effectively tax the
vantage, and thus builds up power itself, leading to an arms race. population, and maintain well-functioning institutions and the
semi-presidential system A mixed or hybrid system combining rule of law.
aspects of presidentialism and parliamentarism. state interventionism An approach to economic management in
separation of powers The division of powers in a government which the state plays a central role, not just through enforcing
system between branches of government or between levels of contracts and property rights but through active interventions
government. such as coordinating investment, supplying credit, and, in many
single transferable vote (STV) Electoral system in which voters
instances, through the establishment and running of state-
rank candidates and the winners’ surplus votes are reallocated owned enterprises.
to other, lower-ranking candidates until a slate of representa­ state of emergency A condition allowed by some constitutions in
tives is chosen. which guarantees, rights, or provisions are temporarily limited,
single-member district (SMD) Electoral system in which voters
to be justified by emergencies or exceptional circumstances.
choose a candidate and the winner is elected by the most votes state system The condition that many of the most important
earned or through winning a runoff vote, actors in international relations are states, which can be under­
single-party system An authoritarian system in which parties
stood as systemically linked to one another.
besides the single dominant party are banned or disallowed, state-led development An approach to economic management

social capital Advantage that individuals or groups hold by

in which the state plays a prominent role in coordinating the
virtue of their social relationships, behavior of economic actors and intervening in the economy.
strain theory A theory suggesting that major social change causes
social construction The process through which socially shared
meanings and definitions are established and maintained, social “strain” or conflict which increases demand for revolution.
strategic voting Voting in a way that does not reflect a voter’s
social democracy An ideological movement that favors both
representative democracy with respect for basic individual ideal preference, so as to prevent a less-desired outcome.
rights and state action to promote relative economic and social structuralism A view in social and political theory holding that
equality, viewed by some as a variety of socialism but by most as social structures, rather than agents or culture, make most of
a variety of liberalism, the difference.
social identity theory An important theory in social psychology structuralism An approach to nationalism studies that sees big,
that sees personal identities as linked to and partially derived difficult-to-change parts of society as determining what really
from group identities and roles, matters about national identity.
social movement organization An organization that has been cre­ subaltern Occupying lower rungs in a hierarchical system.
ated to help maintain and lead social movement activity over time, substantive definition Definition that aims to define a given
social movements Ongoing, organized collective action oriented phenomenon by what it is rather than by what it does (as op­
toward a goal of social change, posed to functional definition).
social networks Structures of social ties and connections among substantive definition of democracy A conception of democ­
individuals. racy, contrasted with a procedural definition, that views a
590 Glossary

polity’s democratic status as dependent on the satisfaction of two-party system A political party system consisting of two sig­
certain substantive ends, such as the extension of broad rights or nificant parties that have a duopoly on opportunities to govern.
the reduction of income inequality. underemployment W hen workers are employed less than they
sustainability The notion, especially used with regard to the en­ wish to be or below their skill level.
vironment, that a resource is capable of being sustained for use unemployment The lack of ongoing, regular access to paid work.
or enjoyment by future generations.
unicameral legislature Legislature with a single chamber.
term limit Restriction on the number of times or total amount of
unitarism System of government in which central government is
time a political official can serve in a given position.
predominant and the powers of subnational governments are
territorial nationalism According to some scholars, a type of limited to those delegated by the center,
nationalism that closely resembles civic nationalism, in that
unitary rational actor In international relations theory and espe­
membership is fundamentally determined by where one is born
or where one resides rather than one’s ancestry. cially realism, the idea that states act as if they were single indi­
viduals capable of making decisions on the basis of rational
terrorism The use of violence to achieve political ends through calculations about the costs and benefits of different actions.
psychological impacts on a civilian population.
United Nations The major international organization whose
theocracy An authoritarian state controlled by religious leaders, membership consists of most of the countries in the world, that
or a state with very strict religious restrictions that uses religion has the aim of preventing and managing conflict and establish­
as its main mode of legitimation. ing multilateral cooperation on matters of international law,
theoretical critique An effort to show that a given theory has economics, and human development and well-being.
logical limitations. upper chamber The chamber in a bicameral legislature that is
theory A general set of explanatory claims about some specifiable usually smaller in number of legislators, often representing
empirical range. larger geographic constituencies such as states or provinces,
thesis A statement for which one argues on the basis of evidence. utility The value that people derive from resources to which they
Third-World revolutions A concept developed by John Foran have access.
holding that revolutions in the developing world have special variable An element or factor that is likely to change, or vary,
characteristics. from case to case.
Tocqueville effect The name given by some scholars to Toc- variation Difference between cases in any given study of com­
queville’s observation that changing relative status positions parative politics.
were an important factor in some groups participating in the veto An act of executive power in which an executive rejects a law
French Revolution. passed by a legislature.
totalitarian regime A form of authoritarian regime that aims
vote of no confidence A vote taken by a legislature that expresses a
to control everything about the lives of its subject population, lack of support for the government or executive, which, if success­
such as in the Soviet Union and Germany under the Nazis. ful, often results in the dissolution of the government and the
transgender An identity in which one’s gender does not conform calling of new legislative elections,
to conventional matching with biological sex. welfare state A state that aims to provide a basic safety net for
transition The movement from an authoritarian regime to a the most vulnerable elements of its population, often accom­
democratic one. plished through social insurance, public health care plans, and
transnational Issues or institutions that cross international borders. poverty relief.
transnational network A network of nonstate actors working Western nationalism An antiquated term for what is now often
across state borders. called “civic nationalism.” (See also civic nationalism)
trust The extent to which an individual has confidence in the reli­ within-case comparison The comparative analysis of variation
ability or good conduct of others. that takes place over time or in distinct parts of a single case.
twenty-first-century socialism The name given to supporters of world society theory A theory associated with scholars such as
governments in some contemporary societies (e.g., Venezuela, John Meyer, who argue that basic organizational features of the
Bolivia) that aims to emphasize their allegedly more participa­ state system are cultural and have diffused globally.
tory and democratic features.
 References and Further Reading

CHAPTER 1 CHAPTER 2
Berlin, Isaiah. 1958. Tw o Concepts o f Liberty: A n Inaugural Lecture Babbie, Earl. 2010. M ethods o f Social Research. 12th ed. Belmont,
D elivered Before the U niversity o f O xford. Oxford: Clarendon CA: W adsworth, Cengage Learning.
Press. Brady, Henry, and David Collier, eds. 2004. R ethinking Social
Brady, Henry, and David Collier, eds. 2004. R eth inkin g Social In ­ Inquiry: D iverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, M D: Rowman
quiry: D iverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, M D: Rowman and Littlefield.
and Littlefield. Cassidy, John. 2013. The Reinhart and RogofF Controversy:
Collier, David, &c Robert Adcock. 1999. Democracy and Dichoto­ A Summing Up. The N e w Yorker , April 26.
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Colley, Linda. 1992. Britons: Forging the N atio n, 1707-1837. New Tilly, Charles. 1995. Popular Contention in Great Britain, 1758-1834.
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Huber, Evelyne, and John D. Stephens. 2001. D evelopm ent a n d the W allman. 2003. W hitew ashing Race: The M y th o f a Colorblind
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Kohn, Hans. 1944. The Idea o f N ationalism . New York: Macmillan in Am erica. New York: Oxford University Press.
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Kumar, Krishan. 2003. The M a kin g o f E nglish N a tio n a l Identity. H o w W ashington M ade the R ich R icher— A n d Turned Its Back on
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Modood, Tariq. 2007. M ulticulturalism : A C ivic Idea. Malden, Haskins, Ron, Julia B. Isaacs, and Isabel V. Sawhill. 2008. Getting
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Morgan, Kenneth 0.2010a. The Twentieth Century (1914-2000). In DC: Brookings Institution Press.
The Oxford H istory o f Britain, ed. Kenneth O. Morgan, 582-676. Iannaccone, Laurence R., Roger Finke, and Rodney Stark. 1997.
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H istory o f B ritain, ed. Kenneth O. Morgan, 677—710. New Kaufman, Jason. 2002. F or the Common Good?American Civic Life and
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Kennedy, David M. 1999. Freedom fro m Fear: The Am erican People Niebuhr, H. Richard. 1929. The Social Sources o fD eno m ina tion a l-
in Depression a n d War, 1929-1945. New York: Oxford Univer­ ism. New York: Henry H olt and Co.
sity Press. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. Sacred a n d Secular:
Ladd, Everett Carll. 1999. The L a d d R eport: Startling N e w Research R eligion a n d Politics Worldwide. New York: Cambridge Univer­
Shows H o w an Explosion o f Voluntary Groups, A ctivities, a nd sity Press.
Charitable D onations Is Transform ing O ur Tow ns a n d Cities. New Patterson, James T. 1996. G rand Expectations: The U nited States,
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Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. Some Social Requisites of Democ­ Patterson, James T. 2005. Restless G iant: The U nited States fro m
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Prasad, Monica. 2006. The Politics o f Free M arkets: The R ise o f N eo­
Lipset, Seymour M artin. 1960. Political M a n : The Social Bases o f liberal Economic Policies in B ritain, France, G erm any, a n d the
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Lipset, Seymour M artin. 1963 The F irst N ew N ation: The U nited Putnam, Robert D. 2000. B ow ling Alone: The Collapse a n d R e v iv a l
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Basic Books.
Schoultz, Lars. 1998. Beneath the U nited States: A H istory o f U.S.
M ann, Thomas, and Norman Ornstein. 2008. The Broken Branch: Policy Tow ard L a tin Am erica. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni­
H o w Congress Is F ailing Am erica a n d H o w to G et I t Back on Track. versity Press.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Turner, Frederick Jackson. 1921. The F rontier in Am erican H istory.
McPherson, James M. 1988. B attle C ry o f Freedom: The C iv il War New York: Henry Holt and Co.
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Wilkerson, Isabel. 2010. The W arm th o f O ther Suns: The E pic Story
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Miller, Perry. [1953] 1983b. The N ew E ng la nd M in d : From Colony to
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Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Nash, Gary B. 1979. The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Con­
sciousness, a nd the Origins o f the Am erican R evolution. Cambridge,
M A: Harvard University Press.
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 Index
Note: page numbers followed by / and / refer to figures and tables respectively.
AARP, 257 American Automobile Association asymmetrical federalism, 186
Abacha, Sani, 513, 514, 516, 521 (AAA), 257 Ataturk, Kemal, 474
Abe, Shinzo, 482/, 489 Am erican Ind ia n E thnic R en ew a l Atlee, Clement, 542, 548
Abiola, Moshood, 513, 514 (Nagel), 338 audit studies, 332
abortion, 187-88, 564 American Indians Australia
absolute deprivation, and revolution, 292 forced relocation of, 331, 557 constitution of, 182/
absolute poverty, 99 Red Power activism, 338, 338/" electoral system in, 210
Abubakar, Abdulsalami, 514 status of identity as, 338 gender empowerment in, 344, 345,
accountability American Revolution, 142,143/, 556 345/, 346/
and democracy, 124 Amerindians, 340, 401 stock exchange, 7 8 /
elections and, 215, 233 Amin, Idi, 150 and W estern nationalism, 311/
legislature’s power to censure executive anti-colonial revolutions, 285—86 Austria, constitution of, 182f
and, 211, 220-21 apartheid in South Africa, 101,123,171/ Austro-Prussian W ar (1866), 443, 444
Acemoglu, Daron, 108,115, 162 172,193,327/328,422 authoritarianism. See also hybrid (semi­
Act of Union (Great Britain, 1707), 67 apportionment, 215—17 authoritarian) regimes
Acts of Settlement (U.K., 1701), Arab Spring, 125,277/ 278, 298-302, collectivistic nationalism and, 313
177, 548 300/-302/, 478 competitive, 152,166
Adenauer, Konrad, 446, 447 Argentina definition of, 147
administration, as term, 229 authoritarian regimes in, 147, 151 electoral, 152
affirmative action, 332, 564 and colonialism, 401, 498 in Latin America, 134, 243
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (U.S.), constitution of, 182f as pressing modern question, 169
556, 566 discrimination in, 326 transitions to, 148,152-58
Africa federalism in, 189 authoritarian persistence, 148,153-55
colonialism in, 512 gender empowerment in, 345, political culture theories of, 163-64,
corporatism in, 266 345/, 346/ 167/ 168, 169/
and democratization, 134 interest groups in, 256 f authoritarian regimes
Ebola virus in, 24 political parties in, 340 and authoritarian persistence, 148,
economic development in, 105,114 populism in, 245, 24 S f 153-55
electoral systems in, 437 socialism in, 368, 370 bureaucratic-authoritarian
legislatures in, 203 argument regimes, 151
party systems in, 269, 275 in comparative method, 3-6 causes of, 158-66
personalistic dictatorships in, 150 empirical vs. normative, 6—7 civil society in, 51
presidentialism in, 241-42 good, characteristics of, 42-45, 44/ and collective action, barriers to,
state development in, 60 arms races, game theory on, 391 164-66,167 f 168,169/
states with dominant single party, 253, Articles of Confederation, U.S., 136,175, constitutions of, 183-84
254/268-69, 275 555-57,556 corporatism in, 266
struggle for independence in, 268-69 Ash, Timothy Garton, 129 definition of, 147
African National Congress (South Asia democratic breakdown and, 124, 137,
Africa), 193, 259,259/ 260, 390 corporatism in, 266, 273-74 148,155-56
Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 471, 472, 473, culture of, and democracy, 134 dominant-party systems in, 259
476, 477,478 economic development in, 104-5, 106 historical institutionalist theories of,
Akerlof, George, 318 welfare state development in, 92-93 159-60,161,162,167/168,169/
Akihito (emperor of Japan), 482/ Asian Tigers, 104, 482-84, 488-89, 490 and human rights, 147-48
Alexander I (tsar of Russia), 527 Asian values argument, 134,260, 421 income inequality and, 161—62
Alexander II (tsar of Russia), 528, 529 assembly, right to, in U.S. Bill of Rights, legislatures in, 201, 202, 204, 222
Allende, Salvador, 155 126-27 personalistic dictatorships, 147,
Almond, Gabriel, 164, 545, 559-60 assimilation 149-50,167,535-36
Almonte, Juan, 500 ethnic identity and, 331-32 poverty and, 160-61,167/j 168, 1 6 9 /
al Qaeda, 288, 289, 387, 389, 523 as issue, 382—83 preference falsification in, 165
alternative energy, 385 rational choice model of, 319 and presidential decrees, 233
alternative vote system, 209, 210/ and U.S. as melting pot, 331 single-party systems in, 272
618
 Index 619

state weakness/failure and, 162-63, brain drain, 384 executive orders to, 233
16I f 168,169/ Brandt, Willy, 446, 447-48 in modern states, 49, 52-53, 5 4 /
theocracies as, 149 Brazil neutrality of, 229
totalitarian regimes, 148-49 authoritarian regimes in, 147 and public officials, self-interest in, 79
types of, 148-52 coalitions in, 236 bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, 151
in Zimbabwe, 146 Constituent Assembly of 1988, 179f Bush, George H. W., 556
autocracy, 150 constitution of, 178, 181,182/ 193-96, Bush, George W ., 556, 566
autonomy, of modern state, 50-51 402,404
Azikiwe, Nnamdi, 512 democratization in, 129, 130, 193, 399, cabinets, 236
402,406,408,411 Cabral, Pedro Alvares, 402
Babangida, Ibrahim, 513, 514, 520 and dependency theory, 40 Calderon, Felipe, 370, 499, 501
Bachelet, Michelle, 125,125/ 326, 368, discrimination in, 325f 326, 332, Callaghan, James, 542
369, 370 336,401 Calvinism, and state development, 61-62
Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), 466 economic development in, 112, 113, Cambodia, genocide in, 305
Balkans, genocide in, 305 399, 401, 404, 406, 407 Cameron, David, 2 26 / 539/, 542,
Bangladesh, 305, 457, 458, 459 economy of, 74/, 399/, 402-3 545, 547
Bani Sadr, Abolhassan, 471, 472 electoral system in, 208, 409 Cameroon, party system in, 275
Basques, 382, 390 empowerment of women in, 335 Canada
Belgium, 182/ 183,186, 373, 431, 448 ethnic groups in, 399/ 401, 405 coalitions in, 239
bellicist theory of state development, executive structure in, 249/, 405/, 404 constitution of, 182/
59-60, 62, 63, 68, 450 federalism in, 189 federalism in, 186
Benin, 19,19/, 129, 275 gender representation in, 410-11 gender empowerment in, 344, 345,
Berlin Conference (1884-85), 512 history of, 399-401, 401-4 345/, 346/
Berlusconi, Silvio, 246 human capital levels in, 102/ judiciary in, 193
“Beyond the Fiction of Federalism” independence of, 399, 402 and Kyoto Protocol, 495
(Rodden and Wibbels), 190 inequality in, 75, 112, 401, 403, 406, Quebec nationalism in, 187
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 458, 460, 407, 408 cancer, causes of, 36
465, 467 key features of, 399-401, 399/ capital, international flow of, 376
Bhutan, 102 Landless Workers Movement in, capitalism
Biafran War, 316, 513, 516, 519-20, 522 282, 410 French ambivalence about, 439
bias, in research, 5-6, 41, 248, 313 legislature in, 209, 405/, 405, 409 and growth of welfare state, 87-89,
bicameral legislatures, 202-3 map of, 4 0 0 / 90, 93
Bill o f Rights, U.K., 177,548 modernization in, 405-6 liberalism on, 354
Bill o f Rights, U.S., 123,178, 556 opening to global economy and, 407 M arx on, 60, 63-64, 357, 365
bimodal voter distribution, 270-72, 271/ political culture in, 405-6 and modern societies, 351
bin Laden, Osama, 467 political economy in, 80, 406 and secularization, 363-64
biological determinism, 328-29 political institutions, 405/, 405 social democrats on, 365
biological weapons, 388 political parties in, 405/, 409 C apitalism , Socialism , a n d Democracy
bipolar world, in international poverty in, 74/ (Schumpeter), 89
relations, 391 presidential decrees in, 233, 234 C apitalism a n d Freedom (Friedman), 79
Bismarck, O tto von, 80, 443-44, 445, 450 presidentialism in, 242 Cardenas, Cuauhtemoc, 506
BJP. See Bharatiya Janata Party race in, 401 Cardenas, Lazaro, 499, 501, 508
Black Panther Party, 283 religion in, 359, 399/ 401 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 40, 402,
Black Power movement, 283 representation in, 216, 217 404, 406, 410
Blair, Tony, 542, 548, 552 socialism in, 368, 369, 370 Carranza, Venustiano, 499, 501
Blum, Leon, 431 welfare state in, 93 Carter, James E. “Jimmy,” 137, 472, 556
Bokassa, Jean-Bedel, 150 Brezhnev, Leonid, 530 Casanova, Jose, 358
Boko Haram, 513, 514, 523 BRIC countries, 406 case, definition of, 13
Boli, John, 65 bridging capital, 108 case studies, 13-14
Bolivar, Simon, 349 Brinton, Crane, 292, 294 case selection in, 247-50
Bolivia British East India Company, 457, 458, 542 limitations of, 68
Amerindian political parties in, 340 Brown, Gordon, 542 uses of, 65, 68
gender empowerment in, 345, 346/ B row n v. Board o f E ducation (1954), Castells, Manuel, 338
Morales presidency, 326, 348/ 556-57, 563-64 Catalonia, 47, 337, 382
socialism in, 349, 365, 368, 370 Buhari, Muhammadu, 510/, 513, 514, 520 catch-all parties, 258
Bolsa F am ilia program (Brazil), 93 bully pulpit, 240, 566 Catherine the Great (tsarina
Bolsheviks, 529, 536 Bundesrat (Germany), 211, 212, 212/, of Russia), 527
bonding capital, 108 451, 452 caudillismo, 500
Botswana, party system in, 275 Bundestag (Germany), 212, 223, 451 causation, 3-6
boundaries, of identity, 327 bureaucracy causal arguments, 6-7
bourgeoisie, and state development, 60 and empowerment of women, 337 vs. correlation, 24, 33-38, 34 f 133
Bove, Jose, 440 executive branch control and definitional problem, 33-34
B ow ling A lone (Putnam), 563 over, 228, 229 and endogeneity problem, 36-37
 ■ ■ ■ H P " ***"
620 Index

causation (C ontinued) ethnic autonomy movements in, 382 practical restrictions on, 127
and falsifiability problem, 34-35 ethnic groups in, 412/ 414 theocracy and, 185
and intervening variable problem, 37 executive structure in, 249/, 418, 418/ in U.S. Bill of Rights, 126-27
and necessary vs. sufficient cause, 4 423-24 Civil Rights Act of 1964,142, 556
and omitted variable problem, 38 federal features in, 181 civil rights movement, 141, 142, 280-81,
questions about, 2-6 , St, (it genocide in, 305 282, 283, 336, 337,556,557
and reverse causality problem, 35-36 and global trade, 377 civil society
and spurious correlation problem, historical development of, 414-17, definition of, 51, 257
38-39 425-26 and democracy, 51-52, 124
terminology of, 14 human capital levels in, 102/ and development, 107—8
testing theories of, 27-29 inequality in, 421 global, 281
Cederman, Lars-Erik, 322 key features of, 412-14, 412/ social movements and, 280
censure, of executive by legislatures, 211, la'icism in, 358 Civil War, U.S., 141,248,287
220-21, 233 leadership of, 423-24 civil wars, 280, 287
Centeno, Miguel Angel, 42 legislature in, 201, 204, 417, 418/ The Clash o f C iviliza tio ns a n d the R em aking
Central African Republic, personalistic Maoism and, 416, 417, 418, 419 o f W orld Order (Huntington),
dictatorship in, 150 map of, 413/ 365, 366
Chamberlain, Neville, 446, 543, 548 market socialism in, 417, 419-20 class interests
chambers, of legislature, 202-3, 204 and modernization, 416 and authoritarianism, 160,161,163
Chandra, Kanchan, 466 nationalism in, 425 development and, 111
Charlemagne, 427, 429 and nuclear weapons, 388, 481 class structure, 284
Charles I (king of England), 541, 546 political culture in, 418-19 clientelism, 240
Charles II (king of England), 542, 546 political economy in, 419—21 climate change, 385-86, 494, 495
Charles X (king of France), 429, 431, 433 political institutions in, 417-18, 418/ Clinton, W illiam J. “Bill,” 499, 556, 558
Chartist movement, 543 population policy in, 414, 420 coalitions, 235-40
Chavez, Hugo, 349, 365, 366-67, 368, poverty in, 420 grand, 239,247
369, 370, 478 public satisfaction with government necessity of in multiparty systems, 262
Chavistas, 368, 369 in, 424-25 negotiation of, 237,23 I f
checks and balances. See also judicial reforms in, 153, 416, 417, 419-20, 423 types of, 237-39,237/, 238/
review religious affiliation in, A \2 fi 414 Coercion, Capital, a n d European States
in French system, 432 rise of, 489, 567 (Tilly), 60
in German system, 452 single-party rule in, 127,131, 236,259, Colbert, Jean-Baptiste, 435
in U.K. system, 549 260, 412,417,418/, 423-25 Cold W ar
in U.S. system, 227,230-31, 558, 566 Spring Festival in, 30/" ending of, 374
chemical weapons, 388 Tiananmen Square protests, 153, international system during, 135
Chiang Kai-Shek, 415, 416 416, 423,424 M arxist theories of international
Chile and unfair trade practices, 420, 421, 562 relations and, 395
and colonialism, 498 U.S. borrowing from, 421 nuclear weapons and, 388, 530
democracy in, 125, 125/ 137, 155 Chinese Communist Party, 153, 154, 260, and totalitarianism, 149
discrimination in, 326 415,416, 417,419, 423-25 and U.S. vs. Soviet political systems,
electoral systems in, 437 Chirac, Jacques, 429, 433-34, 436-37 253,537
liberal government in, 370 Christian Democratic Union Party collective action
party system in, 264 (Germany), 446, 447, 452 barriers to in authoritarian regimes,
socialism in, 368, 369, 370 Christianity, evangelical, 11Of, 364 1 64 -66,167/168,169/
state terrorism under Pinochet, 288 church, as term, 359 definition of, 164, 279
China Churchill, W inston, 542, 548 and rational choice theory of
and authoritarian persistence, 153, citizenship revolution, 294—95, 295/
154, 424 in modern states, 54 collective action (free rider) problem, 273,
and bureaucratic authoritarianism, 151 and political participation, 51, 255 295,295/, 300, 386, 387, 495-96
communist regime in, 357 public education and, 84 collective action research program, 294
communist revolution in, 293, 415, in Western vs. Eastern nationalism, 311 collective behavior, and contention,
416,425-26 civic associations, and reduction of 289-90
Confucianism and, 418-19, 422 ethno-national violence, 321-22 collective behavior theory, 291
cultural cohesion in, 414 civic cultures of participation, 164 collectivistic nationalism, 312-13, 313/
and democratization, 131, 421—22 civic nationalism, 311-13, 311/, 313/, Collor, Fernando, 402, 404
dictatorship in, 417 331, 551 Colombia, 246, 340, 370
economic development in, 98,104, The C ivic C ulture (Almond and Verba), colonialism
105, 245, 412, 416, 417, 419-20, 164, 545,559-60 in Africa, 512
420-21,423, 424-25, 463 civil rights and boundaries of post-colonial states,
economy of, 73, 741, 412 1 constitutional guarantees of, 178,183-84 316,523
electoral system in, 417, 424 in democracies, 121-22, 123, 126-27 in Brazil, 399, 401, 402
environmental damage in, 98, 384, for diverse sexual orientations, 329 and development, 108
385/ 416,420,421, 495 federalism and, 187-88 France and, 431, 440
 Index 621

Germany and, 445 C om petitive A uthoritarianism (Levitsky of South Africa, 172,173,175-76,

in India, 455, 457-59, 461, 465 and Way), 166 177-78,193-96
Lenin on, 64 concentrated party systems, 262, 263 of Soviet Union, 184
in Mexico, 498-99 The Concept o f Representation (Pitkin), 214 types of, 176-84
and modernity, 350-51, 366 concepts of United Kingdom, 177,181, 539
and national identity, 523 conceptualization process, 10 Constitution, U.S.
in Nigeria, 512, 523 definition of, 9 amendments to, 177, 557
as non-democratic, 135-36 freedom as, 11 Articles of Confederation and,
ongoing neo-colonial exploitation, 64 good, characteristics of, 9-10 175, 555-57
and racialization, 330 operationalizing of, 11-12, 11/ Bill of Rights, 123,126-27,178
revolutions against, 285-86 Sartoris ladder of abstraction for, 10 and democratization, 136
in Spanish America, 399, 401, 498-99 conceptualization, 10 Establishment clause, 127
and spread of state model, 63-64 conflict. See also contention as federal system, 175-76,180, 559
and unitarism, 183 as constant in politics, 279 flexibility of, 557
United Kingdom and, 457-59, 512, ethno-national, 313-20, 314 as foundation of entire political
513, 539, 541, 542, 543, 545-46, formal institutions as channel for, 279 system, 174-75
547, 550, 551, 552, 555 conflict theories of state development, influence of, 180
“The Colonial Origins of Comparative 58-60, 5 8/ length of, 194
Development” (Acemoglu Confucianism, 109, 418-19, 422 as model, 557
et al.), 108 Congress, U.S. preamble of, 173
commercial liberalism, 393 as bicameral, 202-3, 559 separation o f church and state in, 357
committees, in legislative decision characteristics of, 204-5, 204/ sovereignty of, 548
making, 219, 220 checks on presidential power, 566 writing of, 174, 175,180
common law, in United Kingdom, 177, 541 design of, 564-65 constitutional conventions, 174
communism. See also China; Soviet Union House of Representatives, 217, 559, constitutional courts, 178-79, 233. See also
collapse of, 82,136, 272 559/, 565 judicial review
discrediting of, 272, 527, 537 legislative process in, 201 “Constitutional Democracy” (Lijphart), 247
in France, 433, 439 power to set policy, 222 constitutionalism, 174, 183
Marxist theory on, 356 representation in, 216, 217 constitutional monarchy, 66, 126,183,
communist parties, 258, 269 Senate, 217, 559, 559/, 565, 566 541, 548
communist regimes, 259, 357 congresses, characteristics of, 204-5, 204/ constitutional republics, 126
Comoros, 182/* conscience, freedom of, 126-27, 148 constitutional theocracy, 184
comparative advantage theory, 378-90, conservatism, as ideology, 354 constructivist theories of nationalism,
378/ Conservative Party (U.K.), 205, 207, 207/, 309-10, 315, 317, 321
comparative checking, 18-19, 19/, 275 258,262-63,545 constructivist theory of international
Com parative Legislatures (Mezey), 222 consociational mechanisms, 246, 321 relations, 394-95
comparative method, 14-20. See also consolidation phase of democratization, consumer inflation, in selected countries, 74/
hypotheses; theories 125,129-30 contention
comparative checking in, 18-19, 19/ constituencies, 205 causes, theories on, 291
critiques in, 39-40 constituent assemblies, 174,1 7 9f and collective behavior, 289-90
generalizability and, 19 constitution(s). See also federalism; definition of, 279
most-different-systems (MDS) unitarism types of, 279-91
method, 18,18/, 193-96,248 amending of, 177-78 corporatism, 265-67, 266, 273-74
most-similar-systems (MSS) design, of authoritarian regimes, 183-84 Correa, Rafael, 368, 370
15-17,16/, 114-17, 248 of Brazil, 178, 181,182/ 193-96, correlation, 31
terminology of, 14-15 402, 404 vs. causation, 24, 33-38, 34£ 133
variables in, 14-15 as characteristic representative positive vs. negative, 31
within-case comparison, 20, 141—44 democracy, 126 corruption, in Brazil, 405
comparative politics. See also research civil rights guaranteed in, 178, 183-84 Costa Rica, 358
argument in, 3-6 definition of, 174 cost of living, G D P and, 73
case selection in, 247-50 designs of, 175-76 coup d’etats
concepts in, 9-12 flexible vs. rigid, 177-78 and democratic breakdown, 156
definition of, 4 and formal power vs. reality, 220 vs. revolution, 285
hypotheticals and counterfactuals in, functions of, 172-73, 174-75 Cox, Gary, 219
222-23 and judicial review, 173, 176, 178-79, criminal transnational networks, 387, 388
indicators in, 41, 344-46 190-92, 549 critical race scholarship, 326
negative cases in, 298-302, 300/-302/ modern, increasing length of, critiques
research questions in, 2-6, 5/, 6/ 177-78, 194 empirical, 39, 40
and scientific method, 20-21 and parliamentary sovereignty, theoretical, 39-40
study of gender in, 326 179-80 Cromwell, Oliver, 541-42, 546
study of race and ethnicity in, 326 preambles of, 172-73 Cuba
competitive authoritarianism, 152, 153, separation of powers in, 176 and authoritarian persistence, 153
166,525-27 social consensus and, 180 communist regime in, 357
 ' ■■'m ; ■• " ffm ' : ^ "

622 Index

Cuba (Continued) parliamentary vs. presidential Desai, Morarji, 459

gender empowerment in, 345, 345/, systems, 240-43 de Soto, Hernando, 152
346/ participatory, 365 despotism, 150
laicism in, 358 peaceful transfer of power in, 123, 125 destructive terrorism, 288
single-party system in, 259 political rights in, 121, 123,126, 127 developed world, and global warming
standard of living in, 100 prestige of after World W ar II, 451 mitigation, 386-87
as totalitarian regime, 149 representative, 126-28 developing world. See also Third World
U.S. an d ,567 single-party, 127-28 and global warming mitigation,
cultural changes, and growth of welfare triumph of as not inevitable, 169 386-87
state, 87 types of, 125-30 and resource curse, 57
culturalist explanations of ethno-national Democracy in Am erica (Tocqueville), revolutions in, 298
conflict, 317 107-8,135 and taxation, 57
cultural theories democratic breakdown, 124,137, 148, development. See also economic
of democratization, 131, 134-35, 155-56 development
422,563 democratic Caesarism, 150 approaches to, 110
of revolution, 296-97, 300/, 301, 426 democratic consolidation, 125, 129-30 colonialism and, 108
of state development, 61-62, 64-65, Democratic Party (U.S.), 258, 261, 558 and comparative political analysis,
68, 449-50, 518 Democratic Party of Japan (DJP), 485, 97, 113-14
culture 486-87, 491 cultural, 102-3
and authoritarianism, 163-64, 167f, democratic peace theory, 393, 394 culture as factor in, 107-10, 116/, 117/
168,169/ democratic regime, 121 definition of, 97-98
and development, 107-10, 116/, 117/ democratic republicanism, 439 and environmental sustainability, 103
as dynamic, 134 democratization, 124-25 export-led growth, 113
multiple ways of defining, 134 causes of, 131-40 gender equality and, 100
currency, monetary policy and, 83 civil society and, 51-52 geography and, 108, 112-13, 116/
Czechoslovakia, democratization in, combining of models on, 138, 139-40 international structures and,
129,165 as concept, 9-10 111-12,117/
consolidation phase of, 125,129-30 in Korea, North vs. South, 97,114-17,
Dahl, Robert, 266 and crime, 505 116/, 117/
Declaration of Independence (U.S.), cultural theories of, 131, 134-35, local definitions of, 102-3
227, 556 422,563 market-led vs. state-led, 104-6, 107,
decrees, presidential, 233 definition of, 124 117/
deductive reasoning, 26 demonstration effect and, 136, 137 path dependency in, 107
defense, as state function, 55. See also domestic institutions and, 131, 136-37 political institutions as factor in,
international security individual and group action and, 131, 106-7, 111, 115-16,116/
defensive realism, in international 137-39,138/, 422 racial equality and, 100-101
relations, 391 international structures and, 131, religion and, 109
definitional problem, 33-34 135-36,137 social indicators of, 98-100
deflation, 75 modernization and, 131, 132-34, 422 social institutions as factor in, 107-8
De Gaulle, Charles, 431, 434, 435 operationalization of concept, 11-12,11/ theories on, 103-14
de Klerk, F. W., 171/ 422 partial, and authoritarian types of, 98
delegative democracies, 152, 243-44, 245 persistence, 153 value systems and, 109-10
“Delegative Democracy” (O’Donnell), 244 and poverty, 502 deviant cases (outliers), 26, 39, 275, 464
democracy transition phase of, 125, 129 Diamond, Jared, 113, 114
Asian values and, 134, 260 wave of in late 20th century, 137, 148, dictatorship
characteristics of, 120, 121-24 151, 367, 501 causes of, 35
citizen participation in, 51 waves of, 136,137,139 democratization and, 124-25
civil rights in, 121-22, 123, 126-27 demographics party, 151
correlation with wealth, 28, 29-30, and construction of race and personalistic, 147, 149-50, 167, 535-36
31-33 ethnicity, 332 differentiation
definitions of, 120, 121, 122-24, ethnic political parties and, 339, 340 definition of, 353
141-42 demonstration effect, and of institutions, with modernization,
delegative, 152, 243-44, 245 democratization, 136,137 363-64
direct, 128-29 demonstrative terrorism, 288 of religious institutions from state,
illiberal, 152 Deng Xiaoping, 154, 415, 416, 417, 419, 353,358
inequality and, 562-63 420, 423 diffusion of state as form, theories on,
judicial review and, 190-92 Denmark, and EU, 374 62-64,450
Marx on, 537 denomination, 359 direct democracy, 128-29
middle class and, 33, 132-34, 161, denominationalism, 359-60, 364 direct elections, in presidential
562-63 dependency theory, 40, 111-12 systems, 230
multiparty, 126 dependent variable, 14 dirigisme, 435
nationalism and, 307 deprivation, and revolution, 291, 292, 299, disadvantaged groups, election to political
number of nations with, 120-21 300/, 301, 301/, 302, 302/, 426 office, 326
 Index 623

The D isciplinary R evolution (Gorski), 62 A n Economic Theory o f Democracy Elizabeth II (queen of United Kingdom),
discrimination, 326, 328, 329, 332, 333 (Downs), 271 226/539/, 541
against ethnic groups, 326, 332 economists, support for neoliberalism, 79 El Salvador, evangelical Christianity
gender, 326, 333-34 economy (of country). See also in, 110/
as ongoing, 326 development Emancipation Proclamation, 141,
racial, 326, 332, 561, 563-64 executive influence on, 244-45 142,143/, 556
district-based electoral systems, 33, 205-7 federalism’s impact on, 188-90 E m bedded A utonom y (Evans), 80
challenges presented by, 215-18, 565 globalization and, 378-80, 378f empirical arguments, 6-7, 242
and mixed (hybrid) systems, 209-11, increasing government involvement empirical critiques, 39, 40, 167-69,
210/, 222-24 in, 80-81 167/, 169/
multi-member districts (M M Ds), 207 market-led vs. state-led, 76-86 empirical evidence, 12-14, 27-29
single-member districts (SMDs), measures of performance, 71-76, 74/, 98 empirical theories, 25
205-7,210/, 215-18,268 economy, global, interdependence of, 377 employment
districting, 215-16 Ecuador, 340, 345, 346/, 349, 365,368, 370 discrimination in, 332, 333
D iv id ed G overnm ent (Fiorina), 221 education as economic measure, 75
divorce, in Brazil, 410-11 as measure of development, 99-100 international trade and, 379
DJP. See Democratic Party of Japan public, 50, 83-84 job outsourcing and, 377
domestic politics, and international effective number of political parties, empowerment
relations, 394-95, 396-97 262-63,264/ definition of, 334
dominant-party systems, 259-61, 262. See Egypt growing interest in, 343
also single-party systems Arab Spring and, 277/ 278, 298, 299, indicators of, 344-46, 345/, 346/
African states with, 253, 254fl 300-301, 301-2,301/, 302/ methods of, 337-43
268-69,275 elections in, 46f symbolic, 336, 337, 338, 345
and corporatism, 266 Islam in, 301 types of, 334-37
Downs, Anthony, 271 modernization in, 479 The E n d o f H istory a n d the L a st M a n
Doyle, Michael, 393 nationalism in, 474 (Fukuyama), 365
Dreyfus Affair, 430, 431 Eisenstadt, Shmuel N., 366 endogeneity problem, 36-37
drug trafficking, as transnational issue, 375 elections. See also electoral systems energy, alternative sources of, 385
Durkheim, Emile, 363 and accountability, 215, 233 England. See United Kingdom
Dutch Disease, 518-19 ballot access and, 206 environmental damage
Duverger, Maurice, 268 primary, 206 China and, 98, 384, 395/ 416, 420,
Duverger’s law, 268 quota systems in, 342-44 421, 495
electoral authoritarianism, 152 and climate change, 385
Eastern nationalism, 311-13, 311/, 313/ Electoral College, 214 development and, 103, 384, 385/
East Germany, democratization in, electoral modern/colonial world system, and free rider problem, 386
129,165 208-9 Japan and, 494-95
Ebola virus, 23f 24 electoral systems, 205-11. See also political difficulty of addressing,
Echevarria, Luis, 507 representation 386-87
economic behavior, social and cultural alternative vote system, 209, 210/ and sustainability, 384, 386
context of, 90 district-based systems, 33, 205-7, U.S. and, 495
economic crisis of 2007-09, U.S. and, 215-17 Equatorial Guinea, 40
72,560,561, 566 first-past-the-post system, 206-7, 341 Esping-Andersen, Gosta, 91, 93-94
economic development indirect election, 210-11 established religions, 357
defining of, 40 mixed (hybrid) systems, 209-11, 210/, Ethiopia, 182 f 186, 275
and environmental damage, 384, 385/’ 222-24, 451 ethnic diversity, increase in, 326
and increase in income inequality, 100 open-list proportional representation, ethnic equality
Marxists views on, 110-12 208-9, 210/ and democracy, 124
measures of, 71-76, 74/, 103 and party discipline, 219-20 as measure of development, 100-101
poor, and development of and political parties, 205-11,261,267-68 ethnic groups
authoritarianism, 163 proportional representation, 208-9, definition of, 330-31
quality of state and, 105-6 210/, 212, 214, 217-18, 268, discrimination against, 326, 332
economic empowerment, 335-36 340-41 political parties for, 339-41, 342,
economic functions of modern states, 82-86 ranking systems, 209-10 508-9
economic management. See also Keynesian and representation, 215-18 and ranked vs. unranked societies, 320
economics; welfare state runoff system, 207, 436-37 study of in comparative politics, 326
counter-cyclical spending, 76, 83 single non-transferable vote (SNTV) E th n ic Groups in Conflict (Horowitz), 320
debate on, 76 system, 491, 492 ethnicity
as modern state function, 82-83 single-transferable vote (CTV) system, and boundaries of identity, 327-28
Economic O rigins o f D ictatorship and 209-10, 210/ as cultural construct, 331, 332
Democracy (Acemoglu and strategic voting, 210 definition of, 327, 330-31
Robinson), 162 Elfas Calles, Plutarco, 499, 501 formal and legal reinforcement of, 328
economic theories of state development, elite parties, 258 vs. race, 330-31
60-64, 68, 450 elites, and revolution, 286-87 state role in construction of, 331-32
624 Index

ethnic nationalism, 311-13, 311/, 313/ impact on representation, 220—22 responsibilities o f lower levels in, 189
ethno-cultural community, 308 legislative power to constrain and social stability, 185—87
ethno-national conflict executive, 233 of South African constitution, 175-76
causes of, 313-20 in parliamentary systems, 204/, of U.S. Constitution, 175-76,180, 559
colonialism and, 316 211-12,229,232,235 Federalism (Riker), 186
definition of, 314-15 in presidential systems, 204/, 212, 229, “Federalism and Democracy” (Stepan), 186
efforts to reduce, 314, 321-22 230,232,235 The Federalist Papers , 180,274
primordialist approach to, 316-17 executive orders, 233 feminist movement, 336, 338
EU. See European Union executives. See also executive-legislative feminist scholarship, 326
euro (currency), 373, 374, 381, 397, 429, relations; president(s); Fernandez, Cristina, 326, 368, 370
444, 542 presidentialism; prime ministers feudalism, 48—49
Europe, Central and Eastern and bureaucracy, control over, 228, 229 filibuster, 217, 566
anti-Soviet revolutions in, 285, 446, 530 in constitutions, 176 financial institutions, international, 380
Cold W ar and, 135 definition of, 228 Finland, 334
and Eastern nationalism, 311/ economic influence of, 244-45 Fiorina, Morris, 221
move to democracy in, 37 in federal systems, 181-82 First Amendment, 126-27
Soviet domination of, 135, 530, 532, 536 formal powers of, 232-35, 241/ first-past-the-post electoral systems,
and trimming of welfare state, 87 heads of state vs. heads of 206-7, 341
Europe, Western. See also specific countries government, 228 Fiscal Federalism (Oates), 189
and colonial racialization, 330 hybrid (semi-presidential) systems, fiscal measures, 75-76
corporatism in, 266-67,274 212,229,230/ fiscal policy, 83
democracy in, 124 informal powers, 240, 241/ The Five Wars of Globalization (Naim), 388
and immigrants, incorporation of, 332 limits on power of, 233 Foran, John, 298
medieval, totalitarian-style government in parliamentary systems, 229-32, 230/ force, modern state monopoly on, 48, 49,54
in, 149 partisan powers of, 235,241/ Ford, Gerald R., 556
modern state development in, 47, 59-60 and populism, 244, 245, 245 f, 250 foreign policy, definition of, 375
monarchs in, 228 power of, coalitions and, 235—40 formal institutions, definition of, 279
northern, corporatism in, 453 powers and roles of, 228-29 formal powers of executives, 232-35,241/
referenda in, 128 power sharing in, 247 fossil fuels, and greenhouse gas
religion in, 362-63 in presidentialism, 229-32, 230/ emissions, 385
secularization in, 353 roles of, 228 Fox, Vincente, 499, 501
European Economic Community, 374, structure of in select nations, 248, 249/ fragmented party systems, 262, 263
380-81 existential security, and religion, 361 framing, 296
European Union (EU) explanatory variable, 14 framing theories of revolution, 296-97,
as challenge to modern state system, 47 export-led growth, 113 300/, 301, 426
combined economy, size of, 448 France. See also French Revolution
economic crisis in, 373, 444, 446, 449 facts authoritarian persistence in, 157, 435-36
history of integration in, 373-74, 381, vs. evidence, 12-13 colonialism and, 431, 440
431, 440, 444, 446, 448 scholarship as more than, 2-4 constitutions of, 174,174/j 429, 431
and levels of analysis, 395-97 failed state, 50 democratization in, 435-36
member states, 374/' Faletto, Enzo, 40 discrimination in, 429
and national sovereignty, 374, 381, 395 falsifiability, 33-34 economy of, 74/, 427/
as success of international cooperation, family electoral system, 436-37
375, 380-81 feminist movement’s changes to, 338 ethnic groups in, 427—29
Evans, Peter, 40, 80 industrial capitalism and, 88 and EU, 373, 431, 435, 440
everyday resistance, 280, 289-90 fascism executive structure in, 249/,
evidence. See also causation as ideology, 351, 355 431-32,432/
for and against, importance of in Italy, 274, 355 globalization and, 439-40
evaluating, 167-69, 167/, 169/ and single-party rule, 272 historical development of, 156,
definition of, 12 Fearon, James, 321-22 429-31, 439
empirical, 12-14 federalism, 180-82 human capital levels in, 102/
inferences from, 29 and apportionment, 216 immigration issue in, 382, 383,
measurement issues and, 41-42 asymmetrical, 186 429,431, 433
quantitative vs. qualitative, 29-30 definition of, 175,181 inequality in, 434, 436, 437-38
strong, characteristics of, 12—13, 12/ and democratic rights, 187—88 Iraq W ar and, 6f
and testing of theories, 27-29 and development, 465 judicial branch in, 191/j 432, 432/
evolutionary psychology, 307 economic impact of, 188-90 key features of, 427-29, 427/
executive-legislative relations nations with federal systems, 181, 182f legislatures in, 200, 432, 432/, 438
balance of power in, 234,235 origins of, 185,186 map of, 428 f
electoral systems and, 211-12 and political parties, 186,190 modernization in, 427, 429
executive power to dissolve legislature, and reduction of ethno-national Muslims in, 359, 35 9 f
232-33 violence, 321 and nuclear weapons, 388
and governing, 228,229 resource allocation in, 189 party system in, 264
 Index 625

political culture in, 432-33 political parties based on, 341, 342 state-building process in, 441, 449-50
political economy in, 433-34, 439-40 study of in comparative politics, 326 unemployment in, 449
political institutions, 431-32, 432/ transgendered identities, 328 welfare state in, 80, 86, 87, 90, 448, 450
political parties in, 432/ gender discrimination, 326, 333-34 and W orld W ar I, 443, 444, 445,
presidential elections in, 230, 231 Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), 448, 450
privatization of religion in, 353, 345, 345/ and World W ar II, 443, 444, 445-46,
358,359 gender equality, 100, 124 448, 450
religion in, 427, 4 2 7 f 429, 438-39, 440 General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade gerrymandering, 216, 565
secularism in, 364 (GATT), 567 Ghana, 14,16-17,16/, 17/, 20, 40,264,275
semi-presidential (hybrid) system in, generalizability, 19 Gill, Anthony, 362
229, 230/, 429, 431-32, 432/ genocide Gini coefficient, 74/, 75
Senate in, 217 efforts to eliminate, 305 global civil society, 281
state in, 59, 546 in 20th century, 304£ 305 globalization
statism in, 434-35 as type of violence, 315 definition of, 376
unemployment in, 434, 435 geography, and development, 108, France and, 439-40
welfare state in, 80, 86, 90, 433-34 112-13,116/ Mexico and, 496, 503, 504
and Western nationalism, 311, 311/, George III (king of United Kingdom), 227 Muslim opposition to, 109
312,313/ Germany. See also Nazi Germany protests against, 281
and World W ar I, 430 authoritarianism in, 450-51 social movements and, 281
and World W ar II, 430, 433 B undesrat in, 211, 212, 212/, 451, 452 and trade, 376-80
Franco, Itamar, 404 Bundestag in, 212, 223, 451 U .S .a n d ,567
Franco-Prussian War, 443, 444, 445 coalitions in, 239 global south, underdevelopment in, 111
freedom, as concept, 11 colonialism and, 445 global warming, 385-86, 495
Freedom House, 121 consensus-based politics in, 452-53 G N I. See gross national income
free markets. See market-led economies constitution of, 181, 182^ Goff, Phil, 198/
free rider (collective action) problem, corporatism in, 452-53 Gome Farias, Valentin, 499
273, 295, 295/, 386, 387, 495-96 democratization in, 443, 450-51 Gorbachev, M ikhail, 528, 530
free trade, 374, 545-46 division into East and W est, 443, 444, Gorski, Philip, 62
French Revolution 446,451 Goulart, Joao, 402
and authoritarian persistence, 435-36 and Eastern nationalism, 311, 311/, government (administrative apparatus),
causes and history of, 429, 437-38 312,313/ branches of, 176
destructive nature of, 438 economic growth in, 273, 441, 445, 448 government (ruling officials), 229
and French statism, 435 economic policy of, 448 government institutions, 173, 184-85.
as model for revolution, 285, 286 f 438 economy of, 74/, 441/, 448 See also executives; interest
as social revolution, 284 electoral system in, 199,212,223,451-52 groups; judicial branch;
Friedman, Milton, 79 ethnic groups in, 441/" legislatures; political parties
From M ovem ents to P arties in L a tin ethnic nationalism in, 441, 453-54 Gowon, Yakubu, 513
A m erica (Van Cott), 340 and EU, 373, 431, 444, 446, 447, grand coalitions, 239, 247
Fujimori, Alberta, 245 448, 449 Great Britain. See United Kingdom
Fukushima nuclear plant disaster, 485 executive structure in, 249/, Great Depression
Fukuyama, Francis, 365 446-47, 447/ Brazil and, 402, 406, 407
functional integration of society, 363 federal system in, 451, 452 Germany and, 445, 448, 450
functions definitions of religion, 351-52 historical development, 443-46 Japan and, 486
human capital levels in, 102/ and rise of state power, 81
game theory, 162, 382/, 391-93 immigration issue in, 382 United Kingdom and, 543
Gandhi, Indira, 458, 459 industrialization in, 448 U.S. and, 558,560, 562
Gandhi, Mohandas, 458, 459 inequality in, 449 and welfare state, 91, 546, 547
Gandhi, Rajiv, 458, 459 key features of, 441-43, 441/ The G reat Transform ation (Polanyi), 90
Garcia, Alan, 367—68 legislature in, 203,210-11,234, 447,447/ Greece, debt crisis in, 373, 396f
Gasperi, Alcide de, 246 map of, 442f Greenfeld, Liah, 310, 312-13
GATT. See General Agreement ofTariffs national identity, World W ar II and, 446 greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,
and Trade nationalism in, 443, 447-48 385, 494
Gauck, Joachim, 441/ party system in, 262 Green Party, 258, 448
Gbowee, Leymah, 335/' political culture in, 447-48 gross domestic product (GDP), 72-73,
GDP. See gross domestic product political economy in, 448-49 74/, 103
Gellner, Ernest, 309-10, 507 political institutions in, 446-47, 447/, gross national income (GNI), 72
GEM . See Gender Empowerment Measure 451-52 group identities, 306
gender political parties in, 446, 447/, 450, 452 groups, in democratization, 131,
and boundaries of identity, 327-28 regime changes in, 157 137-39,138/
as culturally-constructed category, religion in, 441/ 443 guerrilla tactics, 287
328-29 reunification of, 374, 443, 444, 446, G uns , Germs a n d Steel (Diamond), 114
definition of, 327 447, 449, 451 guns, and 2nd Amendment, 127
feminist movement’s changes to, 338 secularization in, 443 Gurr, Ted, 292
626 Index

Hamas, 390 testing of, 31-38, 43-44, 44/ group conflict in, 315, 321-22
H am dan v. R um sfeld (2006), 566 and theories, 26-27 head of state in, 228
Hamilton, Alexander, 561 historical development in, 457-60
happiness, as measure of development, identity. See also gender; national identity; human capital levels in, 102/
101-2 nationalism independence for, 458, 459, 463, 464
Harper, Stephen, 239 boundaries of, 327 inequality in, 461, 465
Hatoyama, Yukio, 261 definition of, 306 intertwining o f domestic and
H D I. See Human Development Index group, 306 international politics in, 466-67
heads of government, 228 political, types of, 338 judicial system in, 460, 461/
heads of state, 228 social movements and, 337—39 key features of, 455-57, 455/
health identity utility, 318 legal system in, 184
and education, correlation between, 36 ideological conflict, efforts to map of, 456f
as measure of development, 99 understand, 367 Mumbai terrorist attack (2008), 458,
health care, as function of modern ideology. See also communism; fascism; 460, 467
state, 84 liberalism; socialism and nuclear weapons, 388, 389, 390,
health care access, as measure of definition of, 351 458, 459-60, 466, 481
development, 99 major ideologies, 351, 354-57 parliamentary system in, 243, 460,
Henry VIII (king of England), 65 modernity and, 349 461/, 464
heteronormativity, 329 persistence of, 349—50, 360, 364-67 political culture in, 461-62
high (supreme) courts, 178-79, 233. as political culture, 350 political economy in, 80, 462
See also judicial review shaping of political opinions by, 351 political institutions in, 460, 461/, 464
Hirschl, Ran, 193 immigrants. See also assimilation political parties in, 458, 459, 461, 461/,
historical institutionalism, 107 discrimination against, 331, 332 465-66
theories of authoritarianism in, documented vs. undocumented, 383 poverty in, 457, 460, 462, 463
159-60,161,16 I f 168,169/ tensions with natives, 383-84 reform in, 462, 463
history, end of, 365 immigration religion in, 4 5 5 f 457, 460, 461
Hitler, Adolf, 81,147, 149, 431, 444, 445, as issue, 382-84 rise to global power, 457
446, 448,450,530, 543 nativism and, 384 security as issue in, 466-67
Hobbes, Thomas, 58, 391 as transnational issue, 375 standard of living in, 100
Hollande, Francois, 427/, 429 and Western vs. Eastern nationalism, 311 state building process in, 455
Holocaust, 305, 444, 445, 453 impeachment o f presidents, 212, 230, statism in, 459, 462
Hong Kong, 414, 542 232,233,241,566 tensions with Pakistan, 389, 459-60,
HongXiuquan, 415 Im perialism , the H ighest Stage o f Capitalism 466-67
Horowitz, Donald L., 320 (Lenin), 111 violence and instability in, 459-60
House of Commons (U.K.), 550 impersonality, of modern state, 53-54 Indian Congress Party, 458, 459
House of Lords (U.K.), 550 import substitution indicators, 41, 344—46
House of Representatives, U.S., 217, 559, in Brazil, 113, 403 indigenous Americans. See American
559/, 565 in Mexico, 501, 503 Indians
H tun, Mala, 342 income inequality, 73—75. See also specific indignadas, 281, 281/
Huerta, Victorino, 499, 501 countries indirect election, 210-11, 231-32
Hu Jintao, 416, 423 and authoritarianism, 161-62 individualism, and economic
Humala, Ollanta, 367-68 and democracy, 124,132 development, 110
human capital, as measure of increase in with economic individualistic nationalism, 312—13, 313/
development, 99—102,102/ development, 100 individualization, and mobilization, 289
Human Development Index (HDI), independent variable, 14 individuals
100,102/, 433 India in democratization, 131,137-39,138/
human rights, authoritarian regimes and, anti-colonial revolution in, 287, 458, 459 fascism on, 355
147-48 caste system in, 455-57, 461, 462, 465 liberalism on, 354
Hungary, democratization in, 129 colonial rule in, 455, 457-59, 461, 465 Indonesia, 181,182/ 184
Huntington, Samuel, 136, 137,139, 292, constitution of, 181, 182/,' 458, 460 inductive reasoning, 26
365, 366 democracy in, 133,133/j 243, 457, 459, industrial capitalism
hybrid (semi-authoritarian) regimes, 148, 461, 463, 464 and growth o f welfare state, 87-89,
151-52,153,157-58,166 development in, 99 90,93
hyperinflation, 75 economic growth in, 457, 458, 462, and mobilization for revolution, 293
hypotheses. See also correlation 463,464-65 and nationalism, 309-10
about future events, 29-30 economy of, 74/ Industrial Revolution, U.K. as origin of,
development of, 93-94 ethnic groups in, 455-57, 4SSf, 461, 543, 545, 547
evidence and, 29—30 465-66 inequality. See also income inequality;
good, characteristics of, 43—44 ethnic political parties in, 341, 465-66 specific countries
indicators in, 41 executive structure in, 249/ and democracy, 562-63
outliers (deviant cases) and, 26, federalism in, 186,189, 460, 464-65 reduction of as state role, 85
39, 275 government corruption in, 462 infant mortality, 99, 102/
in research, 8-9, 25-27 government regulation in, 462, 463 inferences, 29
 Index 627

inflation, 74/, 75 international institutions political culture in, 474-75

informal powers of executives, 240, 241/ financial, 380 political institutions in, 473-74, 473/,
information-gathering, in modern and integration, 380-82 475-76, 477
states, 57 and international cooperation, 393-94 reforms in, 475, 478
infrastructure, as responsibility of modern ongoing importance of state in, 374, religion in, 468£ 470, 472, 477, 478,
state, 85 381,395 479-80
Inglehart, Ronald, 140, 361, 362, 364 and reduction of ethno-national as religious state, 358
Inkatha Freedom Party (South Africa), 258 violence, 322 sanctions on, 475, 480
instant-runoff system, 209 International M onetary Fund (IM F), social class in, 474
institution(s). See also international 105, 380, 567 social movements in, 281
institutions international political economy, 375 theocracy in, 150, 154, 185, 349, 360,
definition of, 173 international relations 473-74, 476-77, 479-80
differentiation of with modernization, definition of, 375 as threat to Israel, 468, 477, 480
363-64 domestic politics and, 394-95, 396-97 as threat to U.S. interests, 468, 480
and empowerment of women and environmental issues and, 384-87 unemployment in, 475
minorities, 341-43 globalization and, 376-80 women in, 352 f, A ll, A19
as factor in democratization, 131, immigration as issue in Iran-Iraq War, 471, 472, 475
136-37 international institutions and, 380-82 Iraq, 321, 474, 479
as factor in development, 106-7, 111, main areas of study, 375 Ireland, 6I f 68, 372/ 373, 542, 551
115-16,116/ nuclear weapons and, 388 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 389-90, 551
formal, definition of, 279 ongoing importance of state in, 374, iron law of oligarchy, 282
and political culture, 502-3 381, 395 Is Gender Like Ethnicity? (Htun), 342
and reduction of ethno-national shape of international system and, 391 ISIS, takeover of Syrian territory, 278
violence, 321 terrorism and, 389-90 Islam. See also Muslims
social, as factor in development, 107-8 theories of, 390-95 and Arab Spring, 300-301
institutionalism, 106-7. See also historical and transnational issues, 375-76 conservative, resurgence of, 364-65
institutionalism; new transnational networks and, 387-88 and development, 109
institutionalism; rational international security, 375, 390-95 as incompatible with West, 366
institutionalism international system and legal systems based on religious
institutionalization, of party systems, and democratization, 131, 135-36, 137 law, 184
263-64, 265 economic, and development, Islamic State. See ISIS
Institutional Revolutionary Party, Mexico 111-12, 117/ isomorphism, organizations and, 64
(PRI). See P artido Revolucionario and state behavior, 391 Israel
Institucional international trade. See trade head of state in, 228
institutional theories of religion, 363-64 intervening variable problem, 37 Iranian threat to, 468, A l l
instrumentalist views of nationalism, invisible hand, 78 judiciary in, 193
315, 318 IRA. See Irish Republican Army legal system in, 184
insurgencies, 280, 287 Iran and nuclear weapons, 388, 389
integration American hostage crisis, 472 parliamentary system in, 221/
international institutions and, 380-82 authoritarian persistence in, 154, 475-76 and terrorism, 390
regional institutions and, 380-81 constitution of, 471, 476-77 Italy
interdependence, of global economy, 377 democracy and, 475-76, 477 debt crisis in, 373
interest aggregation, 257 economy of, 74/, 468/ and EU, 373, 431, 448
interest articulation, 257 ethnic groups in, 468/ fascism in, 274, 355
interest groups. See also special interest executive system in, 229, 232, 249/, instability of government in, 246,
groups 473, 473/ 476, 477 247, 248
and citizens participation, 255 foreign influence in, 470—72 Iturbide, Augustin de, 499
and corporatism, 265-67, 273-74 gender discrimination in, 334
definition of, 256 Green Revolution in, 473, 478 James II (king of England), 542, 546, 547
and development, 111 historical development of, 470-73 Janata Party (India), 459
examples of, 256-57, 256 f human capital levels in, 102/ Jansenism, 438
functions of, 256 ideology of, 366-67, 470, 478 Japan
and growth of welfare state, 89-92 Islamic revolution of 1979 in, 150,154, atomic bombing of, 388, 485, 486, 556
and interest articulation, 257 297, 468, 470, 471, 472, 474-75, business structure in, 488, 490
and pluralism, 264-65, 266, 478, 479-80 Chinese rise and, 489
272-73, 274 key features of, 468-70, 468/ Confucianism and, 418
variations in state interactions with, legal system of, 184 constitutions of, 485, 486
253-54 legislature in, 473, 473/, 476, 477 corporatism in, 273-74, 488, 492
intergovernmental organizations, 380 map of, A 6 9 f democratization in, 486
international cooperation modernization in, 470, 472, 474, 479 dominant-party system in, 261
increase in after World W ar II, 380 nationalism in, 474 and Eastern nationalism, 313/
international institutions and, 393-94 and nuclear weapons, 388, 389, 390, economic growth in, 273, 448, 482-84,
in realist theory, 392-93 480-81 485, 486, 488-89, 490
 628 Index

Japan (Continued) and judicial activism, 190-92, 549, laicism in, 358, 438
economy of, 7At, 482 1 563-64 legislatures in, 202-3, 213
electoral system in, 210, 486, 491, 492 lack of in U.K., 548 nationalism in, 42
ethnic groups in, 482/j 484 judiciaries, 176. See also judicial branch populism in, 245, 245/
executive structure in, 249/ presidentialism in, 241-42
gender discrimination in, 335 “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign racial categories in, 329-30
historical development, 484-87 Affairs” (Doyle), 393 revolutions in, 285, 287
human capital levels in, 102/ Karman, Tawakkol, 335/ socialist governments in, 349,
inequality in, 488, 489 Kennedy, John F., 556 365, 367-70
key features of, 482-84, 482/ keonkai, 486, 492 state development in, 60
and Kyoto Protocol, 495 Keynes, John M aynard, 547 U.S. interventions in, 567
legislature in, 487, 487/, 491 Keynesian economics, 76, 91, 355, 547—48 welfare state in, 93
map of, 483/ Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 185/ 468/, 471, law. See rule of law
modernization in, 482-84, 485, 472, 473, 477 lay states, 358, 364
488-89, 490 Khan, A. Ql , 390 LDP. See Liberal Democratic Party
national identity in, 310, 493 Khatami, Mohammad, 471, 472, 473, ofJapan
nationalism in, 310 476, 478 League of Nations, 566, 567
opening to W est, 484, 493 Khodorkovsky, M ikhail, 534 learning effects, and welfare state, 92-93
and overfishing, 387 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 185/j 297, Lebanon, presidential system in, 246
political culture in, 488 471,472,473, 477,478 Lee Kuan Yew, 134,163, 260
political economy in, 488-89 Khrushchev, Nikita, 530 leftism, pragmatic, 368-70
political institutions in, 487, 487/ Kim Jong-il, 35, 3S f left wing
political parties in, 486-87, 487/, Kim Jong-un, 35, 3S f resurgence of, 365
491-92 King, M artin Luther, Jr., 142 in United Kingdom, 541
reform in, 489, 491, 492 Kirchner, Nestor, 368, 370 legal systems, religious law as basis of, 184
religion in, 482 f 484 Kohl, Helmut, 444, 447 L egislative L evia th a n (Cox and
resource management and, 494-95 Kohli, Atul, 107 McCubbins), 219
state-led development in, 84,104,115 Koizumi, Junichiro, 492 L egislative Politics in L a tin Am erica
statism in, 485-86, 489, 490, 492 Korea. See also N orth Korea; South Korea (Morgenstern and Nacif, eds.), 213
unemployment in, 489 Confucianism and, 418 legislative process, variations in, 201
unions in, 488, 490 Japanese conquest of, 485 legislators
wars of late 19th-early 20th Korean War, 116, 415 and following of public opinion vs.
centuries, 415 Kranton, Rachel, 318 conscience, 214-15
welfare state in, 9 1 / 92, 490 Krook, M ona Lena, 344 and need for reelection, 202
women in, 485, 488, 490, 493-94 Kubitschek, Juscelino, 402, 403 legislatures. See also executive-legislative
and World W ar I, 485, 486 Kunio, Yoshihara, 488 relations
and World W ar II, 446, 484, 485, Kuran, Timur, 165, 391 appointment of executives by, 201,
486, 492,493 Kuru, Ahmet, 364 204-5,204/, 231-32,233-34
Jiang Zemin, 416, 417, 423 Kurzman, Charles, 472 at-large members of, 199
Jim Crow laws, 328, 337, 557 Kyoto Protocol, 495, 566 in authoritarian regimes, 201,
Jinnah, M uhammad Ali, 458, 459 202, 204,222
John II (king of England), 200, 549 labor, M arx on alienation of, 356 bicameral, 202-3
John Paul II (pope), 137 labor market, as gendered, 333 chambers of, 202—3, 204
Johnson, Lyndon B., 556, 558 Labour Party (U.K.), 207,207/, 258, in constitutions, 176
Johnson, Simon, 108 262-63,542, 543, 545,548, 552 decision-making process in, 218-20
Jonathan, Goodluck, 513, 514, 520, laicism, 358, 427, 438-39, 440 definition of, 200
521, 523 Laitin, David, 319, 321-22 electoral systems for, 205-11
“Juan Linx, Presidentialism, and Landless Workers Movement (Brazil), executive power to dissolve, 232-33
Democracy” (Mainwaring 282, 410 in federal systems, 181-82
and Shugart), 243 Langa, Pius, 195/ functions of, 200, 201—2, 214
judicial activism, 190-92, 549, 563-64 Latin America history of, 200-201
judicial branch authoritarianism in, 134,163, 243 names for, 204
and checks and balances, 230, 566 cacerolazo protests in, 156 oversight functions of, 211-12, 566
in constitutions, 176 corporatism in, 266 and power o f the purse, 201-2, 566
increasing power of, 192 delegative democracies in, 152, 244 types of, 202-12, 222
and judicial review, 173,176,178-79, democratization in, 129 unicameral, 203—4
190-92, 549 and dependency theory, 40 Lenin, Vladimir, 64, 111, 292, 528,
judicial institutions, and reduction of discrimination in, 325/ 326, 336 530,536
ethno-national violence, 322 economic development in, 105 Le Pen, Jean-M arie, 433, 436-37
judicial review electoral systems in, 437 Le Pen, M arine, 433
as constitutional provision, 173, 176, immigration to U.S. from, 382 less-developed nations, underdevelopment
178-79 increasing empowerment o f women in, 111
elite interest and, 193 in, 134-35 level o f analysis, 13, 395-97
 Index 629

L evia th a n (Hobbes), 391 mandate-independence controversy, 214-15 economic development in, 496, 498
Levitsky, Steven, 166 Mandela, Nelson, 138,171/ 193, 422 economy of, 74/, 496/
Lewis, John, 280 Maoism, 419 empowerment of women in, 335,
LGBT (lesbian, gay,bisexual and Mao Zedong, 116,131,154, 293, 414, 345, 346/
transgender) movement, 336, 337 415, 416, 417, 419, 420, 423, 426 ethnic discrimination in, 340
Liberal Democratic Party (U.K.), 207, market-led development, vs. state-led, ethnic groups in, 4 9 6 f 498, 508-9
207/, 262-63, 545 104-6,107,117/ executive structure in, 249/, 501, 502/
Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), market-led economies exogenous shocks in, 498, 505
210, 261, 485, 486-87, 488, advantages of, 77-79, 80/' and globalization, 496, 503, 504
490, 491-92 role of state in, 82 historical development in, 498-501
liberal institutionalism, 393-94 vs. state-led, 76-77, 81-82, 81/ human capital levels in, 102/
liberalism W ashington Consensus and, 340, immigration to U.S. from, 382
and denominationalism, 360 380, 407 independence, 499
Fukuyama on triumph of, 365 marketplace of ideas, 253, 265 industrial capitalism in, 309, 507-8
as ideology, 351, 354-55 market socialism, in China, 417, 419-20 inequality in, 498, 503
and laicism, 358 Marshall Plan, 431, 435, 446 key features of, 496-98, 496/
as theory of international relations, Marx, Karl legislature in, 501, 502/
393-94 on capitalism, 60, 63-64, 357, 365 liberal government in, 370
types of, 354 on democracy, 537 map of, 4 9 ^
libertarianism, 354 on division of labor, 363 Mexican Revolution, 498, 499, 503
Libya on economic development, 111 modernization in, 500
Arab Spring and, 278, 298, 301-2, exile from Germany, 450 nationalism in, 309, 507-8
301/, 302/ influence of, 357 nationalizations in, 498, 501, 503, 504
fall of Qaddafi, 11/ 278, 298 and political economy, 71 organized crime in, 498, 501, 504-5
Lichbach, Marc, 294, 296 on social revolutions, 284 political culture in, 502-3
life expectancy, 99,102/ and theory of revolution, 292, 293, 356, political economy in, 503-4
Lijphart, Arend, 247, 262 419, 536 political institutions, 501-2, 502/
Li Keqiang, 2 36 / 412/, 416, 423 Marxism political parties in, 501, 502/, 508-9
limited government. See constitutionalism on economic development, 110-12 poverty in, 496, 502, 503
Lincoln, Abraham, 141, 248, 556, 558 in international relations, 395 presidential system in, 230
Linz, Juan, 241, 243 on welfare state, development of, 88 PRI period of dominance in, 137,151,
Lipset, Seymour M artin, 132,161, 562-63 mass parties, 258 154,164, 267, 498, 501, 502,
List, Friedrich, 450 material resources, and mobilization for 505-7
literacy rates, 99-100, 102/ revolution, 293, 300/ reforms in, 499, 500, 501, 503, 504
local governments, responsibilities under Maximilian I (emperor of Mexico), 429, religion in, 496/ 498, 499, 500, 501
federal system, 189 499, 500 rule of law issues in, 56, 504-5
Locke, John, 552 McCubbins, M atthew, 219 state strength in, 496-98, 500, 501,
The Logic o f Collective A ction (Olson), 273 M DS. See most-different-systems (MDS) 503, 504-5
London bombings o f2005, 383 method unemployment in, 503
Lopez Portillo, Jose, 507 measurement unions in, 506
Louis-Philippe (king of France), 429, of country’s economy, 71-73 Meyer, John, 65
430, 436 of income inequality, 73-75 Mezey, Michael, 222
Louis XIV (king of France), 429, 434, 438 issues in, 41-42 Michels, Robert, 258, 282
Louis XVI (king of France), 429 media, civil society and, 280 Micronesia, 182^
Louis XVIII (king of France), 429, median party coalitions, 238-39, 238/ middle class
430,433 median voters, and politics of two-party and democracy, 33, 132-34, 161,
lower chamber, 203 systems, 269-72, 2 70 / 271/ 562-63
Lugard, Frederick, 512, 513 Medvedev, Dmitry, 23 4 f 525t, 528, 530, rise of in China, 419, 422
Lula da Silva, Luiz Inacio, 282, 326, 534-35 rise of in Iran, 472, 474
368, 369, 370, 402, 404, 405-6, Meiji Restoration, 484-85, 493 rise of in Japan, 486
408,410 Menem, Carlos, 245 M iddle East, legislatures in, 203
Luxembourg, and EU, 373, 431, 448 Merkel, Angela, 1 / 237/ 383, 441/, military
444,447 and democratic breakdown, 156
Macaulay, Fiona, 411 Mexico and legitimate use of force, 49
Machiavelli, 391 authoritarianism in, 164, 498, 501, 502 and revolution, 302, 302/
Madero, Francisco, 499, 500-501 border with U.S., I f / military rule
Madison, James, 180, 274, 564 colonialism in, 498-99 and democracy, 123
Maduro, Nicolas, 155, 365, 368, 369, 370 constitutions of, 181, 182£ 499, 500 and suspension of constitution, 184
Magna Carta, 65,177, 200, 542, 548, 549 corporatism in, 266, 267, 506-7 Milosevic, Slobodan, 314 f
Mainwaring, Scott, 243 democratization in, 121, 129, 137, 501, M in, Brian, 322
Major, John, 542,545, 548 503, 505 minimum connected winning coalition,
malapportionment, 216-17 economic crises of 1980-90s, 501, 238,238/
Malaysia, constitution of, 182^ 503-4, 505, 507 minimum range coalitions, 238/, 239
630 Index

minimum size coalition, 238, 238/ monarchy Napoleon (emperor of France), 429,
minimum winning coalition, 238, 238/ constitutional, 66, 126, 183, 541, 548 430, 433, 436, 438, 439, 443,
minorities. See also ethnic groups; racial replacement by constitutionalism in 453, 527, 528
discrimination Europe, 183 Napoleon III (emperor of France), 429,
empowerment of, 334-43 monetary policy, 83 430, 433, 436, 443, 500
factors influencing representation of, M onster Raving Loony Party (U.K.), nation, definition of, 307
337-43 205/206 National Action Party (PAN). See Partido
representation of in legislatures, 214 Montgomery Bus Boycott, 283, 283/ Accion nacional
M itterrand, F rancis, 429, 434 Moore, Barrington, 160, 161 National Endowment for Democracy,
M M Ds. See multi-member districts Morales, Evo, 326, 348/ 365, 368, 51,137
mobilization 369, 370 national identity
barriers to, 289 mores, and democratization, 135. See also colonialism and, 523
and growth of welfare state, 89-92 value systems definition of, 306-7
of revolutions, 284, 293, 294, 300/, 425 Morgenstern, Scott, 213 in Japan, 310, 493
of social movements, 282, 284 Morsi, Mohammed, 278 nationalism
modernist approaches to nationalism, 307, Mosaddeq, Mohammad, 470-71 civic, U.S. and, 331
308-10, 311 Moseneke, Dikgang, collectivistic vs. individualistic,
modernity most-different-systems (M DS) method, 312-13, 313/
and colonialism, justification of, 18,18/, 193-96, 248 in colonial Africa, 512
350-51 most-similar-systems (MSS) design, constructivist theories of, 309-10,
as cultural construction, 350 15-17,16/, 114-17, 248 315, 317, 321
definition of, 350 Mothers of the Disappeared, 135 dangers of categorizing, 313
and ideology, 349 Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo, 256f definition of, 307
as international status marker, 350 Movement of Landless Workers Eastern/ethnic, 311-13, 311/, 313/
opponents of, 365-67 (M ST), 282, 410 on ethno-national conflict, causes
and religion, 349, 352-53, 358, 360-64 MSS. See most-similar-systems (MSS) of, 313-20
as term in social science, 351 design evolutionary psychology and, 307
types of, 366 MST. See Movement of Landless Workers historical development of, 493
modernization Mubarak, Hosni, 278 instrumentalist views of, 315, 318
definition of, 350 Mugabe, Robert, 145/J146, 167-69 measurement of, 42
and democratization, 131, 132-34, 422 M ughal Empire, 457 modernist approaches to, 307,
as term in social science, 351 M uhammad (prophet), 184 308-10, 311
M o d ern izatio n , C ultural Change , a nd Mujica, Jose, 368, 370 perennialist approaches to, 307, 308
Democracy (Inglehart and Mukherjee, Pranab, 455/ primordialist approaches to, 307-8,
Welzel), 140 multiculturalism, 331, 382-83, 545, 551 311, 315, 316-17
modernization theory, 131, 132-34 multilateral cooperation, 380 rational choice theory of, 318-19, 319/,
Ghana and, 40 multi-member districts (M M Ds), 207 321, 322
India and, 464 multiparty democracies, 126, 272 and revolution, 297
modern societies, characteristics of, 351 multiparty systems, 262 social-psychological approaches to, 320
modern states “Multiple Modernities” (Eisenstadt), 366 sociobiology and, 307
autonomy of, 50-51 multipolar world, in international and state development, 61
bureaucracy in, 49, 52-53, S A f relations, 391 status-inconsistency and, 310
centrality to modern politics, 47-48 murder, and ice-cream sales, correlation structuralist theories of, 309-10
characteristics of, 52-55 between, 38 types of, 311-13, 311/
citizenship in, 54 Museveni, Yoweri, 128/ W estern/civic/territorial, 311-13,
definition of, 49 Muslim Brotherhood, 278, 301 311/, 313/
durability of, 47 Muslim League (India), 458, 459 N ationalism (Greenfeld), 310
economic functions of, 82-86 Muslims. See also Islam Nationalists, Chinese, 415, 416, 425-26
functions of, 55-57, 76 in France, 359, 359^ 429, 433, 439 National of Islam, 283
impersonality of, 53-54 fundamentalist, in Nigeria, 523 National Organization of Women
information-gathering in, 57 in Germany, 443 (NOW ), 256-57
monopoly on use of force, 48, 49, 54 in India, 459-60, 461, 466, 467 National Party (South Africa), 193
movements challenging, 47, 68 Mussolini, Benito, 274, 355, 356f National Rifle Association (NRA), 257
public education as function of, 50 Myanmar, 8 3 / 119/" N atio ns , States , a n d Violence (Laitin), 319
regulation of private property in, 57 N atio ns a n d N ationalism (Gellner), 309
rule of law in, 49 NAACP (National Association for the nativism, 384
and sovereignty, 54-55 Advancement of Colored People), N ATO, 278, 299, 305, 429, 567
and state capacity, 49-50 142, 283 natural experiments, 21, 115, 322
state-society relationship in, 50-52 Nacif, Benito, 213 Naxalites, 460
The M odern World System (Wallerstein), 113 NAFTA. See North American Free Trade Nazi Germany
Modi, Narendra, 455/, 458, 460 Organization corporatism in, 274
Mohamad, M ahathir, 134, 513, 514 Nagel, Joane, 338 and cultural origins of
monarchs, as heads of state, 228 Naim, Moises, 388 authoritarianism, 163-64
 Index 631

Eastern nationalism and, 312 presidentialism in, 242 open-ended questions, 5-6, 168
and ethnic nationalism, 453 regional autonomy movements in, 516 open-list proportional representation,
German nationalism and, 447 religion in, 510/ 512, 523 208-9,210/, 409
and Holocaust, 305, 444, 445, 453 religious conflict in, 361 operationalizing of concepts, 11-12, 11/
and National Socialism, 81, 137, 355 and resource curse, 100/ 101, 510, 513, Orange Revolution, 155, 156/
rise of, 137,155, 431, 445, 450 516, 518-19 organization, of social movements, 281
single-party system in, 259, 272 terrorism in, 513, 514, 523 organization (s)
and state terrorism, 288 as weak state, 63, 510, 517-18 definition of, 64
statism in, 81 Nixon, Richard M., 556, 558 and isomorphism, 64
as totalitarian regime, 148, 149 “no confidence” votes, 211, 220-21, 232, peak, 265-66
and World W ar II, 443, 444, 445-46, 234-35,241,451-52, 550 Organization of American States, 567
448, 450 nonstate actors, terrorism and, 389 Ortega, Daniel, 152/^ 368
negative correlation, 31 Nordic countries, welfare state in, 93-94 outcome, definition of, 14
Nehru, Jawaharlal, 458, 459, 463 normative arguments, 6-7 outliers (deviant cases), 26, 39, 275, 464
neo-colonial exploitation, 64 normative theories, 25 outsourcing, and employment, 377
neoliberalism, 78-79, 8 ( / 407 Norris, Pippa, 361, 362, 364 overfishing, Japan and, 494-95
neorealism, in international relations, 391 North, Douglass, 61
Netanyahu, Benjamin, 221/ North American Free Trade Organization Pahlavi, M ohammad Reza Shah, 470,
Netherlands, and EU, 373, 431, 448 (NAFTA), 380, 496,499, 504,567 471, 472, 479
Neves, Aecio, 404 Northern Ireland, 68 Pahlavi, Reza Shah, 154, 470, 471, 474
Neves, Tancredo, 402, 404 North Korea Pakistan
New Deal, 81, 556, 558 and authoritarian persistence, 153 colonial rule in, 457
new institutionalism, 106 border with South Korea, 96f 97 constitution of, 181, 182^
New Zealand development vs. South Korea, 97, independence for, 458, 459
constitution of, 177 114-17,116/, 117/ and nuclear weapons, 388, 389, 390,
electoral system in, 198^ 199, dictatorship in, 35 459-60,466,481
222-24, 224/ legislature in, 202 tensions with India, 389, 459-60,
gender empowerment in, 344, 345, and nuclear weapons, 388 466-67
345/, 346/ single-party system in, 259 PAN. See P artido A ction nacional
judiciary in, 193 state control of economy in, 106 Panama Canal, 3 I l f
NGOs (nongovermental organizations), as totalitarian regime, 148, 149 parliamentary sovereignty, 179-80
and ethnic political Norway parliamentary systems, 229-32, 230/.
mobilization, 509 and EU, 374 See also prime minister
Nicaragua, 152/ 161, 345, 346/, 349, 368 and gender discrimination, 334 appointment of executive in, 204-5,
Nicolas I (tsar of Russia), 527 NOW . See National Organization of 204/, 231-32, 233-34
Nigeria Women changes in over time, 248
authoritarianism in, 513 “Now Out of Never” (Kuran), 165 characteristics of, 204-5, 204/
Civil W ar of 1967-70, 316, 513, NRA. See National Rifle Association coalitions in, 235-40, 23 I f 2377, 238/
516,519-20, 522 nuclear proliferation, efforts to stop, and compromise, 239, 240, 246
clientism in, 516, 517, 519, 521 388, 480-81 and democracy, 240-43
colonialism in, 512, 523 nuclear weapons executive-legislative relations in, 204/,
constitution of, 181, 182/^ 187 atomic bombing of Japan, 388, 485, 211-12,232,235
corruption in, 513, 514, 515-16, 517, 486,556 “no confidence” votes in, 211, 220-21,
518, 521 Cold W ar and, 388, 530 232, 234-35, 241, 451-52, 550
democracy in, 121, 510 international relations and, 388 and parliamentary sovereignty, 179-80
economy of, 74/, 111, 510/ Iran and, 388, 389, 390, 480-81 power sharing in, 247
ethnic conflict in, 510, 514, 515, nations possessing, 388 vs. presidential system, 240-50
519-20, 521, 523 reasons for wanting, 480 stability of, 246-47
ethnic groups in, 510/ 512 terrorism and, 390 U.K. as model of, 227, 229, 247
executive structure in, 249/, 521 Parliament of U.K.
federalism in, 512-13, 519-20, 521, 523 Oates, Wallace, 189 characteristics of, 204-5, 204/
historical development in, 512-14 Obama, Barack, 326, 553/, 556, 566 and devolution of power, 544
human capital levels in, 102/ Obasanjo, Olusegun, 513, 514, 521 dissolving of parliament in, 233, 544
independence, 512,513 Obregon, Alvaro, 499, 501 history of, 200, 541, 549-50
inequality in, 516-17 Occupy Movement, 281 influence of, 206
key features of, 510-12, 510/ O ’Donnell, Guillermo, 139, 244 and parliamentary sovereignty, 177,
map of, 511/ offensive realism^ in international 179-80,192, 544, 548 '
national identity in, 523 relations, 391 as reactive, 222
political culture in, 515-16 offshoring, and employment, 377 structure of, 203
political economy in, 516-17 oil exporters, and Arab Spring, 300, 301/, parochial cultures, 164
political institutions, 515, 515/, 521 302,302/ participatory democracy, 365
political parties in, 515/, 521 Olson, Mancur, 273, 296 P artido A ction national [Mexico] (PAN),
poverty in, 516 omitted variable problem, 38 501, 503, 504-5, 509
632 Index

P artido de la R evolucion Democratica plebiscites, 128-29 in U.S., 221, 253, 258, 261
[Mexico] (PRD), 505, 506, 509 pluralism, 264-65, 266, 369 variations in number of, 253, 255,
Partido Revolucionario Institucional and representation, 272-73, 274 259-62
[Mexico] (PRI) Poland, 129,165, 530 political revolution, 284-85
and bureaucratic authoritarianism, 151 Polanyi, Karl, 89, 90 political rights
corporatism under, 509 police, as state function, 49, 55-56 in democracy, 121, 123, 126, 127
and democratization, 503 political business cycle, 233 variations between countries, 127
founding of, 499, 501 political culture political science, and scientific method,
and organized crime, 504-5 and authoritarian persistence, 163-64, 20-21
period of dominance of, 137, 151,154, 167/ 168,169/ political theories of state development,
164, 267, 498, 501, 502, 505-7 definition of, 350 58-60, 58/518
state strength under, 503 and democratization, 135 politicians, socializing of by legislatures, 202
Parties a n d P arty Systems (Sartori), 269 political institutions and, 502-3 politics
partisan powers of executives, 235, 241/ political economy. See also economy as area for dispute over resources, 279
Les Partis Politiques (Duverger), 268 (of country); specific countries modern, centrality of state to, 47-48
party. See political parties definition of, 71 and religion, modern forms of, 357-60
party dictatorships, 151 economic performance measures, populism, 244, 245, 245/ 250
party discipline 71-76, 74/ Porfirio Dfaz, Jose de la Cruz, 498, 499,
in Brazil, 409 history of concept, 71 500,504
electoral system and, 219-20 international, 375 portfolios, ministerial, 236
in Germany, 447 political empowerment, 336-37 Portugal, 355, 373, 374
Party of the Democratic Revolution. See institutions and, 341-44 positive correlation, 31
Partido de la Revolucion political parties and, 339-41 positive theories. See empirical theories
Democratica [Mexico] quotas and, 342-44 positivism, influence in Latin America,
party platforms, 255 social movements and, 337-39 403, 500
party systems, 259-64. See also single­ political institutions, political culture post-colonial states, artificial boundaries
party systems an d ,502-3 of, 316
definition of, 255 P olitical M a n (Lipset), 132 poverty
dominant party systems, 253, 254^ political opportunity, and revolution, absolute, 99
259-61, 262 292-93, 300/, 302, 426 authoritarian regimes and, 160-61,
factors shaping, 267-69 P olitical Order in C hanging Societies 16Ifi 168, 169/
fragmented vs. concentrated, 262, 263 (Huntington), 292 definition of, 98
institutionalization of, 263-64, 265 The Political O rigins o f Religious L iberty and democracy, 124
multiparty systems, 262 (Gill), 362 democratization and, 502
in sub-Saharan Africa, 275 political parties. See also party systems; measures of, 98-99
two-party systems, 261-62, 268, specific countries and relative deprivation of revolution,
2 69 -7 2,27 0 /2 71 / catch-all, 258 291, 292, 299, 300/, 301, 301/,
path dependency, development and, 107 and citizens participation, 255 302, 302/, 426
patronage, 240 critiques of, 258 poverty line, 98-99
payoff matrix, 391 definition of, 255 poverty rate, 74/
peak organizations, 265-66 development of from social The Power of Identity (Castells), 338
Pedro I (king of Brazil), 402 movement, 337 PPP. See purchasing power parity
Pedro II (king of Brazil), 402, 403 and district-based electoral systems, 206 PR. See proportional representation
Pena Nieto, Enrique, 154, 370, 496/, 499, district-based electoral systems and, 33 pragmatic leftism, 368-70
501, 506 effective number of, 262-63, 264/ PRD. See P artido de la Revolucion
per capita GDP, 72 and election quota systems, 343 D em ocratica [Mexico]
perennialist approaches to nationalism, electoral system influence on, 205-11, preference falsification, in authoritarian
307, 308 261, 267-68 regimes, 165
Perez, Carlos Andres, 245 elite, 258 preferential vote system, 209
“The Perils of Presidentialism” (Linz), 241 ethnic, 339-41, 342, 508-9 president(s)
periphery, and dependency theory, 111-12 federalism and, 186, 190 bully pulpit of, 240, 566
Peron, Juan and Eva, 2 4 5 f gender-based, 341, 342 checks on power of, 566
Perry, Matthew, 484, 485 and gerrymandering, 216 as head of state and government, 228,231
personalistic dictatorships, 147, 149-50, history of, 258 impeachment of, 212, 230, 232,
167, 535-36 and interest aggregation, 257 233, 241, 566
Peru, 245, 340, 367-68 and legislative decision making, 219-20 informal powers of, 240
Petain, Philippe, 431 mass, 258 roles of, 228
Peter the Great (tsar of Russia), 527, 528 and partisan powers of executives, 235 styles of rule, variations in, 243-45
Philippines, democratization in, 129 party discipline, 219-20 veto power of, 228, 230, 232, 234,
philosophes , 432-33 platforms of, 255 460, 559, 566
Pinera, Sebastian, 125, 125/J 369, 370 and power sharing, 241 presidentialism, 229-32, 230/
Pinochet, Augusto, 125,155, 288 shaping of political outcomes by, balance of power in, 221
Pitkin, Hannah, 214 269-72, 339 changes in over time, 248
 Index 633

coalitions and, 236 Qaddafi, Muammar, 11f 278, 298 maintenance, strategies for, 154-55
definition of, 230 al Qgeda, 288, 289, 387, 389, 523 types of, 124
and democracy, 240-43 qualitative evidence, 29-30 regime change, 124. See also democratic
executive-legislative relations in, 204/, quantitative evidence, 29-30 breakdown; democratization
212,230, 232, 235 Quebec, 186,187 regional organizations, 380-81
vs. parliamentary system, 240-50 questions Reinhart, Carmen, 41
power sharing in, 247, 248 good, characteristics of, 43, 44/ relative deprivation, and revolution, 291,
U.S. as model of, 227, 229, 247 open-ended, 5-6, 168 292, 299, 300/, 301, 301/, 302,
winner-take-all elections in, 248 in research, 2 -6 , 5/, 6/ 302/, 426
press, freedom of, 126-27 quotas religion. See also specific countries
PRI. See Partido Revolucionario Institucional candidate-quota systems, 342-43 and democratization, 134
primary elections, 206, 220, 235, 343 in empowerment of women and development and, 109
prime ministers minorities, 342-44 established religions, 357
appointment by legislature, 201, reserved-seat systems, 342 freedom of, in U.S. Bill of Rights,
204-5, 204/, 231-32 Q uotasfor Women in Politics (Krook), 344 126-27
functions of, 228 functions definitions of, 351-52
political leverage of, 227 race industrial capitalism and, 88
power of vs. presidents, 243 and boundaries of identity, 327-28 institutional theories of, 363-64
U.K., as model, 227, 550 as cultural construct, 329-30, 332 modernity and, 349, 352-53, 358,
primordialist approaches to nationalism, definition of, 327 360-64
307-8, 311, 315, 316-17 vs. ethnicity, 330-31 persistence of, 349-50, 353, 360,
prisoners dilemma, 382/, 391-93 formal and legal reinforcement of, 328 364-65
private property, regulation of in modern and Jim Crow laws, 328, 337 as political culture, 350
states, 57 study of in comparative politics, 326 in politics, modern forms of, 357-60
privatization racial discrimination prevalence of globally, 349, 353, 362
in France, 353, 358, 359, 439 as ongoing, 326 relation to state, variations in, 353, 357
neoliberal call for, 78 subtle forms of, 332 religious economics approach to,
of religious institutions, 353, 358 in U.S., 561, 563-64 362-63
reversals of, 358 variations in, 332 and state development, 61-62
procedural definitions of democracy, racial diversity, increase in, 326 substantive definitions of, 351, 352
121-22,130,141-42 racial equality religious conflict, 353-54
property rights, and development, 106 and democracy, 124 denominationalism and, 360
proportional representation (PR), 208-9, as measure of development, 100-101 efforts to understand, 367
210/, 212, 214, 268 racial formation, 330 religious economics school, 362-63
advantages and disadvantages of, racialization, 330 religious institutions
217-18 Rafsanjani, Akbar Hashemi, 471, 472, differentiation of from state, 353, 358
and ethnic political parties, 340-41 475, 477 modernity and, 353
and mixed (hybrid) systems, 209-11, Rajai, M ohammad-Ali, 471 privatization of, 353, 358, 359
210/, 222-24, 451 Ramaphosa, Cyril, 171/ religious law, legal systems based on, 184
open-list, 409 Ramirez, Francisco I., 65 religious market, 362-63
protectionism, 380 rational choice theory religious monopoly, 363
The Protestant E thic a n d the S pirit o f and democratization in France, 436 religious pluralism, 359, 362-63
Capitalism (Weber), 109 of nationalism, 318-19, 319/, 321, 322 religious states, 358
public choice theory, 79 and realist theory of international religious toleration, origins of, 362-63
public education, 50, 83-84 relations, 391-93 remittances, from immigrants, 384
public goods, state as provider of, 82 and religious economics, 362-63 rent seeking, in weak states, 517
public health programs, as function of of revolution, 294-95, 295/, 299, representation. See also electoral systems
modern state, 84 300/, 319 apportionment, 215-17
public officials, as self-interested actors, 79 rational institutionalism, 106-7 as central function of legislatures, 214
public opinion, shaping of by theories on authoritarianism, 161,162 definition of, as issue, 213
legislators, 202 Reagan, Ronald W., 137, 472, 556, 558 districting, 215-16
Public Religions in the M odern World realism, in international relations, electoral systems and, 215-18
(Casanova), 358 390-93 and executive-legislative relations,
public sphere reasoning, deductive vs. inductive, 26 impact of, 220-22
definition of, 353 The Rebel's D ilem m a (Lichbach), 296 and following o f public opinion vs.
origin of, 542 redistricting, 216, 565 conscience, 214-15
privatization of religious institutions referendums, 128-29, 448 legislative decision making and, 218-20
an d ,353 Regalism, 438 malapportionment, 216-17
purchasing power parity (PPP), 73 regime(s), 121. See also authoritarian varying patterns of, 213-15
Putin, Vladimir, I f 153, 155, 234, 234/^ regimes of women and minorities, factors
264, 265, 525, 525/, 528, 530-31, democratic, 121 influencing, 337-43
532, 534-36 hybrid (semi-authoritarian) regimes, representative democracy, 126-28
Putnam, Robert, 563 148,151-52,153,157-58,166 Republican Party (U.S.), 258, 261, 558
634 Index

Republic of Ireland, 68 corruption in, 532 Saudi Arabia, 184,185, 278, 299-302,
research. See also hypotheses; theories crony capitalism in, 530, 533-34 301/-302/, 358
bias in, 5-6, 41, 248 and delegative democracy, 244 Scandinavia, 85-86, 90, 93-94, 203, 334
empirical evidence in, 12-14 democracy in, 527,530,531,532,533-34 Schengen area, 381
good, characteristics of, 42-45, 44/ democratic breakdown in, 155 Schmitter, Philippe C., 139
Internet resources and, 3, 12 and Eastern nationalism, 311, 311/, 313/ Schroder, Gerhard, 447
level of analysis in, 13, 395-97 economy of, 74/ Schumpeter, Joseph, 89
measurement issues in, 41-42 electoral system in, 208 SCLC. See Southern Christian
originality in, 43-44 emancipation of serfs in, 527, 528 Leadership Conference
outliers (deviant cases) in, 26, 39, 275 ethnic groups in, S 2 S f scope conditions, 40
problem-solving in, 7-9 executive in, 233, 234, 249/, 531, 531/, Scotland, 47, 67-68, 337, 542, 543, 551
quantitative vs. qualitative, 21 534-35 Scott, James, 57, 289
questions in, 2-6 , 5/, 6/ historical development in, 162, 527-31 secessionist movements
scholarly literature and, 19, 43, 44 human capital levels in, 102/ as challenge to modern state system,
small-iV w. large-TVstudies, 14, 30, human rights abuses in, 531 47,68
321-22 hybrid regime in, 153 federal system and, 185-86
thesis in, 27 industrialization in, 529, 533 Second Amendment, U.S., 127
resistance, everyday forms of, 280 inequality in, 533 sect, as term, 359
resource curse, 57, 101 key features of, 525-27, 525/ secularism
Nigeria and, 1 0 (/ 101, 510, 513, 516, and Kyoto Protocol, 495 assertive vs. passive, 364
518-19 legislature in, 531/, 534 definition of, 350
reverse causality problem, 35-36 national identity in, 527, 532 modernity and, 350
revolution nationalism in, 527, 529 Secularism a n d State Policies Tow ard
from above vs. below, 286-87 and nuclear weapons, 388 R eligion (Kuru), 364
Arab Spring as, 125, 211 f 278, oligarchs in, 533-34 secularization, 352-53
298-302,300/-302/ personalism in, 535-36 in Europe, 353
causes, theories on, 291-98 political culture in, 532 modernity and, 352-53, 358, 361-62
definition of, 279, 284 political economy in, 532-33 reversals of, 358
and democratic breakdown, 156 political institutions in, 531, 531/ security dilemma, game theory on, 391
enabling conditions for, 297-98 political parties in, 265, 531/, 535-36 Seko, Mobutu Sese, 150
issues surrounding, 279 poverty in, 533 semi-periphery, and dependency theory,
Marx on, 284, 292, 293, 356, 419, 536 privatization and free market reforms 111-12
mobilization of, 284, 293, 294, in ,530,532-34 semi-presidential (hybrid) systems,
300/, 425 religion in, S 2 S f 212, 229, 230/
rational choice theory of, 294-95, 295/, and rule of law, 530, 532 Senate, U.S., 217, 559, 559/, 565, 566
299, 300/, 319 sanctions against, 533 Seneca Falls Convention, 142
social, 279-80, 284 and shock of lost empire, 532 separation of church and state, in U.S.
types of, 284-87 statism in, 532 Constitution, 357
Ricardo, David, 552 support for return to communism in, 252/' separation of powers, 176, 233
right wing, resurgence of, 364-65 W esternization in, 527, 529, 532 September 11th terrorist attacks, 387,
Riker, W illiam, 186 Russian Revolution of 1905, 528, 529 389, 566
The R ise a n d Decline o f N ations (Olson), 273 Russian Revolution of 1917, 284, 292, services
Robespierre, 438 445, 527, 529, 536-37 international trade in, 376-77
Robinson, James A., 108,115, 162 Russo-Japanese W ar (1904-05), 485, public vs. private provision of, 85
Rodden, Jonathan, 190 493,529 sex, vs. gender, 328-29
Roe v. Wade (1973), 191, 564 Rwanda, genocide in, 30 4 f 305 sexual orientation, 329
Rogoff, Kenneth, 41 Shaftesbury, Earl of, 552
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 81, 248, 556, 558 Sacred a n d Secular (Norris and Inglehart), Shagari, Shehu, 513, 514
Rouhani, Hassan, 468/, 471, 473, 477, 478 361, 362, 364 sharia law, legal systems based on, 184
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 439 Sageman, M ark, 289 Shugart, M atthew, 243
Rousseff, Dilma, 282, 325/ 326, 368, 369, Salinas de Gortari, Carlos, 499, 501 Singapore, 418
370, 399/, 402, 404, 406, 410 same-sex marriage, 191, 329 Singh, Manmohan, 458, 460, 463
rule of law same-sex relationships, discrimination single-member districts (SMDs), 205-7,
in Mexico, as issue, 56, 504-5 against, 329 210/, 215-18, 268
in modern states, 48-49 Santa Anna, Antonio Lopez de, 500 single non-transferable vote (SNTV)
runoff systems, 207, 436-37 Santos, Juan, 370 system, 491, 492
Russia Sarkozy, Nicolas, 429, 433-34, 435 single-party systems, 259-61. See also
aggressive foreign policy of, 530, 533 Sarney, Jose, 402, 404 dominant party systems
alcoholism and drug addiction in, 533 Saro-Wiwa, Ken, 513, 514 arguments for, 260-61
authoritarianism in, 149, 153, 158,162, Sartori, Giovanni, 269 in authoritarian regimes, 148, 259,272
525-27, 530-31, 532, 533-34 Sartori’s ladder of abstraction, 10, 311 in China, 127, 131, 236, 259, 260, 412,
communist regime in, 357 satisfaction, as measure of development, 417, 418/, 423-25
constitution of, 181, 182 f 101-2 in democracies, 127-28
 Index 635

origins of, 255 modern state relationship with, 50-52 Spain

in Soviet Union, 253 sociobiology, 307 constitution of, 181, 182 f
single-transferable vote (CTV) system, Solidarity movement (Poland), 281 debt crisis in, 373
209-10, 210/ Somalia, 50 ethnic autonomy movements in, 382
Sino-Japanese W ar (1894-95), 485, 493 Somoza family, 161 and EU, 374
Skocpol, Theda, 294, 298 South Africa fascism in, 355
slavery, 332 and apartheid, 101,123,171/ 172,193, federalism in, 186
in Brazil, 401, 403, 407 321 f 328,422 gender empowerment in, 345,
Nigeria and, 512, 513 constitution of, 172, 173,175-76, 345/, 346/
U.S. and, 142,143/, 555, 557, 559, 564 177-78,182/ 193-96 gender empowerment in former
SMDs. See single-member districts de-escalation of ethnic conflict in, 322 colonies of, 345-46, 345/, 346/
Smith, Adam, 71, 78, 363, 393, 552 democratization in, 138 party system in, 261
Smith, Chloe, 201/ electoral system in, 208 social movements in, 281, 281/
Smith, John, 201/ judiciary in, 193, 195 f special interest groups
SNCC. See Student Nonviolent political parties in, 258, 259, 2 5 9 f 260, and capitalism, 111
Coordinating Committee 268-69, 275 and legislators, pressure on, 202
snowballing, in democratization, 137 and terrorism, 390 pluralism and, 273
social capital, and development, 108 Southern Baptist Convention, 142 weak states and, 517
social constructionism, on gender, 328-29 Southern Christian Leadership W orld W ar II and, 273, 448-49, 492
social democracy Conference (SCLC), 282 speech, freedom of, in U.S. Bill of Rights,
origins of, 357 Southern Rhodesia, 146 126-27
rise of, 365 South Korea Spruyt, Hendrik, 64
as type of liberalism, 354 border with North Korea, 9 6 f 97 spurious correlation problem, 38-39
United Kingdom and, 552 corporatism in, 273-74 Stalin, Joseph, 111, 147,148,149, 252f
Social Democratic Party (Germany), 446, development vs. North Korea, 97,113, 446, 526, 528, 529-30, 536, 537
447, 452 114-17,116/, 117/ standard o f living, as measure of
social identity theory, 306 economy of, 74/ development, 100
social indicators of development, 98-100 human capital levels in, 102/ Stanton, Elizabeth Cady, 142
social institutions, as factor in political economy in, 80, 81/ Stark, Rodney, 362
development, 107-8 The Sovereign State a n d Its Competitors state(s). See also modern state
social insurance programs, 80, 86. See also (Spruyt), 64 behavior, international system and, 391
welfare state sovereignty breakdown of, and revolution, 292-93,
socialism. See also communism definitions of, 54 294, 298
as ideology, 351, 356-57 Iranian theocracy and, 476 definition of, 48
and lai'cism, 358 in modern state, 54-55 differentiation of religious institutions
in Latin America, 349, 365, 367-70 Soviet Union (USSR) from, 353, 358
twenty-first century, 349, 365-66 authoritarianism in, 536 diffusion of, theories on, 62-64
socialist parties, as mass parties, 258 and Cold War, 526, 528 and ethnicity, construction of, 331-32
social media, Arab Spring and, 300 collapse of, 105,153, 365, 443, 446, failed, 50
social mobility, and modern societies, 351 462, 525, 530, 532, 535 functions of, 55—57
social movements, 280-84 communist regime in, 357 growth o f role, causes of, 80-81, 86-93
definition of, 279-80 constitution of, 184 ongoing importance of in international
and empowerment of women and and cultural origins of relations, 374, 381, 395
minorities, 336, 337-39 authoritarianism, 163-64 pressures on from above and below,
identity and, 337-39 domination of central and eastern 381-82
vs. interest groups, 257 Europe, 135, 530, 532, 536 relation to religion, variations in,
and iron law of oligarchy, 282 genocide in, 305 353,357
mobilization of, 282, 284 human rights violations in, 527, 528, resource curse and, 519
tactics of, 280 529, 536 as unitary rational actors, 391
social networks, social movements lai'cism in, 358 weak, and emergence of
and, 280 market reforms in, 530 authoritarianism, 162-63, 16I f
The Social O rigins o f D ictatorship a nd and M arxist economic theory, 111 168,169/
Democracy , 160, 161 as model for state-led development, weak, characteristics of, 517-18
social outcomes, as measure of 105,116 state, emergence of
development, 99-100 as multinational, 537 in Germany, 449-50
social-psychological approaches to and nuclear weapons, 528 theories on, 47, 57-62, 68
nationalism, 320 as single-party totalitarian state, 253 in United Kingdom, 62, 65-68,
social revolutions, 279-80, 284 and socialism, discrediting of, 272, 6 6 f- 6 7 f 546-47
Social Theory o f Interna tio na l Politics 526,537 state capacity, 49-50, 518
(Wendt), 394 and state terrorism, 288 and revolution, 302, 302/
society statism in, 529, 532 state capitalism, fascism and, 355
functional integration of, 363 as totalitarian regime, 148, 149 State-D irected D evelopm ent (Kohli), 107
as increasing transnational, 326 and World W ar II, 446, 528, 529-30 state feminism, 336-37
636 Index

state governments, responsibilities under as state function, 49, 56-57 transition phase of democratization,
federal system, 189 Value-Added Tax, 434 125,129
state interventionism, 79-80 term limits, 233 Transitions fro m A uthoritarian R ule
state-led development terrorism, 287—89, 389-90 (O’Donnell et al., eds.), 138, 139
in Asia, 104-5 definition of, 280, 287-88, 389 transnational issues, 375—76
in Japan, 84,104 Mumbai terrorist attack (2008), 458, transnational networks, 387-88
vs. market-led, 104—6, 107, 117/ 460,467 Treaty of Rome (1957), 431, 444
Soviet Union as model for, 105 in Nigeria, 513, 514, 523 Treaty of W estphalia (1648), 443-44
state-led economies nuclear weapons and, 390 Trotsky, Leon, 528, 529, 536, 537
arguments for, 79-81, 82 Russia and, 534 Truman, Harry, 486
vs. market-led, 76-77, 81—82, 81/ September 11th terrorist attacks, trust, and development, 108,109
state of emergency, 233 387,389, 566 Trust: The Social Virtues a n d the Creation
States a n d Social Revolutions (Skocpol), 294 Tokyo subway sarin attack, 485 o f Prosperity (Fukuyama), 109
state system, definition of, 58 types of, 288-89 Tunisia, Arab Spring and, 278, 298,299,
state terrorism, 288 U.S. an d ,567 2 99/300,301-2,301/, 302/
statistical methods, 8-9 terrorist groups, 387, 389-90 Turkey, 184, 364
status-inconsistency, 310 terrorist networks, 289 two-party systems, 261-62
Stepan, Alfred, 186 Texas, independence of, 499, 500 circumstances encouraging, 268
stereotyping, 13, 313, 418 Thatcher, M argaret, 87, 542, 543, 545, shaping o f political outcomes by,
strain theory, 291 546, 548 269-72,270/ 271/
strategic voting, 210,270 theocracies, 149,184,185, 302/ typologies
stratification systems, and nationalism, 310 theoretical critiques, 39-40 in disaggregation of concepts, 367
structuralist theories of nationalism, theories of nationalism, 311-13, 311/
309-10 definition of, 25 tyranny of the majority, 126
structuralist theories of revolution, development and uses of, 27—29
294,298 hypotheses and, 26-27 Uganda
Student Nonviolent Coordinating normative vs. empirical, 25 personalistic dictatorship in, 150
Committee (SNCC), 280-81, 283 scope conditions and, 40 and political parties, 260
subalterns synthesis and development of, 62 single-party rule in, 127-28,128 f
definition of, 286 Theory o f Interna tio na l Politics Uighur ethnic group (China), 382
and everyday resistance, 289-90 (Waltz), 391 Ukraine
and revolution, 286-87 Thesis, 27 democratic breakdown in, 155
subject cultures, 164 The Third W ave (Huntington), 137 Orange Revolution in, 155,15</
sub-national groups, pressures on state Third World. See also developing world U nderstanding Terror N etw orks
from, 381—82 Cold W ar and, 135 (Sageman), 289
substantive definitions of democracy, underdevelopment in, M arxist views unemployment, as economic measure, 75
123-24,142 on, 111 U N H CR. See United Nations High
substantive definitions of religion, 351, 352 Third World revolutions, 286 Commission for Refugees
Sudan, genocide in, 305 Thomas, George M ., 65 unicameral legislatures, 203-4
sultanism, 149—50 Three Worlds o f Welfare Capitalism UNICEF, 380
Sun Yat-sen, 415, 416 (Esping-Andersen), 91, 93-94 unions
Supreme Court, U.S., 178-79 Thucydides, 391 and corporatism, 265-66
and judicial activism, 191-92, 563-64 Tiananmen Square protests (China), 153, and development of welfare state, 90
supreme (high) courts, 178-79, 233. See 416, 423,424 in Japan, 488, 490
also judicial review Tilly, Charles, 60, 279 and mobilization for revolution, 293
sustainability, 384, 386 Tocqueville, Alexis de, 107-8, 135, 292, unipolar world, in international
Suu Kyi, Aung San, l Y ) f 294, 436,563 relations, 391
SVT. See single-transferable vote (CTV) Tocqueville effect, 291 unitarism, 176,182—83, 185
system Togo, and comparative method, 14,16-17, unitary rational actors, states as, 391
Sweden, 334 16/, 19,19/, 20 United Arab Emirates, constitution
Switzerland, 180,182/ 183, 374 toleration, religious, origins of, 362-63 of, 182/
Syria, 153, 299, 300, 301-2, 301/, 302/, Tory party (U.K.), 542-43 United Kingdom (U.K.). See also
474, 479 totalitarian regimes, 148-49, 274 Parliament of U.K.
TowardsJuristocracy (Hirschl), 193 ballot access in, 206
Taiping Rebellion, 415, 425 trade, 376-80 and British Empire, 543, 545
Taiwan, 415, 485 comparative advantage theory of, Civil Wars in, 541-42, 549
Taking P ow er (Foran), 298 378-80,378/ coalitions in, 239
Tamil Tigers, 390 free trade, 374, 545-46 and colonialism, 457-59, 512, 513, 539,
Tanzania, political parties in, 268—69 globalization and, 376-80 541, 542, 543, 545-46, 547, 550,
Tarrow, Sidney, 279 protectionism and, 380 551, 552, 555
taxation “The Tragedy of the Commons” common law system, 177, 541
and alienation of citizens, 56 (Hardin), 386 as constitutional monarchy, 126,
and emergence of state, 59, 60 transgendered identities, 328 541, 548
 Index 637

constitution of, 177,181, 539, 541, United States (U.S.). See also Congress, secularism in, 364
548-49 U.S.; Constitution, U.S. and slavery, 142,143/, 555, 557, 559, 564
economic performance after World and American Dream, 559, 560 and socialism, weak tradition of, 555
W ar II, 273 and capitalism, 560, 567 stability of, 555
economy of, 74/, 539/ citizenship oaths, 312 f terrorist attacks on, 390 {See also
elections in, 20 S f and civic nationalism, 331 September 11th terrorist attacks)
electoral system in, 207, 207/ Civil W ar in, 556, 557, 559, 562, 564 trade protectionism in, 561-62
ethnic groups in, 539f 541 as constitutional republic, 126 unemployment in, 561
and EU, 374, 542, 543, 544, 545 and culture of entrepreneurship, 561 welfare state in, 85-86, 90, 555, 556,
executive structure in, 249/, 544, democracy in, 120, 124,135, 140, 557,558, 566
544/, 550 141-44,143/, 562-63 and W estern nationalism, 311/, 313/
gender empowerment in former and democratization, 130 and W orld W ar II, 446
colonies of, 344-46, 345/, 346/ denominationalism in, 359-60 United States Agency for International
global cultural influence of, 545, discrimination in, 326, 331, 557, 561, Development, 51
547-48, 550, 551, 552 563-64 upper chamber, 203, 216-17
globalization and, 548 divided government in, 221 Uribe, Alvaro, 370
Glorious Revolution of 1688-89 in, economic performance in, 72 Uruguay, 345/, 368, 370
539, 541, 542, 547, 549 economy of, 74/, 553/ USSR. See Soviet Union
historical development in, 65-68, electoral system in, 223-24, 437 utility, 102
541-43 ethnic groups in, 553/ identity utility, 318
human capital levels in, 102/ exceptionalism of, 555
and Industrial Revolution, 543,545, 547 executive structure in, 249/, 566 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 458
inequality in, 546 fiscal problems long-term, 72 Vails, Manuel, 427/
Islamic immigrants in, 383 foreign policy, terrorism and, 390 value systems
and judicial review, lack of, 192, 549 freedom as core value in, 11f and democratization, 135
key features of, 539-41, 539/ future challenges for, 567 and development, 109-10
and Keynesianism, 355 gender empowerment in, 344, 345, Van C ott, Donna Lee, 340
legal system in, 184 345/, 346/ Vargas, Getulio, 402, 403
and liberalism, 355, 541, 545, geographical advantages of, 112 variables. See also correlation
547, 552 global cultural influence of, 439 in comparative method, 14-15, 44
map of, 540/* and globalization, 567 dependent, 14
and modernity, 541, 542, 545, 550 and global order, 567 independent, 14
monarchs role in, 227, 544, 545 and Great Recession of 2008, 72 variations, in comparative analysis, 15
National Health Service in, 541, 542, historical development in, 555-58 Varshney, Ashutosh, 321
548,552 human capital levels in, 102/ Vasconcelos, Jose, 508
national identity in, 539, 545 hyphenated Americans, 331 Vazquez, Tabare, 368, 370
nationalism in, 308, 550-51 immigration as issue in, 382, 555, 567 Venezuela
and nuclear weapons, 388 inequality in, 73, 75, 124, 140, 557, Amerindian political parties in, 340
political culture in, 545 560,562-63 and colonialism, 401, 498
political economy in, 77, 81/, 545-46, isolationism and, 560, 567 constitution of, 182/*
547-48 judicial activism in, 190-92, 563-64 democratic breakdown in, 155,157-58
political institutions in, 544, 544/ key features of, 553-55, 553/ ideology of, 366-67
political parties in, 207, 207/, 258, as liberal democracy, 253 populism in, 245
542-43 and liberalism, 541 socialism in, 349, 365, 368, 369, 370
poverty in, 546 map of, 5 5 4 f Verba, Sidney, 164, 545, 559-60
religion in, 5 3 9 f 541, 551 “melting pot” metaphor for, 331 veto power of presidents, 228, 230, 232,
state development in, 62, 65-68, Mexican rule of law issues and, 504, 505 234, 460, 559, 566
6 6 f-6 7 f, 5 4 6 -4 7 as model, 553-55 Vietnam
statism in, 548 and multiculturalism, 331 communist regime in, 357
terrorism and, 383 as nation of immigrants, 384 Confucianism and, 418
welfare state in, 87, 541, 542, 543, 546, and nuclear weapons, 388 Villa, Francisco “Pancho,” 498, 500-501
547, 548 and Pakistan, 467 violence, types of, 315
and Western nationalism, 311, 311/, political culture in, 559-60 Violence a n d Social Orders (North, Wallis,
313/ political economy in, 72, 81/, 560-61 and Weingast), 61
United Nations (UN) political institutions in, 558-59, 559/ voting, obligatory, in Brazil, 405
functions of, 380 political parties in, 221, 253, 258, 261, voting rights
Human Development Index (HDI), 100 557-58 in democracy, 126
U .S .an d ,567 as polluter, 495 expansion of over time, 201
United Nations Development poverty in, 560-61 in U.K., 543
Programme, and poverty poverty line in, 99 and U.S. democracy, 141,142, 557
measurement, 98-99 relations with the world, 381 for women, 141, 142, 201, 334,
United Nations High Commission for religion in, 353, 357, 361, 553/ 555 410, 485
Refugees (UNHCR), 380 religious pluralism in, 362 Voting Rights Act of 1965,141,142, 556
638 Index

Wales, 67-68, 67f 337,543,551 W hy N ations F a il (Acemoglu and Iran and, 470
Wallace, George, 557 Robinson), 115 Japan and, 485, 486
Wallerstein, Immanuel, 113 Wibbels, Erik, 190 and rise of state power, 80
Wallis, John, 61 W ilhelm I (kaiser of Germany), 450 Russia and, 529,536
Walpole, Robert, 543 W ilhelm II (kaiser o f Germany), 443, 450 United Kingdom and, 543
Waltz, Kenneth, 391 William of Orange, 542 U.S. and, 556, 567
war, and origin of the state, 59—60 Wilson, James Howard, 542 W orld W ar II
Washington Consensus, 340, 380, 407 Wilson, Woodrow, 176, 566, 567 and atomic bombing o f Japan, 388
Way, Lucan A., 166 Wimmer, Andreas, 322 China and, 415
wealth, correlation with democracy, 28, within-case comparison, 20,141-44 and executive control, expansion
29-30,31-33 women. See also gender discrimination of, 248
The Wealth o f N ations (Smith), 78 election quota systems for, 342-44 France and, 431, 433
Weber, Max, 48, 109, 473 factors influencing political Germany and, 443, 444, 445-46,
Weimar Republic, 137,155,162, 443, representation of, 337-43 448, 450
444, 445, 448, 450 in Iran, 477, 479 Iran and, 470
Weingast, Barry, 61 in Japan, 485, 488, 490, 493-94 Japan and, 446, 484, 485, 486,
welfare state. See also specific countries representation o f in legislatures, 214 492,493
affordability of, as issue, 86 small business loans to, 335-36 Soviet Union and, 446, 528, 529-30
conservative views on, 88, 89 superior performance in educational state-led development following,
and decommodification of system, 334 104-5,448-49
individuals, 91 in U.S., 557 United Kingdom and, 543
definition of, 85 violence against, in India, 460 U.S. and, 556, 567
emergence, theories on causes of, 86—93 voting rights for, 141, 142,201, 334, and welfare state, 91, 546
and increasing government involvement 410, 485
in economy, 80-81 women, empowerment of Xi Jinping, 236 f 412/, 416, 423
Marxist views on, 88 in Brazil, 410-11 x variable, 14
as modern state responsibility, 85-86 indicators of, 344—46, 345/, 346/
in Nordic countries, 93—94 in Latin America, 134—35 Yar’A dua, Umaru, 513,514, 521
reduction of, states’ implementing, 87 methods of, 337-43 Yeltsin, Boris, 153, 528, 530, 533, 534,
in Scandinavia, 85—86, 90 types of, 334-37 535, 536
types of, 91 women’s cooperatives, 335—36 y variable, 14
Welzel, Christian, 140 women’s movement, 336, 338
Wendt, Alexander, 394 World Bank, 51, 98-99,105, 380, 567 Zaire (now Democratic Republic of the
Wessels, Leon, 171/ World H ealth Organization (W H O ), 380 Congo)
Western civilization, Islam as world polity theory, 64-65 personalistic dictatorship in, 150
incompatible with, 366 W orld Social Forum, 281 political economy in, 80
W estern nationalism, 311-13, 311/, 313/ “World Society and the Nation-State” Zapata, Emiliano, 498, 500, 508—9
Westerwelle, Guido, 23 I f (Meyer et al.), 65 Zapatista insurgency, 499, 509
W estminster System, 206, 549, 550 world society theory, 64-65 Zedillo, Ernesto, 499
W hig Party (U.K.), 542-43 World Trade Organization (W TO ), 416 Zhirinovsky, Vladimir, 535
W hitehead, Laurence, 139 World Values Survey, 113, 361 Zimbabwe, authoritarian regime in, 146,
W H O . See World Health Organization World W ar I 167-69,167/, 169/
Who Governs? (Dahl), 266 France and, 430-31 Zollverein, 450
W hy M en R ebel (Gurr), 292 Germany and, 443, 444, 445, 448, 450 Zuma, Jacob, 25 9 f
Takes an integrative H More so than any other textbook on the market, Comparative
approach to the Politics, Second Edition, provides an excellent combination of
theoretical and conceptual materials with in-depth case studies
relationship
that will empower students to think critically and engage in
between big themes materials well beyond the surface.**
and country case —Joseph Foy, University of Wisconsin-Parkside
studies and
M I am impressed by the way that Comparative Politics, Second
provides students Edition, integrates the discussion of methodology throughout
with the tools every chapter. It has a great approach to presenting the major
to think critically, theories of the field and complements these with outstanding
analyze the case studies and instructional sections on how to conduct
comparative politics.**
world, and “do”
—Anna Brigevich, University ofNorth Carolina at Chapel Hill
comparative politics
FEATURES
• A unique structure offers the best of thematic and country-by-country approaches.
Sixteen succinct thematic chapters— organized around the "big questions" in the field—
are followed by a separate section at the end of the book offering full-length profiles
and case studies for twelve countries

• Each chapter integrates several standalone country case studies in “Case in Context"
boxes: these features tie into the narrative, pose questions, and point students to the
full case discussions in the country profiles

• "ThinkingComparatively" sections introduce new methodological tools and help

students apply the theories and concepts covered in each chapter

• "Thinking It Through" questions help students test their ability to apply comparative
politics theories to cases

• "Research Prompts" in every case-study section help students develop comparative

projects and papers

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WHAT'S NEW TOTH X 0 0 O X E M N W H .
Com parative P o l i t i c s : in t e g r a t
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